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3,783,145 | Fairness is an intrinsic good---competitive fun debate can only happen if both sides have a chance to compete -- above proves they decimate that | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Fairness is an <u>intrinsic good</u>---competitive fun debate can only happen if both sides have a chance to compete -- above proves they decimate that</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,682 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,146 | BUT, Yes great power war – realism, fear of worse alts, failed political processes, violent human nature – their evidence twists definitions to exclude our scenarios | null | -On point answer to Mueller, Pinker and Mandelbaum | }
pundits are keen to draw parallels between 1914 and 2014—though on its face it’s not apparent to me why 2014 should be more like 1914 than 2013.¶ the issue of whether major war’s obsolete received coverage in the late 1990s Mueller argued it was obsolete Mandelbaum argued major war was just a poor policy —because of the steep rise in the costs and thin rewards for success It’s intriguing the question is typically qualified by the adjective “major. No one seems particularly keen to claim that nasty little wars are obsolete, perhaps because they patently aren’t. Then 9/11 came along and sideswiped that whole debate. The nasty little wars of the 1990s didn’t stay in faraway places. A superpower got up and marched off to war Somewhere the mission became conflated with a host of problems, and Washington ended up obsessing about the Global War on Terror Washington’s behavior at least answered one question did great powers still go to war? Yes. Now, the question still unanswered is whether or not major powers still go to war with each other.¶ Pinker recently argued the better angels of our nature are making us turn away from violence. I’m not wholly convinced better angels seem pretty militant to me, and always have been. Let’s put aside the academic arguments and look straight at the case that most worries us. Is a great-power war between the U.S. and China possible yes Great powers don’t go to war with each other lightly. But sometimes wars happen. And they aren’t accidents. They’re about international order. They’re about the life and death of states. And the principal reason for fighting them is that not doing so looks like a worse alternative.¶ Moreover, the paths to war—including major-power war—are not reserved solely for conventionally-armed states. Where both powers are nuclear-armed we should political control it would help if both sides shared a common understanding of where the firebreaks were but it’s possible that neither of those conditions might exist Indeed, it’s because major war is possible that we retain such a keen interest in war termination. Unconstrained escalation doesn’t lead to a happy place. | Mueller argued it was obsolete Mandelbaum argued poor policy No one claim little wars are obsolete because they aren’t 9/11 came along A superpower marched to war Washington’s behavior answered great powers go to war Is war between U.S. China yes sometimes wars happen They’re about international order because major war is possible we retain interest in war termination | Lyon 14 {Rod, director of the strategy and international program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, executive editor of The Strategist, “No, Great Power War Isn’t Obsolete,” The Diplomat, 8/22, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/no-great-power-war-isnt-obsolete/}
August has seen a wave of reflection on major war. It’s a question we seem to revisit every time the key anniversaries of WWI and WWII roll around, but especially this year because its the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI. Some pundits are keen to draw parallels between 1914 and 2014—though on its face it’s not apparent to me why 2014 should be more like 1914 than 2013.¶ Academic strategists familiar with their disciplinary history will know that the issue of whether major war’s obsolete received a detailed coverage back in Survival magazine in the late 1990s. To save readers the trouble of digging through their archives, one contributor, John Mueller, argued that it was obsolete—gone the way of slavery and dueling—while others wrestled partly over how to define obsolescence and even more over how to define major war. Was the Vietnam War “major?” Was the Cold War a “war?” Michael Mandelbaum argued that perhaps major war was just a poor policy option nowadays—because of the steep rise in the costs and the thin rewards for success.¶ It’s intriguing that the question about the obsolescence of war is typically qualified by the adjective “major.” No one seems particularly keen to claim that nasty little wars—in particular, nasty little wars in faraway places—are obsolete, perhaps because they patently aren’t. From memory, Mueller didn’t want to call those conflicts “wars,” though; he saw those more as “opportunistic predation” (That’s the reason the cover of his book, The Remnants of War, features an image—from the Balkan conflict in 1991—of a thug swigging from a bottle.)¶ Then 9/11 came along and sideswiped that whole debate. The nasty little wars of the 1990s didn’t stay in faraway places. A superpower got up and marched off to war—albeit a war against al Qaeda, its supporters, and all its works. Somewhere along the line the mission became conflated with a host of other problems, and Washington ended up obsessing about the Global War on Terror for longer than it probably should have done. But Washington’s behavior at least answered one question related to the Big One: did great powers still go to war? Yes. Now, the question still unanswered—unanswered since 1945 if you think major war has to be hot; unanswered since 1991, if you think major war can be cold—is whether or not major powers still go to war with each other.¶ Psychologist Steven Pinker has recently argued that the better angels of our nature are making us turn away from violence. I’m not wholly convinced by his argument—the better angels of our nature seem pretty militant to me, and always have been. (See Ephesians, 6:12.) But academic research from a few decades back suggests that great-power wars against each other aren’t common. Jack Levy in his research on war in the international system between 1495 and 1975 found only nine of what he would call “world wars”—wars where almost all great powers were involved. Much more commonly, he found “interstate wars”—113 of which engaged a great power.¶ I cite those figures to underline two points. First, if world wars are rare, maybe we don’t need special explanations to say why there hasn’t been one since 1945 (hot) or 1991 (cold). Second, that definition of major war is still a problem.¶ Let’s put aside the academic arguments and look straight at the case that most worries us. Is a great-power war between the U.S. and China possible? I think we could answer that question directly: possible, yes; likely, no. Great powers, especially nuclear-armed ones, don’t go to war with each other lightly. But sometimes wars happen. And they aren’t accidents. They’re about international order. They’re about, as Raymond Aron said, the life and death of states. And the principal reason for fighting them is that not doing so looks like a worse alternative.¶ Moreover, the paths to war—including rare major-power war—are not reserved solely for conventionally-armed states. Where both powers are nuclear-armed we should expect a conflict, even one at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, to be fought with a high degree of political control, and an understanding that the objectives of the conflict are limited. Naturally, it would help if both sides shared a common understanding of where the firebreaks were between conventional and nuclear conflict, and already had in place a set of crisis-management procedures, but it’s possible that neither of those conditions might exist. (Neither would prevent a war, but both would provide a better sense of the likely escalation dynamics of a particular conflict.) Indeed, it’s because major war is possible that we retain such a keen interest in war termination. Unconstrained escalation doesn’t lead to a happy place. | 5,002 | <h4>BUT, Yes great power war – realism, fear of worse alts, failed political processes, violent human nature – their evidence twists definitions to exclude our scenarios </h4><p>-On point answer to Mueller, Pinker and Mandelbaum</p><p><strong>Lyon 14 </strong>{Rod, director of the strategy and international program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, executive editor of The Strategist, “No, Great Power War Isn’t Obsolete,” The Diplomat, 8/22, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/no-great-power-war-isnt-obsolete/<u><strong>}</p><p></u></strong>August has seen a wave of reflection on major war. It’s a question we seem to revisit every time the key anniversaries of WWI and WWII roll around, but especially this year because its the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI. Some <u>pundits are keen to draw parallels between 1914 and 2014—though on its face <strong>it’s not apparent</strong> to me why 2014 should be more like 1914 than 2013.¶</u> Academic strategists familiar with their disciplinary history will know that <u>the issue of whether</u> <u>major war’s obsolete received</u> a detailed <u>coverage</u> back in Survival magazine <u>in the late 1990s</u>. To save readers the trouble of digging through their archives, one contributor, John <u><mark>Mueller</u></mark>, <u><mark>argued</u></mark> that <u><mark>it was obsolete</u></mark>—gone the way of slavery and dueling—while others wrestled partly over how to define obsolescence and even more over how to define major war. Was the Vietnam War “major?” Was the Cold War a “war?” Michael <u><mark>Mandelbaum</mark> <mark>argued</mark> </u>that perhaps<u> major war was just a <mark>poor policy</mark> </u>option nowadays<u>—because of the steep rise in the costs and</u> the <u>thin rewards for success</u>.¶ <u>It’s intriguing </u>that <u>the question</u> about the obsolescence of war <u>is <strong>typically qualified by the adjective “major</strong>.</u>” <u><mark>No one</mark> seems particularly keen to <mark>claim</mark> that nasty <mark>little wars</u></mark>—in particular, nasty little wars in faraway places—<u><mark>are obsolete</mark>, perhaps <mark>because <strong>they</mark> patently <mark>aren’t</strong></mark>. </u>From memory, Mueller didn’t want to call those conflicts “wars,” though; he saw those more as “opportunistic predation” (That’s the reason the cover of his book, The Remnants of War, features an image—from the Balkan conflict in 1991—of a thug swigging from a bottle.)¶ <u>Then <mark>9/11 came along</mark> and <strong>sideswiped that whole debate</strong>. The nasty little wars of the 1990s didn’t stay in faraway places. <mark>A <strong>superpower </mark>got up and <mark>marched </mark>off <mark>to war</u></strong></mark>—albeit a war against al Qaeda, its supporters, and all its works. <u>Somewhere</u> along the line <u>the mission became conflated with a host of</u> other <u>problems, and Washington ended up obsessing about the Global War on Terror </u>for longer than it probably should have done. But <u><mark>Washington’s behavior</mark> at least <mark>answered</mark> one question</u> related to the Big One: <u><strong>did <mark>great powers</mark> still <mark>go to war</mark>? Yes</strong>. Now, the question still unanswered</u>—unanswered since 1945 if you think major war has to be hot; unanswered since 1991, if you think major war can be cold—<u>is whether or not major powers still go to war with each other.¶</u> Psychologist Steven <u>Pinker</u> has <u>recently argued</u> that <u>the better angels of our nature are making us turn away from violence. I’m not wholly convinced</u> by his argument—the <u>better angels</u> of our nature <u><strong>seem pretty militant to me, and always have been.</u></strong> (See Ephesians, 6:12.) But academic research from a few decades back suggests that great-power wars against each other aren’t common. Jack Levy in his research on war in the international system between 1495 and 1975 found only nine of what he would call “world wars”—wars where almost all great powers were involved. Much more commonly, he found “interstate wars”—113 of which engaged a great power.¶ I cite those figures to underline two points. First, if world wars are rare, maybe we don’t need special explanations to say why there hasn’t been one since 1945 (hot) or 1991 (cold). Second, that definition of major war is still a problem.¶ <u>Let’s put aside the academic arguments and look straight at the case that most worries us. <mark>Is</mark> a great-power <mark>war between</mark> the <mark>U.S.</mark> and <mark>China</mark> possible</u>? I think we could answer that question directly: possible, <u><strong><mark>yes</u></strong></mark>; likely, no. <u>Great powers</u>, especially nuclear-armed ones, <u>don’t go to war with each other lightly. But <strong><mark>sometimes wars happen</strong></mark>. And they aren’t accidents. <strong><mark>They’re about international order</strong></mark>. They’re about</u>, as Raymond Aron said, <u>the <strong>life and death of states.</strong> And the <strong>principal</strong> reason for fighting them is that not doing so looks like a worse alternative.¶</u> <u><strong>Moreover</strong>, the paths to war—including</u> rare <u>major-power war—are not reserved solely for conventionally-armed states.</u> <u>Where both powers are nuclear-armed we should</u> expect a conflict, even one at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, to be fought with a high degree of <u>political control</u>, and an understanding that the objectives of the conflict are limited. Naturally, <u>it would help if both sides shared a common understanding of where the firebreaks were</u> between conventional and nuclear conflict, and already had in place a set of crisis-management procedures, <u>but <strong>it’s possible that neither of those conditions might exist</u></strong>. (Neither would prevent a war, but both would provide a better sense of the likely escalation dynamics of a particular conflict.) <u>Indeed, it’s <mark>because major war <strong>is possible</strong></mark> that <mark>we retain</mark> such a keen <mark>interest in war termination</mark>. Unconstrained escalation <strong>doesn’t lead to a happy place.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | Case | Solvency | 18,243 | 42 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,147 | Phone call kills relations AND proves a broader trend for US-China relations once trump takes office | Williams 12-5 | Jennifer Williams, 12-5-2016, "Why Trump's phone call with Taiwan's president is a big deal," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/05/trump-may-have-just-thrown-decades-of-us-china-relations-into-disarray.html//SCOTT | Trump spent the campaign accusing China of manipulating its currency and taking advantage of American businesses, and threatened to take a harder line toward Beijing's aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas China could take actions or make decisions based on those assumptions that could lead to insecurity and potentially even conflict. this phone call will fundamentally change China's perceptions of Trump's strategic intentions for the negative Trump is setting a foundation of enduring mistrust and strategic competition for US-China relations With this latest call given a worrying hint of the kind of diplomatic crises that may erupt once he moves into the White House. | Trump spent campaign accusing China and threatened to take a harder line toward Beijing China take actions sed on those assumptions that could lead to insecurity and conflict phone call will fundamentally change China's perceptions of Trump Trump is setting a foundation of enduring mistrust and strategic competition for US-China relations call a hint of diplomatic crises that may erupt | Trump spent the campaign accusing China of manipulating its currency and taking advantage of American businesses, and threatened to take a harder line toward Beijing's aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas. Trump may not realize it, but the US desperately needs Chinese diplomatic support at the United Nations and in reining in nuclear-armed North Korea. Any decision by Beijing to begin selling off its vast holdings of American debt, meanwhile, could throw the US economy into recession. That means that it doesn't matter whether Trump meant to change US policy or not; Beijing may file away the call as it decides how to calibrate its relationship with the new administration — and whether to see Trump as a potentially ally or a potential adversary. Regardless of whether he "meant it" or not, China could take actions or make decisions based on those assumptions that could lead to insecurity and potentially even conflict. "The Chinese leadership will see this as a highly provocative action, of historic proportions," Evan Medeiros, former Asia director at the White House National Security Council, told the Financial Times. "Regardless if it was deliberate or accidental, this phone call will fundamentally change China's perceptions of Trump's strategic intentions for the negative. With this kind of move, Trump is setting a foundation of enduring mistrust and strategic competition for US-China relations." On Saturday, China's Foreign Ministry reportedly said it had lodged "stern representations" with what it called the "relevant U.S. side," urging the careful handling of the Taiwan issue to avoid any unnecessary disturbances in ties. This is at least the third time that a Trump phone call has triggered controversy. He told British Prime Minister Theresa May, "If you travel to the US you should let me know" — as if sitting heads of state just pop into other countries unannounced. He also managed to anger India by lavishing praise on Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and promising to visit Pakistan — something President Obama pointedly avoided doing during his two terms because of the two countries' complicated relationship. With this latest call, the president-elect hasn't just caused a headache that Obama will have to deal with during his last weeks in office; he's also given a worrying hint of the kind of diplomatic crises that may erupt once he moves into the White House. | 2,425 | <h4>Phone call kills relations AND proves a broader trend for US-China relations once trump takes office</h4><p>Jennifer <strong>Williams</strong>, <strong>12-5<u></strong>-2016, "Why Trump's phone call with Taiwan's president is a big deal," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/05/trump-may-have-just-thrown-decades-of-us-china-relations-into-disarray.html//SCOTT</p><p><mark>Trump spent</mark> the <mark>campaign <strong>accusing China</strong></mark> of manipulating its currency and taking advantage of American businesses, <mark>and threatened to take a <strong>harder line</strong> toward Beijing</mark>'s aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas</u>. Trump may not realize it, but the US desperately needs Chinese diplomatic support at the United Nations and in reining in nuclear-armed North Korea. Any decision by Beijing to begin selling off its vast holdings of American debt, meanwhile, could throw the US economy into recession. That means that it doesn't matter whether Trump meant to change US policy or not; Beijing may file away the call as it decides how to calibrate its relationship with the new administration — and whether to see Trump as a potentially ally or a potential adversary. Regardless of whether he "meant it" or not, <u><mark>China</mark> could <mark>take actions</mark> or make decisions ba<mark>sed on those <strong>assumptions</strong> that could lead to <strong>insecurity</strong> and</mark> potentially even <strong><mark>conflict</strong></mark>. </u>"The Chinese leadership will see this as a highly provocative action, of historic proportions," Evan Medeiros, former Asia director at the White House National Security Council, told the Financial Times. "Regardless if it was deliberate or accidental, <u>this <mark>phone call will fundamentally change China's <strong>perceptions</strong> of Trump</mark>'s strategic intentions for the negative</u>. With this kind of move, <u><mark>Trump is setting a foundation of <strong>enduring mistrust</strong> and strategic <strong>competition</strong> for US-China relations</u></mark>." On Saturday, China's Foreign Ministry reportedly said it had lodged "stern representations" with what it called the "relevant U.S. side," urging the careful handling of the Taiwan issue to avoid any unnecessary disturbances in ties. This is at least the third time that a Trump phone call has triggered controversy. He told British Prime Minister Theresa May, "If you travel to the US you should let me know" — as if sitting heads of state just pop into other countries unannounced. He also managed to anger India by lavishing praise on Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and promising to visit Pakistan — something President Obama pointedly avoided doing during his two terms because of the two countries' complicated relationship. <u>With this latest <strong><mark>call</u></strong></mark>, the president-elect hasn't just caused a headache that Obama will have to deal with during his last weeks in office; he's also <u>given <mark>a</mark> worrying <mark>hint</mark> of the kind <mark>of <strong>diplomatic crises</strong> that may erupt</mark> once he moves into the White House.</p></u> | Case | Relations | null | 1,559,208 | 15 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,148 | The alternative is to reject the affirmative in a manifestation to embrace enmity and accept the friend/enemy dichotomy. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The alternative is to reject the affirmative in a manifestation to embrace enmity and accept the friend/enemy dichotomy.</h4> | null | null | Liberalism K | 1,560,683 | 1 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,149 | China says yes---China WANTS India to join the NSG due to political isolation and indian relations but is scared of the political fallout of going back against their word. The CP is the “diplomatic out” and “Political cover” china is looking for | null | China doesn’t want to appear as completely caving in | eight years ago China backed down under pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the NSG With India’s membership up for consideration an outright repeat appears unlikely China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules Beijing’s position on Indian membership is undoubtedly politically hyphenated with the largely successful diplomatic push by the Indian government reaching the final stages China will be left as the only hold-out once again China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated, virtually always seeking some degree of political cover from others Beijing was wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India The sole countervailing factor is that China will not want to cause real damage to its relationship with India over the NSG China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues the future scope of U.S.-India ties As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy isolation alone is unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to China blocking over Indian membership in the NSG | China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules Beijing’s position on Indian membership is undoubtedly political China will be left as the only hold-out China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated always seeking political cover from others Beijing wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues, As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy | Their position is purely political and not about whether or not they acutally want India to join the NSG
China seeks political cover for their decision and doesn’t want to be isolated
They don’t want to damage indian relations
They don’t want to be the only one opposed
They are looking for a diplomatic out aka an excuse to grant India NSG
Andrew Small 2016 (senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Wire, June 20, http://thewire.in/43991/why-china-is-playing-a-tougher-game-on-the-nsg-this-time-around/
