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3,783,345 | Unconditional engagement gives China a pass for expansionism ensuring conflict and giving China false expectations of American acquiescence | Erickson & Liff 14 ( | Erickson & Liff 14 (Andrew S. & Adam P., U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute Professor and Indiana University’s new School of Global and International Studies Professor “Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk) | In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations the Obama administration fell into a trap .S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations” concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. the formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations, which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise. This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict The Chinese side has exploited this narrative to great effect: Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.” Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans They deny esponsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that great powers have promoted through their own rhetoric and example have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers, the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid otherwise inevitable conflict is a negative foundation, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation wherein each side mistakenly expects unrealistic things of the other worsening the consequences when those expectations are ultimately dashed | U.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations offers ammunition for those who promote a narrative of the U S weakness and China’s inevitable rise the formulation risks committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Washington should champion its own vision for U.S.-Chinese relations which should accord China conditionally great powers have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid conflict is a negative foundation Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation each side expects unrealistic things | In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations” slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, the Obama administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations” concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise. After all, the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Already troubling, each additional invocation of a “new type of great-power relations” grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation, Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly articulate and champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations, which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise. THUCYDIDES TRAP The “new type of great-power relations” concept is appealing to so many policymakers and scholars in both countries because of a misplaced belief in the Thucydides Trap. This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict with the established one. The Chinese side has exploited this oversimplified narrative to great effect: Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, echoed the sentiment at the 2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when she said that the United States and China’s efforts to avoid a catastrophic war are “historically unprecedented” and that both sides need to “write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” A year later, at the Sunnylands summit, Tom Donilon, then the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.” Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans. They deny human agency (and responsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters. And they reject progress. Further, they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that great powers have promoted through their own rhetoric and example have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers, for better or for worse. Most problematic, the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid otherwise inevitable conflict is a negative foundation, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. To be sure, Clinton, Donilon, and their successors might understand all this but are prepared to dismiss rhetoric and focus instead on action. This is surely what U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had in mind at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when he noted that “a new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.” Even so, flirting with the Chinese-proposed slogan for bilateral relations, as the administration has done, while dismissing it in private is dangerous. Chinese leaders take such formulations extremely seriously: the phrase “new type of great-power relations” appears repeatedly in their speeches, and permeates Chinese media and public discourse on U.S.-Chinese relations. Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation wherein each side mistakenly expects unrealistic things of the other, worsening the consequences when those expectations are ultimately dashed. | 4,526 | <h4>Unconditional engagement gives China a pass for expansionism ensuring conflict and giving China false expectations of American acquiescence </h4><p><strong>Erickson & Liff 14 (</strong>Andrew S. & Adam P., U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute Professor and Indiana University’s new School of Global and International Studies Professor “Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk)</p><p><u>In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations</u>” slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, <u>the Obama administration fell into a trap</u>. It has what is most likely its last major chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, <mark>U<u>.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations</mark>” concept <mark>offers ammunition for</mark> <mark>those</mark> in Beijing and beyond <mark>who promote a</mark> false <mark>narrative of the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates’ <mark>weakness and China’s inevitable rise</u></mark>. After all,<u> the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners</u> <u>in the Asia-Pacific.</u> At worst, <u><mark>the formulation</mark> <mark>risks</mark> setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly <mark>committing Washington to unilateral concessions <strong>that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests.</mark> </u></strong>Already troubling, each additional invocation of a “new type of great-power relations” grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation, <u><mark>Washington</mark> must proactively shape the narrative. It <mark>should</u></mark> explicitly articulate and <u><mark>champion its own</mark> positive <mark>vision for U.S.-Chinese relations</mark>, <mark>which should accord</mark> <mark>China</mark> international status <mark>conditionally</mark> -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise.</u> THUCYDIDES TRAP The “new type of great-power relations” concept is appealing to so many policymakers and scholars in both countries because of a misplaced belief in the Thucydides Trap. <u>This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict</u> with the established one. <u>The Chinese side has exploited this</u> oversimplified <u>narrative</u> <u>to great effect:</u> <u>Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition</u>.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, echoed the sentiment at the 2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when she said that the United States and China’s efforts to avoid a catastrophic war are “historically unprecedented” and that both sides need to “write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” A year later, at the Sunnylands summit, Tom Donilon, then <u>the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.”</u> <u>Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans</u>. <u>They deny</u> human agency (and r<u>esponsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters</u>. And they reject progress. Further, <u>they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that <mark>g<strong>reat powers have</mark> promoted through their own rhetoric and example have <mark>shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers</strong></mark>,</u> for better or for worse. Most problematic, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid</mark> otherwise inevitable <mark>conflict is a negative foundation</mark>, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations.</u></strong> To be sure, Clinton, Donilon, and their successors might understand all this but are prepared to dismiss rhetoric and focus instead on action. This is surely what U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had in mind at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when he noted that “a new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.” Even so, flirting with the Chinese-proposed slogan for bilateral relations, as the administration has done, while dismissing it in private is dangerous. Chinese leaders take such formulations extremely seriously: the phrase “new type of great-power relations” appears repeatedly in their speeches, and permeates Chinese media and public discourse on U.S.-Chinese relations. <u><mark>Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation</mark> wherein <mark>each side</mark> mistakenly <strong><mark>expects unrealistic things</strong></mark> of the other</u>, <u><strong>worsening the consequences when those expectations are</strong> ultimately <strong>dashed</u></strong>. </p> | 2NC | T | 1NC | 78,427 | 52 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,346 | A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange | Steinberg and Freeley 13 , | Steinberg and Freeley 13, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, | particular point of difference | null | AND
particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion. | 87 | <h4>A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a <u>specific point of difference</u><strong> in order to promote effective exchange </h4><p>Steinberg and Freeley 13</strong>, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate<strong>, </strong>Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4 </p><p><u>Debate is a means of <strong>settling differences</strong>,</u> <u>so there must be a controversy</u>, </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>particular point of difference</u></strong>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p> | null | 1NC | FW | 470,013 | 38 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,347 | Or we'll burn your store right down to a crisp | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Or we'll burn your store right down to a crisp</h4> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,779 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,348 | Thesis – China is a hostile power. If we win power competition is inevitable, then we win the debate. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Thesis – China is a <u>hostile power.</u> If we win power competition is inevitable, then we win the debate. </h4> | 2NC | Appeasement | Hostile Rise Thesis O/V | 1,560,780 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,349 | And then we'll see ya | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>And then we'll see ya</h4> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,781 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,350 | Even if they win they resolve cooperation for a while, they can’t solve relations in the long term because they are not sustainable. It takes out their aff solvency and makes their competition impacts inevitable. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Even if they win they resolve cooperation for a while, they can’t solve relations in the long term because they are not sustainable. It takes out their aff solvency and makes their competition impacts inevitable. </h4> | 2NC | Appeasement | Hostile Rise Thesis O/V | 1,560,782 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,351 | Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role | Galloway 7 | Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007 | Debate as a dialogue
substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy | null | Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively
AND
substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy. | 182 | <h4>Topical fairness requirements are key to <u>meaningful</u> dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and <u>subverts any meaningful neg role</h4><p></u>Ryan<strong> Galloway 7</strong>, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007</p><p><u>Debate as a dialogue </u>sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits</strong> of topical advocacy</u>.</p> | null | 1NC | FW | 436,008 | 51 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,352 | Debate’s critical axiom is a space for switch-side argumentation where debaters divorce themselves from ideology – our PROCESS of dialogue ensures well-informed knowledge which enables deliberative democracy – rejection of switch side debate is dogmatism masquerading as revolution, which kills the progressive potential of their project | Keller et al, 1 | Keller et al, 1– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago | AND
yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge | null | (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)
SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association
AND
yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue. | 553 | <h4>Debate’s critical axiom is a space for switch-side argumentation where debaters divorce themselves from ideology – our PROCESS of dialogue ensures well-informed knowledge which enables deliberative democracy – rejection of switch side debate is dogmatism masquerading as revolution, which kills the progressive potential of their project</h4><p><strong>Keller et al, 1</strong>– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago</p><p>(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)</p><p>SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association </p><p><u>AND</p><p>yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge</u> and beliefs pertaining to the issue. </p> | null | 1NC | FW | 615,497 | 11 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,353 | Cause you can't turn the ghetto into black Korea | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Cause you can't turn the ghetto into black Korea</h4> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,783 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,354 | This debate is an epistemic filter for reading the 1ac – the question of whether China is hostile determines whether they solve | Kuntić 15 | Kuntić 15 – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, “The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship” CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280) | That China might already be on the way to overtake the US raises a prospect of a power transition within the international system whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the international system has become a critical issue in Sino-American relations Under these assumptions, the push to change the existing distribution of power in China’s favor will raise the stakes between the two powers so high that this could send China and the U S on a collision course | China might to overtake the US raises a prospect of a power transition whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the system has become a critical issue the push to change the existing distribution of power will raise the stakes between the two powers | Realists use a concept of power shift to explain the rise of China and the challenge this rise poses to the global domination of the United States. As rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled China to expand its political and military power, some observers argue that this trend, if it continues, could undermine the U.S.-dominated unipolar international system and even dethrone the United States from a position of a sole global superpower. According to the realist paradigm, a gain for China would result in a loss for the United States.∂ That China might already be on the way to overtake the US raises a prospect of a power transition within the international system. Thus, whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the international system has become a critical issue in Sino-American relations. As China’s rise includes not only economic and political power, but also the policy that enhances its military capabilities, the United States feels less secure and consequently threatened. Whether China’s rise will be peaceful or violent is a question that preoccupies scholars and statesmen alike … Scholars who examine the consequences of China’s rise through the lenses of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a future of conflict (Fravel 2010: 505). Under these assumptions, the push to change the existing distribution of power in China’s favor will raise the stakes between the two powers so high that this could send China and the United States on a collision course. | 1,543 | <h4>This debate is an epistemic filter for reading the 1ac – the question of whether China is hostile determines whether they solve</h4><p><strong>Kuntić 15</strong> – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, “The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship” CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280)</p><p>Realists use a concept of power shift to explain the rise of China and the challenge this rise poses to the global domination of the United States. As rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled China to expand its political and military power, some observers argue that this trend, if it continues, could undermine the U.S.-dominated unipolar international system and even dethrone the United States from a position of a sole global superpower. According to the realist paradigm, a gain for China would result in a loss for the United States.∂ <u>That <mark>China might</mark> already be on the way <mark>to overtake the US raises a prospect of</mark> <mark>a power transition</mark> within the international system</u>. Thus, <u><mark>whether China is a status</mark> <mark>quo power or one that seeks to revise the</mark> international <mark>system has <strong>become a critical issue</mark> in Sino-American relations</u></strong>. As China’s rise includes not only economic and political power, but also the policy that enhances its military capabilities, the United States feels less secure and consequently threatened. Whether China’s rise will be peaceful or violent is a question that preoccupies scholars and statesmen alike … Scholars who examine the consequences of China’s rise through the lenses of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a future of conflict (Fravel 2010: 505). <u>Under these assumptions, <mark>the push to <strong>change the existing</mark> <mark>distribution of power</mark> in China’s favor</strong> <mark>will raise the stakes between the two powers</mark> so high that this could send China and the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>on a <strong>collision course</u></strong>. </p> | 2NC | Appeasement | Hostile Rise Thesis O/V | 179,082 | 7 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,355 | --Black Korea Ice Cube | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>--Black Korea Ice Cube</h4></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,784 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,356 | Extra Topical- the impacts they claim from formlessness limits the topic arbitrarily and no way for the neg team to prepare for the thousands of extra things the aff could add on – kills education and effective exchange. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Extra Topical- the impacts they claim from formlessness limits the topic arbitrarily and no way for the neg team to prepare for the thousands of extra things the aff could add on – kills education and effective exchange.</h4> | null | 1NC | FW | 1,560,785 | 1 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,357 | And, prefer our evidence, two arguments: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>And, prefer our evidence, two arguments:</h4> | 2NC | Appeasement | Hostile Rise Thesis O/V | 1,560,786 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,358 | Antiblackness is based on historical contingencies beginning with the middle passage. | Hudson ‘13 | Hudson ‘13 (Peter, Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, “The state and the colonial unconscious,” Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies) | element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility. | null | This is a slightly more developed version of a paper first presented at a Public
AND
element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 | 151 | <h4>Antiblackness is based on historical contingencies beginning with the middle passage. </h4><p><strong>Hudson ‘13</strong> (Peter, Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, “The state and the colonial unconscious,” Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies) </p><p>This is a slightly more developed version of a paper first presented at a Public </p><p>AND</p><p><u>element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.</u>8</p> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,788 | 1 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,359 | Since the creation of America, African Americans and Asian Americans have been racially exploited by a white supremacist system and have been in a constant revolution against it. This year’s resolution is a chance to interrogate the relations between African Americans and Asian Americans by implementing Afro-Asia Scholarship. White Supremacy has created the myth of the model minority which is alive today. Per the myth Asian Americans vindicate the American dream they are living proof of the power of the free market and absence of racial discrimination. This myth has created a halt in relations. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Since the creation of America, African Americans and Asian Americans have been racially exploited by a white supremacist system and have been in a constant revolution against it. This year’s resolution is a chance to interrogate the relations between African Americans and Asian Americans by implementing Afro-Asia Scholarship. White Supremacy has created the myth of the model minority which is alive today. Per the myth <u><strong>Asian Americans vindicate the American dream they are living proof of the power of the free market and absence of racial discrimination. This myth has created a halt in relations.</h4></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,787 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,360 | Qualification – it is a professor of Japanese politics analyzing trends is Asian relations – most qualified | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Qualification</u> – it is a professor of Japanese politics analyzing trends is Asian relations – most qualified</h4> | 2NC | Appeasement | Hostile Rise Thesis O/V | 1,560,789 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,361 | Liberalism makes the world better and is locked in | Wyne 16 | Wyne 16-Nonresident Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Former Research Assistant, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Ali, “The world is getting better. Why don’t we believe it?” Harvard Belfer Center, originally published in the Washington Post, 1/26/2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26231/world_is_getting_better_why_dont_we_believe_it.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F130%2Fasia%3Fpage%3D13, DKP] | It would seem reasonable to conclude the world has taken turns for
AND
and renegotiated does not | null | It would seem entirely reasonable to conclude that the world has taken several turns for
AND
and renegotiated, therefore, does not necessarily imply that it will disappear. | 172 | <h4>Liberalism makes the world better and is locked in</h4><p><strong>Wyne 16</strong>-Nonresident Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Former Research Assistant, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Ali, “The world is getting better. Why don’t we believe it?” Harvard Belfer Center, originally published in the Washington Post, 1/26/2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26231/world_is_getting_better_why_dont_we_believe_it.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F130%2Fasia%3Fpage%3D13<u>, DKP]</p><p>It would seem</u> entirely <u>reasonable to conclude</u> that <u>the world has taken</u> several <u>turns for </p><p>AND</p><p>and renegotiated</u>, therefore, <u>does not</u> necessarily <strong>imply that it will disappear.</p></strong> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,791 | 2 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,362 | My experiences with Afro Asia conflict is violent. I live in a densely populated area with both Asians and Blacks. You see them fight in the halls. You see them shooting each other especially when it becomes police brutality in metro Atlanta. I drive by people fighting over the simplest things that escalate to the worst things. I see people at my own dad’s restaurant getting denied a job because of their skin color. I speak up about it to end Afro Asia violence because I am tired of hearing about the myth of the model minority everywhere I go. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>My experiences with Afro Asia conflict is violent. I live in a densely populated area with both Asians and Blacks. You see them fight in the halls. You see them shooting each other especially when it becomes police brutality in metro Atlanta. I drive by people fighting over the simplest things that escalate to the worst things. I see people at my own dad’s restaurant getting denied a job because of their skin color. I speak up about it to end Afro Asia violence because I am tired of hearing about the myth of the model minority everywhere I go. </h4> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,790 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,363 | Ideological trends outweigh snap shot claims – our evidence cites historical examples that demonstrate the ideology and nationalist trends that motivate China’s behavior in the long term. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Ideological trends outweigh snap shot claims</u> – our evidence cites historical examples that demonstrate the ideology and nationalist trends that motivate China’s behavior in the long term.</h4> | 2NC | Appeasement | Hostile Rise Thesis O/V | 1,560,792 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,364 | Viewing Asian growth as a threat creates conflict, ignoring their shared history | Pettman 5 | Pettman 5 Jan Jindy, Director of Centre for Women’s Studies The Australian National University “Questions of Identity: Australia and Asia” Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth (pg. 168-169) | transformation from a powerless, colonized Asia to an empowered Asia was often seen as threatening by outsiders. Asian state identities were reconfigured in part through disassociation with the West, This neo-Orientalism has been played out through complex identity dynamics, as Asian elites searched for the key to Asian success—finding it, in cultural values or distinctive relations between state and people and between state and market. These Asian values were posited as communitarian rather than individualist, building on family virtue and individual duty. Too often Asian difference remains essentialized, resting on "a sharp distinction between East and West and on a generally fixed conceptualization of culture/race, which overlooks the hybrid character of the history of the region." The rising wealth and power in the region created considerable alarm in the West, at times exhibiting a kind of colonial/race memory, prompting some to prophesy intensifying civilizational conflicts Asian assertion of exceptionalism or difference has been articulated as an explicit critique of the West. | an empowered Asia was seen as threatening This neo-Orientalism has been played out through complex identity dynamics Asian difference remains essentialized, resting on "a sharp distinction between East and West which overlooks the hybrid character of the region The rising wealth and power created alarm in the West exhibiting a kind of colonial/race memory to prophesy intensifying civilizational conflicts | The prosperity and economic ascendancy that led to a growing cultural self-confidence among East and Southeast Asian elites through the 1980s and 1990s marked "a transformation, but not a cancellation, of the parameters of the discourse of the West versus the rest."38 This transformation from a powerless, colonized Asia to an empowered Asia was often seen as threatening by outsiders. Particular Asian state identities were reconfigured in part through disassociation with the West, reproducing Asian difference through Asian values, or the Asian way. This neo-Orientalism has been played out through complex identity dynamics, as Asian elites and their friends, and bemused Western commentators, searched for the key to Asian success—finding it, often, in cultural values or distinctive relations between state and people and between state and market. These Asian values were posited as communitarian rather than individualist, building on family virtue and individual duty. So, for example, the Singapore government's statement "Shared Value"39 expressed its fears that foreign (U.S./Western) values were threatening Singaporean community values. While distinguishing between different ethnic communities, the statement was especially concerned with distinguishing Asian values as community-oriented, laying the groundwork for articulating a kind of community corporatism that both legitimized authoritarian rule in the name of culture, stability, and order and supported state developmental strategies.40 The dramatic changes in East and Southeast Asia, and the cultural assertions of difference they generated, raised questions concerning the nature of Asian capitalism, that is, whether Asian authoritarian and interventionist states represented an adaptation of Western or global capitalism or a distinctively Asian form of capitalist development. Some claimed that "Asian countries have discovered divergent trajectories of modernisation."41 A study of Southeast Asian modernity identified market corporatism in Malaysia, market socialism in Vietnam, and high-tech developmentalism in Singapore, ing "market fundamentalism" to the emergent middle classes and regime consolidation. Aihwa Ong interrogated narratives of Chinese nationalism and capitalism and notes that "visions of Chinese modernities depend on self-orientalising strategies that critique Western values like individualism and human rights," and saw these narratives as intersecting with counterhegemonic voices raised against U.S. domination of the Asia Pacific.42 Lily Ling labeled the mix of rapid economic growth, Confucist-identified culture, and authoritarian rule as "Asian corporatism."43 Arif Dirlik cautioned against culturalist explanations of Chinese capitalism. He argued that "Chinese culture conceived homogeneously provides an ideological alibi to new developments within [global] capitalism, as well as a means to check the disruptive effects of capitalist development in Chinese societies."44 These studies, while coming to rather different conclusions concerning the relation between culture and political economy, demonstrate how important it is to analyze globalization and social change "as a process of situated transformation."45 Too often, though, Asian difference remains essentialized, resting on "a sharp distinction between East and West and on a generally fixed conceptualization of culture/race, which overlooks the hybrid character of the history of the region."46 The rising wealth and power in the region created considerable alarm in the West, at times exhibiting a kind of colonial/race memory, prompting some to prophesy intensifying civilizational conflicts.47 In turn, Asian assertion of exceptionalism or difference has been articulated as an explicit critique of the West. This critique is counterhegemonic in that it claims both competence (and therefore independence) and suggests reasons for then-perceived comparative Western decline. It was largely directed against the United States, especially by those whose states have most felt the effects of U.S. hegemony: Japan through postwar occupation and reconstruction; South Korea in its client status after the civil war; and those states that had until recently hosted, or still host, a strong U.S. military presence. | 4,287 | <h4>Viewing Asian growth as a threat creates conflict, ignoring their shared history</h4><p><strong>Pettman 5 </strong>Jan Jindy, Director of Centre for Women’s Studies The Australian National University “Questions of Identity: Australia and Asia” Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth (pg. 168-169)</p><p>The prosperity and economic ascendancy that led to a growing cultural self-confidence among East and Southeast Asian elites through the 1980s and 1990s marked "a transformation, but not a cancellation, of the parameters of the discourse of the West versus the rest."38 This <u>transformation from a powerless, colonized Asia to <mark>an empowered Asia was</mark> often <mark>seen as threatening</mark> by outsiders.</u> Particular <u>Asian state identities were reconfigured in part through disassociation with the West,</u> reproducing Asian difference through Asian values, or the Asian way. <u><mark>This neo-Orientalism has been played out through complex identity dynamics</mark>, as Asian elites</u> and their friends, and bemused Western commentators, <u>searched for the key to Asian success—finding it,</u> often, <u>in cultural values or distinctive relations between state and people and between state and market. These Asian values were posited as communitarian rather than individualist, building on family virtue and individual duty. </u>So, for example, the Singapore government's statement "Shared Value"39 expressed its fears that foreign (U.S./Western) values were threatening Singaporean community values. While distinguishing between different ethnic communities, the statement was especially concerned with distinguishing Asian values as community-oriented, laying the groundwork for articulating a kind of community corporatism that both legitimized authoritarian rule in the name of culture, stability, and order and supported state developmental strategies.40 The dramatic changes in East and Southeast Asia, and the cultural assertions of difference they generated, raised questions concerning the nature of Asian capitalism, that is, whether Asian authoritarian and interventionist states represented an adaptation of Western or global capitalism or a distinctively Asian form of capitalist development. Some claimed that "Asian countries have discovered divergent trajectories of modernisation."41 A study of Southeast Asian modernity identified market corporatism in Malaysia, market socialism in Vietnam, and high-tech developmentalism in Singapore, ing "market fundamentalism" to the emergent middle classes and regime consolidation. Aihwa Ong interrogated narratives of Chinese nationalism and capitalism and notes that "visions of Chinese modernities depend on self-orientalising strategies that critique Western values like individualism and human rights," and saw these narratives as intersecting with counterhegemonic voices raised against U.S. domination of the Asia Pacific.42 Lily Ling labeled the mix of rapid economic growth, Confucist-identified culture, and authoritarian rule as "Asian corporatism."43 Arif Dirlik cautioned against culturalist explanations of Chinese capitalism. He argued that "Chinese culture conceived homogeneously provides an ideological alibi to new developments within [global] capitalism, as well as a means to check the disruptive effects of capitalist development in Chinese societies."44 These studies, while coming to rather different conclusions concerning the relation between culture and political economy, demonstrate how important it is to analyze globalization and social change "as a process of situated transformation."45 <u>Too often</u>, though, <u><mark>Asian difference remains essentialized, resting on "a sharp distinction between East and West</mark> and on a generally fixed conceptualization of culture/race, <mark>which overlooks the hybrid character of the</mark> history of the <mark>region</mark>."</u>46 <u><mark>The rising wealth and power</mark> in the region <mark>created</mark> considerable <mark>alarm in the West</mark>, at times <mark>exhibiting a kind of colonial/race memory</mark>, prompting some <mark>to prophesy intensifying civilizational conflicts</u></mark>.47 In turn, <u>Asian assertion of exceptionalism or difference has been articulated as an explicit critique of the West.</u> This critique is counterhegemonic in that it claims both competence (and therefore independence) and suggests reasons for then-perceived comparative Western decline. It was largely directed against the United States, especially by those whose states have most felt the effects of U.S. hegemony: Japan through postwar occupation and reconstruction; South Korea in its client status after the civil war; and those states that had until recently hosted, or still host, a strong U.S. military presence. </p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 1 | 1,560,794 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,365 | Steady engagement with China assimilates them into the international order – that’s peaceful and solves for a multitude of impacts
Ikenberry 11- Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University, PhD @ The University of Chicago, former professor @ University of Pennsylvania [John, “One World” Order Possible? The Rise of China, the West, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism”, Centre on Asia and Globalization, 2011, SCJ]Although the old American-led hegemonic system is passing away, what is striking about liberal internationalism is its durability. The last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system –the emergence of new powers, financial crises, a global recession, and bitter disputes among allies over American unipolar ambitions. Despite these upheavals, liberal international order as an organizational logic of world politics has proven resilient. It is still in demand. Appealing alternatives to an open and rule-based order have simply not crystallized. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies and pressures for liberal international order.2I want to make five arguments. First, the rise of China will not be accompanied by an agenda for a transformation of the deep principles of international order. China is not a revisionist power. It does not have big or contrarian ideas about the organization of world politics. Nor will it as it grows in power and wealth. It will want more authority within the existing international order, and it will seek to alter the mix of rules and principles and institutions that constitute this order. But it will not be a purveyor of a successor order. The fact of the matter is that China cannot become a part of the modern world on its own terms. The opposite is more likely the case –China will become influential and successful to the extent is works within and through existing rules and institutions. Second, the existing international order is a massive and formidable system, significantly different than previous international orders that rising states in those earlier eras encountered. It is wider and deeper. It is more integrated and institutionalized. It is an order that is rooted in the deep structures of modern industrial society. A rising China does not just face the United States or the West. It faces a massive and far-flung global system of capitalism and democracy that continues to expand and integrate. This liberal international order is “easy to join and hard to overturn.” To a remarkable extent, China is already in this order. Indeed, China’s participation in this order –most notably in the world’s trading system –has allowed it to achieve its remarkable growth and progress. In this sense, China is already a stakeholder in the liberal international order –and it will become more so. Third, in depicting this system, it is important to distinguish between different levels or layers. At the deepest level, there is the bedrock of the modern international order: the Westphalian system of sovereign states organized around a group of leading powers. On this foundation, liberal international order has been built. Liberal international order itself can –and has –varied in character. And in the 20thcentury, liberal states have made repeated efforts to built, expand, and reform this order. Generally speaking, liberal international order is order that is open and at least loosely rule-based, and as such, it can be contrasted with order that is organized into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres. But liberal international order itself can be organized in different ways. As noted, American-led liberal hegemonic order has begun to wane. But the more general –and universal –organizing rules and principles of the existing international order are still deeply entrenched.Fourth, a Chinese alternative to this liberal logic of order is simply not sustainable. There is a serious question what such an alternative would actually be or who would join it. The Chinese themselves have not offered one. But an alternative order –a “Beijing model” –would seemingly be one organized around more or less exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks. It would be an illiberal order. It would be less open, less rule-based, and dominated by arrays of state-to-state ties. But organized on a global scale, such a system would not advance the interests of any of the major states, including China. The Beijing model only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit an open system of markets. Raised to the level of a world organizational type, it breaks down. One or a few states can exploit an open system but if everyone does, it is no longer an open system –and everyone suffers. Finally, the coming divide in world politics is not between the United States (and the West) and China, but between proponents of open, rule-based international order and assorted opponents. The struggle is between those whowant to renew and expand today’s system of multilateral governance arrangements –which America championed for most of the postwar period –and those that want to move to some sort of less cooperative order built on spheres of influence and power balances. These fault lines do not map onto geography nor do they split Asia and the West. | Ikenberry 11 | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Steady engagement with China assimilates them into the international order – that’s peaceful and solves for a multitude of impacts</h4><p></u><strong>Ikenberry 11</strong>- Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University, PhD @ The University of Chicago, former professor @ University of Pennsylvania [John, “One World” Order Possible? The Rise of China, the West, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism”, Centre on Asia and Globalization, 2011, SCJ]Although the old American-led hegemonic system is passing away, <u>what is striking about liberal internationalism is its durability.</u> The last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system –the emergence of new powers, financial crises, a global recession, and bitter disputes among allies over American unipolar ambitions. <u>Desp</u>i<u>te </u>these <u>upheavals, liberal international order as an organizational logic of world politics has proven resilient. </u>It is still in demand. <u>Appealing alternatives</u> to an open and rule-based order <u>have simply not crystallized.</u> On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies and pressures for liberal international order.2I want to make five arguments. First, <u>the rise of China will not be accompanied by an agenda for a transformation of the deep principles of international order. China is not a revisionist power.</u> It does not have big or contrarian ideas about the organization of world politics. Nor will it as it grows in power and wealth. <u>It will want more authority within the existing international order</u>, and it will <u>seek to alter the mix of rules and principles and institutions that constitute this order. But it will not be a purveyor of a successor order</u>. The fact of the matter is that <u>China cannot become a part of the modern world on its own terms.</u> The opposite is more likely the case –<u>China will become influential and successful to the extent is works within and through existing rules and institutions.</u> <u>Second, the</u> existing international <u>order is a massive and formidable system</u>, significantly different than previous international orders that rising states in those earlier eras encountered. <u>It is wider and deeper. It is more integrated and institutionalized.</u> It is an order that is rooted in the deep structures of modern industrial society. <u>A rising China does not just face the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates or the West. <u>It faces a massive and far-flung global system of capitalism and democracy that continues to expand and integrate.</u> This liberal international order is <u>“easy to join and hard to overturn.” </u>To a remarkable extent, China is already in this order. Indeed, China’s participation in this order –most notably in the world’s trading system –has allowed it to achieve its remarkable growth and progress. In this sense, China is already a stakeholder in the liberal international order –and it will become more so. <u>Third,</u> in depicting this system, it is important to distinguish between different levels or layers. At the deepest level, <u>there is the bedrock of the modern international order: the Westphalian system</u> of sovereign states organized around a group of leading powers. <u>On this foundation, liberal international order has been built. </u>Liberal international order itself can –and has –varied in character. And in the 20thcentury, liberal states have made repeated efforts to built, expand, and reform this order. Generally speaking, <u>liberal international order is order that is open and at least loosely rule-based, and as such, it can be contrasted with order that is organized into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres. But liberal international order itself can be organized in different ways. </u> As noted, American-led liberal hegemonic order has begun to wane. But <u>the </u>more <u>general –and universal –organizing rules and principles of the existing international order are still deeply entrenched.Fourth, a Chinese alternative to this liberal logic of order is simply not sustainable</u>. There is a serious question what such an alternative would actually be or who would join it. The Chinese themselves have not offered one. But an alternative order –<u>a “Beijing model”</u> –would seemingly be one organized around more or less exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks. It <u>would be an illiberal order.</u> It would be less open, less rule-based, and dominated by arrays of state-to-state ties. But organized on a global scale, such a system would not advance the interests of any of the major states, including China. The Beijing model only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit an open system of markets. Raised to the level of a world organizational type, it breaks down. One or a few states can exploit an open system but if everyone does, it is no longer an open system –and everyone suffers<u>. Finally, the coming divide in world politics is not between the United States (and the West) and China, but between proponents of open, rule-based international order and assorted opponents. </u> The struggle is between those whowant to renew and expand today’s system of multilateral governance arrangements –which America championed for most of the postwar period –and those that want to move to some sort of less cooperative order built on spheres of influence and power balances. <u>These fault lines do not map onto geography nor do they split Asia and the West.</p></u> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,793 | 1 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,366 | The narrative and organic intellectual is key to explain the oppression and to solve the harms, but only by demonstrating the actual harms of this every day oppression is key because we engage in dialogue about each other’s experience to form key education | Mullen & Ho 08 | Mullen & Ho 08 (Bill V. Mullen is the Professor of English and American Studies @ Purdue and teaches courses in African American Literature and Culture; Fred Ho is a political activist and the founder and bandleader of the Afro Asian Music Ensemble; Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, pp. 22) | neither Asian Americans nor African Americans are to blame for the prejudices the victims of that racism and oppression can be expected to harbor the racist attitudes, xenophobia, and even self-hatred fostered by the segregation, Eurocentric education, and endemic powerlessness that fuel frustration What is needed is dialogue and knowledge about each other’s experience and social history of oppression and struggle rather than convenient, evasive explanations of ‘‘cultural differences cultural differences’’ thesis presumes that what is needed is greater ‘‘cultural sensitivity’’ and not political consciousness and organizing around common interests as peoples of color The primary difference is that the experience and historical process of slavery forged African Americans into a distinct nationality while Asian Americans are a composite of diverse minority nationalities: Chinese American, Japanese American, Korean American, Filipino American, Asian Indian, Cambodian, Hmong, Vietnamese, Generations of slavery fused the diverse West African peoples brought to the Americas into one common people who no longer trace their ancestral origin to a specific West African people Their identity, religion, music, and history were no longer any specific African tradition but became definitively African American some contemporary African Americans divest themselves of ‘‘slave names’’ | the victims of that racism and oppression can be expected to harbor the racist attitudes What is needed is dialogue and knowledge about each other’s experience and history of oppression rather than convenient, evasive explanations slavery forged African Americans into a distinct nationality Asian Americans are a composite of diverse minority nationalities slavery brought people who no longer trace their ancestral origin Their identity, religion, music, and history were no longer any specific African tradition but became definitively African American | In my view, neither Asian Americans nor African Americans are to blame for the prejudices, ignorance, misunderstanding, and racism held against the others in a white-racist, oppressive society, the victims of that racism and oppression can be expected to harbor the racist attitudes, xenophobia, and even self-hatred fostered by the segregation, Eurocentric education, and endemic powerlessness that fuel frustration, fear, and mistrust. What is needed from educators, activists, and intellectuals is dialogue and knowledge about each other’s experience and social history of oppression and struggle rather than convenient, evasive explanations of ‘‘cultural differences.’’ (The ‘‘cultural differences’’ thesis presumes that what is needed is greater ‘‘cultural sensitivity’’ and not political consciousness and organizing around common interests as peoples of color.) The primary difference between people of African and Asian heritage in the United States is that the experience and historical process of slavery forged African Americans into a distinct nationality while Asian Americans are a composite of diverse minority nationalities: Chinese American, Japanese American, Korean American, Filipino American, Asian Indian, Cambodian, Hmong, Vietnamese, etc.≥ Generations of slavery fused the diverse West African peoples brought to the Americas into one common people who no longer trace their ancestral origin to a specific West African people; the varying languages of Yoruba, Ibo, Wolof, etc. were replaced by the language of the slave master (English in the British colonies). Their identity, religion, music, and history were no longer any specific African tradition but became definitively African American. Thus, some contemporary African Americans, endeavoring to reclaim their African heritage, divest themselves of ‘‘slave names’’ such as Smith, Jones, Johnson, Washington, etc. for a range of self-identifications such as Xs to Islamic and other non-European adoptions. | 1,981 | <h4>The narrative and organic intellectual is key to explain the oppression and to solve the harms, but only by demonstrating the actual harms of this every day oppression is key because we engage in dialogue about each other’s experience to form key education</h4><p><u><strong>Mullen & Ho 08 </u></strong>(Bill V. Mullen is the Professor of English and American Studies @ Purdue and teaches courses in African American Literature and Culture; Fred Ho is a political activist and the founder and bandleader of the Afro Asian Music Ensemble; Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, pp. 22)</p><p>In my view, <u><strong>neither Asian Americans nor African Americans are to blame for the prejudices</u></strong>, ignorance, misunderstanding, and racism held against the others in a white-racist, oppressive society, <u><strong><mark>the victims of that racism and oppression can be expected to harbor the racist attitudes</mark>, xenophobia, and even self-hatred fostered by the segregation,</u></strong> <u><strong>Eurocentric education, and endemic powerlessness that fuel frustration</u></strong>, fear, and mistrust. <u><strong><mark>What is needed</u></strong></mark> from educators, activists, and intellectuals <u><strong><mark>is dialogue and knowledge about each other’s experience</mark> <mark>and</mark> social <mark>history of oppression</mark> and struggle <mark>rather than convenient, evasive explanations</mark> of ‘‘cultural differences</u></strong>.’’ (The ‘‘<u><strong>cultural differences’’ thesis presumes that what is needed is greater ‘‘cultural sensitivity’’ and not political consciousness and organizing around common interests as peoples of color</u></strong>.) <u><strong>The primary difference </u></strong>between people of African and Asian heritage in the United States <u><strong>is that the experience and historical process of <mark>slavery forged African Americans into a distinct nationality</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>while <mark>Asian Americans are a composite of diverse minority nationalities</mark>: Chinese American, Japanese American, Korean American, Filipino American, Asian Indian, Cambodian, Hmong, Vietnamese,</u></strong> etc.≥ <u><strong>Generations of <mark>slavery</mark> fused the diverse West African peoples <mark>brought</mark> to the Americas into one common <mark>people who no longer trace their ancestral origin</mark> to a specific West African people</u></strong>; the varying languages of Yoruba, Ibo, Wolof, etc. were replaced by the language of the slave master (English in the British colonies). <u><strong><mark>Their identity, religion, music, and history were no longer any specific African tradition but became definitively African American</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong>some contemporary African Americans</u></strong>, endeavoring to reclaim their African heritage, <u><strong>divest themselves of ‘‘slave names’’</u></strong> such as Smith, Jones, Johnson, Washington, etc. for a range of self-identifications such as Xs<strong> to Islamic and other non-European adoptions.</p></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 1,560,795 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,367 | Magnitude – Appeasement ensures the largest wars because it allows China to develop more power | Jacobs 15 | Jacobs 15 (“Appeasement will only encourage China”, 11/1, Bruce Jacobs: professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html#ixzz4D642C1lo) | The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China China claims the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan China's claims for sovereignty have no historical basis and its constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates China's expansionism History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia | tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China China claims the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan. its constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates China's expansionism. appeasement" of expansionist powers as China does not stop war it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia | The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China. On the basis of false "history", China claims the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan. Yet China has no historical claims to the South and East China seas. Historically, south-east Asian states conducted the great trade in the South China Sea. China had almost no role. Furthermore, geographically, the contested areas are close to Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than 1000 kilometres south of China. China's claims for sovereignty in these areas have no historical basis and its constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates China's expansionism. Similarly, in the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The People's Daily of January 8, 1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago, and a World Atlas published in China in 1958 showed that these islands belong to Japan. China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, stated that Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately claim that Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949. These four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a country with a population the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Ching-kuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without consulting Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And, although these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies. The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo – that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks. | 3,952 | <h4>Magnitude – Appeasement ensures the largest wars because it allows China to develop more power</h4><p><strong>Jacobs 15</strong> (“Appeasement will only encourage China”, 11/1, Bruce Jacobs: professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html#ixzz4D642C1lo)</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China</u></strong></mark>. On the basis of false "history", <u><mark>China claims the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan</u>.</mark> Yet China has no historical claims to the South and East China seas. Historically, south-east Asian states conducted the great trade in the South China Sea. China had almost no role. Furthermore, geographically, the contested areas are close to Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than 1000 kilometres south of China. <u>China's claims for sovereignty</u> in these areas <u>have no historical basis and <mark>its constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates China's <strong>expansionism</u></strong>.</mark> Similarly, in the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The People's Daily of January 8, 1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago, and a World Atlas published in China in 1958 showed that these islands belong to Japan. China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, stated that Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately claim that Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949. These four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a country with a population the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Ching-kuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without consulting Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And, although these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies. The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. <u>History has taught us that "<mark>appeasement" of</mark> such <mark>expansionist powers as China does not stop war</mark>. Rather, <mark>it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a <strong>much larger war later</strong>.</u> <u>Appeasement </mark>of China only <mark>enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a <strong>toothless paper tiger.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest</u></mark>. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo – that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. <u><strong><mark>We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia</u></strong></mark>. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks.</p> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 162,544 | 31 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,368 | US interference messes with territorial resolutions – turns the advantage | Storey 3/20 | Storey 3/20 -- PhD, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore (Ian, 2013, "Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic Efforts," http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Bulletin_Storey_Slipping_Away.pdf) | competition between the U S and China has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN and called into question its aspirations for “centrality” in regional security the U S has pursued security policies to promote stability that have fed China’s paranoid geopolitical views the Chinese see this as “meddling” and part of a sustained effort to internationalize the problem Beijing thinks it is none of Washington’s business U.S. support for resolving the dispute multilaterally runs counter to China’s preference to resolve the disputes bilaterally | competition between the U S and China has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN the U S security policies to promote stability have fed China’s paranoid geopolitical views the Chinese see this as “meddling Beijing thinks it is none of Washington’s business. U.S. support for resolving the dispute runs counter to China’s preference to resolve the disputes bilaterally | Fifth, the growing competition between the United States and China in Asia has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN and called into question its aspirations for “centrality” in the evolving regional security architecture. Over the past few years, the United States has pursued diplomatic and security policies, such as relocating troops and equipment, to promote stability and reassure Southeast Asian countries of its commitment to the region that have fed China’s paranoid geopolitical views. When U.S. officials raise the South China Sea dispute at regional meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, the Chinese see this as “meddling” and part of a sustained effort to internationalize the problem. China views U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Philippine armed forces as a way to strengthen Manila’s ability to confront China’s maritime agencies. The United States wants to discuss the South China Sea dispute bilaterally with China, but Beijing thinks it is none of Washington’s business. U.S. support for resolving the dispute multilaterally runs counter to China’s preference to resolve the disputes bilaterally with each individual claimant. | 1,181 | <h4>US interference messes with territorial resolutions – turns the advantage</h4><p><strong>Storey 3/20</strong> -- PhD, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore (Ian, 2013, "Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic Efforts," http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Bulletin_Storey_Slipping_Away.pdf)</p><p>Fifth, the growing <u><mark>competition between the</u> <u>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China</u></mark> in Asia <u><mark>has <strong>exacerbated divisions</strong> within ASEAN</mark> and called into question its aspirations for “centrality” in</u> the evolving <u>regional security</u> architecture. Over the past few years, <u><mark>the</u> <u>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has pursued</u> diplomatic and <u><mark>security policies</u></mark>, such as relocating troops and equipment, <u><mark>to promote stability</u></mark> and reassure Southeast Asian countries of its commitment to the region <u>that <mark>have <strong>fed China’s paranoid geopolitical views</u></strong></mark>. When U.S. officials raise the South China Sea dispute at regional meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, <u><mark>the Chinese see this as “<strong>meddling</strong></mark>” and part of a sustained effort to internationalize the problem</u>. China views U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Philippine armed forces as a way to strengthen Manila’s ability to confront China’s maritime agencies. The United States wants to discuss the South China Sea dispute bilaterally with China, but <u><strong><mark>Beijing thinks it is none of Washington’s business</u></strong>. <u>U.S. support for resolving the dispute</mark> multilaterally <mark>runs counter to China’s preference to resolve the disputes bilaterally</u></mark> with each individual claimant.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 1 | 1,471,570 | 2 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,369 | Sino-American cooperation builds momentum in support of the Paris Climate treaty and is necessary to limit warming below 2 degrees Celsius. | Henderson & Joffe 5/31 | Henderson & Joffe 5/31 (Geoffrey Henderson: Project Specialist for ChinaFAQs within WRI’s Global Climate Program; Paul Joffe: Senior Foreign Policy Counsel at WRI; "China And The United States: Leading On Climate Action--New Challenges, New Opportunities"; Chinafaqs; 5-31-2016; http://www.chinafaqs.org/library/china-and-united-states-leading-climate-action-new-challenges-new-opportunities) | What is the benefit of the U.S. and China
the deep decarbonization necessary to avoid the most dangerous impacts of climate change | null | Q: What is the benefit of the U.S. and China,
AND
the deep decarbonization necessary to avoid the most dangerous impacts of climate change. | 139 | <h4><u>Sino-American cooperation builds momentum in support of the Paris Climate treaty and is necessary to limit warming below 2 degrees Celsius.</h4><p></u><strong>Henderson & Joffe 5/31<u></strong> (Geoffrey Henderson: Project Specialist for ChinaFAQs within WRI’s Global Climate Program; Paul Joffe: Senior Foreign Policy Counsel at WRI; "China And The United States: Leading On Climate Action--New Challenges, New Opportunities"; Chinafaqs; 5-31-2016; http://www.chinafaqs.org/library/china-and-united-states-leading-climate-action-new-challenges-new-opportunities)</p><p></u>Q: <u>What is the benefit of the U.S. and China</u>, </p><p>AND</p><p><u>the deep decarbonization necessary to avoid the most dangerous impacts of climate change</u>. </p> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,796 | 2 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,370 | Timeframe – The plan creates a clear window of opportunity – They incentivize preemptive war in the short term | Haddick 14 ) | Haddick 14 (Robert, defense scholar, “Is there a Chinese window of opportunity for attacking within about 5 to 10 years?,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/03/is-there-a-chinese-window-of-opportunity-for-attacking-within-about-5-to-10-years/) | past 2025 the new U.S. bomber will arrive High-power directed energy defenses may arrive investments in autonomous systems may be a competitive U.S. advantage later next decade. China is leaping forward. China’s submarine fleet will grow, improve in quality China’s land-attack and anti-ship missile forces will continue to expand, the Chinese "window" may open the between 2020 and 2025 after which it may begin to close Whether China’s leaders see it the same way remains to be seen. | past 2025, the new U.S. bomber will arrive energy defenses may arrive investments in systems may be a competitive U.S. advantage later next decade China is leaping forward China’s fleet will grow China’s land-attack and anti-ship missile forces will d, the window" may open the between 2020 and 2025, after which it may close | However, past 2025, the new U.S. bomber will arrive. High-power directed energy defenses may also arrive at that time, making surface forces relevant again. And investments in autonomous and low-cost long-range unmanned systems may be a competitive U.S. advantage later next decade. On the other hand, China is leaping forward. While the United States is fallow over the next 10 years, China’s C4ISR networks will fill out, its Flanker inventories will continue to grow, J-20 long-range stealthy strike-fighter regiments will arrive, and China’s submarine fleet will grow, improve in quality, and outnumber the U.S. Pacific submarine fleet by more than two-to-one. Most important, China’s land-attack and anti-ship missile forces will continue to expand, areas where the United States has much less happening. Adding it up, the Chinese "window" may open the widest between 2020 and 2025, after which it may begin to close. Whether China’s leaders see it the same way remains to be seen. | 986 | <h4><u>Timeframe</u> – The plan creates <u>a clear window of opportunity</u> – They incentivize preemptive war in the <u>short term</u> </h4><p><strong>Haddick 14 </strong>(Robert, defense scholar, “Is there a Chinese window of opportunity for attacking within about 5 to 10 years?,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/03/is-there-a-chinese-window-of-opportunity-for-attacking-within-about-5-to-10-years/<u><strong>) </p><p></u></strong>However, <u><mark>past 2025</u>, <u>the new U.S. bomber will arrive</u></mark>. <u>High-power directed <mark>energy defenses may</u></mark> also <u><mark>arrive</u></mark> at that time, making surface forces relevant again. And <u><mark>investments in</mark> autonomous</u> and low-cost long-range unmanned <u><mark>systems may be a competitive U.S. advantage <strong>later next decade</strong></mark>. </u>On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>China is leaping forward</mark>.</u></strong> While the United States is fallow over the next 10 years, China’s C4ISR networks will fill out, its Flanker inventories will continue to grow, J-20 long-range stealthy strike-fighter regiments will arrive, and <u><mark>China’s</mark> submarine <mark>fleet will grow</mark>, improve in quality</u>, and outnumber the U.S. Pacific submarine fleet by more than two-to-one. Most important, <u><mark>China’s land-attack and anti-ship missile forces will</mark> continue to expan<mark>d,</u></mark> areas where the United States has much less happening. Adding it up, <u><mark>the</mark> Chinese <strong>"<mark>window"</strong> may open the</u></mark> widest <u><strong><mark>between 2020 and 2025</u></strong>, <u>after which it</mark> <strong><mark>may</mark> begin to <mark>close</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Whether China’s leaders see it the same way remains to be seen.</p></u></strong> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 183,521 | 28 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,371 | Only Consciousness of Afro Asia will be the only way to overcome the Myth of the Model Minority which has spurred racial tensions | Mullen & Ho 08 | Mullen & Ho 08 (Bill V. Mullen is the Professor of English and American Studies @ Purdue and teaches courses in African American Literature and Culture; Fred Ho is a political activist and the founder and bandleader of the Afro Asian Music Ensemble; Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, pp. 6-8;0 | During the 1968 student strike at San Francisco State University led by the Third World coalition—the longest campus student strike in U.S. his- tory, which eventually led to the creation of the first Ethnic Studies Department in the United States—then-president of San Francisco State, the Japanese Canadian S. I. Hayakawa, in an effort to divide the Third World students and pit them against each other, pointed to the Asian students as an example of a ‘‘model minority’’ that the blacks and Latinos needed to emulate. Hiyakawa became infamous for employing this divide-and- conquer ploy by promoting Asians as an example of quiet, passive, and hard-working minority members who had pulled themselves up by the bootstraps and thus served as examples that the loud and protesting blacks and Latinos should follow. Given the heightened political consciousness of the student leadership of the Third World coalition, many of whom had associations with the new revolutionary organizations in the Bay Area (such as the Black Panther Party and the Red Guards of San Francisco’s Chinatown-Manilatown), Hiyakawa was denounced by Asians, along with others, as a ‘‘banana’’ (the metaphor for being yellow on the outside and white on the inside). As tokenism and the co-optation of individual Third World leaders were employed by policymakers and institutions, such terms as ‘‘coconut’’ (brown on the outside, white on the inside), ‘‘apple’’ (red on the outside, white on the inside), and ‘‘oreo’’ (black on the outside, white on the inside) became popular political signifiers for Latino, Native American, and black sellouts, respectively. The ‘‘model minority’’ stereotype a≈xed to Asian and Pacific Islander Americans (api), while challenged strongly by the Asian movement, nonetheless continues today with efficacy and currency. Some special programs for minorities have omitted apis, deeming them too ‘‘successful’’ or ‘‘overrepresented.’’ Statistical deception has been used to reduce oppression to a matter of numerical representation rather than degree of political, economic, and social power, as well as quality and control of representation (media and academic inclusion as well as image type). The main site of struggle over api ‘‘overrepresentation’’ has been in college and university admissions. At many elite schools, apis are present in greater percentages than their proportion in the U.S. population as a whole. While on the surface this appears to be true, critics point out that qualified Asians apply in greater proportion to their admissions; that the concentra- tion of elite schools tends to be in major urban centers where api population percentages are far greater than in the overall U.S. population; and that api income analyzed on a per capita basis instead of as a family unit reveals a disturbing trend of larger numbers of income earners and therefore a lesser per capita income. The urgency for greater Afro Asia solidarity and the general elevation of radical, anti-imperialist leadership and political consciousness has become dire with the escalating tragedy of sensationalized racist violence between Asians and blacks. In recent years in New York City, there has been a series of killings of Chinese restaurant takeout-delivery workers—all with alleged and arrested black perpetrators. Four Chinese delivery workers in the last five years have been brutally murdered, all in predominantly black areas. The killings include Jian Lin Chun, killed in the lobby of a Bedford- Stuyvesant building on October 15, 2002; Golden Wok restaurant owner Jin- Sheng Liu, killed on Sept. 1, 2000, in St. Albans while making a delivery; Ng Cheung Cheung, beaten to death by a baseball bat in Jamaica on June 23, 1999; Li-Rong Lin, repeatedly stabbed to death on December 10, 1998, in Hollis while delivering from the China Bu√et restaurant; and, most recently, Huang Chen, killed in South Jamaica on April 30, 2004, where an investigation resulted in the arrest of two African American teens. In the last example, the New York Post reported the incident as an example of ‘‘Chink-bashing’’ and characterized such violence as a new ‘‘urban sport’’ of premeditated assaults committed largely by black youth upon Chinese deliv- ery ‘‘boys’’ (though in typical New York Post racism the majority of these ‘‘boys’’ are men over the age of forty, as Chinese men are still desexualized and belittled as perpetual adolescents incapable of being ‘‘real men’’ as compared to white men). | employing this divide-and- conquer ploy by promoting Asians as hard-working minority members who had pulled themselves up and served as examples that the loud and protesting blacks and Latinos should follow The ‘‘model minority’’ to Asian Americans nonetheless continues today with efficacy special programs have omitted apis deeming them too ‘‘successful’’ overrepresentation’’ has been in college The urgency for greater Afro Asia solidarity and the general elevation of radical, anti-imperialist leadership and political consciousness has become dire with the escalating tragedy of sensationalized racist violence | During the 1968 student strike at San Francisco State University led by the Third World coalition—the longest campus student strike in U.S. his- tory, which eventually led to the creation of the first Ethnic Studies Department in the United States—then-president of San Francisco State, the Japanese Canadian S. I. Hayakawa, in an effort to divide the Third World students and pit them against each other, pointed to the Asian students as an example of a ‘‘model minority’’ that the blacks and Latinos needed to emulate. Hiyakawa became infamous for employing this divide-and- conquer ploy by promoting Asians as an example of quiet, passive, and hard-working minority members who had pulled themselves up by the bootstraps and thus served as examples that the loud and protesting blacks and Latinos should follow. Given the heightened political consciousness of the student leadership of the Third World coalition, many of whom had associations with the new revolutionary organizations in the Bay Area (such as the Black Panther Party and the Red Guards of San Francisco’s Chinatown-Manilatown), Hiyakawa was denounced by Asians, along with others, as a ‘‘banana’’ (the metaphor for being yellow on the outside and white on the inside). As tokenism and the co-optation of individual Third World leaders were employed by policymakers and institutions, such terms as ‘‘coconut’’ (brown on the outside, white on the inside), ‘‘apple’’ (red on the outside, white on the inside), and ‘‘oreo’’ (black on the outside, white on the inside) became popular political signifiers for Latino, Native American, and black sellouts, respectively. The ‘‘model minority’’ stereotype a≈xed to Asian and Pacific Islander Americans (api), while challenged strongly by the Asian movement, nonetheless continues today with efficacy and currency. Some special programs for minorities have omitted apis, deeming them too ‘‘successful’’ or ‘‘overrepresented.’’ Statistical deception has been used to reduce oppression to a matter of numerical representation rather than degree of political, economic, and social power, as well as quality and control of representation (media and academic inclusion as well as image type). The main site of struggle over api ‘‘overrepresentation’’ has been in college and university admissions. At many elite schools, apis are present in greater percentages than their proportion in the U.S. population as a whole. While on the surface this appears to be true, critics point out that qualified Asians apply in greater proportion to their admissions; that the concentra- tion of elite schools tends to be in major urban centers where api population percentages are far greater than in the overall U.S. population; and that api income analyzed on a per capita basis instead of as a family unit reveals a disturbing trend of larger numbers of income earners and therefore a lesser per capita income. The urgency for greater Afro Asia solidarity and the general elevation of radical, anti-imperialist leadership and political consciousness has become dire with the escalating tragedy of sensationalized racist violence between Asians and blacks. In recent years in New York City, there has been a series of killings of Chinese restaurant takeout-delivery workers—all with alleged and arrested black perpetrators. Four Chinese delivery workers in the last five years have been brutally murdered, all in predominantly black areas. The killings include Jian Lin Chun, killed in the lobby of a Bedford- Stuyvesant building on October 15, 2002; Golden Wok restaurant owner Jin- Sheng Liu, killed on Sept. 1, 2000, in St. Albans while making a delivery; Ng Cheung Cheung, beaten to death by a baseball bat in Jamaica on June 23, 1999; Li-Rong Lin, repeatedly stabbed to death on December 10, 1998, in Hollis while delivering from the China Bu√et restaurant; and, most recently, Huang Chen, killed in South Jamaica on April 30, 2004, where an investigation resulted in the arrest of two African American teens. In the last example, the New York Post reported the incident as an example of ‘‘Chink-bashing’’ and characterized such violence as a new ‘‘urban sport’’ of premeditated assaults committed largely by black youth upon Chinese deliv- ery ‘‘boys’’ (though in typical New York Post racism the majority of these ‘‘boys’’ are men over the age of forty, as Chinese men are still desexualized and belittled as perpetual adolescents incapable of being ‘‘real men’’ as compared to white men). | 4,488 | <h4>Only Consciousness of Afro Asia will be the only way to overcome the Myth of the Model Minority which has spurred racial tensions</h4><p><u><strong>Mullen & Ho 08</strong> (Bill V. Mullen is the Professor of English and American Studies @ Purdue and teaches courses in African American Literature and Culture; Fred Ho is a political activist and the founder and bandleader of the Afro Asian Music Ensemble; Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, pp. 6-8;0</p><p>During the 1968 student strike at San Francisco State University led by the Third World coalition—the longest campus student strike in U.S. his- tory, which eventually led to the creation of the first Ethnic Studies Department in the United States—then-president of San Francisco State, the Japanese Canadian S. I. Hayakawa, in an effort to divide the Third World students and pit them against each other, pointed to the Asian students as an example of a ‘‘model minority’’ that the blacks and Latinos needed to emulate. <strong>Hiyakawa became infamous for <mark>employing this divide-and- conquer</mark> <mark>ploy by promoting Asians as</mark> an example of quiet, passive, and <mark>hard-working minority members who had pulled themselves up</mark> by the bootstraps <mark>and</mark> thus <mark>served as examples that the loud and protesting blacks and Latinos should follow</mark>.</strong> Given the heightened political consciousness of the student leadership of the Third World coalition, many of whom had associations with the new revolutionary organizations in the Bay Area (such as the Black Panther Party and the Red Guards of San Francisco’s Chinatown-Manilatown), Hiyakawa was denounced by Asians, along with others, as a ‘‘banana’’ (the metaphor for being yellow on the outside and white on the inside). As tokenism and the co-optation of individual Third World leaders were employed by policymakers and institutions, such terms as ‘‘coconut’’ (brown on the outside, white on the inside), ‘‘apple’’ (red on the outside, white on the inside), and ‘‘oreo’’ (black on the outside, white on the inside) became popular political signifiers for Latino, Native American, and black sellouts, respectively. <strong><mark>The ‘‘model minority’’</mark> stereotype a≈xed <mark>to Asian</mark> and Pacific Islander <mark>Americans</mark> (api), while challenged strongly by the Asian movement, <mark>nonetheless continues today with efficacy</mark> and currency. Some <mark>special programs</mark> for minorities <mark>have omitted apis</mark>, <mark>deeming them too ‘‘successful’’</mark> or ‘‘overrepresented.’’</strong> Statistical deception has been used to reduce oppression to a matter of numerical representation rather than degree of political, economic, and social power, as well as quality and control of representation (media and academic inclusion as well as image type). The main site of struggle over api ‘‘<mark>overrepresentation’’ has been in college</mark> and university admissions. At many elite schools, apis are present in greater percentages than their proportion in the U.S. population as a whole. While on the surface this appears to be true, critics point out that qualified Asians apply in greater proportion to their admissions; that the concentra- tion of elite schools tends to be in major urban centers where api population percentages are far greater than in the overall U.S. population; and that api income analyzed on a per capita basis instead of as a family unit reveals a disturbing trend of larger numbers of income earners and therefore a lesser per capita income. <strong><mark>The urgency for greater Afro Asia solidarity</mark> <mark>and the general elevation of radical, anti-imperialist leadership and political consciousness</mark> <mark>has become dire with the escalating tragedy</mark> <mark>of sensationalized racist violence</mark> between Asians and blacks</strong>. <strong>In recent years in New York City, there has been a series of killings of Chinese restaurant takeout-delivery workers—all with alleged and arrested black perpetrators. Four Chinese delivery workers in the last five years have been brutally murdered, all in predominantly black areas.</strong> The killings include Jian Lin Chun, killed in the lobby of a Bedford- Stuyvesant building on October 15, 2002; Golden Wok restaurant owner Jin- Sheng Liu, killed on Sept. 1, 2000, in St. Albans while making a delivery; Ng Cheung Cheung, beaten to death by a baseball bat in Jamaica on June 23, 1999; Li-Rong Lin, repeatedly stabbed to death on December 10, 1998, in Hollis while delivering from the China Bu√et restaurant; and, most recently, Huang Chen, killed in South Jamaica on April 30, 2004, where an investigation resulted in the arrest of two African American teens. In the last example, the New York Post reported the incident as an example of ‘‘Chink-bashing’’ and characterized such violence as a new ‘‘urban sport’’ of premeditated assaults committed largely by black youth upon Chinese deliv- ery ‘‘boys’’ (though in typical New York Post racism the majority of these ‘‘boys’’ are men over the age of forty, as Chinese men are still desexualized and belittled as perpetual adolescents incapable of being ‘‘real men’’ as compared to white men).</p></u> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 126,165 | 5 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,372 | Warming over 2 degrees causes extinction – agriculture loss, collapse of civilization, and reverse carbon cycle. | Simpson, citing Lynas, 13 | Simpson, citing Lynas, 13 (Larry Simpson is an Emeritus Professor who did research and teaching at the University of California in Los Angeles regarding biology; Mark Lynas is a researcher at the Cornell Alliance for Science, advisor on climate change to the President of the Maldives, environment activist and writer, a frequent speaker around the world on climate change, biotechnology and nuclear power, a Visiting Research Associate at Oxford University’s School of Geography and the Environment, a member of the advisory board of the science advocacy group Sense About Science, and a Visiting Fellow at Cornell University’s Office of International Programs at the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences; “Several degrees of warming”; http://larry-thoughtsandmusings.blogspot.com/2013/11/several-degrees-of-warming.html; DT) | reaches two degrees and triggers carbon-cycle feedbacks from soils and plants. | null | BETWEEN TWO AND THREE DEGREES OF WARMING Up to this point, assuming that governments
AND
reaches two degrees and triggers carbon-cycle feedbacks from soils and plants. | 167 | <h4><u>Warming over 2 degrees causes extinction – agriculture loss, collapse of civilization, and reverse carbon cycle.</h4><p></u><strong>Simpson, citing Lynas, 13<u></strong> (Larry Simpson is an Emeritus Professor who did research and teaching at the University of California in Los Angeles regarding biology; Mark Lynas is a researcher at the Cornell Alliance for Science, advisor on climate change to the President of the Maldives, environment activist and writer, a frequent speaker around the world on climate change, biotechnology and nuclear power, a Visiting Research Associate at Oxford University’s School of Geography and the Environment, a member of the advisory board of the science advocacy group Sense About Science, and a Visiting Fellow at Cornell University’s Office of International Programs at the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences; “Several degrees of warming”; </u>http://larry-thoughtsandmusings.blogspot.com/2013/11/several-degrees-of-warming.html<u>; DT)</p><p></u>BETWEEN TWO AND THREE DEGREES OF WARMING Up to this point, assuming that governments </p><p>AND</p><p><u>reaches two degrees and triggers carbon-cycle feedbacks from soils and plants.</p></u> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,797 | 2 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,373 | Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other | null | Paranoia- a mental condition characterized by delusions of persecution, unwarranted jealousy, or exaggerated self-importance, typically elaborated into an organized system. | Not studying that Forces individuals to allow more killing because we don’t think about the consequences
The threat of nuclear annihilation stimulated us to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war has always arisen Enmity stems from the interaction of psychological elements. These include fear and hostility competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group a tendency to disclaim elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from psychology social and behavioral scientists declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive inevitably committed to war we have real choices threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real The Russians are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our nations It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This does not address the distinction between the threat and one's own contribution to that threat by distortions of perception the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives with anything approaching objectivity We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy to sustain that idea a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7, Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups psychological mechanisms impel individuals to kill or allow killing with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions The image of the enemy is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence | understanding the "enemy system" requires psychology Attempts to explore psychological roots of enmity are met with my enemy is real This does not address one's contribution to that threat how we created that enemy, We never see our enemy with objectivity we are not taught to think about how enemies are selected psychological mechanisms impel individuals to allow killing with little questioning of consequences | No Objective views on what you have contributed to the construction of your enemies
Not studying that Forces individuals to allow more killing because we don’t think about the consequences
Mack 91 – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 *Gender modified)