Nearly eight years ago, after being left in a minority of one, China backed down under intense pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG). With India’s membership up for consideration this week at the NSG’s plenary meeting in Seoul, an outright repeat of these events appears unlikely. In contrast to 2008, when Beijing hid behind other opponents until each and every one of them had been peeled off, this time China has made its position clear. Unless a deal is done in the coming days, most observers are betting that China will stick to its guns. What has changed? And how far is Beijing’s opposition likely to go? On Monday, China responded to the Indian external affairs minister’s statement that Beijing was not opposed to Indian membership. “The inclusion of non-NPT members has never been a topic on the agenda of NSG meetings. In Seoul this year, there is no such topic,” the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said. “We have stressed that the NSG is still divided about non-NPT countries entry into the NSG and under the current circumstances we hope that NSG will make thorough discussions to make a decision based on consultation.” China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules. The nuclear plants that China is building in Pakistan may help to address that country’s dire energy situation but no other member of the NSG accepts the claim by Chinese officials that each and every new reactor was “grandfathered” into China’s original membership agreement. While this violation has not been deemed sufficient to warrant blowing the group up, it has been an ongoing demonstration that China sees the institution through a largely political prism. And Beijing’s position on Indian membership is undoubtedly politically hyphenated: boiled down to its essentials, China is willing to back India’s entry if there is a clear route for Pakistan to join the club too. Beijing did belatedly attempt a similar manoeuvre during the late stages of the negotiations in 2008 but the proposal that Pakistan might be granted a matching exemption to India’s attracted more incredulity than support from other NSG members. This time, Chinese attempts to push for a conditions-based process that would keep the door open to Pakistan’s future entry elicit greater sympathy. Other countries also have their reservations about an ad hominem approach to membership for non-NPT states. Nonetheless, with the largely successful diplomatic push by the Indian government and its supporters reaching the final stages, it is possible that China will be left as the only hold-out once again. Under Hu Jintao, that would likely have proved sufficient. China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated, virtually always seeking some degree of political cover from others. Beijing was wary about going toe-to-toe with Washington on issues deemed to be top-tier strategic priorities, which the NSG waiver certainly was. It had a counter-move in its back pocket too, in the shape of its deal with Pakistan on a new phase of Chashma reactors, an NSG exemption by fiat, from which only its own nuclear industry would benefit. And Beijing was wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India for the sake of a Pakistan that was still reeling from the A.Q. Khan proliferation scandal, one in which China was itself implicated – the bomb designs that showed up in Libya, to take just one example, being of Chinese origin. Very few considerations suggested that this was a propitious moment to make a stand, though even then it was a close, last-minute call. This time, virtually none of these conditions are the same. President Xi Jinping is a more forceful leader than his predecessor, more comfortable with playing great power politics and less anxious about the repercussions of throwing China’s weight around. The United States has less capacity to press China to change its position, and the dynamics between Washington and Beijing are far more competitive than they were in 2008. U.S. officials, however hard they push, will not be able to repeat the same trick. There is also no obvious back-up plan if China agrees to Indian membership without concomitant assurances about Pakistan’s future position, which, given the requirement for unanimous decision-making at the NSG, could permanently entrench a framework that disadvantages its closest partner. And this time, there is more at stake for China in being seen to stick up for the interests of its Pakistani friends. China is not about to make a fundamental break with its non-alignment policies but in a context where Beijing is in the process of establishing its first overseas military facilities, and engaging in an intensifying strategic contest with the United States, credibility with friends and quasi-allies matters more than it did. Pakistan has been the surprising pace-setter in Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative, and over the last year Chinese intellectuals have taken to describing the country as China’s “one real ally”, with the relationship a “model to follow”. For all the supposed constancy of their “all-weather friendship”, this was not the tone in 2008. Standing up for Pakistan now is not only about the bilateral relationship but also about China’s reliability as a partner, and the demonstration effect in this high stakes case would have resonance well beyond Seoul. The sole countervailing factor is that China will not want to cause real damage to its relationship with India over the NSG, which matters far more to New Delhi than it does to Beijing. China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues, such as the South China Sea and the future scope of U.S.-India ties. It will also be uncomfortable about the prospect of its relationships with India and Pakistan being re-coupled at just the moment where it finally appeared to be having some success in developing them along parallel tracks. As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy. But that would require a compromise that will allow China to credibly claim that it has preserved an opening for the Pakistanis, a possibility that is still on the table. Short of that, no matter how effectively Beijing is diplomatically boxed in, isolation alone is unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to China blocking the emerging consensus over Indian membership in the NSG, and last-minute phone calls from the White House will not swing it. The sole reason China would move is because it calculates that the costs to the Sino-Indian relationship outweigh those of being seen as a fair-weather friend. | 7,284 | <h4>China <u>says yes</u>---China WANTS India to join the NSG due to <u>political isolation</u> and <u>indian relations</u> but is scared of the <u>political fallout of </u>going back against their word. The CP is the “<u>diplomatic out</u>” and “<u>Political cover</u>” china is looking for</h4><p>China doesn’t want to appear as completely caving in</p><p>Their position is purely political and not about whether or not they acutally want India to join the NSG</p><p>China seeks political cover for their decision and doesn’t want to be isolated</p><p>They don’t want to damage indian relations</p><p>They don’t want to be the only one opposed</p><p>They are looking for a diplomatic out aka an excuse to grant India NSG</p><p>Andrew <strong>Small 2016</strong> (senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Wire, June 20, http://thewire.in/43991/why-china-is-playing-a-tougher-game-on-the-nsg-this-time-around/ </p><p>Nearly <u>eight years ago</u>, after being left in a minority of one, <u>China backed down under</u> intense <u>pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the</u> Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (<u>NSG</u>). <u>With India’s membership up for consideration</u> this week at the NSG’s plenary meeting in Seoul, <u>an outright repeat</u> of these events <u>appears unlikely</u>. In contrast to 2008, when Beijing hid behind other opponents until each and every one of them had been peeled off, this time China has made its position clear. Unless a deal is done in the coming days, most observers are betting that China will stick to its guns. What has changed? And how far is Beijing’s opposition likely to go? On Monday, China responded to the Indian external affairs minister’s statement that Beijing was not opposed to Indian membership. “The inclusion of non-NPT members has never been a topic on the agenda of NSG meetings. In Seoul this year, there is no such topic,” the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said. “We have stressed that the NSG is still divided about non-NPT countries entry into the NSG and under the current circumstances we hope that NSG will make thorough discussions to make a decision based on consultation.” <u><mark>China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules</u></mark>. The nuclear plants that China is building in Pakistan may help to address that country’s dire energy situation but no other member of the NSG accepts the claim by Chinese officials that each and every new reactor was “grandfathered” into China’s original membership agreement. While this violation has not been deemed sufficient to warrant blowing the group up, it has been an ongoing demonstration that China sees the institution through a largely political prism. And <u><mark>Beijing’s position on Indian membership is <strong>undoubtedly political</mark>ly</strong> hyphenated</u>: boiled down to its essentials, China is willing to back India’s entry if there is a clear route for Pakistan to join the club too. Beijing did belatedly attempt a similar manoeuvre during the late stages of the negotiations in 2008 but the proposal that Pakistan might be granted a matching exemption to India’s attracted more incredulity than support from other NSG members. This time, Chinese attempts to push for a conditions-based process that would keep the door open to Pakistan’s future entry elicit greater sympathy. Other countries also have their reservations about an ad hominem approach to membership for non-NPT states. Nonetheless, <u>with the largely successful diplomatic push by the Indian government </u>and its supporters <u>reaching the final stages</u>, it is possible that <u><mark>China will be left as the only hold-out</mark> once again</u>. Under Hu Jintao, that would likely have proved sufficient. <u><mark>China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated</mark>, virtually <mark>always <strong>seeking</strong></mark> some degree of <strong><mark>political cover from others</u></strong></mark>. Beijing was wary about going toe-to-toe with Washington on issues deemed to be top-tier strategic priorities, which the NSG waiver certainly was. It had a counter-move in its back pocket too, in the shape of its deal with Pakistan on a new phase of Chashma reactors, an NSG exemption by fiat, from which only its own nuclear industry would benefit. And <u><strong><mark>Beijing</mark> was <mark>wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India</u></strong></mark> for the sake of a Pakistan that was still reeling from the A.Q. Khan proliferation scandal, one in which China was itself implicated – the bomb designs that showed up in Libya, to take just one example, being of Chinese origin. Very few considerations suggested that this was a propitious moment to make a stand, though even then it was a close, last-minute call. This time, virtually none of these conditions are the same. President Xi Jinping is a more forceful leader than his predecessor, more comfortable with playing great power politics and less anxious about the repercussions of throwing China’s weight around. The United States has less capacity to press China to change its position, and the dynamics between Washington and Beijing are far more competitive than they were in 2008. U.S. officials, however hard they push, will not be able to repeat the same trick. There is also no obvious back-up plan if China agrees to Indian membership without concomitant assurances about Pakistan’s future position, which, given the requirement for unanimous decision-making at the NSG, could permanently entrench a framework that disadvantages its closest partner. And this time, there is more at stake for China in being seen to stick up for the interests of its Pakistani friends. China is not about to make a fundamental break with its non-alignment policies but in a context where Beijing is in the process of establishing its first overseas military facilities, and engaging in an intensifying strategic contest with the United States, credibility with friends and quasi-allies matters more than it did. Pakistan has been the surprising pace-setter in Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative, and over the last year Chinese intellectuals have taken to describing the country as China’s “one real ally”, with the relationship a “model to follow”. For all the supposed constancy of their “all-weather friendship”, this was not the tone in 2008. Standing up for Pakistan now is not only about the bilateral relationship but also about China’s reliability as a partner, and the demonstration effect in this high stakes case would have resonance well beyond Seoul. <u>The sole countervailing factor is that China will not want to cause real damage to its relationship with India over the NSG</u>, which matters far more to New Delhi than it does to Beijing. <u><mark>China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues</u>,</mark> such as the South China Sea and <u>the future scope of U.S.-India ties</u>. It will also be uncomfortable about the prospect of its relationships with India and Pakistan being re-coupled at just the moment where it finally appeared to be having some success in developing them along parallel tracks. <u><strong><mark>As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy</u></strong></mark>. But that would require a compromise that will allow China to credibly claim that it has preserved an opening for the Pakistanis, a possibility that is still on the table. Short of that, no matter how effectively Beijing is diplomatically boxed in, <u>isolation alone is unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to China blocking</u> the emerging consensus <u>over Indian membership in the NSG</u>, and last-minute phone calls from the White House will not swing it. The sole reason China would move is because it calculates that the costs to the Sino-Indian relationship outweigh those of being seen as a fair-weather friend.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | NSG CP | 414,567 | 12 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,150 | Fairness also comes before substance--- any argument that theyre winning should be viewed as a link to this offense proving that we were never prepared to debate them | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Fairness also comes before substance--- any argument that theyre winning should be viewed as a link to this offense proving that we were never prepared to debate them</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,684 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,151 | Util first – Only ethical model that can deal with competing claims | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Util first – Only ethical model that can deal with competing claims</h4> | 1NC | Case | Solvency | 1,560,685 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,152 | Trump kills Multilateralism -- Outweighs the affs internal link | Wagner 11-11 Trump and the Coming Death of Multilateralism | Daniel Wagner, 11-11-2016, "Trump and the Coming Death of Multilateralism" Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/trump-and-the-coming-deat_b_12915974.html | Trump His election as president of the U.S. implies an assault on multilateralism If Mr. Trump’s dystopian view of the world comes to pass, much of that stands at risk. Mr. Trump will seek to weaken many of the pillars of Post-War stability and prosperity, such as NATO, the WTO and the UN One of the likely results of this is that other countries will undoubtedly want to bypass the U.S. entirely when it comes to trade and investment Another likely net result is the rise of protectionism We could see tit-for-tat trade wars that collectively drive the global economy into the ground. political force emanating from America been intent on dismantling the very multilateral international order it helped to create | Trump assault on multilateralism Mr. Trump will seek to weaken NATO, the WTO and the UN countries will want to bypass the U.S. likely result is the rise of protectionism political force intent on dismantling multilateral international order | It is truly odd that the U.S. and global stock markets actually rose in the days following the election of Donald Trump as president, as if a few passing pro-business comments by the president-elect and prospect of a pro-business administration would make the difference between looming wealth versus lean times for investors. Akin to the “Trump Kool-Aid” (soon to be released in stores across the country, I am sure) that so many American voters apparently drank before they entered the polling booth, the stock markets appear not to care much about the prospect of a paradigm shift in U.S. and global politics — and economics — as a result of the election of Mr. Trump to the presidency. His election as president of the U.S. implies an assault on a great many things, but none of them has as much potential negative global impact as the coming assault on multilateralism. In the Post-War era, the world has been clearly transformed for the better by the ever-freer flow of information, people, money, trade and investment. The world has benefitted greatly from the creation of many multilateral institutions which have fostered a climate of governance, transparency, and accountability - and a willingness to tackle a plethora of issues concerning humanity head on - ranging from climate change to immigration flows to conflict resolution. If Mr. Trump’s dystopian view of the world comes to pass, much of that stands at risk. In the Post-War era, Wilsonianism (liberal internationalism) and Rooseveltism (collective action based on alliances and mutual respect) have been the cornerstone of international relations. If he is to be taken at his word, and if the Republican Congress will allow it, Mr. Trump will seek to weaken many of the pillars of Post-War stability and prosperity, such as NATO, the WTO and the UN. He made his opposition to free trade a central element of his political platform and has promised to declare war on free trade agreements such as the TPP and TTIP. One of the likely results of this is that other countries will undoubtedly want to bypass the U.S. entirely when it comes to trade and investment. China has already redoubled its efforts to promote the adoption of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — both rivals to the TPP — which China was excluded from and which cannot come into force without U.S. ratification. As was demonstrated by Iran when sanctions were in full swing, there are alternatives to participating in traditional forms of trade, investment, and currency clearing; Mr. Trump appears intent on ensuring that such alternatives are explored and pursued with vigor by as many countries as possible. Another likely net result is the rise - even further - of a tendency toward economic nationalism and the propensity for protectionism. As national budgets become further strained, jobs become more scarce, and growth rates continue to decline around the world, governments that are already predispositioned to protect their own interests and adopt policies designed to shelter domestic industries will do so more liberally. They will not take into consideration that the erection of trade barriers and imposition of non-investor friendly investment policies is contrary to economic growth in the long-term - for everyone. If the U.S. no longer leads the way in adopting and practicing free trade and investment policies, governments around the world will have even less incentive to do so. We could see tit-for-tat trade wars that collectively drive the global economy into the ground. In a report released last month, the WTO noted that between mid-October of 2015 and May of 2016, G20 economies had introduced new protectionist measures at the fastest pace seen since the Great Recession, rolling out the equivalent of five each week. That trend has coincided with a slowdown in global trade that is already in its fifth year, which has contributed greatly to an increase in protectionist political rhetoric around the world. The last thing the world needs now is an American president and Congress leading us all straight into an economic abyss. America has vacillated throughout its history between periods of interventionism and isolationism, with varying degrees of depth - all with some impact for other countries around the world. Never before, however, has a political force emanating from America been intent on dismantling the very multilateral international order it helped to create. Mr. Trump’s version of the coming American isolationism has truly frightening potential consequences, immersing the U.S. into a cocoon of self-interest and propelling the world into competing economic and political landscapes where a common set of rules no longer apply and countries are only in it for themselves. Consider the consequences of a world in which alliances depend not on a common set of values, but on perceived short-term interests, and in which every American ally must question U.S. motives and intentions. Envision a world where, as a result of trade wars, the price of natural resources and food could skyrocket at any given time because of spot shortages, resulting in riots and increased global political and economic instability. These are some of the potential outcomes of a collapse of multilateralism in a world reduced, in a very Trumpian way, to a series of business transactions where the winner is supposed to take all. We’ve been there before — in the 1930s. Better buckle up. | 5,510 | <h4>Trump kills Multilateralism -- Outweighs the affs internal link</h4><p>Daniel <strong>Wagner</strong>, <strong>11-11</strong>-2016, "<u><strong><mark>Trump and the Coming Death of Multilateralism</u></strong></mark>" Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/trump-and-the-coming-deat_b_12915974.html</p><p>It is truly odd that the U.S. and global stock markets actually rose in the days following the election of Donald Trump as president, as if a few passing pro-business comments by the president-elect and prospect of a pro-business administration would make the difference between looming wealth versus lean times for investors. Akin to the “Trump Kool-Aid” (soon to be released in stores across the country, I am sure) that so many American voters apparently drank before they entered the polling booth, the stock markets appear not to care much about the prospect of a paradigm shift in U.S. and global politics — and economics — as a result of the election of Mr. <u><strong><mark>Trump</u></strong></mark> to the presidency. <u>His election as president of the U.S. implies an <strong><mark>assault</strong> on</mark> </u>a great many things, but none of them has as much potential negative global impact as the coming assault on<u> <strong><mark>multilateralism</u></strong></mark>. In the Post-War era, the world has been clearly transformed for the better by the ever-freer flow of information, people, money, trade and investment. The world has benefitted greatly from the creation of many multilateral institutions which have fostered a climate of governance, transparency, and accountability - and a willingness to tackle a plethora of issues concerning humanity head on - ranging from climate change to immigration flows to conflict resolution. <u>If Mr. Trump’s dystopian view of the world comes to pass, much of that stands <strong>at risk</strong>. </u>In the Post-War era, Wilsonianism (liberal internationalism) and Rooseveltism (collective action based on alliances and mutual respect) have been the cornerstone of international relations. If he is to be taken at his word, and if the Republican Congress will allow it, <u><mark>Mr. Trump will seek to <strong>weaken</strong></mark> many of the pillars of Post-War stability and prosperity, such as <strong><mark>NATO</strong>, the <strong>WTO</strong> and the <strong>UN</u></strong></mark>. He made his opposition to free trade a central element of his political platform and has promised to declare war on free trade agreements such as the TPP and TTIP. <u>One of the likely results of this is that other <mark>countries will</mark> undoubtedly <mark>want to <strong>bypass the U.S.</strong></mark> entirely when it comes to trade and investment</u>. China has already redoubled its efforts to promote the adoption of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — both rivals to the TPP — which China was excluded from and which cannot come into force without U.S. ratification. As was demonstrated by Iran when sanctions were in full swing, there are alternatives to participating in traditional forms of trade, investment, and currency clearing; Mr. Trump appears intent on ensuring that such alternatives are explored and pursued with vigor by as many countries as possible. <u>Another <mark>likely</mark> net <mark>result is the rise</u></mark> - even further - <u><mark>of</u></mark> a tendency toward economic nationalism and the propensity for <u><strong><mark>protectionism</u></strong></mark>. As national budgets become further strained, jobs become more scarce, and growth rates continue to decline around the world, governments that are already predispositioned to protect their own interests and adopt policies designed to shelter domestic industries will do so more liberally. They will not take into consideration that the erection of trade barriers and imposition of non-investor friendly investment policies is contrary to economic growth in the long-term - for everyone. If the U.S. no longer leads the way in adopting and practicing free trade and investment policies, governments around the world will have even less incentive to do so. <u>We could see tit-for-tat trade wars that collectively drive the global economy into the ground. </u>In a report released last month, the WTO noted that between mid-October of 2015 and May of 2016, G20 economies had introduced new protectionist measures at the fastest pace seen since the Great Recession, rolling out the equivalent of five each week. That trend has coincided with a slowdown in global trade that is already in its fifth year, which has contributed greatly to an increase in protectionist political rhetoric around the world. The last thing the world needs now is an American president and Congress leading us all straight into an economic abyss. America has vacillated throughout its history between periods of interventionism and isolationism, with varying degrees of depth - all with some impact for other countries around the world. Never before, however, has a <u><mark>political force</mark> emanating from America been <strong><mark>intent on dismantling</strong></mark> the very <mark>multilateral international order</mark> it helped to create</u>. Mr. Trump’s version of the coming American isolationism has truly frightening potential consequences, immersing the U.S. into a cocoon of self-interest and propelling the world into competing economic and political landscapes where a common set of rules no longer apply and countries are only in it for themselves. Consider the consequences of a world in which alliances depend not on a common set of values, but on perceived short-term interests, and in which every American ally must question U.S. motives and intentions. Envision a world where, as a result of trade wars, the price of natural resources and food could skyrocket at any given time because of spot shortages, resulting in riots and increased global political and economic instability. These are some of the potential outcomes of a collapse of multilateralism in a world reduced, in a very Trumpian way, to a series of business transactions where the winner is supposed to take all. We’ve been there before — in the 1930s. Better buckle up.</p> | Case | Relations | null | 87,410 | 76 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,153 | It is historically proven to be the only way to guarantee mutual security and stability and restrain the political and absolute sovereign. | Rasch 05 | Rasch 05 (William Rasch, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Ph.D. from University of Washington, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle,” South Atlantic Quarterly, March 1, 2005) // RL | just wars fought for a just cause | null | *Perennially – Lasting for an indefinitely long time.
*Serendipitous – Accidentally
AND
—that is, just wars fought for a just cause? | 132 | <h4>It is historically proven to be the only way to guarantee mutual security and stability and restrain the political and absolute sovereign.</h4><p><strong>Rasch 05</strong> (William Rasch, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Ph.D. from University of Washington, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle,” South Atlantic Quarterly, March 1, 2005) // RL</p><p>*Perennially – Lasting for an indefinitely long time.</p><p>*Serendipitous – Accidentally </p><p>AND</p><p>—that is, <u><strong>just wars fought for a just cause</u></strong>?</p> | null | null | Liberalism K | 1,560,687 | 5 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,154 | China blocks entry now---CP key | Castro 2016 | Bhavani Castro 2016 (fellow of Indian Studies at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil “The International Nuclear Community Should Pressure China to Accept India’s NSG Membership”; June 21, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-international-nuclear-community-should-pressure-china-to-accept-indias-nsg-membership/ | Indian Prime Minister Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG But not all NSG countries are convinced of India’s membership most importantly, China which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition would be a deal breaker Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community. | endorsement from the U S for India’s bid to enter the NSG not all NSG countries are convinced most importantly, China Chinese opposition would be a deal breaker China’s opposition would undermine Beijing | Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently embarked on an impressive five-nation tour that included countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Mexico. Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results, bolstering diplomatic ties and giving India more visibility in the international community. The six-day tour included visits to Afghanistan, Qatar, Switzerland, the United States, and Mexico, and while the visit to the first two countries reinforced India’s partnership with the Islamic world, the highlights of the trip concerned the other three nations. Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a club of 48 countries that holds to established guidelines for trading nuclear-related technology. But not all NSG countries are convinced of the benefits of India’s membership, among them Austria, New Zealand, South Africa and, most importantly, China, which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club. The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition to India’s accession — to be discussed in the Group’s Annual Plenary in Seoul on June 24 — would be a deal breaker. Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community. | 1,574 | <h4>China blocks entry now---CP key</h4><p>Bhavani <strong>Castro 2016</strong> (fellow of Indian Studies at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil “The International Nuclear Community Should Pressure China to Accept India’s NSG Membership”; June 21, <u>http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-international-nuclear-community-should-pressure-china-to-accept-indias-nsg-membership/</p><p>Indian Prime Minister</u> Narendra Modi recently embarked on an impressive five-nation tour that included countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Mexico. <u>Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results</u>, bolstering diplomatic ties and giving India more visibility in the international community. The six-day tour included visits to Afghanistan, Qatar, Switzerland, the United States, and Mexico, and while the visit to the first two countries reinforced India’s partnership with the Islamic world, the highlights of the trip concerned the other three nations. <u>Most importantly, Modi obtained <mark>endorsement from the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, Mexico, and Switzerland <mark>for India’s bid to enter the</mark> exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group</u> (<u><mark>NSG</u></mark>), a club of 48 countries that holds to established guidelines for trading nuclear-related technology. <u>But <mark>not all NSG countries are convinced </mark>of</u> the benefits of <u>India’s membership</u>, among them Austria, New Zealand, South Africa and, <u><strong><mark>most importantly, China</u></strong></mark>, <u>which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club</u>. <u>The NSG works by consensus, so <mark>Chinese opposition</u></mark> to India’s accession — to be discussed in the Group’s Annual Plenary in Seoul on June 24 — <u><strong><mark>would be a deal breaker</u></strong></mark>. <u>Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why <mark>China’s opposition would undermine Beijing</mark>’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community.</p></u> | Earthquakes neg | null | NSG CP | 1,560,020 | 6 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,155 | Second is idea testing: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Second is <u>idea testing</u>:</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,686 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,156 | Biotech investment is high now – engagement with china isn’t key | PwC 15 | PwC 15 [ PwC’s Pharmaceuticals and Life Sciences Industry Group is dedicated to delivering effective solutions to the complex strategic, operational, and financial challenges facing pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies. We provide industry-focused assurance, tax, and advisory services to build public trust and enhance value for our clients and their stakeholders. More than 195,000 people in 157 countries across the PwC global network of firms share their thinking, experience, and solutions to develop fresh perspectives and practical advice. “Biotech holds strong amid record high investments”, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/health industries/publications/assets/lifesciencesmoneytreeq32015.pdf, Accessed 9/27/16] DG | capital funding for the life sciences sector which includes biotechnology increased 60% Venture capitalists invested $2.9 billion in 194 life sciences deals in third quarter 2015, compared with $1.8 billion in 203 deals during the same quarter of 2014. Overall venture funding across all industries grew by 56% in value, Venture investors funnelled $16.3 billion into 1,070 deals during the third quarter of 2015 Biotechnology industry received the second largest amount of venture capital in the third quarter of 2015, with $2.1 billion going into 121 deals, an increase of 77% in deal value and 1% in deal volume, compared with the third quarter of 2014. We’re on track for one of our largest biotech years we have had in quite a long time The third quarter of 2015 shows there is continued interest in biotechnology and medical devices,” said Vlahos. “With the strong exit markets for biotechnology set up for renewed interest in life sciences | capital funding for biotechnology increased 60% funnelled $16.3 billion into 1,070 deals during the third quarter of 201 Biotechnology received second largest venture capital We’re on track for one of our largest biotech years we have had in quite a long time continued interest in biotechnology and medical device | US venture capital funding for the life sciences sector1 , which includes biotechnology and medical devices, increased 60% by value, but declined 4% by volume, on a year-over-year basis during the third quarter of 2015, according to the MoneyTree™ Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) LLP and the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). The report is based on data provided by Thomson Reuters. Venture capitalists invested $2.9 billion in 194 life sciences deals in third quarter 2015, compared with $1.8 billion in 203 deals during the same quarter of 2014. Overall venture funding across all industries grew by 56% in value, but declined 1% in volume, from the third quarter of 2014 to 2015. Venture investors funnelled $16.3 billion into 1,070 deals during the third quarter of 2015. Life sciences venture capital investment The $2.9 billion investments in life sciences during the third quarter of 2015 was the highest investment in the sector since the start of the MoneyTree data series in 1995. The life sciences share of total venture funding increased from 17% during the second quarter of 2015, to 18% during the third quarter of 2015. The Biotechnology industry received the second largest amount of venture capital in the third quarter of 2015, with $2.1 billion going into 121 deals, an increase of 77% in deal value and 1% in deal volume, compared with the third quarter of 2014. The medical device industry also increased by 30% in terms of value, but deal volume declined by 12% for the third quarter of 2015, compared with the same quarter last year, capturing $821 million in 73 deals. We’re on track for one of our largest biotech years we have had in quite a long time,” said Greg Vlahos, Life Sciences Partner at PWC. Figure 1: Life sciences funding compared with total venture funding, 2013-Q3 2015 Life sciences funding by quarter Life sciences investment jumped to $2.9 billion in the third quarter of 2015, compared with the third quarter of 2014, during which $1.8 billion was invested. On a year-over-year basis, both biotechnology and medical devices investments jumped by 77% and 30% respectively in terms of value. When compared with the second quarter of 2015, funding declined by 0.5% for biotechnology, but increased 3% for medical devices. “The third quarter of 2015 shows there is continued interest in biotechnology and medical devices,” said Vlahos. “With the strong exit markets for biotechnology set up for renewed interest in life sciences”. | 2,490 | <h4>Biotech investment is high now – engagement with china isn’t key</h4><p><strong>PwC 15 </strong>[ PwC’s Pharmaceuticals and Life Sciences Industry Group is dedicated to delivering effective solutions to the complex strategic, operational, and financial challenges facing pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies. We provide industry-focused assurance, tax, and advisory services to build public trust and enhance value for our clients and their stakeholders. More than 195,000 people in 157 countries across the PwC global network of firms share their thinking, experience, and solutions to develop fresh perspectives and practical advice. “Biotech holds strong amid record high investments”, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/health industries/publications/assets/lifesciencesmoneytreeq32015.pdf, Accessed 9/27/16] DG</p><p>US venture <u><mark>capital funding for</mark> the life sciences sector</u>1 , <u>which includes <mark>biotechnology</u></mark> and medical devices, <u><mark>increased 60%</u></mark> by value, but declined 4% by volume, on a year-over-year basis during the third quarter of 2015, according to the MoneyTree™ Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) LLP and the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). The report is based on data provided by Thomson Reuters. <u>Venture capitalists invested $2.9 billion in 194 life sciences deals in third quarter 2015, compared with $1.8 billion in 203 deals during the same quarter of 2014. Overall venture funding across all industries grew by 56% in value,</u> but declined 1% in volume, from the third quarter of 2014 to 2015. <u><strong>Venture investors <mark>funnelled $16.3 billion into 1,070 deals during the third quarter of 201</mark>5</u></strong>. Life sciences venture capital investment The $2.9 billion investments in life sciences during the third quarter of 2015 was the highest investment in the sector since the start of the MoneyTree data series in 1995. The life sciences share of total venture funding increased from 17% during the second quarter of 2015, to 18% during the third quarter of 2015. The <u><mark>Biotechnology</mark> industry <mark>received</mark> the <mark>second largest</mark> amount of <mark>venture capital</mark> in the third quarter of 2015, with $2.1 billion going into 121 deals, an increase of 77% in deal value and 1% in deal volume, compared with the third quarter of 2014. </u>The medical device industry also increased by 30% in terms of value, but deal volume declined by 12% for the third quarter of 2015, compared with the same quarter last year, capturing $821 million in 73 deals. <u><mark>We’re on track for one of our largest biotech years we have had in quite a long time</u></mark>,” said Greg Vlahos, Life Sciences Partner at PWC. Figure 1: Life sciences funding compared with total venture funding, 2013-Q3 2015 Life sciences funding by quarter Life sciences investment jumped to $2.9 billion in the third quarter of 2015, compared with the third quarter of 2014, during which $1.8 billion was invested. On a year-over-year basis, both biotechnology and medical devices investments jumped by 77% and 30% respectively in terms of value. When compared with the second quarter of 2015, funding declined by 0.5% for biotechnology, but increased 3% for medical devices. “<u>The third quarter of 2015 shows there is <mark>continued interest in biotechnology and medical device</mark>s,” said Vlahos. “With the strong exit markets for biotechnology set up for renewed interest in life sciences</u>”.</p> | 1NC | Case | Disease | 1,466,201 | 4 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,157 | Trump turns---Slightly higher relations are irrelevant because trump wont coop and his broader warming policies make solving it impossible | South China Morning Post 11-16 | South China Morning Post, 11-16-2016, "With election of Trump, ‘curtain has fallen’ over Sino-US cooperation over climate," http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2044883/election-trump-curtain-has-fallen-over-sino-us//SCOTT | Trump could end Sino-US cooperation on climate change the era of cooperation between the two nations on keeping the global temperature rise to within a safe limit was over. heavy blow to the Paris Agreement Obama made climate change a policy priority and his three summits with President Xi Jinping during his term injected momentum into turning the Paris deal into reality. Trump will try and slam the brakes on climate action president-elect calling global warming a “hoax” created by China to contain the US | Trump could end Sino-US cooperation on climate change heavy blow to the Paris Agreement Trump will try and slam the brakes on climate action calling global warming a “hoax” created by China | The election of Donald Trump as US president could effectively put an end to the honeymoon period of Sino-US cooperation on climate change, which saw the world’s two largest carbon emitters formally join the Paris accord. Mainland experts said that although Trump’s victory was unlikely to derail China’s domestic energy and climate policies, the era of cooperation between the two nations on keeping the global temperature rise to within a safe limit was over. It is a heavy blow to the Paris Agreement, which has just entered into forceWU CHANGHUA, FORMER CHINA DIRECTOR OF THE CLIMATE GROUP “The curtain has fallen with Trump’s election today,” Wu Changhua, former China director of the Climate Group, said. “It is a heavy blow to the Paris Agreement, which has just entered into force. Now we’ll need to draft a new script for global climate leadership.” More than 100 countries, including the United States, have formally joined the pact, which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help vulnerable countries adapt to rising seas, intensifying heat waves, desertification and other effects of a warming planet. It limits global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Obama made climate change a policy priority and his three summits with President Xi Jinping during his term injected momentum into turning the Paris deal into reality. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff delivers her remarks during the signing ceremony for the Paris Agreement on climate change held at the United Nations Headquarters in Manhattan, New York, on April 22. Photo: Reuters China’s top negotiator Xie Zhenhua has called on Trump to “take policy stances that conform with global trends” and said China would honour its climate pledge with no strings attached. Zou Ji, a veteran climate negotiator and deputy director of China’s National Climate Change Strategy Research and International Cooperation Centre, said tackling environmental issues would no longer be a “highlight” of relations between the two sides and implementation of the Paris deal would probably take a back seat. China should look for other areas in energy over which the two sides could cooperate under a Trump presidency, Zou said. The pessimism among Chinese climate advocates extends to activists at the annual UN climate conference in Marrakesh, Morocco. May Boeve, leader of the 350.org environmental group, called the election a “disaster”. Trump will try and slam the brakes on climate action, which means we need to throw all of our weight on the acceleratorMAY BOEVE, LEADER OF 350.ORG ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP “Trump will try and slam the brakes on climate action, which means we need to throw all of our weight on the accelerator,” Boeve said. “In the United States, the climate movement will put everything on the line to protect the progress we’ve made and continue to push for bold action.” The president-elect has made himself an enemy of environmentalists by calling global warming a “hoax” created by China to contain the US, extolling the resurgent fossil fuel industry in the US, and pledging in May to “cancel” the Paris deal. | 3,139 | <h4>Trump turns---Slightly higher relations are irrelevant because trump wont coop and his broader warming policies make solving it impossible</h4><p><strong>South China Morning Post</strong>, <strong>11-16</strong>-2016, "<u>With election of Trump, ‘curtain has fallen’ over Sino-US cooperation over climate</u>," http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2044883/election-trump-curtain-has-fallen-over-sino-us//SCOTT</p><p>The election of Donald <u><strong><mark>Trump</u></strong></mark> as US president <u><mark>could</u></mark> effectively put an <u><strong><mark>end</u></strong></mark> to the honeymoon period of <u><strong><mark>Sino-US cooperation on climate change</u></strong></mark>, which saw the world’s two largest carbon emitters formally join the Paris accord. Mainland experts said that although Trump’s victory was unlikely to derail China’s domestic energy and climate policies, <u>the era of cooperation between the two nations on keeping the global temperature rise to within a safe limit was over. </u>It is a <u><strong><mark>heavy blo</strong>w to the Paris Agreement</u></mark>, which has just entered into forceWU CHANGHUA, FORMER CHINA DIRECTOR OF THE CLIMATE GROUP “The curtain has fallen with Trump’s election today,” Wu Changhua, former China director of the Climate Group, said. “It is a heavy blow to the Paris Agreement, which has just entered into force. Now we’ll need to draft a new script for global climate leadership.” More than 100 countries, including the United States, have formally joined the pact, which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help vulnerable countries adapt to rising seas, intensifying heat waves, desertification and other effects of a warming planet. It limits global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. <u><strong>Obama</strong> made climate change a policy <strong>priority</u></strong> <u>and his three summits with President Xi Jinping during his term injected momentum into turning the Paris deal into reality. </u>Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff delivers her remarks during the signing ceremony for the Paris Agreement on climate change held at the United Nations Headquarters in Manhattan, New York, on April 22. Photo: Reuters China’s top negotiator Xie Zhenhua has called on Trump to “take policy stances that conform with global trends” and said China would honour its climate pledge with no strings attached. Zou Ji, a veteran climate negotiator and deputy director of China’s National Climate Change Strategy Research and International Cooperation Centre, said tackling environmental issues would no longer be a “highlight” of relations between the two sides and implementation of the Paris deal would probably take a back seat. China should look for other areas in energy over which the two sides could cooperate under a Trump presidency, Zou said. The pessimism among Chinese climate advocates extends to activists at the annual UN climate conference in Marrakesh, Morocco. May Boeve, leader of the 350.org environmental group, called the election a “disaster”. <u><strong><mark>Trump </strong>will try and <strong>slam the brakes on climate action</u></strong></mark>, which means we need to throw all of our weight on the acceleratorMAY BOEVE, LEADER OF 350.ORG ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP “Trump will try and slam the brakes on climate action, which means we need to throw all of our weight on the accelerator,” Boeve said. “In the United States, the climate movement will put everything on the line to protect the progress we’ve made and continue to push for bold action.” The <u>president-elect</u> has made himself an enemy of environmentalists by <u><strong><mark>calling global warming a “hoax” created by China</strong></mark> to contain the US</u>, extolling the resurgent fossil fuel industry in the US, and pledging in May to “cancel” the Paris deal.</p> | Case | Relations | null | 404,619 | 6 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,158 | ‘The Political’ is the distinction between friend/enemy – it governs the political and is relation to all other antitheses – the starting point of the friend/enemy dichotomy is critical to the aff | Schmitt ’32 | Schmitt ’32 [Carl Schmitt – the illist of all the German Legal Philosophers, “The Concept of the Political”, published as Der Begriff des Politischen in 1932, accessed 6/23/13, pg. 25-27, Print] | null | null | *edited
A definition of the political can be obtained only by discovering and
AND
distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses. | 172 | <h4>‘The Political’ is the distinction between friend/enemy – it governs the political and is relation to all other antitheses – the starting point of the friend/enemy dichotomy is critical to the aff</h4><p><strong>Schmitt ’32</strong> [Carl Schmitt – the illist of all the German Legal Philosophers, “The Concept of the Political”, published as Der Begriff des Politischen in 1932, accessed 6/23/13, pg. 25-27, Print] </p><p>*edited</p><p>A definition of the political can be obtained only by discovering and </p><p>AND</p><p>distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses. </p> | null | null | Liberalism K | 1,560,688 | 5 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,159 | NSG controversy causes Indo-China tensions---Escalates border disputes | WICKER 7/19 | WICKER 7/19 (McDaniel; Asia Security Fellow at the Wilson Center, “Only America Can Keep a China-India War from Erupting,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/only-america-can-stop-china-india-war-17036) | India and China are on a collision course China’s move to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is merely the latest sign of tension to emerge between the two Asian giants Further competition and even confrontation await. This particular case shows China’s intent to remain the sole Asian power demonstrated when China led the push to exclude India from the NSG Membership in the prestigious group Indians saw as purely political. Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations for such large, neighboring countries China and India clashing on multiple fronts Border issues the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries | India and China are on a collision course China’s move to block Indian membership in the NSG latest sign of tension confrontation await This particular case shows China’s intent to remain the sole power China led the push to exclude India from the NSG China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations China and India clashing on multiple fronts. Border issues | India and China are on a collision course. They boast the world’s two largest populations, two of the fastest growing economies on the globe and aspirations to lead the way into a new Asian century. The two nations’ fates will be intertwined for decades to come. Troublingly, China’s move last week to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is merely the latest sign of tension to emerge between the two Asian giants. Further competition and even confrontation await. Competition between rising powers is hardly new or surprising. This particular case, however, shows China’s intent to remain the sole Asian power stretching from Siberia to the Arabian Sea. This was most recently demonstrated last week when China led the push to exclude India from the NSG. Membership in the prestigious group, which controls the trade of nuclear material and related technologies, would facilitate India’s nuclear power production. While legitimate concerns remain about India’s status as a nuclear state, Prime Minister Modi’s bid was backed by the United States, Britain, France and many others. These advocates could not overcome resistance spearheaded by the Chinese delegation, in a move that many Indians saw as purely political. China’s NSG position could been seen as warranted given India’s failure to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage. India’s push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and China’s opposition to that move highlight this fact. Of the five current permanent members, only China has yet to offer even token support for the second-largest country in the world joining the exclusive group. China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations for such large, neighboring countries. The height of the Himalayas, and the long sea route between the two, have buffered most competition. Beijing’s foreign policy concerns have chiefly resided east and southeast of the country, while India has contented itself in dealing with immediate neighbors and holding fast to the nonalignment policy of the Cold War. The border war of 1962 notwithstanding, relations between the two countries have been relatively sanguine. An increasingly powerful and adventurous China and a more engaged India now appear to be clashing on multiple fronts. Border issues linger still, and reports of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control surface regularly in Indian and Western media. While conflict is unlikely to break out, China has been updating and reinforcing its forces stationed in Tibet, and the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries. | 2,729 | <h4>NSG controversy causes Indo-China tensions---Escalates border disputes</h4><p> <strong>WICKER 7/19</strong> (McDaniel; Asia Security Fellow at the Wilson Center, “Only America Can Keep a China-India War from Erupting,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/only-america-can-stop-china-india-war-17036)</p><p><u><mark>India and China are on a <strong>collision course</u></strong></mark>. They boast the world’s two largest populations, two of the fastest growing economies on the globe and aspirations to lead the way into a new Asian century. The two nations’ fates will be intertwined for decades to come. Troublingly, <u><strong><mark>China’s move</strong></mark> </u>last week<u> <mark>to <strong>block Indian membership</strong> in the</mark> Nuclear Suppliers Group (<strong><mark>NSG</strong></mark>) is merely the <mark>latest sign of <strong>tension</strong></mark> to emerge between the two Asian giants</u>. <u>Further competition and even <strong><mark>confrontation</strong> await</mark>. </u>Competition between rising powers is hardly new or surprising. <u><mark>This particular case</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>shows China’s intent to remain the <strong>sole</mark> Asian <mark>power</u></strong></mark> stretching from Siberia to the Arabian Sea. This was most recently <u>demonstrated</u> last week <u>when <mark>China <strong>led the push to exclude India from the NSG</u></strong></mark>. <u>Membership in the prestigious group</u>, which controls the trade of nuclear material and related technologies, would facilitate India’s nuclear power production. While legitimate concerns remain about India’s status as a nuclear state, Prime Minister Modi’s bid was backed by the United States, Britain, France and many others. These advocates could not overcome resistance spearheaded by the Chinese delegation, in a move that many <u>Indians saw as purely political. </u>China’s NSG position could been seen as warranted given India’s failure to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but <u>Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage</u>. India’s push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and China’s opposition to that move highlight this fact. Of the five current permanent members, only China has yet to offer even token support for the second-largest country in the world joining the exclusive group. <u><mark>China and India have historically maintained <strong>relatively positive relations</strong></mark> for such large, neighboring countries</u>. The height of the Himalayas, and the long sea route between the two, have buffered most competition. Beijing’s foreign policy concerns have chiefly resided east and southeast of the country, while India has contented itself in dealing with immediate neighbors and holding fast to the nonalignment policy of the Cold War. The border war of 1962 notwithstanding, relations between the two countries have been relatively sanguine. An increasingly powerful and adventurous <u><mark>China</u> <u>and</u></mark> a more engaged <u><mark>India</u></mark> now appear to be <u><strong><mark>clashing</strong> on multiple fronts</u>. <u><strong>Border issues</u></strong></mark> linger still, and reports of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control surface regularly in Indian and Western media. While conflict is unlikely to break out, China has been updating and reinforcing its forces stationed in Tibet, and <u>the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries</u>.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | NSG CP | 126,334 | 10 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,160 | This is just another impact to multilat---Trump turns def take this out | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>This is just another impact to multilat---Trump turns def take this out</h4> | Case | Relations | null | 1,560,689 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,161 | SQ research solves – Already developing cures | Watkins 16 | Watkins 16