The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process. | 5,843 | <h4>Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other </h4><p><u>Paranoia</u>- a mental condition characterized by delusions of persecution, unwarranted jealousy, or exaggerated self-importance, typically elaborated into an organized system. </p><p>No Objective views on what you have contributed to the construction of your enemies</p><p><u><strong>Not studying that Forces individuals to allow more killing because we don’t think about the consequences </p><p></u>Mack 91</strong> – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 *Gender modified)</p><p><u>The threat of nuclear annihilation</u> has <u>stimulated us to</u> try to <u>understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such <strong>self-destroying behavior</strong>. Central to this</u> inquiry <u>is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war</u> should it occur, <u>has always arisen</u>. <u>Enmity</u> between groups of people <u>stems from the interaction of psychological</u>, economic, and cultural <u>elements. These include fear and hostility</u> (which are often closely related), <u>competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group</u> or cause,[4] <u>a tendency to disclaim</u> and assign <u>elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses</u> and intentions, <u>and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation</u> by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. <u>A full <mark>understanding</mark> of <mark>the "enemy system"</mark>[3] <mark>requires </mark>insights from</u> many specialities, including <u><mark>psychology</u></mark>, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty <u>social and behavioral scientists</u>, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, <u>declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive</u> animal, <u>inevitably committed to war</u>. The Seville statement implies that <u><strong>we have real choices</u></strong>. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: <u>threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence.</u> The Real and the Created Enemy <u><mark>Attempts to explore </mark>the <mark>psychological roots of enmity</mark> <mark>are</mark> frequently <mark>met with</mark> responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, <strong>but <mark>my enemy is real</u></strong></mark>. <u>The Russians</u> [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] <u>are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm</u>. Furthermore, <u>there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values</u> <u>between our </u>two<u> nations</u>. <u>It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". <mark>This</u></mark> argument <u><mark>does not address</mark> the distinction between the</u> enemy <u>threat and <strong><mark>one's </mark>own <mark>contribution to that threat</u></strong></mark>-<u><strong>by distortions of perception</u></strong>, provocative words, and actions. In short, <u>the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand <mark>how <strong>we </mark>have <mark>created that enemy</u></strong>,</mark> <u>or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "<mark>We never see our enemy</mark>'s motives</u> and we never labor to assess his will, <u><mark>with</mark> <strong>anything approaching <mark>objectivity</u></strong></mark>".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. <u>We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us</u>. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and <u><mark>we are not taught to <strong>think </mark>critically</strong> <mark>about how</mark> <strong>our assigned <mark>enemies are selected</mark> for us. </u></strong>In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, <u>in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] </u>The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "<u><strong>War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy</u></strong>."[9] But <u>to sustain that idea</u> in war and peacetime <u>a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities</u>, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material <u>upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,</u>10] <u>Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups</u>. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the <u><mark>psychological</mark> <mark>mechanisms</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>impel individuals to</mark> kill or <mark>allow killing</u></strong></mark> in their name, often <u><mark>with little questioning</mark> <mark>of </mark>the morality or <mark>consequences</mark> of such actions</u>. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "<u>The image of the enemy</u> is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it <u>is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to <strong>participate in acts of violence</strong> </u>they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 1 | 18,700 | 149 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,374 | We are a confrontation with the model minority – we rid white supremacy the root cause of all oppression | This resolves 3 impacts | This resolves 3 impacts | Chang ’93
This history of discrimination and violence, as well as the contemporary problems of Asian Americans, are obscured by the portrayal of Asian Americans as a "model minority." Asian Americans are portrayed as "hardworking, intelligent, and successful This description represents a sharp break from past stereotypes as "sneaky, obsequious, or inscrutable belief in the "model minority" allows it to justify ignoring the unique discrimination faced by Asian Americans. The portrayal of Asian Americans as successful permits the general public, government officials, and the judiciary to ignore or marginalize the contemporary needs of Asian Americans. An early articulation appeared in U.S. News & World Report in 1966 At a time when Americans are awash in worry over the plight of racial minorities In any Chinatown you discover youngsters at grips with their studies. Still being taught in Chinatown is the old idea that people should depend on their own efforts- in order to reach America's "promised land." you find an important racial minority pulling itself up from hardship and discrimination to become a model of self-respect This "model minority" theme has become a largely unquestioned assumption about current social reality the label "model minority" seems like a compliment. However, one can see the label for what it is-a tool of oppression which works a dual harm by (1) denying the existence of present-day discrimination against Asian Americans and the present-day effects of past discrimination 2) legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites model minority" is a myth But the myth has gained a substantial following, both inside and outside the Asian American community the model minority myth has created an audience unsympathetic to the problems of Asian Americans Thus, when we try to make our problems known, our complaints of discrimination are seen as unwarranted and inappropriate They can even spark resentment Professor Yamada tells about the reactions of her Literature class to an anthology compiled by some outspoken Asian American writers: [One student] blurted out that she was offended by its militant tone and that as a white person she was tired of always being blamed for the oppression I noticed several of her classmates' eyes nodding in tacit agreement. Surely, I pointed out, some of these other writings have been just as, if not more, militant as the words in this introduction Had they been offended by those also but failed to express their feelings about them? To my surprise, they said they were not offended by any of the Black American, Chicano or Native American writings, but were hard-pressed to explain why when I asked for an explanation. A little further discussion revealed that they "understood" the anger expressed by the Blacks and Chicanos and they "empathized" with the frustrations expressed by the Native American. But the Asian Americans? Then finally, one student said it for all of them: "It made me angry because I didn't even know the Asian Americans felt oppressed. I didn't expect their anger This story illustrates the danger of the model minority myth: it renders the oppression of Asian Americans invisible. This invisibility has harmful consequences, especially when those in positions of power cannot see: To be out of sight is also to be without social services. Thinking Asian Americans have succeeded officials have denied funding for social service programs Failing to realize that there are poor Asian families, college administrators have excluded Asian-American students from Educational Opportunity Programs the model minority myth diverts much-needed attention from the problems of many segments of the Asian American community, particularly the Laotians, Hmong, Cambodians, and Vietnamese Judge Posner asked two rhetorical questions: "Are Asians an oppressed group in the United States today? Are they worse off for lacking sizable representation on the faculties of American law schools 84 His questions are rhetorical because he already has answers Anglo-Saxons and Irish exceeded the average by 5% and 2%, respectively 17.8% of the educational investment as do their white counterparts , Posner's strongest case, reveals flaws in his meritocratic thesis when individual income, geographic location, educational attainment, and hours worked are considered In 1980, Japanese American men in California earned incomes comparable to those of white men, but "they did so only by acquiring more education and by working more hours The income disparities for men96 from other Asian American groups are more glaring Thus, the answer to Posner's first question98 is yes-Asian Americans are an oppressed group To accept the myth of white population aged 25 and over had completed four or more years of college, compared to 32.9% of the Asian-American population The unspoken thesis in Judge Posner's comments is "that, when compared to Whites, there are equal payoffs for qualified and educated racial minorities; education and other social factors, but not race, determine earnings."8 If Posner is right, Asian Americans should make as much as their white counterparts, Yet when we look more carefully at the statistics, we find some interesting anomalies First, Posner's reliance on median family income88 as evidence for lack of discriminatory effects in employment is misleading. It does not take into account the fact that Asian American families have more workers per household more Asian American women are compelled to work because the male members of their families earn such low wages the use of national income averages is misleading because most Asian Americans live in geographical locations which have both higher incomes Wage disparities become apparent when geographic location is considered the fact that Asian Americans have a higher percentage of college graduates does not mean that they have economic opportunities Returns on education rather than educational level provide a better indicator Many Asian Americans have discovered that they do not get the same return for their the model minority is to participate in the oppression of Asian Americans the model minority myth works a dual harm by hurting other racial minorities and poor whites who are blamed for not being successful like Asian Americans. "African-Americans and Latinos and poor whites are told, 'look at those Asians-anyone can make it in this country if they really try. This blame is justified by the meritocratic thesis supposedly proven by the example of Asian Americans This blame is then used to campaign against government social services for these "undeserving" minorities and poor whites To the extent that Asian Americans accept the model minority myth we are complicitous in the oppression of other racial minorities This blame and its consequences create resentment against Asian Americans among African Americans, Latinos, and poor whites This resentment, , can flare into anger and violence Asian Americans, the "model minority," serve as convenient scapegoats as Korean Americans in Los Angeles discovered during the 1992 riots. Many Korean Americans "now view themselves as 'human shields' n a complicated racial hierarchy," caught between "the racism of the white majority and the anger of the black minority The model minority myth plays a key role in establishing a racial hierarchy which denies the oppression of Asian Americans while simultaneously legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites. | discrimination and violence, are obscured by the portrayal of Asian Americans as a "model minority hardworking, intelligent, and successful model minority allows to justify ignoring the unique discrimination faced by Asian Americans to ignore or marginalize contemporary needs and has become a largely unquestioned assumption about current social reality ) denying the existence of present-day discrimination against Asian Americans 2) legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites the myth has gained a substantial following outside the Asian American community They spark resentment one said It made me angry because I didn't even know the Asian Americans felt oppressed it renders oppression invisible Failing to realize that there are poor Asian more Asian American women are compelled to work because the male members of their families earn such low wages Wage disparities become apparent when geographic location is considered African-Americans are told, 'look at those Asians-anyone can make it in this country This blame is justified we are complicitous in the oppression of other racial minorities its consequences create resentment against Asian Americans among African Americans the "model minority serve as convenient scapegoats caught between "the racism of the white majority and the anger of the black minority | 1. The psychological violence of Asian Americans
2. The oppression of other minorities that white supremacy justifies through the myth
3. The resentment between minority groups
Chang ’93 [1993, Chang Robert S. is a Professor of Law and an Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, He also serves on the advisory board of Berkeley’s Asian American Law Journal. “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space”, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1241]
B. The Model Minority Myth This history of discrimination and violence, as well as the contemporary problems of Asian Americans, are obscured by the portrayal of Asian Americans as a "model minority." Asian Americans are portrayed as "hardworking, intelligent, and successful." 7 1 This description represents a sharp break from past stereotypes of Asians as "sneaky, obsequious, or inscrutable."'74 But, the dominant culture's75 belief in the "model minority" allows it to justify ignoring the unique discrimination faced by Asian Americans. The portrayal of Asian Americans as successful permits the general public, government officials, and the judiciary to ignore or marginalize the contemporary needs of Asian Americans. An early articulation of the model minority theme76 appeared in U.S. News & World Report in 1966: At a time when Americans are awash in worry over the plight of racial minorities One such minority, the nation's 300,000 Chinese-Americans, is winning wealth and respect by dint of its own hard work. In any Chinatown from San Francisco to New York, you discover youngsters at grips with their studies.... Still being taught in Chinatown is the old idea that people should depend on their own efforts-not a welfare check-in order to reach America's "promised land." Visit "Chinatown U.S.A." and you find an important racial minority pulling itself up from hardship and discrimination to become a model of self-respect and achievement in today's America." This "model minority" theme has become a largely unquestioned assumption about current social reality.7 " At its surface, the label "model minority" seems like a compliment. However, once one moves beyond this complimentary fagade, one can see the label for what it is-a tool of oppression which works a dual harm by (1) denying the existence of present-day discrimination against Asian Americans and the present-day effects of past discrimination, and (2) legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites. That Asian Americans are a "model minority" is a myth. But the myth has gained a substantial following, both inside and outside the Asian American community.79 The successful inculcation of the model minority myth has created an audience unsympathetic to the problems of Asian Americans. Thus, when we try to make our problems known, our complaints of discrimination or calls for remedial action are seen as unwarranted and inappropriate. They can even spark resentment. For example, Professor Mitsuye Yamada tells a story about the reactions of her Ethnic American Literature class to an anthology compiled by some outspoken Asian American writers: [One student] blurted out that she was offended by its militant tone and that as a white person she was tired of always being blamed for the oppression of all the minorities. I noticed several of her classmates' eyes nodding in tacit agreement. A discussion of the "militant" voices in some of the other writings we had read in the course ensued. Surely, I pointed out, some of these other writings have been just as, if not more, militant as the words in this introduction? Had they been offended by those also but failed to express their feelings about them? To my surprise, they said they were not offended by any of the Black American, Chicano or Native American writings, but were hard-pressed to explain why when I asked for an explanation. A little further discussion revealed that they "understood" the anger expressed by the Blacks and Chicanos and they "empathized" with the frustrations and sorrow expressed by the Native American. But the Asian Americans?? [sic] Then finally, one student said it for all of them: "It made me angry. Their anger made me angry, because I didn't even know the Asian Americans felt oppressed. I didn't expect their anger." 80 This story illustrates the danger of the model minority myth: it renders the oppression of Asian Americans invisible. This invisibility has harmful consequences, especially when those in positions of power cannot see: To be out of sight is also to be without social services. Thinking Asian Americans have succeeded, government officials have sometimes denied funding for social service programs designed to help Asian Americans learn English and find employment. Failing to realize that there are poor Asian families, college administrators have sometimes excluded Asian-American students from Educational Opportunity Programs (EOP), which are intended for all students from low-income families. 81 In this way, the model minority myth diverts much-needed attention from the problems of many segments of the Asian American community, particularly the Laotians, Hmong, Cambodians, and Vietnamese who have poverty rates of 67.2%, 65.5%, 46.9%, and 33.5%, respectively.82 These poverty rates compare with a national poverty rate of 9.6%.83 In addition to government officials, this distorted view of the current status of Asian Americans has infected at least one very influential member of the judiciary and legal academy. At a recent conference of the Association of American Law Schools, Judge Posner asked two rhetorical questions: "Are Asians an oppressed group in the United States today? Are they worse off for lacking sizable representation on the faculties of American law schools?"84 His questions are rhetorical because he already has answers, with figures to back them up: "In 1980, JapaneseAmericans had incomes more than 32% above the national average income, and Chinese-Americans had incomes more than 12% above the national average; Anglo-Saxons and Irish exceeded the average by 5% and 2%, respectively."" He also points out that "in 1980, 17.8% of the educational investment as do their white counterparts.94 A closer look, then, at Japanese Americans, Posner's strongest case, reveals flaws in his meritocratic thesis when individual income, geographic location, educational attainment, and hours worked are considered. In 1980, Japanese American men in California earned incomes comparable to those of white men, but "they did so only by acquiring more education (17.7 years compared to 16.8 years for white men twenty-five to forty-four years old) and by working more hours (2,160 hours compared to 2,120 hours for white men in the same age category)."95 The income disparities for men96 from other Asian American groups are more glaring.9 7 Thus, the answer to Posner's first question98 is yes-Asian Americans are an oppressed group in America. To accept the myth of white population aged 25 and over had completed four or more years of college, compared to 32.9% of the Asian-American population. '8 6 The unspoken thesis in Judge Posner's comments, which has been stated by other proponents of meritocracy, is "that, when compared to Whites, there are equal payoffs for qualified and educated racial minorities; education and other social factors, but not race, determine earnings."87 If Posner is right, Asian Americans should make as much as their white counterparts, taking into account "education and other social factors, but not race." Yet when we look more carefully at the statistics, we find some interesting anomalies which belie the meritocratic thesis. First, Posner's reliance on median family income88 as evidence for lack of discriminatory effects in employment is misleading. It does not take into account the fact that Asian American families have more workers per household than do white families;89 in fact, "more Asian American women are compelled to work because the male members of their families earn such low wages." 90 Second, the use of national income averages is misleading because most Asian Americans live in geographical locations which have both higher incomes and higher costs of living.91 Wage disparities become apparent when geographic location is considered. 92 Third, the fact that Asian Americans have a higher percentage of college graduates does not mean that they have economic opportunities commensurate to their level of education. Returns on education rather than educational level provide a better indicator of the existence of discrimination.93 Many Asian Americans have discovered that they, like other racial minorities, do not get the same return for their the model minority is to participate in the oppression of Asian Americans. In addition to hurting Asian Americans, the model minority myth works a dual harm by hurting other racial minorities and poor whites who are blamed for not being successful like Asian Americans. "African-Americans and Latinos and poor whites are told, 'look at those Asians-anyone can make it in this country if they really try.' "" This blame is justified by the meritocratic thesis supposedly proven by the example of Asian Americans." ° This blame is then used to campaign against government social services for these "undeserving" minorities and poor whites 01 and against affirmative action.10 2 To the extent that Asian Americans accept the model minority myth, we are complicitous in the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites. This blame and its consequences create resentment against Asian Americans among African Americans, Latinos, and poor whites.103 This resentment, fueled by poor economic conditions, can flare into anger and violence. Asian Americans, the "model minority," serve as convenient scapegoats, as Korean Americans in Los Angeles discovered during the 1992 riots." 4 Many Korean Americans "now view themselves as 'human shields' in a complicated racial hierarchy," caught between "the racism of the white majority and the anger of the black minority."1'0 The model minority myth plays a key role in establishing a racial hierarchy which denies the oppression of Asian Americans while simultaneously legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites. | 10,345 | <h4>We are a confrontation with the model mi<strong>nority – we rid white supremacy the root cause of all oppression</h4><p>This resolves 3 impacts </p><p>1. The psychological violence of Asian Americans </p><p>2. The oppression of other minorities that white supremacy justifies through the myth</p><p>3. The resentment between minority groups</p><p><u>Chang ’93</u></strong> [1993, Chang Robert S. is a Professor of Law and an Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, He also serves on the advisory board of Berkeley’s Asian American Law Journal. “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space”, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1241]</p><p>B. The Model Minority Myth <u><strong>This history of <mark>discrimination and violence, </mark>as well as the contemporary problems of Asian Americans, <mark>are obscured by the</mark> <mark>portrayal of Asian Americans as a "model minority</mark>." Asian Americans are portrayed as</u></strong> <u><strong>"<mark>hardworking, intelligent, and successful</u></strong></mark>." 7 1 <u><strong>This description represents a sharp break from past stereotypes</u></strong> of Asians <u><strong>as</u></strong> <u><strong>"sneaky, obsequious, or inscrutable</u></strong>."'74 But, the dominant culture's75 <u><strong>belief in the "<mark>model minority</mark>" <mark>allows</mark> it <mark>to justify ignoring the unique discrimination faced by Asian Americans</mark>. The portrayal of Asian Americans as successful permits the general public, government officials, and the judiciary</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>to ignore or marginalize</mark> the <mark>contemporary needs</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>of Asian Americans. An early articulation </u></strong>of the model minority theme76 <u><strong>appeared in U.S. News & World Report in 1966</u></strong>: <u><strong>At a time when Americans are awash in worry over the plight of racial minorities</u></strong> One such minority, the nation's 300,000 Chinese-Americans, is winning wealth and respect by dint of its own hard work. <u><strong>In any Chinatown</u></strong> from San Francisco to New York, <u><strong>you discover youngsters at grips with their studies.</u></strong>... <u><strong>Still being taught in Chinatown is the old idea that people should depend on their own efforts-</u></strong>not a welfare check-<u><strong>in order to reach America's "promised land."</u></strong> Visit "Chinatown U.S.A." and <u><strong>you find an important racial minority pulling itself up from hardship <mark>and</mark> discrimination to become a model of self-respect </u></strong>and achievement in today's America." <u><strong>This "model minority" theme <mark>has become a largely unquestioned assumption about current social reality</u></strong></mark>.7 " At its surface, <u><strong>the label "model minority" seems like a compliment. However,</u></strong> once one moves beyond this complimentary fagade, <u><strong>one can see the label for what it is-a tool of oppression which works a dual harm by (1<mark>) denying the existence of present-day discrimination against Asian Americans</mark> and the present-day effects of past discrimination</u></strong>, and (<u><strong><mark>2) legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites</u></strong></mark>. That Asian Americans are a "<u><strong>model minority" is a myth</u></strong>. <u><strong>But <mark>the myth has gained a substantial following</mark>, both inside and <mark>outside the Asian American community</u></strong></mark>.79 The successful inculcation of <u><strong>the model minority myth has created an audience unsympathetic to the problems of Asian Americans</u></strong>. <u><strong>Thus, when we try to make our problems known, our complaints of discrimination</u></strong> or calls for remedial action <u><strong>are seen as unwarranted and inappropriate</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>They</mark> can even <mark>spark resentment</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u><strong>Professor</u></strong> Mitsuye <u><strong>Yamada tells</u></strong> a story <u><strong>about the reactions of her </u></strong>Ethnic American <u><strong>Literature class to an anthology compiled by some outspoken Asian American writers: [One student] blurted out that she was offended by its militant tone and that as a white person she was tired of always being blamed for the oppression</u></strong> of all the minorities. <u><strong>I noticed several of her classmates' eyes nodding in tacit agreement. </u></strong>A discussion of the "militant" voices in some of the other writings we had read in the course ensued. <u><strong>Surely, I pointed out, some of these other writings have been just as, if not more, militant as the words in this introduction</u></strong>? <u><strong>Had they been offended by those also but failed to express their feelings about them?</u></strong> <u><strong>To my surprise, they said they were not offended by any of the Black American, Chicano or Native American writings, but were hard-pressed to explain why when I asked for an explanation. A little further discussion revealed that they "understood" the anger expressed by the Blacks and Chicanos and they "empathized" with the frustrations </u></strong>and sorrow <u><strong>expressed by the Native American.</u></strong> <u><strong>But the Asian Americans?</u></strong>? [sic] <u><strong>Then finally, <mark>one</mark> student <mark>said</mark> it for all of them: "<mark>It made me angry</u></strong></mark>. Their anger made me angry, <u><strong><mark>because I didn't even know the Asian Americans felt oppressed</mark>. I didn't expect their anger</u></strong>." 80 <u><strong>This story illustrates the danger of the model minority myth: <mark>it renders</mark> the <mark>oppression</mark> of Asian Americans <mark>invisible</mark>. This invisibility has harmful consequences, especially when those in positions of power cannot see: To be out of sight is also to be without social services. Thinking Asian Americans have succeeded</u></strong>, government <u><strong>officials have</u></strong> sometimes <u><strong>denied funding for social service programs</u></strong> designed to help Asian Americans learn English and find employment. <u><strong><mark>Failing to realize that there are poor</mark> <mark>Asian</mark> families, college administrators have</u></strong> sometimes <u><strong>excluded Asian-American students from Educational Opportunity Programs </u></strong>(EOP), which are intended for all students from low-income families. 81 In this way, <u><strong>the model minority myth diverts much-needed attention from the problems of many segments of the Asian American community, particularly the Laotians, Hmong, Cambodians, and Vietnamese</u></strong> who have poverty rates of 67.2%, 65.5%, 46.9%, and 33.5%, respectively.82 These poverty rates compare with a national poverty rate of 9.6%.83 In addition to government officials, this distorted view of the current status of Asian Americans has infected at least one very influential member of the judiciary and legal academy. At a recent conference of the Association of American Law Schools, <u><strong>Judge Posner asked two rhetorical questions: "Are Asians an oppressed group in the United States today? Are they worse off for lacking sizable representation on the faculties of American law schools</u></strong>?"<u><strong>84 His questions are rhetorical because he already has answers</u></strong>, with figures to back them up: "In 1980, JapaneseAmericans had incomes more than 32% above the national average income, and Chinese-Americans had incomes more than 12% above the national average; <u><strong>Anglo-Saxons and Irish exceeded the average by 5% and 2%, respectively</u></strong>."" He also points out that "in 1980, <u><strong>17.8% of the educational investment as do their white counterparts</u></strong>.94 A closer look, then, at Japanese Americans<u><strong>, Posner's strongest case, reveals flaws in his meritocratic thesis when individual income, geographic location, educational attainment, and hours worked are considered</u></strong>. <u><strong>In 1980, Japanese American men in California earned incomes comparable to those of white men, but "they did so only by acquiring more education</u></strong> (17.7 years compared to 16.8 years for white men twenty-five to forty-four years old) <u><strong>and by working more hours</u></strong> (2,160 hours compared to 2,120 hours for white men in the same age category)."95 <u><strong>The income disparities for men96 from other Asian American groups are more glaring</u></strong>.9 7 <u><strong>Thus, the answer to Posner's first question98 is yes-Asian Americans are an oppressed group</u></strong> in America. <u><strong>To accept the myth of white population aged 25 and over had completed four or more years of college, compared to 32.9% of the Asian-American population</u></strong>. '8 6 <u><strong>The unspoken thesis in Judge Posner's comments</u></strong>, which has been stated by other proponents of meritocracy, <u><strong>is "that, when compared to Whites, there are equal payoffs for qualified and educated racial minorities; education and other social factors, but not race, determine earnings."8</u></strong>7 <u><strong>If Posner is right, Asian Americans should make as much as their white counterparts,</u></strong> taking into account "education and other social factors, but not race." <u><strong>Yet when we look more carefully at the statistics, we find some interesting anomalies</u></strong> which belie the meritocratic thesis. <u><strong>First, Posner's reliance on median family income88 as evidence for lack of discriminatory effects in employment is misleading. It does not take into account the fact that Asian American families have more workers per household</u></strong> than do white families;89 in fact, "<u><strong><mark>more Asian American women are compelled to work because the male members of their families earn such low wages</u></strong></mark>." 90 Second, <u><strong>the use of national income averages is misleading because most Asian Americans live in geographical locations which have both higher incomes</u></strong> and higher costs of living.91 <u><strong><mark>Wage disparities become apparent when geographic location is considered</u></strong></mark>. 92 Third, <u><strong>the fact that Asian Americans have a higher percentage of college graduates does not mean that they have economic opportunities</u></strong> commensurate to their level of education. <u><strong>Returns on education rather than educational level provide a better indicator</u></strong> of the existence of discrimination.93 <u><strong>Many Asian Americans have discovered that they</u></strong>, like other racial minorities, <u><strong>do not get the same return for their the model minority is to participate in the oppression of Asian Americans</u></strong>. In addition to hurting Asian Americans, <u><strong>the model minority myth works a dual harm by hurting other racial minorities and poor whites who are blamed for not being successful like Asian Americans. "<mark>African-Americans</mark> and Latinos and poor whites <mark>are told, 'look at those Asians-anyone can make it in this country</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>if they really try.</u></strong>' "" <u><strong><mark>This blame is justified</mark> by the meritocratic thesis supposedly proven by the example of Asian Americans</u></strong>." ° <u><strong>This blame is then used to campaign against government social services for these "undeserving" minorities and poor whites</u></strong> 01 and against affirmative action.10 2 <u><strong>To the extent that Asian Americans accept the model minority myth</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>we are complicitous in the oppression of other racial minorities</u></strong></mark> and poor whites. <u><strong>This blame and <mark>its consequences create resentment against Asian Americans</mark> <mark>among African Americans</mark>, Latinos, and poor whites</u></strong>.103 <u><strong>This resentment,</u></strong> fueled by poor economic conditions<u><strong>, can flare into anger and violence</u></strong>. <u><strong>Asian Americans, <mark>the "model minority</mark>," <mark>serve as convenient scapegoats</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as Korean Americans in Los Angeles discovered during the 1992 riots.</u></strong>" 4 <u><strong>Many Korean Americans "now view themselves as 'human shields'</u></strong> i<u><strong>n a complicated racial hierarchy," <mark>caught between "the racism of the white majority and the anger of the black minority</u></strong></mark>."1'0 <u><strong>The model minority myth plays a key role in establishing a racial hierarchy which denies the oppression of Asian Americans while simultaneously legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites</strong>.</p></u> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 1: Afro – Asia Relations | 127,777 | 14 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,375 | Probability – Equivocation emboldens China – It’s the only route to escalation | Ratner 14 | Ratner 14 (Ely, CNAS Asia-Pacific security program deputy director, “Roiling the Waters”, 1-21, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/roiling-the-waters/) | Beijing’s far-reaching claims in the East and South China seas — and coercive efforts to intimidate neighbors amount to an expansionist strategy, with profound implications U.S. officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle an overemphasis on stability can be dangerous While preventing inadvertent war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal, it is just as important to discourage China from believing that it can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle international disagreements without triggering a serious response Making the risk of escalation too low will at some point start running counter to U.S. interests China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion rocking the boat, seeing what it can extract letting the United States worry about righting it. Beijing’s playbook relies on China’s confidence that it can weather outrage while Washington takes responsibility for ensuring the situation doesn’t get out of control History has demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense of deterrence. The Cuban missile crisis was precipitated by Khrushchev’s perception Kennedy, was overly concerned about cooling tensions history shows that countries like China bluff, coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave it with the impression that these approaches work the U S needs to inject risk into Beijing’s calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate This does not mean abandoning engagement to contain China, let alone fomenting conflict it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems to think China must understand that attempts to roil the waters result in precisely the conflicts it seeks to avoid To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that actually elevate the risks to Beijing of acting assertively On the high seas, the focal point for the region’s territorial disputes, China has bullied its neighbors the U S must demonstrate willingness to push back militarily when China attempts to coerce America’s allies and partners the U.S. military needs capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that offer plausible, concrete options for responding to Chinese attempts to exploit America’s perceived aversion to instability Leaders throughout Asia will be watching. Too much caution may be read as U.S. weakness perpetuating rather than diminishing China’s incentives toward adventurism. Beijing’s planners worry America’s burgeoning military in Asia. Good. That means they’ll be more reluctant to start a fight the goal is to cultivate real, long-term stability in Asia Critics assert these steps invite competition that will make war, most likely But those who are reluctant to push back need to ask themselves whether China’s top leaders currently see a sufficient downside in acting assertively. Clearly, they do not | Beijing’s claims in the East and S C s amount to expansionist strategy overemphasis on stability can be dangerous , it is important to discourage China without triggering a serious response Beijing’s playbook relies on China’s confidence that it can weather outrage while Washington takes responsibility The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave it with the impression that these approaches work China must understand that attempts to roil the waters result in conflicts the United States should pursue policies that elevate the risks to Beijing of acting assertively the U S must demonstrate a willingness to push back and prepare it for major war Leaders throughout Asia will be watching caution may be read as U.S. weakness perpetuating adventurism the goal is to cultivate real, long-term stability those who are reluctant to push back need to ask themselves whether China’s top leaders currently see a sufficient downside in acting assertively. Clearly, they do not | Although officials on both sides of the Pacific are publicly loath to add fuel to the fire, it is increasingly clear that China’s recent regional provocations are the result of more than just knee-jerk reactions or bureaucratic malfunctions over long-forgotten borders or arcane historical ownership. Beijing’s far-reaching claims in the East and South China seas — and coercive efforts to intimidate neighbors — have unsettled countries from Vietnam to the Philippines to Japan because they amount to an expansionist strategy, with profound implications for U.S. power and regional security. China’s latest act of revisionism, in late November, was to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) across large swaths of the East China Sea, including over the disputed Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu by the Chinese). America’s response was twofold: The White House indicated that it would not officially honor the ADIZ designation (a message delivered by sending unarmed B-52 bombers through the zone on what the Pentagon called a routine and long-planned training mission), but it initially encouraged commercial airliners to comply with Beijing’s request to identify themselves to Chinese air traffic control. Meanwhile, it dispatched high-level officials to calm the waters: When Vice President Joe Biden met with Chinese leaders in early December, his mission, according to one senior administration official, was to push for "crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building measures to lower tensions and reduce risk of escalation or miscalculation." This effort to play the role of regional peacemaker echoes the Obama administration’s approach in 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines, as well as during the row between Tokyo and Beijing after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands. But if China’s ends haven’t changed, its means have — in the past years, Beijing has stepped up efforts to achieve its long-held territorial aims. As a former Chinese ambassador told us in December, her country’s position in the world is like that of "a new student that jumped many grades." Maybe so, but Beijing’s behavior since 2009 is more akin to that of a brash adolescent both unaware and blithe to the potential consequences of adventurous behavior. U.S. officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle. Perhaps that’s why Biden invoked his father’s advice in warning on the eve of his Beijing visit that "the only conflict that is worse than one that is intended is one that is unintended." But an overemphasis on stability can be dangerous. While preventing inadvertent war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal, it is just as important to discourage China from believing that it can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle international disagreements without triggering a serious response. Making the risk of escalation too low will at some point start running counter to U.S. interests. Why? Because China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion by rocking the boat, seeing what it can extract in the process, and letting the United States worry about righting it. Beijing’s playbook of tailored coercion relies in part on China’s confidence that it can weather ephemeral international outrage while Washington takes responsibility for ensuring the situation doesn’t get out of control. This means that reducing the likelihood of escalation through high-level strategic dialogues and military-to-military hotlines, however important, is in and of itself insufficient to curb Chinese assertiveness. History has demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense of deterrence. The Cuban missile crisis, the modern world’s closest brush with the apocalypse, was precipitated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s perception that the United States, especially President John F. Kennedy, was overly concerned about stability and cooling tensions between the superpowers. Khrushchev’s sense that America could be pushed was formed by Kennedy’s cautious reactions to assertive Soviet moves toward Berlin, as well as Khrushchev’s measure of Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna superpower summit as "weak" and accommodating. Over the following year and a half, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union sought to exploit what they perceived to be shaky American resolve, pressing in Berlin, where East Germany built a wall closing off the free part of the city, and secretly deploying nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Only through a demonstrated willingness on the part of Kennedy to go to the nuclear brink — with U.S. nuclear forces on high alert and U.S. naval forces prepared to forcibly halt Soviet ships attempting to run the blockade (accompanied by a U.S. concession on missile deployments in Turkey) — was the United States able to get Moscow to back down. Needless to say, restraint and a willingness to negotiate were elemental to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but only in the context of a major mobilization of U.S. forces against Cuba, the elevation of the U.S. alert level to Defcon 2 (one step short of nuclear war), and chilling threats designed to convince the Soviets that conciliation was the only viable move. OF COURSE, CHINA IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION. And 2014 is not 1962. The point is simply that a country with the power of the USSR or China, unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the United States, could well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even under the shadow of nuclear weapons. As historian Francis Gavin has argued, the whole history of the Cold War shows that countries like China — and, at times, the United States — can bluff, coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave it with the impression that these approaches work. Just as the United States would have been far better off if Kennedy, at the Vienna summit, had squelched Khrushchev’s doubts about his resolve to defend Berlin, it will be far better if the leadership in Beijing has the clear sense that the United States will meet each challenge to its and its allies’ interests resolutely. Taking a cue from history, the United States needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing’s calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China. This does not mean abandoning engagement or trying to contain China, let alone fomenting conflict. But it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems to think. China must understand that attempts to roil the waters could result in precisely the kinds of costs and conflicts it seeks to avoid. To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that actually elevate the risks — political, economic, or otherwise — to Beijing of acting assertively. On the high seas, the focal point for the region’s territorial disputes, China has bullied its neighbors by relying on non-military vessels. China is using its rapidly expanding coast guard to assert its expansive sovereignty claims by harassing non-Chinese fishermen, oil companies, and military vessels that pass through contested waters in the East and South China seas. This has the benefit of exploiting China’s dominant numerical advantage while keeping the U.S. Navy on the sidelines. Washington should blur the false distinction between non-military and military ships by stating that it will respond to physical coercion and the use of force as deemed appropriate — regardless of whether the perpetrator is a white- or gray-hulled ship. Exercises that practice U.S. naval operations against aggressive non-military vessels would be a good place to start. So would calling upon China to end its illegal occupation of the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, while contesting Chinese administration there by sending the U.S. Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation. The Chinese PLA Navy, for its part, hasn’t been shy to test the waters. In early December, the U.S. Pacific Fleet revealed that the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens, while shadowing China’s new aircraft carrier on a routine mission in international seas, was forced to take evasive action when a PLA Navy warship attached to the carrier group approached on a collision course, literally forcing the cruiser into a game of chicken. "The Chinese knew what they were doing," a military official told CNN. Beyond the sea, the United States must demonstrate a willingness to push back militarily when China attempts to coerce America’s allies and partners. To do this, the U.S. military needs capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that also offer plausible, concrete options for responding to Chinese attempts to exploit America’s perceived aversion to instability. Leaders throughout Asia will be watching. Too much caution, especially if China is clearly the initiator, may be read as U.S. weakness, thereby perpetuating rather than diminishing China’s incentives toward adventurism. The United States can further raise the stakes by deepening its military ties with Japan. This year, the two countries will rewrite the guidelines that govern the roles and responsibilities of their partnership. The result could be major steps forward in joint military planning and interoperability. Washington can also play a key role in mending fences between Tokyo and Seoul, renewing trilateral cooperation to address the many interests — and common threats — that the three countries share. Beyond America’s traditional alliances in Northeast Asia, the Obama administration must demonstrate a concrete, long-lasting commitment to Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore in order to provide the United States with a more diversified set of partners and forward-operating locations in Asia, as well as broader political legitimacy. Beijing’s planners worry about America’s burgeoning military alliances and partnerships in Asia. Good. That means they’ll be more reluctant to start a fight if doing so means China could end up facing a multitude of the region’s powerhouses. The point, of course, is not to increase the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China. Rather, the goal is to cultivate real, long-term stability in Asia that doesn’t give China a license to push, prod, and bully. Critics might assert that taking these steps will invite precisely the kind of Cold War-like competition that will make conflict, if not outright war, most likely. This is a real possibility, and U.S. policymakers will have to carefully balance deterrence with engagement. But those who are reluctant to push back need to ask themselves whether China’s top leaders currently see a sufficient downside in acting assertively. Clearly, they do not. | 10,955 | <h4>Probability – <u>Equivocation</u> emboldens China – It’s the only route to escalation </h4><p><strong>Ratner 14 </strong>(Ely, CNAS Asia-Pacific security program deputy director, “Roiling the Waters”, 1-21, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/roiling-the-waters/)</p><p>Although officials on both sides of the Pacific are publicly loath to add fuel to the fire, it is increasingly clear that China’s recent regional provocations are the result of more than just knee-jerk reactions or bureaucratic malfunctions over long-forgotten borders or arcane historical ownership. <u><mark>Beijing’s</mark> far-reaching <mark>claims in the East</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>s</mark>eas — and coercive efforts to intimidate neighbors</u> — have unsettled countries from Vietnam to the Philippines to Japan because they <u><mark>amount to</mark> an <mark>expansionist</mark> <mark>strategy</mark>, with profound implications</u> for U.S. power and regional security. China’s latest act of revisionism, in late November, was to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) across large swaths of the East China Sea, including over the disputed Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu by the Chinese). America’s response was twofold: The White House indicated that it would not officially honor the ADIZ designation (a message delivered by sending unarmed B-52 bombers through the zone on what the Pentagon called a routine and long-planned training mission), but it initially encouraged commercial airliners to comply with Beijing’s request to identify themselves to Chinese air traffic control. Meanwhile, it dispatched high-level officials to calm the waters: When Vice President Joe Biden met with Chinese leaders in early December, his mission, according to one senior administration official, was to push for "crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building measures to lower tensions and reduce risk of escalation or miscalculation." This effort to play the role of regional peacemaker echoes the Obama administration’s approach in 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines, as well as during the row between Tokyo and Beijing after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands. But if China’s ends haven’t changed, its means have — in the past years, Beijing has stepped up efforts to achieve its long-held territorial aims. As a former Chinese ambassador told us in December, her country’s position in the world is like that of "a new student that jumped many grades." Maybe so, but Beijing’s behavior since 2009 is more akin to that of a brash adolescent both unaware and blithe to the potential consequences of adventurous behavior. <u>U.S. officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle</u>. Perhaps that’s why Biden invoked his father’s advice in warning on the eve of his Beijing visit that "the only conflict that is worse than one that is intended is one that is unintended." But <u><strong>an <mark>overemphasis on stability can be dangerous</u></strong></mark>. <u>While preventing inadvertent war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal<mark>, it is</mark> just as <mark>important to <strong>discourage China</strong></mark> from believing that it can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle international disagreements <mark>without <strong>triggering a serious response</u></strong></mark>. <u>Making the risk of escalation too low will at some point start running counter to U.S. interests</u>. Why? Because <u>China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion</u> by <u><strong>rocking the boat</strong>,</u> <u>seeing what it can extract</u> in the process, and <u>letting the United States worry about righting it.</u> <u><mark>Beijing’s playbook</u></mark> of tailored coercion <u><mark>relies</u></mark> in part <u><mark>on China’s confidence that it can <strong>weather</u></strong></mark> ephemeral international <u><strong><mark>outrage while Washington takes responsibility</strong></mark> for ensuring the situation doesn’t get out of control</u>. This means that reducing the likelihood of escalation through high-level strategic dialogues and military-to-military hotlines, however important, is in and of itself insufficient to curb Chinese assertiveness. <u>History has demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense of deterrence.</u> <u>The Cuban missile crisis</u>, the modern world’s closest brush with the apocalypse, <u>was precipitated by</u> Soviet Premier Nikita <u>Khrushchev’s perception</u> that the United States, especially President John F. <u>Kennedy, was overly concerned about</u> stability and <u>cooling tensions</u> between the superpowers. Khrushchev’s sense that America could be pushed was formed by Kennedy’s cautious reactions to assertive Soviet moves toward Berlin, as well as Khrushchev’s measure of Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna superpower summit as "weak" and accommodating. Over the following year and a half, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union sought to exploit what they perceived to be shaky American resolve, pressing in Berlin, where East Germany built a wall closing off the free part of the city, and secretly deploying nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Only through a demonstrated willingness on the part of Kennedy to go to the nuclear brink — with U.S. nuclear forces on high alert and U.S. naval forces prepared to forcibly halt Soviet ships attempting to run the blockade (accompanied by a U.S. concession on missile deployments in Turkey) — was the United States able to get Moscow to back down. Needless to say, restraint and a willingness to negotiate were elemental to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but only in the context of a major mobilization of U.S. forces against Cuba, the elevation of the U.S. alert level to Defcon 2 (one step short of nuclear war), and chilling threats designed to convince the Soviets that conciliation was the only viable move. OF COURSE, CHINA IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION. And 2014 is not 1962. The point is simply that a country with the power of the USSR or China, unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the United States, could well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even under the shadow of nuclear weapons. As historian Francis Gavin has argued, the whole <u>history</u> of the Cold War <u>shows that</u> <u>countries like China</u> — and, at times, the United States — can <u>bluff, coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. <mark>The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave it with <strong>the impression that these approaches work</u></strong></mark>. Just as the United States would have been far better off if Kennedy, at the Vienna summit, had squelched Khrushchev’s doubts about his resolve to defend Berlin, it will be far better if the leadership in Beijing has the clear sense that the United States will meet each challenge to its and its allies’ interests resolutely. Taking a cue from history, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>needs to inject</u> a healthy degree of <u>risk into Beijing’s calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate</u> with China. <u>This does not mean abandoning</u> <u>engagement</u> or trying <u>to contain China, let alone fomenting conflict</u>. But <u>it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems to think</u>. <u><mark>China must understand that <strong>attempts to roil the waters</u></strong></mark> could <u><strong><mark>result in</mark> precisely the</u></strong> kinds of costs and <u><strong><mark>conflicts</mark> it seeks to avoid</u></strong>. <u>To make this work, <mark>the United States should pursue policies that</mark> <strong>actually <mark>elevate the risks</u></strong></mark> — political, economic, or otherwise — <u><mark>to Beijing of acting assertively</u></mark>. <u>On the high seas, the focal point for the region’s territorial disputes, China has bullied its neighbors</u> by relying on non-military vessels. China is using its rapidly expanding coast guard to assert its expansive sovereignty claims by harassing non-Chinese fishermen, oil companies, and military vessels that pass through contested waters in the East and South China seas. This has the benefit of exploiting China’s dominant numerical advantage while keeping the U.S. Navy on the sidelines. Washington should blur the false distinction between non-military and military ships by stating that it will respond to physical coercion and the use of force as deemed appropriate — regardless of whether the perpetrator is a white- or gray-hulled ship. Exercises that practice U.S. naval operations against aggressive non-military vessels would be a good place to start. So would calling upon China to end its illegal occupation of the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, while contesting Chinese administration there by sending the U.S. Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation. The Chinese PLA Navy, for its part, hasn’t been shy to test the waters. In early December, the U.S. Pacific Fleet revealed that the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens, while shadowing China’s new aircraft carrier on a routine mission in international seas, was forced to take evasive action when a PLA Navy warship attached to the carrier group approached on a collision course, literally forcing the cruiser into a game of chicken. "The Chinese knew what they were doing," a military official told CNN. Beyond the sea, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>must <strong>demonstrate</u></strong> a<u> <strong>willingness to push back</mark> militarily</strong> when China attempts to coerce America’s allies and partners</u>. To do this, <u>the U.S. military needs capabilities <mark>and</mark> plans that not only <strong><mark>prepare it for major war</strong></mark>, but that</u> also <u>offer <strong>plausible, concrete options for responding</strong> to Chinese attempts to exploit America’s perceived aversion to instability</u>. <u><strong><mark>Leaders throughout Asia will be watching</strong></mark>. <strong>Too much <mark>caution</u></strong></mark>, especially if China is clearly the initiator, <u><strong><mark>may be read as U.S. weakness</u></strong></mark>, thereby <u><strong><mark>perpetuating</mark> rather than diminishing China’s incentives toward <mark>adventurism</strong></mark>. </u>The United States can further raise the stakes by deepening its military ties with Japan. This year, the two countries will rewrite the guidelines that govern the roles and responsibilities of their partnership. The result could be major steps forward in joint military planning and interoperability. Washington can also play a key role in mending fences between Tokyo and Seoul, renewing trilateral cooperation to address the many interests — and common threats — that the three countries share. Beyond America’s traditional alliances in Northeast Asia, the Obama administration must demonstrate a concrete, long-lasting commitment to Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore in order to provide the United States with a more diversified set of partners and forward-operating locations in Asia, as well as broader political legitimacy. <u>Beijing’s planners worry</u> about <u>America’s burgeoning military</u> alliances and partnerships <u>in Asia.</u> <u><strong>Good</strong>. That means they’ll be <strong>more reluctant to start a fight</u></strong> if doing so means China could end up facing a multitude of the region’s powerhouses. The point, of course, is not to increase the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China. Rather, <u><mark>the goal is to cultivate <strong>real, long-term stability</strong> </mark>in Asia</u> that doesn’t give China a license to push, prod, and bully. <u>Critics</u> might <u>assert</u> that taking <u>these steps</u> will <u>invite</u> precisely the kind of Cold War-like <u>competition that will make</u> conflict, if not outright <u>war, most likely</u>. This is a real possibility, and U.S. policymakers will have to carefully balance deterrence with engagement. <u>But <mark>those who are reluctant to push back need to ask themselves whether China’s top leaders currently see a <strong>sufficient downside in acting assertively</strong>. <strong>Clearly, they do not</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 2,188 | 22 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,376 | Util is the only moral framework | Murray, 97 | Murray, 97 (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. Of Wales-Swansea, Reconstructing Realism, p. 110) | the 'absolute ethic | null | Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously
AND
underlying this doctrine 'leads to the negation of absolute ethical judgements altogether'.13 | 185 | <h4>Util is the only moral framework</h4><p><u><strong>Murray, 97</u></strong> (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. Of Wales-Swansea, Reconstructing Realism, p. 110)</p><p>Weber emphasised that, while <u>the 'absolute ethic</u> of the gospel' must be taken seriously</p><p>AND</p><p>underlying this doctrine 'leads to the negation of absolute ethical judgements altogether'.13 </p> | null | 1NC | Case | 615,630 | 7 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,377 | Advocacy Statement: Rik and I CALL TO AFFIRM AFRO ASIA AS A METHOD TO PROVIDE AN EDUCATIONAL FRAMEWORK EXPOSING THE MYTH OF THE MODEL MINORITY THROUGH OUR INSERTION OF SCHOLARSHIP AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST WHITE SUPREMACY | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>Advocacy Statement: Rik and I CALL TO AFFIRM AFRO ASIA AS A METHOD TO PROVIDE AN EDUCATIONAL FRAMEWORK EXPOSING THE MYTH OF THE MODEL MINORITY THROUGH OUR INSERTION OF SCHOLARSHIP AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST WHITE SUPREMACY</h4></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 1,560,798 | 1 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,378 | The U.S. is currently pursuing military containment campaign against China. | Friedman and Shapiro 2-15-2017 | [George Friedman and Jacob L. Shapiro, Mauldin Economics, 2-15-2017, geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs."2 maps that explain US strategy in Asia-Pacific," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/2-maps-that-explain-us-strategy-in-asia-pacific-2017-2] | Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently wrapped up his first international trip was to “listen to the concerns of South Korean and Japanese leaders.” Discussing security threats, though, wasn’t the main goal of Mattis’s trip. He was there to assure both countries that the Trump administration will not abandon the US alliance structure in the Pacific. take a look at current US military and investment positions in the Asia-Pacific region The map above shows that the US is using containment as its main strategy with China. US military assets stationed in Asia-Pacific countries have two purposes. First, they ensure US naval power projection in the Pacific Ocean. Second, they help keep Chinese ambitions in check , the US wants naval control of the oceans. It has a strong navy, but a navy by itself isn’t enough. Containing China is a major part of its Pacific strategy. Even if China could be contained by means other than the US, the US would still want Pacific partners to help project its naval power Beneath all the noise is the simple fact that the US maintains an impressive military presence in the Pacific. Mattis will remind US allies how important they are to US interests He will also convey that US intent can be measured in commitments, not headlines | Mattis recently wrapped up his first international trip He was there to assure countries that the Trump administration will not abandon the US alliance structure in the Pacific take a look at current US military and investment positions in Asia shows that the US is using containment as its main strategy with China US military assets ensure US naval power projection , they help keep Chinese ambitions in check the US wants naval control of the oceans Containing China is a major part of its Pacific strategy He will also convey that US intent can be measured in commitments, not headlines | Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently wrapped up his first international trip whose purpose was to “listen to the concerns of South Korean and Japanese leaders.”¶ The two countries are crucial US allies in Asia, and both face serious threats in their near abroad.¶ Discussing security threats, though, wasn’t the main goal of Mattis’s trip. He was there to assure both countries that the Trump administration will not abandon the US alliance structure in the Pacific.¶ In light of Mattis’s visit, let’s take a look at current US military and investment positions in the Asia-Pacific region.¶ The map above shows that the US is using containment as its main strategy with China.¶ US military assets stationed in Asia-Pacific countries have two purposes. First, they ensure US naval power projection in the Pacific Ocean. Second, they help keep Chinese ambitions in check.¶ Besides Guam (which is US territory), the US has no sovereign soil in the Western Pacific Ocean. That means the US must have good relationships with strategically located countries in the Pacific where it can base ships and soldiers.¶ Japan, South Korea, and Australia are the most important US allies in the region. The US also maintains varying degrees of cooperation with countries like the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.¶ The Philippines is a key part of US strategy, but it is also being courted by China.¶ At present, China is the second-largest economy in the world. It is pouring money into its military. It is also trying to attract cooperation from other countries… like the Philippines.¶ The Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines remains in place, but the two sides only recently agreed on which Philippine bases the US can use. The US still hasn’t been allowed to return to the much-coveted naval base at Subic Bay. And the Philippine president is full of anti-US rhetoric.¶ As we’ve written before, the US wants naval control of the oceans. It has a strong navy, but a navy by itself isn’t enough. Containing China is a major part of its Pacific strategy. Even if China could be contained by means other than the US, the US would still want Pacific partners to help project its naval power.¶ Beneath all the noise is the simple fact that the US maintains an impressive military presence in the Pacific. Mattis will remind US allies how important they are to US interests.¶ He will also convey that US intent can be measured in commitments, not headlines.¶ In addition to its military strategy, the US is using an economic strategy. It wants countries to see the economic benefits of cooperating with the US. As the largest economy in the world, the US used its economic power very effectively in the past.¶ The first thing to note from the map above is that the largest destination for US foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Asia-Pacific region is China. China’s economy is in the midst of a huge transition. The US-Chinese economic relationship is important to both sides, but even more so for China.¶ The US is China’s largest export market. This happened in part because US companies could profit by moving production to China. Now, Beijing needs to move up the value chain by attracting foreign investment and technology. The US is a major source for this. If China seriously challenges the US, it risks the loss of these economic benefits.¶ The next five largest beneficiaries of US FDI in the region are crucial American allies and partners. Japan, South Korea, and Australia are at the top of the list. Singapore (located on the strategically important Strait of Malacca) is next.¶ The map above is a contrast to the first, which shows military strategy. This map of US FDI distribution shows a strategy not of containment but of widespread US economic influence across Asia-Pacific.¶ It should also be noted that some US FDI is directed to small countries, such as the Marshall Islands. The amount of FDI is lower because these are smaller economies, but the investments are arguably more important for the economic development of those countries.¶ Being a US ally or partner means access to US investment. The price of being a US ally can be high, but it also comes with key benefits. | 4,212 | <h4>The U.S. is currently pursuing military containment campaign against China.</h4><p>[George <strong>Friedman</strong> <strong>and</strong> Jacob L. <strong>Shapiro</strong>, Mauldin Economics, <strong>2-15-2017</strong>, geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs."2 maps that explain US strategy in Asia-Pacific," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/2-maps-that-explain-us-strategy-in-asia-pacific-2017-2] </p><p><u>Secretary of Defense James <mark>Mattis recently wrapped up his first international trip</u></mark> whose purpose <u>was to “listen to the concerns of South Korean and Japanese leaders.”</u>¶ The two countries are crucial US allies in Asia, and both face serious threats in their near abroad.¶ <u>Discussing security threats, though, wasn’t the main goal of Mattis’s trip. <mark>He was there to assure </mark>both<mark> countries that the Trump administration will not abandon the US alliance structure in the Pacific</mark>.</u>¶ In light of Mattis’s visit, let’s <u><mark>take a look at current US military and investment positions in </mark>the <mark>Asia</mark>-Pacific region</u>.¶ <u><strong>The map above <mark>shows that the US is using containment as its main strategy with China</mark>.</u></strong>¶ <u><mark>US military assets</mark> stationed in Asia-Pacific countries have two purposes. First, they <mark>ensure US naval power projection</mark> in the Pacific Ocean. Second<strong><mark>, they help keep Chinese ambitions in check</u></strong></mark>.¶ Besides Guam (which is US territory), the US has no sovereign soil in the Western Pacific Ocean. That means the US must have good relationships with strategically located countries in the Pacific where it can base ships and soldiers.¶ Japan, South Korea, and Australia are the most important US allies in the region. The US also maintains varying degrees of cooperation with countries like the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.¶ The Philippines is a key part of US strategy, but it is also being courted by China.¶ At present, China is the second-largest economy in the world. It is pouring money into its military. It is also trying to attract cooperation from other countries… like the Philippines.¶ The Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines remains in place, but the two sides only recently agreed on which Philippine bases the US can use. The US still hasn’t been allowed to return to the much-coveted naval base at Subic Bay. And the Philippine president is full of anti-US rhetoric.¶ As we’ve written before<u>, <mark>the US wants naval control of the oceans</mark>. It has a strong navy, but a navy by itself isn’t enough. <mark>Containing China is a major part of its Pacific strategy</mark>. Even if China could be contained by means other than the US, the US would still want Pacific partners to help project its naval power</u>.¶ <u>Beneath all the noise is the simple fact that the US maintains an impressive military presence in the Pacific. Mattis will remind US allies how important they are to US interests</u>.¶ <u><strong><mark>He will also convey that US intent can be measured in commitments, not headlines</u></strong></mark>.¶ In addition to its military strategy, the US is using an economic strategy. It wants countries to see the economic benefits of cooperating with the US. As the largest economy in the world, the US used its economic power very effectively in the past.¶ The first thing to note from the map above is that the largest destination for US foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Asia-Pacific region is China. China’s economy is in the midst of a huge transition. The US-Chinese economic relationship is important to both sides, but even more so for China.¶ The US is China’s largest export market. This happened in part because US companies could profit by moving production to China. Now, Beijing needs to move up the value chain by attracting foreign investment and technology. The US is a major source for this. If China seriously challenges the US, it risks the loss of these economic benefits.¶ The next five largest beneficiaries of US FDI in the region are crucial American allies and partners. Japan, South Korea, and Australia are at the top of the list. Singapore (located on the strategically important Strait of Malacca) is next.¶ The map above is a contrast to the first, which shows military strategy. This map of US FDI distribution shows a strategy not of containment but of widespread US economic influence across Asia-Pacific.¶ It should also be noted that some US FDI is directed to small countries, such as the Marshall Islands. The amount of FDI is lower because these are smaller economies, but the investments are arguably more important for the economic development of those countries.¶ Being a US ally or partner means access to US investment. The price of being a US ally can be high, but it also comes with key benefits.</p> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 1,560,800 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
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3,783,379 | Reject the affirmative’s security discourse – this untimely intervention is the only chance for a counter-discourse | null | This untimely interruption allows us to transcend and defeat security discourse and open the epistemological universe’s closed doors | the suggestion to dismantle security was deemed untimely in a world where lives of millions were rendered insecure by poverty, violence, disease, and political conflicts it is the element of being untimely to brush history against the grain that gives critical thinking its power This notion of the untimely demands critique be strategic and respond to political exigency critique is figured as a force of disruption, a form of intervention that reconfigures the meaning of the times and “contest[s] the very senses of time invoked to declare critique ‘untimely’ Her exposition overturns the view of critique as self-indulgent and reconfigures the meaning of what it means to be relevant there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment The question is not whether scholars are engaged but what the nature of this engagement is. It is this ethos of critique that dismantling security hopes to recover for a discipline where security operates as the foundational principle and critical thinking keeps on contributing to security’s self-evident condition. what distinguishes critical international relations theory from other theorizing is “its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the hegemonic power of the present their efforts to go against the dominant currents by showing how contemporary practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and domination critical security studies take on an untimely endeavor. Neufeld regards critical approaches to security as “one of the more hopeful intellectual developments The desire for change have led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must accompany critical thinking a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at critical theory purport[s] to ‘think against’ the prevailing current” and c]ritical security studies is no exception critical approaches to security problematize what is taken for granted in the disciplinary production of knowledge about security by “resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing]… security, which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core ‘national’ values, forcibly and from whom security is needed (the enemy).” untimely critique of security entails an attunement to the times and an aggressive violation of their self-conception extending a call to “dismantle security” was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted as the time of crisis in security what is first needed is to overturn the taken-for-granted relations between crisis, timeliness, and critique practice of critical theory appeals to a concern with time that itself signals a rupture of temporal continuity a rupture in political imaginary the present is interpreted as an opening that calls for a response Untimely critique transforms into a technique to blow up the present through fracturing its apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its closed political and epistemological universe the distinction between a political subjectivity is confined to choosing between the existing alternatives and a form of subjectivity that creates the very set of alternatives by “transcend[ing] the coordinates of a given situation [and] ‘posit[ing] the presuppositions’ of one's activity” by redefining the very situation within which one is active critique conceives the present as “historically contoured but not necessarily continuous with what has been It renders the present as the site of “non-utopian possibility” since it is constrained It entails contesting the delimitations of choice and challenging the confinement of politics to existing possibilities what we believe to have happened to us bears concretely on what we are prepared to do with ourselves now and in the future Neocleous concretizes the political stakes entailed with the dead from the perspective of a conservative which aims to reconcile the dead with the living, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to legitimate its fascist program and a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the source of hope and inspiration for the future Brown’s attempt to trace critique vis-à-vis its relation to political time provides a counter-narrative to the conservative assertions that shun untimely critique of security as a luxurious interest committed to abstract ideals rather than to the “reality” of politics Dismantling security entails a claim to unsettle the accounts of “what the times are” with a “bid to reset time.” It aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands thought to be on time aims to challenge the moralizing move that arrives in the form of assertions that saying “no!” to security, that refusing to write it, would be untimely dismantling security aims to open up space for alternative forms, for a different language of politics so as to “stop digging” the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse engagement tries to recast what is taken-for-granted by attending to the conceptual assumptions historical and systemic conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out it entails a simultaneous move of refusing to be a disciple of the discipline of security This implies overturning not only the silent disciplinary protocols about which questions are legitimate but also the very framework that informs those questions. such a notion of the untimely paradoxically calls on critical thought to be on time in the sense of being punctual and strategic untimely critique that dismantling security goes against the times that are saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward taking apart the architecture of security. | the suggestion to dismantle security was deemed untimely the senses invoked to declare critique ‘untimely’ exposition overturns what it means to be relevant c]ritical security studies problematize disciplinary production of knowledge by “resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing] Untimely critique blow up the present through fracturing apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its closed epistemological universe alternatives transcend a given situation posit the presuppositions’ by redefining the very situation dismantling security aims to open up space for a different language of politics to “stop digging” the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse engagement entails refusing to be a disciple of security overturning the framework that informs questions | Calkivik 10 – PhD in Poli Sci @ Univ Minnesota (Emine Asli, 10/2010, "DISMANTLING SECURITY," PhD dissertation submitted to Univ Minnesota for Raymond Duvall, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf)