James, James Watkins is a reporter for the OZY, 10/19/16 (“THE SOLUTION TO ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE — MORE ANTIBIOTICS?”, http://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/the-solution-to-antibiotic-resistance-more-antibiotics/71945, OZY)//DG | Scientists are scrambling to find solutions to this urgent public health concern, and some new research suggests a surprising potential solution: even more antibiotics. UCLA researchers found that certain combinations of three or more antibiotics can work together to kill bacteria more effectively than just one or two of the drugs emergent synergistic interactions” are “something very novel that we didn’t expect might be especially relevant and especially useful” in the fight against antibiotic resistance it’s not just about overcoming drug resistance; it’s also about increasing the efficiency of individual drugs at lower concentrations in order to reduce or eliminate side effects. Multidrug cocktails might not sound synonymous with good health, but they’re already an established treatment for HIV and other viral infections, designed to decrease the chances that some of the virus might survive the pharmacological onslaugh Antibacterial drugs, meanwhile, “have traditionally been so incredibly potent that combinations of antibiotics, although not unheard of, are certainly not the norm | Scientists find solutions to concern research suggests researchers found combinations of three or more antibiotics can work together to kill bacteria something novel especially relevant against antibiotic resistance it’s about increasing the efficiency of individual drugs to reduce side effects eady an established treatment for HIV Antibacterial drugs traditionally been so potent that combinations are certainly not the norm | Are you scared yet? The medical community is. Scientists are scrambling to find solutions to this urgent public health concern, and some new research suggests a surprising potential solution: even more antibiotics. A team of UCLA researchers led by Elif Tekin, a Ph.D. graduate student, and Pamela Yeh, an assistant professor of ecology and evolutionary biology, found that certain combinations of three or more antibiotics can work together to kill bacteria more effectively than just one or two of the drugs. These so-called “emergent synergistic interactions” are “something very novel that we didn’t expect,” Yeh says, and “might be especially relevant and especially useful” in the fight against antibiotic resistance. What’s more, Tekin explains, it’s not just about overcoming drug resistance; it’s also about increasing the efficiency of individual drugs at lower concentrations in order to reduce or eliminate side effects. Multidrug cocktails might not sound synonymous with good health, but they’re already an established treatment for HIV and other viral infections, designed to decrease the chances that some of the virus might survive the pharmacological onslaught. Antibacterial drugs, meanwhile, “have traditionally been so incredibly potent that combinations of antibiotics, although not unheard of, are certainly not the norm,” says Gerry Wright, professor of biochemistry and biomedical sciences at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. Wright’s research focuses on how molecular compounds can team up with antibiotics to tackle infections even more effectively. | 1,585 | <h4><strong>SQ research solves – Already developing cures</h4><p>Watkins 16</p><p></strong>James, James Watkins is a reporter for the OZY, 10/19/16 (“THE SOLUTION TO ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE — MORE ANTIBIOTICS?”, http://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/the-solution-to-antibiotic-resistance-more-antibiotics/71945, OZY)//DG</p><p>Are you scared yet? The medical community is. <u><mark>Scientists</mark> are scrambling to <mark>find solutions to</mark> this urgent public health <mark>concern</mark>, and some new <mark>research suggests</mark> a <strong>surprising potential solution: even more antibiotics. </u></strong>A team of <u>UCLA <mark>researchers</u></mark> led by Elif Tekin, a Ph.D. graduate student, and Pamela Yeh, an assistant professor of ecology and evolutionary biology, <u><mark>found</mark> that certain <mark>combinations of three or more antibiotics can work together to kill bacteria</mark> more effectively than just one or two of the drugs</u>. These so-called “<u>emergent synergistic interactions” are “<mark>something</mark> very <mark>novel</mark> that we didn’t expect</u>,” Yeh says, and “<u><strong>might be <mark>especially relevant</mark> and especially useful” in the fight <mark>against antibiotic resistance</u></strong></mark>. What’s more, Tekin explains, <u>it’s not just about overcoming drug resistance; <mark>it’s</mark> also <mark>about increasing the efficiency of individual drugs</mark> at lower concentrations in order <mark>to reduce</mark> or eliminate <mark>side effects</mark>. Multidrug cocktails might not sound synonymous with good health, but they’re alr<mark>eady an established treatment for HIV</mark> and other viral infections, designed to decrease the chances that some of the virus might survive the pharmacological onslaugh</u>t. <u><mark>Antibacterial drugs</mark>, meanwhile, “have <mark>traditionally been so</mark> incredibly <mark>potent that combinations</mark> of antibiotics, although not unheard of, <mark>are certainly not the norm</u></mark>,” says Gerry Wright, professor of biochemistry and biomedical sciences at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. Wright’s research focuses on how molecular compounds can team up with antibiotics to tackle infections even more effectively.</p> | 1NC | Case | Disease | 1,560,690 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,162 | A clear, well-defined resolution is critical to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion---this process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement, where we learn to improve our arguments based on our opponents’ arguments. This process does not proscribe particular styles or forms of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement. | null | K2 truth testing – if we don’t test the aff it might be “deceptive”ly a bad idea | the idea of negation is central the “labour of the negative” points to disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive The first phenomenon is group polarization The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups can be countered by the inclusion of dissenting voices disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases A second dysfunction is superficial agreement Disagreement can help by challenging superficial agreements Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs In hard cases we must lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean what was wrong with flipping a coin why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases Pure non‐rational procedures would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation If the judges were to flip a coin there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements the agonistic account must come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in negotiation on the same term. the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues The fulcrum of disagreement does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style Each is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince judges Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same concept An agonistic framework can explain in what sense scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials | null | Even if we don’t agree or the aff loses the process of debating against a well prepared negative is inherently good and teaches them how to improve
Debate without disagreement => debates decided on polarization bias and or superficial agreement
Flipping a coin => no incentive to prepare
Without being prepared, we simply “talk past each other” at “cross purposes” aka the opposite of clash
Debaters in a contest can follow the rules while debating in very different “styles”
Poscher, 16—director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming, dml)
Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements. A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached. The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics. In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same concept. An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy. | 16,408 | <h4>A clear, well-defined resolution is critical to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion---this process of negation produces <u>iterative testing and improvement</u>, where we learn to improve our arguments based on our opponents’ arguments. This process does <u>not</u> proscribe particular styles or forms of argument, but <u>does</u> require a common point of disagreement.</h4><p>K2 truth testing – if we don’t test the aff it might be “deceptive”ly a bad idea</p><p>Even if we don’t agree or the aff loses the process of debating against a well prepared negative is inherently good and teaches them how to improve </p><p>Debate without disagreement => debates decided on polarization bias and or superficial agreement</p><p>Flipping a coin => no incentive to prepare</p><p>Without being prepared, we simply “talk past each other” at “cross purposes” aka the opposite of clash</p><p>Debaters in a contest can follow the rules while debating in very different “styles”</p><p><strong>Poscher, 16</strong>—director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming, dml)</p><p>Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits <u>the idea of <strong>negation</u></strong>. It <u>is</u> a <u><strong>central</u></strong> feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls <u><strong>the “labour of the negative”</u></strong>103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema <u>points to</u> yet another feature of <u>disagreements as a <strong>necessary ingredient</strong> of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is <strong>exposed to contrary arguments</strong> can we <strong>test its merits</strong>. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes</u>.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. <u>Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be <strong>deceptive</u></strong> in various ways. <u>The first phenomenon</u> Postema draws attention to <u>is</u> the <u><strong>group polarization</u></strong> effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 <u>The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups</u>106 <u>can be <strong>countered</u></strong> at least in some settings <u>by the <strong>inclusion of dissenting voices</u></strong>. In these scenarios, <u>disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases</u>.107 <u>A second</u> deliberative <u>dysfunction</u> mitigated by disagreement <u>is <strong>superficial agreement</u></strong>, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. <u>Disagreement can help</u> to police such distortions of deliberative processes <u>by challenging superficial agreements</u>. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. <u>Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable <strong>even if we do not come to terms</strong>. Each of the opposing positions will <strong>profit from the catharsis it received</strong> “by <strong>looking the negative in the face</strong> and <strong>tarrying with it</strong>”.</u> These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. <u>Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is <strong>very low from the beginning</u></strong>, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, <u>entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to <strong>test</strong> and <strong>improve our position</strong>. We have to <strong>do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves</strong>. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs</u>, attitudes and dispositions, <u>we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal <strong>for our own personal beliefs</u></strong>, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. <u>In hard cases we must</u> – in some way – <u>lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves</u> in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, <u>until we have <strong>developed a line of argument</strong> against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions</u>. In these cases <u>it might be rational to <strong>discuss the issue</strong> with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who <strong>opposes the view</strong> towards which we lean. This might even be <strong>the most helpful way of corroborating a view</strong>, because we know that our adversary is <strong>much more motivated</strong> to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement</u>. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. <u>It would be <strong>too narrow</strong> an understanding of our practice of</u> legal <u>disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to <strong>persuading an adversary</strong> in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the <strong>irrationality of argumentation</strong> in hard cases</u>, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. <u>Argumentation with an adversary can have <strong>purposes beyond persuading</u></strong> him: <u>to <strong>test one’s own convictions</strong>, to <strong>engage our opponent</strong> in inferential commitments and to <strong>persuade third parties</strong> are only some of these; to <strong>rally our troops</strong> or <strong>express our convictions</strong> might be others</u>. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, <u>the rationality of our disagreements is of a <strong>secondary nature</strong>. The rational <strong>does not lie</strong> in the discovery of a <strong>single right answer</strong> to the topic of debate</u>, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, <u>our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the <strong>exploration of our communalities</strong> or of our <strong>inferential commitments</strong>. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must <strong>stand up to alternative ways</strong> of settling irreconcilable disagreements</u> that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. <u>Why does our legal practice <strong>require lengthy arguments</strong> and <strong>discursive efforts</u></strong> even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? <u>The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean</u> and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But <u>what was wrong with</u> District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly <u>flipping a coin</u>?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, <u>why not decide hard cases by <strong>gut voting at the outset</strong> and <strong>spare everybody the cost</strong> of <strong>developing elaborate arguments</strong> on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?</u> One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that <u>the objectives listed above <strong>could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure</u></strong>. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or <u><strong>taking a gut vote</strong> would not help us to <strong>explore our communalities</strong> or our inferential commitments nor help to <strong>scrutinize the positions</strong> in play</u>. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 <u>the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement</u>.113 <u>Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law</u> in at least two ways: First, <u>the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail</u>. Second, <u>since every position <strong>must be a reasoned one</strong> within the given framework of the law, it must be one that <strong>somehow fits</strong> into the <strong>overall structure</strong> of the law along <strong>coherent lines</strong>. It thus protects against <strong>incoherent “checkerboard” treatments</u></strong>114 <u>of hard cases. It is the <strong>combination</strong> of <strong>reasoned disagreement</strong> and the <strong>non‐rational decision‐making mechanism</strong> of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases</u>: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. <u>Pure non‐rational procedures</u> – like flipping a coin – <u>would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would <strong>undercut the incentive structure</strong> of our agonistic disagreements</u>.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. <u>That the debates are <strong>about winning</strong> or <strong>losing</strong> helps to <strong>keep the participants engaged</strong>. That the decision depends on <strong>counting reasoned opinions</strong> guarantees that the engagement <strong>focuses on rational argumentation</u></strong>. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. <u>If the judges were to <strong>flip a coin</u></strong> at the end of the trial in hard cases, <u>there would be <strong>little incentive</strong> to engage in an <strong>exchange of arguments</strong>. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements</u> and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus <u>the agonistic account</u> of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it <u>must</u> still <u>come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we <strong>disagree about the same issue</strong> and are not just <strong>talking at cross purposes</u></strong>. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 <u>Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are <strong>not talking past each other</strong>, since they are engaged in</u> a metalinguistic <u>negotiation on</u> the use of <u><strong>the same term</strong>.</u> The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of <u>the term serves as a <strong>semantic anchor</strong> for a disagreement on the substantive issues</u> connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements. A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached. The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics. In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. <u>The fulcrum of disagreement</u> that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 <u>does not lie in its existence, but in <strong>the communality of the effort</strong> – if only on the basis of an <strong>overlapping common ground</strong> of legal <strong>materials</strong>, <strong>accepted practices</strong>, <strong>experiences</strong> and <strong>dispositions</strong>. As two athletes are <strong>engaged in the same contest</strong> when they <strong>follow the same rules</strong>, <strong>share the same concept of winning and losing</strong> and act in the same context, but <strong>follow very different styles</u></strong> of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. <u>They are in the same contest, <strong>even if there is no single best style</u></strong> in which to wrestle, box or swim. <u>Each</u>, however, <u>is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince</u> a bench of <u>judges</u>.122 <u>Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still <strong>share a concept</strong>, in that they are <strong>engaged in the same process</strong> of theorizing over <strong>roughly the same legal materials</strong> and <strong>practices</u></strong>. <u>Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are <strong>talking about the same concept</u></strong>. <u>An agonistic</u> account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic <u>framework</u>, which <u>can explain in what sense</u> lawyers, judges and <u>scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are <strong>not talking past each other</strong>. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same</u> legal <u>materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions</u> in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, <u>semantic unity is provided by the <strong>largely overlapping legal materials</strong> that <strong>form the basis</strong> for their disagreement. Such a semantic <strong>collapses</strong> only when we <strong>lack a sufficient overlap</strong> in the materials</u>. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.</p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 14,649 | 1,154 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,163 | “the USFG should” means the text of the resolution is only about a policy established by governmental means. | Ericson 3 | Ericson 3 (Jon Ericson, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, pg. 4) | Proposition of Policy each topic contains
AND | null | The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains
AND
compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. | 177 | <h4>“the USFG should” means the text of the resolution is only about a policy established by governmental means.</h4><p><strong>Ericson 3<u></strong> (Jon Ericson, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, pg. 4)</p><p></u>The <u>Proposition of Policy</u>: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u>each topic contains </p><p>AND</p><p></u>compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p> | null | null | Framework | 478,602 | 101 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,164 | Nuclear war | Goswami ‘13 | Goswami ‘13 | /GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears intractable Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear weapons will fight a future war. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs. Security analysts argued internal problems within India and China would create large disincentives for conflict. However wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions over land can lead to conflict As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a particular level is inevitable both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity Hence managing the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for. | China-India border dispute intractable. militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia a nuclear-armed China and India will fight a future war proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations political tensions over land can lead to conflict the border issue in the next five years | [Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears intractable. Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear weapons, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, will fight a future war. This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs. Security analysts have argued that internal problems within India and China would create large disincentives for conflict. However, despite such constraints, wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions over land can lead to conflict, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a particular level is inevitable, both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity. Hence, managing and resolving the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for. | 4,211 | <h4>Nuclear war<strong> </h4><p>Goswami ‘13</p><p></strong>[Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml /<u><strong>/GBS-JV]</p><p></strong><mark>China-India</mark> border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia</u>. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, <u>despite growing bilateral economic relations, <strong>the <mark>border dispute</mark> appears <mark>intractable</u></strong>.</mark> Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. <u>Given this overt <mark>militarization of the China-India border conflict</u>, <u><strong>any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia</mark>. </u></strong>This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. <u>Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario <strong>where <mark>a nuclear-armed China and India</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>with more than 300 nuclear weapons</u></strong>, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, <u><strong><mark>will fight a future war</mark>.</u></strong> This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. <u><strong>The physical <mark>proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations</mark> if war occurs.</u></strong> <u>Security analysts</u> have <u>argued</u> that <u>internal problems within India and China would create large</u> <u>disincentives for conflict. <strong>However</u></strong>, despite such constraints, <u>wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions.</u> Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it <u>is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation,</u> <u><strong><mark>political tensions over land can lead to conflict</u></strong></mark>, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. <u><strong>As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. </strong>While competition at a particular level is inevitable</u>, <u>both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity</u>. <u>Hence</u>, <u>managing</u> and resolving <u><strong><mark>the border issue</mark> peacefully <mark>in the next five years</mark> is something worth seriously working for.</p></u></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | NSG CP | 105,715 | 11 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,165 | They don’t solve for the lack of incentives for antibiotic research | Sageman 15 | Sageman 15 | Andrea, Graduate of Grand Valley State University specializing in medicine and health sciences, 2015 (“Antibiotic Resistance Mechanisms, Problems, and Solutions”, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1411&context=honorsprojects,)//DG
There may also be a financial component to the problem of drug resistance Developing new antibiotics may be a partial solution to this problem of bacterial antibiotic resistance developing new antibiotics is very costly, and pharmaceutical companies may not see as much of a return on their investments as they might with other types of drugs. price of antibiotics may influence which antibiotics are prescribed antibiotics are the “only therapeutic area where prescribing decisions are made based on price rather than efficacy Even if a pharmaceutical company is successful in developing a new antibiotic, it may be too expensive to use often. makes antibiotic research less lucrative for pharmaceutical companies than other areas of research. | Developing antibiotics may be a partial solution However, developing antibiotics is costly and companies may not see as much of a return price influence which antibiotics are prescribed only therapeutic area where prescribing decisions are made based on price rather than efficacy | Andrea, Graduate of Grand Valley State University specializing in medicine and health sciences, 2015 (“Antibiotic Resistance Mechanisms, Problems, and Solutions”, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1411&context=honorsprojects,)//DG
There may also be a financial component to the problem of drug resistance. Developing different and new antibiotics may be a partial solution to this problem of bacterial antibiotic resistance. However, developing new antibiotics is very costly, and pharmaceutical companies may not see as much of a return on their investments as they might with other types of drugs. Also, the price of antibiotics may influence which antibiotics are prescribed. Jeffrey Stein, executive of Trius Therapeutics, claims that antibiotics are the “only therapeutic area where prescribing decisions are made based on price rather than efficacy,”(Herper, 2014). Even if a pharmaceutical company is successful in developing a new antibiotic, it may be too expensive to use often. This makes antibiotic research less lucrative for pharmaceutical companies than other areas of research. | 1,116 | <h4><strong>They don’t solve for the lack of incentives for antibiotic research</h4><p>Sageman 15</p><p><u></strong>Andrea, Graduate of Grand Valley State University specializing in medicine and health sciences, 2015 (“Antibiotic Resistance Mechanisms, Problems, and Solutions”, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1411&context=honorsprojects,)//DG</p><p>There may also be a financial component to the problem of drug resistance</u>. <u><mark>Developing</u></mark> different and <u>new <mark>antibiotics may be a partial solution</mark> to this problem of bacterial antibiotic resistance</u>. <mark>However, <u><strong>developing</mark> new <mark>antibiotics is</mark> very <mark>costly</mark>, <mark>and</mark> pharmaceutical <mark>companies may not see as much of a return</mark> on their investments as they might with other types of drugs. </u></strong>Also, the <u><mark>price</mark> of antibiotics may <mark>influence which antibiotics are prescribed</u></mark>. Jeffrey Stein, executive of Trius Therapeutics, claims that <u>antibiotics are the “<mark>only therapeutic area where prescribing <strong>decisions are made based on price rather than efficacy</u></strong></mark>,”(Herper, 2014). <u>Even if a pharmaceutical company is successful in developing a new antibiotic, it may be too expensive to use often.</u> This <u>makes antibiotic research less lucrative for pharmaceutical companies than other areas of research.</p></u> | 1NC | Case | Disease | 1,560,691 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,166 | Specifically, Tillerson really turns it | Shank 12-12 Expect Resource Wars | Michael Shank, Ph.D., 12-12-2016, "Expect Resource Wars With Exxon CEO At State Helm," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/expect-resource-wars-with_b_13580498.html//SCOTT | Tillerson expect U.S. foreign policy to adopt a more overt and explicit commitment to resource-based warfare. Tillerson will steer diplomacy in the direction of resource exploitation and resource control, using “American security” framing to justify it Tillerson will take it to another level. Exxon has known about global warming for years land grabs, water grabs, and food grabs are happening here and now and will only increase in frequency and ferocity. appointment is a sinister preview of the kind of resource wars that await. Trump and Tillerson are both exploiters That’s their business modus operandi. When it comes to energy, for Tillerson, it’s about drilling farther and further | Tillerson commitment to resource-based warfare. Tillerson will steer diplomacy in the direction of resource exploitation and resource control Exxon has known about global warming for years Trump and Tillerson are both exploiters for Tillerson, it’s about drilling farther and further | Now that President-elect Donald Trump is positioning ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson as head of the U.S. State Department and America’s top diplomat, expect U.S. foreign policy to adopt a more overt and explicit commitment to resource-based warfare. There is no question that Tillerson will steer diplomacy in the direction of resource exploitation and resource control, using “American security” framing to justify it. Watch for the narrative. America’s diplomats and White House officials are already using it. Tillerson, however, will take it to another level. To be clear, Tillerson isn’t unmindful of climate change - in fact, Exxon has known about global warming for years - and knows well that land grabs, water grabs, and food grabs are happening here and now and will only increase in frequency and ferocity. While the U.S. Defense Department, CIA and State Department were already deeply entrenched in the business of resource domination for decades (see America’s overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Mohammad Mosaddegh, for example, after the nationalization of his country’s oil supply), this appointment is a sinister preview of the kind of resource wars that await. America’s more recent resource grabs - for Iraq’s oil, Afghanistan’s minerals, and even Libya’s oil - may soon pale in comparison to what a Secretary of State Rex Tillerson would implement. What’s most maddening is the mental mindset behind this appointment. Trump and Tillerson are both exploiters. That’s their business modus operandi. When it comes to energy, for Tillerson, it’s about drilling farther and further. And while we should, indeed, be pioneering if we want to meet the increasing energy demands of a rapidly growing population, there are much more sustainable ways to secure our future. | 1,786 | <h4>Specifically, Tillerson really turns it</h4><p>Michael <strong>Shank</strong>, Ph.D., <strong>12-12</strong>-2016, "<u><strong><mark>Expect Resource Wars</strong></mark> With Exxon CEO At State Helm</u>," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/expect-resource-wars-with_b_13580498.html//SCOTT</p><p>Now that President-elect Donald Trump is positioning ExxonMobil CEO Rex <u><mark>Tillerson</u></mark> as head of the U.S. State Department and America’s top diplomat, <u>expect U.S. foreign policy to adopt a more overt and explicit <mark>commitment to <strong>resource-based warfare.</strong></mark> </u>There is no question that <u><mark>Tillerson will steer diplomacy in the direction of <strong>resource exploitation</strong> and resource control</mark>, using “American security” framing to justify it</u>. Watch for the narrative. America’s diplomats and White House officials are already using it. <u>Tillerson</u>, however, <u>will take it to another level.</u> To be clear, Tillerson isn’t unmindful of climate change - in fact, <u><mark>Exxon has known about global warming for years</u></mark> - and knows well that <u>land grabs, water grabs, and food grabs are happening here and now and will only increase in frequency and ferocity. </u>While the U.S. Defense Department, CIA and State Department were already deeply entrenched in the business of resource domination for decades (see America’s overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Mohammad Mosaddegh, for example, after the nationalization of his country’s oil supply), this <u>appointment is a sinister preview of the kind of resource wars that await. </u>America’s more recent resource grabs - for Iraq’s oil, Afghanistan’s minerals, and even Libya’s oil - may soon pale in comparison to what a Secretary of State Rex Tillerson would implement. What’s most maddening is the mental mindset behind this appointment. <u><strong><mark>Trump and Tillerson are both exploiters</u></strong></mark>. <u>That’s their business modus operandi. When it comes to energy, <mark>for Tillerson, it’s about drilling farther and further</u></mark>. And while we should, indeed, be pioneering if we want to meet the increasing energy demands of a rapidly growing population, there are much more sustainable ways to secure our future.</p> | Case | Relations | null | 1,560,692 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,167 | Third is Topic education: Detailed information exchange, research, debate, and info-processing on economic and diplomatic foreign policy key to an informed citizenry that constrains hurtful foreign policies | null | Dr. Eliasson ‘10 | foundation of democracy is that power stems from the citizenry This acts to constrain public officials, restricting, if not completely preventing, policies that counteract the majority view in foreign policy, whether in regards to trade, aid, or military conflict Yet the evolutionary ceding of foreign policy powers from Congress to the executive branch, along with an ever increasing complexity in international affairs, and a diminished public interest in foreign policy, has brought renewed relevance to the question of whether policy makers are less beholden to public opinion in foreign policy. Case in point China‘s influence Though the American population is generally ill-informed of politics, it remains slightly more knowledgeable about domestic than international affairs, and tends to react and engage to a larger extent on domestic policies a more informed citizenry makes for better government and better policy, thus turning the debate to how we increase public understanding, from which will emerge better public debates, more accurate assessments of the arguments, and better/different decisions This paper is a multi-year undertaking, on public knowledge of foreign policy knowledge of foreign affairs leads to changed opinion altered opinions lead to action that changes policy whether U.S. foreign policy would change if the population, and some policy makers, were more knowledgeable of international affairs Would avoid unnecessary spats and harmful trade disputes policy makers refer specifically to the President and leading members of Congress; influence refers to a new or altered policy, or resorting to an existing position on an issue where a change was previously declared desirable I am concerned with whether increased levels of knowledge would lead to different opinions and more public engagement, and different policies Powlick and Katz find public opinion latent on foreign policy issues, Most Americans today get their information from cable TV online media sites, and talk radio, all dominated by agenda-pushing ideologues debates among pundits and Monday-morning political-quarterback citizen-commentators result in a frightening display of conspiracies, half-truths, emotional outbursts, and selective phraseology; substituting for proper research and analysis Propaganda, not information or analysis, results in assertions and innuendoes filtered acceptance of information is growing as an increasing number of people choose to get their news only from sources reflective of their own ideology that tend to reinforce their pre-existing political perspectives an increased focus on domestic and entertainment oriented news, and the concomitant and precipitous decline in media coverage of foreign policy, results in less attention paid by of citizens to international news leaves fewer opportunities for ―lazy citizens to encounter substantive political information Lingering misperceptions and distortions can become permanently incorrect interpretations of policies the explosion of information emanating from our high-tech devices also makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish fact from fiction Americans‘ limited knowledge of world affairs is neither justifiable nor defensible, and it may carry implications for US domestic and foreign policies Global economic and political integration--with the relative rise in China‘s, influence- makes it critically important to avoid misunderstanding of what other countries do, whether and why certain US policies are pursued and how all this influence Americans‘ lives those who perceive themselves knowledgeable also tend, generally speaking, to participate more in the political process , Americans‘ knowledge of foreign policy and global affairs remains very limited This lack of awareness is even more surprising when one considers that most issues today are what scholars call ―intermestic : they overlap domestic and international affairs. Pollution and trade are obvious examples, yet people often fail to recognize how most products, whether manufactured goods, services, or jobs, are today marketed, sold and bought globally Joesph Nye‘s terms– soft (economic, social) and hard policy areas soft policy is important the linkages of various economic and trade areas, and how decisions in one are affect another, are far more difficult to comprehend This contributes to self-defeating advocacy because the linkages, cause-and-effect, are not evident Obama, yielding to unions, imposed tariffs (taxes) on Chinese tires, was met with a 105% tax on American poultry exports to China it‘s dangerous if citizens believe it‘s sufficient to assume that all is well as long as policy makers understand complicated foreign policy issue or a relationship Uninformed citizens become ill-informed leaders most American policy makers reach top positions lacking any knowledge of foreign affairs Better informed citizens are more likely to hold elected officials accountable a better informed citizenry also mean better informed future leaders a general public lacking in understanding of foreign affairs provides the elite (policy makers, media) greater opportunity to manipulate public opinion and diminish transparency | null | (Dr. Leif Johan Eliasson, East Stroudsburg University, “Assessing Whether Increased Knowledge of Foreign Affairs Alters Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Influences Actions: A First Step,” pg online @ http://www.mpsanet.org/Portals/0/PaperArchive/916879-Eliasson_MWPSA%202010.pdf //um-ef)
The basic foundation of democracy is that power stems from the citizenry. This structure acts to constrain public officials, restricting, if not completely preventing, policies that counteract the majority view, as officials are judged by the voters –their employers– on a regular basis. In theory there is no reason this should not hold true in foreign policy, whether in regards to trade, aid, or military conflict. Yet the evolutionary ceding of foreign policy powers from Congress to the executive branch, along with an ever increasing complexity in international affairs, and a diminished public interest in foreign policy, has brought renewed relevance to the question of whether policy makers are less beholden to public opinion in foreign policy. Cases in point: debates and protests over the self-defense response against Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and, to lesser degree, China‘s influence and ―taking jobs [from] Americans. Though the American population is generally ill-informed of politics, it remains slightly more knowledgeable about domestic than international affairs, and tends to react and engage to a larger extent on domestic policies, with the partial exception of foreign wars. The majority of the literature argues that a more informed citizenry makes for better government and better policy, thus turning the debate to how we increase public understanding, from which will, hopefully, emerge better public debates, more accurate assessments of the arguments, and better/different decisions. One can legitimately ask how, or whether, this can, or should, be done? Most importantly: does it matter whether people are better informed? Despite the vast and longstanding literature on the media and foreign policy, the role of the ―attentive public, and the influence of domestic opinion polls on foreign policy, there is less research on whether the level of public understanding of foreign affairs actually affects foreign policy in our current era of 24/7 news and constant internet access. 2 This paper is predominantly is a structured-brainstorming session, the first installment in a larger, multi-year undertaking, on public knowledge of foreign policy. It partly emanates from a book that looks at Americans‘ beliefs about Europe –America’s Perception on Europe (2010)– which includes the many myths, misperceptions, and distortions the public holds in regards to close allies of the United States. Similar to the debate on domestic opinion and public engagement one may ask whether it matters if the views espoused are anchored in facts? The overarching two-part question guiding this new endeavor is whether knowledge of foreign affairs leads to changed opinion, and, most crucially, would altered opinions lead to action that changes policy? Put differently, is opinion subject to, and altered by, knowledge, and are there practical resultants? What if momentum and advocacy is all opinion, partly, or largely, devoid of facts? The larger question is whether U.S. foreign policy would change if the population, and some policy makers, were more knowledgeable of international affairs? Would we avoid unnecessary spats and harmful trade disputes? This paper has an initial discussion of three pertinent issues in need of clarification in any discussion on whether and how Americans‘ knowledge actually influences foreign policy. After explaining the motivation for this project, a summary discussion of the different between opinion and knowledge precedes an assessment of whether these difference matter, followed by examples of accepted distortions and myths. I end by reflecting on how we may construct surveys to better address the question of whether increased knowledge would alter opinions and affect policy. In so doing I accept as a premise, and provide further evidence of, what the existing literature shows, namely that Americans‘ knowledge of foreign policy in general is poor, and that policy makers react to, and pursue policies based on, public opinion and news stories more easily, and more frequently, on domestic issues than foreign policy. Throughout this paper policy makers refer specifically to the President and leading members of Congress; influence refers to a new or altered policy, or resorting to an existing position on an issue where a change was previously declared desirable. Again, I am not disputing that opinions matter on foreign policy issues, instead I am concerned with whether increased levels of knowledge would lead to different opinions and more public engagement, and ultimately different policies. The Context Much research on foreign policy making focuses on domestic political, structural, cultural, and legal restrictions on foreign policy makers (see e.g Hagan 1995 for a summary). 1 Of course different domestic structures and institutions are cemented over time, and resistant to anything more than slow, incremental, change. Leader know these, learn to act within them, and are cognizant that these areas change only slowly, and in small increments, over time. Opinion can move faster. America has a unique set of domestic institutions and politically influential sources, including a radio and TV media sector unlike any other in scope and reach. So, while it may appear intuitive that increased understanding of issues could alter opinion, a brief reflection on this complex issue leaves most of us agreeing that such a premise is contingent upon recipients‘ receptivity to facts that may counter pre-existing beliefs (overcoming cognitive dissonance), as well as recipients‘ ideological convictions, among other factors. One may counter that any information, however, skewed, is knowledge, and thus a legitimate basis for opinion and action in a democratic society where free speech is guaranteed, thus returning us to the question of whether there are genuine underlying views that would not change when confronted with facts? I return to some of these arguments later. 4 The traditional study of foreign policy opinion focuses either on polls and protests which then force policy makers to address expressed concerns, or on the media‘s influence on opinion makers and the ―interested public, who then influence the policy making process. Powlick and Katz find public opinion generally latent on foreign policy issues, awakened only in times of large-scale media attention; they also argue that when influential elites differ with government policy, government has serious problems managing public opinion (think i.e. health care in 2009/2010, or Iraq war in 2004/2005).2 Compared to half a century ago getting the scoop and setting the agenda and winning supporters is more important than working with, even supporting, U.S. foreign policy, as e.g. Cohen, 1962, found the media did in the 1950s. 3 Twenty years ago O‘Heffernan (1991) found that the media itself had become a significant force shaping our culture and politics, and it‘s independent of government. Fast forward 20 years and his statement that media … ―create a reality … –a paradigm–of the world within which policy makers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , members of Congress, the public, terrorists, corporations, other governments … use as their map of the world they want to change is even more accurate; largely irrefutable. 4 The media (broadly speaking) not merely scrutinizes government, but also examines foreign governments, and sets their own ―policy agendas (e.g. MSNBC evening shows advocating for the democrats) or promotes certain governing entities (Fox programming pushing issues for Republicans). This is crucial in an e-wired society. Most Americans today get their information from cable TV, online media sites, and talk radio, all of which are dominated by agenda-pushing ideologues (progressive liberals and far-right conservatives).5 Nielsen ratings confirm the switch from network news to ideologically dominated cable shows, where a majority of hosts appear to revel in distortions, alterations, or omitted facts for the purpose of promoting an ideology 5 agenda. Awash with iconography and rife with contradictions, debates among pundits and Monday-morning political-quarterback citizen-commentators result in a frightening display of conspiracies, half-truths, emotional outbursts, and selective phraseology; all frequently substituting for proper research and analysis. Propaganda, not information or analysis, results in assertions and innuendoes pointing to ―this is… rather than ―why is this… Thus, the hodgepodge of extracts which serve to distort reality and reinforce misperceptions and myths largely cater to, rather than challenge, audiences‘ preexisting beliefs, in the process relegating accuracy and truthfulness to an afterthought. Misperception or knowledge. Perception is received and interpreted verbal and visual information that leads to a certain image. 6 Misperception refers to when, for a number of different reasons, information received about the behavior of others diverges from reality; when a message is not interpreted as intended by the disseminator, e.g. a government, company, or individual. Humans naturally prefer consistency and simplicity over the complex reality, often erecting filters that stop inconstant and contradictory information, leading people to hear what they like and expect. In other words, information is either incorrectly interpreted or altered so as to conform to what one expects based on preconceived notions and worldviews (e.g. when leisure is valued as highly as work and the observer perceives this as laziness). Studies show this phenomena occurring when individuals, ostensibly learning from history, draw incorrect inferences from previous events that they believe resemble contemporary developments.7 Some research indicates that the American public reacts reasonably well to informed foreign policy debate.8 Yet, one must wonder if that is possible in an era of polarization and 6 ideologically driven media content. There problem of filtered acceptance of information is growing as an increasing number of people choose to get their news only from sources reflective of their own ideology, and that tend to reinforce their pre-existing political perspectives, 9 e.g. from Keith Olberman and Bill Maher on the political left, or Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck on the right. This increasingly prevalent situation stifles dialogue while encouraging attacks. Receptivity only to information that conforms to one‘s expectations increases the likelihood of accepting and disseminating distortions of reality, such as stories with omitted or misrepresented facts, to other audiences, either through the media or interpersonal communication (word of mouth). Furthermore, an increased focus on domestic and entertainment oriented news, and the concomitant and precipitous decline in media coverage of foreign policy, results in less attention paid by of citizens to international news (down 25 percent from 2002). This combination also leaves fewer opportunities for ―lazy citizens to encounter substantive political information as a matter of course, 10 leaving the casual person even more receptive to misperceptions and myths whenever a foreign affairs issue finally draws their attention. These developments may be in response to consumer demand, as some find that Americans largely think foreign policy is less important than domestic issues, where ―… importance [of an issue] motivated selective exposure and selective elaboration: when given the opportunity to choose, people chose to acquire information about policies toward which they had more personally important attitudes, and they chose to think more about these policies 11 Lingering misperceptions and distortions can become permanently incorrect interpretations of events or policies, resulting in myths. A myth is a popular belief or story associated with a person, institution, or occurrence; it is established, formulated, and repeated over time, and when heard evokes a certain response or association.12 Publicly held 7 misperceptions, myths, and distortions can result in support for candidates and policies that contradict widely held American values and objectives; or worse, even if unintended, directly harm average Americans‘ financial well-being, security, and quality of life. Myths, Opinions, Knowledge In presenting his widely cited 1961 model Rosenau argued that less than a quarter of the population could understand what was happening internationally, and yet even today, when nearly everyone who wants has the necessary tools to learn about any international issue, that number appears to have dropped further. Cable TV, the web, and cell phones make our lives more enjoyable, allowing people to gather information and research almost any issue. Thus, one could argue there should be no excuse for saying ―I don‘t know or ―I don‘t understand, but in reality such responses are understandable and, frankly, logical. That ordinary citizens, reporters, and various talk show hosts can generate rumors, distortions, and even lies, using slogans, rhetoric, and web-postings to spur interests from other citizens, means the explosion of information emanating from our high-tech devices also makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish fact from fiction. A 2007 Pew Research Center national study revealed how Americans‘ overall knowledge showed no significant difference compared to 18 years earlier. 13 The Pew 1989 and 2007 studies of public knowledge of foreign affairs are among the few who ask about what people know rather than just what they think or believe. My own, limited, 2009 college freshmen survey showed similar and disappointing results; a 1994 study showed Americans were much less knowledgeable that citizens in other rich democracies, and another large study revealed a majority of Americans cannot define liberal, conservative, various constitutional rights such as free speech, or a host of other fundamentals of our political system; whereas people knew much more about celebrities and trivia. 14 The 2007 Pews study also finds no signs that overall increased educational qualifications in the U.S. since 1989 had any effect on overall knowledge of foreign affairs. The average score of 1,500 randomized respondents to a 23-question foreign affairs quiz was 12; only 10% achieved 90% correct answers. ―The survey provides further evidence that changing news formats are not having a great deal of impact on how much the public knows about national and international affairs. And ―…there is no clear connection between news formats and what audiences know. 15 But, Older Americans - particularly those 50 years old or older - did better than younger people. Whites scored better than blacks, while more affluent Americans knew more than those with lower household incomes. 16 Yet, it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the highest scoring group were college graduates; the finding by Pew in 2007 that income, race, age and education are related to higher levels of knowledge are consistent with previous findings in other studies in the 1980s.17 From this we can infer that opinion matters for voting since more older than younger people respond in polls, and more older, affluent, college educated, white citizens, as a percentage, vote, thus lending greater significance to their views from a policy makers‘ perspective. But why are we so lacking in understanding international affairs? Being the sole democratic superpower since World War II contributes a partial but reasonable explanation of dismal levels of public knowledge. The rest of the world has traditionally come to the US –every religion, language, race and ethnicity is represented within its borders– leaving many Americans without a perceived need to learn about other regions and policies, at least not the way the rest of the world studies and follows American culture and politics. While perhaps understandable, Americans‘ limited knowledge of world affairs is neither justifiable nor defensible, and it may carry implications for US domestic and foreign policies in a global and interdependent world. Global economic and political integration--with the relative rise in Europe‘s, and increasingly China‘s, influence--makes it critically important to avoid misunderstanding of what other countries do, whether and why certain US policies are pursued, and how all this influence Americans‘ lives. People appear less informed than they care to admit, and some studies confirm exaggerated self-reporting on how much news people watch.18 Perhaps those who consider themselves informed or well-informed may be referencing what they think it means to be an ―informed citizen, or they exaggerate to not appear ill-informed. Furthermore, those who perceive themselves knowledgeable also tend, generally speaking, to participate more in the political process. Party affiliation was not a determinant of knowledge among top-scorers, but more self-declared democrats were found in the lowest scoring group, which raises the heretofore unanswered question of whether less distortion and misperceptions are disseminated among right-wing media outlets. Yet caution is advised, as age, income and education were much stronger indicators of knowledge, and a college degree with training in discriminating and evaluating ideas appears the best way to ensure an ability to discriminate among propaganda and information, and ultimately promote better understanding of international affairs and foreign policy. All these surveys are nonetheless indicative of a strange phenomenon: America is world leaders in so many areas, yet its citizens have a dismal awareness of the world they dominate. Bennett et all (1996) show that Germans are most knowledgeable about foreign policy, that British, French and Canadian citizens also know more than Americans, and that education was correlated with knowledge of foreign affairs.19 It is probably no exaggeration to say that many Americans know more about their favorite football team –whose fortunes hardly affect their jobs, security or personal finances– than they do about what or where we export, who invests and creates jobs in the U.S. Thus, notwithstanding, 24/7 news, the internet, and a proliferation of related sources of information, Americans‘ knowledge of foreign policy and global affairs remains very limited.20 This lack of awareness is even more surprising when one considers that most issues today are what scholars call ―intermestic : they overlap domestic and international affairs. Pollution and trade are perhaps obvious examples, yet people often fail to recognize how most products, whether manufactured goods, services, or jobs, are today marketed, sold and bought globally. Noting the distinction between –for lack of better distinctions, while giving credit to Joesph Nye‘s terms– soft (economic, social) and hard (security, military) policy areas, I would argue that today the ―soft policy is more important, but the linkages of various economic and trade areas, and how decisions in one are affect another, are far more difficult to comprehend. This contributes to, at times, self-defeating advocacy because the linkages, cause-and-effect, are not evident. Obama, yielding to unions, imposed tariffs (taxes) on Chinese tires, was met with a 105% tax on select American poultry exports to China. Congress imposed a 50¢ per gallon tariff on Brazilian sugar-cane ethanol after easily surrendering to farm-lobbyists and primary-induced politics, further thickening the gravy-related by throwing billions of tax dollars to subsidize corn based ethanol, which also cuts into the food supply and raises corn-based food prices for all Americans. An argument may be had that we need to accept different levels of knowledge, just as people differ in other areas of life, and that having a relatively informed quarter or so of the populace is sufficient to ensure policy debate and accountability. Yet it‘s dangerous if citizens believe it‘s sufficient to assume that all is well as long as policy makers and their staff understand a complicated foreign policy issue or a relationship –be it political, economic, or other–, and that it matters little if the public is uninformed, or whether their perceptions are distorted. Uninformed citizens become ill-informed leaders. A look at recent presidents and elected representatives reveals that most American policy makers reach top positions lacking any knowledge of foreign affairs, let allow experience.21 The circle is perpetuated as rising stars often receive incomplete or slanted the information from peers and superiors. It is appropriate to retain a degree of deference to those we elect, but remember that voting alone does not absolve us of our responsibilities to acquire accurate information. Better informed citizens are more likely to hold elected officials accountable. 22 Therefore, a better informed citizenry also means better informed future leaders. Conversely, a general public lacking in understanding of foreign affairs provides the elite (policy makers, media) greater opportunity to manipulate public opinion and diminish transparency. | 21,474 | <h4><u>Third is Topic education</u><strong>: Detailed information exchange, research, debate, and info-processing on economic and diplomatic foreign policy key to an informed citizenry that constrains hurtful foreign policies </h4><p></strong>Dr. Eliasson ‘10</p><p><strong>(Dr. Leif Johan Eliasson, East Stroudsburg University, “Assessing Whether Increased Knowledge of Foreign Affairs Alters Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Influences Actions: A First Step,” pg online @ http://www.mpsanet.org/Portals/0/PaperArchive/916879-Eliasson_MWPSA%202010.pdf //um-ef)</p><p></strong>The basic <u>foundation of democracy is that power stems from the citizenry</u>. <u><strong>This</u></strong> structure <u><strong>acts to constrain public officials, restricting, if not completely preventing, policies that counteract the majority view</u></strong>, as officials are judged by the voters –their employers– on a regular basis. In theory there is no reason this should not hold true <u>in foreign policy, whether in regards to trade, aid, or military conflict</u>. <u>Yet the evolutionary ceding of foreign policy powers from Congress to the executive branch, along with an ever increasing complexity in international affairs, and a diminished public interest in foreign policy, has brought renewed relevance to the question of whether policy makers are less beholden to public opinion</u> <u>in foreign policy. Case</u>s<u> in point</u>: debates and protests over the self-defense response against Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and, to lesser degree, <u><strong>China‘s influence</u></strong> and ―taking jobs [from] Americans. <u>Though the American population is generally ill-informed of politics, it remains slightly more knowledgeable about domestic than international affairs, and tends to react and engage to a larger extent on domestic policies</u>, with the partial exception of foreign wars. The majority of the literature argues that <u>a more informed citizenry makes for <strong>better government and better policy</strong>, thus turning the debate to how we <strong>increase public understanding</strong>, from which will</u>, hopefully,<u> emerge better public debates, more accurate assessments of the arguments, and better/different decisions</u>. One can legitimately ask how, or whether, this can, or should, be done? Most importantly: does it matter whether people are better informed? Despite the vast and longstanding literature on the media and foreign policy, the role of the ―attentive public, and the influence of domestic opinion polls on foreign policy, there is less research on whether the level of public understanding of foreign affairs actually affects foreign policy in our current era of 24/7 news and constant internet access. 2 <u>This paper is</u> predominantly is <u>a</u> structured-brainstorming session, the first installment in a larger, <u>multi-year undertaking, on public knowledge of foreign policy</u>. It partly emanates from a book that looks at Americans‘ beliefs about Europe –America’s Perception on Europe (2010)– which includes the many myths, misperceptions, and distortions the public holds in regards to close allies of the United States. Similar to the debate on domestic opinion and public engagement one may ask whether it matters if the views espoused are anchored in facts? The overarching two-part question guiding this new endeavor is whether <u>knowledge of foreign affairs leads to <strong>changed opinion</u></strong>, and, most crucially, would<u> altered opinions lead to <strong>action that changes policy</u></strong>? Put differently, is opinion subject to, and altered by, knowledge, and are there practical resultants? What if momentum and advocacy is all opinion, partly, or largely, devoid of facts? The larger question is <u>whether U.S. foreign policy would change if the population, and some policy makers, were more knowledgeable of international affairs</u>? <u>Would</u> we<u> avoid unnecessary spats and <strong>harmful trade disputes</u></strong>? This paper has an initial discussion of three pertinent issues in need of clarification in any discussion on whether and how Americans‘ knowledge actually influences foreign policy. After explaining the motivation for this project, a summary discussion of the different between opinion and knowledge precedes an assessment of whether these difference matter, followed by examples of accepted distortions and myths. I end by reflecting on how we may construct surveys to better address the question of whether increased knowledge would alter opinions and affect policy. In so doing I accept as a premise, and provide further evidence of, what the existing literature shows, namely that Americans‘ knowledge of foreign policy in general is poor, and that policy makers react to, and pursue policies based on, public opinion and news stories more easily, and more frequently, on domestic issues than foreign policy. Throughout this paper <u>policy makers refer specifically to the President and leading members of Congress; influence refers to a new or altered policy, or resorting to an existing position on an issue where a change was previously declared desirable</u>. Again, I am not disputing that opinions matter on foreign policy issues, instead <u>I am concerned with whether increased levels of knowledge would lead to different opinions and more public engagement, and</u> ultimately <u><strong>different policies</u></strong>. The Context Much research on foreign policy making focuses on domestic political, structural, cultural, and legal restrictions on foreign policy makers (see e.g Hagan 1995 for a summary). 1 Of course different domestic structures and institutions are cemented over time, and resistant to anything more than slow, incremental, change. Leader know these, learn to act within them, and are cognizant that these areas change only slowly, and in small increments, over time. Opinion can move faster. America has a unique set of domestic institutions and politically influential sources, including a radio and TV media sector unlike any other in scope and reach. So, while it may appear intuitive that increased understanding of issues could alter opinion, a brief reflection on this complex issue leaves most of us agreeing that such a premise is contingent upon recipients‘ receptivity to facts that may counter pre-existing beliefs (overcoming cognitive dissonance), as well as recipients‘ ideological convictions, among other factors. One may counter that any information, however, skewed, is knowledge, and thus a legitimate basis for opinion and action in a democratic society where free speech is guaranteed, thus returning us to the question of whether there are genuine underlying views that would not change when confronted with facts? I return to some of these arguments later. 4 The traditional study of foreign policy opinion focuses either on polls and protests which then force policy makers to address expressed concerns, or on the media‘s influence on opinion makers and the ―interested public, who then influence the policy making process. <u>Powlick and Katz find public opinion </u>generally<u> latent on foreign policy issues,</u> awakened only in times of large-scale media attention; they also argue that when influential elites differ with government policy, government has serious problems managing public opinion (think i.e. health care in 2009/2010, or Iraq war in 2004/2005).2 Compared to half a century ago getting the scoop and setting the agenda and winning supporters is more important than working with, even supporting, U.S. foreign policy, as e.g. Cohen, 1962, found the media did in the 1950s. 3 Twenty years ago O‘Heffernan (1991) found that the media itself had become a significant force shaping our culture and politics, and it‘s independent of government. Fast forward 20 years and his statement that media … ―create a reality … –a paradigm–of the world within which policy makers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , members of Congress, the public, terrorists, corporations, other governments … use as their map of the world they want to change is even more accurate; largely irrefutable. 4 The media (broadly speaking) not merely scrutinizes government, but also examines foreign governments, and sets their own ―policy agendas (e.g. MSNBC evening shows advocating for the democrats) or promotes certain governing entities (Fox programming pushing issues for Republicans). This is crucial in an e-wired society. <u>Most Americans today get their information from cable TV</u>, <u>online media sites, and talk radio,<strong> all </u></strong>of which are<u><strong> dominated by agenda-pushing ideologues</u></strong> (progressive liberals and far-right conservatives).5 Nielsen ratings confirm the switch from network news to ideologically dominated cable shows, where a majority of hosts appear to revel in distortions, alterations, or omitted facts for the purpose of promoting an ideology 5 agenda. Awash with iconography and rife with contradictions, <u>debates among pundits and Monday-morning political-quarterback citizen-commentators result in a frightening display of conspiracies, half-truths, emotional outbursts, and selective phraseology; </u>all frequently <u><strong>substituting for proper research and analysis</u></strong>. <u>Propaganda, not information or analysis, results in assertions and innuendoes </u>pointing to ―this is… rather than ―why is this… Thus, the hodgepodge of extracts which serve to distort reality and reinforce misperceptions and myths largely cater to, rather than challenge, audiences‘ preexisting beliefs, in the process relegating accuracy and truthfulness to an afterthought. Misperception or knowledge. Perception is received and interpreted verbal and visual information that leads to a certain image. 6 Misperception refers to when, for a number of different reasons, information received about the behavior of others diverges from reality; when a message is not interpreted as intended by the disseminator, e.g. a government, company, or individual. Humans naturally prefer consistency and simplicity over the complex reality, often erecting filters that stop inconstant and contradictory information, leading people to hear what they like and expect. In other words, information is either incorrectly interpreted or altered so as to conform to what one expects based on preconceived notions and worldviews (e.g. when leisure is valued as highly as work and the observer perceives this as laziness). Studies show this phenomena occurring when individuals, ostensibly learning from history, draw incorrect inferences from previous events that they believe resemble contemporary developments.7 Some research indicates that the American public reacts reasonably well to informed foreign policy debate.8 Yet, one must wonder if that is possible in an era of polarization and 6 ideologically driven media content. There problem of <u>filtered acceptance of information is growing as an increasing number of people choose to get their news only from sources reflective of their own ideology</u>, and <u><strong>that tend to reinforce their pre-existing political perspectives</u></strong>, 9 e.g. from Keith Olberman and Bill Maher on the political left, or Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck on the right. This increasingly prevalent situation stifles dialogue while encouraging attacks. Receptivity only to information that conforms to one‘s expectations increases the likelihood of accepting and disseminating distortions of reality, such as stories with omitted or misrepresented facts, to other audiences, either through the media or interpersonal communication (word of mouth). Furthermore, <u>an increased focus on domestic and entertainment oriented news, and the concomitant and precipitous decline in media coverage of foreign policy, results in less attention paid by of citizens to international news</u> (down 25 percent from 2002). This combination also <u>leaves fewer opportunities for ―lazy citizens to encounter substantive political information </u>as a matter of course, 10 leaving the casual person even more receptive to misperceptions and myths whenever a foreign affairs issue finally draws their attention. These developments may be in response to consumer demand, as some find that Americans largely think foreign policy is less important than domestic issues, where ―… importance [of an issue] motivated selective exposure and selective elaboration: when given the opportunity to choose, people chose to acquire information about policies toward which they had more personally important attitudes, and they chose to think more about these policies 11 <u>Lingering misperceptions and distortions can become permanently incorrect interpretations of</u> events or <u>policies</u>, resulting in myths. A myth is a popular belief or story associated with a person, institution, or occurrence; it is established, formulated, and repeated over time, and when heard evokes a certain response or association.12 Publicly held 7 misperceptions, myths, and distortions can result in support for candidates and policies that contradict widely held American values and objectives; or worse, even if unintended, directly harm average Americans‘ financial well-being, security, and quality of life. Myths, Opinions, Knowledge In presenting his widely cited 1961 model Rosenau argued that less than a quarter of the population could understand what was happening internationally, and yet even today, when nearly everyone who wants has the necessary tools to learn about any international issue, that number appears to have dropped further. Cable TV, the web, and cell phones make our lives more enjoyable, allowing people to gather information and research almost any issue. Thus, one could argue there should be no excuse for saying ―I don‘t know or ―I don‘t understand, but in reality such responses are understandable and, frankly, logical. That ordinary citizens, reporters, and various talk show hosts can generate rumors, distortions, and even lies, using slogans, rhetoric, and web-postings to spur interests from other citizens, means <u><strong>the explosion of information emanating from our high-tech devices also makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish fact from fiction</u></strong>. A 2007 Pew Research Center national study revealed how Americans‘ overall knowledge showed no significant difference compared to 18 years earlier. 13 The Pew 1989 and 2007 studies of public knowledge of foreign affairs are among the few who ask about what people know rather than just what they think or believe. My own, limited, 2009 college freshmen survey showed similar and disappointing results; a 1994 study showed Americans were much less knowledgeable that citizens in other rich democracies, and another large study revealed a majority of Americans cannot define liberal, conservative, various constitutional rights such as free speech, or a host of other fundamentals of our political system; whereas people knew much more about celebrities and trivia. 14 The 2007 Pews study also finds no signs that overall increased educational qualifications in the U.S. since 1989 had any effect on overall knowledge of foreign affairs. The average score of 1,500 randomized respondents to a 23-question foreign affairs quiz was 12; only 10% achieved 90% correct answers. ―The survey provides further evidence that changing news formats are not having a great deal of impact on how much the public knows about national and international affairs. And ―…there is no clear connection between news formats and what audiences know. 15 But, Older Americans - particularly those 50 years old or older - did better than younger people. Whites scored better than blacks, while more affluent Americans knew more than those with lower household incomes. 