It is this self-evidence of security even for critical approaches and the antinomy stemming from dissident voices reproducing the language of those they dissent from that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as untimely critique. As mentioned in the vignette in the opening section, the suggestion to dismantle security was itself deemed as an untimely pursuit in a world where lives of millions were rendered brutally insecure by poverty, violence, disease, and ongoing political conflicts. Colored by the tone of a call to conscience in the face of the ongoing crisis of security, it was not the time, interlocutors argued, for self-indulgent critique. I will argue that it is the element of being untimely, the effort, in the words of Walter Benjamin, “to brush history against the grain” that gives critical thinking its power.291 It might appear as a trivial discussion to bring up the relation between time and critique because conceptions of critical thinking in the discipline of International Relations already possess the notion that critical thought needs to be untimely. In the first section, I will tease out what this notion of untimeliness entails by visiting ongoing conversations within the discipline about critical thought and political time. Through this discussion, I hope to clarify what sets apart dismantling security as untimely critique from the notion of untimeliness at work in critical international relations theory. The latter conception of the untimely, I will suggest, paradoxically calls on critical thought to be “on time” in that it champions a particular understanding of what it means for critical scholarship to be relevant and responsible for its times. This notion of the untimely demands that critique be strategic and respond to political exigency, that it provide answers in this light instead of raising more questions about which questions could be raised or what presuppositions underlie the questions that are deemed to be waiting for answers. After elaborating in the first section such strategic conceptions of the untimeliness of critical theorizing, in the second section I will turn to a different sense of the untimely by drawing upon Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique, crisis, and political time through her reading of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”292 In contrast to a notion of untimeliness that demands strategic thinking and punctuality, Brown’s exegesis provides a conception of historical materialism where critique is figured as a force of disruption, a form of intervention that reconfigures the meaning of the times and “contest[s] the very senses of time invoked to declare critique ‘untimely’.”293 Her exposition overturns the view of critique as a self-indulgent practice as it highlights the immediately political nature of critique and reconfigures the meaning of what it means for critical thought to be relevant.294 It is in this sense of the untimely, I will suggest, that dismantling security as a critique hopes to recover. I should point out that in this discussion my intention is neither to construct a theory of critique nor to provide an exhaustive review and evaluation of the forms of critical theorizing in International Relations. Rather, my aim is to contribute to the existing efforts that engage with the question of what it means to be critical apart from drawing the epistemological and methodological boundaries so as to think about how one is critical.295 While I do not deny the importance of epistemological questions, I contend that taking time to think about the meaning of critique beyond these issues presents itself as an important task. This task takes on additional importance within the context of security studies where any realm of investigation quickly begets its critical counterpart. The rapid emergence and institutionalization of critical terrorism studies when studies on terrorism were proliferating under the auspices of the so-called Global War on Terror provides a striking example to this trend. 296 Such instances are important reminders that, to the extent that epistemology and methodology are reified as the sole concerns in defining and assessing critical thinking297 or “wrong headed refusals”298 to get on with positive projects and empirical research gets branded as debilitating for critical projects, what is erased from sight is the political nature of the questions asked and what is lost is the chance to reflect upon what it means for critical thinking to respond to its times. In his meditation on the meaning of responding and the sense of responsibility entailed by writing, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that “all writing is ‘committed.’” 299 This notion of commitment diverges from the programmatic sense of committed writing. What underlies this conception is an understanding of writing as responding: writing is a response to the voice of an other.In Nancy’s words, “[w]hoever writes responds” 300 and “makes himself responsible to in the absolute sense.”301 Suggesting that there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creative autonomy premised on the idea of a free, self-legislating subject who responds. In other words, it discredits the idea of an original voice by suggesting that there is no voice that is not a response to a prior response. Hence, to respond is configured as responding to an expectation rather than as an answer to a question and responsibility is cast as an “anticipated response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, not exactly predictable expectations.”302 Echoing Nancy, David Campbell makes an important reminder as he suggests that as international relations scholars “we are always already engaged,” although the sites, mechanisms and quality of engagements might vary.303 The question, then, is not whether as scholars we are engaged or not, but what the nature of this engagement is. Such a re-framing of the question is intended to highlight the political nature of all interpretation and the importance of developing an “ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, limits, their historical production, social and political effects, and the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action.”304 Taking as its object assumptions and limits, their historical production and social and political effects places the relevancy of critical thought and responsibility of critical scholarship on new ground. It is this ethos of critique that dismantling security hopes to recover for a discipline where security operates as the foundational principle and where critical thinking keeps on contributing to security’s impressing itself as a self-evident condition. Critical Theory and Punctuality Within the context of International Relations, critical thought’s orientation toward its time comes out strongly in Kimberley Hutchings’s formulation.305 According to Hutchings, no matter what form it takes, what distinguishes critical international relations theory from other forms of theorizing is “its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the hegemonic power of the present.”306 What this implies about the nature of critical thought is that it needs to be not only diagnostic, but also self-reflexive. In the words of Hutchings, “all critical theories lay claim to some kind of account not only of the present of international politics and its relation to possible futures, but also of the role of critical theory in the present and future in international politics.” 307 Not only analyzing the present, but also introducing the question of the future into analysis places political time at the center of critical enterprise and makes the problem of change a core concern. It is this question of change that situates different forms of critical thinking on a shared ground since they all attempt to expose the way in which what is presented as given and natural is historically produced and hence open to change. With their orientation to change, their efforts to go against the dominant currents and challenge the hegemony of existing power relations by showing how contemporary practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and domination, critical theorists in general and critical security studies specialists in particular take on an untimely endeavor. It is this understanding of the untimely aspect of critical thinking that is emphasized by Mark Neufeld, who regards the development of critical approaches to security as “one of the more hopeful intellectual developments in recent years.”308 Despite nurturing from different theoretical traditions and therefore harboring “fundamental differences between modernist and postmodernist commitments,” writes Neufeld, scholars who are involved in the critical project nevertheless “share a common concern with calling into question ‘prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized.’” 309 The desire for change—through being untimely and making the way to alternative futures that would no longer resemble the present—have led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must accompany all critical thinking. Quoting Oscar Wilde’s aphorism—a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at, Ken Booth argues for the need to restore the role and reputation of utopianism in the theory and practice of international politics. 310 According to Booth, what goes under the banner of realism—“ethnocentric self-interest writ large”311 — falls far beyond the realities of a drastically changed world political landscape at the end of the Cold War. He describes the new reality as “an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it a global community omelette [sic] is cooking.”312 Rather than insisting on the inescapability of war in the international system as political realists argue, Booth argues for the need and possibility to work toward the utopia of overcoming the condition of war by banking on the opportunities provided by a globalizing world. The point that critical thought needs to be untimely by going against its time is also emphasized by Dunne and Wheeler, who assert that, regardless of the form it takes, “critical theory purport[s] to ‘think against’ the prevailing current” and that “[c]ritical security studies is no exception” to this enterprise.313 According to the authors, the function of critical approaches to security is to problematize what is taken for granted in the disciplinary production of knowledge about security by “resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing]…theories of security, which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core ‘national’ values, forcibly if necessary) and from whom security is needed (the enemy).”314 While critical theory in this way is figured as untimely, I want to suggest that this notion of untimeliness gets construed paradoxically in a quite timely fashion. With a perceived disjuncture between writing the world from within a discipline and acting in it placed at the center of the debates, the performance of critical thought gets evaluated to the extent that it is punctual and in synch with the times. Does critical thought provide concrete guidance and prescribe what is to be done? Can it move beyond mere talk and make timely political interventions by providing solutions? Does it have answers to the strategic questions of progressive movements? Demanding that critical theorizing come clean in the court of these questions, such conceptions of the untimely demand that critique respond to its times in a responsible way, where being responsible is understood in stark contrast to a notion of responding and responsibility that I briefly discussed in the introductory pages of this chapter (through the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and David Campbell). Let me visit two recent conversations ensuing from the declarations of the contemporary crisis of critical theorizing in order to clarify what I mean by a timely understanding of untimely critique. The first conversation was published as a special issue in the Review of International Studies (RIS), one of the major journals of the field. Prominent figures took the 25th anniversary of the journal’s publication of two key texts—regarded as canonical for the launching and development of critical theorizing in International Relations—as an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the impact of critical theory in the discipline and interrogate what its future might be. 315 The texts in question, which are depicted as having shaken the premises of the static world of the discipline, are Robert Cox’s 1981 essay entitled on “Social Forces, States, and World Orders”316 and Richard Ashley’s article, “Political Realism and Human Interests.”317 In their introductory essay to the issue, Rengger and Thirkell-White suggest that the essays by Cox and Ashley—followed by Andrew Linklater’s Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations318 —represent “the breach in the dyke” of the three dominant discourses in International Relations (i.e., positivists, English School, and Marxism), unleashing “a torrent [that would] soon become a flood” as variety of theoretical approaches in contemporary social theory (i.e., feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, poststructuralism, and post-colonialism) would get introduced through the works of critical scholars.319 After elaborating the various responses given to and resistance raised against the critical project in the discipline, the authors provide an overview and an assessment of the current state of critical theorizing in International Relations. They argue that the central question for much of the ongoing debate within the critical camp in its present state—a question that it cannot help but come to terms with and provide a response to—concerns the relation between critical thought and political practice. As they state, the “fundamental philosophical question [that] can no longer be sidestepped” by critical International Relations theory is the question of the relation between “knowledge of the world and action in it.”320 One of the points alluded to in the essay is that forms of critical theorizing, which leave the future “to contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects” and therefore provide “less guidance for concrete political action”321 or, again, those that problematize underlying assumptions of thought and “say little about the potential political agency that might be involved in any subsequent struggles”322 may render the critical enterprise impotent and perhaps even suspect. This point comes out clearly in Craig Murphy’s contribution to the collection of essays in the RIS’s special issue. 323 Echoing William Wallace’s argument that critical theorists tend to be “monks,”324 who have little to offer for political actors engaged in real world politics, Murphy argues that the promise of critical theory is “partially kept” because of the limited influence it has had outside the academy towards changing the world.Building a different world, he suggests, requires more than isolated academic talk; that it demands not merely “words,” but “deeds.”325 This, according to Murphy, requires providing “knowledge that contributes to change.”326 Such knowledge would emanate from connections with the marginalized and would incorporate observations of actors in their everyday practices. More importantly, it would create an inspiring vision for social movements, such as the one provided by the concept of human development, which, according to Murphy, was especially powerful “because it embodied a value-oriented way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations.”327 In sum, if critical theory is to retain its critical edge, Murphy’s discussion suggests, it has to be in synch with political time and respond to its immediate demands. The second debate that is revelatory of this conception of the timing of critical theory—i.e., that critical thinking be strategic and efficient in relation to political time—takes place in relation to the contemporary in/security environment shaped by the so-called Global War on Terror. The theme that bears its mark on these debates is the extent to which critical inquiries about the contemporary security landscape become complicit in the workings of power and what critique can offer to render the world more legible for progressive struggles.328 For instance, warning critical theorists against being co-opted by or aligned with belligerence and war-mongering, Richard Devetak asserts that critical international theory has an urgent “need to distinguish its position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism.”329 While scholars such as Devetak, Booth,330 and Fierke331 take the critical task to be an attempt to rescue liberal internationalism from turning into liberal imperialism, others announce the “crisis of critical theorizing” and suggest that critical writings on the nature of the contemporary security order lack the resources to grasp their actual limitations, where the latter is said to reside not in the realm of academic debate, but in the realm of political practice.332 It is amidst these debates on critique, crisis, and political time that Richard Beardsworth raises the question of the future of critical philosophy in the face of the challenges posed by contemporary world politics.333 Recounting these challenges, he provides the matrix for a proper form of critical inquiry that could come to terms with “[o]ur historical actuality.”334 He describes this actuality as the “thick context” of modernity (“an epoch, delimited by the capitalization of social relations,” which imposes its own philosophical problematic—“that is, the attempt, following the social consequences of capitalism, to articulate the relation between individuality and collective spirit”335 ), American unilateralism in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the growing political disempowerment of people worldwide. Arguing that “contemporary return of religion and new forms of irrationalism emerge, in large part, out of the failure of the second response of modernity to provide a secular solution to the inequalities of the nation-state and colonization,”336 he formulates the awaiting political task for critical endeavors as constructing a world polity to resist the disintegration of the world under the force of capital.It is with this goal in mind that he suggests that “responsible scholarship needs to rescue reason in the face irrational war”337 and that intellectuals need to provide “the framework for a world ethical community of law, endowed with political mechanisms of implementation in the context of a regulated planetary economy.”338 He suggests that an aporetic form of thinking such as Jacques Derrida’s—a thinking that “ignores the affirmative relation between the determining powers of reason and history”339 —would be an unhelpful resource because such thinking “does not open up to where work needs to be done for these new forms of polity to emerge.”340 In other words, critical thinking, according to Beardsworth, needs to articulate and point out possible political avenues and to orient thought and action in concrete ways so as to contribute to progressive political change rather than dwelling on the encounter of the incalculable and calculation and im-possibility of world democracy in a Derridean fashion. In similar ways to the first debate on critique that I discussed, critical thinking is once again called upon to respond to political time in a strategic and efficient manner. As critical inquiry gets summoned up to the court of reason in Beardsworth’s account, its realm of engagement is limited to that which the light of reason can be shed upon, and its politics is confined to mapping out the achievable and the doable in a given historical context without questioning or disrupting the limits of what is presented as “realistic” choices. Hence, if untimely critical thought is to be meaningful it has to be on time by responding to political exigency in a practical, efficient, and strategic manner. In contrast to this prevalent form of understanding the untimeliness of critical theory, I will now turn to a different account of the untimely provided by Wendy Brown whose work informs the project of dismantling security as untimely critique. Drawing from her discussion of the relationship between critique, crisis, and political time, I will suggest that untimely critique of security entails, simultaneously, an attunement to the times and an aggressive violation of their self-conception. It is in this different sense of the untimely that the suggestion of dismantling security needs to be situated. Critique and Political Time As I suggested in the Prelude to this chapter, elevating security itself to the position of major protagonist and extending a call to “dismantle security” was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted as the time of crisis in security. Such a declaration stood as an exemplary moment (not in the sense of illustration or allegory, but as a moment of crystallization) for disciplinary prohibitions to think and act otherwise—perhaps the moment when a doxa exhibits its most powerful hold. Hence, what is first needed is to overturn the taken-for-granted relations between crisis, timeliness, and critique. The roots krisis and kritik can be traced back to the Greek word krinõ, which meant “to separate”, to “choose,” to “judge,” to “decide.”341 While creating a broad spectrum of meanings, it was intimately related to politics as it connoted a “divorce” or “quarrel,” but also a moment of decision and a turning point. It was also used as a jurisprudential term in the sense of making a decision, reaching a verdict or judgment (kritik) on an alleged disorder so as to provide a way to restore order. Rather than being separated into two domains of meaning—that of “subjective critique” and “objective crisis”—krisis and kritik were conceived as interlinked moments. Koselleck explains this conceptual fusion: [I]t wasin the sense of “judgment,” “trial,” “legal decision,” and ultimately “court” that crisis achieved a high constitutionalstatus, through which the individual citizen and the community were bound together. The “for and against” wastherefore present in the original meaning of the word and thisin a manner that already conceptually anticipated the appropriate judgment. 342 Recognition of an objective crisis and subjective judgments to be passed on it so as to come up with a formula for restoring the health of the polity by setting the times right were thereby infused and implicated in each other.343 Consequently, as Brown notes, there could be no such thing as “mere critique” or “untimely critique” because critique always entailed a concern with political time: “[C]ritique as political krisis promise[d] to restore continuity by repairing or renewing the justice that gives an order the prospect of continuity, that indeed ma[de] it continuous.”344 The breaking of this intimate link between krisis and kritik, the consequent depoliticization of critique and its sundering from crisis coincides with the rise of modern political order and redistribution of the public space into the binary structure of sovereign and subject, public and private.345 Failing to note the link between the critique it practiced and the looming political crisis, emerging philosophies of history, according Koselleck, had the effect of obfuscating this crisis. As he explains, “[n]ever politically grasped, [this political crisis] remained concealed in historico-philosophical images of the future which cause the day’s events to pale.”346 It is this intimate, but severed, link between crisis and critique in historical narratives that Wendy Brown’s discussion brings to the fore and re-problematizes. She turns to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and challenges conventional understandings of historical materialism, which conceives of the present in terms of unfolding laws of history.347 According to Brown, the practice of critical theory appeals to a concern with time to the extent that “[t]he crisis that incites critique and that critique engages itself signals a rupture of temporal continuity, which is at the same time a rupture in political imaginary.”348 Cast in these terms, it is a particular experience with time, with the present, that Brown suggests Benjamin’s theses aim to capture. Rather than an unmoving or an automatically overcome present (a present that is out of time), the present is interpreted as an opening that calls for a response to it. This call for a response highlights the idea that, far from being a luxury, critique is non-optional in its nature. Such an understanding of critical thought is premised on a historical consciousness that grasps the present historically so as to break with the selfconception of the age. Untimely critique transforms into a technique to blow up the present through fracturing its apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its closed political and epistemological universe.349 Such a conception resonates with the distinction that Žižek makes between a political subjectivity that is confined to choosing between the existing alternatives—one that takes the limits of what is given as the limits to what is possible—and a form of subjectivity that creates the very set of alternatives by “transcend[ing] the coordinates of a given situation [and] ‘posit[ing] the presuppositions’ of one's activity” by redefining the very situation within which one is active.”350 With its attempt to grasp the times in its singularity, critique is cast neither as a breaking free from the weight of time (which would amount to ahistoricity) nor being weighed down by the times (as in the case of teleology).351 It conceives the present as “historically contoured but not itself experienced as history because not necessarily continuous with what has been.”352 It is an attitude that renders the present as the site of “non-utopian possibility” since it is historically situated and constrained yet also a possibility since it is not historically foreordained or determined.353 It entails contesting the delimitations of choice and challenging the confinement of politics to existing possibilities. Rather than positing history as existing objectively outside of narration, what Brown’s discussion highlights is the intimate relation between the constitution of political subjectivity vis-à-vis the meaning of history for the present. It alludes to “the power of historical discourse,” which Mowitt explains as a power “to estrange us from that which is most familiar, namely, the fixity of the present” because “what we believe to have happened to us bears concretely on what we are prepared to do with ourselves both now and in the future.”354 Mark Neocleous concretizes the political stakes entailed in such encounters with history—with the dead—from the perspective of three political traditions: a conservative one, which aims to reconcile the dead with the living, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to legitimate its fascist program, and a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the source of hope and inspiration for the future.355 Brown’s discussion of critique and political time is significant for highlighting the immediately political nature of critique in contrast to contemporary invocations that cast it as a self-indulgent practice, an untimely luxury, a disinterested, distanced, academic endeavor. Her attempt to trace critique vis-à-vis its relation to political time provides a counter-narrative to the conservative and moralizing assertions that shun untimely critique of security as a luxurious interest that is committed to abstract ideals rather than to the “reality” of politics—i.e., running after utopia rather than modeling “real world” solutions. Dismantling security as untimely critique entails a similar claim to unsettle the accounts of “what the times are” with a “bid to reset time.”356 It aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands on critical thought to be on time; aims to challenge the moralizing move, the call to conscience that arrives in the form of assertions that saying “no!” to security, that refusing to write it, would be untimely. Rather than succumbing to the injunction that thought of political possibility is to be confined within the framework of security, dismantling security aims to open up space for alternative forms, for a different language of politics so as to “stop digging” the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse. Conclusion As an attempt to push a debate that is fixated on security to the limit and explore what it means to dismantle security, my engagement with various aspects of this move is not intended as an analysis raised at the level of causal interpretations or as an attempt to find better solutions to a problem that already has a name. Rather, it tries to recast what is taken-for-granted by attending to the conceptual assumptions, the historical and systemic conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out. As I tried to show in this chapter, it also entails a simultaneous move of refusing to be a disciple of the discipline of security. This implies overturning not only the silent disciplinary protocols about which questions are legitimate to ask, but also the very framework that informs those questions. It is from this perspective that I devoted two chapters to examining and clarifying the proposal to dismantle security as a claim on time. After explicating, in Chapter 4, the temporal structure that is enacted by politics of security and elaborating on how security structures the relation between the present and the future, in this chapter, I approached the question of temporality from a different perspective, by situating it in relation to disciplinary times in order to clarify what an untimely critique of security means. I tried to elaborate this notion of the untimely by exploring the understanding of untimeliness that informs certain conceptions of critical theorizing in International Relations. I suggested that such a notion of the untimely paradoxically calls on critical thought to be on time in the sense of being punctual and strategic. Turning to Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique and political time, I elaborated on the sense of untimely critique that dismantling security strives for—a critique that goes against the times that are saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward taking apart the architecture of security. | 31,290 | <h4>Reject the affirmative’s security discourse – this untimely intervention is the only chance for a counter-discourse</h4><p>This untimely interruption allows us to transcend and defeat security discourse and open the epistemological universe’s closed doors</p><p><strong>Calkivik 10</strong> – PhD in Poli Sci @ Univ Minnesota (Emine Asli, 10/2010, "DISMANTLING SECURITY," PhD dissertation submitted to Univ Minnesota for Raymond Duvall, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf)</p><p>It is this self-evidence of security even for critical approaches and the antinomy stemming from dissident voices reproducing the language of those they dissent from that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as untimely critique. As mentioned in the vignette in the opening section, <u><mark>the suggestion to dismantle security was</u></mark> itself <u><mark>deemed</u></mark> as an <u><mark>untimely</u></mark> pursuit <u>in a world where lives of millions were rendered</u> brutally <u>insecure by poverty, violence, disease, and</u> ongoing <u>political conflicts</u>. Colored by the tone of a call to conscience in the face of the ongoing crisis of security, it was not the time, interlocutors argued, for self-indulgent critique. I will argue that <u>it is the element of being untimely</u>, the effort, in the words of Walter Benjamin, “<u>to brush history against the grain</u>” <u>that gives critical thinking its power</u>.291 It might appear as a trivial discussion to bring up the relation between time and critique because conceptions of critical thinking in the discipline of International Relations already possess the notion that critical thought needs to be untimely. In the first section, I will tease out what this notion of untimeliness entails by visiting ongoing conversations within the discipline about critical thought and political time. Through this discussion, I hope to clarify what sets apart dismantling security as untimely critique from the notion of untimeliness at work in critical international relations theory. The latter conception of the untimely, I will suggest, paradoxically calls on critical thought to be “on time” in that it champions a particular understanding of what it means for critical scholarship to be relevant and responsible for its times. <u>This notion of the untimely demands</u> that <u>critique be strategic and respond to political exigency</u>, that it provide answers in this light instead of raising more questions about which questions could be raised or what presuppositions underlie the questions that are deemed to be waiting for answers. After elaborating in the first section such strategic conceptions of the untimeliness of critical theorizing, in the second section I will turn to a different sense of the untimely by drawing upon Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique, crisis, and political time through her reading of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”292 In contrast to a notion of untimeliness that demands strategic thinking and punctuality, Brown’s exegesis provides a conception of historical materialism where <u>critique is figured as a force of <strong>disruption</strong>, a form of <strong>intervention</strong> that reconfigures the meaning of the times and “contest[s] <mark>the </mark>very <mark>senses </mark>of time <mark>invoked to declare critique ‘untimely’</u></mark>.”293 <u>Her <mark>exposition overturns</mark> the view of critique as</u> a <u>self-indulgent</u> practice as it highlights the immediately political nature of critique <u>and reconfigures the meaning of <mark>what it means</u></mark> for critical thought <u><mark>to be relevant</u></mark>.294 It is in this sense of the untimely, I will suggest, that dismantling security as a critique hopes to recover. I should point out that in this discussion my intention is neither to construct a theory of critique nor to provide an exhaustive review and evaluation of the forms of critical theorizing in International Relations. Rather, my aim is to contribute to the existing efforts that engage with the question of what it means to be critical apart from drawing the epistemological and methodological boundaries so as to think about how one is critical.295 While I do not deny the importance of epistemological questions, I contend that taking time to think about the meaning of critique beyond these issues presents itself as an important task. This task takes on additional importance within the context of security studies where any realm of investigation quickly begets its critical counterpart. The rapid emergence and institutionalization of critical terrorism studies when studies on terrorism were proliferating under the auspices of the so-called Global War on Terror provides a striking example to this trend. 296 Such instances are important reminders that, to the extent that epistemology and methodology are reified as the sole concerns in defining and assessing critical thinking297 or “wrong headed refusals”298 to get on with positive projects and empirical research gets branded as debilitating for critical projects, what is erased from sight is the political nature of the questions asked and what is lost is the chance to reflect upon what it means for critical thinking to respond to its times. In his meditation on the meaning of responding and the sense of responsibility entailed by writing, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that “all writing is ‘committed.’” 299 This notion of commitment diverges from the programmatic sense of committed writing. What underlies this conception is an understanding of writing as responding: writing is a response to the voice of an other.In Nancy’s words, “[w]hoever writes responds” 300 and “makes himself responsible to in the absolute sense.”301 Suggesting that <u>there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment</u>, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creative autonomy premised on the idea of a free, self-legislating subject who responds. In other words, it discredits the idea of an original voice by suggesting that there is no voice that is not a response to a prior response. Hence, to respond is configured as responding to an expectation rather than as an answer to a question and responsibility is cast as an “anticipated response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, not exactly predictable expectations.”302 Echoing Nancy, David Campbell makes an important reminder as he suggests that as international relations scholars “we are always already engaged,” although the sites, mechanisms and quality of engagements might vary.303 <u>The question</u>, then, <u>is not whether</u> as <u>scholars</u> we <u>are engaged</u> or not, <u>but what the nature of this engagement is.</u> Such a re-framing of the question is intended to highlight the political nature of all interpretation and the importance of developing an “ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, limits, their historical production, social and political effects, and the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action.”304 Taking as its object assumptions and limits, their historical production and social and political effects places the relevancy of critical thought and responsibility of critical scholarship on new ground. <u>It is this ethos of critique that dismantling security hopes to recover for a discipline where security operates as the foundational principle and</u> where <u>critical thinking keeps on contributing to security’s</u> impressing itself as a <u>self-evident condition. </u>Critical Theory and Punctuality Within the context of International Relations, critical thought’s orientation toward its time comes out strongly in Kimberley Hutchings’s formulation.305 According to Hutchings, no matter what form it takes, <u>what distinguishes critical international relations theory from other</u> forms of <u>theorizing is “its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the <strong>hegemonic power of the present</u></strong>.”306 What this implies about the nature of critical thought is that it needs to be not only diagnostic, but also self-reflexive. In the words of Hutchings, “all critical theories lay claim to some kind of account not only of the present of international politics and its relation to possible futures, but also of the role of critical theory in the present and future in international politics.” 307 Not only analyzing the present, but also introducing the question of the future into analysis places political time at the center of critical enterprise and makes the problem of change a core concern. It is this question of change that situates different forms of critical thinking on a shared ground since they all attempt to expose the way in which what is presented as given and natural is historically produced and hence open to change. With their orientation to change, <u>their efforts to go against the dominant currents</u> and challenge the hegemony of existing power relations <u>by showing how contemporary practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and domination</u>, critical theorists in general and <u>critical security studies</u> specialists in particular <u>take on an untimely endeavor. </u>It is this understanding of the untimely aspect of critical thinking that is emphasized by Mark <u>Neufeld</u>, who <u>regards</u> the development of <u>critical approaches to security as “one of the more hopeful intellectual developments</u> in recent years.”308 Despite nurturing from different theoretical traditions and therefore harboring “fundamental differences between modernist and postmodernist commitments,” writes Neufeld, scholars who are involved in the critical project nevertheless “share a common concern with calling into question ‘prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized.’” 309 <u>The desire for change</u>—through being untimely and making the way to alternative futures that would no longer resemble the present—<u>have led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must accompany</u> all <u>critical thinking</u>. Quoting Oscar Wilde’s aphorism—<u>a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at</u>, Ken Booth argues for the need to restore the role and reputation of utopianism in the theory and practice of international politics. 310 According to Booth, what goes under the banner of realism—“ethnocentric self-interest writ large”311 — falls far beyond the realities of a drastically changed world political landscape at the end of the Cold War. He describes the new reality as “an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it a global community omelette [sic] is cooking.”312 Rather than insisting on the inescapability of war in the international system as political realists argue, Booth argues for the need and possibility to work toward the utopia of overcoming the condition of war by banking on the opportunities provided by a globalizing world. The point that critical thought needs to be untimely by going against its time is also emphasized by Dunne and Wheeler, who assert that, regardless of the form it takes, “<u>critical theory purport[s] to ‘think against’ the prevailing current” and</u> that “[<u><mark>c]ritical security studies</mark> is no exception</u>” to this enterprise.313 According to the authors, the function of <u>critical approaches to security</u> is to <u><mark>problematize </mark>what is taken for granted in the <mark>disciplinary production of knowledge </mark>about security <mark>by “<strong>resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing]</strong></mark>…</u>theories of <u>security, which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core ‘national’ values, forcibly</u> if necessary) <u>and from whom security is needed (the enemy).”</u>314 While critical theory in this way is figured as untimely, I want to suggest that this notion of untimeliness gets construed paradoxically in a quite timely fashion. With a perceived disjuncture between writing the world from within a discipline and acting in it placed at the center of the debates, the performance of critical thought gets evaluated to the extent that it is punctual and in synch with the times. Does critical thought provide concrete guidance and prescribe what is to be done? Can it move beyond mere talk and make timely political interventions by providing solutions? Does it have answers to the strategic questions of progressive movements? Demanding that critical theorizing come clean in the court of these questions, such conceptions of the untimely demand that critique respond to its times in a responsible way, where being responsible is understood in stark contrast to a notion of responding and responsibility that I briefly discussed in the introductory pages of this chapter (through the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and David Campbell). Let me visit two recent conversations ensuing from the declarations of the contemporary crisis of critical theorizing in order to clarify what I mean by a timely understanding of untimely critique. The first conversation was published as a special issue in the Review of International Studies (RIS), one of the major journals of the field. Prominent figures took the 25th anniversary of the journal’s publication of two key texts—regarded as canonical for the launching and development of critical theorizing in International Relations—as an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the impact of critical theory in the discipline and interrogate what its future might be. 315 The texts in question, which are depicted as having shaken the premises of the static world of the discipline, are Robert Cox’s 1981 essay entitled on “Social Forces, States, and World Orders”316 and Richard Ashley’s article, “Political Realism and Human Interests.”317 In their introductory essay to the issue, Rengger and Thirkell-White suggest that the essays by Cox and Ashley—followed by Andrew Linklater’s Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations318 —represent “the breach in the dyke” of the three dominant discourses in International Relations (i.e., positivists, English School, and Marxism), unleashing “a torrent [that would] soon become a flood” as variety of theoretical approaches in contemporary social theory (i.e., feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, poststructuralism, and post-colonialism) would get introduced through the works of critical scholars.319 After elaborating the various responses given to and resistance raised against the critical project in the discipline, the authors provide an overview and an assessment of the current state of critical theorizing in International Relations. They argue that the central question for much of the ongoing debate within the critical camp in its present state—a question that it cannot help but come to terms with and provide a response to—concerns the relation between critical thought and political practice. As they state, the “fundamental philosophical question [that] can no longer be sidestepped” by critical International Relations theory is the question of the relation between “knowledge of the world and action in it.”320 One of the points alluded to in the essay is that forms of critical theorizing, which leave the future “to contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects” and therefore provide “less guidance for concrete political action”321 or, again, those that problematize underlying assumptions of thought and “say little about the potential political agency that might be involved in any subsequent struggles”322 may render the critical enterprise impotent and perhaps even suspect. This point comes out clearly in Craig Murphy’s contribution to the collection of essays in the RIS’s special issue. 323 Echoing William Wallace’s argument that critical theorists tend to be “monks,”324 who have little to offer for political actors engaged in real world politics, Murphy argues that the promise of critical theory is “partially kept” because of the limited influence it has had outside the academy towards changing the world.Building a different world, he suggests, requires more than isolated academic talk; that it demands not merely “words,” but “deeds.”325 This, according to Murphy, requires providing “knowledge that contributes to change.”326 Such knowledge would emanate from connections with the marginalized and would incorporate observations of actors in their everyday practices. More importantly, it would create an inspiring vision for social movements, such as the one provided by the concept of human development, which, according to Murphy, was especially powerful “because it embodied a value-oriented way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations.”327 In sum, if critical theory is to retain its critical edge, Murphy’s discussion suggests, it has to be in synch with political time and respond to its immediate demands. The second debate that is revelatory of this conception of the timing of critical theory—i.e., that critical thinking be strategic and efficient in relation to political time—takes place in relation to the contemporary in/security environment shaped by the so-called Global War on Terror. The theme that bears its mark on these debates is the extent to which critical inquiries about the contemporary security landscape become complicit in the workings of power and what critique can offer to render the world more legible for progressive struggles.328 For instance, warning critical theorists against being co-opted by or aligned with belligerence and war-mongering, Richard Devetak asserts that critical international theory has an urgent “need to distinguish its position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism.”329 While scholars such as Devetak, Booth,330 and Fierke331 take the critical task to be an attempt to rescue liberal internationalism from turning into liberal imperialism, others announce the “crisis of critical theorizing” and suggest that critical writings on the nature of the contemporary security order lack the resources to grasp their actual limitations, where the latter is said to reside not in the realm of academic debate, but in the realm of political practice.332 It is amidst these debates on critique, crisis, and political time that Richard Beardsworth raises the question of the future of critical philosophy in the face of the challenges posed by contemporary world politics.333 Recounting these challenges, he provides the matrix for a proper form of critical inquiry that could come to terms with “[o]ur historical actuality.”334 He describes this actuality as the “thick context” of modernity (“an epoch, delimited by the capitalization of social relations,” which imposes its own philosophical problematic—“that is, the attempt, following the social consequences of capitalism, to articulate the relation between individuality and collective spirit”335 ), American unilateralism in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the growing political disempowerment of people worldwide. Arguing that “contemporary return of religion and new forms of irrationalism emerge, in large part, out of the failure of the second response of modernity to provide a secular solution to the inequalities of the nation-state and colonization,”336 he formulates the awaiting political task for critical endeavors as constructing a world polity to resist the disintegration of the world under the force of capital.It is with this goal in mind that he suggests that “responsible scholarship needs to rescue reason in the face irrational war”337 and that intellectuals need to provide “the framework for a world ethical community of law, endowed with political mechanisms of implementation in the context of a regulated planetary economy.”338 He suggests that an aporetic form of thinking such as Jacques Derrida’s—a thinking that “ignores the affirmative relation between the determining powers of reason and history”339 —would be an unhelpful resource because such thinking “does not open up to where work needs to be done for these new forms of polity to emerge.”340 In other words, critical thinking, according to Beardsworth, needs to articulate and point out possible political avenues and to orient thought and action in concrete ways so as to contribute to progressive political change rather than dwelling on the encounter of the incalculable and calculation and im-possibility of world democracy in a Derridean fashion. In similar ways to the first debate on critique that I discussed, critical thinking is once again called upon to respond to political time in a strategic and efficient manner. As critical inquiry gets summoned up to the court of reason in Beardsworth’s account, its realm of engagement is limited to that which the light of reason can be shed upon, and its politics is confined to mapping out the achievable and the doable in a given historical context without questioning or disrupting the limits of what is presented as “realistic” choices. Hence, if untimely critical thought is to be meaningful it has to be on time by responding to political exigency in a practical, efficient, and strategic manner. In contrast to this prevalent form of understanding the untimeliness of critical theory, I will now turn to a different account of the untimely provided by Wendy Brown whose work informs the project of dismantling security as untimely critique. Drawing from her discussion of the relationship between critique, crisis, and political time, I will suggest that <u>untimely critique of security entails</u>, simultaneously, <u>an attunement to the times and an <strong>aggressive violation of their self-conception</u></strong>. It is in this different sense of the untimely that the suggestion of dismantling security needs to be situated. Critique and Political Time As I suggested in the Prelude to this chapter, elevating security itself to the position of major protagonist and <u>extending a call to “dismantle security” was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted as the time of crisis in security</u>. Such a declaration stood as an exemplary moment (not in the sense of illustration or allegory, but as a moment of crystallization) for disciplinary prohibitions to think and act otherwise—perhaps the moment when a doxa exhibits its most powerful hold. Hence, <u>what is first needed is to overturn the taken-for-granted relations between crisis, timeliness, and critique</u>. The roots krisis and kritik can be traced back to the Greek word krinõ, which meant “to separate”, to “choose,” to “judge,” to “decide.”341 While creating a broad spectrum of meanings, it was intimately related to politics as it connoted a “divorce” or “quarrel,” but also a moment of decision and a turning point. It was also used as a jurisprudential term in the sense of making a decision, reaching a verdict or judgment (kritik) on an alleged disorder so as to provide a way to restore order. Rather than being separated into two domains of meaning—that of “subjective critique” and “objective crisis”—krisis and kritik were conceived as interlinked moments. Koselleck explains this conceptual fusion: [I]t wasin the sense of “judgment,” “trial,” “legal decision,” and ultimately “court” that crisis achieved a high constitutionalstatus, through which the individual citizen and the community were bound together. The “for and against” wastherefore present in the original meaning of the word and thisin a manner that already conceptually anticipated the appropriate judgment. 342 Recognition of an objective crisis and subjective judgments to be passed on it so as to come up with a formula for restoring the health of the polity by setting the times right were thereby infused and implicated in each other.343 Consequently, as Brown notes, there could be no such thing as “mere critique” or “untimely critique” because critique always entailed a concern with political time: “[C]ritique as political krisis promise[d] to restore continuity by repairing or renewing the justice that gives an order the prospect of continuity, that indeed ma[de] it continuous.”344 The breaking of this intimate link between krisis and kritik, the consequent depoliticization of critique and its sundering from crisis coincides with the rise of modern political order and redistribution of the public space into the binary structure of sovereign and subject, public and private.345 Failing to note the link between the critique it practiced and the looming political crisis, emerging philosophies of history, according Koselleck, had the effect of obfuscating this crisis. As he explains, “[n]ever politically grasped, [this political crisis] remained concealed in historico-philosophical images of the future which cause the day’s events to pale.”346 It is this intimate, but severed, link between crisis and critique in historical narratives that Wendy Brown’s discussion brings to the fore and re-problematizes. She turns to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and challenges conventional understandings of historical materialism, which conceives of the present in terms of unfolding laws of history.347 According to Brown, the <u>practice of critical theory appeals to a concern with time</u> to the extent <u>that</u> “[t]he crisis that incites critique and that critique engages <u>itself signals a <strong>rupture of temporal continuity</u></strong>, which is at the same time <u>a <strong>rupture in political imaginary</u></strong>.”348 Cast in these terms, it is a particular experience with time, with the present, that Brown suggests Benjamin’s theses aim to capture. Rather than an unmoving or an automatically overcome present (a present that is out of time), <u>the present is interpreted as an opening that calls for a response</u> to it. This call for a response highlights the idea that, far from being a luxury, critique is non-optional in its nature. Such an understanding of critical thought is premised on a historical consciousness that grasps the present historically so as to break with the selfconception of the age. <u><mark>Untimely critique</mark> transforms into a technique to <strong><mark>blow up the present</strong> through fracturing</mark> its <mark>apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its <strong>closed</mark> political and <mark>epistemological universe</u></strong></mark>.349 Such a conception resonates with <u>the distinction</u> that Žižek makes <u>between a political subjectivity</u> that <u>is confined to choosing between the existing alternatives</u>—one that takes the limits of what is given as the limits to what is possible—<u>and a form of subjectivity that creates the very set of <mark>alternatives </mark>by “<mark>transcend</mark>[ing] the coordinates of <mark>a given situation</mark> [and] ‘<mark>posit</mark>[ing] <mark>the presuppositions’</mark> of one's activity” <mark>by redefining the very situation</mark> within which one is active</u>.”350 With its attempt to grasp the times in its singularity, <u>critique</u> is cast neither as a breaking free from the weight of time (which would amount to ahistoricity) nor being weighed down by the times (as in the case of teleology).351 It <u>conceives the present as “historically contoured but not</u> itself experienced as history because not<u> necessarily continuous with what has been</u>.”352 <u>It</u> is an attitude that <u>renders the present as the site of “non-utopian possibility” since it is</u> historically situated and <u>constrained</u> yet also a possibility since it is not historically foreordained or determined.353 <u>It entails <strong>contesting the delimitations of choice</strong> and <strong>challenging the confinement of politics to existing possibilities</u></strong>. Rather than positing history as existing objectively outside of narration, what Brown’s discussion highlights is the intimate relation between the constitution of political subjectivity vis-à-vis the meaning of history for the present. It alludes to “the power of historical discourse,” which Mowitt explains as a power “to estrange us from that which is most familiar, namely, the fixity of the present” because “<u>what we believe to have happened to us bears concretely on what we are prepared to do with ourselves</u> both <u>now and in the future</u>.”354 Mark <u>Neocleous concretizes the political stakes entailed</u> in such encounters with history—<u>with the dead</u>—<u>from the perspective of </u>three political traditions: <u>a conservative</u> one, <u>which aims to reconcile the dead with the living, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to <strong>legitimate its fascist program</u></strong>, <u>and a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the source of hope and inspiration for the future</u>.355 <u>Brown’s</u> discussion of critique and political time is significant for highlighting the immediately political nature of critique in contrast to contemporary invocations that cast it as a self-indulgent practice, an untimely luxury, a disinterested, distanced, academic endeavor. Her <u>attempt to trace critique vis-à-vis its relation to political time provides a counter-narrative to the conservative</u> and moralizing <u>assertions that shun untimely critique of security as a luxurious interest</u> that is <u>committed to abstract ideals rather than to the “reality” of politics</u>—i.e., running after utopia rather than modeling “real world” solutions. <u>Dismantling security</u> as untimely critique <u>entails a</u> similar <u>claim to unsettle the accounts of “what the times are” with a “bid to reset time.”</u>356 <u>It aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands</u> on critical <u>thought to be on time</u>; <u><strong>aims to challenge the moralizing move</u></strong>, the call to conscience <u>that arrives in the form of assertions <strong>that saying “no!” to security</strong>, that <strong>refusing to write it, would be untimely</u></strong>. Rather than succumbing to the injunction that thought of political possibility is to be confined within the framework of security, <u><mark>dismantling security aims to open up space</mark> for alternative forms, <mark>for a different language of politics </mark>so as <mark>to “stop digging” the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse</u></mark>. Conclusion As an attempt to push a debate that is fixated on security to the limit and explore what it means to dismantle security, my <u><mark>engagement</u></mark> with various aspects of this move is not intended as an analysis raised at the level of causal interpretations or as an attempt to find better solutions to a problem that already has a name. Rather, it <u>tries to recast what is taken-for-granted by attending to the conceptual assumptions</u>, the <u>historical and systemic conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out</u>. As I tried to show in this chapter, <u>it</u> also <u><mark>entails</mark> a simultaneous move of <strong><mark>refusing to be a disciple of</mark> the discipline of <mark>security</u></strong></mark>. <u>This implies <mark>overturning</mark> not only the silent disciplinary protocols about which questions are legitimate </u>to ask, <u>but also <mark>the</mark> very <mark>framework that informs</mark> those <mark>questions</mark>. </u>It is from this perspective that I devoted two chapters to examining and clarifying the proposal to dismantle security as a claim on time. After explicating, in Chapter 4, the temporal structure that is enacted by politics of security and elaborating on how security structures the relation between the present and the future, in this chapter, I approached the question of temporality from a different perspective, by situating it in relation to disciplinary times in order to clarify what an untimely critique of security means. I tried to elaborate this notion of the untimely by exploring the understanding of untimeliness that informs certain conceptions of critical theorizing in International Relations. I suggested that <u>such a notion of the untimely paradoxically calls on critical thought to be on time in the sense of being punctual and strategic</u>. Turning to Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique and political time, I elaborated on the sense of <u>untimely critique that dismantling security </u>strives for—a critique that <u>goes against the times that are saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward <strong>taking apart the architecture of security. </p></u></strong> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 1 | 197,120 | 115 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,380 | The affirmative must defend a world where the United States federal government substantially increases its economic and/or diplomatic with the People’s Republic of China. The purpose of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question: Is the outcome of the enactment of a topical plan better than the status quo or a competitive policy option? | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The affirmative must <u>defend a world</u> where the United States federal government substantially increases its economic and/or diplomatic with the People’s Republic of China. The <u>purpose of the ballot</u> is to answer the resolutional question: Is the outcome of the enactment of a topical plan better than the status quo or a competitive policy option? </h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,799 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,381 | While util might have its flaws, it’s the only sustainable ethical theory | Baber 11 | Baber 5/13/11[Harriet Baber is a philosophy professor at the University of San Diego. | “Utilitarianism – it’s the best we’ve got” The Guardian 2011 d.a. 1/3/17] [AB] | AND
. But for the time being at least it's the best we've got. | null | The question: Does Osama bin Laden's capture justify torture? I'd forgotten all about
AND
. But for the time being at least it's the best we've got. | 148 | <h4><u>While util might have its flaws, it’s the only sustainable ethical theory</h4><p></u><strong>Baber <u></strong>5/13/</u><strong>11<u></strong>[Harriet Baber is a philosophy professor at the University of San Diego. | “Utilitarianism – it’s the best we’ve got” The Guardian 2011 d.a. 1/3/17] [AB]</p><p></u>The question: Does Osama bin Laden's capture justify torture? I'd forgotten all about </p><p><u><strong>AND</p><p></strong>. But for the time being at least <strong>it's the best we've got. </p></u></strong> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,801 | 3 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,382 | The system of knowledge that supports the orientalist archetype of the enemy ensures that the conditions of genocidal, colonial, and capitalist violence will continue. | Ilter 2003 | Ilter 2003 (Tuğrul is an Associate professor of Communication at Eastern Mediterranean University. “The Framing of September 11th in the Turkish Media” Arab Studies Quarterly 2003, Proquest) | the orientalist worlding of the world imagined an ontological/categorial/essential distinction between the Occident and the Orient whatever the West is ) the Orient is not characteristics attributed to the Orient are thus West-centric projections, the result of an active othering by the West. In making such characterizations, one adopts a Western point of view, and installs the West as the sovereign subject of history there is no room for a radically different Other that does not know its proper place, one that does not fit its domestic representation. The ontology of the Orient thus involves an epistemic violence, a violence in "knowing the Orient" that obliterates the Other and subjects its very being to the sovereignty of the West the whitewashed eurocentrism of such worlding, but also to the blanking of the radically other [allows] the Western writing of his(s)tory on lands that are epistemologically cleansed of aboriginal peoples and their stories, this is colonialism that colonizes minds in addition to bodies and lands.( The Western history of discovery and conquest, of colonialism and imperialism, of development and modernization, and of corporate globalization are all founded on this epistemic violence, and it should come as no surprise that they continue to beget violence on the ground. | whatever the West is the Orient is not and installs the West as the sovereign thus involves an epistemic violence in "knowing the Orient" this is colonialism that colonizes minds in addition to bodies and lands The Western history of discovery and conquest, of colonialism and imperialism and globalization founded on this epistemic violence | In his path-breaking work on orientalism that led to the creation of the new field of postcolonial studies, Edward Said has pointed out how the orientalist worlding of the world imagined an ontological/categorial/essential distinction between the Occident and the Orient. Accordingly, whatever the West is (for example modern, civilized, developed) the Orient is not (that is, not modern, not civilized, not developed). The characteristics attributed to the Orient are thus West-centric projections, the result of an active othering by the West. In making such characterizations, one adopts--one has already adopted-a Western point of view, and installs the West as the sovereign subject of history. In other words, one sees through the sovereign eye/I of the West. The otherness of the Orient is not radically Other, an unknown about which our (Western) knowledge is ignorant, but, an otherness that is the product of a colonizing and domesticating appropriation.(n2) We always-already know what the Orient is all about: it is the opposite of what we consider ourselves to be (not modern, not civilized, not developed). It is on the basis of this knowledge that comprehends the other as its binary opposition that the West makes universality claims for its knowledge. In this economy-of-the-same there is no room for a radically different Other that does not know its proper place, one that does not fit its domestic representation. Jacques Derrida has argued that this logic of binary opposition is characteristic of "Western metaphysics," and that it is from within this particular binary opposition that the Orient as the proper other of the West is projected. The properly identified other, in other words, is not outside the Western imaginary, but is projected onto the outside from within. What it depicts as the outside, where the other belongs, is internal to its representational logic of binary opposition. The ontology of the Orient thus involves an epistemic violence, a violence in "knowing the Orient" that obliterates the Other and subjects its very being to the sovereignty of the West in what Jacques Derrida has called a "white mythology.(n3) The "white" of white mythology refers not only to the whitewashed eurocentrism of such worlding, but also to the blanking of the radically other [allows] the Western writing of his(s)tory on lands that are epistemologically cleansed of aboriginal peoples and their stories, as illustrated by the European notion of "discovery." An idea like "Columbus' discovery of America," for example, makes absolutely no sense without this epistemic erasure. But the consequent cleansing of the natives, for example in the "Westward march of civilization" in North America, is congruent with their already-accomplished epistemic cleansing. As Ashis Nandy puts it, this is colonialism that colonizes minds in addition to bodies and lands.(n4) The Western history of discovery and conquest, of colonialism and imperialism, of development and modernization, and of corporate globalization are all founded on this epistemic violence, and it should come as no surprise that they continue to beget violence on the ground. | 3,164 | <h4>The system of knowledge that supports the orientalist archetype of the enemy ensures that the conditions of genocidal, colonial, and capitalist violence will continue. </h4><p><u><strong>Ilter</u></strong> <strong>2003</strong> (Tuğrul is an Associate professor of Communication at Eastern Mediterranean University. “The Framing of September 11th in the Turkish Media” Arab Studies Quarterly 2003, Proquest)<u> </p><p></u>In his path-breaking work on orientalism that led to the creation of the new field of postcolonial studies, Edward Said has pointed out how <u>the orientalist worlding of the world imagined an ontological/categorial/essential distinction between the Occident and the Orient</u>. Accordingly, <u><mark>whatever the West is</u></mark> (for example modern, civilized, developed<u>) <mark>the Orient is not</u></mark> (that is, not modern, not civilized, not developed). The <u>characteristics attributed to the Orient are thus West-centric projections, the result of an active othering by the West. In making such characterizations, one adopts</u>--one has already adopted-<u>a Western point of view, <mark>and installs the West as the sovereign</mark> subject of history</u>. In other words, one sees through the sovereign eye/I of the West. The otherness of the Orient is not radically Other, an unknown about which our (Western) knowledge is ignorant, but, an otherness that is the product of a colonizing and domesticating appropriation.(n2) We always-already know what the Orient is all about: it is the opposite of what we consider ourselves to be (not modern, not civilized, not developed). It is on the basis of this knowledge that comprehends the other as its binary opposition that the West makes universality claims for its knowledge. In this economy-of-the-same <u>there is no room for a radically different Other that does not know its proper place, one that does not fit its domestic representation<strong>.</u></strong> Jacques Derrida has argued that this logic of binary opposition is characteristic of "Western metaphysics," and that it is from within this particular binary opposition that the Orient as the proper other of the West is projected. The properly identified other, in other words, is not outside the Western imaginary, but is projected onto the outside from within. What it depicts as the outside, where the other belongs, is internal to its representational logic of binary opposition. <u>The ontology of the Orient <mark>thus involves an epistemic violence</mark>, a violence <mark>in "knowing the Orient"</mark> that obliterates the Other and subjects its very being to the sovereignty of the West</u> in what Jacques Derrida has called a "white mythology.(n3) The "white" of white mythology refers not only to <u>the whitewashed eurocentrism of such worlding, but also to the blanking of the radically other [allows] the Western writing of his(s)tory on lands that are epistemologically cleansed of aboriginal peoples and their stories,</u> as illustrated by the European notion of "discovery." An idea like "Columbus' discovery of America," for example, makes absolutely no sense without this epistemic erasure. But the consequent cleansing of the natives, for example in the "Westward march of civilization" in North America, is congruent with their already-accomplished epistemic cleansing. As Ashis Nandy puts it, <u><mark>this is colonialism that colonizes minds in addition to bodies and lands</mark>.(</u>n4)<strong> <u></strong><mark>The Western history of discovery and conquest, of colonialism and imperialism</mark>, of development and modernization, <mark>and</mark> of corporate <mark>globalization</mark> are all <mark>founded on this epistemic violence</mark>, and it should come as no surprise that they continue to beget violence on the ground.</p></u> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 1 | 186,097 | 6 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,383 | The 1AC methodology exposes the INDIFFERENCES from the LINKAGES, CONECTIONS, and CROSS-CULTURE INTERACTIONS, to the COMPLEXITIES, CONTRADICTIONS, and CONFLICT between black and Asian individuals in the United States by creating a dialectical framework to solve | Mullen & Ho 08 | Mullen & Ho 08 (Bill V. Mullen is the Professor of English and American Studies @ Purdue and teaches courses in African American Literature and Culture; Fred Ho is a political activist and the founder and bandleader of the Afro Asian Music Ensemble; Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, pp. 2-5) | Asian/Chinese American was ignited by the upsurge of the Black Power movement Like many other United States activists of color, Ho first came to an affirmation of ethnic identity from the inspiration and impact of radical and revolutionary African American politics , a way to enact, analyze, and catalyze a radical and revolutionary political and cultural stance grounded in anti-imperialism and anti-oppression and devoid of Eurocentric and white supremacist reference and ideals Afro Asia is a strategic intersection for thinking through an internationalist, global paradigm that joins the world’s two largest continents and populations, as well as an anti-imperialist, insurgent identity that is no longer majority white in orientation Afro Asia is the imperative to imagine a ‘‘new world’’ It is a tradition with DuBois the Asian Pacific American movement These figures give a name and voice to their international counterparts in the black and Asiatic worlds, and they have for two centuries sustained a tradition of collaborative radical political and cultural connections Africans and Asians in the Americas have been linked in a shared tradition of resistance to class and racial exploitation and oppression trade that brought Asian laborers, often on the very same ships that transported captured Africans African Americans and Asian Americans have mutually influenced, borrowed from, and jointly innovated new forms in culture the focus of this anthology is likewise on shared and common struggles as well as the linkages, connections, cross-cultural borrowing, and mutual solidarity, it is important to recognize the complexities, contradictions, and conflicts between black and Asian peoples It is also important to provide a proper framework and analysis of the systemic causes for such complexities as well as the political function served by the manipulation of race race, racism, and capitalism have conspired, according to Horne, to both produce and manipulate the black world’s understanding of Asia and the Asian world’s understanding of the black ‘‘West It is both the watershed and high-water mark of black-Asian affiliation and the unfinished and imperfect dream of a road still being pursued and paved | Afro Asia is a strategic intersection for thinking through an internationalist, paradigm that joins the world’s two largest continents as well as an anti-imperialist, insurgent identity that is no longer majority white in orientation trade brought Asian laborers the very same ships that transported captured Africans is important to recognize the complexities, contradictions, and conflicts between black and Asian It is also important to provide a proper framework and analysis of the systemic causes for such complexities race, racism, and capitalism have conspired, to both produce and manipulate the black world’s understanding of Asia and the Asian world’s understanding of the black ‘‘West | Fred himself came of age during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and he claims that his identity as Asian/Chinese American was ignited by the upsurge of the Black Power movement in the United States. It was reading Malcolm X’s Autobiography while being singled out for racial harassment in public school that forged his own sense of mutually shared oppressions. Like many other United States activists of color, Ho first came to an affirmation of ethnic identity from the inspiration and impact of radical and revolutionary African American politics and culture. This discovery brought with it, however, a far larger challenge: namely, a way to enact, analyze, and catalyze a radical and revolutionary political and cultural stance grounded in anti-imperialism and anti-oppression and devoid of Eurocentric and white supremacist reference and ideals. For Ho, and for other authors in this book, Afro Asia is a strategic intersection for thinking through an internationalist, global paradigm that joins the world’s two largest continents and populations, as well as an anti-imperialist, insurgent identity that is no longer majority white in orientation. Afro Asia, that is, is the imperative to imagine a ‘‘new world’’ grounded upon two great ancient worlds as well as a radical and revolutionary anti-imperialist tradition. It is a tradition with long roots, one that includes and links W. E. B. DuBois, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, Malcolm X, Robert F. Williams, the Black Panthers, the Asian Pacific American movement, Yuri Kochiyama, Ishmael Reed, Frank Chin, and Maxine Hong Kingston, to name just a few. These figures give a name and voice to their international counterparts in the black and Asiatic worlds, and they have for two centuries sustained a tradition of collaborative radical political and cultural connections heretofore undocumented in the literature of the West. From the earliest days of the United States, Africans and Asians in the Americas have been linked in a shared tradition of resistance to class and racial exploitation and oppression. With the formal abolition of African slavery arose the Asiatic ‘‘coolie’’ (or contract labor) trade that brought Asian laborers, often on the very same ships that transported captured Africans, to the very same plantation societies in the West. In this common and often overlapping diasporic experience, shared traditions of resistance and struggle have developed for liberation and equality. African Americans and Asian Americans have mutually influenced, borrowed from, and jointly innovated new forms in culture (from music to cuisine to clothing) and politics (from shared movement ideologies to organizations). This intersecting ground of cultural borrowing and exchange has been partly documented by classicists engaged by questions of the relationship between Greek and Rome on the one hand, and the larger realm of the contemporary Middle East, from North Africa to the Mediterranean, on the other. Among the early pioneers in this work was the African American classicist Frank Snowden. His books, Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks and Blacks in Antiquity and Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience, describe the influences on Western art, literature, and design of North African societies in particular. Snowden’s work sits squarely in the tradition of the Classics. Martin Bernal’s influential multivolume book Black Athena provides a polemical cultural studies framework for under- standing the influence of North African and Mediterranean influence on Greco-Roman culture as a story of racist historiography extending to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European scholars’ efforts to downplay or eradicate the Afro Asian role in the production of Western culture. Wilson Moses, in his book Afrotopia, provides his own historiography for this debate, noting that nineteenth-century Afrocentrists and Egyptocentrists in the United States likewise struggled to make visible the influences of African thought and culture on antiquity debates. Later, G. M. James’s Stolen Legacy gave a name to the accusations of cultural ‘‘pirating’’ described by Bernal, an argument that W. E. B. Du Bois also made vigorously in his chapter ‘‘Asia in Africa’’ in the expanded edition of his book The World and Africa, first published in 1946. DuBois’s own large body of writing on Asian politics and history is perhaps the most overlooked legacy of his capacious intellectual career and a sign of the ethnocentrism that has constrained the analysis of Afro Asian exchange. Indeed, the publication of Vijay Prashad’s two important books The Karma of Brown Folk and Everybody Was Kung-Fu Fighting helped to reanimate attention to Afro Asian intersections. Prashad used the term ‘polyculturalism’ to characterize the long, repressed but vital tradition of Afro Asian encounter and exchange, particularly among the working classes. While the focus of this anthology is likewise on shared and common struggles as well as the linkages, connections, cross-cultural borrowing, and mutual solidarity, it is important to recognize the complexities, contradictions, and conflicts between black and Asian peoples in the United States. It is also important to provide a proper framework and analysis of the systemic causes for such complexities as well as the political function served by the manipulation of race, the promotion of nationalist divisions and rivalries, and the inculcation of mutually pervasive stereotypes and racial jealousies. Indeed, DuBois himself was perhaps the first to recognize the nefariousness of these divisions and misunderstandings. For example, in his 1935 essay ‘‘Indians and American Negroes’’ DuBois complained that black Americans were provided almost no information on Asia, especially India, and thus had no context for seeing their own racial struggles in the necessary context of anticolonialism. Likewise, South Asians, fed a steady Western diet of imperialist rhetoric, were absent a positive understanding of African Americans and Africans. DuBois’s ability to recognize this dual orientalism capable of dismantling and forestalling Afro Asian unity also illuminates the work done by the scholars Reginald Kearney and Mark Gallichio. They note that during the 1930s and 1940s subgroups of black Americans, primarily from the working classes, were drawn to Afro Asian solidarity and even infatuation with Japanese imperialism as an imaginative means of cross-racial alliance. Gerald Horne, in his impressive book Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire, situates these desires and at times misunderstandings within the broad context of white supremacy. Horne argues that the importation of British and U.S. forms of racial supremacy across the Pan-Pacific region came home to roost both in the racial supremacist rhetoric undergirding Japanese imperialism during the 1930s as well as in the various nationalist, cross-nationalist, and otherwise anti-racist Afro Asian dreams of alliance. Put simply, race, racism, and capitalism have conspired, according to Horne, to both produce and manipulate the black world’s understanding of Asia and the Asian world’s understanding of the black ‘‘West.’’ And yet the dominant form of black-Asian alliance across the twentieth century is a carefully considered strategic anti-essentialism rooted in analysis of political, economic, and racial conditions across the colored world produced under white supremacy. This is the clear legacy of the so-called Bandung era of 1955 to 1973 that arguably countered and corrected many of the advances made in the Afro Asian solidarity movements of the 1930s by linking them to emergent anticolonial struggles around the world. Richard Wright understood this movement well when he traveled from Paris to Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 to attend the Afro Asian meeting of twenty- nine decolonizing heads of state. His book on the event, The Color Curtain, is itself a contradictory example of Afro Asia’s themes: a vigorous support for anticolonial solidarity, an indictment of white supremacy, a cry to the wretched of the earth, and yet an oddly anti-Communist and at times orientalist rendering of his own dislocation from both the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ worlds during his American exile. Bandung informs and haunts any and all efforts to theorize Afro Asia. It is both the watershed and high-water mark of black-Asian affiliation and the unfinished and imperfect dream of a road still being pursued and paved by the authors represented in this book. | 8,564 | <h4>The 1AC methodology exposes the INDIFFERENCES from the LINKAGES, CONECTIONS, and CROSS-CULTURE INTERACTIONS, to the COMPLEXITIES, CONTRADICTIONS, and CONFLICT between black and Asian in<u>dividuals in the United States by creating a dialectical framework to solve </h4><p><strong>Mullen & Ho 08 </strong>(Bill V. Mullen is the Professor of English and American Studies @ Purdue and teaches courses in African American Literature and Culture; Fred Ho is a political activist and the founder and bandleader of the Afro Asian Music Ensemble; Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, pp. 2-5)</p><p></u>Fred himself came of age during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and he claims that his identity as <u><strong>Asian/Chinese American was ignited by the upsurge of the Black Power movement</u></strong> in the United States. It was reading Malcolm X’s Autobiography while being singled out for racial harassment in public school that forged his own sense of mutually shared oppressions. <u><strong>Like many other United States activists of color, Ho first came to an affirmation of ethnic identity from the inspiration and impact of radical and revolutionary African American politics</u></strong> and culture. This discovery brought with it, however, a far larger challenge: namely<u><strong>, a way to enact, analyze, and catalyze a radical and revolutionary political and cultural stance grounded in anti-imperialism and anti-oppression and devoid of Eurocentric and white supremacist reference and ideals</u></strong>. For Ho, and for other authors in this book, <u><strong><mark>Afro Asia is a strategic intersection for thinking through an internationalist,</mark> global <mark>paradigm that joins the world’s two largest continents</mark> and populations, <mark>as well as an anti-imperialist, insurgent identity that is no longer majority white in orientation</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Afro Asia</u></strong>, that is, <u><strong>is the imperative to imagine a ‘‘new world’’</u></strong> grounded upon two great ancient worlds as well as a radical and revolutionary anti-imperialist tradition. <u><strong>It is a tradition with</u></strong> long roots, one that includes and links W. E. B. <u><strong>DuBois</u></strong>, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, Malcolm X, Robert F. Williams, the Black Panthers, <u><strong>the Asian Pacific American movement</u></strong>, Yuri Kochiyama, Ishmael Reed, Frank Chin, and Maxine Hong Kingston, to name just a few. <u><strong>These figures give a name and voice to their international counterparts in the black and Asiatic worlds, and they have for two centuries sustained a tradition of collaborative radical political and cultural connections</u></strong> heretofore undocumented in the literature of the West. From the earliest days of the United States, <u><strong>Africans and Asians in the Americas have been linked in a shared tradition of resistance to class and racial exploitation and oppression</u></strong>. With the formal abolition of African slavery arose the Asiatic ‘‘coolie’’ (or contract labor) <u><strong><mark>trade</mark> that <mark>brought Asian laborers</mark>, often on <mark>the very same ships that transported captured</mark> <mark>Africans</u></strong></mark>, to the very same plantation societies in the West. In this common and often overlapping diasporic experience, shared traditions of resistance and struggle have developed for liberation and equality. <u><strong>African Americans and Asian Americans have mutually influenced, borrowed from, and jointly innovated new forms in culture</u></strong> (from music to cuisine to clothing) and politics (from shared movement ideologies to organizations). This intersecting ground of cultural borrowing and exchange has been partly documented by classicists engaged by questions of the relationship between Greek and Rome on the one hand, and the larger realm of the contemporary Middle East, from North Africa to the Mediterranean, on the other. Among the early pioneers in this work was the African American classicist Frank Snowden. His books, Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks and Blacks in Antiquity and Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience, describe the influences on Western art, literature, and design of North African societies in particular. Snowden’s work sits squarely in the tradition of the Classics. Martin Bernal’s influential multivolume book Black Athena provides a polemical cultural studies framework for under- standing the influence of North African and Mediterranean influence on Greco-Roman culture as a story of racist historiography extending to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European scholars’ efforts to downplay or eradicate the Afro Asian role in the production of Western culture. Wilson Moses, in his book Afrotopia, provides his own historiography for this debate, noting that nineteenth-century Afrocentrists and Egyptocentrists in the United States likewise struggled to make visible the influences of African thought and culture on antiquity debates. Later, G. M. James’s Stolen Legacy gave a name to the accusations of cultural ‘‘pirating’’ described by Bernal, an argument that W. E. B. Du Bois also made vigorously in his chapter ‘‘Asia in Africa’’ in the expanded edition of his book The World and Africa, first published in 1946. DuBois’s own large body of writing on Asian politics and history is perhaps the most overlooked legacy of his capacious intellectual career and a sign of the ethnocentrism that has constrained the analysis of Afro Asian exchange. Indeed, the publication of Vijay Prashad’s two important books The Karma of Brown Folk and Everybody Was Kung-Fu Fighting helped to reanimate attention to Afro Asian intersections. Prashad used the term ‘polyculturalism’ to characterize the long, repressed but vital tradition of Afro Asian encounter and exchange, particularly among the working classes. While <u><strong>the focus of this anthology is likewise on shared and common struggles as well as the linkages, connections, cross-cultural borrowing, and mutual solidarity, it <mark>is important to recognize the complexities, contradictions, and conflicts between black and Asian</mark> peoples</u></strong> in the United States. <u><strong><mark>It is also important to provide a proper framework and analysis of the systemic causes for such complexities</mark> as well as the political function served by the manipulation of race</u></strong>, the promotion of nationalist divisions and rivalries, and the inculcation of mutually pervasive stereotypes and racial jealousies. Indeed, DuBois himself was perhaps the first to recognize the nefariousness of these divisions and misunderstandings. For example, in his 1935 essay ‘‘Indians and American Negroes’’ DuBois complained that black Americans were provided almost no information on Asia, especially India, and thus had no context for seeing their own racial struggles in the necessary context of anticolonialism. Likewise, South Asians, fed a steady Western diet of imperialist rhetoric, were absent a positive understanding of African Americans and Africans. DuBois’s ability to recognize this dual orientalism capable of dismantling and forestalling Afro Asian unity also illuminates the work done by the scholars Reginald Kearney and Mark Gallichio. They note that during the 1930s and 1940s subgroups of black Americans, primarily from the working classes, were drawn to Afro Asian solidarity and even infatuation with Japanese imperialism as an imaginative means of cross-racial alliance. Gerald Horne, in his impressive book Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire, situates these desires and at times misunderstandings within the broad context of white supremacy. Horne argues that the importation of British and U.S. forms of racial supremacy across the Pan-Pacific region came home to roost both in the racial supremacist rhetoric undergirding Japanese imperialism during the 1930s as well as in the various nationalist, cross-nationalist, and otherwise anti-racist Afro Asian dreams of alliance. Put simply, <u><strong><mark>race, racism, and capitalism have conspired,</mark> according to Horne, <mark>to both produce and manipulate the black world’s understanding of Asia and the Asian world’s understanding of the black ‘‘West</u></strong></mark>.’’ And yet the dominant form of black-Asian alliance across the twentieth century is a carefully considered strategic anti-essentialism rooted in analysis of political, economic, and racial conditions across the colored world produced under white supremacy. This is the clear legacy of the so-called Bandung era of 1955 to 1973 that arguably countered and corrected many of the advances made in the Afro Asian solidarity movements of the 1930s by linking them to emergent anticolonial struggles around the world. Richard Wright understood this movement well when he traveled from Paris to Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 to attend the Afro Asian meeting of twenty- nine decolonizing heads of state. His book on the event, The Color Curtain, is itself a contradictory example of Afro Asia’s themes: a vigorous support for anticolonial solidarity, an indictment of white supremacy, a cry to the wretched of the earth, and yet an oddly anti-Communist and at times orientalist rendering of his own dislocation from both the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ worlds during his American exile. Bandung informs and haunts any and all efforts to theorize Afro Asia. <u><strong>It is both the watershed and high-water mark of black-Asian affiliation and the unfinished and imperfect dream of a road still being pursued and paved</u></strong> by the authors represented in this book.</p> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 187,552 | 5 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,384 | Containment is working now—military presence and economic control | Pilko 12- | Pilko 12- Associate Professor at the Moscow State University’s Faculty of History (Alexey, AMERICA’S POLICY OF “CONTAINMENT OF CHINA”, 4/16/12, http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-s-policy-of-containment-of-china/30354)//MP | America is avoiding making declarations towards China practical steps to curb Beijing have already been taken. The U.S. has been consolidating its power in Australia and Singapore, and there are plans to begin military assistance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region the United States, in its confrontation with China, has at least three lines of strategic deterrence located all over the Pacific Ocean. It has been confirmed that the U.S. and Vietnam have begun informal talks on leasing the former U.S. military base in Cam Ranh. the Chinese navy’s access to open water is controlled by Americans According to a source close to the White House, China is now clearly perceived by the American political establishment as the most important threat to U.S. interests in the long run, so Washington believes it is advisable to start to control China today. United States has set up a system allowing it to deprive the Chinese economy of energy commodities at any time
The Chinese government is aware of this and is trying to find a way out by creating a powerful fleet capable of operating far beyond the Chinese coast that could directly threaten the United States, as well as by strengthening relations with Russia, which does not want to contain China. | null | Apparently, with the Cold War over, a new global confrontation between the United States and China could begin. One might get this impression after analyzing the steps taken by Washington in the international arena. For now, America is avoiding making any declarations towards China, such as the Truman or Eisenhower doctrines or Churchill’s Fulton speech. However, practical steps to curb Beijing have already been taken. The U.S. has been consolidating its power in Australia and Singapore, and there are plans to begin military assistance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region. From discussing the problem with American experts working on military issues, it becomes clear that today the United States, in its confrontation with China, has at least three lines of strategic deterrence located all over the Pacific Ocean. The first is in close proximity to the Chinese territory, based on U.S. military bases and infrastructure on the Japanese archipelago, in South Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan. Intense negotiations are taking place on re-establishing the US naval base in Subic Bay in the Philippines. It has been confirmed that the U.S. and Vietnam have begun informal talks on leasing the former U.S. military base in Cam Ranh. If you draw a line between all these states, you will see the first circle of the U.S. containment of China, which effectively prevents the country from being a maritime power. Today, the Chinese navy’s access to open water is controlled by Americans. However, there is also a second circle (based on Guam and Hawaii), as well as a third, reserve one, the base for which is California and Alaska. According to a source close to the White House, China is now clearly perceived by the American political establishment as the most important threat to U.S. interests in the long run, so Washington believes it is advisable to start to control China today. The United States is not going to control China alone. It is actively trying to recruit as many allies as possible. These can be divided into several groups. The first is composed of countries that are heavily dependent on the U.S.: Japan (in military terms, the country is more an American satellite rather than an ally), South Korea (which without military aid from Washington risks a showdown with North Korea), and Taiwan (an unrecognized state that remains de facto independent only with the support of the U.S.). Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei will support any initiatives from the White House directed against China. The situation is more complicated with other international actors. The United States, in trying to contain China, has set up a system allowing it to deprive the Chinese economy of energy commodities at any time.
To implement this, it is important to shut the northern and southern transit routes, according to the abovementioned expert close to Barack Obama’s administration. The southern transit route, which runs through the strategically important Strait of Malacca, is vital for China. If it were closed, China’s economy would not be able to survive even for a month. That is why the U.S. created a permanent group of warships that will be located in Singapore. Strategic depth will be provided by the U.S. military in Australia and the Philippines. Thus, the strait can easily be blocked by Washington. The situation is somewhat more complicated with the northern transit route, Russia. According to available information, for the past few months the United States has been waging an intense campaign of negotiations with Moscow, trying to obtain its support on the issue of containing China. They have so far been unsuccessful. In order to achieve a positive outcome, the U.S. is willing to make some concessions to Russia, including on missile defense and financial and economic issues. In Washington, they are well aware that Russian support may be the decisive factor in dictating terms to China. That is why they intend to continue to move in this direction. Simultaneously, the U.S. continues to hold an anti-China dialogue with India. In recent years, Sino-Indian relations have not been so bad, but in the past significant differences have arisen between Beijing and New Delhi. That is why the participation of India in containing China does not seem improbable. The formation of an anti-China coalition consisting of the USA, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Southeast Asia could put China in a desperate situation. The Chinese government is well aware of this and is trying to find a way out by creating a powerful fleet capable of operating far beyond the Chinese coast for a long period of time and that could directly threaten the United States, as well as by strengthening relations with Russia, which does not want to contain China. This is one of the reasons for the Chinese media’s attempts to project the idea of a Russian-Chinese Eurasian alliance, which could in fact be a tool for balancing U.S. influence in Eurasia. | 4,961 | <h4><strong>Containment is working now—military presence and economic control </h4><p>Pilko 12- </strong>Associate Professor at the Moscow State University’s Faculty of History (Alexey, AMERICA’S POLICY OF “CONTAINMENT OF CHINA”, 4/16/12, http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-s-policy-of-containment-of-china/30354)//MP</p><p>Apparently, with the Cold War over, a new global confrontation between the United States and China could begin. One might get this impression after analyzing the steps taken by Washington in the international arena. For now, <u>America is avoiding making</u> any <u>declarations towards China</u>, such as the Truman or Eisenhower doctrines or Churchill’s Fulton speech. However, <u>practical steps to curb Beijing have already been taken. The U.S. has been consolidating its power in Australia and Singapore, and there are plans to begin military assistance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region</u>. From discussing the problem with American experts working on military issues, it becomes clear that today <u>the United States, in its confrontation with China, has at least three lines of strategic deterrence located all over the Pacific Ocean.</u> The first is in close proximity to the Chinese territory, based on U.S. military bases and infrastructure on the Japanese archipelago, in South Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan. Intense negotiations are taking place on re-establishing the US naval base in Subic Bay in the Philippines. <u>It has been confirmed that the U.S. and Vietnam have begun informal talks on leasing the former U.S. military base in Cam Ranh.</u> If you draw a line between all these states, you will see the first circle of the U.S. containment of China, which effectively prevents the country from being a maritime power. Today, <u>the Chinese navy’s access to open water is controlled by Americans</u>. However, there is also a second circle (based on Guam and Hawaii), as well as a third, reserve one, the base for which is California and Alaska. <u>According to a source close to the White House, China is now clearly perceived by the American political establishment as the most important threat to U.S. interests in the long run, so Washington believes it is advisable to start to control China today.</u> The United States is not going to control China alone. It is actively trying to recruit as many allies as possible. These can be divided into several groups. The first is composed of countries that are heavily dependent on the U.S.: Japan (in military terms, the country is more an American satellite rather than an ally), South Korea (which without military aid from Washington risks a showdown with North Korea), and Taiwan (an unrecognized state that remains de facto independent only with the support of the U.S.). Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei will support any initiatives from the White House directed against China. The situation is more complicated with other international actors. The <u>United States</u>, in trying to contain China, <u>has set up a system allowing it to deprive the Chinese economy of energy commodities at any time</u>.</p><p> To implement this, it is important to shut the northern and southern transit routes, according to the abovementioned expert close to Barack Obama’s administration. The southern transit route, which runs through the strategically important Strait of Malacca, is vital for China. If it were closed, China’s economy would not be able to survive even for a month. That is why the U.S. created a permanent group of warships that will be located in Singapore. Strategic depth will be provided by the U.S. military in Australia and the Philippines. Thus, the strait can easily be blocked by Washington. The situation is somewhat more complicated with the northern transit route, Russia. According to available information, for the past few months the United States has been waging an intense campaign of negotiations with Moscow, trying to obtain its support on the issue of containing China. They have so far been unsuccessful. In order to achieve a positive outcome, the U.S. is willing to make some concessions to Russia, including on missile defense and financial and economic issues. In Washington, they are well aware that Russian support may be the decisive factor in dictating terms to China. That is why they intend to continue to move in this direction. Simultaneously, the U.S. continues to hold an anti-China dialogue with India. In recent years, Sino-Indian relations have not been so bad, but in the past significant differences have arisen between Beijing and New Delhi. That is why the participation of India in containing China does not seem improbable. The formation of an anti-China coalition consisting of the USA, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Southeast Asia could put China in a desperate situation. <u>The Chinese government is</u> well <u>aware of this and is trying to find a way out by creating a powerful fleet capable of operating far beyond the Chinese coast </u>for a long period of time and <u>that could directly threaten the United States, as well as by strengthening relations with Russia, which does not want to contain China. </u>This is one of the reasons for the Chinese media’s attempts to project the idea of a Russian-Chinese Eurasian alliance, which could in fact be a tool for balancing U.S. influence in Eurasia.</p> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 179,160 | 2 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,385 | This is most predictable and grounded in the resolution | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>This is most predictable and grounded in the resolution </h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,802 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,386 | Democrats block Trump releasing sanctions now | RT 1-23 | RT 1-23
RT is a writer and editor for Signs of the Times, “Spineless Democrats propose bill to prevent Trump lifting Russian sanctions”, Signs of the Times, https://www.sott.net/article/340425-Spineless-Democrats-propose-bill-to-prevent-Trump-lifting-Russian-sanctions, Accessed 2-3 | Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation designed to stop President Trump from relaxing US sanctions on Russia Trump's cautious statements about the desirability of working towards rapprochement with Moscow, which could include easing economic sanctions on Russia, have not gone unnoticed by some in the US establishment a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill that would significantly restrict the president's ability to lift the sanctions We need more sanctions against Russia. We should not relax them Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction deal Allegations that Russia interfered in the US elections are unsubstantiated He's certainly not looking at the strategic picture, he's absolutely trying to undermine the Trump administration | Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation to stop Trump from relaxing US sanctions a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill We need more sanctions against Russia | A top Senate Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation designed to stop President Trump from relaxing US sanctions on Russia. Critics argue that the bill is a "rabid and short-sighted" move to undermine the new administration. President Donald Trump's cautious statements about the desirability of working towards rapprochement with Moscow, which could include easing economic sanctions on Russia, have not gone unnoticed by some in the US establishment. Shortly after Trump's inauguration, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer (D-New York) said on Sunday that a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill that would significantly restrict the president's ability to lift the sanctions that Washington imposed on Russia in 2014 after Crimea voted to leave Ukraine and rejoin it in a referendum. The bill would demand that any changes to the restrictions be put to a vote in the US Congress, thus preventing the president from acting unilaterally. "We repeal sanctions, it tells Russia, 'Go ahead and interfere in our elections and do bad things;' it tells China; it tells Iran. That would be terrible," Schumer told ABC's This Week show, adding that he has secured support from GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham. "We need more sanctions against Russia. We should not relax them," McCain said on the same program, adding "if we don't keep those sanctions on and even increase them, it will encourage Vladimir Putin, who is a war criminal." Earlier in January, Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction deal. "For us to repeal sanctions, given what Russia has done in Ukraine and threatened the Baltics, and now they have clearly tried to intervene in our election - whether it had an effect or not - that is something, that's a danger that we have never faced to this extent in American history," Schumer went on. However, Gregory Copley, editor-in-chief of the Defense & Foreign Affairs journal, told RT that the bill was surely designed "as a part of the legacy that the then-president Obama wanted to leave for President Trump." "[Obama] wanted to make sure that he had grave difficulty in maintaining any normal strategic policy at all and particularly with regard to Russia. So he left that time bomb if you like," Copley asserted. Allegations that Russia interfered in the US elections are unsubstantiated, the expert continued, while noting that Washington itself has waged "political warfare" against other countries in the past. "There's a lot of material around to show that the Obama administration interfered with the election processes in Ukraine, in Israel and in other countries," he said. "Schumer himself is a rabid, and I use this word advisedly, rabid, political advocate concerned only with domestic political outcomes. He's certainly not looking at the strategic picture, he's absolutely trying to undermine the Trump administration,"Copley concluded. | 2,970 | <h4><strong>Democrats block Trump releasing sanctions now</h4><p>RT 1-23</p><p></strong>RT is a writer and editor for Signs of the Times, “Spineless Democrats propose bill to prevent Trump lifting Russian sanctions”, Signs of the Times, https://www.sott.net/article/340425-Spineless-Democrats-propose-bill-to-prevent-Trump-lifting-Russian-sanctions, Accessed 2-3</p><p>A top Senate <u><mark>Democrat is planning to introduce bipartisan legislation</mark> designed <mark>to stop </mark>President <mark>Trump from relaxing US sanctions</mark> on Russia</u>. Critics argue that the bill is a "rabid and short-sighted" move to undermine the new administration. President Donald <u>Trump's cautious statements about the desirability of working towards rapprochement with Moscow, which could include easing economic sanctions on Russia, have not gone unnoticed by some in the US establishment</u>. Shortly after Trump's inauguration, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer (D-New York) said on Sunday that <u><mark>a bipartisan group of US Senators was preparing to introduce a bill</mark> that would significantly restrict the president's ability to lift the sanctions</u> that Washington imposed on Russia in 2014 after Crimea voted to leave Ukraine and rejoin it in a referendum. The bill would demand that any changes to the restrictions be put to a vote in the US Congress, thus preventing the president from acting unilaterally. "We repeal sanctions, it tells Russia, 'Go ahead and interfere in our elections and do bad things;' it tells China; it tells Iran. That would be terrible," Schumer told ABC's This Week show, adding that he has secured support from GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham. "<u><mark>We need more sanctions against Russia</mark>. We should not relax them</u>," McCain said on the same program, adding "if we don't keep those sanctions on and even increase them, it will encourage Vladimir Putin, who is a war criminal." Earlier in January, <u>Trump floated the idea of lifting the sanctions as part of a new nuclear weapons reduction deal</u>. "For us to repeal sanctions, given what Russia has done in Ukraine and threatened the Baltics, and now they have clearly tried to intervene in our election - whether it had an effect or not - that is something, that's a danger that we have never faced to this extent in American history," Schumer went on. However, Gregory Copley, editor-in-chief of the Defense & Foreign Affairs journal, told RT that the bill was surely designed "as a part of the legacy that the then-president Obama wanted to leave for President Trump." "[Obama] wanted to make sure that he had grave difficulty in maintaining any normal strategic policy at all and particularly with regard to Russia. So he left that time bomb if you like," Copley asserted. <u>Allegations that Russia interfered in the US elections are unsubstantiated</u>, the expert continued, while noting that Washington itself has waged "political warfare" against other countries in the past. "There's a lot of material around to show that the Obama administration interfered with the election processes in Ukraine, in Israel and in other countries," he said. "Schumer himself is a rabid, and I use this word advisedly, rabid, political advocate concerned only with domestic political outcomes. <u>He's certainly not looking at the strategic picture, he's absolutely trying to undermine the Trump administration</u>,"Copley concluded.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 2 | 1,559,371 | 3 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,387 | East China Sea disputes escalate and cause extinction---high tensions now | Liff, and Erickson, 15 | Liff, Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies, and Erickson, Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, ‘15(Adam P. and Andrew S., “Crowding the Waters”, Foreign Affairs, 3/23/15, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143285/adam-p-liff-and-andrew-s-erickson/crowding-the-waters?cid=rss-rss_xml-crowding_the_waters-000000) | Since the de facto dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in
AND | null | Since September 2012, the de facto dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in
AND
Diplomatic cooperation and robust, depoliticized communication mechanisms are vital and needed urgently. | 193 | <h4>East China Sea disputes escalate and cause extinction---high tensions now</h4><p><strong>Liff, </strong>Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies,<strong> and Erickson,</strong> Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, ‘<strong>15<u></strong>(Adam P. and Andrew S., “Crowding the Waters”, Foreign Affairs, 3/23/15, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143285/adam-p-liff-and-andrew-s-erickson/crowding-the-waters?cid=rss-rss_xml-crowding_the_waters-000000)</p><p>Since</u> September 2012, <u>the de facto dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in </p><p>AND</p><p></u>Diplomatic cooperation and robust, depoliticized communication mechanisms are vital and needed urgently.</p> | null | 1NC | Case | 1,560,803 | 1 | 126,086 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,590 | N | UC Berkeley | 5 | Hendrickson PW | Matt Reichle | 1AC - Cosmological Formlessness
1NC - FW Case
2NC - FW
1NR - Case | hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-UC%20Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,013 | BaKa | Katy Taylor BaKa | null | Ar..... | Ba..... | Ja..... | Ka..... | 20,161 | KatyTaylor | Katy Taylor | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,388 | Our reps of US diplomacy efforts in Asia are rooted in colonialist motives that seek to spread capitalism in order to compete with rivaling European nations to only perpetuate the myth of the model minority by seeing Asians as always on the top creating antoganism | Hernandez and Steen ’06 “, pgs. 169-170, 2006, NAE) | Hernandez and Steen ’06 (Professor English and American Studies Julius Maximilians Universität Würzburg, Germany. Ph.D., Stanford University. Professor Steen writes and teaches about race and performance, primarily in the intersection of the African American and Asian American worlds. “AfroAsian Encounters: Culture, History, Politics “, pgs. 169-170, 2006, NAE) | the United States of the early twentieth century viewed East Asia as an arena through which it could compete against the European colonialist powers in order to be- come one of the elite global powers As the United States attempted to extend its cultural, economic, and military influence in East Asia, white America mobilized, and in some cases altered, images of African Ameri- cans in order to manage anxieties raised by Asia and Asian American im- migration The swing adaptations of the 1930s used a set of primitivist cultural references to re-project the Orientalist parody of Gil- bert and Sullivan’s original onto the American cultural scene through the associations of swing with blackness. it contained significantly less anxiety, as Japan had not yet become a poten- tial naval and imperial power in 1885 when the original show premiered. While they similarly intended to parody Japan, the 1930s productions did so at the expense of African Americans. The new adaptations did not sim- ply use black actors to translate The Mikado to an American context, how- ever, but staged a chain of incomplete racial displacements to perform a national racial context that was at once black, white, and Asian. | the United States viewed East Asia as an arena through which it could compete As to extend its influence white America mobilized images of African Ameri- cans in order to manage anxieties raised by Asia and Asian im- migration Japan productions did so at the expense of African Americans adaptations did not sim- ply use black actors to translate The Mikado how ever staged a chain of incomplete racial displacements to perform a national racial context that was at once black, white, and Asian | As David Palumbo-Liu and others have noted, the United States of the early twentieth century viewed East Asia as an arena through which it could compete against the European colonialist powers in order to be- come one of the elite global powers. As the United States attempted to extend its cultural, economic, and military influence in East Asia, white America mobilized, and in some cases altered, images of African Ameri- cans in order to manage anxieties raised by Asia and Asian American im- migration. Gilbert and Sullivan’s 1885 original had satirized contemporary English attitudes toward sexuality and capital punishment by projecting ing of Japanese trade to the West in 1853 that produced an England awash in Japanese trinkets. The swing adaptations of the 1930s used a set of primitivist cultural references to re-project the Orientalist parody of Gil- bert and Sullivan’s original onto the American cultural scene through the associations of swing with blackness. While the Victorian British fascina- tion with Japan had similarities to that of swing-era America (indeed, these similarities allowed for the musical to “play” to both audiences), it contained significantly less anxiety, as Japan had not yet become a poten- tial naval and imperial power in 1885 when the original show premiered. While they similarly intended to parody Japan, the 1930s productions did so at the expense of African Americans. The new adaptations did not sim- ply use black actors to translate The Mikado to an American context, how- ever, but staged a chain of incomplete racial displacements to perform a national racial context that was at once black, white, and Asian. | 1,666 | <h4>Our reps of US diplomacy efforts in Asia are rooted in colonialist motives that seek to spread capitalism in order to compete with rivaling European nations to only perpetuate the myth of the model minority by seeing Asians as always on the top creating antoganism</h4><p><u><strong>Hernandez and Steen ’06</u></strong> (Professor English and American Studies Julius Maximilians Universität Würzburg, Germany. Ph.D., Stanford University. Professor Steen writes and teaches about race and performance, primarily in the intersection of the African American and Asian American worlds. “AfroAsian Encounters: Culture, History, Politics <u><strong>“, pgs. 169-170, 2006, NAE)</p><p></u></strong>As David Palumbo-Liu and others have noted, <u><strong><mark>the United States</mark> of the early twentieth century <mark>viewed East Asia as an arena through which it could compete</mark> against the European colonialist powers in order to be- come one of the elite global powers</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>As</mark> the United States attempted <mark>to</mark> <mark>extend</mark> <mark>its</mark> cultural, economic, and military <mark>influence</mark> in East Asia, <mark>white America mobilized</mark>, and in some cases altered, <mark>images of African Ameri- cans in order to manage anxieties raised by Asia and Asian</mark> American <mark>im- migration</u></strong></mark>. Gilbert and Sullivan’s 1885 original had satirized contemporary English attitudes toward sexuality and capital punishment by projecting ing of Japanese trade to the West in 1853 that produced an England awash in Japanese trinkets. <u><strong>The swing adaptations of the 1930s used a set of primitivist cultural references to re-project the Orientalist parody of Gil- bert and Sullivan’s original onto the American cultural scene through the associations of swing with blackness.</u></strong> While the Victorian British fascina- tion with Japan had similarities to that of swing-era America (indeed, these similarities allowed for the musical to “play” to both audiences), <u><strong>it contained significantly less anxiety, as Japan had not yet become a poten- tial naval and imperial power in 1885 when the original show premiered. While they similarly intended to parody <mark>Japan</mark>, the 1930s <mark>productions did so at the expense of African Americans</mark>. The new <mark>adaptations did not sim- ply use black actors to translate The Mikado</mark> to an American context, <mark>how</mark>- <mark>ever</mark>, but <mark>staged a chain of incomplete racial displacements</mark> <mark>to perform a national racial context that was at once black, white, and Asian</mark>. </p></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 187,583 | 4 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,389 | US crisis management sends the perception that the US will back down every conflict – increased cooperation and communication is the death knell of US military resolve | Mastro 15 (Oriana Skylar, an Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Affairs @ Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay,” CIAONET, 1/21/15, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads) | Mastro 15 (Oriana Skylar, an Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Affairs @ Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay,” CIAONET, 1/21/15, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads) | China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy The U.S. focus on de-escalation only exacerbates this issue the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the U S to give in to its demands and preferences the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations To signal to China that the U S will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict | China is testing the waters because they are probing resolve The belief resolve drives outcomes more than power is the China’s new assertive strategy focus on de-escalation only exacerbates this issue the Chinese believe leaders control escalation and therefore wars happen because leaders decide China is chipping at U.S. cred through diplomacy crisis management is unlikely to produce change in Chinese behavior it will only encourage greater provocations Beijing is exploiting de-escalation Washington must signal willingness to escalate | These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia. China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight. The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75 China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76 Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve. This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage. | 3,304 | <h4>US crisis management sends the perception that the US will back down <u>every</u> conflict – increased cooperation and communication is the <u>death knell</u><strong> of US military resolve </h4><p>Mastro 15 (Oriana Skylar, an Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Affairs @ Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay,” CIAONET, 1/21/15, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)</p><p></strong>These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But <u><mark>China is</mark> currently <mark>testing the waters</mark> not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but <mark>because they are</mark> <mark>probing</mark> the balance of <strong><mark>resolve</u></strong></mark>. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia. China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. <u><mark>The belief</mark> that balance of <mark>resolve drives outcomes</mark> <mark>more</mark> so <mark>than</mark> the balance of <mark>power is the</mark> <strong>foundation of <mark>China’s new</mark>, more <mark>assertive strategy</u></strong></mark>; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight. <u>The U.S. <mark>focus on de-escalation</u></mark> in all situations <u><mark>only <strong>exacerbates</strong> this issue</u></mark>. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which <u><mark>the</mark> main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis</u> or incident <u>with Beijing. But <mark>Chinese</mark> leaders do not share this mindset—they <mark>believe leaders</mark> deliberately <mark>control</mark> the <mark>escalation</mark> process <mark>and therefore wars happen because</mark> <mark>leaders decide</mark> at a given juncture that the best option is to fight</u>.75 <u><mark>China is</mark> masterful at <mark>chipping</mark> away <mark>at U.S. cred</mark>ibility <mark>through</mark> advancing militarization and coercive <mark>diplomacy</mark>. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met</u>. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76 <u>Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through <mark>crisis management is unlikely to produce </mark>any <mark>change in Chinese behavior</mark>—if anything <mark>it will only <strong>encourage greater provocations</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>Beijing</mark> has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and <mark>is exploiting </mark>it to compel the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>to give in to its demands and preferences</u>. In this way, <u>the U.S. focus on <mark>de-escalation</mark> may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations</u>. <u>To signal to China that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will not opt out of a conflict, <strong><mark>Washington must signal willingness to escalate</strong></mark> to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve</u>. <u>This may include <strong>reducing channels of communication during a conflict</u></strong>, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage.</p> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 9,815 | 162 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,390 | A) “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum | Army Officer School, 04 | Army Officer School, 04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm) | The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor. | The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: That this council petition the mayor. | The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor. | 1,216 | <h4>A) “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum</h4><p><strong>Army Officer School, 04<u></strong> (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)</p><p><mark>The colon introduces</u></mark> the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. <u><mark>A formal</mark> <mark>resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved:</mark> (colon) <strong><mark>That this council petition the mayor.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,131 | 1,242 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,391 | Plan is popular – public has consistently seen China as a beneficial trade ally for 10 years | Friedhoff and Smeltz 15 | Friedhoff and Smeltz 15 Karl Friedhoff, Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2016, (AMERICANS VIEW RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS IMPORTANT DESPITE SOME MISTRUST, September 22nd, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-view-relations-china-important-despite-some-mistrust, 6.22.16, WP | American public prefers engagement to the containment of China. In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, 67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Three in ten (29%) said that the United States should seek to actively limit China’s growth. This finding has been consistent since the question was first asked in 2006. Americans underscore the importance of ties to China likely because of growing Chinese influence in Asia. Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years, compared to just 31 percent who expect the same from the United States. | the American public prefers engagement to the containment of China 67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. This finding has been consistent since 2006 Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years | Despite suspicions toward China, the American public prefers engagement to the containment of China. In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, 67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Three in ten (29%) said that the United States should seek to actively limit China’s growth. This finding has been consistent since the question was first asked in 2006. Americans underscore the importance of ties to China likely because of growing Chinese influence in Asia. Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years, compared to just 31 percent who expect the same from the United States. [2] Some expectation of China’s influence in the next decade, however, is based on misperception. From 2010 through 2014, Pew Research surveys showed that Americans were either as likely or more likely to name China as to name the United States when asked which country is the world’s leading economic power. In the most recent spring 2015 survey, however, Americans were more likely to say that the United States leads by ten percentage points (46% US, 36% China), perhaps a reflection of China’s economic difficulties over the past several months as well as US economic recovery. | 1,267 | <h4>Plan is popular – public has consistently seen China as a beneficial trade ally for 10 years</h4><p><strong>Friedhoff and Smeltz</strong> <strong>15</strong> Karl Friedhoff, Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2016, (AMERICANS VIEW RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS IMPORTANT DESPITE SOME MISTRUST, September 22nd, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-view-relations-china-important-despite-some-mistrust, 6.22.16, WP</p><p>Despite suspicions toward China, <mark>the <u>American public prefers engagement to the containment of China</mark>. In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, <mark>67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China.</mark> Three in ten (29%) said that the United States should seek to actively limit China’s growth. <mark>This finding has been consistent since</mark> the question was first asked in <mark>2006</mark>.</u> <u>Americans underscore the importance of ties to China likely because of growing Chinese influence in Asia. <mark>Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years</mark>, compared to just 31 percent who expect the same from the United States.</u> [2] Some expectation of China’s influence in the next decade, however, is based on misperception. From 2010 through 2014, Pew Research surveys showed that Americans were either as likely or more likely to name China as to name the United States when asked which country is the world’s leading economic power. In the most recent spring 2015 survey, however, Americans were more likely to say that the United States leads by ten percentage points (46% US, 36% China), perhaps a reflection of China’s economic difficulties over the past several months as well as US economic recovery.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 2 | 171,879 | 10 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,392 | Our reps of Economic engagement with China works simultaneously to fuel capitalist fantasies of rising Asian economies, fears of yellow peril and Orientalize black urban poor as unassimilable to American citizenship which establish the foundation for Asian-Black antagonisms | Jun in 11 99-101. CS> | Jun in 11 <Helan Heran. Associate Professor of English and African American Studies at University of Illinois at Chicago. Race for Citizenship : Black Orientalism and Asian Uplift from Pre-Emancipation to Neoliberal America. February 23, 2011. NYU Press. Pgs 99-101. CS> | The accelerated mobility of capital, goods, and bodies has become a defining feature of contemporary discourses of globalization. In the United States, formal racial equality, global shifts in modes of production, and unprecedented levels of immigration distinguish the post-1965 experience of race in this age of heightened capital mobility Asia now figures as the site of capitalism’s future. At the same time the much-vaunted mobilities of the post–civil rights era are contemporaneous with the intensification of mass displacement (deindustrialization, gentrification, incarceration, etc.), The inordinate impact of the new urban enclosures on working-class black communities, in particular, has only exacerbated the conditions of spatial isolation and fixity, which stand in stark contrast to the hypermobilities of capitalist globalization these countervailing movements have come to provide the contrasting poles through which contemporary ideologies of development are racialized the black urban poor now occupy the place of the atavistic, underdeveloped Others of global progress: incapable of being incorporated into the national citizenry, let alone into a world economy the concepts of black Orientalism and Asian uplift provide an alternative means through which to interrogate the assumptions of “racial prejudice” and “racial conflict,” which tend to short-circuit our analyses of U.S. black and Asian racial formations the discursive registers of black Orientalism and Asian uplift should not be regarded as unfortunate psychological complexes of “racial prejudice” but, rather, as a form of cultural politics integral to negotiating the contradictions endemic to Asian and African American citizenship black Orientalism names how the persistent failures of black citizenship—the inadequacy of legal equality, intensified residential segregation of the black poor, disenfranchisement through mass incarceration—are negotiated in relation to global restructuring, mass immigration, and a dominant cold-war American Orientalism that is wary of a future shaped by Asian economic domination black disenfranchisement is structurally related to new Asian immigration and the rise of the so-called Pacific Rim economy black Orientalism directs our analytical focus to the complexity of black national formation in contemporary transnationalism, in which Asian labor, markets, and capital constitute both America’s dream of future prosperity and the likely realization of its worst yellow peril nightmare. contemporary black/Asian antagonisms are contained through the dominant liberal episteme they are not merely repetitions of the old. What is new in these critical vernaculars can be discerned by attending to how the “tradition of all the dead generations” continues to operate in and on the present. | in heightened capital mobility Asia now figures The inordinate impact of the new urban enclosures on black communities has only exacerbated conditions the black urban poor now occupy the place of the atavistic, underdeveloped Others into the economy the concepts of black Orientalism provide an alternative means through which to interrogate the assumptions of racial conflict citizenship equality incarceration are negotiated in relation to global restructuring, mass immigration that is wary of a future shaped by Asian economic domination in which Asian labor constitute the likely realization of its worst yellow peril nightmare | The accelerated mobility of capital, goods, and bodies has become a defining feature of contemporary discourses of globalization. In the United States, formal racial equality, global shifts in modes of production, and unprecedented levels of immigration from Asia and Latin America distinguish the post-1965 experience of race. In contrast to the nineteenth century, in this age of heightened capital mobility Asia now figures as the site of capitalism’s future.1 At the same time, however, the much-vaunted mobilities of the post–civil rights era are contemporaneous with the intensification of mass displacement (deindustrialization, gentrification, incarceration, etc.), which is particularly acute given the relative immobility of impoverished urban populations. The inordinate impact of the new urban enclosures on working-class black communities, in particular, has only exacerbated the conditions of spatial isolation and fixity, which stand in stark contrast to the hypermobilities of capitalist globalization. In the dominant imaginary, these countervailing movements have come to provide the contrasting poles through which contemporary ideologies of development are racialized. Out of this complex matrix of mobilities and some twenty years after the passage of civil rights legislation, it is the black urban poor who have become “Orientalized” in contemporary discourses of development. In the modified terrain of symbolic pasts and futures, the black urban poor now occupy the place of the atavistic, underdeveloped Others of global progress: incapable of being incorporated into the national citizenry, let alone into a world economy.2 In this chapter I examine the figure of the Asian immigrant merchant in post–civil rights discourses of black dispossession and disenfranchisement as one critical sign of how this new, global racial imaginary has recast the race for citizenship. In my analysis, the concepts of black Orientalism and Asian uplift provide an alternative means through which to interrogate the assumptions of “racial prejudice” and “racial conflict,” which tend to short-circuit our analyses of U.S. black and Asian racial formations. As described in preceding chapters, the discursive registers of black Orientalism and Asian uplift should not be regarded as unfortunate psychological complexes of “racial prejudice” but, rather, as a form of cultural politics integral to negotiating the contradictions endemic to Asian and African American citizenship. Echoing the previous analysis of nineteenth-century discourses of black citizenship, my point is not to identify whether black Orientalism is racist or problematic. Instead, in the post-1965 period, black Orientalism names how the persistent failures of black citizenship—the inadequacy of legal equality, intensified residential segregation of the black poor, disenfranchisement through mass incarceration—are negotiated in relation to global restructuring, mass immigration, and a dominant cold-war American Orientalism that is wary of a future shaped by Asian economic domination. Current discourses of black Orientalism are distinct from dominant forms of American Orientalism, insofar as these discourses serve as a strategic means to engage with the abandonment and disenfranchisement of the black urban poor. Contemporary black Orientalisms, like their antecedent historic forms, cannot simply be reduced to Asian scapegoating, since black disenfranchisement is structurally related to new Asian immigration and the rise of the so-called Pacific Rim economy. In this way, rather than dispute the existence of anti-Korean or anti-Asian sentiments during, say, the Los Angeles uprisings or merchant boycotts, black Orientalism directs our analytical focus to the complexity of black national formation in contemporary transnationalism, in which Asian labor, markets, and capital constitute both America’s dream of future prosperity and the likely realization of its worst yellow peril nightmare. In particular, I show here that an understanding of the contradictions endemic to the institution of U.S. citizenship help leverage the “ethical frame” in which contemporary black/Asian antagonisms are contained through the dominant liberal episteme. In other words, the reductive imposition of situational ethics through which black collective resistance is persistently figured, individualized, and neutralized (as in “do the right thing”) requires a different kind of critical reckoning with the past in the present, a reckoning that Marx so eloquently depicted in his 1852 account of French history in the making: Men make history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. . . . In like manner a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without recalling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.3 The sociological analyses and film scripts, the boycotts and the riots, that I take up in this chapter bear the traces of “this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language,” but they are not merely repetitions of the old. What is new in these critical vernaculars can be discerned by attending to how the “tradition of all the dead generations” continues to operate in and on the present. | 6,023 | <h4>Our reps of Economic engagement with China works simultaneously to fuel capitalist fantasies of rising Asian economies, fears of yellow peril and Orientalize black urban poor as unassimilable to American citizenship which establish the foundation for Asian-Black antagonisms</h4><p><strong>Jun in 11</strong> <Helan Heran. Associate Professor of English and African American Studies at University of Illinois at Chicago. Race for Citizenship : Black Orientalism and Asian Uplift from Pre-Emancipation to Neoliberal America. February 23, 2011. NYU Press. Pgs<u><strong> 99-101. CS></p><p>The accelerated mobility of capital, goods, and bodies has become a defining feature of contemporary discourses of globalization. In the United States, formal racial equality, global shifts in modes of production, and unprecedented levels of immigration</u></strong> from Asia and Latin America <u><strong>distinguish the post-1965 experience of race</u></strong>. In contrast to the nineteenth century, <u><strong><mark>in</mark> this age of <mark>heightened capital mobility Asia now figures</mark> as the site of capitalism’s future.</u></strong>1 <u><strong>At the same time</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>the much-vaunted mobilities of the post–civil rights era are contemporaneous with the intensification of mass displacement (deindustrialization, gentrification, incarceration, etc.), </u></strong>which is particularly acute given the relative immobility of impoverished urban populations. <u><strong><mark>The inordinate impact of the new urban enclosures</mark> <mark>on</mark> working-class <mark>black communities</mark>, in particular, <mark>has only exacerbated</mark> the <mark>conditions</mark> of spatial isolation and fixity, which stand in stark contrast to the hypermobilities of capitalist globalization</u></strong>. In the dominant imaginary, <u><strong>these countervailing movements have come to provide the contrasting poles through which contemporary ideologies of development are racialized</u></strong>. Out of this complex matrix of mobilities and some twenty years after the passage of civil rights legislation, it is the black urban poor who have become “Orientalized” in contemporary discourses of development. In the modified terrain of symbolic pasts and futures, <u><strong><mark>the black urban poor now occupy the place of the atavistic, underdeveloped Others</mark> of global progress: incapable of being incorporated <mark>into</mark> <mark>the</mark> national citizenry, let alone into a world <mark>economy</u></strong></mark>.2 In this chapter I examine the figure of the Asian immigrant merchant in post–civil rights discourses of black dispossession and disenfranchisement as one critical sign of how this new, global racial imaginary has recast the race for citizenship. In my analysis, <u><strong><mark>the concepts of black Orientalism</mark> and Asian uplift <mark>provide an alternative means through which to interrogate</mark> <mark>the assumptions of</mark> “racial prejudice” and “<mark>racial conflict</mark>,” which tend to short-circuit our analyses of U.S. black and Asian racial formations</u></strong>. As described in preceding chapters, <u><strong>the discursive registers of black Orientalism and Asian uplift should not be regarded as unfortunate psychological complexes of “racial prejudice” but, rather, as a form of cultural politics integral to negotiating the contradictions endemic to Asian and African American citizenship</u></strong>. Echoing the previous analysis of nineteenth-century discourses of black citizenship, my point is not to identify whether black Orientalism is racist or problematic. Instead, in the post-1965 period, <u><strong>black Orientalism names how the persistent failures of black <mark>citizenship</mark>—the inadequacy of legal <mark>equality</mark>, intensified residential segregation of the black poor, disenfranchisement through mass <mark>incarceration</mark>—<mark>are negotiated in relation to global restructuring, mass immigration</mark>, and a dominant cold-war American Orientalism <mark>that is wary of a future shaped by Asian economic domination</u></strong></mark>. Current discourses of black Orientalism are distinct from dominant forms of American Orientalism, insofar as these discourses serve as a strategic means to engage with the abandonment and disenfranchisement of the black urban poor. Contemporary black Orientalisms, like their antecedent historic forms, cannot simply be reduced to Asian scapegoating, since <u><strong>black disenfranchisement is structurally related to new Asian immigration and the rise of the so-called Pacific Rim economy</u></strong>. In this way, rather than dispute the existence of anti-Korean or anti-Asian sentiments during, say, the Los Angeles uprisings or merchant boycotts, <u><strong>black Orientalism directs our analytical focus to the complexity of black national formation in contemporary transnationalism, <mark>in which Asian labor</mark>, markets, and capital <mark>constitute</mark> both America’s dream of future prosperity and <mark>the likely realization of its worst yellow peril nightmare</mark>. </u></strong>In particular, I show here that an understanding of the contradictions endemic to the institution of U.S. citizenship help leverage the “ethical frame” in which <u><strong>contemporary black/Asian antagonisms are contained through the dominant liberal episteme</u></strong>. In other words, the reductive imposition of situational ethics through which black collective resistance is persistently figured, individualized, and neutralized (as in “do the right thing”) requires a different kind of critical reckoning with the past in the present, a reckoning that Marx so eloquently depicted in his 1852 account of French history in the making: Men make history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. . . . In like manner a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without recalling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.3 The sociological analyses and film scripts, the boycotts and the riots, that I take up in this chapter bear the traces of “this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language,” but <u><strong>they are not merely repetitions of the old. What is new in these critical vernaculars can be discerned by attending to how the “tradition of all the dead generations” continues to operate in and on the present.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 187,521 | 6 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,393 | Naval concessions to China increase risks of miscalculated conflict and marginalize US Asian power | Kurth 12 ) KR | Kurth 12 (James, Senior Fellow at Center for the Study of America and the West, “Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics”, http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-western-characteristics/) KR | If the U S adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments there . In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese characteristics Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting this policy, making its application inconsistent and confusing and therefore again making for misconceptions and miscalculations. the loss of the three littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the Second Island Chains. In the end, the U S could be reduced to being marginalized, power in the Western Pacific. Given the economic and military dynamics now underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem that the Chinese will inevitably displace the U S from its dominant position in the three littoral seas and replace it with its own The time and the way that this will happen is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be appeasement or accommodation in this regional arena. | If the U S adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments there In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese characteristics. Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting this policy, making its application inconsistent and confusing and therefore again making for misconceptions and miscalculations. the loss of the three littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the Second Island Chains. In the end, the U S could be reduced to being marginalized, power in the Western Pacific Given the economic and military dynamics now underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem that the Chinese will inevitably displace the U S from its dominant position in the three littoral seas and replace it with its own. The time and the way that this will happen is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be appeasement or accommodation in this regional arena. | If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments there. The pace and direction of this reduction might be understood by China to be consistent with its own conceptions of patience and persistence. In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese characteristics. Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting this policy, making its application inconsistent and confusing and therefore again making for misconceptions and miscalculations. However, if the appeasement or accommodation policy were carried out to its logical conclusion, there would be a massive realignment of the long-established U.S. alliance system in the Western Pacific, i.e., involving not only the states bordering the three littoral seas and west of the “First Island Chain,” but also involving Japan, which is a major component of that chain and a principal power in the region. In other words, the loss of the three littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the Second Island Chains. In the end, the United States could be reduced to being a secondary, or even marginalized, power in the Western Pacific. Indeed, some Chinese military figures are beginning to raise the idea of a partitioning of the Pacific between China and the United States, along a line roughly corresponding to the Second Island Chain. Given the economic and military dynamics now underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem that the Chinese will inevitably displace the United States from its dominant position in the three littoral seas and replace it with its own. The time and the way that this will happen is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be appeasement or accommodation in this regional arena. | 2,104 | <h4>Naval concessions to China increase risks of miscalculated conflict and marginalize US Asian power</h4><p><strong>Kurth 12 </strong>(James, Senior Fellow at Center for the Study of America and the West, “Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics”, http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-western-characteristics/<u><strong>) KR</p><p></strong><mark>If the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments there</u></mark>. The pace and direction of this reduction might be understood by China to be consistent with its own conceptions of patience and persistence<u>. <mark>In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese characteristics</u>. <u>Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting this policy, making its application inconsistent and confusing and therefore again making for misconceptions and miscalculations.</mark> </u>However, if the appeasement or accommodation policy were carried out to its logical conclusion, there would be a massive realignment of the long-established U.S. alliance system in the Western Pacific, i.e., involving not only the states bordering the three littoral seas and west of the “First Island Chain,” but also involving Japan, which is a major component of that chain and a principal power in the region. In other words, <u><mark>the loss of the three littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the Second Island Chains. In the end, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could be reduced to being </u></mark>a secondary, or even<u><mark> marginalized, power in the Western Pacific</mark>.</u> Indeed, some Chinese military figures are beginning to raise the idea of a partitioning of the Pacific between China and the United States, along a line roughly corresponding to the Second Island Chain. <u><mark>Given the economic and military dynamics now underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem that the Chinese will inevitably displace the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates<u><mark> from its dominant position in the three littoral seas and replace it with its own</u>. <u>The time and the way that this will happen is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be appeasement or accommodation in this regional arena.</p></u></mark> | 2NC | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 162,623 | 2 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,394 | The United States Federal Government should do the aff if and only if the Peoples Republic of China harmonizes foreign non-governmental management laws with international law, reduces restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion and releases individuals detained under those restrictions. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States Federal Government should do the aff if and only if the Peoples Republic of China harmonizes foreign non-governmental management laws with international law, reduces restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion and releases individuals detained under those restrictions.</h4> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 1,560,804 | 1 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,395 | B) “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means | Ericson, 03 | Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4) | each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a program policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. | each topic contains certain key elements . An agent doing the acting ---“The U S the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb urges action should means to put a program policy into action though governmental means. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. | The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. | 1,287 | <h4>B) “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means</h4><p><strong>Ericson, 03</strong> (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><mark>each topic contains certain key elements</u></mark>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions<u>. 1<mark>. An agent doing the acting ---“The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates” in “The United States should adopt</u> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u><mark>the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb </mark>should</u>—the first part of a verb phrase <u>that <mark>urges</mark> <mark>action</u></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. <u>For example, <mark>should </mark>adopt </u>here <u><mark>means to put a program</u></mark> or <u><mark>policy into action though</mark> <mark>governmental means</u>.</mark> 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><mark>The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.</u><strong></mark> What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,149 | 3,809 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,396 | Sanctions key to solve adventurism and democracy | Pascrell 12/19 | Pascrell 12/19/16 (Bill, Member of Congress, “Thank you very much for your attention to this matter,” https://pascrell.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-pascrell-says-congress-must-increase-russia-sanctions)//cmr | In light of Putin’s continued aggression around the globe, I encourage you to prioritize our national security in the 115th Congress One of the first items of business Congress must consider is legislation to further tighten economic sanctions against Russia. this would be an important show of American strength. Putin’s attempts to undermine global stability are boundless Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty continues to support the Syrian Government The clear intent is to preserve Assad and his regime .S. intelligence clearly demonstrates the Russian Government directed an extensive breach of e-mails from U.S. citizens and institutions during our election These actions threaten our democratic institutions, national security, and sovereignty and warrant a swift, strong response. the current sanctions on Russia were implemented through executive orders These sanctions serve as an important tool to ensure Russia abandons its aggression abroad The U S must send a clear message that we will not stand idly by as Putin bullies his neighbors, tests the commitment of NATO, and works to fracture Western democracies legislation builds on existing sanctions and sends a clear signal Russia about the U.S.’s commitment Maintaining strict sanctions on Russia until it abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad has always been a source of bipartisan support Now, more than ever, it is critical the U S stand up to Putin by sending a clear message that Russia’s aggression will not be tolerated | legislation to tighten sanctions would be an important show of American strength. Putin’s attempts to undermine global stability are boundless Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty support the Syrian Government intelligence clearly demonstrates Russia threaten our democratic institutions sanctions ensure Russia abandons its aggression abroad The U S must send a clear message we will not stand by as Putin bullies his neighbors tests NATO and works to fracture democracies | In light of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued meddling and aggression around the globe, I encourage you to prioritize our national security in the 115th Congress. One of the first items of business the Congress must consider next year is legislation to further tighten economic sanctions against Russia. Earlier this year, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the STAND for Ukraine Act to contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine; support the sovereignty of Crimea against Russia’s illegal annexation; and ultimately assist Ukraine’s democratic transition. Advancing this bill would be an important show of American strength. President Putin’s attempts to undermine global stability are boundless. Russia has cultivated networks of patronage across Central and Eastern Europe in order to influence and direct decision-making to serve the Kremlin's interests. Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty by providing aid to separatists who attack Ukrainian military positions in Donetsk and Donbass, resulting in civilian casualties. In a similar vein, Russia continues to support the Syrian Government through its supply of ammunition and weapons, as well as its efforts to destroy opposition-controlled population zones and civilian infrastructure. The clear intent of these actions is to preserve Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. Finally, U.S. intelligence clearly demonstrates that the Russian Government directed an extensive breach of e-mails from U.S. citizens and institutions, including U.S. political organizations, during our election. These actions threaten our democratic institutions, national security, and sovereignty – and warrant a swift, strong response. As you know, the current sanctions on Russia were implemented in 2014 through executive orders relating to its actions in Ukraine. These sanctions serve as an important tool to ensure Russia abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad, which is why I am so concerned that they could be easily undone with the stroke of a pen by a future administration. The United States must send a clear message that we will not stand idly by as President Putin bullies his neighbors, tests the commitment of NATO, and works to fracture Western democracies. That is why it is critical for the Congress to pass the STAND for Ukraine Act. The STAND for Ukraine Act would codify the 2014 sanctions levied against Russia through executive orders into U.S. law, making it more difficult for future administrations to unravel our efforts to deter President Putin’s aggression and disrespect for global order. This legislation builds on existing sanctions and sends a clear signal to Russia about the U.S.’s commitment to this policy, just as we did during the Soviet Union’s decades-long occupation of the Baltic States. Maintaining strict sanctions on Russia until it abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad has always been a source of bipartisan support, evidenced by the strong bipartisan passage of every piece of legislation ramping up Russian sanctions. Now, more than ever, it is critical the United States stand up to President Putin by sending a clear message that Russia’s aggression will not be tolerated. | 3,257 | <h4>Sanctions key to solve adventurism and democracy</h4><p><strong>Pascrell 12/19</strong>/16 (Bill, Member of Congress, “Thank you very much for your attention to this matter,” https://pascrell.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-pascrell-says-congress-must-increase-russia-sanctions)//cmr</p><p><u>In light of</u> Russian President Vladimir <u>Putin’s continued </u>meddling and<u> aggression around the globe, I encourage you to prioritize our national security in the 115th Congress</u>. <u>One of the first items of business</u> the <u>Congress must consider</u> next year <u>is <mark>legislation to</mark> further <mark>tighten</mark> economic <mark>sanctions</mark> against Russia.</u> Earlier this year, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the STAND for Ukraine Act to contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine; support the sovereignty of Crimea against Russia’s illegal annexation; and ultimately assist Ukraine’s democratic transition. Advancing <u><strong>this</u></strong> bill <u><strong><mark>would be an important show of American strength.</mark> </u></strong>President <u><mark>Putin’s attempts to undermine <strong>global stability</strong> are <strong>boundless</u></strong></mark>. Russia has cultivated networks of patronage across Central and Eastern Europe in order to influence and direct decision-making to serve the Kremlin's interests. <u><mark>Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty</u></mark> by providing aid to separatists who attack Ukrainian military positions in Donetsk and Donbass, resulting in civilian casualties. In a similar vein, Russia <u>continues to <mark>support the Syrian Government</u></mark> through its supply of ammunition and weapons, as well as its efforts to destroy opposition-controlled population zones and civilian infrastructure. <u>The clear intent</u> of these actions <u>is to preserve</u> Syrian President Bashar al-<u>Assad and his regime</u>. Finally, U<u>.S. <mark>intelligence clearly demonstrates</u></mark> that <u>the <mark>Russia</mark>n Government directed an extensive breach of e-mails from U.S. citizens and institutions</u>, including U.S. political organizations, <u>during our election</u>. <u>These actions <mark>threaten our democratic institutions</mark>, national security, and sovereignty</u> – <u>and warrant a swift, strong response. </u>As you know, <u>the current sanctions on Russia were implemented</u> in 2014 <u>through executive orders</u> relating to its actions in Ukraine. <u>These <mark>sanctions</mark> serve as an important tool to <mark>ensure Russia <strong>abandons its</strong></mark> </u>oppression at home and<u> <strong><mark>aggression abroad</u></strong></mark>, which is why I am so concerned that they could be easily undone with the stroke of a pen by a future administration. <u><mark>The <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>must send a <strong>clear message</strong></mark> that <mark>we will not stand</mark> idly <mark>by as</mark> </u>President <u><mark>Putin bullies his neighbors</mark>, <mark>tests</mark> the commitment of <mark>NATO</mark>, <mark>and works to fracture</mark> Western <mark>democracies</u></mark>. That is why it is critical for the Congress to pass the STAND for Ukraine Act. The STAND for Ukraine Act would codify the 2014 sanctions levied against Russia through executive orders into U.S. law, making it more difficult for future administrations to unravel our efforts to deter President Putin’s aggression and disrespect for global order. This <u>legislation builds on existing sanctions and sends a <strong>clear signal</u></strong> to <u>Russia about the U.S.’s commitment</u> to this policy, just as we did during the Soviet Union’s decades-long occupation of the Baltic States. <u>Maintaining strict sanctions on Russia until it abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad has always been a source of bipartisan support</u>, evidenced by the strong bipartisan passage of every piece of legislation ramping up Russian sanctions. <u>Now, more than ever, it is critical the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>stand up to</u> President <u>Putin by sending a <strong>clear message</strong> that Russia’s aggression will not be tolerated</u>.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 2 | 406,286 | 29 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
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2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,397 | Our interpretation of diplomatic and economic engagement is that it must be the offer of positive inducements in exchange for specific concessions –that’s Hall | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Our interpretation of <u>diplomatic and economic engagement</u> is that it must be the offer of positive inducements <u>in exchange</u> for specific concessions –that’s Hall </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 1,560,805 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,398 | US engagement of China creates the good/bad Asian binary which aids in creating myths about Asians – basing arrangements are used to make Asians appear to be “model minorities” delegitimizing claims for empowerment from other communities of color AND they make Asians appear to be passive which constructs patriarchal gender dynamics. | Jalan 8 ) | Jalan 8 (Jalan Journal, “On the origins of anti-Asian racism and how we have fought back,” http://jalanjournal.org/2008/09/asians-against-white-supremacy/#more-44) | Racists project their own fears, anxieties, desires, and aspirations onto us in order to suppress our self-government and make us into who they want us to be, even if what they want us to be makes no sense. But racist fears, anxieties, desires and aspirations are not simply the product of individual ill will they are shaped by powerful institutions the U.S. military reproduces stereotypes of Asians as an aggressive brainwashed Mongolian horde in order to raise support for their base expansion projects aimed at containing Chinese military power Without U.S. military interests in Asia, this stereotype could have died out but instead it is growing. That’s why strategies of “anti-racism” will not liberate us Liberals encourage white people to question their stereotypes as part of confronting their “privilege.” They do not attempt to abolish the institutions like military bases that produce and reproduce these stereotypes to keep us subordinated. we can say that our enemies are the forces of white supremacy; any institutions practices that have the effect of elevating white people over people of color including Asians by subordinating and suppressing our attempts to be self-governing. there are two interlocking systems The first consists of the social relations formed by the colonial settlement of North America and the founding of the United States out of colonial settler state It is the result of land stolen from American Indians and Chicano/as, the enslavement of Blacks, and the extreme exploitation of “free” Black, Indigenous, European, and Asian migrant labor. settlerism The second system of white supremacy is related to settlerism but is more global consists of the social relations formed through the expansion of U.S. imperialism in Asia through military conquest the domination of American multinational corporations the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank over Asian economies U.S. Empire enforced the fiction of a white Western civilization reforming Asian barbarism. The experience of Asian Americans has been shaped by the fact that those who rule over us here in the U.S. also subjugated the countries we or our families came from The architects of U.S. Empire in Asia created a whole string of lies about Asians being backwards, ignorant, weak, and undemocratic in order to justify this subjugation Others have bought into U.S. empire, claiming they are the “good” Asians, unlike those “bad” Asians over there who are prone to terrorism fanaticism Communism or Islam US Empire has exported aspects of North American settlerist ideology to Asia, which is why so many of our aunties and uncles over there are scared of Black Americans even though they have never met any. to understand Asian American struggles we need to keep both of these systems of white supremacy in our headlights We can’t adopt the all-too-common view that race in America is a simple binary of white over Black. Social relations in the U.S. are deeply shaped by U.S. imperialism in Asia, anti-Chinese campaigns were a key moment in the construction of that bloody line between white and nonwhite in America Part of the logic of settlerism was the deputization of rank and file white workers into a vigilante force that could aid the state in dispossessing and murdering American Indians and Chicanos. Asian American workers found solidarity with Euro-American, Chicano, Black, and Native American workers in the IWW, a radical union that fought the bosses and the racist and corrupt American Federation of Labor. Japanese workers organized alongside Mexican workers in Oxnard CA, and Japanese-led labor organizing and strikes on Hawaiian sugar plantations attempted to break down the divide-and conquer management system that allocated wages based on ethnicity to create resentment between different Asian group These moments of resistance are overlooked chapters in the struggle for democracy and anti-racism in the U.S. This perpetual foreigner myth was reinforced by the machinery of U.S. Empire, which was expanding into Asia This perpetual foreigner myth is gendered: white supremacist efforts to define Asians as strange and exotic are often fought over the bodies of Asian women. Yet everywhere they went, these colonists set out to create reflections of their own patriarchal societies. In They eagerly tried to “civilize” these “exotic” women by training Burmese men to dominate them. While the US military is busy “liberating” Asian women, its soldiers and sailors stationed at the military bases in Asia sometimes rape local women and get away with it under Status of Forces agreements reminiscent of colonial concessions. Prostitution, sex tourism, and human trafficking rings from Thailand to the Philippines have sprung up to provide “rest and relaxation” to US soldiers and tropical getaways for US businessmen This logic has helped build an Asian underclass inside the U.S. When these women resist and sabotage their bosses’ efforts they are subjected to assault or are detained and deported. This arrangement proved useful to the ideologues of white supremacy. They began to argue that Asians were a “model minority” because they had supposedly pulled themselves up by their bootstraps through education and hard work. The implication here is that other minorities are problem minorities; that Latinos and especially Blacks remain poor because of their supposedly inferior culture, laziness, or lack of intelligence, and not 500 years of settlerism, slavery, Jim Crow, and discrimination. a time when the Black Power movement was shaking up American society and galvanizing young working class Asian Americans to side with Blacks in the struggle against white supremacy, this emerging model minority myth was deployed to divide Asians from Blacks and delegitimize the Black revolt. The model minority myth is destructiv because it sets us against other people of color but also because it erases our own legacies of working class struggle. By presenting Asian Americans as inherently middle class it obscures the key histories outlined above, denying us democratic and anti-racist sheroes and organizational precedents from our own communities. It also renders invisible the significant and growing Asian American working class today. From undocumented Chinese and Filipino workers to Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Laotian refugees from the terror of the US war in their homelands, this myth leaves out some of the most important and dynamic Asian American communities- the very folks who are a waging key struggles today against police brutality, homeland security raids, and deportation orders. our struggles against the model minority myth today are not just struggles against the white supremacist media and immigration systems; they are struggles for women’s’ liberation workers’ self management sexual and gender freedom and antiracism in our own communities. If the U.S. and China begin a protracted inter-imperialist rivalry over energy, military, or financial supremacy, this could re-awaken some of the old anti-Asian elements of U.S. nationalism. Faced with angry American workers who have lost their jobs due to corporate looting, politicians may try to divert this anger against Chinese workers abroad and Asian American workers here, claiming we are “stealing” American jobs. This could lead to new attacks against Asian Americans reminiscent of the killing of Vincent Chin who was beaten to death in 1982 by Detroit auto workers angry at Japanese competition outright war with China could lead to social chaos in both countries and the possibility of new internment camps it is crucial that Asian Americans begin organizing now to prevent these potential catastrophes anti-Asian racism is not simply the product of individual ill will The docile worker myth, the perpetual foreigner myth, the model minority myth, and the myth of the yellow peril all have to do with deep-rooted contradictions in American society If we want to break free of these oppressive myths then we need to confront these contradictions head on, in solidarity with other people | racist anxieties are not the product of individual ill will they are shaped by institutions this stereotype could have died out instead it is growing strategies of “anti-racism” will not liberate us Liberals encourage white people to question their stereotypes as part of confronting their “privilege.” They do not attempt to abolish institutions that produce stereotypes The second system of white suprema related to settlerism is more global social relations formed through expansion U.S. Empire enforced the fiction of a white Western civilization reforming Asian barbarism in Asia created a whole string of lies about Asians being backwards, ignorant, weak, and undemocratic in order to justify this subjugation Others bought into empire claiming they are the “good” Asians, unlike those “bad” Asians aspects of North American settlerist ideology to Asia which is why so many are scared of Black Americans Social relations in the U.S. are deeply shaped by U.S. in Asia anti-Chinese campaigns were a key in the construction of line between white and nonwhite . the deputization of rank and file white workers into a vigilante force that could aid the state in dispossessing and murdering American Indians and Chicanos This perpetual foreigner myth is gendered: white supremacist efforts to define Asians as strange and exotic fought over the bodies of Asian women US soldiers and sailors stationed at the military bases in Asia sometimes rape local women and get away with it under Status of Forces agreements . This logic has helped build an Asian underclass inside the U.S. women resist they are subjected to assault or are detained and deported other minorities are problem minorities; Blacks remain poor because of their supposedly inferior culture, , and not 500 years of settlerism, slavery, and discrimination a time when the Black Power movement was shaking up American society and galvanizing young working class Asian Americans to side with Blacks in the struggle against white supremacy, this emerging model minority myth was deployed to divide Asians from Blacks it sets us against other people of color struggles are against the white supremacist media and struggles for women’s’ liberation, workers’ self management, sexual and gender freedom, If the U.S. and China begin a protracted inter-imperialist rivalry this could re-awaken some of the old anti-Asian elements of U.S. nationalism This could lead to new attacks against Asian Americans we need to confront these contradictions head on, | The fact that these stereotypes are so contradictory show their ludicrousness. Racists project their own fears, anxieties, desires, and aspirations onto us in order to suppress our self-government and make us into who they want us to be, even if what they want us to be makes no sense. But racist fears, anxieties, desires and aspirations are not simply the product of individual ill will; they are shaped by powerful institutions. For example the U.S. military reproduces stereotypes of Asians as an aggressive, brainwashed Mongolian horde in order to raise support for their base expansion projects aimed at containing Chinese military power. Without U.S. military interests in Asia, this stereotype could have died out but instead it is growing. That’s why liberal strategies of “anti-racism” will not liberate us. Liberals encourage white people to question their stereotypes as part of confronting their “privilege.” They do not attempt to abolish the institutions like military bases that produce and reproduce these stereotypes to keep us subordinated. This editorial will examine the historic political, economic, and social origins of anti-Asian racism. Our goal is not to enlighten anyone’s consciousness but rather to expose the institutions that oppress us so we know who our enemies are and what we need to smash. The big picture: Facing the double-barreled shotgun of colonialism and empire In general, we can say that our enemies are the forces of white supremacy; any institutions and practices that have the effect of elevating white people over people of color (including Asians) by subordinating and suppressing our attempts to be self-governing. In particular, there are two interlocking systems of white supremacy that shape the terrain of Asian American life and struggle. The first consists of the social relations formed by the colonial settlement of North America and the founding of the United States out of colonial settler states. It is the result of land stolen from American Indians and Chicano/as, the enslavement of Blacks, and the extreme exploitation of “free” Black, Indigenous, European, and Asian migrant labor. As a shorthand, we will call all of this “settlerism”.[1] Settlerism has created a legacy of terror, violence, and racial hierarchy which Asian Americans have had to navigate. From the moment we arrived as workers in the Wild Wild West we found ourselves facing down the barrels of guns originally pointed at Blacks and American Indians. Later, we found ourselves victims of a Jim-Crow-style legal system. It is only more recently that we have been championed as the “model minority”, a supposed solution to the “problem” of militant Black resistance to 500 years of settler terror. The racist rationale that created such an identification for Asian Americans is further explored below, as well as in other articles. The second system of white supremacy is related to settlerism but is more global. It consists of the social relations formed through the expansion of U.S. imperialism in Asia through military conquest (the colonization of the Philippines, the partition of Korea, the Vietnam War, etc.) and the domination of American multinational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank over Asian economies. U.S. Empire built off of earlier forms of European imperialism in Asia even as it modified them. Like them, it enforced the fiction of a white Western civilization reforming Asian barbarism. The experience of Asian Americans has been shaped by the fact that those who rule over us here in the U.S. also subjugated the countries we or our families came from. The architects of U.S. Empire in Asia created a whole string of lies about Asians being backwards, ignorant, weak, and undemocratic in order to justify this subjugation. These lies have been applied to us as well, preventing us from assimilating and becoming white like the formerly non-white immigrant groups from Europe did. In response many Asian Americans have chosen to be consistent and principled internationalists – we have known that our situation here will not improve unless people of color abroad defeat U.S. Empire. Others have bought into U.S. empire, claiming they are the “good” Asians, unlike those “bad” Asians over there who are prone to terrorism, fanaticism, Communism, or Islam. And of course US Empire has exported aspects of North American settlerist ideology to Asia, which is why so many of our aunties and uncles over there are scared of Black Americans even though they have never met any. In order to understand Asian American struggles we need to keep both of these systems of white supremacy in our headlights. We can’t adopt the all-too-common view that race in America is a simple binary of white over Black. Social relations in the U.S. are deeply shaped by U.S. imperialism in Asia, our peoples’ resistance to it, and our own struggles here in North America. But at the same time, we can’t pretend we’re in a national liberation struggle somewhere in Asia where we are the “majority,” we are in the Western Hemisphere where our lives are forged in the Black-indigenous-white crucible and we need to seek our allies and define our enemies within this context. To do so, we will consider the origins and contemporary manifestations of four forms of anti-Asian racism: the backwards worker myth, the perpetual foreigner myth, the model minority myth, and the myth of the yellow peril. The Docile Worker Myth: Frustrated American Dreams turned deadly The fundamental forms of anti-Asian racism emerged because of labor competition between Asian workers and white workers who viewed Asians as backwards and submissive. To understand why this happened we need to look at a key moment in the formation of both settlerism and imperialism: the late 1800s and early 1900s, when Asian Americans first began to arrive in large numbers as miners, farmers, workers, and rebels. At this time the U.S. was going through the industrial revolution, unleashing forces of capitalist accumulation with a voracious appetite for land, resources, and labor. To fulfill this appetite, soldiers and settlers were moving westward looting and plundering American Indian and Chicano lands at a breakneck pace. The wealth they wrenched from their genocidal drive to the Pacific was delivered, dripping in blood, as the down-payment for the new factories, plants, and shipyards that formed the bedrock of emerging U.S. imperial power in Latin America and Asia. All of this involved mobilizing and exploiting human labor at an unprecedented scale. American settlerist mythology describes the conquest of the West as a something led by individualistic small property owners, “farmers, cowboys, merchants, prospectors, etc.,“ who supposedly represent the soul of American democracy. But digging goldmines, boring through mountains to build transcontinental railroads, and similar enterprises required a level of organization that rugged individualists alone could not accomplish and capital that only large corporations and the federal government could provide. Soon enough big companies shunted aside the pioneers and hired mass gangs of workers at the lowest wages they could possibly impose. This was the birth day of the America we know today, where our dreams are of cowboy glory and our day jobs are full of monotonous toil under the watch of bureaucrats. The corporations were looking for workers who could be compelled to accept slave-like wages and conditions without revolt. They turned to two sources. The first consisted of European immigrant workers from the east coast who had found themselves thrown into unemployment and poverty through economic crisis. The second consisted of former Asian farmers dislocated by the European and U.S. imperialism that was ravaging their homes (e.g. the Opium War and the genocidal Philippine-American war). But neither of these groups proved to be a well-disciplined or docile workforce, and it turned out that the only way to neutralize them was to pit the former against the latter. The European immigrants were lured west with dreams of becoming self-made men- owning property and eventually becoming capitalists. Their dream was a mirage; they were sorely disappointed and were seething with anger. Those who had established small businesses were getting out-competed by the big corporations. And new unskilled workers who arrived from east coast slums found dangerous, low paying jobs their only option. White supremacist politicians, craft union bureaucrats, businessmen, and many white skilled workers joined together to make Asian workers scapegoats for these frustrations; the Chinese community, which was the largest Asian ethnic group at the time, became their primary victim. They deflected the anger of small proprietors away from the big corporations and against their Chinese workers, arguing that the corporations’ reliance on cheap Chinese labor gave them an unfair advantage over smaller businesses. They also claimed that “civilized” white Americans should not have to compete in a labor market with “backwards” and “weak” “Orientals.” This allowed the skilled white workers and their craft unions to deflect the demands of unskilled European laborers for training and entry into the trades. The unskilled workers were told Chinese immigrants, not the corrupt and elitist craft unions and bosses were to blame for their plight. All of this allowed expanding US capitalism to solidify control over the workforce, neutralizing potential trouble from the unskilled white workers by co-opting them into white supremacy and neutralizing the Chinese workers by subjecting them to vigilante terror. These anti-Chinese campaigns were a key moment in the construction of that bloody line between white and nonwhite in America. Part of the logic of settlerism was the deputization of rank and file white workers into a vigilante force that could aid the state in dispossessing and murdering American Indians and Chicanos. This logic was extended against Asians as bands of armed vigilantes attacked Chinese folks and drove them out of gold mines, orchards, and small towns across the West. Between 1850 and 1906, Chinatowns burned to the ground and thousands of Chinese were killed, forced into prostitution, or marched to railroad cars and driven out, sometimes along the very tracks they and built. It was a campaign of wholesale ethnic cleansing. Eventually, this vigilante force was legalized in the form of a whole complex of Jim-crow-style legislation that forbade Asians from owning land, testifying against white men in court and attending public schools, etc. It all culminated in the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act which attempted to prevent any further Chinese immigration. Early Filipino-Americans faced similar conditions. For example, there were anti-Filipino riots against Filipinos in Yakima and Wenatchee valleys in Washington, and Filipinos were driven out of Yakima in 1928. Japanese Americans also faced segregation from public schools and were attacked by racist mobs in San Francisco in 1907. The ideologues leading these campaigns justified them by describing Asian workers as docile, dirty, backwards, and undemocratic. They were painted as conformist, traditional people unfit for a world of hearty American pioneer individualism. Many of these stereotypes remain today. (Of course, in cases where they had managed to set up their own businesses or farms, the script was flipped and Asians were portrayed as uppity, cunning devils who must have some trick up their sleeve). In reality, the white workers were just as dirty, poor and miserable as Asian American workers, but they were bamboozled into hugging the chains of their own wretchedness rather than fighting back against their real enemies. They were the ones who succumbed to the manipulations of anti-democratic ideologues and if anyone was swept mindlessly into mob conformity it was them. They were tricked into siding with their bosses and decadent, conservative craft unions rather than joining with Asian workers who could have been their natural allies in building a more democratic America. Of course, this is not to say that all classes of Asian Americans were automatically democratic. Emerging elites in Asian American communities also exploited our peoples ruthlessly. For example, Chinese workers were oppressed by powerful businessmen and labor brokers such as the Chinese Six Companies on the West Coast. These cartels collaborated with white supremacists to deliver coolie workers under slave-like conditions to American corporations. They worked with other Chinese elites that controlled political dissent in Chinese communities and maintained highly patriarchal and semi-feudal patronage networks backed up by thugs. But despite these restraints, Asian American workers proved themselves to be anything but backwards and naturally slavish. They lived the classic American experience of being thrown into a rootless, violent new context and improvising strategies of survival and resistance. During the anti-Chinese pogroms, Chinese Americans organized boycotts, lawsuits, popular militias for armed self-defense, appeals to China for arms, and mass civil disobedience against attempts to get them to wear photo ID cards. At times, Asian American workers found solidarity with Euro-American, Chicano, Black, and Native American workers in the IWW, a radical union that fought the bosses and the racist and corrupt American Federation of Labor. Japanese workers organized alongside Mexican workers in Oxnard CA, and Japanese-led labor organizing and strikes on Hawaiian sugar plantations attempted to break down the divide-and conquer management system that allocated wages based on ethnicity to create resentment between different Asian groups. Pioneering Filippino activists such as Philip Vera Cruz and Carlos Bulosan also organized alongside Arab and Latino farm workers to create the strong United Farmworkers Union in the 1960s. Enduring much physical and economic duress, the farmworkers managed to go on strike and organized a four-year long grape boycott to push for higher wages and better working conditions. These moments of resistance are often overlooked chapters in the struggle for democracy and anti-racism in the U.S. They offer important lessons for us today where the American dream is once again dissolving into unemployment, economic crisis, dislocation, and faceless bureaucracy. Once again, right-wing populist/ white supremacist politicians and militias are emerging to blame all of this on immigrant workers. Latinos are the primary targets for now, and for reasons we explain below Asian Americans could also be targeted in the future. We can look to this early Asian American resistance for insight into how we can fight back today. The Perpetual Foreigner Myth Despite these heroic struggles, Asian American workers and principled multiracial labor organizations were numerically outnumbered. Eventually, Asian Americans were barred from many industries and forced to live in ghettoes (Chinatowns, Manillatowns, little Tokoyos etc). Although Asian Americans used these communities to build networks of mutual aid and protection from white supremacy, this ghettoization limited their ability to impact broader American politics through multiracial labor struggles and cultural production. This is partly the material basis for the myth that Asian Americans are perpetual foreigners. Having ethnically cleansed and concentrated Asian American populations, white supremacists turned around and argued that Asians liked to keep to themselves, that we are just visitors or squatters here who are loyal to our homelands and not to America. They see our cultures as strange and exotic, fundamentally incompatible with American democracy. This perpetual foreigner myth was reinforced by the machinery of U.S. Empire, which was expanding into Asia. To justify its conquests, the imperialists argued that Asians had an exotic, decadent, and outdated civilization that needed to be supplanted by Western modernity. Rudyard Kipling’s notorious poem the “White Man’s Burden” was about this conquest, and it described Filipinos as ungrateful heathens, “half devil, half child.” He is only one of many examples. These views of Asians as an exotic and backwards civilization were applied to Asian Americans as well, and our ongoing segregation has been justified over and over again with the excuse that we will never be able to participate fully in American civic life. The perpetual foreigner myth reached a crescendo during World War II when the U.S. government portrayed the entire Japanese-American community as a ticking suicide bomb ready to go off in support of Japan. They rounded up thousands of Japanese families and put them in concentration camps. The perpetual foreigner myth is still alive today as neoconservative pundits portray South and Southeast Asian- American Muslims as a fifth column ready to pollute America with Jihadi terror, vampirish patriarchy, and religious fanaticism. Of course, some Asian Americans buy into this malicious propaganda by arguing that those other Asians, not us good suck ups, are the real, perpetual enemy aliens. The notorious Michelle Malkin who wrote the book, “In Defense of Internment: The case for ‘Racial Profiling’ in World War II and the War on Terror” is one such example. This perpetual foreigner myth is gendered: white supremacist efforts to define Asians as strange and exotic are often fought over the bodies of Asian women. Before the Western colonists arrived, Asian societies had a wide diversity of gendered institutions from the rigid patriarchy of imperial Chinese Confucianism to the relatively matriarchal norms of Southeast Asia and southern India. Yet everywhere they went, these colonists set out to create reflections of their own patriarchal societies. In Burma, British colonialists found themselves interacting with powerful women leaders. They argued that the equality or even dominance women enjoyed there was a mark of Burmese society’s barbarism. They eagerly tried to “civilize” these “exotic” women by training Burmese men to dominate them. Ironically, in the 20th century the imperialists flipped their script. Now they like to portray Asian societies as strange and backwards because of their supposedly more “traditional” patriarchy. We are constantly exposed to images of veiled Pakistani or Afghani women and the neoconservatives would have us believe that the war on terror is being fought to liberate these women from the grips of Islamic repression. What they never mention is that the U.S. has often supported the most patriarchal despots in Asia from Park Chung Hee in Korea to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. While the US military is busy “liberating” Asian women, its soldiers and sailors stationed at the military bases in Asia sometimes rape local women and get away with it under Status of Forces agreements reminiscent of colonial concessions. Prostitution, sex tourism, and human trafficking rings from Thailand to the Philippines have sprung up to provide “rest and relaxation” to US soldiers and tropical getaways for US businessmen. Associated advertising and pornography outfits turn this material reality into the myth of the hyper-sexual exotic Asian woman. While some white supremacists claim they are coming to Asia to liberate its women, others appeal to the patriarchy of American capitalism and attempt to pimp out Asian women as supposedly traditional, docile, unliberated peasants who will make good sweatshop workers, mail order brides, and prostitutes. This logic has helped build an Asian underclass inside the U.S. When these women resist and sabotage their bosses’ efforts they are subjected to assault or are detained and deported. The model minority myth Today this underclass is rendered invisible and this history of Asian American working class resistance is suppressed. Both inside and outside our communities, Asian Americans are now portrayed as middle class, upwardly mobile, hard working techies. Our classmates assume we are naturally smart and politicians assume we are naturally conservative. These new stereotypes also have a dark history behind them. In 1965, the US was facing pressures from the civil rights movement at home and the cold war abroad. In an attempt to improve its poor image as the world’s greatest racist, the U.S. government relaxed some of it’s explicitly race-based immigration laws and began to allow more Asian immigrants to come over. Unlike at the turn of the century when they needed cheap workers, in the 60s the U.S. capitalists faced a crisis of overproduction and unemployment due to massive automation of U.S. factories. However they did have a large demand for trained technicians, scientists, and engineers who could help run and update this automated machinery, and they were competing with the USSR for scientific talent to promote military supremacy. Given this context, the 1965 immigration act only allowed in the educated, skilled Asians and continued to bar unskilled Asian workers. This also contributed to a brain drain in Asian countries that now lost the skilled doctors and scientists who had received state subsidized training for their capabilities. This arrangement proved useful to the ideologues of white supremacy. They began to argue that Asians were a “model minority” because they had supposedly pulled themselves up by their bootstraps through education and hard work. The disproportionate number of Asian technicians and professionals who had arrived at the US through the state’s capitalist immigration policies, was ahistorically attributed to Asian values of hard work and family. The implication here is that other minorities are problem minorities; that Latinos and especially Blacks remain poor because of their supposedly inferior culture, laziness, or lack of intelligence, and not 500 years of settlerism, slavery, Jim Crow, and discrimination. At a time when the Black Power movement was shaking up American society and galvanizing young working class Asian Americans to side with Blacks in the struggle against white supremacy, this emerging model minority myth was deployed to divide Asians from Blacks and delegitimize the Black revolt. The model minority myth is destructive not only because it sets us against other people of color but also because it erases our own legacies of working class struggle. By presenting Asian Americans as inherently middle class it obscures the key histories outlined above, denying us democratic and anti-racist sheroes and organizational precedents from our own communities. It also renders invisible the significant and growing Asian American working class today. From undocumented Chinese and Filipino workers to Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Laotian refugees from the terror of the US war in their homelands, this myth leaves out some of the most important and dynamic Asian American communities- the very folks who are a waging key struggles today against police brutality, homeland security raids, and deportation orders. The model minority myth could not have lasted if it were simply a white racist fantasy propagated by media portrayals of Asians. It was solidified because upwardly mobile middle class leaders in some of our own communities have bought into it. As soon as possible they moved out of the ghetto and into the suburbs and they tried to train their kids to fear and pity other people of color. Many of our parents continue to buy into this myth because in their eyes it jives with some of their own chauvinistic thinking about essential “Asian” values of hard work and family discipline (expressed through very American and very capitalist reinterpretation of Confucianism, Hinduism, etc.). For them being the model minority also means maintaining patriarchy, regulating their kids’ sexuality, and keeping them away from the more dynamic (and less white!) aspects of American culture such as hip hop. It is the task of our generation to break this middle-class stronghold that has dominated Asian Americans today. In this sense, our struggles against the model minority myth today are not just struggles against the white supremacist media and immigration systems; they are also struggles for women’s’ liberation, workers’ self management, sexual and gender freedom, and antiracism in our own communities. As more Asian workers begin to immigrate and as our generation of young Asian Americans begin to identify more with other people of color, the model minority myth could be shaken up. The international dimensions of the model minority myth follow the same pattern, and exacerbates its harm. U.S. Empire has propped up the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) as models for other people of color nations to follow. And yet these supposed capitalist success stories have faced restless working classes and democratic challenges to their authoritarian governments. South Korean workers and farmers militantly confronting the cops at anti-globalization demonstrations should be enough to shatter the myth of Asian docility and conservativism. The Myth of the Yellow Peril All of the myths discussed so far are built on the assumption that Asian countries will remain subordinated to U.S. Empire. Even the Asian tigers are junior partners. But the prospect of a growing Chinese empire emerging as a direct rival to U.S. imperialism could significantly shake up the relationship between Asian Americans and other Americans. The rise of the Japanese Empire in the early 20th century gives us a precedent for understanding what might happen. At first the American ruling class saw the Japanese Empire as a benign, progressive force that could help modernize the rest of Asia and Japanese Americans were thus seen in a positive light. But eventually, Japan began to approach parity with the U.S. and the two empires began to compete for territory and resources. At that point, the script was flipped and the Japanese were portrayed as ruthless, cunning, diabolical aliens threatening to swarm across the world and exterminate the white race. The propaganda of both the Japanese and the U.S. armies turned the Pacific front into a race war. In the U.S., this gave rise to the stereotypes of the “yellow peril” literature and films. Today, while most American elites are content to cash in on cooperation with China’s dynamic capitalists, some factions of the U.S. ruling class are beginning to promote a vision of China as the new yellow peril. They recognize that China holds trillions of U.S. dollars in its state bank and are startled by Chinese government efforts to wean its economy off of production for the U.S. consumer market. They describe the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony as a strange pageant of Asian conformism, as an unleashing of the collective power of docile Asian workers who will bow to a rising new Emperor, a new Oriental Despot. There is renewed talk about the threat that Chinese people supposedly pose to Western values. What effect all of this will have on Asian Americans is yet to be seen. Many of us, regardless of ethnicity, are mistaken for Chinese by white folks who can’t tell the difference between us. If the U.S. and China begin a protracted inter-imperialist rivalry over energy, military, or financial supremacy, this could re-awaken some of the old anti-Asian elements of U.S. nationalism. The model minority myth could dissolve and more direct and vicious forms of white supremacy could re-emerge. Faced with angry American workers who have lost their jobs due to corporate looting, politicians may try to divert this anger against Chinese workers abroad and Asian American workers here, claiming we are “stealing” American jobs. This could lead to new attacks against Asian Americans reminiscent of the killing of Vincent Chin who was beaten to death in 1982 by Detroit auto workers angry at Japanese competition. Although unlikely in the near future, outright war with China could lead to social chaos in both countries and the possibility of new internment camps. We shouldn’t be alarmist but it is crucial that Asian Americans begin organizing now to prevent these potential catastrophes. We are in a good position to make links between American workers and Asian workers abroad, articulating our common interests and challenging the claims of both Chinese and American elites to speak for our peoples. Conclusion As we have seen, anti-Asian racism is not simply the product of individual ill will. The docile worker myth, the perpetual foreigner myth, the model minority myth, and the myth of the yellow peril all have to do with deep-rooted contradictions in American society. If we want to break free of these oppressive myths then we need to confront these contradictions head on, in solidarity with other people | 28,969 | <h4>US engagement of China creates<strong> the good/bad Asian binary which aids in creating myths about Asians – basing arrangements are used to make Asians appear to be “model minorities” delegitimizing claims for empowerment from other communities of color AND they make Asians appear to be passive which constructs patriarchal gender dynamics. </h4><p><u>Jalan 8 </u></strong>(Jalan Journal, “On the origins of anti-Asian racism and how we have fought back,” http://jalanjournal.org/2008/09/asians-against-white-supremacy/#more-44<u><strong><mark>) </p><p></u></strong></mark>The fact that these stereotypes are so contradictory show their ludicrousness. <u><strong>Racists project their own fears, anxieties, desires, and aspirations onto us in order to suppress our self-government and make us into who they want us to be,</u></strong> <u><strong>even if</u></strong> <u><strong>what they want us to be makes no sense. But</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>racist</mark> fears, <mark>anxieties</mark>, desires and aspirations <mark>are not</mark> simply <mark>the product of individual ill will</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>they are shaped by</mark> powerful <mark>institutions</u></strong></mark>. For example <u><strong>the U.S. military reproduces stereotypes of Asians as an aggressive</u></strong>, <u><strong>brainwashed Mongolian horde in</u></strong> <u><strong>order to raise support for their base expansion projects aimed at containing Chinese military power</u></strong>. <u><strong>Without U.S. military interests in Asia, <mark>this</mark> <mark>stereotype could have died out</mark> but <mark>instead it is growing</mark>. That’s why</u></strong> liberal <u><strong><mark>strategies of “anti-racism” will</mark> <mark>not liberate us</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Liberals encourage white people to question their stereotypes as part of confronting their “privilege.”