16 Yet, it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the highest scoring group were college graduates; the finding by Pew in 2007 that income, race, age and education are related to higher levels of knowledge are consistent with previous findings in other studies in the 1980s.17 From this we can infer that opinion matters for voting since more older than younger people respond in polls, and more older, affluent, college educated, white citizens, as a percentage, vote, thus lending greater significance to their views from a policy makers‘ perspective. But why are we so lacking in understanding international affairs? Being the sole democratic superpower since World War II contributes a partial but reasonable explanation of dismal levels of public knowledge. The rest of the world has traditionally come to the US –every religion, language, race and ethnicity is represented within its borders– leaving many Americans without a perceived need to learn about other regions and policies, at least not the way the rest of the world studies and follows American culture and politics. While perhaps understandable, <u>Americans‘ limited knowledge of world affairs is neither justifiable nor defensible, and it may carry implications for US domestic and foreign policies</u> in a global and interdependent world. <u>Global economic and political integration--with the relative rise in</u> Europe‘s, and increasingly <u><strong>China‘s, influence-</u></strong>-<u>makes it critically important to <strong>avoid misunderstanding</strong> of what other countries do, whether and why certain US policies are pursued</u>, <u><strong>and how all this influence Americans‘ lives</u></strong>. People appear less informed than they care to admit, and some studies confirm exaggerated self-reporting on how much news people watch.18 Perhaps those who consider themselves informed or well-informed may be referencing what they think it means to be an ―informed citizen, or they exaggerate to not appear ill-informed. Furthermore, <u>those who perceive themselves knowledgeable also tend, generally speaking, to participate more in the political process</u>. Party affiliation was not a determinant of knowledge among top-scorers, but more self-declared democrats were found in the lowest scoring group, which raises the heretofore unanswered question of whether less distortion and misperceptions are disseminated among right-wing media outlets. Yet caution is advised, as age, income and education were much stronger indicators of knowledge, and a college degree with training in discriminating and evaluating ideas appears the best way to ensure an ability to discriminate among propaganda and information, and ultimately promote better understanding of international affairs and foreign policy. All these surveys are nonetheless indicative of a strange phenomenon: America is world leaders in so many areas, yet its citizens have a dismal awareness of the world they dominate. Bennett et all (1996) show that Germans are most knowledgeable about foreign policy, that British, French and Canadian citizens also know more than Americans, and that education was correlated with knowledge of foreign affairs.19 It is probably no exaggeration to say that many Americans know more about their favorite football team –whose fortunes hardly affect their jobs, security or personal finances– than they do about what or where we export, who invests and creates jobs in the U.S. Thus, notwithstanding, 24/7 news, the internet, and a proliferation of related sources of information<u>, Americans‘ knowledge of foreign policy and global affairs remains very limited</u>.20 <u>This lack of awareness is even more surprising when one considers that most issues today are what scholars call ―intermestic : they overlap domestic and international affairs.</u> <u><strong>Pollution and trade are</u></strong> perhaps <u>obvious examples, yet people often fail to recognize how most products, whether manufactured goods, services, or jobs, are today marketed, sold and bought globally</u>. Noting the distinction between –for lack of better distinctions, while giving credit to <u>Joesph Nye‘s terms– soft (economic, social) and hard</u> (security, military) <u>policy areas</u>, I would argue that today the ―<u><strong>soft policy</u></strong> <u><strong>is </u></strong>more <u><strong>important</u></strong>, but <u>the linkages of various economic and trade areas, and how decisions in one are affect another, are far more difficult to comprehend</u>. <u>This contributes to</u>, at times, <u><strong>self-defeating advocacy because the linkages, cause-and-effect, are not evident</u></strong>. <u>Obama, yielding to unions, imposed tariffs (taxes) on Chinese tires, was met with a 105% tax on</u> select<u> American poultry exports to China</u>. Congress imposed a 50¢ per gallon tariff on Brazilian sugar-cane ethanol after easily surrendering to farm-lobbyists and primary-induced politics, further thickening the gravy-related by throwing billions of tax dollars to subsidize corn based ethanol, which also cuts into the food supply and raises corn-based food prices for all Americans. An argument may be had that we need to accept different levels of knowledge, just as people differ in other areas of life, and that having a relatively informed quarter or so of the populace is sufficient to ensure policy debate and accountability. Yet <u>it‘s dangerous if citizens believe it‘s sufficient to assume that all is well as long as policy makers </u>and their staff<u> understand </u>a <u>complicated foreign policy issue or a relationship</u> –be it political, economic, or other–, and that it matters little if the public is uninformed, or whether their perceptions are distorted. <u><strong>Uninformed citizens become ill-informed leaders</u></strong>. A look at recent presidents and elected representatives reveals that <u>most American policy makers reach top positions lacking any knowledge of foreign affairs</u>, let allow experience.21 The circle is perpetuated as rising stars often receive incomplete or slanted the information from peers and superiors. It is appropriate to retain a degree of deference to those we elect, but remember that voting alone does not absolve us of our responsibilities to acquire accurate information. <u><strong>Better informed citizens are more likely to hold elected officials accountable</u></strong>. 22 Therefore, <u><strong>a better informed citizenry also mean</u></strong>s<u><strong> better informed future leaders</u></strong>. Conversely, <u><strong>a general public lacking in understanding of foreign affairs provides the elite (policy makers, media) greater opportunity to manipulate public opinion and diminish transparency</u></strong>. </p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 85,888 | 120 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,168 | Being in the direction of the topic isn’t good enough---stick to a precise and limited resolution that creates clear differences and points of refutation in order to allow productive, in-depth debates with well-prepared opponents | Gutting 13 | Gutting 13 (Gary Gutting, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, holds a Ph.D. from St. Louis University, 2013, “A Great Debate,” The Stone—a New York Times blog featuring writing by contemporary philosophers curated by Simon Critchley, February 19th, Available Online at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/) | at stake in our disputes and why their opponents think as they do | null | This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending
AND
at stake in our disputes and why their opponents think as they do. | 149 | <h4>Being in the direction of the topic isn’t good enough---stick to a precise and limited resolution that creates clear differences and points of refutation in order to allow productive, in-depth debates with well-prepared opponents</h4><p><strong>Gutting 13</strong> (Gary Gutting, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, holds a Ph.D. from St. Louis University, 2013, “A Great Debate,” The Stone—a New York Times blog featuring writing by contemporary philosophers curated by Simon Critchley, February 19th, Available Online at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/)</p><p>This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>at stake in our disputes</strong> and <strong>why their opponents think as they do</u></strong>.</p> | null | null | Framework | 622,133 | 21 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,169 | Infrastructure spending package will pass – no thumpers – but Trump’s political capital with Republicans is key | Thompson 1-24 | Thompson 1-24 | Democrats have put forward the blueprint of a $1 trillion infrastructure plan to revamp and build roads, bridges, internet access, airports, schools, veterans hospitals, railways, sewers, The plan represents an opening bid by Democratic lawmakers for one of Trump’s top domestic priorities the broad strokes would mean a larger investment than President Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus bill Trump repeatedly pledged on the campaign trail to restore America’s infrastructure and has made it clear it’s a top priority of his administration He knew that his push for a “trillion-dollar” infrastructure plan would make deficit-hawk conservatives “go crazy,” but he said Trump was creating an “entirely new political movement.” not all conservatives are keen on the idea Trump discussed infrastructure with the Democratic leadership until McConnell “made the important point that it needs to be paid for,” McConnell seemed a bit miffed at the camaraderie between Trump and Schumer There are only so many ways to get new tax dollars, and many Republicans would prefer to dedicate any available money to tax cuts rather than infrastructur There’s going to be a massive struggle in Congress because President Trump wants to do tax reform and infrastructure, and there’s only one revenue source said Delaney who has been a leading driver of bipartisan infrastructure reform Such an approach would also likely not attract much Democratic support. “You can’t take every road in the country and toll it The Senate Democratic plan relies heavily on government spending instead of tax credits and public-private partnerships But that may just be an opening offer for Trump Trump spent most of his professional career building things and may be persuaded to prioritize infrastructure over tax cuts It offers the new president a tantalizing opportunity to deliver “big-league” on a campaign promise with bipartisan support | infrastructure plan represents one of Trump’s top domestic priorities creating an “entirely new political movement not all conservatives are keen it needs to be paid for, going to be a struggle because only one revenue source But offers the new president opportunity to deliver “big-league” on a campaign promise with bipartisan support | [Alex. “If you build it... Democrats dare Trump to spend $1 trillion on infrastructure.” 1/24/17 https://news.vice.com/story/senate-democrats-are-daring-trump-to-spend-1-trillion-on-infrastructure //GBS-JV]
Several Senate Democrats have put forward the blueprint of a $1 trillion infrastructure plan to revamp and build roads, bridges, internet access, airports, schools, veterans hospitals, railways, sewers, and more. The plan represents an opening bid by Democratic lawmakers for one of Trump’s top domestic priorities and may be designed to drive a wedge between Trump and congressional Republicans. The plan was introduced Tuesday by Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer along with Democratic Sens. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, Ron Wyden of Oregon, Tom Carper of Delaware, Sherrod Brown of Ohio, Bill Nelson of Florida, and Maria Cantwell of Washington. It lacks many details that an actual bill would require, but the broad strokes would mean a larger investment than President Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus bill from 2009 in the midst of the Great Recession. Trump repeatedly pledged on the campaign trail to restore America’s infrastructure and has made it clear since his election victory that it’s a top priority of his administration. In his 15-minute inaugural address Friday, Trump said “[w]e will build new roads, and highways, and bridges, and airports, and tunnels, and railways all across our wonderful nation…rebuilding our country with American hands and American labor.” Immediately after the election last November, White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon told The Hollywood Reporter that “it’s the greatest opportunity to rebuild everything. Shipyards, ironworks — get them all jacked up.” He knew that his push for a “trillion-dollar” infrastructure plan would make deficit-hawk conservatives “go crazy,” but he said Trump was creating an “entirely new political movement.” As Bannon predicted, not all conservatives are keen on the idea, as the national debt has reached nearly $20 trillion. During his first official meeting with congressional leaders of both parties Monday night, Trump discussed infrastructure with the Democratic leadership until Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell “made the important point that it needs to be paid for,” Sen. John Cornyn recounted to reporters after the meeting. McConnell seemed a bit miffed at the camaraderie between Trump and fellow New Yorker Chuck Schumer, telling reporters afterward that he “enjoyed the president and Sen. Schumer talking about all the people they knew in New York.” There are only so many ways to get new tax dollars, and many Republicans would prefer to dedicate any available money to tax cuts rather than infrastructure. “There’s going to be a massive struggle in Congress because President Trump wants to do tax reform and infrastructure, and there’s only one revenue source,” said Democratic Congressman John Delaney, who has been a leading driver of bipartisan infrastructure reform over the last four years and is reintroducing his bipartisan bill this spring that is funded through international tax reform. “What are they going to prioritize?” While Trump’s campaign plan for infrastructure claimed to be revenue-neutral through public-private partnership and tax credits, rural Republicans have shown concern that such an approach would leave out their voters. Such rural parts of the country were essential to Trump’s victory in November. The Trump administration must “ensure that rural areas are not left out of the equation,” said Sen. John Thune of South Dakota last week during the confirmation hearing for Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. Thune questioned whether the Trump plan would improve infrastructure in rural areas without an additional source of revenue. Such an approach would also likely not attract much Democratic support. “You can’t take every road in the country and toll it,” said Delaney when asked about Trump’s plans. “It’s a massively regressive approach to public services. Some infrastructure is just for the public good, period.” The Senate Democratic plan relies heavily on government spending instead of tax credits and public-private partnerships and does not specify how to fund the massive investment. But that may just be an opening offer for Trump, who has repeatedly talked about revelling in negotiations. Trump spent most of his professional career building things and may be persuaded to prioritize infrastructure over tax cuts. It offers the new president a tantalizing opportunity to deliver “big-league” on a campaign promise with bipartisan support. | 4,608 | <h4>Infrastructure spending package will pass – no thumpers – but Trump’s <u>political capital with Republicans</u><strong> is key </h4><p>Thompson 1-24</p><p></strong>[Alex. “If you build it... Democrats dare Trump to spend $1 trillion on infrastructure.” 1/24/17 https://news.vice.com/story/senate-democrats-are-daring-trump-to-spend-1-trillion-on-infrastructure //GBS-JV]</p><p>Several Senate <u>Democrats have put forward the blueprint of a $1 trillion <mark>infrastructure </mark>plan to revamp and build</u> <u>roads, bridges, internet access, airports, schools, veterans hospitals, railways, sewers, </u>and more. <u><strong>The <mark>plan represents</mark> an opening bid by Democratic lawmakers for <mark>one of Trump’s top</mark> <mark>domestic priorities</u></strong></mark> and may be designed to drive a wedge between Trump and congressional Republicans. The plan was introduced Tuesday by Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer along with Democratic Sens. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, Ron Wyden of Oregon, Tom Carper of Delaware, Sherrod Brown of Ohio, Bill Nelson of Florida, and Maria Cantwell of Washington. It lacks many details that an actual bill would require, but <u>the broad strokes would mean a larger investment than President Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus bill</u> from 2009 in the midst of the Great Recession. <u>Trump repeatedly pledged on the campaign trail to restore America’s infrastructure and has made it clear</u> since his election victory that <u><strong>it’s a top priority of his administration</u></strong>. In his 15-minute inaugural address Friday, Trump said “[w]e will build new roads, and highways, and bridges, and airports, and tunnels, and railways all across our wonderful nation…rebuilding our country with American hands and American labor.” Immediately after the election last November, White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon told The Hollywood Reporter that “it’s the greatest opportunity to rebuild everything. Shipyards, ironworks — get them all jacked up.” <u>He knew that his push for a “trillion-dollar” infrastructure plan would make deficit-hawk conservatives “go crazy,” but he said Trump was <mark>creating an “<strong>entirely new political movement</strong></mark>.” </u>As Bannon predicted, <u><mark>not all conservatives are keen</mark> on the idea</u>, as the national debt has reached nearly $20 trillion. During his first official meeting with congressional leaders of both parties Monday night, <u>Trump discussed infrastructure with the Democratic leadership <strong>until</u></strong> Senate Majority Leader Mitch <u><strong>McConnell “made the important point that<mark> it needs to be paid for,</mark>”</u></strong> Sen. John Cornyn recounted to reporters after the meeting. <u>McConnell seemed a bit miffed at the camaraderie between Trump and</u> fellow New Yorker Chuck <u>Schumer</u>, telling reporters afterward that he “enjoyed the president and Sen. Schumer talking about all the people they knew in New York.” <u>There are only so many ways to get new tax dollars, and many Republicans would prefer to dedicate any available money to tax cuts rather than infrastructur</u>e. “<u><strong>There’s <mark>going to be a</mark> massive <mark>struggle </mark>in Congress <mark>because</mark> President Trump wants to do tax reform and infrastructure, and there’s <mark>only one revenue source</u></strong></mark>,” <u>said</u> Democratic Congressman John <u>Delaney</u>, <u>who has been a leading driver of bipartisan infrastructure reform</u> over the last four years and is reintroducing his bipartisan bill this spring that is funded through international tax reform. “What are they going to prioritize?” While Trump’s campaign plan for infrastructure claimed to be revenue-neutral through public-private partnership and tax credits, rural Republicans have shown concern that such an approach would leave out their voters. Such rural parts of the country were essential to Trump’s victory in November. The Trump administration must “ensure that rural areas are not left out of the equation,” said Sen. John Thune of South Dakota last week during the confirmation hearing for Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. Thune questioned whether the Trump plan would improve infrastructure in rural areas without an additional source of revenue. <u>Such an approach would also likely not attract much Democratic support. “You can’t take every road in the country and toll it</u>,” said Delaney when asked about Trump’s plans. “It’s a massively regressive approach to public services. Some infrastructure is just for the public good, period.” <u>The Senate Democratic plan relies heavily on government spending instead of tax credits and public-private partnerships</u> and does not specify how to fund the massive investment. <u><strong><mark>But</mark> that may just be an opening offer for Trump</u></strong>, who has repeatedly talked about revelling in negotiations. <u>Trump spent most of his professional career building things and may be persuaded to prioritize infrastructure over tax cuts</u>. <u><strong>It <mark>offers the new president</mark> a tantalizing <mark>opportunity to deliver “big-league” on a campaign promise with bipartisan support</u></strong></mark>.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Politics | 1,560,475 | 2 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,170 | They don’t solve for antibiotic resistance in animals that’s causing the whole crisis in the first place – Means its inevtiable | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They don’t solve for antibiotic resistance in animals that’s causing the whole crisis in the first place – Means its inevtiable</h4> | 1NC | Case | Disease | 1,560,693 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,171 | The fourth net benefit is implementation education – they critique the USFG and its foreign policy but don’t have a plan to change either of those things -- Implementation education and learning how to change these things are key to successful activist strategies. | Chandler '10 | Chandler '10 [David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – This card internally quotes Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 'No Communicating Left' (review article), Radical Philosophy, No. 160 (March/April 2010), pp.53-55. ISSN 0300 211X]bjs | Dean devastating critique of the American left for its complacency its limited capacity, and even its lack of awareness of the need to offer a stand of political resistance to power opposition keeps us feeling like we matter we lack a coherent politics disintegration of the collective left there is no possibility of universalising into a collective challenge to the system no possibility of a left which stands for something beyond itself rather than confront this problem, the left take refuge in fantasy inability to engage abandonment of workers and the poor acceptance of the neoliberal economy radicalism appears to be based less on changing the world than on the articulation of an alternative oppositionalist identity: a non-strategic, non-instrumental, articulation of a protest against power left too busy to think about engaging in an organised, collective, attempt to achieve societal transformation this is fake or hollow political activity, pursued more for its own sake than for future political ends This is a politics of narcissism he left needs to rethink its values and approaches the left’s focus on creating spaces merely reproduces the domination of capitalism where there is no shared space of debate but the proliferation of mediums capitalism is held to thrive on this framework of communication, which gives the impression of a movement but leaves reality just as it is, with neoliberal frameworks of domination, inequality, and destruction continuing unopposed | null | Dean pulls few punches in her devastating critique of the American left for its complacency, its limited capacity, and even its lack of awareness of the need to offer a stand of political resistance to power. This is how she concludes her book: The eight years of the Bush administration were a diversion. Intoxicated with a sense of purpose, we could oppose war, torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, a seemingly endless series of real crimes… such opposition keeps us feeling like we matter… We have an ethical sense. But we lack a coherent politics. (p.175) Dean highlights clearly the disintegration of the collective left and its simulacra in the individuated life-style politics of today’s depoliticized radicalism, where it appears that particular individual demands and identities are to be respected but there is no possibility of universalising them into a collective challenge to the system: no possibility of a left which stands for something beyond itself. She argues that, rather than confront this problem, the left take refuge in the fantasy that technology will overcome their inability to engage and that the circulation of ideas and information on the internet will construct the collectivities and communities of interest, which are lacking in reality. For Dean, this ‘technology fetishism’ marks the left’s failure: its ‘abandonment of workers and the poor; its retreat from the state and repudiation of collective action; and its acceptance of the neoliberal economy as the “only game in town”’ (p.33). In fact, she uncovers the gaping hole at the heart of the left, highlighting that radicalism appears to be based less on changing the world than on the articulation of an alternative oppositionalist identity: a non-strategic, non-instrumental, articulation of a protest against power. In a nutshell, the left are too busy providing alternative voices, spaces and forums to think about engaging with mass society in an organised, collective, attempt to achieve societal transformation. For Dean, this is fake or hollow political activity, pursued more for its own sake than for future political ends. This is a politics of ethical distancing, of selfflattery and narcissism, which excuses or even celebrates the self-marginalization of the left: as either the result of the overwhelming capacity of neoliberal power to act, to control, and to regulate; or as the result of the apathy, stupidity, or laziness of the masses - or the ‘sheeple’ (p.171) - for their failure to join the radical cause. Dean suggests that the left needs to rethink its values and approaches and her book is intended to be a wake-up call to abandon narcissistic complacency. In doing this, she highlights a range of problems connected around the thematic of the left’s defence of democracy in an age of communicative capitalism. She argues that the left’s focus on extending or defending democracy by asserting their role in giving voice and creating spaces merely reproduces the domination of communicative capitalism, where there is no shared space of debate and disagreement but the proliferation of mediums and messages without the responsibility to develop and defend positions or to engage and no external measure of accountability. Communicative capitalism is held to thrive on this fragmented, atomizing, and individuated, framework of communication, which gives the impression of a shared discourse, community, or movement but leaves reality just as it is, with neoliberal frameworks of domination, inequality, and destruction continuing unopposed (pp.162-75). This is not merely a critique of the US left; it is also a powerful deconstruction of its claims for a collective existence. She suggests this most strongly in her chapters on ‘technology fetishism’ and on the ‘9/11 truth’ movement, in which she analyzes how individuals come together not on the basis of a collective political project, challenging power, but on the basis of an invitation for individuals to affirm their alienation from power and to produce, or to ‘find out for themselves’, their own personal ‘truths’. These are not projects to change or to transform the external world but mechanisms whereby individuals can find meaning through their ethical individual actions and beliefs. She powerfully describes how ‘9/11 truth’ movements are about individual affirmation rather than collective engagement. In this they can easily be equated with the mass anti-war demonstrations where individuals marched under the banner of ‘Not in My Name’, seeking personal affirmation in distancing themselves from politics rather than taking responsibility to engage in political struggle by the building of any collective movement (p.47). | 4,724 | <h4>The fourth net benefit <u>is implementation education</u> – they critique the USFG and its foreign policy but don’t have a plan to change either of those things -- Implementation education and learning how to change these things are key to successful activist strategies.