</u></strong> <u><strong>They do not attempt to abolish</mark> the <mark>institutions </mark>like military bases</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that</mark> <mark>produce </mark>and reproduce these <mark>stereotypes</mark> to keep us subordinated.</u></strong> This editorial will examine the historic political, economic, and social origins of anti-Asian racism. Our goal is not to enlighten anyone’s consciousness but rather to expose the institutions that oppress us so we know who our enemies are and what we need to smash. The big picture: Facing the double-barreled shotgun of colonialism and empire In general, <u><strong>we can say that our enemies are the forces of white supremacy;</u></strong> <u><strong>any institutions</u></strong> and <u><strong>practices that have the effect of elevating white people over people of color</u></strong> (<u><strong>including Asians</u></strong>) <u><strong>by subordinating and suppressing our attempts to be self-governing. </u></strong>In particular, <u><strong>there are two interlocking systems</u></strong> of white supremacy that shape the terrain of Asian American life and struggle. <u><strong>The first consists of the social relations formed by the colonial settlement of North America</u></strong> <u><strong>and the founding of the United States out of colonial settler state</u></strong>s. <u><strong>It is the result of land stolen from American Indians and Chicano/as, the enslavement of Blacks, and the extreme exploitation of “free” Black, Indigenous, European, and Asian migrant labor.</u></strong> As a shorthand, we will call all of this “<u><strong>settlerism</u></strong>”.[1] Settlerism has created a legacy of terror, violence, and racial hierarchy which Asian Americans have had to navigate. From the moment we arrived as workers in the Wild Wild West we found ourselves facing down the barrels of guns originally pointed at Blacks and American Indians. Later, we found ourselves victims of a Jim-Crow-style legal system. It is only more recently that we have been championed as the “model minority”, a supposed solution to the “problem” of militant Black resistance to 500 years of settler terror. The racist rationale that created such an identification for Asian Americans is further explored below, as well as in other articles. <u><strong><mark>The second system of white suprema</mark>cy is <mark>related to settlerism</mark> but <mark>is more global</u></strong></mark>. It <u><strong>consists of the <mark>social relations formed through</mark> the <mark>expansion </mark>of U.S. imperialism in Asia through military conquest</u></strong> (the colonization of the Philippines, the partition of Korea, the Vietnam War, etc.) and <u><strong>the domination of American multinational corporations</u></strong>, <u><strong>the International Monetary Fund</u></strong>, <u><strong>and the World Bank over Asian economies</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>U.S. Empire</u></strong></mark> built off of earlier forms of European imperialism in Asia even as it modified them. Like them, it <u><strong><mark>enforced the fiction of a white Western civilization reforming Asian barbarism</mark>. The experience of Asian Americans has been shaped by the fact that those who rule over us here in the U.S. also subjugated the countries we or our families came from</u></strong>. <u><strong>The architects of U.S. Empire <mark>in Asia created a whole string of lies about Asians being backwards, ignorant, weak, and undemocratic in order to justify this subjugation</u></strong></mark>. These lies have been applied to us as well, preventing us from assimilating and becoming white like the formerly non-white immigrant groups from Europe did. In response many Asian Americans have chosen to be consistent and principled internationalists – we have known that our situation here will not improve unless people of color abroad defeat U.S. Empire. <u><strong><mark>Others</mark> have <mark>bought</mark> <mark>into</mark> U.S. <mark>empire</mark>, <mark>claiming they are the “good” Asians, unlike those “bad” Asians</mark> over there who are prone to terrorism</u></strong>, <u><strong>fanaticism</u></strong>, <u><strong>Communism</u></strong>, <u><strong>or</u></strong> <u><strong>Islam</u></strong>. And of course <u><strong>US Empire has exported<mark> aspects of North American settlerist ideology to Asia</mark>, <mark>which is why so many</mark> of our aunties and uncles over there <mark>are scared of Black Americans</mark> even though they have never met any. </u></strong>In order <u><strong>to understand Asian American struggles we need to keep both of these systems of white supremacy in our headlights</u></strong>. <u><strong>We can’t adopt the all-too-common view that race in America is a simple binary of white over Black. <mark>Social relations in the U.S. are deeply shaped by U.S. </mark>imperialism <mark>in Asia</mark>,</u></strong> our peoples’ resistance to it, and our own struggles here in North America. But at the same time, we can’t pretend we’re in a national liberation struggle somewhere in Asia where we are the “majority,” we are in the Western Hemisphere where our lives are forged in the Black-indigenous-white crucible and we need to seek our allies and define our enemies within this context. To do so, we will consider the origins and contemporary manifestations of four forms of anti-Asian racism: the backwards worker myth, the perpetual foreigner myth, the model minority myth, and the myth of the yellow peril. The Docile Worker Myth: Frustrated American Dreams turned deadly The fundamental forms of anti-Asian racism emerged because of labor competition between Asian workers and white workers who viewed Asians as backwards and submissive. To understand why this happened we need to look at a key moment in the formation of both settlerism and imperialism: the late 1800s and early 1900s, when Asian Americans first began to arrive in large numbers as miners, farmers, workers, and rebels. At this time the U.S. was going through the industrial revolution, unleashing forces of capitalist accumulation with a voracious appetite for land, resources, and labor. To fulfill this appetite, soldiers and settlers were moving westward looting and plundering American Indian and Chicano lands at a breakneck pace. The wealth they wrenched from their genocidal drive to the Pacific was delivered, dripping in blood, as the down-payment for the new factories, plants, and shipyards that formed the bedrock of emerging U.S. imperial power in Latin America and Asia. All of this involved mobilizing and exploiting human labor at an unprecedented scale. American settlerist mythology describes the conquest of the West as a something led by individualistic small property owners, “farmers, cowboys, merchants, prospectors, etc.,“ who supposedly represent the soul of American democracy. But digging goldmines, boring through mountains to build transcontinental railroads, and similar enterprises required a level of organization that rugged individualists alone could not accomplish and capital that only large corporations and the federal government could provide. Soon enough big companies shunted aside the pioneers and hired mass gangs of workers at the lowest wages they could possibly impose. This was the birth day of the America we know today, where our dreams are of cowboy glory and our day jobs are full of monotonous toil under the watch of bureaucrats. The corporations were looking for workers who could be compelled to accept slave-like wages and conditions without revolt. They turned to two sources. The first consisted of European immigrant workers from the east coast who had found themselves thrown into unemployment and poverty through economic crisis. The second consisted of former Asian farmers dislocated by the European and U.S. imperialism that was ravaging their homes (e.g. the Opium War and the genocidal Philippine-American war). But neither of these groups proved to be a well-disciplined or docile workforce, and it turned out that the only way to neutralize them was to pit the former against the latter. The European immigrants were lured west with dreams of becoming self-made men- owning property and eventually becoming capitalists. Their dream was a mirage; they were sorely disappointed and were seething with anger. Those who had established small businesses were getting out-competed by the big corporations. And new unskilled workers who arrived from east coast slums found dangerous, low paying jobs their only option. White supremacist politicians, craft union bureaucrats, businessmen, and many white skilled workers joined together to make Asian workers scapegoats for these frustrations; the Chinese community, which was the largest Asian ethnic group at the time, became their primary victim. They deflected the anger of small proprietors away from the big corporations and against their Chinese workers, arguing that the corporations’ reliance on cheap Chinese labor gave them an unfair advantage over smaller businesses. They also claimed that “civilized” white Americans should not have to compete in a labor market with “backwards” and “weak” “Orientals.” This allowed the skilled white workers and their craft unions to deflect the demands of unskilled European laborers for training and entry into the trades. The unskilled workers were told Chinese immigrants, not the corrupt and elitist craft unions and bosses were to blame for their plight. All of this allowed expanding US capitalism to solidify control over the workforce, neutralizing potential trouble from the unskilled white workers by co-opting them into white supremacy and neutralizing the Chinese workers by subjecting them to vigilante terror. These <u><strong><mark>anti-Chinese campaigns were a key </mark>moment <mark>in the construction of </mark>that bloody<mark> line between white and nonwhite </mark>in America</u></strong><mark>.</mark> <u><strong>Part of the logic of settlerism was <mark>the deputization of rank and file white workers into a vigilante force that could aid the state in dispossessing and murdering American Indians and Chicanos</mark>.</u></strong> This logic was extended against Asians as bands of armed vigilantes attacked Chinese folks and drove them out of gold mines, orchards, and small towns across the West. Between 1850 and 1906, Chinatowns burned to the ground and thousands of Chinese were killed, forced into prostitution, or marched to railroad cars and driven out, sometimes along the very tracks they and built. It was a campaign of wholesale ethnic cleansing. Eventually, this vigilante force was legalized in the form of a whole complex of Jim-crow-style legislation that forbade Asians from owning land, testifying against white men in court and attending public schools, etc. It all culminated in the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act which attempted to prevent any further Chinese immigration. Early Filipino-Americans faced similar conditions. For example, there were anti-Filipino riots against Filipinos in Yakima and Wenatchee valleys in Washington, and Filipinos were driven out of Yakima in 1928. Japanese Americans also faced segregation from public schools and were attacked by racist mobs in San Francisco in 1907. The ideologues leading these campaigns justified them by describing Asian workers as docile, dirty, backwards, and undemocratic. They were painted as conformist, traditional people unfit for a world of hearty American pioneer individualism. Many of these stereotypes remain today. (Of course, in cases where they had managed to set up their own businesses or farms, the script was flipped and Asians were portrayed as uppity, cunning devils who must have some trick up their sleeve). In reality, the white workers were just as dirty, poor and miserable as Asian American workers, but they were bamboozled into hugging the chains of their own wretchedness rather than fighting back against their real enemies. They were the ones who succumbed to the manipulations of anti-democratic ideologues and if anyone was swept mindlessly into mob conformity it was them. They were tricked into siding with their bosses and decadent, conservative craft unions rather than joining with Asian workers who could have been their natural allies in building a more democratic America. Of course, this is not to say that all classes of Asian Americans were automatically democratic. Emerging elites in Asian American communities also exploited our peoples ruthlessly. For example, Chinese workers were oppressed by powerful businessmen and labor brokers such as the Chinese Six Companies on the West Coast. These cartels collaborated with white supremacists to deliver coolie workers under slave-like conditions to American corporations. They worked with other Chinese elites that controlled political dissent in Chinese communities and maintained highly patriarchal and semi-feudal patronage networks backed up by thugs. But despite these restraints, Asian American workers proved themselves to be anything but backwards and naturally slavish. They lived the classic American experience of being thrown into a rootless, violent new context and improvising strategies of survival and resistance. During the anti-Chinese pogroms, Chinese Americans organized boycotts, lawsuits, popular militias for armed self-defense, appeals to China for arms, and mass civil disobedience against attempts to get them to wear photo ID cards. At times, <u><strong>Asian American workers found solidarity with Euro-American, Chicano, Black, and Native American workers in the IWW, a radical union that fought the bosses and the racist and corrupt American Federation of Labor. Japanese workers organized alongside Mexican workers in Oxnard CA, and Japanese-led labor organizing and strikes on Hawaiian sugar plantations attempted to break down the divide-and conquer management system that allocated wages based on ethnicity to create resentment between different Asian group</u></strong>s. Pioneering Filippino activists such as Philip Vera Cruz and Carlos Bulosan also organized alongside Arab and Latino farm workers to create the strong United Farmworkers Union in the 1960s. Enduring much physical and economic duress, the farmworkers managed to go on strike and organized a four-year long grape boycott to push for higher wages and better working conditions. <u><strong>These moments of resistance are</u></strong> often <u><strong>overlooked chapters in the struggle for democracy and anti-racism in the U.S.</u></strong> They offer important lessons for us today where the American dream is once again dissolving into unemployment, economic crisis, dislocation, and faceless bureaucracy. Once again, right-wing populist/ white supremacist politicians and militias are emerging to blame all of this on immigrant workers. Latinos are the primary targets for now, and for reasons we explain below Asian Americans could also be targeted in the future. We can look to this early Asian American resistance for insight into how we can fight back today. The Perpetual Foreigner Myth Despite these heroic struggles, Asian American workers and principled multiracial labor organizations were numerically outnumbered. Eventually, Asian Americans were barred from many industries and forced to live in ghettoes (Chinatowns, Manillatowns, little Tokoyos etc). Although Asian Americans used these communities to build networks of mutual aid and protection from white supremacy, this ghettoization limited their ability to impact broader American politics through multiracial labor struggles and cultural production. This is partly the material basis for the myth that Asian Americans are perpetual foreigners. Having ethnically cleansed and concentrated Asian American populations, white supremacists turned around and argued that Asians liked to keep to themselves, that we are just visitors or squatters here who are loyal to our homelands and not to America. They see our cultures as strange and exotic, fundamentally incompatible with American democracy. <u><strong>This perpetual foreigner myth was reinforced by the machinery of U.S. Empire,</u></strong> <u><strong>which was expanding into Asia</u></strong>. To justify its conquests, the imperialists argued that Asians had an exotic, decadent, and outdated civilization that needed to be supplanted by Western modernity. Rudyard Kipling’s notorious poem the “White Man’s Burden” was about this conquest, and it described Filipinos as ungrateful heathens, “half devil, half child.” He is only one of many examples. These views of Asians as an exotic and backwards civilization were applied to Asian Americans as well, and our ongoing segregation has been justified over and over again with the excuse that we will never be able to participate fully in American civic life. The perpetual foreigner myth reached a crescendo during World War II when the U.S. government portrayed the entire Japanese-American community as a ticking suicide bomb ready to go off in support of Japan. They rounded up thousands of Japanese families and put them in concentration camps. The perpetual foreigner myth is still alive today as neoconservative pundits portray South and Southeast Asian- American Muslims as a fifth column ready to pollute America with Jihadi terror, vampirish patriarchy, and religious fanaticism. Of course, some Asian Americans buy into this malicious propaganda by arguing that those other Asians, not us good suck ups, are the real, perpetual enemy aliens. The notorious Michelle Malkin who wrote the book, “In Defense of Internment: The case for ‘Racial Profiling’ in World War II and the War on Terror” is one such example. <u><strong><mark>This perpetual foreigner myth is gendered:</u></strong> <u><strong>white supremacist efforts to define Asians as strange and exotic</mark> are often <mark>fought over the bodies of Asian women</mark>.</u></strong> Before the Western colonists arrived, Asian societies had a wide diversity of gendered institutions from the rigid patriarchy of imperial Chinese Confucianism to the relatively matriarchal norms of Southeast Asia and southern India. <u><strong>Yet everywhere they went, these colonists set out to create reflections of their own patriarchal societies. In</u></strong> Burma, British colonialists found themselves interacting with powerful women leaders. They argued that the equality or even dominance women enjoyed there was a mark of Burmese society’s barbarism. <u><strong>They eagerly tried to “civilize” these “exotic” women by training Burmese men to dominate them. </u></strong>Ironically, in the 20th century the imperialists flipped their script. Now they like to portray Asian societies as strange and backwards because of their supposedly more “traditional” patriarchy. We are constantly exposed to images of veiled Pakistani or Afghani women and the neoconservatives would have us believe that the war on terror is being fought to liberate these women from the grips of Islamic repression. What they never mention is that the U.S. has often supported the most patriarchal despots in Asia from Park Chung Hee in Korea to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. <u><strong>While the <mark>US</mark> military is busy “liberating” Asian women, its <mark>soldiers and sailors stationed at the military bases in Asia sometimes rape local women and get away with it under Status of Forces agreements </mark>reminiscent of colonial concessions<mark>.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Prostitution, sex tourism, and human trafficking rings from Thailand to the Philippines have sprung up to provide “rest and relaxation” to US soldiers and tropical getaways for US businessmen</u></strong>. Associated advertising and pornography outfits turn this material reality into the myth of the hyper-sexual exotic Asian woman. While some white supremacists claim they are coming to Asia to liberate its women, others appeal to the patriarchy of American capitalism and attempt to pimp out Asian women as supposedly traditional, docile, unliberated peasants who will make good sweatshop workers, mail order brides, and prostitutes. <u><strong><mark>This logic has helped build an Asian underclass inside the U.S.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>When these <mark>women resist </mark>and sabotage their bosses’ efforts <mark>they are subjected to assault or are detained and deported</mark>. </u></strong>The model minority myth Today this underclass is rendered invisible and this history of Asian American working class resistance is suppressed. Both inside and outside our communities, Asian Americans are now portrayed as middle class, upwardly mobile, hard working techies. Our classmates assume we are naturally smart and politicians assume we are naturally conservative. These new stereotypes also have a dark history behind them. In 1965, the US was facing pressures from the civil rights movement at home and the cold war abroad. In an attempt to improve its poor image as the world’s greatest racist, the U.S. government relaxed some of it’s explicitly race-based immigration laws and began to allow more Asian immigrants to come over. Unlike at the turn of the century when they needed cheap workers, in the 60s the U.S. capitalists faced a crisis of overproduction and unemployment due to massive automation of U.S. factories. However they did have a large demand for trained technicians, scientists, and engineers who could help run and update this automated machinery, and they were competing with the USSR for scientific talent to promote military supremacy. Given this context, the 1965 immigration act only allowed in the educated, skilled Asians and continued to bar unskilled Asian workers. This also contributed to a brain drain in Asian countries that now lost the skilled doctors and scientists who had received state subsidized training for their capabilities. <u><strong>This arrangement proved useful to the ideologues of white supremacy. They began to argue that Asians were a “model minority” because they had supposedly pulled themselves up by their bootstraps through education and hard work.</u></strong> The disproportionate number of Asian technicians and professionals who had arrived at the US through the state’s capitalist immigration policies, was ahistorically attributed to Asian values of hard work and family. <u><strong>The implication here is that <mark>other minorities are problem minorities; </mark>that Latinos and especially <mark>Blacks remain poor because of their supposedly inferior culture, </mark>laziness, or lack of intelligence<mark>, and not 500 years of settlerism, slavery, </mark>Jim Crow, <mark>and discrimination</mark>.</u></strong> At <u><strong><mark>a time when the Black Power movement was shaking up American society and galvanizing young working class Asian Americans to side with Blacks in the struggle against white supremacy, this emerging model minority myth was deployed to divide Asians from Blacks </mark>and delegitimize the Black revolt. The model minority myth is destructiv</u></strong>e not only <u><strong>because <mark>it sets us against other people of color </mark>but also because it erases our own legacies of working class struggle.</u></strong> <u><strong>By presenting Asian Americans as inherently middle class it obscures the key histories outlined above, denying us democratic and anti-racist sheroes and organizational precedents from our own communities. It also renders invisible the significant and growing Asian American working class today. From undocumented Chinese and Filipino workers to Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Laotian refugees from the terror of the US war in their homelands, this myth leaves out some of the most important and dynamic Asian American communities- the very folks who are a waging key struggles today against police brutality, homeland security raids, and deportation orders. </u></strong>The model minority myth could not have lasted if it were simply a white racist fantasy propagated by media portrayals of Asians. It was solidified because upwardly mobile middle class leaders in some of our own communities have bought into it. As soon as possible they moved out of the ghetto and into the suburbs and they tried to train their kids to fear and pity other people of color. Many of our parents continue to buy into this myth because in their eyes it jives with some of their own chauvinistic thinking about essential “Asian” values of hard work and family discipline (expressed through very American and very capitalist reinterpretation of Confucianism, Hinduism, etc.). For them being the model minority also means maintaining patriarchy, regulating their kids’ sexuality, and keeping them away from the more dynamic (and less white!) aspects of American culture such as hip hop. It is the task of our generation to break this middle-class stronghold that has dominated Asian Americans today. In this sense, <u><strong>our <mark>struggles </mark>against the model minority myth today <mark>are </mark>not just struggles <mark>against</mark> <mark>the white supremacist media</mark> <mark>and</mark> immigration systems; they are</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>struggles for women’s’ liberation</u></strong>, <u><strong>workers’ self management</u></strong>, <u><strong>sexual and gender freedom</u></strong>, <u><strong></mark>and antiracism in our own communities.</u></strong> As more Asian workers begin to immigrate and as our generation of young Asian Americans begin to identify more with other people of color, the model minority myth could be shaken up. The international dimensions of the model minority myth follow the same pattern, and exacerbates its harm. U.S. Empire has propped up the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) as models for other people of color nations to follow. And yet these supposed capitalist success stories have faced restless working classes and democratic challenges to their authoritarian governments. South Korean workers and farmers militantly confronting the cops at anti-globalization demonstrations should be enough to shatter the myth of Asian docility and conservativism. The Myth of the Yellow Peril All of the myths discussed so far are built on the assumption that Asian countries will remain subordinated to U.S. Empire. Even the Asian tigers are junior partners. But the prospect of a growing Chinese empire emerging as a direct rival to U.S. imperialism could significantly shake up the relationship between Asian Americans and other Americans. The rise of the Japanese Empire in the early 20th century gives us a precedent for understanding what might happen. At first the American ruling class saw the Japanese Empire as a benign, progressive force that could help modernize the rest of Asia and Japanese Americans were thus seen in a positive light. But eventually, Japan began to approach parity with the U.S. and the two empires began to compete for territory and resources. At that point, the script was flipped and the Japanese were portrayed as ruthless, cunning, diabolical aliens threatening to swarm across the world and exterminate the white race. The propaganda of both the Japanese and the U.S. armies turned the Pacific front into a race war. In the U.S., this gave rise to the stereotypes of the “yellow peril” literature and films. Today, while most American elites are content to cash in on cooperation with China’s dynamic capitalists, some factions of the U.S. ruling class are beginning to promote a vision of China as the new yellow peril. They recognize that China holds trillions of U.S. dollars in its state bank and are startled by Chinese government efforts to wean its economy off of production for the U.S. consumer market. They describe the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony as a strange pageant of Asian conformism, as an unleashing of the collective power of docile Asian workers who will bow to a rising new Emperor, a new Oriental Despot. There is renewed talk about the threat that Chinese people supposedly pose to Western values. What effect all of this will have on Asian Americans is yet to be seen. Many of us, regardless of ethnicity, are mistaken for Chinese by white folks who can’t tell the difference between us. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. and China begin a protracted inter-imperialist rivalry</mark> over energy, military, or financial supremacy, <mark>this could re-awaken some of the old anti-Asian elements of U.S. nationalism</mark>. </u></strong>The model minority myth could dissolve and more direct and vicious forms of white supremacy could re-emerge. <u><strong>Faced with angry American workers who have lost their jobs due to corporate looting, politicians may try to divert this anger against Chinese workers abroad and Asian American workers here, claiming we are “stealing” American jobs. <mark>This could lead to new attacks against Asian Americans </mark>reminiscent of the killing of Vincent Chin who was beaten to death in 1982 by Detroit auto workers angry at Japanese competition</u></strong>. Although unlikely in the near future, <u><strong>outright war with China could lead to social chaos in both countries and the possibility of new internment camps</u></strong>. We shouldn’t be alarmist but <u><strong>it is crucial that Asian Americans begin organizing now to prevent these potential catastrophes</u></strong>. We are in a good position to make links between American workers and Asian workers abroad, articulating our common interests and challenging the claims of both Chinese and American elites to speak for our peoples. Conclusion As we have seen, <u><strong>anti-Asian racism is not simply the product of individual ill will</u></strong>. <u><strong>The docile worker myth, the perpetual foreigner myth, the model minority myth, and the myth of the yellow peril all have to do with deep-rooted contradictions in American society</u></strong>. <u><strong>If we want to break free of these oppressive myths then <mark>we need to confront these contradictions head on, </mark>in solidarity with other people</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 126,675 | 108 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,399 | The affirmative does not meet this because they ask you to < deny the policy of the resolution > instead of defending a world in which the USFG changes China policy | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The affirmative does not meet this because they ask you to < deny the policy of the resolution > instead of defending a world in which the USFG changes China policy </h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,806 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,400 | US pressure creates meaningful human rights reforms in China if we assign it top priority by integrating human rights demands into the relationship | HRW 16 | HRW 16 (Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization (6/5, US: Show Breadth of Rights Commitment at China Dialogue, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/us-show-breadth-rights-commitment-china-dialogue) | The U S should make the need for progress on key human rights issues in China a top priority This is the Obama administration’s last best chance to show it incorporates human rights across the scope of the relationship and demands change, US human rights advocacy with China can succeed Human Rights Watch urged the US to Press Chinese counterparts to bring into line with international law the Counterterrorism and the Foreign Non-Governmental Management laws; Publicly call for the release of individuals detained for peacefully exercising their rights; and Publicly discuss US concerns about growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion talks create an opportunity for the US to take unequivocal steps towards integrating human rights into its wider goals and to make clear the priority it assigns to these issues Chinese authorities have committed or tolerated gross human rights violations. Few members of the police or other security forces are held accountable for torture or other abuses, and there is no political or legal impulse for fundamental reforms necessary to curb their power. Peaceful prominent activists have been given harsh sentences . Greater human rights protections in China are in the US interest, and raising these concerns outside the normal channels is likely to produce results. US officials have described their strategy as a “whole of government” approach. Yet there is little evidence that officials are raising such concerns. “President Xi and his government have sadly left the US spoiled for choice on which human rights issues to raise The question is: will the US use its whole weight with China to push back effectively | The U S should make progress on human rights in China a top priority This is the administration’s last best chance to show it incorporates human rights across the relationship and demands change US human rights advocacy with China can succeed to bring into line with international law the Counterterrorism and Foreign Non-Governmental Management laws release individuals detained for peacefully exercising their rights discuss growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion talks create an opportunity for the US to take unequivocal steps towards integrating human rights into its wider goals and to make clear the priority it assigns to these issues raising these concerns is likely to produce results. US officials have described their strategy as whole of government Yet there is little evidence that officials are raising such concerns. “President Xi and his government have sadly left the US spoiled for choice on which human rights issues to raise The question is: will the US use its weight with China to push back | The United States should make the need for progress on key human rights issues in China a top priority in the final US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) for the Obama administration, Human Rights Watch said today. The talks, involving more than a dozen agencies from each government, will be held in Beijing from June 6-8, 2016. “This is the Obama administration’s last best chance to show it incorporates human rights across the scope of the bilateral relationship and demands change, from law enforcement cooperation to surveillance on ethnic minority regions, to Beijing’s ferocious assault on civil society,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “US human rights advocacy with China can succeed when it is unapologetic, public, and argued by diverse interests.” In a joint letter Human Rights Watch and nine other organizations - Amnesty International, China Aid, Freedom House, Human Rights in China, Initiatives for China, International Campaign for Tibet, Reporters without Borders, Uyghur Human Rights Project, and World Uygur Congress - urged the US to: Meet with representatives of civil society in China during or immediately after the meeting; Press Chinese counterparts to repeal or bring into line with international law new national security laws, including the Counterterrorism and the Foreign Non-Governmental Management laws; Publicly call for the release of specific individuals detained for peacefully exercising their rights; and Publicly discuss US concerns about growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion, among others. The talks create an opportunity for the US to take unequivocal steps towards integrating human rights into its wider strategic goals and to make clear the priority it assigns to these issues, Human Rights Watch said. Since the June 2015 strategic dialogue, the US has issued statements expressing concern about a range of human rights abuses in China, including the July-September 2015 sweep of lawyers and activists across the country, 25 of whom remain detained. The US has also publicly called on Beijing to repeal or not adopt abusive laws, including the Foreign NGO Management Law. In March, it spearheaded an unprecedented statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council, calling on China to end its arbitrary detention of lawyers and activists, and its extraterritorial abuses. At the same time, Chinese authorities have committed or tolerated gross human rights violations. Few members of the police or other security forces are held accountable for torture or other abuses, and there is no political or legal impulse for fundamental reforms necessary to curb their power. Peaceful prominent activists, including Guo Feixiong and Tang Jingling, have been given harsh sentences, some on vague charges of “disturbing public order.” Nor is there any progress towards accountability for the June 3-4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre, the 27th anniversary of which came just two days before the opening of the strategic talks. Human Rights Watch has long encouraged the US and other governments to take a broader approach to human rights in China, particularly as the number of government agencies and officials interacting with Chinese counterparts has grown exponentially over the last decade. Greater human rights protections in China are in the US interest, and raising these concerns outside the normal channels, through diverse and coordinated actors, is more likely to produce results. US officials have described their strategy as a “whole of government” approach. Yet there is little evidence that officials, other than those from the State Department or the White House, are raising such concerns. “President Xi and his government have sadly left the US spoiled for choice on which human rights issues to raise,” Richardson said. “The question is: will the US use its whole weight at the S&ED talks with China to push back effectively?” | 3,956 | <h4>US pressure creates meaningful human rights reforms in China if we assign it top priority by integrating human rights demands into the relationship</h4><p><strong>HRW 16</strong> (Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization (6/5, US: Show Breadth of Rights Commitment at China Dialogue, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/us-show-breadth-rights-commitment-china-dialogue)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The U</u></strong></mark>nited<u><strong><mark> S</u></strong></mark>tates<u><strong><mark> should make</mark> the need for <mark>progress on</mark> key <mark>human rights</mark> issues <mark>in China a top priority</u></strong></mark> in the final US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) for the Obama administration, Human Rights Watch said today. The talks, involving more than a dozen agencies from each government, will be held in Beijing from June 6-8, 2016. “<u><mark>This is the</mark> Obama <mark>administration’s last best chance to show it incorporates human rights across the</mark> scope of the </u>bilateral <u><mark>relationship and demands change</mark>,</u> from law enforcement cooperation to surveillance on ethnic minority regions, to Beijing’s ferocious assault on civil society,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “<u><strong><mark>US human rights advocacy with China can succeed</u></strong></mark> when it is unapologetic, public, and argued by diverse interests.” In a joint letter <u>Human Rights Watch</u> and nine other organizations - Amnesty International, China Aid, Freedom House, Human Rights in China, Initiatives for China, International Campaign for Tibet, Reporters without Borders, Uyghur Human Rights Project, and World Uygur Congress - <u>urged the US <mark>to</u></mark>: Meet with representatives of civil society in China during or immediately after the meeting; <u>Press Chinese counterparts to</u> repeal or <u><mark>bring into line with international law</mark> </u>new national security laws, including<u> <mark>the Counterterrorism and</mark> the <mark>Foreign Non-Governmental Management laws</mark>; Publicly call for the <mark>release</mark> of</u> specific <u><mark>individuals detained for peacefully exercising their rights</mark>; and Publicly <mark>discuss</mark> US concerns about <mark>growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion</u></mark>, among others. The <u><mark>talks create an opportunity for the US to take unequivocal steps towards integrating human rights into its wider </u></mark>strategic<u><mark> goals and to make clear the priority it assigns to these issues</u></mark>, Human Rights Watch said. Since the June 2015 strategic dialogue, the US has issued statements expressing concern about a range of human rights abuses in China, including the July-September 2015 sweep of lawyers and activists across the country, 25 of whom remain detained. The US has also publicly called on Beijing to repeal or not adopt abusive laws, including the Foreign NGO Management Law. In March, it spearheaded an unprecedented statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council, calling on China to end its arbitrary detention of lawyers and activists, and its extraterritorial abuses. At the same time, <u>Chinese authorities have committed or tolerated gross human rights violations. Few members of the police or other security forces are held accountable for torture or other abuses, and there is no political or legal impulse for fundamental reforms necessary to curb their power. Peaceful prominent activists</u>, including Guo Feixiong and Tang Jingling, <u>have been given harsh sentences</u>, some on vague charges of “disturbing public order.” Nor is there any progress towards accountability for the June 3-4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre, the 27th anniversary of which came just two days before the opening of the strategic talks. Human Rights Watch has long encouraged the US and other governments to take a broader approach to human rights in China, particularly as the number of government agencies and officials interacting with Chinese counterparts has grown exponentially over the last decade<u>. Greater human rights protections in China are in the US interest, and <mark>raising these concerns</mark> outside the normal channels</u>, through diverse and coordinated actors, <u><mark>is </u></mark>more<u><mark> likely to produce results. US officials have described their strategy as</mark> a “<mark>whole of government</mark>” approach. <strong><mark>Yet there is little evidence that officials</u></strong></mark>, other than those from the State Department or the White House, <u><strong><mark>are raising such concerns</strong>. “President Xi and his government have sadly left the US spoiled for choice on which human rights issues to raise</u></mark>,” Richardson said. “<u><strong><mark>The question is: will the US use its</mark> whole <mark>weight</u></strong></mark> at the S&ED talks <u><strong><mark>with China to push back</mark> effectively</u></strong>?”</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 162,251 | 16 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,401 | Russian aggression risks nuclear war | Farmer 15 | Farmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, 2-20-2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2) | Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat Britain’s top general in Nato has warned Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult" Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was a classic Soviet technique “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Nato’s resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine | Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat Putin could invade Nato Russia could use brinkmanship escalation might be used with the risk of miscalc resulting in conflict Russia might try to test Nato’s resolve | Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.” Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Nato’s resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression “whatever form it takes”, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were “warming up”. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond “diplomatic ethics” . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing.” "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements." | 4,152 | <h4>Russian aggression risks nuclear war </h4><p><strong>Farmer 15</strong> (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, 2-20-2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2)</p><p><u><mark>Tensions with Russia could blow up into <strong>all-out conflict</strong>, posing “an <strong>existential threat</u></strong></mark> to our whole being”, <u>Britain’s top general in Nato has warned</u>. <u>Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said</u> there was a danger Vladimir <u><mark>Putin could</mark> try to use his armies to <mark>invade</mark> and seize <mark>Nato </mark>territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid </u>of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the <u>"resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult"</u>. But <u>Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces</u>, went further and <u>said there was also danger that <mark>Russia could use</mark> conventional forces and Soviet-era <mark>brinkmanship</mark> to seize Nato territory</u>. He said <u>Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of <strong><mark>escalation</strong> might be used </mark>to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was</u> of course <u>a classic Soviet technique</u>.” He went on to say that <u>“the threat from Russia, together <mark>with the risk</mark> it brings <mark>of</mark> a <strong><mark>miscalc</mark>ulation</strong><mark> resulting in </mark>a <strong>strategic <mark>conflict</strong></mark>, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an <strong>existential threat</u></strong> to our whole being.” <u>Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force</u> of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, <u>in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe</u>. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. <u>Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion</u>. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, <u>Mr Fallon said the <mark>Russia</mark>n president <mark>might try to <strong>test Nato’s resolve</strong> </mark>with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine</u>. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression “whatever form it takes”, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were “warming up”. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond “diplomatic ethics” . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing.” "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 2 | 5,609 | 229 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,402 | The plan is an unconditional concession, which does not require a change in behavior or concession by China | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The plan is an unconditional concession, which does not require a change in behavior or concession by China </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 1,560,807 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,403 | Our three tier process is able to rupture the system of the hegemonic straight forward debates about policymaking. Only by focusing on culture and racial minorities can we actually create change or else the alternative is a vanishment of education about ongoing racial problems hidden behind our same nuke war debate | That is Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley in 2008 | That is Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley in 2008 | ) (ASIA)
The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence; their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.” In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.” Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claimsin debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.” Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.” The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education. The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks, Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression. | their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.” the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices, crowd out alternative knowledge-making practices. an alternative framework for debate they refer to it as a three-tier process we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices While the debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education. The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study | ("THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE" pages 81-83) (ASIA)
The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence; their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.” In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.” Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claimsin debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.” Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.” The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education. The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks, Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression. | 4,007 | <h4>Our three tier process is able to rupture the system of the hegemonic straight forward debates about policymaking. Only by focusing on culture and racial minorities can we actually create change or else the alternative is a vanishment<u><strong> of education about ongoing racial problems hidden behind our same nuke war debate</h4><p>That is Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley in 2008 </p><p></u></strong>("THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE" pages 81-83<u><strong>) (ASIA)</p><p>The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence; <mark>their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”</mark> In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain <mark>the dominance of normative knowledge-making</mark> <mark>practices,</mark> while <mark>crowd</mark>ing <mark>out</mark> or directly excluding <mark>alternative knowledge-making practices.</mark> The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.” Jones and Green offer <mark>an alternative framework for</mark> drawing claimsin <mark>debate</mark> speeches, <mark>they refer to it as a three-tier process</mark>: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And <mark>we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals.</mark> Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.” Jones argues that <mark>without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power</mark>. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.” <mark>The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices</mark>. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. <mark>While the</mark> Louisville <mark>debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions</mark> because of their lack of training and expertise. <mark>Such exclusions prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed</mark>. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because <mark>it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education. The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse</mark>. Note the reference to bell hooks, Green argues that <mark>without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study</mark>. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 157,396 | 333 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,404 | This is a voting issue – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>This is a voting issue – </h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,808 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,405 | Human rights promotion develops the recognition of a common humanity – Prevents extinction | Annas 2 | Annas 2 (Prof. and Chair Health Law at Boston U. School of Public Health, George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology at Illinois Institute Tech, and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow at Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”) | The development of the atomic bomb presented the prospect of total annihilation The conclusion of World War II led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars Prevention must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war Kennedy underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet The recognition of human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a solution to deal with its miseries Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species | the atomic bomb presented the prospect of total annihilation the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival The recognition of human rights is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a solution to deal with its miseries Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species | The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: [L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5 Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon. | 3,907 | <h4>Human rights promotion develops the recognition of a common humanity – Prevents extinction</h4><p><strong>Annas 2</strong> (Prof. and Chair Health Law at Boston U. School of Public Health, George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology at Illinois Institute Tech, and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow at Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”)</p><p><u>The development of <strong><mark>the atomic bomb</u></strong></mark> not only<u> <mark>presented</u></mark> to the world for the first time <u><mark>the prospect of <strong>total annihilation</u></strong></mark>, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. <u>The conclusion of World War</u> <u>II </u>(with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) <u>led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the <strong>entire species</u></strong> <u>and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of <strong>preventing such wars</u></strong>. n2 <u><strong>Prevention</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong>must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same</u></strong>, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. <u>In the</u> <u>aftermath of <mark>the Cuban missile crisis</u>, <u><strong>the closest the world has ever come to nuclear w</strong>ar</u></mark>, President John F. <u>Kennedy</u>, in an address to the former Soviet Union, <u><mark>underscored the necessity for recognizing <strong>similarities for our survival</mark>:</u></strong> [<u>L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved</u> . . . . For, in the final analysis, <u><strong>our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet</u></strong>. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 <u><strong><mark>The recognition of </u></strong></mark>universal<u><strong><mark> human rights</mark>, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, <mark>is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness</u></strong></mark>. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: <u>Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades</u>. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . <u><strong><mark>The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a</mark> </u></strong>minimum<u><strong> <mark>solution to deal with its miseries</u></strong></mark>. n5 <u><strong><mark>Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species</u></strong></mark>. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon. </p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 77,729 | 41 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,406 | Engagement is the attempt to influence the behavior of China – it needs to be defined by both means and ends in the context of China to distinguish military strategy from diplomatic engagement | Finamore, 14 | Finamore, 14 – Doctoral Researcher at the University of Cambridge, Department of Politics and International Relations (Salvatore, The EU, the US and China: Towards a New International Order?, ed: Men and Shen, p. 111-113) | with respect to China Constructing a framework for the study of engagement, most scholars would agree that engagement refers to one of several possible strategies that can be adopted in the attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes' engagement is situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach' aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system'. if a distinction can be made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order' This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has been strongly criticized by Resnick argues the notion of engagement as socialization may be too restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies, and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish other goals rather than socialization he proposes a means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines the essentially relational nature of engagement. However, overlooking its goals and focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of the analysis of engagement as a foreign policy strategy. strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between ends and means ). This is true for military strategy, which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends' but it also holds true for strategy in general. in order to analyze engagement as a foreign policy strategy, one needs to pay attention both to its goals and to the instruments by which they are achieved. | with respect to China. Constructing a framework for engagement scholars would agree engagement refers to attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes' Resnick , overlooking goals focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of engagement as a foreign policy strategy true for military strategy, to analyze engagement needs to pay attention to goals and the instruments . | As the previous section illustrated, even a brief sketch of American and European experiences with respect to China's rise is sufficient to draw some key parallels in US and EU China policies, as well as to outline some of their main differences. In order to move beyond this contextual level and take the analysis further, however, it is necessary to develop an analytical framework capturing the main elements of their engagement strategies. To this end, this section proposes a framework based on socialization theory, which will serve to highlight the different policy instruments available to the EU and the US and the way they have been employed in pursuit of their specific engagement goals with respect to China. Constructing a framework for the study of engagement, however, is a harder task than it would initially appear, not least because of the existence of profound disagreements in the academic literature over the meaning and scope of engagement as a foreign policy strategy (Resnick 2(H) 1: Suetlinger 2000. p. 17). Broadly speaking, most scholars would agree that engagement refers to one of several possible strategies that can be adopted in the attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes' (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000, p. I). In some more specific instances, it can also be understood as an approach through which established powers can deal with the emergence of new actors posing a threat to the international status quo (Schweller 1999). From this perspective, engagement could then be grouped within the same category as other foreign policy strategies, such as balancing, containment or appeasement. In fact, many commentators point in particular to the existence of shared traits between engagement and appeasement, with some even arguing that engagement is essentially nothing but a new and more acceptable term for a policy otherwise fallen into historical disrepute (Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81: George 1993, p. 61). According to Stephen Rock (2000. pp. 22-23), both engagement and appeasement rely on positive inducements to produce a relaxation of tensions and a change in the behavior of the target actor, with a potential scope for socialization and learning. The difference between these two concepts would rest mainly in the fact that engagement is situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach' aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system'. From this point of view, appeasement would essentially constitute 'a subcategory of engagement'. According to other authors, if a distinction can be made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order' (Schweller 1999, p. 14; Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81), rather than simply aiming for more 'modest' goals such as tension-reduction and the avoidance of war (Resnick 2001, p. 557). This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has been strongly criticized by some authors. Evan Resnick in particular argues that, as an ends-based definition, the notion of engagement as socialization may be too restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies, and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish other goals rather than socialization. Instead, he proposes what he regards as a means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts ... across multiple issue-areas' (Resnick 2001, p. 559). Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines the essentially relational nature of engagement. However, overlooking its goals and focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of the analysis of engagement as a foreign policy strategy. In fact, at least since the time of Carl von Clausewitz, strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between ends and means (see Howard 2002, pp. 16 and 36). This is true for military strategy, which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends' (Betts 2000, p. 5), but it also holds true for strategy in general. It follows that in order to analyze engagement as a foreign policy strategy, one needs to pay attention both to its goals and to the instruments by which they are achieved. | 4,564 | <h4>Engagement is the attempt to influence the behavior of China – it needs to be defined by both means and ends in the context of China to distinguish military strategy from diplomatic engagement</h4><p><strong>Finamore, 14</strong> – Doctoral Researcher at the University of Cambridge, Department of Politics and International Relations (Salvatore, <u>The EU, the US and China: Towards a New International Order?</u>, ed: Men and Shen, p. 111-113)</p><p>As the previous section illustrated, even a brief sketch of American and European experiences with respect to China's rise is sufficient to draw some key parallels in US and EU China policies, as well as to outline some of their main differences. In order to move beyond this contextual level and take the analysis further, however, it is necessary to develop an analytical framework capturing the main elements of their engagement strategies. To this end, this section proposes a framework based on socialization theory, which will serve to highlight the different policy instruments available to the EU and the US and the way they have been employed in pursuit of their specific engagement goals <u><mark>with respect to China</u>.<u> Constructing a framework for </mark>the study of <mark>engagement</mark>,</u> however, is a harder task than it would initially appear, not least because of the existence of profound disagreements in the academic literature over the meaning and scope of engagement as a foreign policy strategy (Resnick 2(H) 1: Suetlinger 2000. p. 17). Broadly speaking, <u>most <mark>scholars would agree</mark> that <mark>engagement refers to</mark> one of several possible strategies that can be adopted in the <mark>attempt to influence the behavior of 'problem regimes'</u></mark> (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000, p. I). In some more specific instances, it can also be understood as an approach through which established powers can deal with the emergence of new actors posing a threat to the international status quo (Schweller 1999). From this perspective, engagement could then be grouped within the same category as other foreign policy strategies, such as balancing, containment or appeasement. In fact, many commentators point in particular to the existence of shared traits between engagement and appeasement, with some even arguing that engagement is essentially nothing but a new and more acceptable term for a policy otherwise fallen into historical disrepute (Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81: George 1993, p. 61). According to Stephen Rock (2000. pp. 22-23), both engagement and appeasement rely on positive inducements to produce a relaxation of tensions and a change in the behavior of the target actor, with a potential scope for socialization and learning. The difference between these two concepts would rest mainly in the fact that <u>engagement is situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach' aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system'.</u> From this point of view, appeasement would essentially constitute 'a subcategory of engagement'. According to other authors, <u>if a distinction can be made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order'</u> (Schweller 1999, p. 14; Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81), rather than simply aiming for more 'modest' goals such as tension-reduction and the avoidance of war (Resnick 2001, p. 557). <u>This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has been strongly criticized</u> <u>by</u> some authors. Evan <u><mark>Resnick</u></mark> in particular <u>argues</u> that, as an ends-based definition, <u>the notion of engagement as socialization may be too restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies, and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish other goals rather than socialization</u>. Instead, <u>he proposes</u> what he regards as <u>a means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts</u> ... across multiple issue-areas' (Resnick 2001, p. 559). <u>Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines the essentially relational nature of engagement<strong>. However<mark>, overlooking </mark>its <mark>goals </mark>and <mark>focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of </mark>the analysis of <mark>engagement as a foreign policy strategy</mark>.</u></strong> In fact, at least since the time of Carl von Clausewitz, <u>strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between ends and means </u>(see Howard 2002, pp. 16 and 36<u>). This is <mark>true for</u> <u><strong>military strategy</strong>, </mark>which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends'</u> (Betts 2000, p. 5), <u>but it also holds true for strategy in general.</u> It follows that <u><strong>in order <mark>to</mark> <mark>analyze engagement</mark> as a foreign policy strategy, one <mark>needs to pay attention </mark>both <mark>to </mark>its <mark>goals and </mark>to <mark>the instruments </mark>by which they are achieved<mark>.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 3 | 1,555,359 | 47 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,407 | Vote negative | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Vote negative </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 1,560,809 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,408 | The simulacra of the law inculcates the perfection of the necropolitical state of total lawfare – imposition of control onto an unbounded space, maintaining the false distinction of law and disorder which the foundation of a liberal war on difference | Comaroff and Comaroff 7 | Comaroff and Comaroff 7 John Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies also at Harvard, “Law and disorder in the postcolony,” Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144 | the past is being fought out in the courts By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it What imperialism is being indicted for is its commission of lawfare the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens Lawfare34 may be limited or it may reduce people to ‘bare life’ it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count it always seeks to launder visceral power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital the law originates in violence and lives by violent means the legal and the lethal animate one another. Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? The turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about lawlessness this does not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs The fetishism has to do with the very constitution of the postcolonial polity nationhood is undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity with growing heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of commensuration a repertoire of standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage Hence the flight into a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions But most 21st century governments have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and delegating ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of actor, social or legal especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between Which exacerbates the resort to lawfare The court has become a utopic site to which human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends. the fetishism of the law seems over-determined Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are ‘communities’ within the nation-state cultural communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities Everything, it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law the counterfeiting of a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes like a hall of mirrors this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing they become communities at all Herein lies their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law Lawmaking’ ‘is power making power is the principal of all lawmaking’ to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra. | the past is colonialism rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to justice its commission of lawfare Lawfare reduce people to ‘bare life’ it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count it seeks to launder power in a wash of legitimacy it is deployed to strengthen the state or enlarge capital. the legal and the lethal animate one another. The turn to law seem to arise out of anxieties about lawlessnes legal instruments offer a means of commensuration constitutionalism embraces universa Bills of Rights where states are paying less and less of the bills human rights more global, more authoritative discourse. governments delegat more to individuals Which resort to lawfare a utopic site to which human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends. Everything , exists here in the shadow of the law. a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder social order becomes a hall of mirrors the will to sovereignty e exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra | Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier, the past, too, is being fought out in the courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated territory from one African people to another, and so on.33 By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the official tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of lawfare: the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word. Also, to commit its own ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) – is equally marked in postcolonies. As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime has consistently passed laws to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, ‘Drive Out Trash’, which has forced political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of ‘slum clearance’ – has recently taken this practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the law of the land to raze dangerous ‘illegal structures’. Lawfare34 may be limited or it may reduce people to ‘bare life’; in Zimbabwe, it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count. But it always seeks to launder visceral power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital. Hence Benjamin’s (1978) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal animate one another. Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about lawlessness. But this does not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs. The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity: a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity (Anderson 1983). The rise of neoliberalism – with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies of production and accumulation – has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected from the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because, with growing heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage. Hence the flight into a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. But there is something else at work too. A well-recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of war, integral to the management of life itself. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course. But most 21st century governments have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and delegating ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of actor, social or legal. Under these conditions, especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between. Which, in turn, exacerbates the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends. This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this together and the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are ‘communities’ within the nation-state: cultural communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities. Everything, it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law. Which also makes it unsurprising that a ‘culture of legality’ should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer ‘alternative citizenship’ to their members.35 Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime. These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently, the counterfeiting of a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder. After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties. We said a moment ago that communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing, in fact, that they become communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law. ‘Lawmaking’, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet again, ‘is power making.’ But ‘power is the principal of all lawmaking’. In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra. | 8,265 | <h4>The simulacra of the law inculcates the perfection of the necropolitical state of total lawfare – imposition of control onto an unbounded space, maintaining the false distinction of law and disorder which the foundation of a liberal war on difference</h4><p><u><strong>Comaroff and Comaroff 7</u></strong> John Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies also at Harvard, “Law and disorder in the postcolony,” Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144</p><p>Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier, <u><mark>the past</u></mark>, too, <u>is being fought out in the courts</u>. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated territory from one African people to another, and so on.33 <u>By these means <mark>is colonialism </mark>itself <mark>rendered criminal</u>.</mark> <u><mark>Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to </mark>the scales of <mark>justice</mark> at the behest of those who suffered it</u>. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the official tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. <u>What imperialism is being indicted for</u>, above all, <u>is <mark>its</mark> <strong><mark>commission</mark> <mark>of lawfare</u></strong></mark>: <u>the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word</u>. Also, to commit its own ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) – is equally marked in postcolonies. <u>As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens</u>. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime has consistently passed laws to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, ‘Drive Out Trash’, which has forced political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of ‘slum clearance’ – has recently taken this practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the law of the land to raze dangerous ‘illegal structures’. <u><mark>Lawfare</mark>34 may be limited or it may <mark>reduce people to ‘bare life’</u></mark>; in Zimbabwe, <u><strong><mark>it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count</u></strong></mark>. But <u><mark>it</mark> always <mark>seeks to launder </mark>visceral <mark>power in a wash of legitimacy </mark>as <mark>it is deployed to strengthen the </mark>sinews of <mark>state or enlarge </mark>the capillaries of <mark>capital</u>.</mark> Hence Benjamin’s (1978) thesis that <u>the law originates in violence and lives by violent means</u>; that <u><strong><mark>the legal and the lethal animate one another</strong>.</u></mark> Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: <u>Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? </u>The answer to the first question looks obvious. <u><mark>The turn to law</mark> would <mark>seem to arise </mark>directly <mark>out of </mark>growing <strong><mark>anxieties about lawlessnes</mark>s</u></strong>. But <u>this does not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs</u>. <u>The fetishism</u>, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It <u>has to do with the very constitution of the postcolonial polity</u>. Late modernist <u>nationhood</u>, it appears, <u>is undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity</u>: <u>a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity</u> (Anderson 1983). The rise of neoliberalism – with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies of production and accumulation – has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected from the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because, <u>with growing heterodoxy, <strong><mark>legal instruments</mark> appear to <mark>offer a means of commensuration</u></strong></mark> (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): <u>a repertoire of standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage</u>. <u>Hence the flight into a <mark>constitutionalism</mark> that explicitly <mark>embraces</mark> heterogeneity in highly individualistic, <mark>universa</mark>listic <mark>Bills of Rights</mark>, even <mark>where states are paying less and less of the bills</mark>. Hence the effort to make <mark>human rights</mark> into an ever <mark>more global, </mark>ever <mark>more authoritative discourse.</mark> </u>But there is something else at work too. A well-recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of war, integral to the management of life itself. <u>Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions</u>, of course. <u>But most 21st century <mark>governments</mark> have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and <mark>delegat</mark>ing ever <mark>more</mark> responsibility <mark>to</mark> citizens as <mark>individuals</mark>, as volunteers, as classes of actor, social or legal</u>. Under these conditions, <u>especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between</u>. <u><strong><mark>Which</u></strong></mark>, in turn, <u><strong>exacerbates the <mark>resort to lawfare</u></strong></mark>. <u>The court has become <strong><mark>a utopic site</strong> to which <strong>human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends</strong>.</u></mark> This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this together and <u>the fetishism of the law <strong>seems over-determined</u></strong>. <u>Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are ‘communities’ within the nation-state</u>: <u>cultural communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities</u>. <u><strong><mark>Everything</strong></mark>, it seems<mark>,</u> <u><strong>exists here in the shadow of the law</u></strong>.</mark> Which also makes it unsurprising that a ‘culture of legality’ should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer ‘alternative citizenship’ to their members.35 Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime. These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently, <u>the counterfeiting of <mark>a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder</u></mark>. <u>After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, <strong><mark>social order</mark> itself <mark>becomes</mark> like <mark>a hall of mirrors</u></strong></mark>. What is more, <u>this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties</u>. We said a moment ago that <u>communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing</u>, in fact, that <u>they become communities at all</u>, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. <u>Herein lies <mark>the</mark>ir <mark>will to</mark> <mark>sovereignty</mark>, which we take to connote th<mark>e exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview</mark> – and <strong>the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law</u></strong>. ‘<u><strong>Lawmaking’</u></strong>, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet again, <u>‘<strong>is power making</u></strong>.’ But ‘<u>power is the principal of all lawmaking’</u>. In sum, <u>to transform itself into sovereign authority, <strong><mark>power demands an architecture of legalities</strong>. Or their simulacra<strong></mark>.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 50,212 | 118 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,409 | They are non-topical because they don’t defend the enactment of a policy by the United States federal government. Topicality is an a-priori voting issue – as judge you are only allowed to affirm those policies within your jurisdiction dictated by the resolution. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They are <u>non-topical</u> because they don’t defend the enactment of a policy by the United States federal government. Topicality is an <u>a-priori</u> voting issue – as judge you are only allowed to affirm those policies within <u>your jurisdiction</u> dictated by the resolution.</h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,810 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,410 | Tax reform wont pass—dems | Kapur 12/26 | Kapur 12/26 (Sahil Kapur is a national political reporter for Bloomberg Politics based in Washington, D.C. “Democrats Plotting ‘Collision Course’ With Trump’s Tax Plan” Dec 26. 2016, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-26/democrats-plotting-collision-course-with-trump-s-tax-plan) | “There’s going to be opposition if these tax cuts are directed to the people at the top again,” said Representative Richard Neal, the Massachusetts Democrat We’re going to be pretty united.” Their initial comments suggest that the 115th Congress, which convenes Jan. 3 with a Republican-led agenda of instituting a broad tax overhaul and repealing Obamacare, will be peppered with debate over income inequality. Democrats plan to challenge this claim. “His populist image and the reality of his policies are on a collision course,” said Representative Keith Ellison of Minnesota, a candidate for Democratic National Committee chairman. “And they’re going to crash.” | There’s going to be opposition if these tax cuts are directed to the people at the top again, said Neal, the Massachusetts Democrat We’re going to be pretty united.” Their comments suggest that the 115th Congress will be peppered with debate over income inequality Democrats plan to challenge this claim. | “There’s going to be opposition if these tax cuts are directed to the people at the top again,” said Representative Richard Neal, the Massachusetts Democrat who represents his party’s first line of defense as the next ranking member of the House’s tax-writing Ways and Means Committee. “We’re going to be pretty united.” Neal and others say they’ll zero in on upper-income tax breaks pitched by Trump and House leaders in an attempt to make it politically difficult for Republicans to support large parts of the emerging plans. Their initial comments suggest that the 115th Congress, which convenes Jan. 3 with a Republican-led agenda of instituting a broad tax overhaul and repealing Obamacare, will be peppered with debate over income inequality. Trump and House Speaker Paul Ryan of Wisconsin have endorsed across-the-board cuts in individual income tax rates. After Republicans took the White House and held onto majorities in Congress in November’s elections, both say they aim to achieve the most far-reaching overhaul of the U.S. tax system in a generation. Details remain to be filled in; for example, Ryan and others envision dramatic changes for corporate taxation that Trump’s economic team has yet to embrace. Trump’s ‘Contract’ Trump has sought to portray his plan as a pro-growth simplification of the tax code that would benefit the middle class. In a “Contract with the American Voter” published before the election, his campaign HYPERLINK "https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf" \t "_blank" \o "Link to Document" said of his proposal: “The largest tax reductions are for the middle class.” Democrats plan to challenge this claim. “His populist image and the reality of his policies are on a collision course,” said Representative Keith Ellison of Minnesota, a candidate for Democratic National Committee chairman. “And they’re going to crash.” | 1,903 | <h4>Tax reform wont pass—dems </h4><p><strong>Kapur 12/26 </strong>(Sahil Kapur is a national political reporter for Bloomberg Politics based in Washington, D.C. “Democrats Plotting ‘Collision Course’ With Trump’s Tax Plan” Dec 26. 2016, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-26/democrats-plotting-collision-course-with-trump-s-tax-plan<u>)</p><p>“<mark>There’s going to be opposition if these tax cuts are directed to the people at the top again,</mark>” <mark>said</mark> Representative Richard <mark>Neal, the Massachusetts Democrat</u></mark> who represents his party’s first line of defense as the next ranking member of the House’s tax-writing Ways and Means Committee. “<u><strong><mark>We’re going to be pretty united.”</mark> </u></strong>Neal and others say they’ll zero in on upper-income tax breaks pitched by Trump and House leaders in an attempt to make it politically difficult for Republicans to support large parts of the emerging plans. <u><mark>Their</mark> initial <mark>comments suggest that the 115th Congress</mark>, which convenes Jan. 3 with a Republican-led agenda of instituting a broad tax overhaul and repealing Obamacare, <mark>will be peppered with debate over income inequality</mark>. </u>Trump and House Speaker Paul Ryan of Wisconsin have endorsed across-the-board cuts in individual income tax rates. After Republicans took the White House and held onto majorities in Congress in November’s elections, both say they aim to achieve the most far-reaching overhaul of the U.S. tax system in a generation. Details remain to be filled in; for example, Ryan and others envision dramatic changes for corporate taxation that Trump’s economic team has yet to embrace. Trump’s ‘Contract’ Trump has sought to portray his plan as a pro-growth simplification of the tax code that would benefit the middle class. In a “Contract with the American Voter” published before the election, his campaign HYPERLINK "https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf" \t "_blank" \o "Link to Document" said of his proposal: “The largest tax reductions are for the middle class.” <u><strong><mark>Democrats plan to challenge this claim.</strong></mark> “His populist image and the reality of his policies are on a collision course,” said Representative Keith Ellison of Minnesota, a candidate for Democratic National Committee chairman. “And they’re going to crash.”</p></u> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 1,527,724 | 4 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,411 | Diplomatic is categorically distinct from the military | Lee 12 | Lee 12 – Instructor, Department of Military & Strategic Studies, Republic of Korea Air Force Academy (Jeongseok, “Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China” Available Online at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_18064.pdf) | Engagement is defined as “the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the enhancement of contacts with that state Instruments of engagement policy include diplomatic contacts e.g. elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings military contacts e.g. military exchange, joint training or exercise, confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng economic contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic policies and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism, youth exchange programs | Engagement is the attempt to influence behavior of a state Instruments of engagement policy include diplomatic elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings military military exchange confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng), | The Seventh option is to engage with the ascending power. Engagement is defined as “the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas.” (Resnick 2001: 559) Instruments of engagement policy include diplomatic contacts (e.g. extension and elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings, etc.), military contacts (e.g. military exchange, joint training or exercise, confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng), economic contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic policies), and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism, youth exchange programs). Through these forms of interactions, minor powers can try to induce its target to more moderate and peaceful path of ascendance. Although secondary states’ influence over shaping perceptions and behaviors of rising power is not as powerful as great powers,’ engagement is a considerable option. If ascending state’s thinking and behavior can be altered to a more favorable direction even to the slightest degree, it is worth to attempt because it does not require significant compensations nor costs, and it does not risk provoking antagonism. | 1,302 | <h4>Diplomatic is categorically distinct from the military</h4><p><strong>Lee 12 </strong>– Instructor, Department of Military & Strategic Studies, Republic of Korea Air Force Academy (Jeongseok, “Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China” Available Online at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_18064.pdf)</p><p>The Seventh option is to engage with the ascending power. <u><mark>Engagement is</mark> defined as “<mark>the attempt to <strong>influence</mark> the </strong>political <strong><mark>behavior of a</mark> target <mark>state</strong></mark> through the</u> comprehensive establishment and <u>enhancement of contacts with that state</u> across multiple issue-areas.” (Resnick 2001: 559) <u><mark>Instruments of engagement policy</u></mark> <u><mark>include <strong>diplomatic</strong></mark> contacts</u> (<u>e.g.</u> extension and <u><mark>elevation of diplomatic relations, summits, high level meetings</u></mark>, etc.), <u><strong><mark>military</strong></mark> contacts</u> (<u>e.g. <mark>military exchange</mark>, joint training or exercise, <mark>confidence building measures, intelligence shari ng</u>), <u><strong></mark>economic</strong> contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic policies</u>), <u>and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism, youth exchange programs</u>). Through these forms of interactions, minor powers can try to induce its target to more moderate and peaceful path of ascendance. Although secondary states’ influence over shaping perceptions and behaviors of rising power is not as powerful as great powers,’ engagement is a considerable option. If ascending state’s thinking and behavior can be altered to a more favorable direction even to the slightest degree, it is worth to attempt because it does not require significant compensations nor costs, and it does not risk provoking antagonism. </p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 3 | 174,785 | 65 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,412 | The violence is silent – the right covers up this exception to uphold the model minority myth | Thrupkaew ‘2 is a prospect senior correspondent. “The Myth of the Model Minority,” The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_myth_of_the_model_minority) | Thrupkaew ‘2 (4/7/02, Noy Thrupkaew is a prospect senior correspondent. “The Myth of the Model Minority,” The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_myth_of_the_model_minority) | the majority of refugees from Southeast Asia frequently hailed from rural areas and lacked both financial resources and formal schooling. Their psychological scars were even deeper from their longer years in squalid refugee camps or the killing fields. Once here, these refugees often found themselves trapped in poverty providing low-cost labor, and receiving no health or other benefits But shouldn't the touted Asian dedication to schooling have overcome these disadvantages, lifting the refugees' children out of poverty and keeping them off the streets? Unfortunately, it didn't The picture that emerges -- of high welfare participation and dropout rates, low levels of education and income -- is startlingly similar to the situation of the poorest members of "nonmodel" minority groups. Southeast Asians, Latinos, and African Americans also have in common significant numbers of single-parent families. Largely as a result of the killing fields, nearly a quarter of Cambodian households are headed by single women. No matter how "traditional" Southeast Asians may be, they share the fate of other people of color when they are denied access to good education, safe neighborhoods, and jobs that provide a living wage and benefits. But for the sake of preserving the model-minority myth, conservative policy makers have largely ignored the needs of Southeast Asian communities. | refugees from Asia hailed from lacked both financial resources and formal schooling. Their psychological scars were from their longer years in squalid refugee camps in poverty , , The picture that emerges is startlingly similar to the situation of the poorest members of "nonmodel" minority groups they share the fate of other people of color when they are denied access to good education, safe neighborhoods, and jobs But for preserving the model-minority myth, conservative policy makers have largely ignored the needs | But the majority of refugees from Southeast Asia had no such advantages. Subsequent waves frequently hailed from rural areas and lacked both financial resources and formal schooling. Their psychological scars were even deeper than the first group's, from their longer years in squalid refugee camps or the killing fields. The ethnic Chinese who began arriving from Vietnam had faced harsh discrimination as well, and the Amerasians -- the children of Vietnamese women and U.S. soldiers -- had lived for years as pariahs. Once here, these refugees often found themselves trapped in poverty, providing low-cost labor, and receiving no health or other benefits, while their lack of schooling made decent jobs almost impossible to come by. In 1990, two-thirds of Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong adults in America had less than a high-school education -- compared with 14 percent of whites, 25 percent of African Americans, 45 percent of Latinos, and 15 percent of the general Asian-American population. Before the welfare-reform law cut many of them off, nearly 30 percent of Southeast Asian Americans were on welfare -- the highest participation rate of any ethnic group. And having such meager incomes, they usually lived in the worst neighborhoods, with the attendant crime, gang problems, and poor schools. But shouldn't the touted Asian dedication to schooling have overcome these disadvantages, lifting the refugees' children out of poverty and keeping them off the streets? Unfortunately, it didn't. "There is still a high number of dropouts for Southeast Asians," Yang said. "And if they do graduate, there is a low number going on to higher education." Their parents' difficulty in navigating American school systems may contribute to the problem. "The parents' lack of education leads to a lack of role models and guidance. Without those things, youth can turn to delinquent behavior and in some very extreme cases, gangs, instead of devoting themselves to education," said Narin Sihavong, director of SEARAC's Successful New Americans Project, which interviewed Mali Keo. "This underscores the need for Southeast Asian school administrators or counselors who can be role models, ease the cultural barrier, and serve as a bridge to their parents." "Sometimes families have to choose between education and employment, especially when money is tight," said Porthira Chimm, a former SEARAC project director. "And unfortunately, immediate money concerns often win out." The picture that emerges -- of high welfare participation and dropout rates, low levels of education and income -- is startlingly similar to the situation of the poorest members of "nonmodel" minority groups. Southeast Asians, Latinos, and African Americans also have in common significant numbers of single-parent families. Largely as a result of the killing fields, nearly a quarter of Cambodian households are headed by single women. Other Southeast Asian families have similar stories. Sihavong's mother, for example, raised him and his five siblings on her own while his father was imprisoned in a Laotian re-education camp. No matter how "traditional" Southeast Asians may be, they share the fate of other people of color when they are denied access to good education, safe neighborhoods, and jobs that provide a living wage and benefits. But for the sake of preserving the model-minority myth, conservative policy makers have largely ignored the needs of Southeast Asian communities. | 3,460 | <h4><u><strong>The violence is silent – the right covers up this exception to uphold the model minority myth</h4><p>Thrupkaew ‘2</u></strong> (4/7/02, Noy Thrupkaew<u><strong> is a prospect senior correspondent. “The Myth of the Model Minority,” The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_myth_of_the_model_minority)</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>the majority of <mark>refugees from</mark> Southeast <mark>Asia</u></strong></mark> had no such advantages. Subsequent waves <u><strong>frequently <mark>hailed</mark> <mark>from</mark> rural areas and <mark>lacked both financial resources and formal schooling.</mark> <mark>Their psychological scars</mark> <mark>were</mark> even deeper </u></strong>than the first group's, <u><strong><mark>from their longer years in squalid refugee camps</mark> or the killing fields.</u></strong> The ethnic Chinese who began arriving from Vietnam had faced harsh discrimination as well, and the Amerasians -- the children of Vietnamese women and U.S. soldiers -- had lived for years as pariahs. <u><strong>Once here, these refugees often found themselves trapped <mark>in poverty</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>providing low-cost labor, and receiving no health or other benefits</u></strong>, while their lack of schooling made decent jobs almost impossible to come by. In 1990, two-thirds of Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong adults in America had less than a high-school education -- compared with 14 percent of whites, 25 percent of African Americans, 45 percent of Latinos, and 15 percent of the general Asian-American population. Before the welfare-reform law cut many of them off, nearly 30 percent of Southeast Asian Americans were on welfare -- the highest participation rate of any ethnic group. And having such meager incomes, they usually lived in the worst neighborhoods, with the attendant crime, gang problems, and poor schools. <u><strong>But shouldn't the touted Asian dedication to schooling have overcome these disadvantages<mark>,</mark> lifting the refugees' children out of poverty and keeping them off the streets? Unfortunately<mark>,</mark> it didn't</u></strong>. "There is still a high number of dropouts for Southeast Asians," Yang said. "And if they do graduate, there is a low number going on to higher education." Their parents' difficulty in navigating American school systems may contribute to the problem. "The parents' lack of education leads to a lack of role models and guidance. Without those things, youth can turn to delinquent behavior and in some very extreme cases, gangs, instead of devoting themselves to education," said Narin Sihavong, director of SEARAC's Successful New Americans Project, which interviewed Mali Keo. "This underscores the need for Southeast Asian school administrators or counselors who can be role models, ease the cultural barrier, and serve as a bridge to their parents." "Sometimes families have to choose between education and employment, especially when money is tight," said Porthira Chimm, a former SEARAC project director. "And unfortunately, immediate money concerns often win out." <u><strong><mark>The picture that emerges</mark> -- of high welfare participation and dropout rates, low levels of education and income -- <mark>is startlingly similar to the situation of the poorest members of "nonmodel" minority groups</mark>. Southeast Asians, Latinos, and African Americans also have in common significant numbers of single-parent families. Largely as a result of the killing fields, nearly a quarter of Cambodian households are headed by single women.</u></strong> Other Southeast Asian families have similar stories. Sihavong's mother, for example, raised him and his five siblings on her own while his father was imprisoned in a Laotian re-education camp. <u><strong>No matter how "traditional" Southeast Asians may be, <mark>they share the fate of other people of color</mark> <mark>when they are denied access to good education, safe neighborhoods, and jobs</mark> that provide a living wage and benefits. <mark>But</mark> <mark>for</mark> the sake of <mark>preserving the model-minority myth, conservative policy makers have largely ignored the needs</mark> of Southeast Asian communities. </p></u></strong> | null | 1AC—Afro Asia | Contention 2: Our Engagement | 128,080 | 16 | 125,787 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | 655,624 | A | Westminster | 4 | Alpharetta DD | Ian Goldstein | 1AC - Afro Asia
1NC - FW Fem
2NR - FW | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/JeNa/Chattahoochee-Jeong-Nagabhirava-Aff-Westminster-Round4.docx | null | 55,550 | JeNa | Chattahoochee JeNa | null | Jo..... | Je..... | Ri..... | Na..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,413 | A – limits – unconditional AFFs justify small changes from the status quo like warming cooperation or relaxing a tariff on China – we solve this – QPQ’s requires large changes from the status quo, because a large US concession is required for China to say yes – there’s only a small literature base that defends these style of AFFs, which creates a functional limit | Drezner 99 | Drezner 99 (Daniel Drezner, Assistant Prof of Political Science at CU-Boulder, former John M. Olin National Security Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, pp 27-28) | How do senders choose between economic coercion and economic inducements to influence the target. The model argues that senders will be far more willing to use inducements with allies than adversaries. Carrots are of limited use against adversaries; only under a narrow set of circumstances will the sender prefer to offer a carrot over accepting a stalemate great powers are constrained in their ability to influence an adversary’s behavior. | e model argues that senders will be far more willing to use inducements Carrots are of limited use against adversaries only under a narrow set of circumstances great powers are constrained in their ability to influence an adversary’s behavior | The rest of the chapter considers the implications of relaxing some of the model’s technical assumptions. What happens when states realign their position in the international system, altering conflict expectations? The model predicts that it will increase the likelihood of a coercion event, but reduce the sender country’s ability to extract meaningful concessions from the target. What happens when demands become non-negotiable? The model predicts that stalemates over indivisible issues are more likely to occur between adversaries than allies, leading to prolonged sanctions imposition. How do senders choose between economic coercion and economic inducements to influence the target. The model argues that senders will be far more willing to use inducements with allies than adversaries. Carrots as well as sticks are of limited use against adversaries; only under a narrow set of circumstances will the sender prefer to offer a carrot over accepting a stalemate outcome. This result suggests that without the willingness to use brute force, even great powers are constrained in their ability to influence an adversary’s behavior. | 1,136 | <h4>A – limits – unconditional AFFs justify <u>small changes</u> from the status quo like warming cooperation or relaxing a tariff on China – <u>we solve this</u> – QPQ’s requires <u>large changes</u> from the status quo, because a large US concession is required for China to say yes – there’s only a small literature base that defends these style of AFFs, which creates a <u>functional limit</h4><p></u><strong>Drezner 99</strong> (Daniel Drezner, Assistant Prof of Political Science at CU-Boulder, former John M. Olin National Security Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, <u>The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, pp 27-28)</p><p></u>The rest of the chapter considers the implications of relaxing some of the model’s technical assumptions. What happens when states realign their position in the international system, altering conflict expectations? The model predicts that it will increase the likelihood of a coercion event, but reduce the sender country’s ability to extract meaningful concessions from the target. What happens when demands become non-negotiable? The model predicts that stalemates over indivisible issues are more likely to occur between adversaries than allies, leading to prolonged sanctions imposition. <u><strong>How do senders choose between economic coercion and economic inducements</u></strong> <u><strong>to influence the target. Th<mark>e model argues that senders will be far more willing to use inducements</mark> with allies than adversaries. <mark>Carrots</u></strong></mark> as well as sticks <u><strong><mark>are of limited use against adversaries</mark>; <mark>only under a narrow set of circumstances</mark> will the sender prefer to offer a carrot over accepting a stalemate</u></strong> outcome. This result suggests that without the willingness to use brute force, even <u><strong><mark>great powers are constrained in their ability to influence an adversary’s behavior</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NR | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 182,827 | 12 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,414 | Clash - Debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary fact based arguments – their roll of the ballot allows the AFF to cement their prep advantage into an undefeatable position since it lets them win as long as they used their infinite time to find quality evidence supporting an ideological orientation. The real controversy isn’t the problem, it’s the solution, which is why disadvantages based on their praxis are incredibly important | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Clash - Debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary fact based arguments – their roll of the ballot allows the AFF to cement their prep advantage into an undefeatable position since it lets them win as long as they used their infinite time to find quality evidence supporting an ideological orientation. The real controversy isn’t the problem, it’s the solution, which is why disadvantages based on their praxis are incredibly important </h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,811 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,415 | Engagement with China is broadly supported – Defense, business, & public all push them to back the plan | Sutter 12 (Robert, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1/27, “Congress’ Weak China Hand”, http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/congress-weak-china-hand/) | Sutter 12 (Robert, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1/27, “Congress’ Weak China Hand”, http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/congress-weak-china-hand/) | members of Congress have become keenly aware of the serious negative consequences for them of strong U.S. measures against Chinese trading They have participated in trips to China They’ve listened to lobbying by constituent business interests, Chinese officials and lobbyists hired by China, and a broad range of U.S. business groups urging moderation in dealing with China. it’s not in a position to prompt serious negative change in U.S. policy toward China The U.S. public eschews confrontation and doesn’t support U.S. actions that would lead to conflict with China over mainstream American media have become more moderate in their extensive coverage of developments in China U.S. business groups have been seeking congressional support against perceived unfair Chinese economic practices A prevailing sentiment is to support stability in the Chinese business environment, which has proven advantageous for many U.S. companies | members of Congress have become keenly aware of the serious negative consequences strong U.S. measures against Chinese trading trips to China lobbying Chinese officials and lobbyists hired and a broad range of U.S. business groups urging moderation in dealing with China public schews confrontation and doesn’t support U.S. actions that would lead to conflict A prevailing sentiment is to support stability in the Chinese business environment, which has proven advantageous for many U.S. companies | Many members of Congress have become keenly aware of the serious negative consequences for them and their constituents of strong U.S. measures against Chinese trading and economic practices. They have participated in trips to China and discussions in various congressional working groups regarding China. They’ve listened to lobbying by constituent business interests, Chinese officials and lobbyists hired by China, and a broad range of U.S. business groups urging moderation in dealing with China. U.S. public opinion remains more negative than positive regarding the policies and practices of China, but it’s not in a position, as it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, to prompt serious negative change in U.S. policy toward China. The U.S. public is somewhat anxious about Chinese economic and military power, but it eschews confrontation and doesn’t support U.S. actions that would lead to conflict with China over Taiwan. Similarly, mainstream American media have become more moderate in their extensive coverage of developments in China than was the case in the years following the Tiananmen crackdown. U.S. business groups have been seeking congressional support against perceived unfair Chinese economic practices and some have supported legislation threatening retaliation. However, divisions within the business community on what to do about China remain profound. A prevailing sentiment is to support stability in the Chinese business environment, which has proven advantageous for many U.S. companies. Congress generally supports U.S. military and security agencies in preparing for contingencies involving China, but it also tends to join with Defense Department leaders in seeking to establish contacts with China that can manage tensions short of military conflict. Congressional critics of President Obama’s reluctance to sell F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan are countered by defenders of the president’s record of multibillion dollar sales to Taiwan amounting in three years to double the value of U.S. arms sold to Taiwan in the eight years of the George W. Bush administration. | 2,106 | <h4>Engagement with China is broadly supported – Defense, business, & public all push them to back the plan</h4><p><strong>Sutter 12 (Robert, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1/27, “Congress’ Weak China Hand”, http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/congress-weak-china-hand/)</p><p></strong>Many <u><mark>members of Congress have become keenly aware of the serious negative consequences</mark> for them </u>and their constituents <u>of <mark>strong U.S. measures against Chinese trading</u> </mark>and economic practices. <u>They have participated in <mark>trips to China</u></mark> and discussions in various congressional working groups regarding China. <u>They’ve listened to <mark>lobbying</mark> by constituent business interests, <mark>Chinese officials and lobbyists hired</mark> by China, <mark>and a broad range of U.S. business groups</mark> <mark>urging</mark> <mark>moderation in dealing with China</mark>.</u> U.S. public opinion remains more negative than positive regarding the policies and practices of China, but <u>it’s not in a position</u>, as it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, <u>to prompt serious negative change in U.S. policy toward China</u>. <u>The U.S. <mark>public</u></mark> is somewhat anxious about Chinese economic and military power, but it <u>e<mark>schews confrontation and doesn’t support U.S. actions that would lead to conflict</mark> with China over</u> Taiwan. Similarly, <u>mainstream American media have become more moderate in their extensive coverage of developments in China</u> than was the case in the years following the Tiananmen crackdown. <u>U.S. business groups have been seeking congressional support against perceived unfair Chinese economic practices</u> and some have supported legislation threatening retaliation. However, divisions within the business community on what to do about China remain profound.<u> <mark>A prevailing sentiment is to support stability in the Chinese business environment, which has proven advantageous for many U.S. companies</u></mark>. Congress generally supports U.S. military and security agencies in preparing for contingencies involving China, but it also tends to join with Defense Department leaders in seeking to establish contacts with China that can manage tensions short of military conflict. Congressional critics of President Obama’s reluctance to sell F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan are countered by defenders of the president’s record of multibillion dollar sales to Taiwan amounting in three years to double the value of U.S. arms sold to Taiwan in the eight years of the George W. Bush administration.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 164,385 | 2 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,416 | Violation – the aff is military engagement, not diplomatic. Plan text not in a vacuum—their internal links are based off of military engagement. They rid of coastal surveillance—that’s military. Gross 13 is the card you should read. Says increase military transparency and eliminates military | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Violation – the aff is military engagement, not diplomatic. Plan text not in a vacuum—their internal links are based off of military engagement. They rid of coastal surveillance—that’s military. Gross 13 is the card you should read. Says increase military transparency and eliminates military</h4> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 3 | 1,560,812 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,417 | B – Negative Ground – small unconditional AFFs don’t have the magnitude to trigger core negative generics like the Japan, Politics, or Chinese politics DA, can perm condition counterplans, and sidestep say no debates – independently, these sorts of AFFs capitalize on link non-unique arguments – this makes it impossible to be negative | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>B – Negative Ground – small unconditional AFFs <u>don’t have the magnitude</u> to trigger core negative generics like the Japan, Politics, or Chinese politics DA, can perm condition counterplans, and sidestep say no debates – independently, these sorts of AFFs <u>capitalize on link non-unique arguments</u> – this makes it <u>impossible</u> to be negative </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | War Impact Calculus | 1,560,814 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,418 | Switch-side debating – the advocacy of things you sometimes don’t necessarily believe in. Topic based education and ground should be prioritized because it encourages students to learn in-depth about new and important public policy issues each year. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Switch-side debating – the advocacy of things you sometimes don’t necessarily believe in. Topic based education and ground should be prioritized because it encourages students to learn in-depth about new and important public policy issues each year. </h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 1,560,813 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,419 | Vote neg to preserve predictable limits – it’s the key internal link to education, clash, and ground – this is the largest topic of the decade and the military could be a separate resolution | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Vote neg to preserve predictable limits – it’s the key internal link to education, clash, and ground – this is the largest topic of the decade and the military could be a separate resolution </h4> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 3 | 1,560,815 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,420 | Decks econ | Snell 12/23 | Kelsey Snell 12/23. Reporter and writer for the Washington Post. “The Five Biggest Obstacles to Trump’s Plan to Overhaul the Tax Code” https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/kelsey-snell/?utm_term=.18e5375bee92 | a more apt metaphor may be a second “Showdown at Gucci Gulch” if the new president spearheads an ambitious effort to remake the federal tax code during his first year as president in the real world there are challenges and legislation needs to go through a process in Congress During his campaign, Trump released a bare-bones tax plan containing some ideas familiar to Washington wonks, including deep rate cuts for businesses and individuals and changes to the way small businesses pay taxes. But many of the president-elect’s proposals — like a 15 percent rate for businesses and the elimination of most deductions for individuals — could alienate lawmakers Trump’s tax reform push is expected to be led by Treasury secretary nominee Steven Mnuchin, a movie producer, Wall Street banker and former Goldman Sachs executive. Mnuchin has promised bigger than-expected economic growth of 3 to 4 percent in addition to deep tax cuts. But he’s said very little about the critical details of how that growth can be achieved This will be the largest tax change since Reagan Trump’s biggest hurdles will be figuring out how to pay for his big rate cuts, how to explain major breaks for the rich and how to make good on his promise to cut taxes for companies overseas. He’ll also need a gameplan for parrying pushback from off Capitol Hill, including possibly crafting a strategy for wooing Democratic support things standing in the way of Trump’s tax reform 1. Cutting rates without ballooning the deficit He has proposed slashing corporate taxes from 35 to 15 percent, setting the top small business rate at 15 percent and cutting the top individual rate from 39.6 percent to 25 percent. Those rate cuts are far below levels proposed in past GOP tax plans and most experts say such dramatic cuts will be hard, if not impossible, to achieve without sending the deficit soaring. The Tax Policy Center estimates that Trump’s plan would cost the federal government as much as $9.5 trillion in the first decade. Even conservative groups like the Tax Foundation estimate that Trump’s plan would lose between $2.6 and $5.9 trillion over a decade, depending on which model they use The] national debt is dangerous and unacceptable,” Trump has proposed limiting itemized deductions in order to make up some of the cost — but Pomerleau and other experts said the code doesn’t contain enough deductions and special tax breaks to compensate. “I don’t think the plan can get as close to revenue neutral as they’d like to,” Pomerleau said. “They’d still need to cut spending.” 2. Selling a plan that will help the super-rich Trump has proposed cutting capital gains and dividends from a top rate of 23.8 percent to a top rate of 20 percent. Income from carried interest would top out at a rate of 15 percent Getting Democrats on board. Congress is planning to establish a process allowing some elements of a tax reform to be approved without the threat of obstruction in the Senate. But most tax writers say they’d rather include Democrats in the process. Senate Republicans have been discussing bipartisan reform ideas with Democrats since 2013. Hatch renewed that push last year when he convened a series of bipartisan working groups tasked with reviewing thorny issues Trump hasn’t touched, like how a tax code rewrite will handle breaks and credits for community development, infrastructure and education. Hatch said last month that his dedication to bipartisanship hasn’t wavered since Trump was elected. ““I don’t think it can be done except in a bipartisan way,” Hatch said in November. House Republicans, including Brady, have also hinted they’re open to talking to Democrats. “Join us, engage, bring us your best ideas for how to grow the economy | Trump tax plan 15 percent rate for businesses and elimination of deductions could alienate lawmakers Trump’s biggest hurdles will be figuring out how to pay for big rate cuts He’ll need a gameplan for parrying pushback from Capitol Hill, including a strategy for wooing Democratic support rate cuts are far below levels proposed in past GOP tax plans experts say such will be impossible, to achieve without sending the deficit soaring Tax Policy Center estimates Trump’s plan would cost 9.5 trillion national debt is dangerous and unacceptable don’t think the plan can get revenue neutral tax writers say they’d rather include Democrats Republicans have been discussing bipartisan reform since 2013 last year convened bipartisan groups reviewing how a tax code rewrite will handle credits for development, infrastructure and education dedication to bipartisanship hasn’t wavered since Trump was elected don’t think it can be done except in a bipartisan way | President-elect Donald Trump likes to say he will “drain the swamp” of special interests when he takes up residence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. But a more apt metaphor may be a second “Showdown at Gucci Gulch” if the new president spearheads an ambitious effort to remake the federal tax code during his first year as president. Gucci Gulch, as the authors of a book on major 1986 tax reform under President Reagan wrote, refers to the swarm of well-heeled lobbyists who may stand in his way. “Trump may not be someone who cares about what certain industries say about his proposals,” said Kyle Pomerleau, director of federal tax projects at the conservative Tax Foundation. “But in the real world there are challenges and legislation needs to go through a process in Congress. Some members will hear these concerns from certain industries and that makes it a challenge.” During his campaign, Trump released a bare-bones tax plan containing some ideas familiar to Washington wonks, including deep rate cuts for businesses and individuals and changes to the way small businesses pay taxes. But many of the president-elect’s proposals — like a 15 percent rate for businesses and the elimination of most deductions for individuals — could alienate lawmakers in both parties, as well as spark a major fight with special interests who might support other parts of the Trump agenda. Most of Trump’s tax ideas came up through his campaign advisers, who have more experience and closer ties to think tanks and boardrooms than to the Washington establishment. Trump’s tax reform push is expected to be led by Treasury secretary nominee Steven Mnuchin, a movie producer, Wall Street banker and former Goldman Sachs executive. Mnuchin has promised bigger than-expected economic growth of 3 to 4 percent in addition to deep tax cuts. But he’s said very little about the critical details of how that growth can be achieved. “Our number one priority is tax reform,” Mnuchin said in a recent interview with CNBC. “This will be the largest tax change since Reagan.” Lawmakers, particularly GOP tax writers on the House Ways and Means Committee that will helm an overhaul, have worked for months to develop more detailed proposals that Trump could adopt. But there is no guarantee he will support their ideas, particularly when it comes to tax breaks for individuals. Republicans and Trump are far closer in their thinking on business reform — but even that could be a challenge to accomplish. “I think everybody assumes a Republicans Congress and President Trump can get a business tax plan passed but aside from just cutting rates, there’s a lot of disagreement.” said Len Burman, director of the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center. Trump’s biggest hurdles will be figuring out how to pay for his big rate cuts, how to explain major breaks for the rich and how to make good on his promise to cut taxes for companies overseas. He’ll also need a gameplan for parrying pushback from off Capitol Hill, including possibly crafting a strategy for wooing Democratic support. Here are five big things standing in the way of Trump’s tax reform promises: 1. Cutting rates without ballooning the deficit. Trump has promised to cut rates for every taxpayer. He has proposed slashing corporate taxes from 35 to 15 percent, setting the top small business rate at 15 percent and cutting the top individual rate from 39.6 percent to 25 percent. Those rate cuts are far below levels proposed in past GOP tax plans and most experts say such dramatic cuts will be hard, if not impossible, to achieve without sending the deficit soaring. The Tax Policy Center estimates that Trump’s plan would cost the federal government as much as $9.5 trillion in the first decade. Even conservative groups like the Tax Foundation estimate that Trump’s plan would lose between $2.6 and $5.9 trillion over a decade, depending on which model they use. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Texas) and Mnuchin have all said they would prefer to do a tax overhaul that avoids such big losses. “[The] national debt is dangerous and unacceptable,” McConnell said at a press conference in December. “My preference on tax reform is that it be revenue neutral.” But experts say that may be impossible. Trump has proposed limiting itemized deductions in order to make up some of the cost — but Pomerleau and other experts said the code doesn’t contain enough deductions and special tax breaks to compensate. “I don’t think the plan can get as close to revenue neutral as they’d like to,” Pomerleau said. “They’d still need to cut spending.” 2. Selling a plan that will help the super-rich. Trump has promised to cut taxes for everyone and while his plan may do that, experts say the biggest beneficiaries will be the wealthy, or those earning over $3.7 million. The proposals in Trump’s plan include a long list of goodies for the super-rich that go well beyond cutting the top individual rate. Trump’s proposal includes limiting deductions taken by high-income earners — but most of those taxpayers would benefit from other changes in his plan. The wealthiest earners would also benefit from cuts to small business taxes and lower rates for income from investments. Trump has proposed cutting capital gains and dividends from a top rate of 23.8 percent to a top rate of 20 percent. Income from carried interest would top out at a rate of 15 percent. That’s because most of the highest-income earners make more money off of investments and business income than they do from a regular salary. People like investors, hedge fund managers, and commercial real-estate brokers earn money through small business arrangements known as pass-throughs, which would see their tax rate cut from a top rate of 39.6 to as low at 15 percent. “Pass-through businesses are across the income scale but most of it is at the very top income bracket,” Pomerleau. “One-third of their income is labor income, one-third is capital and one-third comes from small-business income.” The average taxpayer in that top .1 percent tax bracket would have one-third of their income taxed at 15 percent, one third at 20 percent and one-third taxed at the top rate of 33 percent, assuming these taxpayers aren’t eligible for any other breaks or benefits. Those rules could also make it easier for moderately high income taxpayers to avoid paying taxes by asking to be hired as contractors instead of employees. Under Trump’s plan, contractors could file as small businesses and lock in a 15 percent top rate. “That is a loophole to drive a truck through,” Burman said. “If I’m supposed to be taxed in the 33 percent tax bracket, I tell my employer I’m an independent contractor and all of a sudden I’m taxed at 15 percent.” 3. Finding a way to tax international businesses. Lawmakers have long argued that the current system makes it easy for companies to stockpile cash offshore and avoid paying U.S. levies by only taxing companies when they reinvest foreign-earned money back home. Republicans also argue that high corporate tax rates have led to a recent spate of companies shifting their tax base overseas. Trump has promised to crack down on these companies but hasn’t detailed how. He has used Twitter to float ideas like a 35 percent tariff on goods shipped to the United States by companies that send jobs overseas. The idea of a tariff is controversial in Congress and wouldn’t solve the issue of how companies who already operate overseas should be taxed. Members of the House Ways and Means Committee have proposed a plan that would, in part, tax the sale of imported goods and not the sale of exports through a process known as border adjustability. Some tax experts think Trump could just adopt that proposal as part of his plan. “There’s a good reason to think that the GOP could sell Trump on border adjustment,” Pomerleau said. “A fundamental misunderstanding of the plan could make it seem like a tariff.” But Democrats and even most Senate Republicans aren’t on board with House GOP plan. Members of the Senate Finance Committee have been working on their own plan for corporate tax reform. Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) has held a series of hearings on how to prevent companies from stashing cash overseas and has been working with committee Democrats since last year to craft a bipartisan plan. 4. Getting Democrats on board. Congress is planning to establish a process allowing some elements of a tax reform to be approved without the threat of obstruction in the Senate. But most tax writers say they’d rather include Democrats in the process. Senate Republicans have been discussing bipartisan reform ideas with Democrats since 2013. Hatch renewed that push last year when he convened a series of bipartisan working groups tasked with reviewing thorny issues Trump hasn’t touched, like how a tax code rewrite will handle breaks and credits for community development, infrastructure and education. Hatch said last month that his dedication to bipartisanship hasn’t wavered since Trump was elected. ““I don’t think it can be done except in a bipartisan way,” Hatch said in November. House Republicans, including Brady, have also hinted they’re open to talking to Democrats. “Join us, engage, bring us your best ideas for how to grow the economy,” Brady told reporters this month. “[Democrats] watching the same companies we do consider moving their manufacturing plants and their research overseas.” | 9,505 | <h4>Decks econ</h4><p>Kelsey <strong>Snell 12/23</strong>. Reporter and writer for the Washington Post. “The Five Biggest Obstacles to Trump’s Plan to Overhaul the Tax Code” https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/kelsey-snell/?utm_term=.18e5375bee92</p><p>President-elect Donald Trump likes to say he will “drain the swamp” of special interests when he takes up residence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. But <u>a more apt metaphor may be a second “Showdown at Gucci Gulch” if the new president spearheads an ambitious effort to remake the federal tax code during his first year as president</u>. Gucci Gulch, as the authors of a book on major 1986 tax reform under President Reagan wrote, refers to the swarm of well-heeled lobbyists who may stand in his way. “Trump may not be someone who cares about what certain industries say about his proposals,” said Kyle Pomerleau, director of federal tax projects at the conservative Tax Foundation. “But <u>in the real world there are challenges and legislation needs to go through a process in Congress</u>. Some members will hear these concerns from certain industries and that makes it a challenge.” <u>During his campaign, <mark>Trump</mark> released a bare-bones <mark>tax plan</mark> containing some ideas familiar to Washington wonks, including deep rate cuts for businesses and individuals and changes to the way small businesses pay taxes. But many of the president-elect’s proposals — like a <mark>15 percent rate for businesses and</mark> the <mark>elimination of</mark> most <mark>deductions</mark> for individuals — <mark>could alienate lawmakers</u></mark> in both parties, as well as spark a major fight with special interests who might support other parts of the Trump agenda. Most of Trump’s tax ideas came up through his campaign advisers, who have more experience and closer ties to think tanks and boardrooms than to the Washington establishment. <u>Trump’s tax reform push is expected to be led by Treasury secretary nominee Steven Mnuchin, a movie producer, Wall Street banker and former Goldman Sachs executive. Mnuchin has promised bigger than-expected economic growth of 3 to 4 percent in addition to deep tax cuts. But he’s said very little about the critical details of how that growth can be achieved</u>. “Our number one priority is tax reform,” Mnuchin said in a recent interview with CNBC. “<u>This will be the largest tax change since Reagan</u>.” Lawmakers, particularly GOP tax writers on the House Ways and Means Committee that will helm an overhaul, have worked for months to develop more detailed proposals that Trump could adopt. But there is no guarantee he will support their ideas, particularly when it comes to tax breaks for individuals. Republicans and Trump are far closer in their thinking on business reform — but even that could be a challenge to accomplish. “I think everybody assumes a Republicans Congress and President Trump can get a business tax plan passed but aside from just cutting rates, there’s a lot of disagreement.” said Len Burman, director of the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center. <u><mark>Trump’s biggest hurdles will be figuring out how to pay for</mark> his <mark>big rate cuts</mark>, how to explain major breaks for the rich and how to make good on his promise to cut taxes for companies overseas. <mark>He’ll</mark> also <mark>need a gameplan for parrying pushback from</mark> off <mark>Capitol Hill, including</mark> possibly crafting <mark>a strategy for wooing Democratic support</u></mark>. Here are five big <u>things standing in the way of Trump’s tax reform</u> promises: <u>1. Cutting rates without ballooning the deficit</u>. Trump has promised to cut rates for every taxpayer. <u>He has proposed slashing corporate taxes from 35 to 15 percent, setting the top small business rate at 15 percent and cutting the top individual rate from 39.6 percent to 25 percent. Those <mark>rate cuts are far below levels proposed in past GOP tax plans</mark> and most <mark>experts say such</mark> dramatic cuts <mark>will be</mark> hard, if not <mark>impossible, to achieve without sending the deficit soaring</mark>. The <mark>Tax Policy Center estimates</mark> that <mark>Trump’s plan would cost</mark> the federal government as much as $<mark>9.5 trillion</mark> in the first decade. Even conservative groups like the Tax Foundation estimate that Trump’s plan would lose between $2.6 and $5.9 trillion over a decade, depending on which model they use</u>. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Texas) and Mnuchin have all said they would prefer to do a tax overhaul that avoids such big losses. “[<u>The] <mark>national debt is dangerous and unacceptable</mark>,” </u>McConnell said at a press conference in December. “My preference on tax reform is that it be revenue neutral.” But experts say that may be impossible. <u>Trump has proposed limiting itemized deductions in order to make up some of the cost — but Pomerleau and other experts said the code doesn’t contain enough deductions and special tax breaks to compensate. “I <mark>don’t think the plan can get</mark> as close to <mark>revenue neutral</mark> as they’d like to,” Pomerleau said. “They’d still need to cut spending.” 2. Selling a plan that will help the super-rich</u>. Trump has promised to cut taxes for everyone and while his plan may do that, experts say the biggest beneficiaries will be the wealthy, or those earning over $3.7 million. The proposals in Trump’s plan include a long list of goodies for the super-rich that go well beyond cutting the top individual rate. Trump’s proposal includes limiting deductions taken by high-income earners — but most of those taxpayers would benefit from other changes in his plan. The wealthiest earners would also benefit from cuts to small business taxes and lower rates for income from investments. <u>Trump has proposed cutting capital gains and dividends from a top rate of 23.8 percent to a top rate of 20 percent. Income from carried interest would top out at a rate of 15 percent</u>. That’s because most of the highest-income earners make more money off of investments and business income than they do from a regular salary. People like investors, hedge fund managers, and commercial real-estate brokers earn money through small business arrangements known as pass-throughs, which would see their tax rate cut from a top rate of 39.6 to as low at 15 percent. “Pass-through businesses are across the income scale but most of it is at the very top income bracket,” Pomerleau. “One-third of their income is labor income, one-third is capital and one-third comes from small-business income.” The average taxpayer in that top .1 percent tax bracket would have one-third of their income taxed at 15 percent, one third at 20 percent and one-third taxed at the top rate of 33 percent, assuming these taxpayers aren’t eligible for any other breaks or benefits. Those rules could also make it easier for moderately high income taxpayers to avoid paying taxes by asking to be hired as contractors instead of employees. Under Trump’s plan, contractors could file as small businesses and lock in a 15 percent top rate. “That is a loophole to drive a truck through,” Burman said. “If I’m supposed to be taxed in the 33 percent tax bracket, I tell my employer I’m an independent contractor and all of a sudden I’m taxed at 15 percent.” 3. Finding a way to tax international businesses. Lawmakers have long argued that the current system makes it easy for companies to stockpile cash offshore and avoid paying U.S. levies by only taxing companies when they reinvest foreign-earned money back home. Republicans also argue that high corporate tax rates have led to a recent spate of companies shifting their tax base overseas. Trump has promised to crack down on these companies but hasn’t detailed how. He has used Twitter to float ideas like a 35 percent tariff on goods shipped to the United States by companies that send jobs overseas. The idea of a tariff is controversial in Congress and wouldn’t solve the issue of how companies who already operate overseas should be taxed. Members of the House Ways and Means Committee have proposed a plan that would, in part, tax the sale of imported goods and not the sale of exports through a process known as border adjustability. Some tax experts think Trump could just adopt that proposal as part of his plan. “There’s a good reason to think that the GOP could sell Trump on border adjustment,” Pomerleau said. “A fundamental misunderstanding of the plan could make it seem like a tariff.” But Democrats and even most Senate Republicans aren’t on board with House GOP plan. Members of the Senate Finance Committee have been working on their own plan for corporate tax reform. Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) has held a series of hearings on how to prevent companies from stashing cash overseas and has been working with committee Democrats since last year to craft a bipartisan plan. 4. <u>Getting Democrats on board. Congress is planning to establish a process allowing some elements of a tax reform to be approved without the threat of obstruction in the Senate. But most <mark>tax writers say they’d rather include Democrats</mark> in the process. Senate <mark>Republicans have been discussing bipartisan reform</mark> ideas with Democrats <mark>since 2013</mark>. Hatch renewed that push <mark>last year</mark> when he <mark>convened</mark> a series of <mark>bipartisan</mark> working <mark>groups</mark> tasked with <mark>reviewing</mark> thorny issues Trump hasn’t touched, like <mark>how a tax code rewrite will handle</mark> breaks and <mark>credits for</mark> community <mark>development, infrastructure and education</mark>. Hatch said last month that his <mark>dedication to bipartisanship hasn’t wavered since Trump was elected</mark>. ““I <mark>don’t think it can be done except in a bipartisan way</mark>,” Hatch said in November. House Republicans, including Brady, have also hinted they’re open to talking to Democrats. “Join us, engage, bring us your best ideas for how to grow the economy</u>,” Brady told reporters this month. “[Democrats] watching the same companies we do consider moving their manufacturing plants and their research overseas.”</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 1,491,079 | 9 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,421 | Doesn’t overlimit – QPQs exist with China in a variety of forms that are non-adversarial | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Doesn’t overlimit – QPQs exist with China in a <u>variety</u> of forms that are <u>non-adversarial</u> </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,816 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,422 | US growth is a pre-requisite to solving great power conflicts – it’s key to solve nuclear war | Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012 | Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012 | (Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)
American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight less stable Major war will become more likely. Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, , dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished. | American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad countries sense our weakness Allies will doubt our commitment and pursue nuclear weapons adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained Major war will become more likely Obama articulated foreign policy visions curbing poverty moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons there is a more urgent big-picture restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to foreign policy is not reestablished | (Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)
Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished. | 1,953 | <h4><strong>US growth is a pre-requisite to solving great power conflicts – it’s key to solve nuclear war</h4><p>Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012</p><p><u>(Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)</p><p></u></strong>Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, <u><mark>American economic weakness <strong>undercuts U.S. leadership abroad</strong></mark>. Other <mark>countries <strong>sense our weakness</u></strong></mark> and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to <u><strong>take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future</u></strong>. <u><mark>Allies</mark> and friends <mark>will <strong>doubt our commitment</strong> and</mark> may <strong><mark>pursue nuclear weapons</strong></mark> for their own security, for example; <mark>adversaries will <strong>sense opportunity</strong> and be <strong>less restrained</strong></mark> <strong>in throwing around their weight</u></strong> in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become <u><strong>less stable</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Major war will </strong>become more likely</mark>.</u> When running for president last time, <u><mark>Obama</mark> eloquently <mark>articulated</mark> big <mark>foreign policy visions</mark>: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, </u>controlling global climate change<u>, dramatically <mark>curbing</mark> <strong>global</strong> <strong><mark>poverty</strong></mark> through development aid, <strong><mark>moving toward a world free of</strong> <strong>nuclear weapons</strong></mark>. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, <mark>there is</mark> now <strong><mark>a</mark> much <mark>more urgent big-picture </mark>issue: <mark>restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is</mark> really <mark>possible if that</mark> <mark>fundamentalprerequisite to</mark> effective <mark>foreign policy is not reestablished</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 21,670 | 522 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,423 | Text: ASEAN should utilize their multilateral cooperation channels to resolve south china sea disputes through a series of dialogues and meetings utilizing the ASEAN framework that corresponds to directives in the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea and East China Sea. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: ASEAN should utilize their multilateral cooperation channels to resolve south china sea disputes through a series of dialogues and meetings utilizing the ASEAN framework that corresponds to directives in the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea and East China Sea.</h4> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 4 | 1,560,817 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,424 | Here’s a case list – affs can condition on human rights, cyber security, the environment, public health, and territorial disputes --- this ensures aff innovation while preserving negative preparation | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Here’s a case list – affs can condition on <u>human rights</u>, <u>cyber security</u>, <u>the environment</u>, <u>public health</u>, and <u>territorial disputes</u> --- this <u>ensures</u> aff innovation while <u>preserving</u> negative preparation</h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,818 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,425 | Agonism – The resolution asks a question concerning institutional change that the affirmative ought to answer with an instrumental reform - keeping debate within a limited range fosters agonistic democracy which their interpretation undermines by tearing down the foundations of the political prior to engaging it by understanding the government as an inherent antagonism. They have no offence because agonistic democracy does not require uncritical embrace of hegemonic attitudes or ideologies, the foundations legitimacy can be called into question, but the infrastructure of the resolution cannot be discarded as a starting point | Wingenbach, Notre Dame Government and international studies PhD, 2011 | Wingenbach, Notre Dame Government and international studies PhD, 2011 | stic Democracy, pg 190-198)
The objective of agonistic democracy is not to eliminate all relations of domination this sort of utopian aspiration leads precisely to the rationalist exclusions the goal is to craft conditions under which these relations can be made visible, and thus contested. common values make agonism possible, and their dominant institutional interpretations, inevitably and explicitly favor some identities, interests, or other articulations of subjectivity over other Agonism hopes to set interpretation against interpretation, identity against identity, hegemonic claim against hegemonic claim, so that in the perpetual conflict between citizens the burden of domination shifts and moves. nature. Agonistic democrats refuse any such commitments, asserting instead that the premises of social life are themselves products of humanity, and that the ontology within which our politics emerges is itself a product of political assertions Highlighting contingency and inviting engagement in conflicts over the interpretation of values need not weaken their pragmatic significance It is only dangerous to expose the contingency of our deeply shared ontopolitical premises if one of those premises suggests that legitimacy must be derived from criteria not subject to human agency. it pushes these reconstructive projects further by demanding that the practices and institutions of democracy itself be engaged in this reconstruction rather than merely governed by it. emphasis of this work on critique, practices of identity, contestation of power, exposure of hegemonic interpretations, and so on depict a vision of democracy that is primarily procedural Agonism explicitly situates itself within existing institutional forms, not outside them. agonistic thinkers propose not a revolution but a reformation, urging that extant democratic resources be strengthened, democratic values reinterpreted, and hegemonic structures exposed and contested. Over time agonism might lead, directly and indirectly, to dramatic reforms to, and even revolutionary redesign of, democratic institutions, but that change is inevitably slow This makes agonism appear conservative when compared to radical democracy, as radical democracy takes as its goal the near term transformation and elimination of social and economic injustice. Agonism aspires to create a democratic social order that will lead to the amelioration or destruction of injustice, but recognizes that such injustices are embedded in the context of politics within which such work occurs and against which organization, mobilization, and resistance must take place. Agonism creates democratic conditions out of which real transformation might arise. the political conception can subject itself to debate when invoked to resolve conflict. This is the structural argument for an agonistic liberalism-a competitive environment of plural identities and interests will tend to undercut any and all claims to overcome contingency, thus cultivating practices that make visible and contest hegemonic interpretations. If this can happen within an agonistic cultural order, within a shared symbolic framework (liberty/equality), exercised by citizens informed by an ethos of reciprocity is likely to maximize inclusion and minimize domination the possibilities for dramatic transformation to the ontopolitical grounds of that social order increase as citizens come to see both conflict and reciprocity as living norms of political life. We find ourselves always already inhabiting a history of meaning, practice, and identity, and these elements of our being are not infinitely malleable. They may be transformed, reinterpreted, and eventually even overcome liberalism offered by radical theorists represents an objection to an idea of liberalism imbricated with existing structures of inequality a rationalistic account of individual interests Some aspects of liberal politics contribute to visions of subjectivity that will generate resentment and oppression but elements within these same theories might also be used to mitigate such pressures Some versions of liberalism identify closely with capitalism and neo-liberal aspirations, but others endeavor to identify an economic order consistent with liberal values without offering any such privilege to markets or competition. If only a rupture and overcoming can achieve democratic outcomes and democracy will ever be over the horizon of history, a democratic theory of institutions and engagement rather than resistance and aspiration is impossible radical aspirations of democratic theory need not begin and end with the rejection of the dominant interpretation of democracy within and against which political action must engage. Agonistic theory can offer an account of democracy mindful of both the danger and the potential of the liberal hegemony. The ontopolitical foundations of agonistic democracy are contingent and revisable but they cannot be the constant object of debate If a post-foundational politics demands the recognition both of the contingency of foundations and the situated limits to the range of possible meanings found in any particular grounds of the political then an agonistic politics must also be a bounded politics. Agonism works within historicity in order to expand the constellation of conceivable conflicts, without rejecting the tragic reality that limits to inclusion are endemic to politics Hegemony can be productive or destructive, but hegemony cannot be universal. Post-foundational politics embraces the inevitability of boundaries and limits and works to make those boundaries as wide as possible without turning debates into ontological conflicts that cannot but be violent as they take place outside the grounds of shared ontopolitical premises Calling perspectives that accept the contingent liberal principles of democratic politics legitimate may seem dangerous, as it implies that perspectives beyond this consensus are illicit and excluded. Adversaries do fight fiercely agonism is a willingness to accept some set of principles, interpretations, or procedures as legitimate, even if that legitimacy is understood as subject to legitimate conflict itself. At some point the confrontation between principles is so vast that the contest must be antagonistic Political liberalism offers a set of principles and practices compatible with the type of "conflictual consensus" agonistic democrats advocate, while also highlighting the historically contingent yet also ontologically powerful status of these same principles. A theory of agonistic democracy embedded within a modified version of political liberalism can support institutions capable of addressing both imperatives and the institutions it supports are not different from those envisioned by liberal theory . The modified political liberalism proposed in this book is probably not the only institutional possibility for agonistic democracy, but its plausibility demonstrates that institutionalization is neither incompatible with agonistic principles nor impossible to develop within existing social norms. By situating liberalism explicitly within a post-foundational ontology, liberalism is transformed in significant ways and its practices opened up to greater contestation, generosity, and active re-constitution. | objective of agonistic democracy is not eliminate all domination this utopian aspiration leads to rationalist exclusions goal is to craft conditions under which relations be made visible, and contested. common values make agonism possible Agonistic democrats refuse premises of social life are products of humanity, and the ontology within our politics is a product of political assertions Agonism situates within existing institutional forms propose not revolution but reformation, democratic resources reinterpreted, and hegemonic structures contested change is slow Agonism aspires to create a democratic order that will lead to destruction of injustice, but recognizes injustices embedded in politics within which such occurs Agonism creates democratic conditions out of which transformation might arise. This competitive environment of plural identities will undercut claims to overcome contingency, cultivating practices that contest hegemonic interpretations. agonistic order, within a shared symbolic framework informed by an ethos of reciprocity is to maximize inclusion and minimize domination. liberalism represents an objection to existing structures liberal politics contribute visions of subjectivity that generate oppression, but mitigate such liberalism identify an economic order consistent with liberal values without offering privilege to markets If only a rupture can achieve democratic outcomes a democratic theory of institutions and engagement rather than resistance is impossible aspirations of theory need not begin with rejection of democracy within which political action must engage. Agonistic theory can account democracy mindful of the danger and the potential ontopolitical foundations of agonistic democracy are contingent and revisable, but cannot be constant object of debate. , agonistic politics must be a bounded Agonism works without rejecting tragic reality that limits to inclusion are endemic Post-foundational politics embraces inevitability of boundaries and limits, and works to make those wide as possible without turning debates into ontological conflicts agonism is a willingness to accept some interpretations as legitimate, even if legitimacy is understood as subject to legitimate conflict itself By situating liberalism within a post-foundational ontology, liberalism is transformed and its practices opened to active re-constitution | (Ed, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, pg 190-198)
Third, because Knops ignores the situated source of antagonism and the persistence of hegemony in the construction of meaning he misconceives the problem of subordination and oppression. The objective of agonistic democracy is not to eliminate all relations of domination and oppression; this sort of utopian aspiration leads precisely to the rationalist exclusions they are at pains to expose. Rather, the goal is to craft conditions under which these relations can be made visible, and thus contested. The common values that make agonism possible, and their dominant institutional interpretations, inevitably and explicitly favor some identities, interests, or other articulations of subjectivity over others. In fact, these values and their dominant interpretations act to shape subjectivity so that they are seen not as constructions but simply "the way things are." Because Knops assumes the project of agonism is to eliminate these hegemonic relations of domination, he also assumes that Mouffe needs to establish an unbiased and objective set of criteria by which to identify and ameliorate these injustices. Hence his claim that her theory ultimately must rely on rationalist arguments. But agonism does not share this aspiration. Instead pluralist agonism accepts that the inevitability of injustice is the price of democratic plurality, and endeavors to identify practices that render these injustices amenable to contestation. Agonism hopes to set interpretation against interpretation, identity against identity, hegemonic claim against hegemonic claim, so that in the perpetual conflict between citizens the burden of domination shifts and moves. Where Knops sees unbiased consensus on rational principles eliminating domination, Mouffe sees an elaboration of hegemonic power so thorough as to make the injustices it produces not merely invisible but unthinkable. When Knops concludes that Mouffe's agonism should be seen as an adjunct to deliberation, one that calls attention to "the erroneous projection of one party's understandings onto another, constraining their meanings - it is fraught with the possibility of hegemony" (2007, 125), he is mistakenly subsuming agonism into deliberation by eliding the ontological distinctions between the two accounts. Deliberative democracy has faith that careful scrutiny of arguments, rational evaluation of principles, and deliberation oriented toward understanding will produce an unforced consensus shorn of power, domination, and manipulation. Its reconstruction of democratic principles is one that aspires to transcend the ambiguity of the everyday in order to resolve injustice. It takes this possibility as a real one, because its ontology is fundamentaily committed to the universality of human nature. Agonistic democrats refuse any such commitments, asserting instead that the premises of social life are themselves products of humanity, and that the ontology within which our politics emerges is itself a product of political assertions. No standard can be found or created that can extract us from this process of meaning creation, and thus all political standards should be understood as both historically constraining (we cannot start anew) and subject to collective reconstruction (we can act upon our situation by rendering it visible). Nonetheless, Knops's confusion is understandable-how is one to know what this process of contestation and reinterpretation looks like, absent some institutional suggestions consistent with the particularity of the history that makes agonism attractive? Political liberalism, modified as I suggested in the last chapter, helps clarify this question. Pluralist agonism requires some shared commitments without which the unavoidably contentious process of disputing hegemonic interpretations will descend into antagonism. Precisely because the clashes of politics are not oriented toward consensus, and precisely because democratic engagement always involves challenges with the potential to become explicitly violent (as all challenges are, at some level, hegemonic contestations), some institutional norms are needed to confine or limit the range of these battles. Agonism proposes that our situated context may provide governing norms that permit the procedures of contestation to occur, without those same norms becoming idealized or acquiring pseudo¬transcendent status. We begin from "our" norms, which contain within them some commitment to fundamental values (liberty/equality), but make the contest over the meaning and implementation of these norms a central aspect of institutional and political debate. Schmittian violence emerges when contestants cannot perceive a commonality sufficient to justify limitations of the tactics employed. But the commonality that permits these shared limits need not hold extra-political status. Put differently, the concern of critics of agonism seems to be that the barrier to violence can only be effective if it is itself uncontaminated by the conflicts it is meant to mediate, or can be sufficiently abstracted from these conflicts as to play a semi-transcendental role. If the boundaries of engagement are recognized as being themselves in play, then they will lack sufficient purchase to restrain politics. Thus the proposed dichotomy: either agonism will collapse into warfare, or agonism presupposes a hidden extra-political claim. Emphasizing the post-foundational elements from which agonism derives helps illustrate why this dichotomy can be plausibly refused. This is why the tum to Rawls (and, to a lesser extent, Habermas) is useful for agonistic democracy. Political liberalism details the way institutional and cultural structures shape and constrain political engagement without demanding an external anchor. Political liberalism is a situated reconstruction of the emergence of the values of liberal democracy and the operation of those values upon citizens. It is only the Rawlsian insistence upon a well-ordered society that makes political liberalism appear as a moralized account of democratic politics rather than a situated and contingent one. As I show in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of the situated norms of liberalism does not, ultimately, depend upon the semi-transcendental status Rawls evokes. That these values are ours historically, and that they shape our identities and aspirations contingently, provides sufficient status to guide political action. Highlighting this contingency and inviting citizen engagement in conflicts over the interpretation and application of these values need not weaken their pragmatic significance. It is only dangerous to expose the contingency of our deeply shared ontopolitical premises if one of those premises suggests that legitimacy must be derived from criteria not subject to human agency. It is on this point that agonism captures better than many theories the central insights of democratic theory. To the extent democracy is identified with individual and collective autonomy from imposed authority, to the extent democracy is identified with individual and collective agency over the terms of social cooperation, and to the extent democracy is identified with the rights of individuals and collectives to challenge these authorities and those terms, an agonistic account of democracy as situated historically while engaged in ongoing reconstruction of the contingent but deeply shared values of liberal democracy represents a powerful vision. It shares with other post-metaphysical theorists, like Habermas and Rawls, an emphasis on the reconstructive aspects of democratic theory, designed to adduce from extant practices and necessary assumptions the best possible description of legitimate democratic politics. But it pushes these reconstructive projects further by demanding that the practices and institutions of democracy itself be engaged in this reconstruction rather than merely governed by it. Agonistic democracy emerged reactively, offered as an alternative vision of liberalism, deliberation, and democratic engagement. The emphasis of this work on critique, practices of identity, contestation of power, exposure of hegemonic interpretations, and so on depict a vision of democracy that is primarily procedural: democracy reflects practices that take place within the existing realm of the political. Agonism thus explicitly situates itself within existing institutional forms, not outside them. Unlike radical democracy, agonistic thinkers propose not a revolution but a reformation, urging that extant democratic resources be strengthened, democratic values reinterpreted, and hegemonic structures exposed and contested. To the extent agonism is transformative, it is transformative from within the horizon of politics from which it emerges. Agonism does not evoke sudden and rapid change in the character of social order. Over time agonism might lead, directly and indirectly, to dramatic reforms to, and even revolutionary redesign of, democratic institutions, but that change is inevitably slow. This makes agonism appear conservative when compared to radical democracy, as radical democracy takes as its goal the near term transformation and elimination of social and economic injustice. Agonism aspires to create a democratic social order that will lead to the amelioration or destruction of injustice, but recognizes that such injustices are embedded in the context of politics within which such work occurs and against which organization, mobilization, and resistance must take place. Agonism does not represent transformation, but it creates democratic conditions out of which real transformation might arise. To claim that liberalism in its Rawlsian variant represents the best path for agonism is not a capitulation to the narratives of liberalism and its inevitable injustices, nor an endorsement of chastened conservatism about social change. It is to recognize that transformative politics begins within existing politics, and that an effective strategy must identify the structures most amenable to that project. Agonism as a political practice demands both the common ontopolitical framework within which conflict can take place and an institutional framework open to this practice. Political liberalism offers both, without also requiring agonism to shed its skepticism about foundational or teleological claims. Agonism presupposes active engagement with the situated character of social life in order to grasp our own circumstances without demanding to be liberated from them. Political liberalism takes these circumstances as the frame from which a governing interpretation of justice emerges; as long as this conception remains open to further reinterpretation (as it can be once severed from the insistence on stability) political liberalism supports agonistic politics. The objections of Mouffe and others can be attributed to Rawls's insistence that the governing interpretation of the political embody an overlapping consensus with deep roots in comprehensive moral doctrines, and which can be invoked to resolve contentious questions of democratic life. But as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the political conception can also be understood as a relatively contingent modus vivendi, subject itself to debate when invoked to resolve conflict. For Rawls an overlapping consensus is necessary to forestall the sort of deeper public debate and passionate engagement that agonistic democrats hope to foster. Understanding the political conception as the negotiated but revisable shared interpretation of liberal democratic principles permits both the channeling of passionate conflict into agonistic engagement and the possibility that the governing interpretation can be itself an object of engagement. In fact, Mouffe makes the same distinction as Rawls between a political conception ("commitment to principles") and substantive moral doctrines, as does Connolly when he describes the practices of contemporary democratic citizenship: They embrace their faith at one level, and recoil back upon it at another to come to terms with the obdurate fact that it does not convince millions of others. Sometimes their own commitment is punctuated with a residual element of uncertainty. That seems noble to me, but perhaps not necessary to deep pluralism. What is needed is pursuit of a bicameral orientation to citizenship and being, in which you embrace your creed as you bring it into the public realm; and then recoil back without deep resentment on its contestability to open up negotiating space with others (Schoolman 2008: 316). The agonistic practice so envisioned is strikingly similar to that proposed by Rawls: citizens hold their own moral doctrines as true and complete, while recognizing that the entrance of this doctrine into the public realm will expose your absolute in its partiality. The bicameralism Connolly describes mirrors the distinction between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception, with the difference that Connolly does not think that faith is incompatible with democratic negotiation. Rawls excludes the metaphysical because it undermines the overlapping consensus, which must be minimal in order to be consensual. An agonistic political liberalism maintains this model without the demand that the passions, ideals, and beliefs of citizens be confined to the private realm. Since the political conception is recognizably partial, understood as hegemonic, and an explicit subject of political engagement, the line between metaphysical and political need not be policed. What the political conception does, once generated, is provide a guiding framework within which democratic conflicts can be engaged openly, where a real possible result of that engagement is a revision of the negotiated interpretation that is the condition of agonistic encounters. Mouffe asserts that "a difficult balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, democracy understood as a set of procedures required to cope with plurality, and, on the other, democracy as the adherence to values which inform a particular mode of coexistence" (1993: 131 ). Political liberalism shorn of the imperative to consensus capture this balance by offering the framework through which democratic societies can manage plurality by articulating a shared understanding of liberal values, while also permitting this articulation to be contested and revised. Agonism thus forestalls the idea that any democratic institution can claim substantive legitimacy for its use of power-any act of government is an act of a particular identity or interest acting upon (not implementing) the collective. There are collectively binding decisions but no collective decisions; the institutional conditions of democratic agonism are much like those described by Dahl's vision of polyarchy, where minorities rule and liberty is preserved by ensuring that no minority comes to dominate in the name of a fictionalized popular identity. Similarly, Connolly envisages a society "made up of intersecting and independent minorities of numerous types and sorts who occupy the same territorial space and who negotiate an ethos of engagement between themselves" (2000: 92). This is the structural argument for an agonistic liberalism-a competitive environment of plural identities and interests will tend to undercut any and all claims to overcome contingency, thus cultivating practices that make visible and contest hegemonic interpretations. If this can happen within an agonistic cultural order, within a shared symbolic framework (liberty/equality), exercised by citizens informed by an ethos of reciprocity and presumptive gratitude (which will, of course, require some material conditions to be maintained), it is likely to maximize inclusion and minimize domination. Under such circumstances the range of emancipatory visions and contested democratic norms is likely to be vast. Since the shared interpretation of common principles that permits agonistic participation is itself subject to the same regular challenge and renegotiation, the mechanism for significant democratic change resides at the heart of agonistic liberalism. And to the extent the experience of living in a society in which peaceful but passionate negotiation and renegotiation of the inherited values that bind people collectively is likely to shape subjectivity, as post-foundational thinkers and Rawlsian liberals all suggest, the possibilities for dramatic transformation to the ontopolitical grounds of that social order increase as citizens come to see both conflict and reciprocity as living norms of political life. There is room in this modus vivendi for radical visions of the future, and room for these visions to transform the temporary hegemony of the political conception of justice. While no political order, liberal or otherwise, can ever attain full transparency, consensus, or inclusion, an institutional commitment to negotiate and renegotiate terms of agreement that are themselves both the condition of further conflict and themselves subjects of this same conflict offers a vision of political life sufficiently capacious to render transformative change conceivable. I began thisbook with a discussion ofpost-foundationalism and its implications for politics. Agonistic democracy, I claimed, offers the account of democratic politics best suited to post-foundational circumstances in which claims to have achieved a stable consensus to guide political action, whether rooted in truth, nature, identity, morality, rationality, or any other extra-contextual criteria, cannot be sustained. I also argued that the justification for democracy, agonistic or otherwise, does not derive from the recognition of post-foundational conditions; like any other hegemonic ideal democracy is a situated product of the history within which its dominant position emerged. That is not to say that convergence on some sort of democratic norms is unlikely, as absent massive coercion or uncommon homogeneity the radical pluralism post-foundationalism tends to provoke is also likely to undermine claims to authority based upon claims of truth. In the case of western societies with liberal democratic histories, however, the convergence of post-foundational pluralism and an historical framework that privileges the values of equality and liberty produces circumstances in which democratic institutions are the unavoidable default for politics. A commitment to liberalism also shapes these historical conditions, so attempts to articulate an appropriate vision of democratic politics that expresses these situated values and embraces a post-foundational account of meaning must also grapple with the powerful role liberalism plays in the interpretation of democratic values in western democracies. These constraints are neither optional nor binding. We find ourselves always already inhabiting a history of meaning, practice, and identity, and these elements of our being are not infinitely malleable. They may be transformed, reinterpreted, and eventually even overcome, but such work begins with recognition of our limitations. Marx, despite his otherwise universalistic commitments, captured these circumstances as clearly anything in Heidegger's work, writing in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that "men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted." The inherited circumstances of western democratic theory include the powerful presence of liberalism, and a viable theory aspiring to deepen democratic possibilities must grapple with this fact. This commitment to dealing with the world as we find it helps explain the recurrent frustration with agonism expressed by more radical critics. Because pluralist agonists focus on the situated possibilities inherent to the hegemonic interpretations and norms already in place and then try to expand these possibilities, they appear to those committed to the complete transformation of contemporary liberalism to be defending the status quo. Tally makes this argument in his review ofMouffe: The most damning critique of On the Political may be that it winds up reinforcing the status quo ... Indeed, Mouffe's agonistic politics does not seem very radical at all. Whenever Mouffe addresses practical matters, she uses the language of adversarial or agonistic politics, but evokes tame and familiar scenes. Mouffe argues for a pluralism that recognizes real differences, but that also ensures that everyone plays by the same rules. "Partisans" who really want to change the political landscape may not be allowed to participate (2007: 7-8). Vazquez-Arroyo (2004) develops a similar critique of Connolly. There are two problems with this critique, and addressing each will help clarify why an agonistic pluralism is best cultivated within liberal institutional bounds. First, the critique underestimates the democratic capacities of liberalism, associating all liberal accounts with a broader indictment of capitalist rationality. Second, the critique fails to account for the situated character of politics, asserting a transformative radicalism that agonism rejects. Often the objection to liberalism offered by radical theorists represents an objection to an idea of liberalism imbricated with existing structures of inequality, a rationalistic account of individual interests, and the problems of global capitalism. Liberalism thus represents a constellation of problems against which democratic advocates position themselves. Dietz identifies this view of liberalism as an abstracted enemy of democracy: "The polemic that afflicts so many current studies of democracy and citizenship is most evident at the level of discourse on liberal ism, where this complex and multifaceted historical phenomenon has become little more than an ideational enemy, or a suspect to be processed and called forth for 'rebuke'" (1998: 116). But liberalism is as complex and pluralistic as any other major account of contemporary politics, and both its theoretical and historical specificity should not be elided. Some aspects of liberal politics contribute to visions of subjectivity that will generate resentment and oppression, but elements within these same theories might also be used to mitigate such pressures. Some versions of liberalism identify closely with capitalism and neo-liberal aspirations, but others endeavor to identify an economic order consistent with liberal values without offering any such privilege to markets or competition. Some versions of liberalism presuppose strong forms of rationality while others are attentive to the variety of ways different identities organize and prioritize their values and actions. There is no single liberalism, and-democratic theory would do well to be attentive to the range of possibilities available within this plurality. Instead, liberalism "in much contemporary democratic theory, particularly post-structural and post¬foundational work, is taken to embody the flaws of modernity generally and thus becomes the flaw that democratic theorizing is intended to overcome" (Dietz 1998: 117). But a theory of democracy that takes historicity seriously cannot reduce liberalism to polemic and the dominant mode of democratic institution to that which is to be overcome. That liberal democracy is in practice and theory flawed is beyond dispute, but if it also lacks any potential to nurture a more democratic and less flawed practice then there is little hope for post-foundational democratic theory. If only a rupture and overcoming can achieve democratic outcomes and democracy will ever be over the horizon of history, a democratic theory of institutions and engagement rather than resistance and aspiration is impossible. I hope to have shown by looking carefully at Rawlsian liberalism as a singular and situated example of a particular and historically viable form of liberalism that the more radical aspirations of democratic theory need not begin and end with the rejection of the dominant interpretation of democracy within and against which political action must engage. Agonistic theory can offer an account of democracy mindful of both the danger and the potential of the liberal hegemony. Agonism does not envision contestation extending "all the way" down, as it were. The ontopolitical foundations of agonistic democracy are contingent and revisable, but they cannot be the constant object of debate. If, as I have tried to argue, a post-foundational politics demands the recognition both of the contingency of foundations and the situated limits to the range of possible meanings found in any particular grounds of the political, then an agonistic politics must also be a bounded politics. Agonism works within historicity in order to expand the constellation of conceivable conflicts, without rejecting the tragic reality that limits to inclusion are endemic to politics. Hegemony can be productive or destructive, democratic or authoritarian, contested or univocal, but hegemony cannot be universal. Post-foundational politics embraces the inevitability of boundaries and limits, and then works to make those boundaries as wide as possible without turning debates into ontological conflicts, conflicts that cannot but be violent as they take place outside the grounds of shared ontopolitical premises. Calling perspectives that accept the contingent liberal principles of democratic politics legitimate may seem dangerous, as it implies that perspectives beyond this consensus are illicit and excluded. And it does so imply. But the language of legitimacy is unavoidable for post-foundational politics. "Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight - even fiercely - but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are accepted as legitimate perspectives" (Mouffe 2005a: 52). The condition of peaceful democratic agonism is a willingness to accept some set of principles, interpretations, or procedures as legitimate, even if that legitimacy is understood as subject to legitimate conflict itself. Pluralist agonism endeavors not to utterly transform the political in order to bring about a new democratic dawn. Instead, it aspires to deepen, extend, and intensify the democratic capacity for contestation and questioning already latent within the situated norms and hegemonic articulations of the political. At some point the confrontation between principles is so vast that the contest must be antagonistic, and enemies simply cannot recognize one another as legitimate. Political liberalism offers a set of principles and practices compatible with the type of "conflictual consensus" agonistic democrats advocate, while also highlighting the historically contingent yet also ontologically powerful status of these same principles. Post-foundationalism dictates democratic theorizing both pay close attention to the ontopolitical grounds of any proposed politics and propose ways to preserve the pluralism that inevitably follows from the recognition of contingency. A theory of agonistic democracy embedded within a modified version of political liberalism can support institutions capable of addressing both imperatives, and the institutions it supports are not remarkably different from those envisioned by liberal theory. The resources necessary for agonistic transformation are present in the political institutions, political culture, and political theory of contemporary democracy. The modified political liberalism proposed in this book is probably not the only institutional possibility for agonistic democracy, but its plausibility demonstrates that institutionalization is neither incompatible with agonistic principles nor impossible to develop within existing social norms. By situating liberalism explicitly within a post-foundational ontology, liberalism is transformed in significant ways and its practices opened up to greater contestation, generosity, and active re-constitution. | 28,296 | <h4>Agonism – The resolution asks a question concerning <u>institutional change </u>that the affirmative ought to answer with an <u>instrumental reform</u> - keeping debate within <u>a limited range</u> fosters <u>agonistic democracy</u> which their interpretation undermines by <u>tearing down the foundations of the political</u> prior to <u>engaging it by understanding the government as an inherent antagonism</u>. They have <u>no offence</u> because agonistic democracy does not require uncritical embrace of hegemonic attitudes or ideologies, the <u>foundations legitimacy can be called into question,</u> but <u>the infrastructure of the resolution cannot be discarded</u><strong> as a starting point </h4><p>Wingenbach, Notre Dame Government and international studies PhD, 2011</p><p></strong>(Ed, Institutionalizing Agoni<u><strong>stic Democracy, pg 190-198)</p><p></u></strong>Third, because Knops ignores the situated source of antagonism and the persistence of hegemony in the construction of meaning he misconceives the problem of subordination and oppression. <u>The <mark>objective of agonistic democracy is not </mark>to <mark>eliminate all </mark>relations of <mark>domination</mark> </u>and oppression;<u> <strong><mark>this </mark>sort of <mark>utopian aspiration leads</mark> precisely <mark>to </mark>the <mark>rationalist exclusions</u></strong></mark> they are at pains to expose. Rather, <u>the <mark>goal is to craft conditions under which </mark>these <mark>relations <strong></mark>can <mark>be made visible,</strong> and <strong></mark>thus <mark>contested</strong>.</u> </mark>The<u> <mark>common values </u></mark>that<u> <mark>make agonism possible</mark>, and their dominant institutional interpretations, inevitably and explicitly favor some identities, interests, or other articulations of subjectivity over other</u>s. In fact, these values and their dominant interpretations act to shape subjectivity so that they are seen not as constructions but simply "the way things are." Because Knops assumes the project of agonism is to eliminate these hegemonic relations of domination, he also assumes that Mouffe needs to establish an unbiased and objective set of criteria by which to identify and ameliorate these injustices. Hence his claim that her theory ultimately must rely on rationalist arguments. But agonism does not share this aspiration. Instead pluralist agonism accepts that the inevitability of injustice is the price of democratic plurality, and endeavors to identify practices that render these injustices amenable to contestation. <u>Agonism hopes to set interpretation against interpretation, identity against identity, hegemonic claim against hegemonic claim, so that in the perpetual conflict between citizens the burden of domination shifts and moves.</u> Where Knops sees unbiased consensus on rational principles eliminating domination, Mouffe sees an elaboration of hegemonic power so thorough as to make the injustices it produces not merely invisible but unthinkable. When Knops concludes that Mouffe's agonism should be seen as an adjunct to deliberation, one that calls attention to "the erroneous projection of one party's understandings onto another, constraining their meanings - it is fraught with the possibility of hegemony" (2007, 125), he is mistakenly subsuming agonism into deliberation by eliding the ontological distinctions between the two accounts. Deliberative democracy has faith that careful scrutiny of arguments, rational evaluation of principles, and deliberation oriented toward understanding will produce an unforced consensus shorn of power, domination, and manipulation. Its reconstruction of democratic principles is one that aspires to transcend the ambiguity of the everyday in order to resolve injustice. It takes this possibility as a real one, because its ontology is fundamentaily committed to the universality of human <u>nature. <mark>Agonistic democrats refuse </mark>any such commitments, asserting instead that the <mark>premises of social life are </mark>themselves <mark>products of humanity, and </mark>that <mark>the ontology within </mark>which <mark>our politics </mark>emerges <mark>is</mark> itself <mark>a product of political assertions</u></mark>. No standard can be found or created that can extract us from this process of meaning creation, and thus all political standards should be understood as both historically constraining (we cannot start anew) and subject to collective reconstruction (we can act upon our situation by rendering it visible). Nonetheless, Knops's confusion is understandable-how is one to know what this process of contestation and reinterpretation looks like, absent some institutional suggestions consistent with the particularity of the history that makes agonism attractive? Political liberalism, modified as I suggested in the last chapter, helps clarify this question. Pluralist agonism requires some shared commitments without which the unavoidably contentious process of disputing hegemonic interpretations will descend into antagonism. Precisely because the clashes of politics are not oriented toward consensus, and precisely because democratic engagement always involves challenges with the potential to become explicitly violent (as all challenges are, at some level, hegemonic contestations), some institutional norms are needed to confine or limit the range of these battles. Agonism proposes that our situated context may provide governing norms that permit the procedures of contestation to occur, without those same norms becoming idealized or acquiring pseudo¬transcendent status. We begin from "our" norms, which contain within them some commitment to fundamental values (liberty/equality), but make the contest over the meaning and implementation of these norms a central aspect of institutional and political debate. Schmittian violence emerges when contestants cannot perceive a commonality sufficient to justify limitations of the tactics employed. But the commonality that permits these shared limits need not hold extra-political status. Put differently, the concern of critics of agonism seems to be that the barrier to violence can only be effective if it is itself uncontaminated by the conflicts it is meant to mediate, or can be sufficiently abstracted from these conflicts as to play a semi-transcendental role. If the boundaries of engagement are recognized as being themselves in play, then they will lack sufficient purchase to restrain politics. Thus the proposed dichotomy: either agonism will collapse into warfare, or agonism presupposes a hidden extra-political claim. Emphasizing the post-foundational elements from which agonism derives helps illustrate why this dichotomy can be plausibly refused. This is why the tum to Rawls (and, to a lesser extent, Habermas) is useful for agonistic democracy. Political liberalism details the way institutional and cultural structures shape and constrain political engagement without demanding an external anchor. Political liberalism is a situated reconstruction of the emergence of the values of liberal democracy and the operation of those values upon citizens. It is only the Rawlsian insistence upon a well-ordered society that makes political liberalism appear as a moralized account of democratic politics rather than a situated and contingent one. As I show in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of the situated norms of liberalism does not, ultimately, depend upon the semi-transcendental status Rawls evokes. That these values are ours historically, and that they shape our identities and aspirations contingently, provides sufficient status to guide political action. <u>Highlighting</u> this <u>contingency</u> <u>and inviting</u> citizen <u>engagement</u> <u>in conflicts over the interpretation</u> and application <u>of</u> these <u>values</u> <u>need not weaken their pragmatic significance</u>. <u>It is only dangerous to expose the contingency of our deeply shared ontopolitical premises if one of those premises suggests that legitimacy must be derived from criteria not subject to human agency.</u> It is on this point that agonism captures better than many theories the central insights of democratic theory. To the extent democracy is identified with individual and collective autonomy from imposed authority, to the extent democracy is identified with individual and collective agency over the terms of social cooperation, and to the extent democracy is identified with the rights of individuals and collectives to challenge these authorities and those terms, an agonistic account of democracy as situated historically while engaged in ongoing reconstruction of the contingent but deeply shared values of liberal democracy represents a powerful vision. It shares with other post-metaphysical theorists, like Habermas and Rawls, an emphasis on the reconstructive aspects of democratic theory, designed to adduce from extant practices and necessary assumptions the best possible description of legitimate democratic politics. But <u>it pushes these reconstructive projects further by demanding that the practices and institutions of democracy itself be engaged in this reconstruction rather than merely governed by it. </u>Agonistic democracy emerged reactively, offered as an alternative vision of liberalism, deliberation, and democratic engagement. The <u>emphasis of this work on critique, practices of identity, contestation of power, exposure of hegemonic interpretations, and so on depict a vision of democracy that is primarily procedural</u>: democracy reflects practices that take place within the existing realm of the political. <u><mark>Agonism</u></mark> thus <u>explicitly <mark>situates </mark>itself <mark>within <strong>existing institutional forms</strong></mark>, not outside them.</u> Unlike radical democracy, <u><strong>agonistic thinkers <mark>propose not </mark>a <mark>revolution but </mark>a <mark>reformation,</u></strong> <u></mark>urging that extant <mark>democratic resources </mark>be strengthened, democratic values <mark>reinterpreted, and <strong>hegemonic structures </mark>exposed and <mark>contested</mark>.</u></strong> To the extent agonism is transformative, it is transformative from within the horizon of politics from which it emerges. Agonism does not evoke sudden and rapid change in the character of social order. <u>Over time agonism might lead, directly and indirectly, to dramatic reforms to, and even revolutionary redesign of, democratic institutions, but that <mark>change is <strong></mark>inevitably <mark>slow</u></strong></mark>. <u>This makes agonism appear conservative when compared to radical democracy, as radical democracy takes as its goal the near term transformation and elimination of social and economic injustice. <mark>Agonism aspires to create a democratic </mark>social <mark>order that will lead to</mark> the amelioration or <strong><mark>destruction of injustice</strong>, but recognizes </mark>that such <mark>injustices </mark>are <mark>embedded in </mark>the context of <mark>politics <strong>within which such </mark>work <mark>occurs</strong></mark> and against which organization, mobilization, and resistance must take place.</u> <u><mark>Agonism</u></mark> does not represent transformation, but it <u><strong><mark>creates democratic conditions out of which </mark>real <mark>transformation might arise.</u></strong></mark> To claim that liberalism in its Rawlsian variant represents the best path for agonism is not a capitulation to the narratives of liberalism and its inevitable injustices, nor an endorsement of chastened conservatism about social change. It is to recognize that transformative politics begins within existing politics, and that an effective strategy must identify the structures most amenable to that project. Agonism as a political practice demands both the common ontopolitical framework within which conflict can take place and an institutional framework open to this practice. Political liberalism offers both, without also requiring agonism to shed its skepticism about foundational or teleological claims. Agonism presupposes active engagement with the situated character of social life in order to grasp our own circumstances without demanding to be liberated from them. Political liberalism takes these circumstances as the frame from which a governing interpretation of justice emerges; as long as this conception remains open to further reinterpretation (as it can be once severed from the insistence on stability) political liberalism supports agonistic politics. The objections of Mouffe and others can be attributed to Rawls's insistence that the governing interpretation of the political embody an overlapping consensus with deep roots in comprehensive moral doctrines, and which can be invoked to resolve contentious questions of democratic life. But as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, <u>the political conception can</u> also be understood as a relatively contingent modus vivendi, <u>subject itself to debate when invoked to resolve conflict.</u> For Rawls an overlapping consensus is necessary to forestall the sort of deeper public debate and passionate engagement that agonistic democrats hope to foster. Understanding the political conception as the negotiated but revisable shared interpretation of liberal democratic principles permits both the channeling of passionate conflict into agonistic engagement and the possibility that the governing interpretation can be itself an object of engagement. In fact, Mouffe makes the same distinction as Rawls between a political conception ("commitment to principles") and substantive moral doctrines, as does Connolly when he describes the practices of contemporary democratic citizenship: They embrace their faith at one level, and recoil back upon it at another to come to terms with the obdurate fact that it does not convince millions of others. Sometimes their own commitment is punctuated with a residual element of uncertainty. That seems noble to me, but perhaps not necessary to deep pluralism. What is needed is pursuit of a bicameral orientation to citizenship and being, in which you embrace your creed as you bring it into the public realm; and then recoil back without deep resentment on its contestability to open up negotiating space with others (Schoolman 2008: 316). The agonistic practice so envisioned is strikingly similar to that proposed by Rawls: citizens hold their own moral doctrines as true and complete, while recognizing that the entrance of this doctrine into the public realm will expose your absolute in its partiality. The bicameralism Connolly describes mirrors the distinction between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception, with the difference that Connolly does not think that faith is incompatible with democratic negotiation. Rawls excludes the metaphysical because it undermines the overlapping consensus, which must be minimal in order to be consensual. An agonistic political liberalism maintains this model without the demand that the passions, ideals, and beliefs of citizens be confined to the private realm. Since the political conception is recognizably partial, understood as hegemonic, and an explicit subject of political engagement, the line between metaphysical and political need not be policed. What the political conception does, once generated, is provide a guiding framework within which democratic conflicts can be engaged openly, where a real possible result of that engagement is a revision of the negotiated interpretation that is the condition of agonistic encounters. Mouffe asserts that "a difficult balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, democracy understood as a set of procedures required to cope with plurality, and, on the other, democracy as the adherence to values which inform a particular mode of coexistence" (1993: 131 ). Political liberalism shorn of the imperative to consensus capture this balance by offering the framework through which democratic societies can manage plurality by articulating a shared understanding of liberal values, while also permitting this articulation to be contested and revised. Agonism thus forestalls the idea that any democratic institution can claim substantive legitimacy for its use of power-any act of government is an act of a particular identity or interest acting upon (not implementing) the collective. There are collectively binding decisions but no collective decisions; the institutional conditions of democratic agonism are much like those described by Dahl's vision of polyarchy, where minorities rule and liberty is preserved by ensuring that no minority comes to dominate in the name of a fictionalized popular identity. Similarly, Connolly envisages a society "made up of intersecting and independent minorities of numerous types and sorts who occupy the same territorial space and who negotiate an ethos of engagement between themselves" (2000: 92). <u><mark>This</mark> is the structural argument for an agonistic liberalism-<strong>a<mark> competitive environment of plural identities </mark>and interests </strong><mark>will </mark>tend to <mark>undercut </mark>any and all <mark>claims to overcome contingency, </mark>thus <strong><mark>cultivating practices that</mark> make visible and <mark>contest hegemonic interpretations</strong>. </mark>If this can happen within an <mark>agonistic</mark> cultural <mark>order, within <strong>a shared symbolic framework</strong></mark> (liberty/equality), exercised by citizens <mark>informed by an <strong>ethos of reciprocity</strong></mark> </u>and presumptive gratitude (which will, of course, require some material conditions to be maintained), it <u><mark>is</mark> likely <mark>to <strong>maximize inclusion </strong>and <strong>minimize domination</u></strong>. </mark>Under such circumstances the range of emancipatory visions and contested democratic norms is likely to be vast. Since the shared interpretation of common principles that permits agonistic participation is itself subject to the same regular challenge and renegotiation, the mechanism for significant democratic change resides at the heart of agonistic liberalism. And to the extent the experience of living in a society in which peaceful but passionate negotiation and renegotiation of the inherited values that bind people collectively is likely to shape subjectivity, as post-foundational thinkers and Rawlsian liberals all suggest, <u>the possibilities for dramatic transformation to the ontopolitical grounds of that social order increase as citizens come to see both conflict and reciprocity as living norms of political life. </u>There is room in this modus vivendi for radical visions of the future, and room for these visions to transform the temporary hegemony of the political conception of justice. While no political order, liberal or otherwise, can ever attain full transparency, consensus, or inclusion, an institutional commitment to negotiate and renegotiate terms of agreement that are themselves both the condition of further conflict and themselves subjects of this same conflict offers a vision of political life sufficiently capacious to render transformative change conceivable. I began thisbook with a discussion ofpost-foundationalism and its implications for politics. Agonistic democracy, I claimed, offers the account of democratic politics best suited to post-foundational circumstances in which claims to have achieved a stable consensus to guide political action, whether rooted in truth, nature, identity, morality, rationality, or any other extra-contextual criteria, cannot be sustained. I also argued that the justification for democracy, agonistic or otherwise, does not derive from the recognition of post-foundational conditions; like any other hegemonic ideal democracy is a situated product of the history within which its dominant position emerged. That is not to say that convergence on some sort of democratic norms is unlikely, as absent massive coercion or uncommon homogeneity the radical pluralism post-foundationalism tends to provoke is also likely to undermine claims to authority based upon claims of truth. In the case of western societies with liberal democratic histories, however, the convergence of post-foundational pluralism and an historical framework that privileges the values of equality and liberty produces circumstances in which democratic institutions are the unavoidable default for politics. A commitment to liberalism also shapes these historical conditions, so attempts to articulate an appropriate vision of democratic politics that expresses these situated values and embraces a post-foundational account of meaning must also grapple with the powerful role liberalism plays in the interpretation of democratic values in western democracies. These constraints are neither optional nor binding. <u>We find ourselves always already inhabiting a history of meaning, practice, and identity, and these elements of our being are not infinitely malleable. They may be transformed, reinterpreted, and eventually even overcome</u>, but such work begins with recognition of our limitations. Marx, despite his otherwise universalistic commitments, captured these circumstances as clearly anything in Heidegger's work, writing in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that "men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted." The inherited circumstances of western democratic theory include the powerful presence of liberalism, and a viable theory aspiring to deepen democratic possibilities must grapple with this fact. This commitment to dealing with the world as we find it helps explain the recurrent frustration with agonism expressed by more radical critics. Because pluralist agonists focus on the situated possibilities inherent to the hegemonic interpretations and norms already in place and then try to expand these possibilities, they appear to those committed to the complete transformation of contemporary liberalism to be defending the status quo. Tally makes this argument in his review ofMouffe: The most damning critique of On the Political may be that it winds up reinforcing the status quo ... Indeed, Mouffe's agonistic politics does not seem very radical at all. Whenever Mouffe addresses practical matters, she uses the language of adversarial or agonistic politics, but evokes tame and familiar scenes. Mouffe argues for a pluralism that recognizes real differences, but that also ensures that everyone plays by the same rules. "Partisans" who really want to change the political landscape may not be allowed to participate (2007: 7-8). Vazquez-Arroyo (2004) develops a similar critique of Connolly. There are two problems with this critique, and addressing each will help clarify why an agonistic pluralism is best cultivated within liberal institutional bounds. First, the critique underestimates the democratic capacities of liberalism, associating all liberal accounts with a broader indictment of capitalist rationality. Second, the critique fails to account for the situated character of politics, asserting a transformative radicalism that agonism rejects. Often the objection to <u><mark>liberalism </mark>offered by radical theorists <mark>represents an objection to</mark> an idea of liberalism imbricated with <mark>existing structures</mark> of inequality</u>, <u>a rationalistic account of individual interests</u>, and the problems of global capitalism. Liberalism thus represents a constellation of problems against which democratic advocates position themselves. Dietz identifies this view of liberalism as an abstracted enemy of democracy: "The polemic that afflicts so many current studies of democracy and citizenship is most evident at the level of discourse on liberal ism, where this complex and multifaceted historical phenomenon has become little more than an ideational enemy, or a suspect to be processed and called forth for 'rebuke'" (1998: 116). But liberalism is as complex and pluralistic as any other major account of contemporary politics, and both its theoretical and historical specificity should not be elided. <u>Some aspects of <mark>liberal politics contribute </mark>to <mark>visions of subjectivity that</mark> will <mark>generate</mark> resentment and <mark>oppression</u>, <u>but </mark>elements within these same theories might also be used to <strong><mark>mitigate such</mark> pressures</u></strong>. <u>Some versions of <mark>liberalism</mark> identify closely with capitalism and <strong>neo-liberal aspirations</strong>, but others endeavor to <mark>identify <strong>an economic order consistent with liberal values</strong> <strong>without offering </mark>any such <mark>privilege to markets</mark> or competition.</strong> </u>Some versions of liberalism presuppose strong forms of rationality while others are attentive to the variety of ways different identities organize and prioritize their values and actions. There is no single liberalism, and-democratic theory would do well to be attentive to the range of possibilities available within this plurality. Instead, liberalism "in much contemporary democratic theory, particularly post-structural and post¬foundational work, is taken to embody the flaws of modernity generally and thus becomes the flaw that democratic theorizing is intended to overcome" (Dietz 1998: 117). But a theory of democracy that takes historicity seriously cannot reduce liberalism to polemic and the dominant mode of democratic institution to that which is to be overcome. That liberal democracy is in practice and theory flawed is beyond dispute, but if it also lacks any potential to nurture a more democratic and less flawed practice then there is little hope for post-foundational democratic theory. <u><mark>If only a rupture</mark> and overcoming <mark>can achieve democratic outcomes </mark>and democracy <strong>will ever be over the horizon of history</strong>, <mark>a democratic theory of <strong>institutions</strong> and <strong>engagement</strong> rather than</u> <u><strong>resistance</u></strong> <u></mark>and<strong> aspiration <mark>is impossible</u></strong></mark>. I hope to have shown by looking carefully at Rawlsian liberalism as a singular and situated example of a particular and historically viable form of liberalism that the more <u>radical <mark>aspirations of </mark>democratic <mark>theory need not begin</mark> and end <mark>with </mark>the <strong><mark>rejection</strong> of </mark>the dominant interpretation of<mark> democracy <strong>within </mark>and against <mark>which political action must engage. </strong>Agonistic theory can </mark>offer an <mark>account </mark>of <mark>democracy mindful of </mark>both <mark>the danger and the potential </mark>of the liberal hegemony. </u>Agonism does not envision contestation extending "all the way" down, as it were. <u>The <mark>ontopolitical foundations of agonistic democracy are <strong>contingent and revisable</u></strong>, <u><strong>but </mark>they <mark>cannot be </mark>the <mark>constant object of debate</u></strong>.</mark> <u>If</u><mark>,</mark> as I have tried to argue, <u>a</u> <u>post-foundational politics demands the recognition both of the contingency of foundations and the situated limits to the range of possible meanings found in any particular grounds of the political</u>, <u><strong>then an <mark>agonistic politics must </mark>also<mark> be a bounded </mark>politics.</u></strong> <u><mark>Agonism works</mark> within historicity in order to expand the constellation of conceivable conflicts, <mark>without <strong>rejecting </mark>the <mark>tragic reality that limits to inclusion are endemic </mark>to politics</u></strong>. <u>Hegemony can be productive or destructive,</u> democratic or authoritarian, contested or univocal, <u>but hegemony cannot be universal.</u> <u><mark>Post-foundational politics <strong>embraces </mark>the <mark>inevitability of boundaries and limits</u></strong>, <u>and</u></mark> then <u><mark>works to make those </mark>boundaries as <mark>wide as possible without turning debates into <strong>ontological conflicts</u></strong></mark>, conflicts <u>that cannot but be violent as they take place outside the grounds of shared ontopolitical premises</u>.<u> Calling perspectives that accept the contingent liberal principles of democratic politics legitimate may seem dangerous, as it implies that perspectives beyond this consensus are illicit and excluded.</u> And it does so imply. But the language of legitimacy is unavoidable for post-foundational politics. "Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. <u>Adversaries do fight</u> - even <u><strong>fiercely</u></strong> - but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are accepted as legitimate perspectives" (Mouffe 2005a: 52). The condition of peaceful democratic <u><mark>agonism is a</u></mark> <u><mark>willingness to accept some </mark>set of principles, <mark>interpretations</mark>, or procedures <mark>as legitimate, even if </mark>that <mark>legitimacy is understood as subject to legitimate conflict itself</mark>.</u> Pluralist agonism endeavors not to utterly transform the political in order to bring about a new democratic dawn. Instead, it aspires to deepen, extend, and intensify the democratic capacity for contestation and questioning already latent within the situated norms and hegemonic articulations of the political. <u>At some point the confrontation between principles is so vast that <strong>the contest must be antagonistic</u></strong>, and enemies simply cannot recognize one another as legitimate.<u> Political liberalism offers a set of principles and practices compatible with the type of "conflictual consensus" agonistic democrats advocate, while also highlighting the historically contingent yet also ontologically powerful status of these same principles. </u>Post-foundationalism dictates democratic theorizing both pay close attention to the ontopolitical grounds of any proposed politics and propose ways to preserve the pluralism that inevitably follows from the recognition of contingency. <u>A theory of agonistic democracy embedded within a modified version of political liberalism can support institutions capable of addressing both imperatives</u>, <u>and the institutions it supports are not</u> remarkably <u>different from those envisioned by liberal theory</u>. The resources necessary for agonistic transformation are present in the political institutions, political culture, and political theory of contemporary democracy<u>. The modified political liberalism proposed in this book is probably not the only institutional possibility for agonistic democracy, but its plausibility demonstrates that institutionalization is neither incompatible with agonistic principles nor impossible to develop within existing social norms. <mark>By situating liberalism </mark>explicitly <mark>within <strong>a post-foundational ontology</strong>,</u> <u>liberalism is transformed</mark> in significant ways <mark>and its practices opened </mark>up <mark>to</mark> <strong>greater contestation</strong>, <strong>generosity</strong>, and <strong><mark>active re-constitution</mark>. </p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | 1 | null | 74,337 | 159 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,426 | Trump doesn’t have support of NAFTA repeal now | Wallach 1-5 | Wallach 1-5 | , Accessed 2-3
there are terms that Democrats oppose Republicans view NAFTA renegotiation as a way to extend one of NAFTA’s most protectionist elements the Obama administration could never build a majority to pass the TPP — a deal based on the NAFTA model. Almost every congressional Democrat and a significant minority of the GOP opposed it. Renegotiating NAFTA to remedy the issues that united those congressional TPP opponents is Trump’s path to enacting his promised NAFTA fix That means not trying to satisfy the majority of congressional Republicans who support It also means not alienating the large bloc of congressional Democrats who have long demanded a new trade pact model if Trump really wants trade deals that are better for working people, he will have to work with Democrats | there are terms that Democrats oppose Republicans view NAFTA as a way to extend protectionist elements TPP Almost every congressional Democrat and a significant minority of the GOP opposed it Trump’s path means not trying to satisfy the majority of congressional Republicans if Trump really wants trade deals that are better for working people, he will have to work with Democrats | Lori is the director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. She has testified on NAFTA, WTO, and other globalization issues before 30 U.S. congressional committees, 2017, “Trump will need Democrats' help to rework NAFTA”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/312796-trump-will-need-democrats-help-to-rework-nafta, Accessed 2-3
Next, there are terms that Democrats oppose that must not be added. Congressional Republicans view NAFTA renegotiation as a way to extend one of NAFTA’s most protectionist elements — limits on competition that bring down medicine prices for consumers. They want to implement the intellectual property protections for the pharmaceutical industry found in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that are more extreme than those in NAFTA. Trade agreements should not require countries to enact monopolistic “rent-seeking” protections for specific industries. Nor should they undermine governments’ ability to negotiate prices with pharmaceutical firms, as the TPP did. But even if Trump disagrees, as a policy matter, to enact a NAFTA renegotiation, eliminating the existing medicine-price-gouging terms in NAFTA will be essential. Adding more of the same would be fatal. That is the lesson of the TPP’s demise. Since its February 2016 signing, the Obama administration could never build a majority to pass the TPP — a deal based on the NAFTA model. Almost every congressional Democrat and a significant minority of the GOP opposed it. Renegotiating NAFTA to remedy the issues that united those congressional TPP opponents is Trump’s path to enacting his promised NAFTA fix. That means not trying to satisfy the majority of congressional Republicans who support the investor, procurement and other terms generating the NAFTA damage Trump has spotlighted. It also means not alienating the large bloc of congressional Democrats who have long demanded a new trade pact model that harvests the benefits of expanded trade without incentivizing the offshoring of U.S. jobs and tax dollars, the undermining of U.S. wages and the undermining of consumer and environmental protections. Vice President Biden’s former Chief Economist Jared Bernstein and I published an overview of that alternative approach. The bottom line — if Trump really wants trade deals that are better for working people, he will have to work with Democrats to get there. | 2,389 | <h4><strong>Trump doesn’t have support of NAFTA repeal now</h4><p>Wallach 1-5</p><p></strong>Lori is the director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. She has testified on NAFTA, WTO, and other globalization issues before 30 U.S. congressional committees, 2017, “Trump will need Democrats' help to rework NAFTA”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/312796-trump-will-need-democrats-help-to-rework-nafta<u><strong>, Accessed 2-3</p><p></u></strong>Next, <u><mark>there are terms that Democrats oppose</u></mark> that must not be added. Congressional <u><mark>Republicans view NAFTA</mark> renegotiation <mark>as a way to</mark> <mark>extend</mark> one of NAFTA’s most <mark>protectionist elements</u></mark> — limits on competition that bring down medicine prices for consumers. They want to implement the intellectual property protections for the pharmaceutical industry found in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that are more extreme than those in NAFTA. Trade agreements should not require countries to enact monopolistic “rent-seeking” protections for specific industries. Nor should they undermine governments’ ability to negotiate prices with pharmaceutical firms, as the TPP did. But even if Trump disagrees, as a policy matter, to enact a NAFTA renegotiation, eliminating the existing medicine-price-gouging terms in NAFTA will be essential. Adding more of the same would be fatal. That is the lesson of the TPP’s demise. Since its February 2016 signing,<u> the Obama administration could never build a majority to pass the <mark>TPP</mark> — a deal based on the <strong>NAFTA model</strong>. <mark>Almost every congressional Democrat and a significant minority of the GOP opposed it</mark>.</u> <u>Renegotiating NAFTA to remedy the issues that united those congressional TPP opponents is <mark>Trump’s path</mark> to enacting his promised NAFTA fix</u>. <u>That <mark>means not trying to satisfy the majority of congressional</mark> <mark>Republicans</mark> who support</u> the investor, procurement and other terms generating the NAFTA damage Trump has spotlighted. <u>It also means not alienating the large bloc of congressional Democrats who have long demanded a new trade pact model</u> that harvests the benefits of expanded trade without incentivizing the offshoring of U.S. jobs and tax dollars, the undermining of U.S. wages and the undermining of consumer and environmental protections. Vice President Biden’s former Chief Economist Jared Bernstein and I published an overview of that alternative approach. The bottom line — <u><strong><mark>if Trump really wants trade deals that are better for working people, he will have to work with Democrats</u></mark> to get there.</p></strong> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 1 | 1,524,116 | 3 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,427 | The US spread using aid under the banner of neoliberalism | Guoyou, 16 | Guoyou, 16
(Song Guoyou, director of the Center for Economic Diplomacy at Fudan University, “IMF doubts prove neoliberal model is not inevitable”, Global Times, 6/15/16, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/988391.shtml) | A recently released report by IMF researchers reevaluated the organization's long-advocated neoliberalism and its global impact and came to disquieting conclusions." The report's authors stated they believe that the benefits of some IMF policies seem difficult to establish the costs in terms of increased inequality are prominent which in turn hurts the level and sustainability of growth." The conclusions contradict neoliberals' long-held maxim that neoliberalism is the best recipe for economic prosperity after a broad range of countries have been instilled with the notion that neoliberalism is the only option for boosting their economies Neoliberalism emphasizes privatization This economic ideology particularly stresses the free flow of capital across the globe so as to allegedly better allocate resources and advance economic development there are consequences of capital account liberalization the most problematic of which is that it exacerbates income inequality a tendency that has been demonstrated at both the national and international level On the national level, capital gains even further widening the income gap between rich and poor people domestic inequality has persisted as a serious social problem Powerful examples of fighting inequality include the French which arose out of protests against the country's proposed labor reforms and the protest in the US On the international level the gap between rich countries and poorer ones is also growing as the least developed countries' proportion of global GDP has continued to decrease as trade and financial conditions deteriorate developing countries are confronted with greater difficulties in overcoming the middle-income trap to become high-income economies neoliberalism has focused on enhancing the efficiency of capital allocation but has overlooked the distributional effects Unbalanced distribution has deprived the majority of people of the sense of accomplishment from economic development while ultimately hindering economic progress itself Even the US capital gains have realized maximum profits by riding the wave of neoliberalism The US and some others have pushed neoliberalism because capital gain is in these countries' interest and abundant capital from the US and other developed countries comes in the form of various multinational corporations Lifting cross-border capital controls is essentially equal to removing necessary restrictions on multinational corporations from the US and other developed countries the government must act to defend itself and maintain domestic economic order But under the principles of neoliberalism, developing economies are not encouraged or allowed to execute regulation of capital flows but are required to advocate the abolition of government intervention the US' abundant capital and strong government influence helps sustain its leadership in the global system despite the in the term The US and others have adopted a series of deterrents to promote neoliberalism the US has offered more economic aid and has further opened its domestic market to those that follow neoliberalism But those countries that do otherwise have their products blocked from entering the US domestic market or receive reduced foreign direct investment The US has also made accepting neoliberalism a major condition for the dispersal of aid to countries and regions in financial or economic crisis As a result of this assiduous promotion by the US and some other countries or are viewed as a threat to the US or even are labeled as challengers of world order The IMF report has sent out clear signals that neoliberalism hasn't achieved the ideal results it is widely thought to have Governments and relevant scholars should take note and break the pattern by realizing that neoliberalism is only one of many economic development models regardless of whether those measures are neoliberal Neoliberalism is optional | IMF researchers reevaluated the organization's long-advocated neoliberalism they believe the benefits of some IMF policies seem difficult to establish the costs of increased inequality are prominent This ideology stresses the free flow of capital across the globe there are consequences of liberalization On the international level, the gap between rich countries and poorer ones is growing developing countries are confronted with greater difficulties in overcoming the middle-income trap neoliberalism has focused on enhancing the efficiency of capital allocation under the principles of neoliberalism, developing economies are not encouraged or allowed to execute regulation of capital flows The IMF report has sent out clear signals that neoliberalism hasn't achieved ideal results | A recently released report by IMF researchers reevaluated the organization's long-advocated neoliberalism and its global impact and came to "disquieting conclusions." The report's authors stated they believe that the benefits of some IMF policies, including removing restrictions on capital movement across borders, "seem fairly difficult to establish," while "the costs in terms of increased inequality are prominent, which in turn hurts the level and sustainability of growth." The conclusions contradict neoliberals' long-held maxim that neoliberalism is the best recipe for economic prosperity after a broad range of countries have been instilled with the notion that neoliberalism is the only option for boosting their economies. Neoliberalism emphasizes privatization, deregulation and opening domestic markets to foreign competition. This economic ideology particularly stresses the free flow of capital across the globe so as to allegedly better allocate resources and advance economic development. However, there are consequences of capital account liberalization, the most problematic of which is that it exacerbates income inequality, a tendency that has been demonstrated at both the national and international level. On the national level, capital gains have far exceeded earned income from labor, even further widening the income gap between rich and poor people. Even in developed economies, domestic inequality has persisted as a serious social problem. Powerful examples of fighting inequality include the French "Nuit Debout" social movement, which arose out of protests against the country's proposed labor reforms, and the "Occupy Wall Street" protest in the US, which is against social and economic inequality worldwide. On the international level, the gap between rich countries and poorer ones is also growing, as the least developed countries' proportion of global GDP has continued to decrease as trade and financial conditions deteriorate. Meanwhile, developing countries are confronted with greater difficulties in overcoming the middle-income trap to become high-income economies. Ultimately, neoliberalism has focused on enhancing the efficiency of capital allocation but has overlooked the distributional effects. Unbalanced distribution has deprived the majority of people of the sense of accomplishment from economic development while ultimately hindering economic progress itself. Even the US, a country that has spared no efforts to push for neoliberalism, has gone through a financial crisis and hasn't been able to achieve robust economic growth in a long while. Meanwhile, capital gains have realized maximum profits by riding the wave of neoliberalism. The US and some others have pushed neoliberalism because capital gain is in these countries' interest, and abundant capital from the US and other developed countries comes in the form of various multinational corporations. Lifting cross-border capital controls is essentially equal to removing necessary restrictions on multinational corporations from the US and other developed countries. When a country's domestic economic system cannot withstand attacks from cross-border capital, the government must act to defend itself and maintain domestic economic order. But under the principles of neoliberalism, developing economies are not encouraged or allowed to execute effective guidance and regulation of capital flows, but are required to advocate the abolition of government intervention. In addition, the US' abundant capital and strong government influence helps sustain its leadership in the global system. Ironically, despite the "liberal" in the term "neoliberal," it's doubtful whether a country can freely choose to adopt neoliberal policies. The US and others have adopted a series of deterrents to promote neoliberalism. For instance, the US has offered more economic aid and has further opened its domestic market to those that follow neoliberalism. But those countries that do otherwise have their products blocked from entering the US domestic market or receive reduced foreign direct investment. The US has also made accepting neoliberalism a major condition for the dispersal of aid to countries and regions in financial or economic crisis, forcefully demanding that they reform in accordance with neoliberal policies. As a result of this assiduous promotion by the US and some other countries, neoliberalism seems to have enjoyed unprecedented success in establishing prosperous economic development models, and has received enormous respect from many countries. Those who haven't followed neoliberal plans and have sought alternative development paths are usually deemed wrong, or are viewed as a threat to the US, or even are labeled as challengers of world order. The IMF report has sent out clear signals that neoliberalism hasn't achieved the ideal results it is widely thought to have. Governments and relevant scholars should take note and break the pattern by realizing that neoliberalism is only one of many economic development models. Each country should reflect on its own situation and phase of development and should take viable measures to advance economic growth, regardless of whether those measures are neoliberal, non-neoliberal or even anti-neoliberal. Neoliberalism is optional, not inevitable. | 5,323 | <h4>The US spread using aid under the banner of neoliberalism </h4><p><strong>Guoyou, 16</strong> </p><p>(Song Guoyou, director of the Center for Economic Diplomacy at Fudan University, “IMF doubts prove neoliberal model is not inevitable”, Global Times, 6/15/16, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/988391.shtml)</p><p><u>A recently released report by <mark>IMF researchers reevaluated the organization's long-advocated neoliberalism</mark> and its global impact and came to </u>"<u>disquieting conclusions." The report's authors stated <mark>they believe</mark> that <mark>the benefits of some IMF policies</u></mark>, including removing restrictions on capital movement across borders, "<u><mark>seem</u></mark> fairly <u><mark>difficult to establish</u></mark>," while "<u><mark>the costs</mark> in terms <mark>of increased inequality are prominent</u></mark>, <u>which in turn hurts the level and sustainability of growth." The conclusions contradict neoliberals' long-held maxim that neoliberalism is the best recipe for economic prosperity after a broad range of countries have been instilled with the notion that neoliberalism is the only option for boosting their economies</u>. <u>Neoliberalism emphasizes privatization</u>, deregulation and opening domestic markets to foreign competition. <u><mark>This</mark> economic <mark>ideology</mark> particularly <mark>stresses the free flow of capital across the globe</mark> so as to allegedly better allocate resources and advance economic development</u>. However, <u><mark>there are consequences of </mark>capital account <mark>liberalization</u></mark>, <u>the most problematic of which is that it exacerbates income inequality</u>, <u>a tendency that has been demonstrated at both the national and international level</u>. <u>On the national level, capital gains</u> have far exceeded earned income from labor, <u>even further widening the income gap between rich and poor people</u>. Even in developed economies, <u>domestic inequality has persisted as a serious social problem</u>. <u>Powerful examples of fighting inequality include the French </u>"Nuit Debout" social movement, <u>which arose out of protests against the country's proposed labor reforms</u>, <u>and the </u>"Occupy Wall Street" <u>protest in the US</u>, which is against social and economic inequality worldwide. <u><mark>On the international level</u>, <u>the gap between rich countries and poorer ones is</mark> also <mark>growing</u></mark>, <u>as the least developed countries' proportion of global GDP has continued to decrease as trade and financial conditions deteriorate</u>. Meanwhile, <u><mark>developing countries are confronted with greater difficulties in overcoming the middle-income trap</mark> to become high-income economies</u>. Ultimately, <u><mark>neoliberalism has focused on enhancing the efficiency of capital allocation</mark> but has overlooked the distributional effects</u>. <u>Unbalanced distribution has deprived the majority of people of the sense of accomplishment from economic development while ultimately hindering economic progress itself</u>. <u>Even the US</u>, a country that has spared no efforts to push for neoliberalism, has gone through a financial crisis and hasn't been able to achieve robust economic growth in a long while. Meanwhile, <u>capital gains have realized maximum profits by riding the wave of neoliberalism</u>. <u>The US and some others have pushed neoliberalism because capital gain is in these countries' interest</u>, <u>and abundant capital from the US and other developed countries comes in the form of various multinational corporations</u>. <u>Lifting cross-border capital controls is essentially equal to removing necessary restrictions on multinational corporations from the US and other developed countries</u>. When a country's domestic economic system cannot withstand attacks from cross-border capital, <u>the government must act to defend itself and maintain domestic economic order</u>. <u>But <mark>under the principles of neoliberalism, developing economies are not encouraged or allowed to execute</u></mark> effective guidance and <u><mark>regulation of capital flows</u></mark>, <u>but are required to advocate the abolition of government intervention</u>. In addition, <u>the US' abundant capital and strong government influence helps sustain its leadership in the global system</u>. Ironically, <u>despite the </u>"liberal" <u>in the term </u>"neoliberal," it's doubtful whether a country can freely choose to adopt neoliberal policies. <u>The US and others have adopted a series of deterrents to promote neoliberalism</u>. For instance, <u>the US has offered more economic aid and has further opened its domestic market to those that follow neoliberalism</u>. <u>But those countries that do otherwise have their products blocked from entering the US domestic market or receive reduced foreign direct investment</u>. <u>The US has also made accepting neoliberalism a major condition for the dispersal of aid to countries and regions in financial or economic crisis</u>, forcefully demanding that they reform in accordance with neoliberal policies. <u>As a result of this assiduous promotion by the US and some other countries</u>, neoliberalism seems to have enjoyed unprecedented success in establishing prosperous economic development models, and has received enormous respect from many countries. Those who haven't followed neoliberal plans and have sought alternative development paths are usually deemed wrong, <u>or are viewed as a threat to the US</u>, <u>or even are labeled as challengers of world order</u>. <u><mark>The IMF report has sent out clear signals that neoliberalism hasn't achieved</mark> the <mark>ideal results</mark> it is widely thought to have</u>. <u>Governments and relevant scholars should take note and break the pattern by realizing that neoliberalism is only one of many economic development models</u>. Each country should reflect on its own situation and phase of development and should take viable measures to advance economic growth, <u>regardless of whether those measures are neoliberal</u>, non-neoliberal or even anti-neoliberal. <u>Neoliberalism is optional</u>, not inevitable.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 180,971 | 8 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,428 | They have double turned themselves—they are an act of whiteness because they say their way is only right and doesn’t allow us to tackle issues | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They have double turned themselves—they are an act of whiteness because they say their way is only right and doesn’t allow us to tackle issues</h4> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 1,560,819 | 1 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,429 | ASEAN dialogue and realist agreement key to solve US-China maritime disputes—US policy can’t | Wanandi 3-10 | Jusuf Wanandi 3-10, vice chair of the Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, “Insight: Trust ASEAN to solve South China Sea dispute”, Jakarta Post, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/10/insight-trust-asean-solve-south-china-sea-dispute.html, Accessed 9-23 | ASEAN consists of individual state members that strongly uphold the principle of sovereignty. ASEAN state members take collective action on issues of international or regional interest only if they can come to an agreement as a group ASEAN is not a supra-national entity External powers, including the US, consider ASEAN the center of the region ASEAN meetings, such as the recent ASEAN-US summit should not try to make ASEAN a united front against any other country in this case against China on the South China Sea issue It is not up to external powers to decide how the countries in Southeast Asia should manage their relations with China Other members of ASEAN may take a different approach to their foreign policy, and that is their choice, in accordance with their sovereign rights On the South China Sea, ASEAN should remain a united front by holding regular dialogue through which each member state can convey its stance and policies, while at the same time maintaining understanding and cooperation with China ASEAN states fully realize the difficulty of maintaining a united fron ASEAN states recognize that their efforts may have limited outcomes Although , it is in the interests of all ASEAN member states to establish a regional order in the South China Sea for peace and development in Southeast Asia in general some countries may consider ASEAN actions too slow, but that is part of the ASEAN character the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ASEAN and China are also currently engaged in dialogue to discuss the formulation of a code of conduct with some commonalities or principles of approach already agreed. We can use these accomplishments as a base for further efforts China and most ASEAN members can get their act together to quicken the process It is time to trust ASEAN | ASEAN is not a supra-national entity the US, consider ASEAN the center of the region on the South China Sea issue It is not up to external powers to decide ASEAN may take a different approach to their foreign policy ASEAN should remain a united front by holding regular dialogue through which each member state can convey its stance and policies, while at the same time maintaining understanding and cooperation with China states fully realize the difficulty of maintaining a united front it is in the interests of all ASEAN member states to establish a regional order China and most ASEAN members can get their act together to quicken the process | As an expert on the subject, Emmerson should understand that ASEAN consists of individual state members that strongly uphold the principle of sovereignty. ASEAN state members take collective action on issues of international or regional interest only if they can come to an agreement as a group. That is why ASEAN is not a supra-national entity. External powers, including the US, consider ASEAN the center of the region. Nonetheless, ASEAN+1 meetings, such as the recent ASEAN-US summit in Sunnylands, should not try to make ASEAN a united front against any other country ' in this case against China on the South China Sea issue. It is not up to external powers to decide how the countries in Southeast Asia should manage their relations with China. I, for one, believe that Indonesia can manage its foreign relations well as a sovereign country, as it has done so for decades since independence. Other members of ASEAN may take a different approach to their foreign policy, and that is their choice, in accordance with their sovereign rights. On the South China Sea, ASEAN should remain a united front by holding regular dialogue through which each member state can convey its stance and policies, while at the same time maintaining understanding and cooperation with China. ASEAN states fully realize the difficulty of maintaining a united front, as only four are claimant states. In this regard, ASEAN states recognize that their efforts may have limited outcomes. Although facing difficulties, it is in the interests of all ASEAN member states to establish a regional order in the South China Sea for peace and development in Southeast Asia in general. In accordance with the ASEAN 'way', some countries may consider ASEAN actions too slow, but that is part of the ASEAN character. Remember, it took ASEAN nine years to host its first summit, in Bali in 1976. I strongly advocate the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). ASEAN and China are also currently engaged in dialogue to discuss the formulation of a code of conduct (COC), with some commonalities or principles of approach already agreed. We can use these accomplishments as a base for further efforts. I believe that both China and most ASEAN members can get their act together to quicken the process. It is time for all stakeholders and interested parties to trust ASEAN. | 2,396 | <h4>ASEAN dialogue and realist agreement key to solve US-China maritime disputes—US policy can’t</h4><p>Jusuf <strong>Wanandi 3-10</strong>, vice chair of the Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, “Insight: Trust ASEAN to solve South China Sea dispute”, Jakarta Post, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/10/insight-trust-asean-solve-south-china-sea-dispute.html, Accessed 9-23</p><p>As an expert on the subject, Emmerson should understand that <u>ASEAN consists of individual state members that strongly uphold the principle of sovereignty. ASEAN state members take collective action on issues of international or regional interest only if they can come to an agreement as a group</u>. That is why <u><strong><mark>ASEAN is not a supra-national entity</u></strong></mark>. <u>External powers, including <mark>the US, consider ASEAN the center of the region</u></mark>. Nonetheless, <u>ASEAN</u>+1 <u>meetings, such as the recent ASEAN-US summit</u> in Sunnylands, <u>should not try to make ASEAN a united front against any other country</u> ' <u>in this case against China <mark>on the South China Sea issue</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It is not up to external powers to decide</mark> how the countries in Southeast Asia should manage their relations with China</u></strong>. I, for one, believe that Indonesia can manage its foreign relations well as a sovereign country, as it has done so for decades since independence. <u>Other members of <mark>ASEAN may take a different approach to their foreign policy</mark>, and that is their choice, in accordance with their sovereign rights</u>. <u><strong>On the South China Sea, <mark>ASEAN should remain a united front by holding regular dialogue through</mark> <mark>which each member state can convey its stance and policies, while at the same time maintaining understanding and cooperation with China</u></strong></mark>. <u>ASEAN <mark>states fully realize the difficulty of maintaining a united fron</u>t</mark>, as only four are claimant states. In this regard, <u>ASEAN states recognize that their efforts may have limited outcomes</u>. <u>Although</u> facing difficulties<u><strong>, <mark>it is in the interests of all ASEAN member states to establish a regional order</mark> in the South China Sea for peace and development in Southeast Asia in general</u></strong>. In accordance with the ASEAN 'way', <u>some countries may consider ASEAN actions too slow, but that is part of the ASEAN character</u>. Remember, it took ASEAN nine years to host its first summit, in Bali in 1976. I strongly advocate <u>the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</u> (DOC). <u>ASEAN and China are also currently engaged in dialogue to discuss the formulation of a code of conduct</u> (COC), <u>with some commonalities or principles of approach already agreed. We can use these accomplishments as a base for <strong>further efforts</u></strong>. I believe that both <u><strong><mark>China and most ASEAN members can get their act together to quicken the process</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is time</u> for all stakeholders and interested parties <u>to trust ASEAN</u>. </p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 4 | 1,560,820 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,430 | Overlimiting is good – this topic is enormous and needs checks on what is T – less affs ensure richer and deeper research on DAs and CPs which fosters more in-depth debates | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Overlimiting is good – this topic is <u>enormous</u> and needs checks on what is T – less affs ensure richer and deeper research on DAs and CPs which <u>fosters more in-depth debates</u> </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,821 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,431 | Snowball – plan forces democrats to cave to Trump on the plan, which signals his strategies are effective – emboldens the GOP and enables their agenda | Marín and Aristizabal 2016 | Marín and Aristizabal, 2016 12-20
(Adanjesus Marín and Natalia Aristizabal are, respectively, the Pennsylvania State Director and organizer of Make the Road Action, a grassroots immigrant organization, Senate Republicans Were Wrong To Block Obama, But Senate Democrats Are Right To Block Trump, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/center-for-community-change-action/senate-republicans-were-w_b_13745176.html) | while it may feel uncomfortable to follow the same strategy one opposed so vocally there is a strong moral case for obstruction the threats from the incoming Trump administration are qualitatively greater than those of any recent major party nominee there is a moral imperative to stop this reckless agenda Democrats must stand with the most vulnerable people in our society when they are under attack. If Democrats cave on anything they will be handing legitimacy to a Trump administration that will use that political capital to double-down on attacking immigrants Muslims, and people of color. Trump’s winning formula thus far has been precisely that: a combination of misguided economic populism with white nationalist appeals There is no responsible way to negotiate with such an administration blocking Trump at every turn is sound strategy. The only reason that Democrats may give in to working with the Trump administration is that progressives tend to believe that government can work But if Democrats cede ground and allow Trump to proceed with his agend they will be further vindicating the Republican strategy obstruct long enough Republicans will say and eventually Democrats will fold because they are unwilling to bargain as hard as we are. Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business Democrats in Congress cannot responsibly engage in deal-making with the Trump administration. Only once Democrats in Congress have passed this moral and strategic test should they reconsider their strategy | there is a strong case for obstruction threats from Trump are great there is a moral imperative to stop this reckless agenda If Democrats cave on anything they will be handing legitimacy to Trump that will use that p c to double-down on misguided economic populism with white nationalist appeals blocking Trump at every turn is sound strategy if Democrats cede ground they will be vindicating the Republican strategy obstruct long enough, and Democrats will fold Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business | Democrats, meanwhile, are presented with a conundrum. As the party that has always believed that government can actually work, some key figures are understandably wondering if they can be justified in mirroring McConnell’s strategy. But, while it may feel uncomfortable to follow the same strategy one opposed so vocally, there is a strong moral case for obstruction in the Trump era. The core reason for Democrats to use the filibuster and every available parliamentary tactic to block the Trump agenda is that the President-elect has pledged to cause grave harm to many different communities in this country, and there is a responsibility to protect them. Trump has pledged to devastate immigrant families through mass deportation, Muslims through surveillance and potential registration, and people of color through stop-and-frisk and other criminalization efforts. His appointments thus far, far from showing “softening,” have included notorious racists Steve Bannon and Jeff Sessions, with more odious people likely to come. In short, the threats from the incoming Trump administration are qualitatively greater than those of any recent major party nominee. And there is a moral imperative to stop this reckless agenda: Democrats must stand with the most vulnerable people in our society when they are under attack. If Democrats cave on anything — for instance, a deeply-flawed infrastructure bill that they fear will appeal to the white working-class — they will be handing legitimacy to a Trump administration that will use that political capital to double-down on attacking immigrants, Muslims, and people of color. After all, Trump’s winning formula thus far has been precisely that: a combination of misguided economic populism with white nationalist appeals. There is no responsible way to negotiate with such an administration. Beyond the intrinsic case for obstruction, blocking Trump at every turn is also sound strategy. The only reason that Democrats may give in to working with the Trump administration is that progressives tend to believe that government can work — that it can provide public goods like public safety, clean air and drinking water, and an effective social safety net. But if Democrats cede ground and allow Trump to proceed with his agenda, they will be further vindicating the Republican strategy: obstruct long enough, Republicans will say, and eventually Democrats will fold because they are unwilling to bargain as hard as we are. Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business. We all know that Washington is broken. Polarization between the two parties has increased, communication has broken down, and the ability to negotiate fairly and efficiently — without stalemates that take us to the brink of government shut downs and defaulting on our national debt — has fallen by the wayside. But, frankly, this is the fault of Republicans — who have presided over the deterioration of our political norms since Newt Gingrich’s tenure leading the House. With immigrants, Muslims, and communities color facing likely existential threats, Democrats in Congress cannot responsibly engage in deal-making with the Trump administration. They must prove their mettle by defending vulnerable citizens and residents of this country with every fiber of their being. Only once Democrats in Congress have passed this moral and strategic test should they reconsider their strategy. After the grave threat to American communities has subsided, the two parties in Washington can engage again in the discussion of how to fix our broken political system. | 3,579 | <h4><strong>Snowball – plan forces democrats to cave to Trump on the plan, which signals his strategies are effective – emboldens the GOP and enables their agenda</h4><p>Marín</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Aristizabal</strong>, <strong>2016</strong> 12-20</p><p>(Adanjesus Marín and Natalia Aristizabal are, respectively, the Pennsylvania State Director and organizer of Make the Road Action, a grassroots immigrant organization, Senate Republicans Were Wrong To Block Obama, But Senate Democrats Are Right To Block Trump, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/center-for-community-change-action/senate-republicans-were-w_b_13745176.html) </p><p>Democrats, meanwhile, are presented with a conundrum. As the party that has always believed that government can actually work, some key figures are understandably wondering if they can be justified in mirroring McConnell’s strategy. But, <u>while it may feel uncomfortable to follow the same strategy one opposed so vocally</u>, <u><mark>there is a <strong>strong </mark>moral <mark>case for obstruction</u></strong></mark> in the Trump era. The core reason for Democrats to use the filibuster and every available parliamentary tactic to block the Trump agenda is that the President-elect has pledged to cause grave harm to many different communities in this country, and there is a responsibility to protect them. Trump has pledged to devastate immigrant families through mass deportation, Muslims through surveillance and potential registration, and people of color through stop-and-frisk and other criminalization efforts. His appointments thus far, far from showing “softening,” have included notorious racists Steve Bannon and Jeff Sessions, with more odious people likely to come. In short, <u>the <mark>threats from</mark> the incoming <mark>Trump</mark> administration <mark>are <strong></mark>qualitatively <mark>great</mark>er</u></strong> <u>than those of any recent major party nominee</u>. And <u><mark>there is a <strong>moral imperative</strong> to stop this</u> <u>reckless agenda</u></mark>: <u>Democrats must stand with <strong>the most vulnerable people</u></strong> <u>in our society when they are under attack<strong>. <mark>If Democrats cave on anything</u></strong></mark> — for instance, a deeply-flawed infrastructure bill that they fear will appeal to the white working-class — <u><strong><mark>they will be handing legitimacy to</mark> a <mark>Trump</mark> administration</u></strong> <u><mark>that will use that <strong>p</strong></mark>olitical <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>apital <strong><mark>to double-down on </mark>attacking immigrants</u></strong>, <u><strong>Muslims, and people of color.</u></strong> After all, <u>Trump’s winning formula thus far has been precisely that: a combination of <strong><mark>misguided economic populism</u></strong> <u>with</u> <u><strong>white nationalist appeals</u></strong></mark>. <u>There is no responsible way to negotiate with such an administration</u>. Beyond the intrinsic case for obstruction, <u><mark>blocking Trump at every turn is</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>sound strategy</strong></mark>. The only reason that Democrats may give in to working with the Trump administration is that progressives tend to believe that government can work</u> — that it can provide public goods like public safety, clean air and drinking water, and an effective social safety net. <u>But <mark>if Democrats cede ground</mark> and allow Trump to proceed with his agend</u>a, <u><mark>they will be</mark> further <strong><mark>vindicating the Republican strategy</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>obstruct long enough</u></strong>,</mark> <u>Republicans will say</u>, <u><mark>and</mark> eventually <strong><mark>Democrats will fold</u></strong></mark> <u>because they are unwilling <strong>to bargain as hard as we are.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Republicans need to see that Democrats mean business</u></strong></mark>. We all know that Washington is broken. Polarization between the two parties has increased, communication has broken down, and the ability to negotiate fairly and efficiently — without stalemates that take us to the brink of government shut downs and defaulting on our national debt — has fallen by the wayside. But, frankly, this is the fault of Republicans — who have presided over the deterioration of our political norms since Newt Gingrich’s tenure leading the House. With immigrants, Muslims, and communities color facing likely existential threats, <u>Democrats in Congress cannot responsibly engage in deal-making with the Trump administration.</u> They must prove their mettle by defending vulnerable citizens and residents of this country with every fiber of their being. <u>Only once Democrats in Congress have passed this moral and strategic test should they reconsider their strategy</u>. After the grave threat to American communities has subsided, the two parties in Washington can engage again in the discussion of how to fix our broken political system.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 1 | 145,704 | 27 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,432 | Only by rupturing the system of neolib can we solve | Meszaros 8 | Meszaros 8 | The unreality of postulation the solution within the formal framework and constraints of politics arises from the fundamental misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule since capital is in control of all aspects of the social metabolism it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies, is necessary to radically challenge capital itself The “social productive powers of labor appear as immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it. This is how capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure. None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform. Capital cannot be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework the only challenge that could affect the power of capital is one which would simultaneously aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being hopelessly constrained by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated political action to parliamentary legislation in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process that must be initiated right in our own historical time It means, in the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society | The unreality of postulation the solution within the framework and constraints of politics arises from the misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule capital is in control of all aspects of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies necessary to challenge capital capital’s mode of reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system. Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform the only challenge is one which would aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes instead of being hopelessly constrained by institutionally legitimated political action | (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328)
The unreality of postulation the sustainable solution of the grave problems of our social order within the formal and legal framework and corresponding constraints of parliamentary politics arises from the fundamental misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary framework is this that since capital is actually in control of all vital aspects of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter, thereby necessarily excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the parliamentary legislative process, even in the latter is supposed to be fully independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the “democratic equality” of all political forces participating in the legislative process. TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies, now completely dominated by the forces of capital in every domain, it is necessary to radically challenge capital itself as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant change on the margins of the established political system is that the later can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the “personification of capital” but simultaneously functions also “as the personification of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such,” the system can claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-à-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of labor-from the producers, and therefore capital’s claimed “constitutionality” (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. The “social productive powers of labor, or productive power or social labor, first develop historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence appear as something immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it. This is how capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system. Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure. The real state of affairs on thee plane of socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor and its absolute necessity for securing capital’s own reproduction- disappears from sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin of capital’s “primitive accumulation” and the concomitant, frequently violent, expropriation of property as the precondition of the system’s present mode of functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity is a personification of things and a reification of persons. None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform. It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the “personification of things and the reification of persons” by political decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended reform within the framework of capital’s political institutions. For the capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the relationship between persons and things: capital’s alienated and reified powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as “isolated workers” could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of parliamentary reforms enacted under capital’s order of social metabolic control. For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over the material stakes of “either/or” Capital can neither abdicate its-usurped-social productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor, thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious “political compromise.” For they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of “the rule of wealth over society.” Thus it is impossible to escape, in the domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer isolated-members. Capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It cannot possibly be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. And precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence, it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework. Since the vital issue on which everything else hinges is that “the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker” buy, on the contrary, “he appears as subsumed under them,” no meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics capable of matching capital’s extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and in the domain of material reproduction. Thus the only challenge that could affect the power of capital, in a sustainable manner, is one which would simultaneously aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being hopelessly constrained by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated political action to parliamentary legislation. There is a great deal of critique of formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized “personal betrayals” and the painful “party derailments.” Unfortunately, though the advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising. The reason why the now established political institutions successfully resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the material ground of capital’s historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changing- circumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capital’s productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the required function of being the overall command structure of the capital system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall decision making from the producers. Even the “particular personifications of capital” were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely naïve to imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices. The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of society’s vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem characterized as the wither away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic task of accomplishing “the withering away of the state,” self-management through full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital concern and not “romantic faithfulness to Marx’s unrealizable dream,” as some people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process that must be initiated right in our own historical time. It means, in plain language, the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the material and political ground of globally viable planning- an absolute must for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched self realization- of its individual members- its synonymous with the withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise. | 12,373 | <h4><strong>Only by rupturing the system of neolib can we solve</h4><p>Meszaros 8 </p><p>(Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328)</p><p><u><mark>The unreality of postulation</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong></mark> sustainable <u><strong><mark>solution</u></strong></mark> of the grave problems of our social order <u><strong><mark>within</mark> <mark>the</mark> formal</u></strong> and legal <u><strong><mark>framework</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> corresponding <u><strong><mark>constraints</u></strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong></mark> parliamentary <u><strong><mark>politics</mark> <mark>arises from the</mark> fundamental <mark>misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule</u></strong></mark>, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary framework is this that <u><strong>since <mark>capital is</u></strong></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>in control of all</u></strong></mark> vital <u><strong><mark>aspects of the social metabolism</u></strong>, <u><strong>it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter</u></strong></mark>, thereby necessarily <u><strong><mark>excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged</u></strong></mark> in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the parliamentary legislative process, even in the latter is supposed to be fully independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the “democratic equality” of all political forces participating in the legislative process. <u><strong><mark>TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies</mark>,</u></strong> now completely dominated by the forces of capital in every domain, it <u><strong>is <mark>necessary to</mark> radically <mark>challenge capital</mark> itself</u></strong> as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant change on the margins of the established political system is that the later can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the “personification of capital” but simultaneously functions also “as the personification of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such,” the system can claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-à-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of labor-from the producers, and therefore capital’s claimed “constitutionality” (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. <u><strong>The “social productive powers of labor</u></strong>, or productive power or social labor, first develop historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence <u><strong>appear</u></strong> <u><strong>as</u></strong> something <u><strong>immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is how <mark>capital’s mode of</mark> social metabolic <mark>reproduction</mark> <mark>becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system</u></strong>. <u><strong>Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure</mark>. </u></strong>The real state of affairs on thee plane of socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor and its absolute necessity for securing capital’s own reproduction- disappears from sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin of capital’s “primitive accumulation” and the concomitant, frequently violent, expropriation of property as the precondition of the system’s present mode of functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity is a personification of things and a reification of persons. <u><strong><mark>None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform</mark>. </u></strong>It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the “personification of things and the reification of persons” by political decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended reform within the framework of capital’s political institutions. For the capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the relationship between persons and things: capital’s alienated and reified powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as “isolated workers” could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of parliamentary reforms enacted under capital’s order of social metabolic control. For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over the material stakes of “either/or” Capital can neither abdicate its-usurped-social productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor, thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious “political compromise.” For they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of “the rule of wealth over society.” Thus it is impossible to escape, in the domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer isolated-members. <u><strong>Capital</u></strong> is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It <u><strong>cannot</u></strong> possibly <u><strong>be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power.</u></strong> And precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence, <u><strong>it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework</u></strong>. Since the vital issue on which everything else hinges is that “the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker” buy, on the contrary, “he appears as subsumed under them,” no meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics capable of matching capital’s extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and in the domain of material reproduction. Thus <u><strong><mark>the only challenge</mark> that could affect the power of capital</u></strong>, in a sustainable manner, <u><strong><mark>is one which would</mark> simultaneously <mark>aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes</mark> in all spheres, <mark>instead of being hopelessly constrained by </mark>the circular confinement of <mark>institutionally legitimated political action</mark> to parliamentary legislation</u></strong>. There is a great deal of critique of formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized “personal betrayals” and the painful “party derailments.” Unfortunately, though the advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising. The reason why the now established political institutions successfully resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the material ground of capital’s historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changing- circumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capital’s productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the required function of being the overall command structure of the capital system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall decision making from the producers. Even the “particular personifications of capital” were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely naïve to imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, <u><strong>in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices</u></strong>. <u><strong>The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system</u></strong>. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of society’s vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem characterized as the wither away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic task of accomplishing “the withering away of the state,” self-management through full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital concern and not “romantic faithfulness to Marx’s unrealizable dream,” as some people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, <u><strong>the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process</strong> <strong>that must be initiated right in our own historical time</u></strong>. <u><strong>It means, in</u></strong> plain language, <u><strong>the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society</u></strong>. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the material and political ground of globally viable planning- an absolute must for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched self realization- of its individual members- its synonymous with the withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise. </p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 52,612 | 28 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,433 | A similar argument holds for discussions of anti-blackness. Institutional approaches to anti-blackness ought to be endorsed because racism gains its currency through the concentration of power not the existence of ideas – ontological arguments ignore the question of ethics, pessimism assumes humans have the ability to accurately forecast which they cannot because of the complexity of human identity. Humans are constellations informed through infinite previous actions, they are dynamic because new experiences creates either growth or regression, which means all of the systems they create are equally in flux; no structure can predetermine outcomes. This disproves the theory of social death because humans have the capacity to change their conditions. Reject afropessimism and nihilism since it adopts its values through pre-existing social forces which produces bad faith & nihilism. The best way of measuring solvency is through commitment to changing an anti-black world. | Gordon 17 | Gordon, Philosophy Prof @ UCONN, 17 | 296-298)
Should the analysis remain at white and black the world would appear more closed than it in fact is. Missing from this view is that no human being is “really” any of these things; the claim itself is a manifestation of mauvaise foi. The project of making people into such is one thing. People actually becoming such is another. the schema of racism is one in which the hegemonic group relates to its members as selves and others They could only be such in relation to each other in other words a form of ontological segregation as a condition of ethics and morals The fight against racism does not work as a fight against being others or The Other It is a fight against being nonothers. Racism is the system of institutions and social norms that empower individuals with such beliefs Without that system a racist would simply be an obnoxious, With that system, racist points of view affect the social world as reality Without that system racists become inconsequential and irrelevant beyond personal concerns of saving their souls from unethical and immoral beliefs and choices An objection to the Afro-pessimistic assertion of blackness as social death could thus be raised from a Fanonian phenomenological perspective Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as a social perspective? And if the question of racism is a function of power, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological? Seeing that that position is false moves one dialectically forward into asking about the system that attempts to force one into such an identity: This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, fixed, and semantical into the grammar of how meaning is produced. as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model; otherwise there will simply be one normative outcome whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms That would in effect be an essence before an existence indeed, before an actual event of harm. This observation emerges as well with the Afro-pessimist model when one thinks of pessimism as the guiding attitude The existential phenomenological critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships human actions. Because human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand depends on commitment This pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity discourses One could only be pessimistic about an out come, It is an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed What if there were no way to know either? Some actions are deontological, they are at least reflections of our commitments the point of some actions is not about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing Taking responsibility for such actions bringing value to them is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise foi: the spirit of seriousness. | Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would appear more closed than it is no human is “really” any of these things; the claim itself is mauvaise foi The project of making people such is one thing. People actually becoming such is another. The fight against racism is a fight against being nonothers. Racism is the institutions and social norms that empower individuals with such beliefs Without that system, a racist would simply be obnoxious With that system, racist points of view affect the world Without racists become irrelevant An objection to the Afro-pessimistic assertion of social death could thus be raised Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count And if racism is a function of power, why not study power instead of assert its manifestations as ontological? This requires looking beyond blackness to understand blackness identity requires more than an intersecting model; otherwise there will simply be one normative outcome whoever manifests the maximum predetermined intersecting terms optimism and pessimism are the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental the world is a manifestation of human actions. Because human s can build the future instead of it determining us, the task depends on commitment pessimist is an act of forecasting What if there were no way to know Some actions are deontological reflections of our commitments the point is not about success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing | (Lewis, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, pg. 296-298)
Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would appear more closed than it in fact is. For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as “Afro-pessimists” (Wilderson 2010; Sexton 2011). Black for them is absolute “social death:’ li is outside of relations. Missing from this view is; however, is at least what I argued in Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, which is that no human being is “really” any of these things; the claim itself is a manifestation of mauvaise foi. The project of making people into such is one thing. People actually becoming such is another. This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the tone of nonbeing and his critique of Self—Other discourses in Peau noir, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks). Fanon distinguishes between the zone of nonbeing (nonappearance as human beings) and those of being. ‘The latter presumes a self-justified reality, which means it does not call itself into question. The former faces the problem of illegitimate appearance (Fanon 1952, chapters; Gordon 1999; AIcoir 2006; Yancy 2008). Thus, even the effort “to be” is in conflict as the system in question presumes legitimate absence of certain groups. Yet, paradoxically, the human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of being is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. The racial conflict is thus changed to an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. Existential ontology pertains to human being, whereas ontological being pertains to gods. This is why Fanon concludes that racism is also an attack against human being, as it creates a world in which one set stands above others as gods and the rest as below human. Where, in this formulation, stand human beings? The argument itself gains some clarity with the etymology of “existence” which is from the Latin expression exsístere (to stand out, to emerge -that is, to appear). Blacks thus face the paradox of existing (standing out) as nonexistence (not standing out). The system of racism renders black appearance illicit. This conundrum of racialized existence affects ethics and morals. Ethical relations are premised on selves relating to another or others. The others must, however, appear as such, and they too, manifest themselves as selves. Implicit in such others as other selves is the formalization of ethical relations as equal. as found in the thought of Immanuel Kant and shifted in deference to the other in that of Emmanuel Levinas, Racism, however, excludes certain groups from being others and selves (if interpreted as being of a kind similar to the presumed legitimate selves). Thus, the schema of racism is one in which the hegemonic group relates to its members as selves and others, whereas the nonhegemonic groups are neither selves nor others. They, in effect, could only be such in relation to each other. It is, in other words, a form of ontological segregation as a condition of ethics and morals. The fight against racism, then, does not work as a fight against being others or The Other. It is a fight against being nonothers. Fanon’s insight demands an additional clarification. Racists should be distinguished from racism. Racists are people who hold beliefs about the superiority and inferiority of certain groups of racially designated people. Racism is the system of institutions and social norms that empower individuals with such beliefs. Without that system, a racist would simply be an obnoxious, whether overtly deprecating or patronizing, individual. With that system, racist points of view affect the social world as reality. Without that system, racists ultimately become inconsequential and, in a word, irrelevant beyond personal concerns of saving their souls from unethical and immoral beliefs and choices. Fanon was concerned with racists in his capacity as a psychiatrist (therapy, if necessary). but he was also concerned with racism as a philosopher, social thinker, and revolutionary (Fanon 1959/1975). The latter, in other words, is a system, from an antiracism perspective, in need of eradication. An objection to the Afro-pessimistic assertion of blackness as social death could thus be raised from a Fanonian phenomenological perspective: Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as a social perspective? And if the question of racism is a function of power, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological? An additional problem with the Afro-pessimistic model is that its proponents treat “blackness” as though it could exist independent of other categories. A quick examination of double consciousness (Du Bois 1903)—a phenomenological concept if there ever were one by virtue of the focus on forms of consciousness and, better, that of which one is conscious, that is, intentionality would reveal why this would not work. Double conscious ness involves seeing oneself from the perspective of another that deems one as negative (for example, the Afro-pessimistic conception of blackness). That there is already another perspective makes the subject who lives through double consciousness relational. Added is what Paget Henry (2005) calls polemic, ted double consciousness and Nahum Chandler (2014, 6o—6i) calls the redoubled gesture, which is the realization that the condemnation of negative meaning means that one must not do what the Afro pessimist does. Seeing that that position is false moves one dialectically forward into asking about the system that attempts to force one into such an identity: This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness. This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, fixed, and semantical into the grammar of how meaning is produced. Such grammars, such as that of gender, emerge in interesting ways (Gordon 1999, 124—129; 1997,73—74). However, as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model; otherwise there will simply be one (a priori) normative outcome in every moment of inquiry: whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms. That would in effect be an essence before an existence indeed, before an actual event of harm. This observation emerges as well with the Afro-pessimist model when one thinks of pessimism as the guiding attitude. The existential phenomenological critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental, which means that the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships in other words, human actions. Because human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand, as phenomenology—oriented existentialists from Beauvoir and Sartre to Fanon, William R. Jones, and this author have argued, depends on commitment. This concern also pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity discourses with which I began. One could only be pessimistic about an out come, an activity. It is an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. What however, if there were no way to know either? Here we come to the foi element in mauvaise foi. Some actions are deontological, and if not that, they are at least reflections of our commitments, our projects. Thus, the point of some actions is not about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing. Taking responsibility for such actions—bringing value to them— is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise foi: the spirit of seriousness. | 8,195 | <h4>A similar argument holds for discussions of anti-blackness. <u>Institutional approaches</u> to anti-blackness ought to be <u>endorsed</u> because <u>racism gains its currency</u> through the <u>concentration of power</u> not the <u>existence of ideas</u> – ontological arguments <u>ignore the question of ethics</u>, pessimism <u>assumes humans have the ability to accurately forecast</u> which they <u>cannot</u> because of the complexity of <u>human identity</u>. Humans are <u>constellations</u> informed through <u>infinite previous actions</u>, they are <u>dynamic</u> because <u>new experiences</u> creates either growth or regression, which means <u>all of the systems they create are equally in flux</u>; no structure can predetermine outcomes. This disproves the theory of social death because humans have the capacity to change their conditions. <u>Reject afropessimism and nihilism</u> since it adopts its values through <u>pre-existing social forces</u> which produces <u>bad faith & nihilism</u>. The best way of measuring solvency is through <u>commitment</u> to changing an anti-black world.</h4><p><strong>Gordon</strong>, Philosophy Prof @ UCONN, <strong>17</strong> </p><p>(Lewis, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, pg.<u><strong> 296-298) </p><p></strong><mark>Should the analysis remain at <strong>white and black</u></strong>, <u>the world would appear <strong>more closed</strong> than <strong>it</mark> in fact <mark>is</mark>.</u></strong> For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as “Afro-pessimists” (Wilderson 2010; Sexton 2011). Black for them is absolute “social death:’ li is outside of relations. <u>Missing from this view is</u>; however, is at least what I argued in Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, which is <u>that <mark>no human</mark> being <mark>is <strong>“really” any of these things</strong>;</u> <u>the claim itself is</mark> a manifestation of <strong><mark>mauvaise foi</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>The <strong>project</strong> of making people</mark> into <mark>such is one thing.</u> <u><strong>People actually becoming such is another.</u></strong></mark> This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the tone of nonbeing and his critique of Self—Other discourses in Peau noir, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks). Fanon distinguishes between the zone of nonbeing (nonappearance as human beings) and those of being. ‘The latter presumes a self-justified reality, which means it does not call itself into question. The former faces the problem of illegitimate appearance (Fanon 1952, chapters; Gordon 1999; AIcoir 2006; Yancy 2008). Thus, even the effort “to be” is in conflict as the system in question presumes legitimate absence of certain groups. Yet, paradoxically, the human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of being is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. The racial conflict is thus changed to an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. Existential ontology pertains to human being, whereas ontological being pertains to gods. This is why Fanon concludes that racism is also an attack against human being, as it creates a world in which one set stands above others as gods and the rest as below human. Where, in this formulation, stand human beings? The argument itself gains some clarity with the etymology of “existence” which is from the Latin expression exsístere (to stand out, to emerge -that is, to appear). Blacks thus face the paradox of existing (standing out) as nonexistence (not standing out). The system of racism renders black appearance illicit. This conundrum of racialized existence affects ethics and morals. Ethical relations are premised on selves relating to another or others. The others must, however, appear as such, and they too, manifest themselves as selves. Implicit in such others as other selves is the formalization of ethical relations as equal. as found in the thought of Immanuel Kant and shifted in deference to the other in that of Emmanuel Levinas, Racism, however, excludes certain groups from being others and selves (if interpreted as being of a kind similar to the presumed legitimate selves). Thus, <u>the schema of racism is one in which the hegemonic group relates to its members as selves</u> <u>and others</u>, whereas the nonhegemonic groups are neither selves nor others. <u>They</u>, in effect, <u>could only be such in relation to each other</u>. It is, <u>in other words</u>, <u>a form of ontological segregation as a condition of ethics and morals</u>. <u><mark>The fight against racism</u></mark>, then, <u>does not work as a fight against <strong>being others</strong> or</u> <u><strong>The Other</u></strong>. <u><strong>It <mark>is a fight against being nonothers.</mark> </u></strong>Fanon’s insight demands an additional clarification. Racists should be distinguished from racism. Racists are people who hold beliefs about the superiority and inferiority of certain groups of racially designated people. <u><mark>Racism is the</mark> system of <strong><mark>institutions</strong> and <strong>social norms</u></strong> <u>that empower individuals with such beliefs</u></mark>. <u><mark>Without that system</u>, <u>a racist would simply be</mark> an <strong><mark>obnoxious</strong></mark>,</u> whether overtly deprecating or patronizing, individual. <u><mark>With that system, racist points of view <strong>affect the</mark> social <mark>world</mark> as reality</u></strong>. <u><mark>Without</u></mark> <u>that system</u>, <u><mark>racists</u></mark> ultimately <u><mark>become</u></mark> <u><strong>inconsequential</u></strong> <u>and</u>, in a word, <u><strong><mark>irrelevant</u></strong></mark> <u>beyond personal concerns of saving their souls from unethical</u> <u>and immoral beliefs and choices</u>. Fanon was concerned with racists in his capacity as a psychiatrist (therapy, if necessary). but he was also concerned with racism as a philosopher, social thinker, and revolutionary (Fanon 1959/1975). The latter, in other words, is a system, from an antiracism perspective, in need of eradication. <u><mark>An objection to the Afro-pessimistic assertion of</mark> blackness</u> <u>as <strong><mark>social death</u></strong> <u>could thus be raised</mark> from a <strong>Fanonian phenomenological perspective</u></strong>: <u><mark>Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of <strong>antiblack racists?</strong> Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count</mark> as a social perspective?</u> <u><mark>And if</mark> the question of <mark>racism is a <strong>function of power</strong>,</u> <u>why not</mark> offer <strong>a <mark>study</mark> of <mark>power</mark>,</u></strong> <u>how it is gained and lost,</u> <u><mark>instead of</mark> an <strong><mark>assert</mark>ion of <mark>its manifestations as ontological?</mark> </u></strong>An additional problem with the Afro-pessimistic model is that its proponents treat “blackness” as though it could exist independent of other categories. A quick examination of double consciousness (Du Bois 1903)—a phenomenological concept if there ever were one by virtue of the focus on forms of consciousness and, better, that of which one is conscious, that is, intentionality would reveal why this would not work. Double conscious ness involves seeing oneself from the perspective of another that deems one as negative (for example, the Afro-pessimistic conception of blackness). That there is already another perspective makes the subject who lives through double consciousness relational. Added is what Paget Henry (2005) calls polemic, ted double consciousness and Nahum Chandler (2014, 6o—6i) calls the redoubled gesture, which is the realization that the condemnation of negative meaning means that one must not do what the Afro pessimist does. <u>Seeing that that position is false moves one dialectically forward into asking about the system that attempts to force one into such an identity: <mark>This</mark> relational matter <mark>requires</u> <u><strong>looking beyond blackness</u></strong></mark> <u>ironically in order <mark>to</u> <u><strong>understand blackness</u></strong></mark>. <u>This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, fixed, and semantical into the grammar of how meaning is produced. </u>Such grammars, such as that of gender, emerge in interesting ways (Gordon 1999, 124—129; 1997,73—74). However, <u>as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning,</u> <u>the question of <mark>identity requires more than an <strong>intersecting model;</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>otherwise there will simply be one</u></mark> (a priori) <u><mark>normative outcome</u></mark> in every moment of inquiry: <u><strong><mark>whoever manifests</strong> the <strong>maximum</mark> manifestation</strong> of <strong><mark>predetermined</mark> negative <mark>intersecting terms</u></strong></mark>. <u>That would in effect be an essence before an existence indeed, before an actual event of harm. This observation emerges as well with the Afro-pessimist model when <strong>one thinks of pessimism as the guiding attitude</u></strong>. <u>The <strong>existential phenomenological critique</u></strong> <u>would be that <strong><mark>optimism and pessimism</u></strong> <u>are</mark> symptomatic of <mark>the same attitude</u>: <u><strong>a priori assertions on reality.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Human existence is contingent but not accidental</u></strong></mark>, which means that <u><mark>the</mark> social <mark>world</mark> at hand <mark>is a manifestation of <strong></mark>choices</strong> and <strong>relationships</u></strong> in other words, <u><strong><mark>human actions.</u></strong> <u>Because human</mark> being<mark>s can</mark> only <mark>build the future instead of it <strong>determining us,</u></strong> <u>the task</mark> at hand</u>, as phenomenology—oriented existentialists from Beauvoir and Sartre to Fanon, William R. Jones, and this author have argued, <u><strong><mark>depends on commitment</u></strong></mark>. <u>This</u> concern also <u>pertains to the initial concerns about</u> <u><strong>authenticity discourses</u></strong> with which I began. <u>One could only be <mark>pessimist</mark>ic about an out come,</u> an activity. <u>It <mark>is an act of forecasting</mark> what could only be meaningful once actually performed</u>. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. <u><mark>What</u></mark> however, <u><mark>if there were <strong>no way to know</mark> either? </u></strong>Here we come to the foi element in mauvaise foi. <u><mark>Some actions are deontological</mark>,</u> and if not that, <u>they are at least <mark>reflections of our commitments</u></mark>, our projects. Thus, <u><mark>the point</mark> of <strong>some actions</u></strong> <u><mark>is <strong>not</strong> about</mark> their <strong><mark>success or failure</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>but whether we deem them worth doing</u></strong></mark>. <u>Taking responsibility for such actions</u>—<u>bringing value to them</u>— <u>is opposed to another manifestation of <strong>mauvaise foi:</u></strong> <u><strong>the spirit of seriousness.</p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 9,459 | 601 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,434 | New Tillerson confirmation means he will take hardline stances against China | Brunnstrom and Spetalnick 1-12 | Brunnstrom and Spetalnick 1-12
David is a writer and correspondent for Reuters covering East Asia and South Asia and Matt is an editor and correspondent for Reuters covering Middle East and Asia and politics, “Tillerson says China should be barred from South China Sea islands”, 2017, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congress-tillerson-china-idUSKBN14V2KZ, Accessed 2-1 | Trump's nominee for secretary of state has set a course for a potentially confrontation with Beijing saying China should be denied access to islands it has built in the contested South China Sea Tillerson told his confirmation that China's building of islands and putting military assets on those islands was "akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine Asked whether he supported a more aggressive posture toward China, he said: "We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed Tillerson's comments on blocking access to islands, China's foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said he couldn't make any guesses as to what Tillerson was referring to Tillerson also said Washington needed to reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan | secretary of state saying China should be denied access to islands it has built in the contested South China Sea Tillerson told that China's building of islands and putting military assets on those islands was not going to be allowed Tillerson also said Washington needed to reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan | U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's nominee for secretary of state has set a course for a potentially serious confrontation with Beijing, saying China should be denied access to islands it has built in the contested South China Sea. In comments expected to enrage Beijing, Rex Tillerson told his confirmation hearing on Wednesday before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that China's building of islands and putting military assets on those islands was "akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine. Asked whether he supported a more aggressive posture toward China, he said: "We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” The former Exxon Mobil Corp (XOM.N) chairman and chief executive did not elaborate on what might be done to deny China access to the islands it has built up from South China Sea reefs, equipped with military-length airstrips and fortified with weapons. Trump's transition team did not immediately respond to a request for specifics on how China might be blocked from the artificial islands. China claims most of the energy-rich waters through which about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. Neighbors Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims. When asked repeatedly about Tillerson's comments on blocking access to islands, China's foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said he couldn't make any guesses as to what Tillerson was referring to and would not answer hypothetical questions. China's right to carry out 'normal activities' in its sovereign territory in the South China Sea is 'indisputable', Lu said, speaking at a daily briefing on Thursday. He did not elaborate. Tillerson also said Washington needed to reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province, but stopped short of Trump's questioning of Washington's long-standing policy on the issue. The United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, acknowledging that China takes the position that there is "one China" and Taiwan is part of it. But the United States is also Taiwan's biggest ally and arms supplier. | 2,228 | <h4><strong>New Tillerson confirmation means he will take hardline stances against China</h4><p>Brunnstrom and Spetalnick 1-12</p><p></strong>David is a writer and correspondent for Reuters covering East Asia and South Asia and Matt is an editor and correspondent for Reuters covering Middle East and Asia and politics, “Tillerson says China should be barred from South China Sea islands”, 2017, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congress-tillerson-china-idUSKBN14V2KZ, Accessed 2-1</p><p>U.S. President-elect Donald <u>Trump's nominee for <mark>secretary of state</mark> has set a course for a potentially</u> serious <u>confrontation with Beijing</u>, <u><strong><mark>saying China should be denied access to islands it has built in the contested South China Sea</u></strong></mark>. In comments expected to enrage Beijing, Rex <u><mark>Tillerson told</mark> his confirmation</u> hearing on Wednesday before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee <u><strong><mark>that China's building of islands and putting military assets on those islands was</mark> "akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine</u></strong>. <u>Asked whether he supported a more aggressive posture toward China, he said: "We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is <mark>not going to be allowed</u></mark>.” The former Exxon Mobil Corp (XOM.N) chairman and chief executive did not elaborate on what might be done to deny China access to the islands it has built up from South China Sea reefs, equipped with military-length airstrips and fortified with weapons. Trump's transition team did not immediately respond to a request for specifics on how China might be blocked from the artificial islands. China claims most of the energy-rich waters through which about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. Neighbors Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims. When asked repeatedly about <u>Tillerson's comments on blocking access to islands, China's foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said he couldn't make any guesses as to what Tillerson was referring to</u> and would not answer hypothetical questions. China's right to carry out 'normal activities' in its sovereign territory in the South China Sea is 'indisputable', Lu said, speaking at a daily briefing on Thursday. He did not elaborate. <u><mark>Tillerson also said Washington needed to reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan</u></mark>, which Beijing regards as a renegade province, but stopped short of Trump's questioning of Washington's long-standing policy on the issue. The United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, acknowledging that China takes the position that there is "one China" and Taiwan is part of it. But the United States is also Taiwan's biggest ally and arms supplier.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 5 | 1,560,823 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,435 | Having a neg strat outweighs advantage ground --- we can read the unconditional cp and internal link turn the other advantage --- only a limit on the topic can ensure the eng is prepared for the qpq advs teams can read | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Having a <u>neg strat</u> outweighs advantage ground --- we can read the <u>unconditional cp</u> and <u>internal link turn</u> the other advantage --- only a <u>limit</u> on the topic can ensure the eng is <u>prepared</u> for the qpq advs teams can read</h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,822 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,436 | NAFTA has stimulated expanded global free trade and economic growth | Sergie 14 | Sergie 14 (Mohammed Aly, Geoeconomics reporter, Online Writer/Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, “NAFTA's Economic Impact”, Council on Foreign Relations, February 14, http://www.cfr.org/trade/naftas-economic-impact/p15790 | Twenty years after its implementation NAFTA has helped boost intraregional trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States Trade relations have broadened substantially, and U.S. manufacturers created supply chains across North America that have made companies more globally competitive These factors stimulated economic growth NAFTA was designed to promote economic growth by spurring competition in domestic markets and promoting investment It has worked Experts say trade liberalization between Mexico and the United States has had positive consequences for Mexicans generally the deal has led to a dramatic reduction in Mexican prices which helps offset slow income growth Mexican workers have benefitted from the treaty and helped expand the country's manufacturing base Mexico has enjoyed an intangible benefit of NAFTA: The country has adopted orthodox economic management practices and is no longer prone to crises. e agreement ended up straightjacketing a government accustomed to overspending, overpromising, and underachieving . The government abandoned many protectionist policies | NAFTA helped boost trade between Mexico, and the U S U.S. manufacturers created supply chains stimulated economic growth NAFTA was designed to promote economic growth by spurring competition the deal has led to a dramatic reduction in Mexican prices which helps offset slow growth The country has adopted orthodox economic management practices and is no longer prone to crises | Twenty years after its implementation, the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, has helped boost intraregional trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, but has fallen short of generating the jobs and the deeper regional economic integration its advocates promised decades ago. Trade relations have broadened substantially, and U.S. manufacturers created supply chains across North America that have made companies more globally competitive. These factors may have stimulated economic growth; Canada has expanded at the fastest average rate and Mexico at the slowest. But economists still debate NAFTA's direct impact, given the many other economic forces at play and the possibility that trade liberalization might have happened even without the agreement. Both advocates and critics of the treaty have lobbied for changes to NAFTA, but momentum has stalled and is likely to be overtaken by larger trade agreements under negotiation such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. "NAFTA was designed to promote economic growth by spurring competition in domestic markets and promoting investment from both domestic and foreign sources. It has worked," write Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, experts at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the authors of NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges. Experts say trade liberalization between Mexico and the United States has had positive consequences for Mexicans generally, not just Mexican business interests. For instance, the deal has led to a dramatic reduction in Mexican prices for clothes, televisions, and food, which helps offset slow income growth. GEA, a Mexico City-based economic consulting firm, estimates that the cost of basic household goods in Mexico has halved since NAFTA's implementation. Mexican workers in the car manufacturing and aeronautics sectors of northern Mexico have benefitted from the treaty and helped expand the country's manufacturing base.¶ And Mexico has enjoyed an intangible benefit of NAFTA: The country has adopted orthodox economic management practices and is no longer prone to crises. "The agreement ended up straightjacketing a government accustomed to overspending, overpromising, and underachieving," writes Castañeda. The government abandoned many protectionist policies and allowed the prices of tradable goods to converge on both sides of the border, which reduced deficits and limited the potential for currency crises, he adds. | 2,528 | <h4>NAFTA has stimulated expanded global free trade and economic growth</h4><p><strong>Sergie 14</strong> (Mohammed Aly, Geoeconomics reporter, Online Writer/Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, “NAFTA's Economic Impact”, Council on Foreign Relations, February 14, http://www.cfr.org/trade/naftas-economic-impact/p15790</p><p><u>Twenty years after its implementation</u>, the North American Free Trade Agreement, or <u><mark>NAFTA</u></mark>, <u>has <mark>helped</mark> <mark>boost</mark> intraregional <mark>trade</mark> <mark>between</mark> Canada, <mark>Mexico, and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>, but has fallen short of generating the jobs and the deeper regional economic integration its advocates promised decades ago. <u>Trade relations have broadened substantially, and <mark>U.S. manufacturers created supply chains</mark> across North America that have made companies more globally competitive</u>. <u>These factors</u> may have <u><mark>stimulated economic growth</u></mark>; Canada has expanded at the fastest average rate and Mexico at the slowest. But economists still debate NAFTA's direct impact, given the many other economic forces at play and the possibility that trade liberalization might have happened even without the agreement. Both advocates and critics of the treaty have lobbied for changes to NAFTA, but momentum has stalled and is likely to be overtaken by larger trade agreements under negotiation such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. "<u><mark>NAFTA was designed to promote economic growth by spurring competition</mark> in domestic markets and promoting investment</u> from both domestic and foreign sources. <u><strong>It has worked</u></strong>," write Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, experts at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the authors of NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges. <u>Experts say trade liberalization between Mexico and the United States has had positive consequences for Mexicans generally</u>, not just Mexican business interests. For instance, <u><mark>the deal has led to a dramatic reduction in Mexican prices</u></mark> for clothes, televisions, and food, <u><mark>which helps offset slow</mark> income <mark>growth</u></mark>. GEA, a Mexico City-based economic consulting firm, estimates that the cost of basic household goods in Mexico has halved since NAFTA's implementation. <u>Mexican workers</u> in the car manufacturing and aeronautics sectors of northern Mexico <u>have benefitted from the treaty and helped expand the country's manufacturing base</u>.¶ And <u>Mexico has enjoyed an intangible benefit of NAFTA: <mark>The country has adopted orthodox economic management practices and is <strong>no longer prone to crises</strong></mark>.</u> "Th<u>e agreement ended up straightjacketing a government accustomed to overspending, overpromising, and underachieving</u>," writes Castañeda<u>. The government abandoned many protectionist policies</u> and allowed the prices of tradable goods to converge on both sides of the border, which reduced deficits and limited the potential for currency crises, he adds.</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 1 | 1,560,824 | 1 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,437 | Xi is consolidating power now to change the economy | Madaus 1-20 | Madaus 1-20 | CCP will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event Xi Jinping may try to use the CCP’s 19th Party Congress to effect a drastic adjustment in how China is governed China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace China’s citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food If growth stalls and the population believes the government is falling short on its bargain, the state might face demands for political representation Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability Xi’s zealous anti-corruption campaign has purged many of his rivals and keeps potential adversaries in check He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was its “core,” He has also cracked down on the media, churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers in a drive to restore hard authoritarian rule to China | Xi may try to use the CCP’s Congress to effect a drastic adjustment China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food If growth stalls the government is falling short on its bargai the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability Xi’s zealous anti-corruption keeps potential adversaries in check He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him its “core,” He has cracked down on the media churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers to restore hard authoritarian rule | Roman is an editor and writer for Foreign Brief, “Xi’s the boss: China’s leadership transition”, Foreign Brief, 2017, http://www.foreignbrief.com/xis-boss-chinas-leadership-transition/, Accessed 2-4
China faces an inflection point in 2017. In the latter half of this year the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event: around 60 per cent of the party’s leaders will retire, including five out of seven members of the country’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. President Xi Jinping may try to use the CCP’s 19th Party Congress to effect a drastic adjustment in how China is governed. China only changes its paramount leader every ten years and the party congress held at the midpoint of any administration determines who will take over five years hence. Given China’s authoritarian governance and highly centralised power system, who sits at the top and how much power they have determines how the country deals with its mounting challenges. This will arguably be the most significant party congress held since the years of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” that ignited China’s meteoric rise to superpower status. The 2017 Party Congress is critical for two reasons. First, China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory. Firms, banks and the government relied on massive debt-fuelled spending to power through the Great Recession, and this debt is now a drag on growth and could catalyse future economic crises. Reform will be harrowing. Zombie firms – uncompetitive state-owned firms that cannot repay their debts – must be allowed to fail to free up capital and stagnant economic sectors, which will lead to higher unemployment. China’s exhausted investment-driven growth strategy must be replaced by one reliant on domestic consumption, meaning deregulation and liberalisation. The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace. China’s citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food in implicit exchange for ever-increasing prosperity. If growth stalls and the population believes the government is falling short on its bargain, the state might face demands for political representation in order to improve its responsiveness to its people’s needs. China’s incoming leaders will have to address these contradictions to keep the country functioning. The second reason for the congress’ importance is that in the past five years, President Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s. After the horrors of Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability. Mr Xi appears to have been systematically undermining this system over the past five years. Xi’s zealous anti-corruption campaign has purged many of his rivals, and the threat of investigation keeps potential adversaries in check. He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him – in order to concentrate decision-making power in his hands. Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was its “core,” a designation that was not bestowed upon his predecessors. The president has appropriated key portfolios from Li Keqiang, the government’s second most powerful leader and Xi’s ostensible counterweight. He has also cracked down on the media, churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers in a drive to restore hard authoritarian rule to China. Many analysts believe that Xi intends to fully do away with collective leadership and move the country towards strongman rule. This would have profound consequences for China and the world. | 3,744 | <h4><strong>Xi is consolidating power now to change the economy </h4><p>Madaus 1-20</p><p></strong>Roman is an editor and writer for Foreign Brief, “Xi’s the boss: China’s leadership transition”, Foreign Brief, 2017, http://www.foreignbrief.com/xis-boss-chinas-leadership-transition/, Accessed 2-4</p><p>China faces an inflection point in 2017. In the latter half of this year the Chinese Communist Party (<u>CCP</u>) <u>will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event</u>: around 60 per cent of the party’s leaders will retire, including five out of seven members of the country’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. President <u><mark>Xi</mark> Jinping <mark>may try to use the CCP’s</mark> 19th Party <mark>Congress</mark> <mark>to effect a drastic adjustment</mark> in how China is governed</u>. China only changes its paramount leader every ten years and the party congress held at the midpoint of any administration determines who will take over five years hence. Given China’s authoritarian governance and highly centralised power system, who sits at the top and how much power they have determines how the country deals with its mounting challenges. This will arguably be the most significant party congress held since the years of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” that ignited China’s meteoric rise to superpower status. The 2017 Party Congress is critical for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory</u></strong></mark>. Firms, banks and the government relied on massive debt-fuelled spending to power through the Great Recession, and this debt is now a drag on growth and could catalyse future economic crises. Reform will be harrowing. Zombie firms – uncompetitive state-owned firms that cannot repay their debts – must be allowed to fail to free up capital and stagnant economic sectors, which will lead to higher unemployment. China’s exhausted investment-driven growth strategy must be replaced by one reliant on domestic consumption, meaning deregulation and liberalisation. <u>The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace</u>. <u>China’s <mark>citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food</u> </mark>in implicit exchange for ever-increasing prosperity. <u><mark>If growth stalls</mark> and the population believes <mark>the government is falling short on its bargai</mark>n, the state might face demands for political representation</u> in order to improve its responsiveness to its people’s needs. China’s incoming leaders will have to address these contradictions to keep the country functioning. The second reason for the congress’ importance is that in the past five years, President <u>Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s</u>. After the horrors of Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, <u><strong><mark>the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability</u></strong></mark>. Mr Xi appears to have been systematically undermining this system over the past five years. <u><mark>Xi’s zealous anti-corruption</mark> campaign has purged many of his rivals</u>, <u>and</u> the threat of investigation <u><strong><mark>keeps potential adversaries in check</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him</u></strong></mark> – in order to concentrate decision-making power in his hands. <u>Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was <strong><mark>its “core,”</u></strong></mark> a designation that was not bestowed upon his predecessors. The president has appropriated key portfolios from Li Keqiang, the government’s second most powerful leader and Xi’s ostensible counterweight. <u><strong><mark>He has</mark> also <mark>cracked down on the media</mark>, <mark>churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers</mark> in a drive <mark>to restore hard authoritarian rule</mark> to China</u>. Many analysts believe that Xi intends to fully do away with collective leadership and move the country towards strongman rule. This would have profound consequences for China and the world.</p></strong> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 1,099,397 | 5 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,438 | Pivoting away from diplomatic and economic engagement is key to contain China rise | Steingberg and O’Hanion 1-18 | Steingberg and O’Hanion 1-18
Jim and Michael are writers and editors for National Interest, “Can Donald Trump Avoid a Dangerous South China Sea Showdown?”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-donald-trump-avoid-dangerous-south-china-sea-showdown-19099?page=3, Accessed 2-1 | Until recently, there was considerable bipartisan continuity in U.S. policy towards economic engagement and diplomatic partnership with China preserved security for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and East Asia. The peaceful regional environment provided a context for China’s leaders to launch a strategy of “reform and opening up,” this strategy produced other, more worrying consequences. China became the world’s top manufacturing nation and boasted the world’s second-largest economy developments gave China the wherewithal to field the world’s second most expensive military force, featuring a growing range of high-technology weapons, which now challenge America’s military supremacy in the Western Pacific. The tension in U.S.-China relations was exacerbated because the hoped-for political reforms, which were expected to follow the economic opening, failed to materialize Obama elaborated an approach to China that responded to China’s actions while preserving the basic framework of the One China policy The rebalance focused not only on security, but also broader economic and political issues as well Many in China see the rebalance as thinly disguised containment, while critics in the United States fault the Obama administration for an inadequate response to China’s assertiveness | Until recently, there was considerable continuity in engagement this produced consequences developments gave China the wherewithal to field the world’s second most expensive military force, The rebalance focused not only on security, but also broader economic and political issues as well. | Until recently, there was considerable bipartisan continuity in U.S. policy towards the PRC. The pillars of this policy have included support for economic engagement and diplomatic partnership with China, combined with ongoing security commitments to regional allies, a capable U.S. military presence to back up those commitments, robust trade and investment relations, and involvement in range of multilateral institutions. This strategy served U.S. interests well for decades—helping pull the PRC away from the Soviet Union and thus accelerating the end of the Cold War. It also preserved security for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and East Asia. The peaceful regional environment provided a context for China’s leaders to launch a strategy of “reform and opening up,” which lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty and contributed to regional and global economic growth as transnational supply chains offered consumers lower prices for tradeable goods. As the decades went by, however, this strategy produced other, more worrying consequences. China became the world’s top manufacturing nation and boasted the world’s second-largest economy. That status came with dramatic implications for jobs and investment, especially in the manufacturing sectors of developed countries—particularly the United States and Europe. Those developments gave China the wherewithal to field the world’s second most expensive military force, featuring a growing range of high-technology weapons, which now challenge America’s military supremacy in the Western Pacific. That burgeoning capability has been accompanied by an increasingly assertive foreign policy, particularly with respect to China’s territorial and maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. Taken together, the developments have led growing numbers of Americans to question whether China’s rise was of mutual benefit both on security and economic fronts. The tension in U.S.-China relations was exacerbated because the hoped-for political reforms, which were expected to follow the economic opening, failed to materialize. On the contrary, under President Xi Jinping, the movement toward a more open and rights-respecting China seems to have reversed course in favor of more central control and an assertive nationalism, which rejects what most people in the United States and countries around the world consider to be universal principles of human rights. In response to those developments, President Barack Obama elaborated an approach to China that responded to China’s actions while preserving the basic framework of the One China policy—an approach which has been called the Asia-Pacific rebalance or pivot. The rebalance focused not only on security, but also broader economic and political issues as well. It has been generally well received among American strategists and leaders of both parties, and among American allies in Asia as well. Yet the new approach has not, by itself, stabilized the Sino-U.S. relationship. Many in China see the rebalance as thinly disguised containment, while critics in the United States fault the Obama administration for an inadequate response to China’s assertiveness—a critique reflected in the president-elect’s rather cryptic comments to date. | 3,256 | <h4><strong>Pivoting away from diplomatic and economic engagement is key to contain China rise</h4><p>Steingberg and O’Hanion 1-18</p><p></strong>Jim and Michael are writers and editors for National Interest, “Can Donald Trump Avoid a Dangerous South China Sea Showdown?”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-donald-trump-avoid-dangerous-south-china-sea-showdown-19099?page=3, Accessed 2-1</p><p><u><strong><mark>Until recently</strong>, there was considerable</mark> bipartisan <mark>continuity</mark> <mark>in</mark> U.S. policy towards</u> the PRC. The pillars of this policy have included support for <u>economic <mark>engagement</u></mark> <u>and diplomatic partnership with China</u>, combined with ongoing security commitments to regional allies, a capable U.S. military presence to back up those commitments, robust trade and investment relations, and involvement in range of multilateral institutions. This strategy served U.S. interests well for decades—helping pull the PRC away from the Soviet Union and thus accelerating the end of the Cold War. It also<u> preserved security for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and East Asia. The peaceful regional environment provided a context for China’s leaders to launch a strategy of “reform and opening up,”</u> which lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty and contributed to regional and global economic growth as transnational supply chains offered consumers lower prices for tradeable goods. As the decades went by, however, <u><mark>this</mark> strategy <mark>produced</mark> other, more worrying <mark>consequences</mark>. China became the world’s top manufacturing nation and boasted the world’s second-largest economy</u>. That status came with dramatic implications for jobs and investment, especially in the manufacturing sectors of developed countries—particularly the United States and Europe. Those <u><mark>developments gave China the wherewithal to field the world’s second most expensive military force,</mark> featuring a growing range of high-technology weapons, which now challenge America’s military supremacy in the Western Pacific.</u> That burgeoning capability has been accompanied by an increasingly assertive foreign policy, particularly with respect to China’s territorial and maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. Taken together, the developments have led growing numbers of Americans to question whether China’s rise was of mutual benefit both on security and economic fronts. <u>The tension in U.S.-China relations was exacerbated because the hoped-for political reforms, which were expected to follow the economic opening, failed to materialize</u>. On the contrary, under President Xi Jinping, the movement toward a more open and rights-respecting China seems to have reversed course in favor of more central control and an assertive nationalism, which rejects what most people in the United States and countries around the world consider to be universal principles of human rights. In response to those developments, President Barack <u>Obama elaborated an approach to China that responded to China’s actions while preserving the basic framework of the One China policy</u>—an approach which has been called the Asia-Pacific rebalance or pivot. <u><mark>The rebalance focused not only on security, but also broader economic and political issues as well</u>.</mark> It has been generally well received among American strategists and leaders of both parties, and among American allies in Asia as well. Yet the new approach has not, by itself, stabilized the Sino-U.S. relationship. <u>Many in China see the rebalance as thinly disguised containment, while critics in the United States fault the Obama administration for an inadequate response to China’s assertiveness</u>—a critique reflected in the president-elect’s rather cryptic comments to date.</p> | 1NC round 5 State | Off Case | 5 | 1,560,826 | 1 | 125,776 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | 655,691 | N | GFCA State But not really | 5 | Woodward KK | Jordana Sternberg | 1AC - Security Framework
1NC - ASEAN CP Sec K T - Mil Trump Ptx Da Containment DA
2NC - Sec K
1NR - T Case
2NR - T | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,439 | China says no – they have no incentive to self-constrain – means affs will always still increase soft engagement. Says no DA’s are non-unique – they’re inevitable under their counterinterp. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>China says no – they have no incentive to self-constrain – means affs will always still increase soft engagement. Says no DA’s are non-unique – they’re inevitable under their counterinterp. </h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,825 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,440 | Learning to seize power through debating institutional dynamics is a more effective political strategy than the alternatives analysis – speaking truth to power cannot create a new political organization that becomes powerful. Empirics prove radical black political organizing is effective when it targets governments strategically and pragmatically. | Spence 15 | Spence, Poli Sci Prof @ John Hopkins, 15 | (Lester, Knocking the Hustle: Against the Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics, pp. 140-147)
four examples have a few things in common all occurred at a moment where all seemed lost. while the neoliberal turn has signifcantly altered our ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability It still exists in institutions we have written of thinking they are no longer relevant It exists in populations we’ve written of because we believe they are incapable of radical political action black youth. It exists in cities that we don’t think of as having a long history of radical political struggle like Jackson, Mississippi black youth organizers recognized that they had to pressure Maryland state legislators to kill the prison The black radicals in the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement made electing Lumumba a component of their organizing. The CTU chose to take the city head on and to hold a series of town hall meetings designed to inform people of the ways political officials, philanthropists and corporations are working together to neoliberalize and kill public education The #blacklivesmatter movement recognized that politics was at the center of their struggle in Ferguson All campaigns used moral language However they didn’t rely on those arguments They understood that seizing power rather than speaking truth to it that proposing new alternatives would at some level have to involve political struggle Relying on morality can make it hard to move against the wealthy charter school proponent who sincerely believes privatizing public schools represent the best hope In deciding how we go about making our arguments and how we go about choosing our strategies and tactics we should act morally We should never however ignore the fundamental role politics plays and should play they all relied on political organizing that included long discussions about political issues that mattered but also parties and other events designed to get people working with each other and trusting one another people do not come to a common understanding of the structural dynamics of the problem they face, and to a common understanding of what the solution should be, through being exposed to a loving without having the space to talk about the issues in depth over a long period of time I’m referring to building the capacity of people to govern and make important political decisions not political “mobilizing”. Mobilizing people for a protest act of one kind or another may get people out to engage in a specific act but unless combined with organizing work, will not cause those people to organize for themselves Protest is not enough Just as the neoliberal turn did not simply occur when the welfare state was removed rather it occurred when the welfare state was removed and then replaced with a new program we will not be able to build a sustainable constituency for a new world without articulating what that new world will look like, what type of policies would result, what the benefits of those policies would be I use these examples in order to show that we already have the seeds for a new institutional framework that re-roots the economy in politics and in the public interest. To show that we aren’t alone, and that a number of people recognize another way of life is possible. There aren’t as many of us as we’d like, but there are far more of us than we think. | while the neoliberal turn altered ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability. in institutions in populations black youth in , Mississippi organizers recognized they had to pressure legislators to kill the prison radicals in the Malcolm X Movement made electing Lumumba a component of organizing The CTU chose to take the city on and hold meetings to inform people of ways officials, , and corporations are working to neoliberalize public education blacklivesmatter recognized politics at the center All used moral language However, they didn’t rely on those seizing power rather than speaking truth to it), proposing new alternatives, would involve political struggle morality can make it hard to move against charter proponent who believes privatizing schools represent the best hope We should never ignore fundamental role politics plays i people do not come to a common understanding of structural dynamics of the problem , the solution through loving without space to talk about issues in depth over time building capacity to make political decisions not “mobilizing”. Mobilizing may get a act, but unless combined with organizing , will not cause people to organize for themselves Protest is not enough to build a sustainable constituency without articulating what that new world will look like, what policies result, benefits would be we have the seeds for a new institutional framework | (Lester, Knocking the Hustle: Against the Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics, pp. 140-147)
All four examples have a few things in common. First all occurred at a moment where all seemed lost. While I wouldn’t go as far as to suggest that these events suggest that neoliberalism is “naturally” contested—just as there is no “good teaching gene” there is no “contest neoliberalism gene”—I would say that while the neoliberal turn has signifcantly altered our ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability. It still exists. It exists in institutions we have written of thinking they are no longer relevant—like teachers unions. It exists in populations we’ve written of because we believe they are incapable of radical political action— black youth. It exists in cities that we don’t think of as having a long history of radical political struggle —like Jackson, Mississippi. Second all three recognized the fundamental role politics played in their struggles. The black youth organizers recognized that they had to pressure Maryland state legislators to kill the prison. The black radicals in the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement made electing Chokwe Lumumba a component of their organizing. The CTU chose to take the city head on and to hold a series of town hall meetings designed to inform people of the ways political officials, philanthropists, and corporations are working together to neoliberalize and kill public education. The #blacklivesmatter movement recognized that politics was at the center of their struggle in Ferguson, Baltimore, and elsewhere. All campaigns used moral language in making their arguments. In Jackson they argued that the current way power was allocated in Jackson was immoral because it largely concentrated all of the benefits into a few (predominantly white) hands. In Baltimore they argued that putting $104 million to the goal of incarcerating youth was immoral given the lack of money being spent on youth in other areas, and later that Freddie Gray’s (and before him Tyrone West’s) murder was immoral. In Chicago they argued that closing 50 schools was immoral because it severely impacted the ability of poor black parents and black students to get the same degree of learning their white counterparts had. However, they didn’t rely on those arguments. They understood that seizing power (rather than speaking truth to it), that proposing new alternatives, would at some level have to involve political struggle. Morality wasn’t enough. Even if we had a common defnition of morality, a Christian-infuenced morality for example, that sense of morality could still be interpreted in diferent ways based on material interest. Relying on morality can make it hard to move against the wealthy charter school proponent who sincerely believes that privatizing public schools represent the best hope for increasing positive outcomes among black children. Relying on morality can make it very difficult to argue against the political bureaucrat who says — as they did in the case of Baltimore —that the conditions of youth currently held in adult prisons is so bad that the moral choice would be to give them their own facility where they won’t have to face the risks associated with being housed with adults. In deciding how we go about making our arguments and how we go about choosing our strategies and tactics we should act morally—I do believe our politics have to be rooted in a certain sense of ethics. We should never, however, ignore the fundamental role politics plays and should play in our struggle. Not only did they focus on politics, they all relied on political organizing. Organizing that included long discussions about political issues that mattered, but also parties and other events designed to get people working with each other and trusting one another. In general, people do not come to a common understanding of the structural dynamics of the problem they face, and to a common understanding of what the solution should be, through being exposed to a charismatic speaker, or through “loving black people”, without having the space to talk about the issues in depth over a long period of time. The CTU organized for several years to be able to get a 90% vote. The infrastructure black youth in Baltimore relied upon was by definition designed to inculcate critical thinking skills as well as a sense of the way racism worked at structuring black life chances. The Malcolm X Grassroots Movement worked for years to build the critical capacity required to elect Chokwe, first to the City Council, then Mayor, and to put the political platform into action. There is no way to get around the fact that the type of work we have to do to rebuild a sense of the public interest is going to take a long time and has to start by building connections between people who may not think of themselves as political, who may not think of the various issues they struggle with as being the product of the neoliberal turn, who may not know what neoliberalism is. What I am referring to here is not the same as getting people to attend a rally or a march. I’m referring to political organizing— building the capacity of people to govern and make important political decisions for themselves —not political “mobilizing”. Mobilizing people for a protest act of one kind or another may get people out to engage in a specific act, but unless combined with organizing work, will not cause those people to organize for themselves. Tird in each case they were not only reactive, they were not only being critical of the turn and its efects, they proposed a positive alternative. Protest is not enough. Just as the neoliberal turn did not simply occur when the welfare state was removed, rather it occurred when the welfare state was removed and then replaced with a new program, we will not be able to build a sustainable constituency for a new world without articulating as clearly as possible what that new world will look like, what type of policies would result, what the benefits of those policies would be. Fourth while each of these instances represent responses against the neoliberal turn broadly considered, they each began locally. Te Malcolm X Grassroots Movement has several chapters throughout the country and has already held one conference (planned before Lumumba’s untimely passing) about the Jackson model (which itself is partially based on ideas developed in Spain) and how to export it to other cities. Te movement against the proposed youth jail in Baltimore relied in part on data accumulated by the ACLU on the schoolto-prison pipeline. And as I noted above the Chicago Teachers Union have begun organizing events all across the country to get people to understand how the privatization movement in education afects them. And each of the #blacklivesmatter campaigns began with a specifc local act of police brutality and used that act to organize locally. With this said though each case represents a local struggle people could experience directly. Mark Purcell (2006) argues that academics and activists alike run the risk of falling into the “local trap” by arguing that there is something inherently better and anti-neoliberal about organizing locally. I agree with him a little. Te Civil Rights Movement represented in large part a fght against white supremacy as embedded in local and state politics —the local was not the site of empowerment but rather the site of profound disempowerment for black people throughout the North and the South. However at the same time I argue that sustainable organizing is more likely to occur in response to a local issue (a local school closing, a rise in foreclosures in a local neighborhood, a jail built up the road, a local referendum) that can then be connected to other local issues and made national rather than the other way around. And again the Civil Rights Movement represents the best example of this —people weren’t interested in ending Jim Crow as much as they were interested in desegregating the buses they took to work everyday, desegregating the restaurants they passed on the way to school, desegregating the schools themselves. Fifth they used a variety of black institutions in their struggles. Te Baltimore youth all attended black public schools in Baltimore. Tey used the public schools to garner support for their work and to build relationships with black adults and black children. While a number of Baltimore area churches do promote the prosperity gospel, not all do. A few black churches in Baltimore became critical spaces for organizing against the jail—in fact I ended up fnding out about the movement against the jail in the frst place through hearing a young progressive black nationalist Baltimore pastor speak about the movement. And they used popular culture. Tey used poetry, they used rap and hip-hop, they used parties, understanding that while again the national terrain for hip-hop may move with rather than against the neoliberal turn, they themselves could use it to speak to their local condition. And later they used these same institutions and spaces for their fght against police brutality. Similarly in Jackson the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement did not operate from a clean slate. Tey relied on professors from nearby Jackson State University, they used connections with local churches to gain support for their activities. And the CTU was itself located in one of the most important institutions in black communities, schools. Lastly, they all relied on the fundamental premise that black people had the capacity to be the change they wanted to see in the world. Tey neither believed that black people’s fundamental condition was bruised and broken, nor did they believe that black people because of the contemporary condition didn’t love each other. At the same time though they understood explicitly and implicitly that love was not enough. And while each organization does have a number of leaders they have largely (though not fully) stayed away from the type of prophetic politics that have often created problematic internal hierarchies. Again there are signifcant diferences between these instances. And even though each of these instances were victorious ones that helped to change the terrain of political struggle, there is still much more to be done. In the case of Baltimore they stopped the youth jail but were not able to stop the privatization of Baltimore youth recreation centers, nor have they been able to (as of yet) redirect the $104 million to more progressive ends. Jackson elected Lumumba mayor but after his untimely passing his son ended up coming in second. Chicago teachers made substantial gains as a result of the strike but they were not able to prevent the 50 schools from being closed. Te #blacklivesmatter movement as it stands has not gone without critique. Te most notable one is that even though the project has increased the range of black lives that people are willing to fght for, it still hasn’t gone far enough. Although it’s reasonable to assume, based on the limited data we have, that black boys and young men are victimized by police more than other populations (and to the extent the zero-tolerance technology itself generates broader forms of policing in places like schools), black boys and young men are not the sole target. Black women have been victimized both directly and indirectly by police, as have black transgender populations. These acts have in many instances been as violent as those perpetrated against their male counterparts, and they have been videotaped as well. But they haven’t garnered the same degree of support and/or outrage. Extending the #blacklivesmatter movement to include the lives of black women and transgender populations that are also the victims of police violence would be more than simply a good thing. However there’s a more systemic problem at work. Te idea behind “black lives matters” represents an opportunity to organize around and against a certain type of sufering, a uniquely black sufering, made possible by the neoliberal turn. (It bears repeating, this is not simply the “new Jim Crow” at work. Te odds that someone like me would sufer the type of horrifc death someone like Freddie Gray did is very slim.) However the politics of the #blacklivesmatter movement do not quite match the phrase. Every single time the #blacklivesmatters movement appears it does so in the presence of either a horrifc instance of black death or a startling instance of police brutality. One could argue given this that the real politics of the movement refect the concept that (graphic) black death matters rather than black life. Tis move makes a great deal of sense — one way to think about this move is to think about the way civil rights movement activists used non-violence. Particularly when news cameras were present, non-violent tactics of protest tended to really highlight how violent and terroristic white supremacy in the South and other places was. However, by privileging the graphic black death, the victim shot in his back while running away, the victim who had his back violently broken by police, it ends up ignoring the many forms of non-graphic black death that occurs not because of police violence per se, but because of economic violence. If Freddie Gray weren’t murdered by the police but rather experienced a slow death due to lead poisoning it’s unlikely we’d be talking about him right now. It’d be unlikely that Baltimore would’ve had anything like an uprising. Following up, by privileging black death, graphic black death, we privilege certain types of tactics, strategies, and institutions. We counter the spectacle of the murder with the spectacle of the mass assembly, in the form of the protest march, or the spectacle of the mass disruption, in the form of the highway stoppage, or even in the form of the type of violent actvity the uprising hinted at. Actions in other words that are not only designed to transform the event into a black-and-white catalytic moment where people and the institutions around them feel forced to make a choice for the status quo or against it. And the organizations and institutions we call into being end up being those designed to generate these types of activities and to generate support for these activities (in order to grow the organizations and institutions themselves). As far as solutions go, we also privilege anti-police legislation, and perhaps more broadly, legislation designed to counter the school to prison pipeline. Te political solution for black life matters is to reduce the likelihood of a graphic singular black death— a kid shot on the way to the corner store, a young man shot while holding a BB gun he may have planned on purchasing, a black couple driving a car with a tendency to backfre. Te types of politics that generate change when the deaths come slow, painfully, and in aggregates, or when the issue is an entire legal framework (like the Maryland Law Enforcement Ofcers Bill of Rights) is a diferent politics. It is not solely or primarily a politics of the spectacle. Spectacle can work here in instances. It can be used to mobilize support. It can be used to increase awareness and general participation. And sometimes in combination with other tactics it can be used to disrupt. To generate and prolong crises. Te types of crises that engendered the same type of problems that caused the neoliberal turn. Certainly in the case of Baltimore a range of institutions and elites had no ready-to-roll-out solutions to the issues that the uprising called up. But these aren’t enough. It requires a politics attuned to the type of long term institution building that builds the capacity of individuals to govern and devise alternatives themselves. It also requires a solution set that is more about combating the type of long term institutional violence that doesn’t necessarily have a Trayvon Martin or a Freddie Gray at the center. Te types of violence that, instead might have Freddie Gray at the center, but not at the moment of his murder but at the moment he was found to have lead poisoning. I use these examples in order to argue that we aren’t starting from scratch necessarily— some of the work is already being done on the ground. I use these examples in order to show that we already have the seeds for a new institutional framework that re-roots the economy in politics and in the public interest. To show that we aren’t alone, and that a number of people recognize another way of life is possible. There aren’t as many of us as we’d like, but there are far more of us than we think. | 16,636 | <h4>Learning to seize power through debating institutional dynamics is a more effective political strategy than the alternatives analysis – speaking truth to power cannot create a new political organization that becomes powerful. Empirics prove radical black political organizing is effective when it targets governments strategically and pragmatically. </h4><p><strong>Spence</strong>, Poli Sci Prof @ John Hopkins, <strong>15</p><p><u>(Lester, Knocking the Hustle: Against the Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics, pp. 140-147) </p><p></u></strong>All <u>four examples have a few things in common</u>. First <u>all occurred at a moment where <strong>all seemed lost.</u></strong> While I wouldn’t go as far as to suggest that these events suggest that neoliberalism is “naturally” contested—just as there is no “good teaching gene” there is no “contest neoliberalism gene”—I would say that <u><mark>while the neoliberal turn</mark> has signifcantly <mark>altered </mark>our <mark>ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability</u>. <u></mark>It still exists</u>. It exists <u><strong><mark>in institutions</u></strong></mark> <u>we have written of thinking they are <strong>no longer relevant</u></strong>—like teachers unions. <u>It exists <mark>in populations </mark>we’ve written of because we believe they are incapable of <strong>radical political action</u></strong>— <u><strong><mark>black youth</mark>.</u></strong> <u>It exists <mark>in</mark> cities that we don’t think of as having a long history of radical political struggle</u> —<u><strong>like Jackson<mark>, Mississippi</u></strong></mark>. Second all three recognized the fundamental role politics played in their struggles. The <u>black youth <mark>organizers recognized </mark>that <mark>they had to <strong>pressure </mark>Maryland state <mark>legislators</strong> to kill the prison</u></mark>. <u>The black <mark>radicals in the Malcolm X </mark>Grassroots <mark>Movement made electing</mark> </u>Chokwe <u><mark>Lumumba a component of </mark>their <mark>organizing</mark>.</u> <u><mark>The CTU chose to take the city </mark>head <mark>on and </mark>to <mark>hold </mark>a series of town hall <mark>meetings <strong></mark>designed <mark>to inform people</strong> of </mark>the <mark>ways <strong></mark>political <mark>officials</strong>,</u> <u><strong></mark>philanthropists</u></strong><mark>, <u>and <strong>corporations</u></strong> <u>are working </mark>together <mark>to neoliberalize </mark>and kill <mark>public education</u></mark>. <u>The #<mark>blacklivesmatter</mark> movement <mark>recognized</mark> that <mark>politics</mark> was <mark>at <strong>the center</strong></mark> of their struggle in <strong>Ferguson</u></strong>, Baltimore, and elsewhere. <u><mark>All </mark>campaigns <mark>used moral language</u></mark> in making their arguments. In Jackson they argued that the current way power was allocated in Jackson was immoral because it largely concentrated all of the benefits into a few (predominantly white) hands. In Baltimore they argued that putting $104 million to the goal of incarcerating youth was immoral given the lack of money being spent on youth in other areas, and later that Freddie Gray’s (and before him Tyrone West’s) murder was immoral. In Chicago they argued that closing 50 schools was immoral because it severely impacted the ability of poor black parents and black students to get the same degree of learning their white counterparts had. <u><strong><mark>However</u></strong>, <u>they didn’t <strong>rely</strong> on those </mark>arguments</u>. <u>They understood that <strong><mark>seizing power</u></strong></mark> (<u><mark>rather than <strong>speaking truth to it</u></strong>), <u></mark>that <mark>proposing <strong>new alternatives</u></strong>, <u>would</mark> at some level have to <strong><mark>involve political struggle</u></strong></mark>. Morality wasn’t enough. Even if we had a common defnition of morality, a Christian-infuenced morality for example, that sense of morality could still be interpreted in diferent ways based on material interest. <u>Relying on <mark>morality can make it hard to move against</mark> the wealthy <mark>charter </mark>school <mark>proponent who <strong></mark>sincerely <mark>believes</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>privatizing</mark> public <mark>schools represent <strong>the best hope</u></strong></mark> for increasing positive outcomes among black children. Relying on morality can make it very difficult to argue against the political bureaucrat who says — as they did in the case of Baltimore —that the conditions of youth currently held in adult prisons is so bad that the moral choice would be to give them their own facility where they won’t have to face the risks associated with being housed with adults. <u>In deciding how we go about making our arguments and how we go about choosing our strategies and tactics we should <strong>act morally</u></strong>—I do believe our politics have to be rooted in a certain sense of ethics. <u><mark>We should <strong>never</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>however</u></strong>, <u><mark>ignore </mark>the <strong><mark>fundamental role politics plays</u></strong> <u></mark>and <strong>should play</strong> </u><mark>i</mark>n our struggle. Not only did they focus on politics, <u>they all relied on <strong>political organizing</u></strong>. Organizing <u>that included long discussions about political issues that mattered</u>, <u>but also parties and other events designed to get people working with each other and trusting one another</u>. In general, <u><mark>people do not come to a <strong>common understanding</strong> of </mark>the <strong><mark>structural dynamics</u></strong> <u>of the problem </mark>they face<mark>, </mark>and to a common understanding of what <mark>the solution </mark>should be,</u> <u><mark>through </mark>being exposed to a</u> charismatic speaker, or through “<u><mark>loving</u></mark> black people”, <u><mark>without </mark>having the <mark>space to talk about </mark>the <mark>issues <strong>in depth</strong> over </mark>a <strong>long period of <mark>time</u></strong></mark>. The CTU organized for several years to be able to get a 90% vote. The infrastructure black youth in Baltimore relied upon was by definition designed to inculcate critical thinking skills as well as a sense of the way racism worked at structuring black life chances. The Malcolm X Grassroots Movement worked for years to build the critical capacity required to elect Chokwe, first to the City Council, then Mayor, and to put the political platform into action. There is no way to get around the fact that the type of work we have to do to rebuild a sense of the public interest is going to take a long time and has to start by building connections between people who may not think of themselves as political, who may not think of the various issues they struggle with as being the product of the neoliberal turn, who may not know what neoliberalism is. What I am referring to here is not the same as getting people to attend a rally or a march. <u>I’m referring to </u>political organizing— <u><mark>building </mark>the <mark>capacity </mark>of people<mark> to</mark> govern and<mark> make</mark> important <strong><mark>political decisions</strong></mark> </u>for themselves —<u><strong><mark>not </mark>political <mark>“mobilizing”.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Mobilizing</mark> people for a protest act of one kind or another <mark>may get</mark> people out to engage in <mark>a <strong></mark>specific <mark>act</u></strong>, <u><strong>but</u></strong> <u>unless combined with <strong>organizing </mark>work</strong><mark>,</u> <u>will not cause </mark>those <mark>people to organize for themselves</u></mark>. Tird in each case they were not only reactive, they were not only being critical of the turn and its efects, they proposed a positive alternative. <u><strong><mark>Protest is not enough</u></strong></mark>. <u>Just as the neoliberal turn did not simply occur when the welfare state was removed</u>, <u>rather it occurred when the welfare state was removed and then replaced <strong>with a new program</u></strong>, <u>we will not be able <mark>to build a sustainable constituency</mark> for a new world <strong><mark>without articulating</u></strong></mark> as clearly as possible <u><strong><mark>what that new world will look like,</u></strong> <u><strong>what </mark>type of <mark>policies </mark>would <mark>result</strong>, <strong></mark>what the <mark>benefits </mark>of those policies <mark>would be</u></strong></mark>. Fourth while each of these instances represent responses against the neoliberal turn broadly considered, they each began locally. Te Malcolm X Grassroots Movement has several chapters throughout the country and has already held one conference (planned before Lumumba’s untimely passing) about the Jackson model (which itself is partially based on ideas developed in Spain) and how to export it to other cities. Te movement against the proposed youth jail in Baltimore relied in part on data accumulated by the ACLU on the schoolto-prison pipeline. And as I noted above the Chicago Teachers Union have begun organizing events all across the country to get people to understand how the privatization movement in education afects them. And each of the #blacklivesmatter campaigns began with a specifc local act of police brutality and used that act to organize locally. With this said though each case represents a local struggle people could experience directly. Mark Purcell (2006) argues that academics and activists alike run the risk of falling into the “local trap” by arguing that there is something inherently better and anti-neoliberal about organizing locally. I agree with him a little. Te Civil Rights Movement represented in large part a fght against white supremacy as embedded in local and state politics —the local was not the site of empowerment but rather the site of profound disempowerment for black people throughout the North and the South. However at the same time I argue that sustainable organizing is more likely to occur in response to a local issue (a local school closing, a rise in foreclosures in a local neighborhood, a jail built up the road, a local referendum) that can then be connected to other local issues and made national rather than the other way around. And again the Civil Rights Movement represents the best example of this —people weren’t interested in ending Jim Crow as much as they were interested in desegregating the buses they took to work everyday, desegregating the restaurants they passed on the way to school, desegregating the schools themselves. Fifth they used a variety of black institutions in their struggles. Te Baltimore youth all attended black public schools in Baltimore. Tey used the public schools to garner support for their work and to build relationships with black adults and black children. While a number of Baltimore area churches do promote the prosperity gospel, not all do. A few black churches in Baltimore became critical spaces for organizing against the jail—in fact I ended up fnding out about the movement against the jail in the frst place through hearing a young progressive black nationalist Baltimore pastor speak about the movement. And they used popular culture. Tey used poetry, they used rap and hip-hop, they used parties, understanding that while again the national terrain for hip-hop may move with rather than against the neoliberal turn, they themselves could use it to speak to their local condition. And later they used these same institutions and spaces for their fght against police brutality. Similarly in Jackson the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement did not operate from a clean slate. Tey relied on professors from nearby Jackson State University, they used connections with local churches to gain support for their activities. And the CTU was itself located in one of the most important institutions in black communities, schools. Lastly, they all relied on the fundamental premise that black people had the capacity to be the change they wanted to see in the world. Tey neither believed that black people’s fundamental condition was bruised and broken, nor did they believe that black people because of the contemporary condition didn’t love each other. At the same time though they understood explicitly and implicitly that love was not enough. And while each organization does have a number of leaders they have largely (though not fully) stayed away from the type of prophetic politics that have often created problematic internal hierarchies. Again there are signifcant diferences between these instances. And even though each of these instances were victorious ones that helped to change the terrain of political struggle, there is still much more to be done. In the case of Baltimore they stopped the youth jail but were not able to stop the privatization of Baltimore youth recreation centers, nor have they been able to (as of yet) redirect the $104 million to more progressive ends. Jackson elected Lumumba mayor but after his untimely passing his son ended up coming in second. Chicago teachers made substantial gains as a result of the strike but they were not able to prevent the 50 schools from being closed. Te #blacklivesmatter movement as it stands has not gone without critique. Te most notable one is that even though the project has increased the range of black lives that people are willing to fght for, it still hasn’t gone far enough. Although it’s reasonable to assume, based on the limited data we have, that black boys and young men are victimized by police more than other populations (and to the extent the zero-tolerance technology itself generates broader forms of policing in places like schools), black boys and young men are not the sole target. Black women have been victimized both directly and indirectly by police, as have black transgender populations. These acts have in many instances been as violent as those perpetrated against their male counterparts, and they have been videotaped as well. But they haven’t garnered the same degree of support and/or outrage. Extending the #blacklivesmatter movement to include the lives of black women and transgender populations that are also the victims of police violence would be more than simply a good thing. However there’s a more systemic problem at work. Te idea behind “black lives matters” represents an opportunity to organize around and against a certain type of sufering, a uniquely black sufering, made possible by the neoliberal turn. (It bears repeating, this is not simply the “new Jim Crow” at work. Te odds that someone like me would sufer the type of horrifc death someone like Freddie Gray did is very slim.) However the politics of the #blacklivesmatter movement do not quite match the phrase. Every single time the #blacklivesmatters movement appears it does so in the presence of either a horrifc instance of black death or a startling instance of police brutality. One could argue given this that the real politics of the movement refect the concept that (graphic) black death matters rather than black life. Tis move makes a great deal of sense — one way to think about this move is to think about the way civil rights movement activists used non-violence. Particularly when news cameras were present, non-violent tactics of protest tended to really highlight how violent and terroristic white supremacy in the South and other places was. However, by privileging the graphic black death, the victim shot in his back while running away, the victim who had his back violently broken by police, it ends up ignoring the many forms of non-graphic black death that occurs not because of police violence per se, but because of economic violence. If Freddie Gray weren’t murdered by the police but rather experienced a slow death due to lead poisoning it’s unlikely we’d be talking about him right now. It’d be unlikely that Baltimore would’ve had anything like an uprising. Following up, by privileging black death, graphic black death, we privilege certain types of tactics, strategies, and institutions. We counter the spectacle of the murder with the spectacle of the mass assembly, in the form of the protest march, or the spectacle of the mass disruption, in the form of the highway stoppage, or even in the form of the type of violent actvity the uprising hinted at. Actions in other words that are not only designed to transform the event into a black-and-white catalytic moment where people and the institutions around them feel forced to make a choice for the status quo or against it. And the organizations and institutions we call into being end up being those designed to generate these types of activities and to generate support for these activities (in order to grow the organizations and institutions themselves). As far as solutions go, we also privilege anti-police legislation, and perhaps more broadly, legislation designed to counter the school to prison pipeline. Te political solution for black life matters is to reduce the likelihood of a graphic singular black death— a kid shot on the way to the corner store, a young man shot while holding a BB gun he may have planned on purchasing, a black couple driving a car with a tendency to backfre. Te types of politics that generate change when the deaths come slow, painfully, and in aggregates, or when the issue is an entire legal framework (like the Maryland Law Enforcement Ofcers Bill of Rights) is a diferent politics. It is not solely or primarily a politics of the spectacle. Spectacle can work here in instances. It can be used to mobilize support. It can be used to increase awareness and general participation. And sometimes in combination with other tactics it can be used to disrupt. To generate and prolong crises. Te types of crises that engendered the same type of problems that caused the neoliberal turn. Certainly in the case of Baltimore a range of institutions and elites had no ready-to-roll-out solutions to the issues that the uprising called up. But these aren’t enough. It requires a politics attuned to the type of long term institution building that builds the capacity of individuals to govern and devise alternatives themselves. It also requires a solution set that is more about combating the type of long term institutional violence that doesn’t necessarily have a Trayvon Martin or a Freddie Gray at the center. Te types of violence that, instead might have Freddie Gray at the center, but not at the moment of his murder but at the moment he was found to have lead poisoning. I use these examples in order to argue that we aren’t starting from scratch necessarily— some of the work is already being done on the ground. <u>I use these examples in order to show that <mark>we </mark>already <mark>have the seeds for a <strong>new institutional framework</strong> </mark>that <strong>re-roots the economy</strong> in <strong>politics</strong> and in <strong>the public interest</strong>. To show that we aren’t alone, and that a number of people recognize another way of life is possible.</u> <u>There aren’t as many of us as we’d like,</u> <u><strong>but there are far more of us than we think.</p></u></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 56,994 | 255 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,441 | US and Mexican economic coop key to global econ | Shifter, Georgetown Latin American Studies Professor, 13 | Shifter, Georgetown Latin American Studies Professor, 13
(Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, February 2013, Inter-American Dialogue, “A More Ambitious Agenda: A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Comission on Mexico-US Relations,” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf, pg. 2) | reinforce and deepen economic cooperation ncludes increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of both nations, opening opportunities for longterm growth and job creation, and setting the stage for further economic integration. the more the United States and Mexico coordinate and integrate their economies, the more ably they can compete for global markets. Their economic cooperation is more vital than ever as drivers of the global economy falter—as the European financial crisis persists, as China enters a period of slower growth, as Japan remains stalled, and as many emerging markets appear increasingly vulnerable. the two countries should develop a framework to make their shared labor markets more efficient and equitable; formation of a coherent North American energy market | economic cooperation the U S and Mexico coordinate compete for global markets economic cooperation is more vital than ever as drivers of the global economy falter as China Japan remain stalled the two countries should develop a framework to make their shared labor markets more efficient and equitable; | The first is to reinforce and deepen economic cooperation. That includes increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of both nations, opening opportunities for longterm growth and job creation, and setting the stage for further economic integration. In a world of persistent, widespread economic insecurity, the more the United States and Mexico coordinate and integrate their economies, the more ably they can compete for global markets. Their economic cooperation is more vital than ever as drivers of the global economy falter—as the European financial crisis persists, as China enters a period of slower growth, as Japan remains stalled, and as many emerging markets appear increasingly vulnerable. Among the concrete objectives the two countries should consider are development of a framework to make their shared labor markets more efficient and equitable; formation of a coherent North American energy market (which could help meet the needs of energy-poor Central America); and coordination among the United States, Mexico, and Canada in negotiations toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). | 1,120 | <h4><strong>US and Mexican economic coop key to global econ </h4><p>Shifter, Georgetown Latin American Studies Professor, 13</p><p></strong>(Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, February 2013, Inter-American Dialogue, “A More Ambitious Agenda: A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Comission on Mexico-US Relations,” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf, pg. 2)</p><p> The first is to <u>reinforce and deepen <mark>economic cooperation</u></mark>. That i<u>ncludes increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of both nations, opening opportunities for longterm growth and job creation, and setting the stage for further economic integration. </u>In a world of persistent, widespread economic insecurity,<u> the more <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and Mexico coordinate</mark> and integrate their economies, the more ably they can <mark>compete for global markets</mark>.</u> <u>Their <mark>economic cooperation is more vital than ever as drivers of the global economy falter</mark>—as the European financial crisis persists, <mark>as China</mark> enters a period of slower growth, as <mark>Japan remain</mark>s <mark>stalled</mark>, and as many emerging markets appear increasingly vulnerable. </u>Among the concrete objectives <u><mark>the two countries should</u></mark> consider are <u><mark>develop</u></mark>ment of <u><mark>a framework to make their shared labor markets more efficient and equitable;</mark> formation of a coherent North American energy market</u> (which could help meet the needs of energy-poor Central America); and coordination among the United States, Mexico, and Canada in negotiations toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).</p> | Neg Mount vernon | Off Case | 1 | 275,591 | 10 | 125,796 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | 655,688 | N | Johns Creek | 1 | Mount Vernon | Hadar Regev | 1ac - space colonization
1nc - neolib PIC out of wolf wolf good nasa budget da aliens turn on case ptx nafta da T
2nc - neolib wolf good pic
1nr - case aliens turn | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Johns%20Creek-Round1.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,442 | Foreign aid specific to the aff is seen as a waste of domestic resources—backlash against Xi | Huang 2/9 | Huang 2/9(Krisitin Huang, Kristin Huang has extensive experience as an author and journalist in Chinese Politics, foreign relations, and ties. 02-09-2017, "China must act more wisely in giving out foreign aid, says Xi Jinping," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/article/2069414/chinas-president-xi-wants-wiser-approach-foreign-aid-donation) | China must act more wisely when giving money to foreign countries by “optimising the strategic layout” of foreign aid, President Xi Jinping told a meeting in Beijing this week. China must “improve management over foreign aid funds The country’s foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly, putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce “wasteful” use of Chinese funds, China has provided 600 billion yuan (HK$678 billion) in “foreign assistance” since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa. ”, China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion | China must act more wisely when giving foreign aid, foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce “wasteful” use of Chinese funds, A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa. China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion | China must act more wisely when giving money to foreign countries by “optimising the strategic layout” of foreign aid, President Xi Jinping told a meeting in Beijing this week.Xi’s comments at the meeting of the Communist Party’s leading small group on comprehensively deepening reform reflect his desire to extract greater returns from China’s spending abroad as Beijing seeks to increase its international influence. China must “improve management over foreign aid funds and projects, reform the foreign aid administration system and improve the overall results of foreign aid,” the official Xinhua news agency quoted Xi as telling Monday’s meeting. How China’s development story can be an alternative to the Western model The country’s foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly, putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing for overseas spending. The reserves fell below US$3 trillion at the end of January, the lowest level in six years. At the same time, the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments and failing to consider possible returns. China’s ambassador to Syria, Qi Qianjin (second left) signs a memorandum of understanding with Imad al-Azab, head of the National Commission for the Syrian Science Olympiad, in Damascus, Syria, in November. Qi said China was carrying on with providing Syria with humanitarian aid worth US$70 million. Photo: Xinhua “China needs to make sure that foreign assistance is used in the right places,” said Su Ge, president of the China Institute of International Studies, a foreign ministry think tank. A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce “wasteful” use of Chinese funds, Su said. According to a government white paper issued at the end of last year, China has provided 600 billion yuan (HK$678 billion) in “foreign assistance” since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. In the early days, foreign aid when mainly to countries with similar ideologies, such as North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania. Beijing pledged billions to aid developing country over 15 years, says Xi Jinping A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa. China is trying to boost its global clout via programmes such as the ‘One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative and new institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and foreign assistance is also expected to facilitate overseas investment. President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (right) while South African President Jacob Zuma looks on during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015. Photo: Reuters It was “normal” for China to adjust its foreign assistance strategies according to differences in recipients’ levels of development, Liu Naiya, a West Asian and African studies expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said. Improving the way foreign aid worked would help China gain an image as “a responsible country in the world”, Liu said. China’s foreign aid projects have, however, sometimes been criticised as sweeteners offered by Beijing to gain deals abroad. China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion Professor Axel Dreher, an economist at the University of Heidelberg in Germany who specialises in international and development politics, said some aid had been diverted to the tribal homelands of African leaders or members of their tribe. “It thus seems that the aid does not purely finance development,” he said But given that China stressed the principle of non-interference in recipients’ policies, it “should grant its aid as pure budget support, allowing the recipient government to chose what to use the aid for”. | 3,877 | <h4><strong>Foreign aid specific to the aff is seen as a waste of domestic resources—backlash against Xi</h4><p>Huang 2/9</strong>(Krisitin Huang, Kristin Huang has extensive experience as an author and journalist in Chinese Politics, foreign relations, and ties. 02-09-2017, "China must act more wisely in giving out foreign aid, says Xi Jinping," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/article/2069414/chinas-president-xi-wants-wiser-approach-foreign-aid-donation)</p><p><u><mark>China must act more wisely when giving</mark> money to foreign countries by “optimising the strategic layout” of <mark>foreign aid,</mark> President Xi Jinping told a meeting in Beijing this week.</u>Xi’s comments at the meeting of the Communist Party’s leading small group on comprehensively deepening reform reflect his desire to extract greater returns from China’s spending abroad as Beijing seeks to increase its international influence. <u>China must “improve management over foreign aid funds</u> and projects, reform the foreign aid administration system and improve the overall results of foreign aid,” the official Xinhua news agency quoted Xi as telling Monday’s meeting. How China’s development story can be an alternative to the Western model <u>The country’s <mark>foreign exchange reserves have been shrinking rapidly</mark>, <mark>putting constraints on the financial resources available to Beijing</u></mark> for overseas spending. The reserves fell below US$3 trillion at the end of January, the lowest level in six years. At the same time, <u><strong><mark>the central government has faced domestic criticism for being too generous when giving money to foreign governments</u></strong></mark> and failing to consider possible returns. China’s ambassador to Syria, Qi Qianjin (second left) signs a memorandum of understanding with Imad al-Azab, head of the National Commission for the Syrian Science Olympiad, in Damascus, Syria, in November. Qi said China was carrying on with providing Syria with humanitarian aid worth US$70 million. Photo: Xinhua “China needs to make sure that foreign assistance is used in the right places,” said Su Ge, president of the China Institute of International Studies, a foreign ministry think tank. <u><mark>A key foreign aid priority for China was to reduce <strong>“wasteful” </strong>use of Chinese funds,</u></mark> Su said. According to a government white paper issued at the end of last year, <u>China has provided 600 billion yuan (HK$678 billion) in “foreign assistance” since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949</u>. In the early days, foreign aid when mainly to countries with similar ideologies, such as North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania. Beijing pledged billions to aid developing country over 15 years, says Xi Jinping <u><mark>A government report in 2014 said China gave 89 billion yuan in foreign assistance in the three years from 2010 to 2012, with half of that going to Africa.</mark> </u>China is trying to boost its global clout via programmes such as the ‘One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative and new institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and foreign assistance is also expected to facilitate overseas investment. President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (right) while South African President Jacob Zuma looks on during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015. Photo: Reuters It was “normal” for China to adjust its foreign assistance strategies according to differences in recipients’ levels of development, Liu Naiya, a West Asian and African studies expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said. Improving the way foreign aid worked would help China gain an image as “a responsible country in the world<u><strong>”,</u></strong> Liu said. China’s foreign aid projects have, however, sometimes been criticised as sweeteners offered by Beijing to gain deals abroad. <u><mark>China says foreign aid budget over six decades tops US$58 billion</mark> </u>Professor Axel Dreher, an economist at the University of Heidelberg in Germany who specialises in international and development politics, said some aid had been diverted to the tribal homelands of African leaders or members of their tribe. “It thus seems that the aid does not purely finance development,” he said But given that China stressed the principle of non-interference in recipients’ policies, it “should grant its aid as pure budget support, allowing the recipient government to chose what to use the aid for”.</p> | 1NC Round 5 v Woodward | Off Case | 1NC Off Case Shell | 1,560,827 | 2 | 125,775 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | 655,696 | N | Woodward nats | 5 | Wayzata KY | Jacob Crusan | 1ac - obor
1nc - ptx cap k human rights cp xi da
2nc - ptx case
1nr - cp
2nr - ptx cp theory case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-Woodward%20nats-Round5.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,443 | Flight from an anti-black world is activated through macropolitical changes – freedom is metaphysical cognition meaning institutional engagement complements their political strategy, it doesn’t supplant it. Material theories of social position double turn with their theory, which is a reason to prefer framework over the af. | Roberts 15 | Roberts, Associate Professor of Africana Studies @ Williams College, 15 | 118-121)
Sociogenic marronage denotes macropolitical flight whereby agents flee through non-fleeting acts of reordering of the state of society and constitutionalism It is a non-sovereign state of being whose conception of freedom is shaped by cognition, metaphysics egalitarianism hope and the experiences of masses in political order Condition, not place, is vital marronage operates against the presumption that slaves exist in a state of “social death.” The idea of social death denies the significance of psychology to freedom rendering it unable to explain how slaves are able to become free physically outside the actions and intentions of enslaving agents It cannot explain the metaphysics of freedom thereby offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the constitution of the self and drastic alterations of social structures. This would shatter the assumptions of European human sciences the unfree exist in a zone of nonbeing Rather than an inert state of social death the zone of nonbeing is As loathsome as life inside this zone might be, it is a zone of hope Flight always exists as a potentiality The experience of the unfree in the zone of nonbeing, Fanon detects there how the experience of the black under the racial gaze during and after slavery and colonialism structures unfreedom choices and vision of an alter native future The “Look” fixes Fanon, unable to avoid the effects of another’s learned language Fanon details unfreedom and the phenomenology of antiblack racis His point is to exhibit an edict that transcends periodization however counterintuitive or nauseating, the zone can induce action The zone of nonbeing harbors the prospect for revolution among the unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing life options | Sociogenic marronage denotes macropolitical flight whereby agents flee through non-fleeting acts reordering of the state and constitutionalism by cognition, metaphysics Condition is vital marronage operates against presumption slaves exist in “social death.” social death denies significance of psychology to freedom, rendering it unable to explain how slaves are able to become free physically outside actions enslaving agents. It cannot explain the metaphysics of freedom offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the self and alterations of social structures. As loathsome as life inside this zone it is a zone of hope Flight always exists The “Look” fixes Fanon unable to avoid the effects of another’s learned language His point is to exhibit an edict that transcends periodization however counterintuitive the zone can induce action zone of nonbeing harbors prospect for revolution among unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing options | (Neil, “Freedom as Marronage” pp. 118-121)
Sociogenic marronage denotes macropolitical flight whereby agents flee slavery through non-fleeting acts of naming, vèvè architectonics, liberation, reordering of the state of society, and constitutionalism. It is a non-sovereign state of being whose conception of freedom is shaped by cognition, metaphysics, egalitarianism, hope for refuge, and the experiences of masses in a social and political order. Condition, not place, is vital to its phenomenology In the beginning of our study, we discerned how marronage operates against the presumption that slaves exist in a state of “social death.” In the language of vodou, social death is the life of a zombie, a being roaming the earth with glazed eyes, lacking the ability to control its actions, an entity neither dead nor alive. Social death is compatible with maintaining that all slave revolts inevitably enter into a maroon dimension and that freedom is the slave’s response to powerlessness, dishonor, and natal alienation under mastery. The idea of social death denies the significance of psychology to freedom, rendering it unable to explain how slaves are able to become free physically outside the actions and intentions of enslaving agents. It also cannot explain the metaphysics of freedom, thereby offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the constitution of the self and drastic alterations of social structures. Prominent nineteenth- and twentieth-century European thinkers, in cluding Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Alfred Adler, and Jacques Lacan, opposed the bracketing of the psychological in interpreta lions of child, adolescent, and adult behavior and actions. Nietzsche went so far as to categorize psychology as a prima philosophiac and the foremost human science beyond good and evil,” Before the Martinican philosopher and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, the fields of psychoanalysis and psychopathology shared a common limiting epistemology inherited from the Enlightenment: the reduction of individual psychological experiences to universal human attributes. In the mid-twentieth century, Fanon reshaped psychological inquiry by placing it alongside the traditions of existential phenomenology and Ca ribbean thought. This would shatter the assumptions of European human sciences and leave, well into the twenty-first century, residual questions for the philosophical conjectures of adherents of the social death trope who have sought to overturn Western bifurcations of negative and positive the orizations of freedom while subordinating the psychological to statistical insignificance. Fanon once wrote of composing ideas that were not to he construed as timeless truths. Hut his revelations turned out to be of tians- historical import, and they can be read for our purposes backward into the Haitian Revolution. Fanon argues in Black Skin, White Masks that the unfree exist in a zone of nonbeing” (zone de non-être; see fig. 1). This hellish cartographic space is physical and psychological, and it structures personal expression as well as the state of society. Rather than an inert state of social death, the zone of nonbeing is “an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge.”” As loathsome as life inside this zone of enslavement might be, it is a zone of hope and natality. Flight always exists as a potentiality constrained by circumstance. The experience of the unfree in the zone of nonbeing, which Fanon likens in his final treatise, The Wretched of the Earth, to that of the dannes (the damned), foments the trepidations and aspirations of the enslaved. The famous fifth chapter of Black Skin, mistranslated into English for decades as The Fact of Blackness,” is properly translated The Lived Experience of the Black” (L’expérience vécue du Noir). Fanon detects there how the experience of the black Antillean under slavery and the racial gaze during and after slavery and colonialism structures her unfreedom, choices, and vision of an alter native future. He laments an experience of a walk in France when, after having departed Martinique for the metropole, a young white child, fearful of Fanon’s presence by virtue of his blackness, points to him and shouts; “Look, a Negro (Nègre)”' The child’s parent replies, “Ssh! You’ll make him angry Don’t pay attention to him, monsieur, he doesn’t realize you’re pust as civilized as we are”3 The “Look” fixes Fanon, the black over-determined externally because of the epidermal racial schema, the black unable to avoid the effects of another’s learned language rooted in the political philosophy of white supremacy. Fanon details unfreedom and the phenomenology of antiblack racism not only in late colonialism, but also in transatlantic slavery. His point, though, is to exhibit an edict that transcends periodization. Fanon examines the zone of nonbeing, determining that, however counterintuitive or nauseating, the zone prepares Ithe human to act,” can induce man to be actional,” and is a region ripe for an authentic upheaval.’5 Whether through négritude, Marxism, sources of the self, or another system beyond Fanon’s considerations in Black Skin, the axiom is clear: The zone of nonbeing harbors the prospect for revolution among the unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing life options. | 5,414 | <h4>Flight from an anti-black world is activated through macropolitical changes – freedom is metaphysical cognition meaning institutional engagement complements their political strategy, it doesn’t supplant it. Material theories of social position double turn with their theory, which is a reason to prefer framework over the af. </h4><p><strong>Roberts</strong>, Associate Professor of Africana Studies @ Williams College, <strong>15</strong> </p><p>(Neil, “Freedom as Marronage” pp. <u><strong>118-121)</p><p></strong><mark>Sociogenic marronage denotes <strong>macropolitical flight</u></strong> <u>whereby agents flee</u></mark> slavery <u><strong><mark>through non-fleeting acts</u></strong></mark> <u>of</u> naming, vèvè architectonics, liberation, <u><strong><mark>reordering of the state</mark> of society</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>constitutionalism</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is a non-sovereign state of being whose conception of freedom is shaped <mark>by <strong>cognition</strong>,</u> <u><strong>metaphysics</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>egalitarianism</u></strong>,<mark> <u><strong></mark>hope</u></strong> for refuge, <u>and the experiences of masses in</u> a social and <u><strong>political order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Condition</mark>, not place, <mark>is vital</u></strong></mark> to its phenomenology In the beginning of our study, we discerned how <u><mark>marronage operates <strong>against </mark>the <mark>presumption</strong> </mark>that <strong><mark>slaves exist in </mark>a state of <mark>“social death.”</mark> </u></strong>In the language of vodou, social death is the life of a zombie, a being roaming the earth with glazed eyes, lacking the ability to control its actions, an entity neither dead nor alive. Social death is compatible with maintaining that all slave revolts inevitably enter into a maroon dimension and that freedom is the slave’s response to powerlessness, dishonor, and natal alienation under mastery. <u>The idea of <mark>social death denies </mark>the <mark>significance of <strong>psychology to freedom</u></strong>, <u>rendering it unable</mark> <mark>to explain how slaves are able to become <strong>free physically outside</u></strong></mark> <u>the <mark>actions </mark>and <strong>intentions of <mark>enslaving agents</u></strong>. <u>It</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>cannot explain</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the metaphysics of freedom</u></mark>, <u>thereby <mark>offering an incomplete account of becoming free as it relates to the </mark>constitution of the <mark>self and <strong></mark>drastic <mark>alterations of social structures.</mark> </u></strong>Prominent nineteenth- and twentieth-century European thinkers, in cluding Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Alfred Adler, and Jacques Lacan, opposed the bracketing of the psychological in interpreta lions of child, adolescent, and adult behavior and actions. Nietzsche went so far as to categorize psychology as a prima philosophiac and the foremost human science beyond good and evil,” Before the Martinican philosopher and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, the fields of psychoanalysis and psychopathology shared a common limiting epistemology inherited from the Enlightenment: the reduction of individual psychological experiences to universal human attributes. In the mid-twentieth century, Fanon reshaped psychological inquiry by placing it alongside the traditions of existential phenomenology and Ca ribbean thought. <u><strong>This would shatter the assumptions</u></strong> <u>of European human sciences</u> and leave, well into the twenty-first century, residual questions for the philosophical conjectures of adherents of the social death trope who have sought to overturn Western bifurcations of negative and positive the orizations of freedom while subordinating the psychological to statistical insignificance. Fanon once wrote of composing ideas that were not to he construed as timeless truths. Hut his revelations turned out to be of tians- historical import, and they can be read for our purposes backward into the Haitian Revolution. Fanon argues in Black Skin, White Masks that <u>the unfree exist in a zone of nonbeing</u>” (zone de non-être; see fig. 1). This hellish cartographic space is physical and psychological, and it structures personal expression as well as the state of society. <u>Rather than an inert state of <strong>social death</u></strong>, <u>the zone of nonbeing is </u>“an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge.”” <u><mark>As loathsome as life inside this zone</u></mark> of enslavement <u><strong>might be, <mark>it is a zone of hope</mark> </u></strong>and natality. <u><strong><mark>Flight always exists</u></strong> <u></mark>as a potentiality </u>constrained by circumstance. <u>The experience of the unfree in the zone of nonbeing, </u>which Fanon likens in his final treatise, The Wretched of the Earth, to that of the dannes (the damned), foments the trepidations and aspirations of the enslaved. The famous fifth chapter of Black Skin, mistranslated into English for decades as The Fact of Blackness,” is properly translated The Lived Experience of the Black” (L’expérience vécue du Noir). <u>Fanon detects there how the experience of the black</u> Antillean <u>under</u> slavery and <u>the racial gaze during and after slavery and colonialism structures</u> her <u>unfreedom</u>, <u>choices</u>, <u>and vision of an alter native future</u>. He laments an experience of a walk in France when, after having departed Martinique for the metropole, a young white child, fearful of Fanon’s presence by virtue of his blackness, points to him and shouts; “Look, a Negro (Nègre)”' The child’s parent replies, “Ssh! You’ll make him angry Don’t pay attention to him, monsieur, he doesn’t realize you’re pust as civilized as we are”3 <u><strong><mark>The “Look” fixes Fanon</mark>,</u></strong> the black over-determined externally because of the epidermal racial schema, the black <u><mark>unable to avoid the effects of <strong>another’s learned language</u></strong></mark> rooted in the political philosophy of white supremacy. <u>Fanon details unfreedom and the phenomenology of antiblack racis</u>m not only in late colonialism, but also in transatlantic slavery. <u><mark>His point</u></mark>, though, <u><mark>is to exhibit an edict that <strong>transcends periodization</u></strong></mark>. Fanon examines the zone of nonbeing, determining that, <u><mark>however <strong>counterintuitive</strong> </mark>or <strong>nauseating</strong>,</u> <u><strong><mark>the zone</mark> </u></strong>prepares Ithe human to act,” <u><strong><mark>can induce</mark> </u></strong>man to be <u><strong><mark>action</u></strong></mark>al,” and is a region ripe for an authentic upheaval.’5 Whether through négritude, Marxism, sources of the self, or another system beyond Fanon’s considerations in Black Skin, the axiom is clear: <u><strong>The <mark>zone of nonbeing harbors </mark>the <mark>prospect for revolution among </mark>the <mark>unfree who ascertain dissatisfaction with existing </mark>life <mark>options</u></mark>.</p></strong> | 1NC Round 3 State | Case | null | 40,798 | 26 | 125,795 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | 655,690 | N | GFCA State But not really | 3 | Paideia HT | Lane Bearden | 1AC - Afro-Eurasia
1NC - T Case
2NC - T
1NR - Case
2NR - T Case | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,444 | Functional limits check – those affs would lose to T-increase means net outcome. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Functional limits check – those affs would lose to T-increase means net outcome.</h4> | 1NR | Appeasement | over | 1,560,828 | 1 | 126,082 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | 660,776 | N | Berkeley | 3 | Bellarmine YP | Pismarov, Vivie | 1AC- Underwater Drones
1NC- Appeasement Xi Pan T-QPQ
2AC- Condo and Perf Con
Block- Appeasement T-QPQ
2NR-T-QPQ | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round3.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
Subsets and Splits