</h4><p><strong>Chandler '10 </strong>[David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – This card internally quotes Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 'No Communicating Left' (review article), Radical Philosophy, No. 160 (March/April 2010), pp.53-55. ISSN 0300 211X]bjs</p><p><u>Dean</u> pulls few punches in her <u>devastating critique of the American left for its <strong>complacency</u></strong>, <u>its limited capacity, and even its lack of awareness</u> <u>of the need to offer a stand of <strong>political resistance to power</u></strong>. This is how she concludes her book: The eight years of the Bush administration were a diversion. Intoxicated with a sense of purpose, we could oppose war, torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, a seemingly endless series of real crimes… such <u>opposition keeps us feeling like we matter</u>… We have an ethical sense. But <u>we lack a coherent politics</u>. (p.175) Dean highlights clearly the <u>disintegration of the collective left</u> and its simulacra in the individuated life-style politics of today’s depoliticized radicalism, where it appears that particular individual demands and identities are to be respected but <u>there is no possibility of universalising</u> them <u>into a <strong>collective challenge to the system</u></strong>: <u>no possibility of a left which stands for something beyond itself</u>. She argues that, <u>rather than confront this problem, the left take refuge in</u> the <u>fantasy</u> that technology will overcome their <u><strong>inability to engage</u></strong> and that the circulation of ideas and information on the internet will construct the collectivities and communities of interest, which are lacking in reality. For Dean, this ‘technology fetishism’ marks the left’s failure: its ‘<u>abandonment of workers and the poor</u>; its retreat from the state and repudiation of collective action; and its <u>acceptance of the neoliberal economy</u> as the “only game in town”’ (p.33). In fact, she uncovers the gaping hole at the heart of the left, highlighting that <u>radicalism appears to be based less on <strong>changing the world</strong> than on the articulation of an alternative oppositionalist identity: a <strong>non-strategic</strong>, <strong>non-instrumental</strong>, articulation of a <strong>protest against power</u></strong>. In a nutshell, the <u>left</u> are <u>too busy</u> providing alternative voices, spaces and forums <u>to think about engaging</u> with mass society <u>in an organised, collective, attempt to achieve societal transformation</u>. For Dean, <u>this is fake or hollow political activity, pursued more for its own sake than for <strong>future political ends</u></strong>. <u>This is a politics of </u>ethical distancing, of selfflattery and <u><strong>narcissism</u></strong>, which excuses or even celebrates the self-marginalization of the left: as either the result of the overwhelming capacity of neoliberal power to act, to control, and to regulate; or as the result of the apathy, stupidity, or laziness of the masses - or the ‘sheeple’ (p.171) - for their failure to join the radical cause. Dean suggests that t<u>he left needs to rethink its values and approaches</u> and her book is intended to be a wake-up call to abandon narcissistic complacency. In doing this, she highlights a range of problems connected around the thematic of the left’s defence of democracy in an age of communicative capitalism. She argues that <u>the left’s focus on</u> extending or defending democracy by asserting their role in giving voice and <u>creating spaces merely <strong>reproduces the domination</strong> of</u> communicative <u>capitalism</u>, <u>where there is no shared space of debate</u> and disagreement <u>but the proliferation of mediums</u> and messages without the responsibility to develop and defend positions or to engage and no external measure of accountability. Communicative <u>capitalism is held to <strong>thrive</strong> on this</u> fragmented, atomizing, and individuated, <u>framework of communication, which gives the impression of a</u> shared discourse, community, or <u>movement but leaves reality just as it is, with neoliberal frameworks of <strong>domination</strong>, <strong>inequality</strong>, and <strong>destruction</strong> <strong>continuing unopposed</u></strong> (pp.162-75). This is not merely a critique of the US left; it is also a powerful deconstruction of its claims for a collective existence. She suggests this most strongly in her chapters on ‘technology fetishism’ and on the ‘9/11 truth’ movement, in which she analyzes how individuals come together not on the basis of a collective political project, challenging power, but on the basis of an invitation for individuals to affirm their alienation from power and to produce, or to ‘find out for themselves’, their own personal ‘truths’. These are not projects to change or to transform the external world but mechanisms whereby individuals can find meaning through their ethical individual actions and beliefs. She powerfully describes how ‘9/11 truth’ movements are about individual affirmation rather than collective engagement. In this they can easily be equated with the mass anti-war demonstrations where individuals marched under the banner of ‘Not in My Name’, seeking personal affirmation in distancing themselves from politics rather than taking responsibility to engage in political struggle by the building of any collective movement (p.47). </p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 72,075 | 187 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,172 | They don’t solve the ECS and SCS---I’ll answer the four internal links | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They don’t solve the ECS and SCS---I’ll answer the four internal links</h4> | Case | ECS | null | 1,560,694 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,173 | You should evaluate through a lens of game design. Although this is hard because it results in conflicting interests, the created rules are the underpinnings of a possibility space which encourages players to play. | Hawreliak 12 | Hawreliak 12 (Jason Hawreliak, Assistant Professor of Game Studies at the Centre for Digital Humanities at Brock University, former Researcher and Lecturer at the University of Waterloo, holds a Ph.D. in English from the University of Waterloo and an M.A. in English and Film Studies from Wilfrid Laurier University, 2012, “In Defense of Procedurality: Procedural Rhetoric, Civilization, and ‘You Didn’t Build That!’,” First Person Scholar, December 5th, http://www.firstpersonscholar.com/procedural-rhetoric-civ3/) | AND
procedural authorship does not always turn out in an expected or predictable manner. | null | In “Against Procedurality,” Miguel Sicart characterizes procedural rhetoric in the following manner:¶
AND
procedural authorship does not always turn out in an expected or predictable manner. | 190 | <h4>You should evaluate through a lens of <u>game design</u>. Although this is hard because it results in <u>conflicting</u> interests, the created rules are the <u>underpinnings</u> of a possibility space which encourages players to play.</h4><p><strong>Hawreliak 12</strong> (Jason Hawreliak, Assistant Professor of Game Studies at the Centre for Digital Humanities at Brock University, former Researcher and Lecturer at the University of Waterloo, holds a Ph.D. in English from the University of Waterloo and an M.A. in English and Film Studies from Wilfrid Laurier University, 2012, “In Defense of Procedurality: Procedural Rhetoric, Civilization, and ‘You Didn’t Build That!’,” First Person Scholar, December 5th, http://www.firstpersonscholar.com/procedural-rhetoric-civ3/)</p><p>In “Against Procedurality,” Miguel Sicart characterizes procedural rhetoric in the following manner:¶ </p><p><u>AND</p><p>procedural authorship does not always turn out in an expected or predictable manner. </p></u> | null | null | Framework | 1,560,695 | 5 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,174 | The plan links to politics - requires Trump to use PC and congress does not want to give money to aid | Shore 11 | Shore 11- Bill, founder and executive director of Share Our Strength, the nation's leading organization working to end childhood hunger, A famine in Somalia, and a chronic political failure on humanitarian aid, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-leadership/a-famine-in-somalia-and-a-chronic-political-failure-on-humanitarian-aid/2011/08/03/gIQAPaOgrI_story.html) JB | chronic and collective failure of political leadership current famine intersects squarely with the U.S. debt ceiling crisis. As a result, the U.S. political establishment is in no mood to meet even the most urgent need with increased assistance. Two programs critical to alleviating suffering both be cut by tens of millions of dollars. leaders use some p c to marshal support for the long-term efforts that might prevent disaster in the first place. | collective failure of political leadership famine intersects squarely with the U.S. debt ceiling crisis. the U.S. political establishment is in no mood to meet even the most urgent need with increased assistance programs critical to alleviating suffering both be cut by tens of millions of dollars. leaders use p c to marshal support for the long-term efforts that might prevent disaster in the first place | There has been much progress over the years, but one thing hasn’t changed: Humanitarian relief efforts still require vast amounts of private support when governments across the globe fail to respond sufficiently. That represents a chronic and collective failure of political leadership. It is an especially sad statement about the strength, vision, independence and courage of those we entrust to help navigate America through a dangerous and troubled world. As if those struggling to stay alive needed any more misfortune, the current famine in East Africa intersects squarely with the U.S. debt ceiling crisis. As a result, the U.S. political establishment is in no mood to meet even the most urgent need with increased assistance. In fact the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations approved legislation to make deep cuts in foreign assistance spending. Two programs critical to alleviating suffering among the women and children who are victims of Africa’s famine – the Migration and Refugee Assistance Program and the Disaster Assistance Program – would both be cut by tens of millions of dollars. Almost by definition, leaders help others to get somewhere that they would otherwise not get on their own. That means having the courage to be out in front of them, and the wisdom to advocate for investments that may not pay off until the long term. Humanitarian organizations have become skilled in the art of moving individuals to contribute in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake, tsunami or famine. But the greater need is for national leaders willing to use some political capital to marshal support for the long-term efforts that might prevent disaster in the first place. It is our political leaders, not our nongovernmental organizations, that are in the best position to educate citizens on the relationship between this long-term development and our economic and national security interests. | 1,925 | <h4>The plan links to politics - requires Trump to use PC and congress does not want to give money to aid</h4><p><strong>Shore 11</strong>- Bill, founder and executive director of Share Our Strength, the nation's leading organization working to end childhood hunger, A famine in Somalia, and a chronic political failure on humanitarian aid, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-leadership/a-famine-in-somalia-and-a-chronic-political-failure-on-humanitarian-aid/2011/08/03/gIQAPaOgrI_story.html) JB</p><p>There has been much progress over the years, but one thing hasn’t changed: Humanitarian relief efforts still require vast amounts of private support when governments across the globe fail to respond sufficiently. That represents a <u>chronic and <mark>collective failure of political leadership</u></mark>. It is an especially sad statement about the strength, vision, independence and courage of those we entrust to help navigate America through a dangerous and troubled world. As if those struggling to stay alive needed any more misfortune, the <u>current <mark>famine</u></mark> in East Africa <u><mark>intersects squarely with the U.S. debt ceiling crisis.</mark> As a result, <strong><mark>the U.S. political establishment is in no mood to meet even the most urgent need with increased assistance</mark>.</u></strong> In fact the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations approved legislation to make deep cuts in foreign assistance spending. <u>Two <mark>programs critical to alleviating suffering</u></mark> among the women and children who are victims of Africa’s famine – the Migration and Refugee Assistance Program and the Disaster Assistance Program – would <u><mark>both be cut by tens of millions of dollars.</u></mark> Almost by definition, leaders help others to get somewhere that they would otherwise not get on their own. That means having the courage to be out in front of them, and the wisdom to advocate for investments that may not pay off until the long term. Humanitarian organizations have become skilled in the art of moving individuals to contribute in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake, tsunami or famine. But the greater need is for national <u><mark>leaders</u></mark> willing to <u><mark>use</mark> some <strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>olitical <u><strong><mark>c</u></strong></mark>apital <u><mark>to marshal support for the long-term efforts that might prevent disaster in the first place</mark>.</u> It is our political leaders, not our nongovernmental organizations, that are in the best position to educate citizens on the relationship between this long-term development and our economic and national security interests.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Politics | 176,029 | 4 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,175 | Net benefit five is Switch Side Debate – | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Net benefit five is <u>Switch Side Debate</u> – </h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,696 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,176 | Diseases won’t cause extinction – burnout or variation | York 14 #THUR} | York 14 {Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species#THUR} | mostly diseases don't drive species extinct the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens less virulent either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV There is a small fraction are naturally resistant or altogether immune And there are a handful of people who were infected that didn't progress to disease We can see this in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. | diseases don't drive extinct If disease is lethal population drops, it becomes less likely individuals contact Highly contagious diseases burn themselves out main reason is variation hosts may be resistant. in combination individuals survive. We see this in HIV a small fraction are immune genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes | But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species. | 1,362 | <h4>Diseases won’t cause extinction – burnout or variation</h4><p><strong>York 14 </strong>{Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species<strong>#THUR}</p><p></strong>But <u>mostly <mark>diseases <strong>don't drive </mark>species <mark>extinct</u></strong></mark>. There are several reasons for that. For one, <u>the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. <mark>If</mark> the <mark>disease is </mark>highly <mark>lethal</mark>, then the <mark>population drops,</mark> and <mark>it becomes <strong>less likely</mark> that <mark>individuals </mark>will <mark>contact</mark> each other</u></strong> during the infectious phase. <u><strong><mark>Highly contagious diseases </mark>tend to <mark>burn themselves out</u></strong></mark> that way. Probably <u>the <mark>main reason is variation</mark>. Within the host and the pathogen population</u> there will be a wide range of variants. <u>Some <mark>hosts may be </mark>naturally<mark> resistant.</mark> Some pathogens</u> will be <u>less virulent</u>. And <u>either alone or <mark>in combination</mark>, <strong>you end up with infected <mark>individuals</mark> who <mark>survive</strong>. We see this in HIV</u></mark>, for example. <u>There is <mark>a small fraction</u></mark> of humans who <u><mark>are</mark> naturally resistant or</u> <u>altogether <mark>immune</u></mark> to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. <u>And there are a handful of people who were infected </u>with defective versions of HIV<u> <strong>that didn't progress</strong> to disease</u>. <u>We can see</u> indications of <u>this</u> sort of thing happening <u>in the past, because our <mark>genomes contain <strong>many instances</strong> of pathogen resistance genes</mark> that have spread through the whole population.</u> Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.</p> | 1NC | Case | Disease | 24,497 | 495 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,177 | 1)Relations reset doesn’t solve | Jackson 15 | Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” The Diplomat, August 6th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/, Accessed 06-28-2016) | grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises | grand bargains rarely work. dangerous naivete in abandoning commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns military competition plays out over years and decades | But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises. | 628 | <h4>1)Relations reset doesn’t solve</h4><p><strong>Jackson 15</strong> — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” The Diplomat, August 6th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p>But <u><mark>grand bargains rarely work. </mark>There’s a <strong><mark>dangerous naivete</strong> in abandoning</mark> U.S. <mark>commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes</u></mark>. And <u>policies of <mark>accommodation will <strong>not</strong> suspend military competition because that involves <strong>more than present day concerns</strong></mark> with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, <mark>military competition plays out over <strong>years and decades</strong></mark>; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises</u>.</p> | Case | ECS | null | 66,490 | 157 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,178 | Preserving the precise and predictable topic is the driver behand students’ motivation to learn. A poorly designed game ruins students’ motivation and they won’t learn anything. | Paras and Bizzocchi 5 | Paras and Bizzocchi 5 (Brad Paras, Game Developer and Research Assistant at Simon Fraser University, and Jim Bizzocchi, Associate Professor in the School of Interactive Arts and Technology at Simon Fraser University, holds an M.Sc. in Comparative Media Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005, “Game, Motivation, and Effective Learning: An Integrated Model for Educational Game Design,” Proceedings of DiGRA—the Digital Games Research Association, http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-library/06276.18065.pdf) | To motivate is to “provide with an incentive”. To motivate someone to learn
AND
Learners are more motivated when there are rewards for correctly executed actions | null | To motivate is to “provide with an incentive”. To motivate someone to learn
AND
- Learners are more motivated when there are rewards for correctly executed actions. | 164 | <h4>Preserving the precise and predictable topic is the driver behand students’ motivation to learn. A poorly designed game ruins students’ motivation and they won’t learn anything.</h4><p><strong>Paras and Bizzocchi 5</strong> (Brad Paras, Game Developer and Research Assistant at Simon Fraser University, and Jim Bizzocchi, Associate Professor in the School of Interactive Arts and Technology at Simon Fraser University, holds an M.Sc. in Comparative Media Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005, “Game, Motivation, and Effective Learning: An Integrated Model for Educational Game Design,” Proceedings of DiGRA—the Digital Games Research Association, http://www.digra.org/wp-conten<u>t/uploads/digital-library/06276.18065.pdf)</p><p>To motivate is to “provide with an incentive”. To motivate someone to learn </p><p>AND</p><p></u>- <u>Learners are more motivated when there are rewards for correctly executed actions</u>.</p> | null | null | Framework | 74,324 | 50 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,179 | Transportation infrastructure’s crumbling now – this makes economic calamity an inevitability -- greater investment key | ASCE ‘14 | ASCE ‘14 | The nation’s surface transportation infrastructure includes the critical highways, bridges, ¶ railroads, and transit systems that enable people ¶ and goods to access the markets, services, and ¶ inputs of production essential to America’s ¶ economic vitality the nation’s surface transportation infrastructure has been deteriorating because this deterioration has ¶ been diffused and has ¶ occurred gradually over time, its true costs are not always immediately ¶ apparent allocations have often been sufficient to avoid the imminent failure the continued deterioration leaves a significant and mounting burden on the U.S. economy Deteriorating conditions and performance ¶ impose costs on American households and businesses Facilities in poor ¶ condition lead to increases in operating costs for ¶ trucks, cars, and rail vehicles costs ¶ include damage to vehicles time expended to avoid unusable or heavily congested roadways and the added cost ¶ of repairing facilities as opposed to preserving them in good condition increased congestion decreases ¶ the reliability of transportation facilities, meaning that travelers are forced to allot more time for ¶ trips to assure on-time arrivals it increases ¶ environmental and safety costs by exposing more ¶ travelers to substandard travel conditions and ¶ requiring vehicles to operate at less efficient levels As conditions continue to deteriorate they will increasingly detract from the ability of American households and businesses to be ¶ productive and prosperous at work and at home the effect that surface ¶ transportation deficiencies have, , on U.S. economic performance. it was estimated that deficiencies ¶ in America’s surface transportation systems ¶ cost households and businesses nearly $130 ¶ billion America’s projected infrastructure ¶ deficiencies in a trends extended scenario are ¶ expected to cost the national economy more than 400,000 jobs 1.3 million more ¶ jobs could exist in key knowledge-based and ¶ technology-related economic sectors if sufficient transportation infrastructure were maintained If present trends continue, by 2020 the annual costs imposed on the U.S. economy by deteriorating infrastructure will increase by 82% to $210 billion, and by 2040 the costs will have increased by 351% to $520 billion The avoidable transportation costs that hinder¶ the nation’s economy are imposed primarily by¶ pavement and bridge conditions, highway congestion,¶ and¶ transit¶ and¶ train¶ vehicle¶ conditions¶ that¶ are¶ operating¶ well¶ below¶ minimum¶ tolerable¶ levels If¶ the¶ nation’s¶ infrastructure¶ were¶ free¶ of¶ deficient¶ conditions¶ Americans¶ would¶ earn¶ more¶ personal¶ income¶ and¶ industry¶ would¶ be¶ more¶ productive regions are affected differently ¶ by deficient and deteriorating infrastructure. The most affected regions are those with the largest concentrations of urban areas because the nation is so dependent on the Interstate Highway System, impacts ¶ on interstate performance in some regions or area ¶ types are felt throughout the nation 630 million vehicle hours ¶ traveled were lost due to congestion in 2010. This ¶ total is expected to increase to 6.2 billion hours in 2040 These vehicle hours understate person hours and underscore the severity of the loss in productivity The specific economic implications of the ¶ further deterioration of the U.S. national surface ¶ transportation system are Deficient surface transportation infrastructure¶ will¶ cost¶ Americans¶ nearly¶ $3¶ trillion¶ by 2040 This cost to business will reduce the¶ productivity and competitiveness of ¶ American firms relative to global competitors. ¶ Increased cumulative cost to businesses will ¶ reach $430 billion by 2020. Businesses will have ¶ to divert increasing portions of earned income ¶ to pay for transportation delays and vehicle ¶ repairs, draining money that would otherwise ¶ be invested in innovation and expansion Households will be forced to forgo discretionary¶ purchases in order to pay transportation costs that ¶ could be avoided if infrastructure were built to ¶ sufficient levels The U.S. will lose jobs in high value, high-paying¶ services¶ and¶ manufacturing¶ industries this will result in employee income in 2040 that is $252 billion less : First, a negative impact is due to larger costs ¶ of transportation services in terms of time ¶ expended and vehicle costs. These costs absorb ¶ money from businesses and households that ¶ would otherwise be directed to investment, ¶ innovation and “quality of life purchases.” This dynamic will create lower demand ¶ in key economic sectors . Productivity ¶ deteriorates¶ with¶ infrastructure¶ degradation, so¶ more¶ resources are wasted in each sector. job losses are mitigated by more people working for less money and less productively due to the diminished effectiveness of the U.S. surface transportation system this drain on wages and productivity implies ¶ an additional 115% effect if income and productivity were stable These exports are lost due to lost productivity ¶ and the higher costs of American goods and ¶ services, relative to competing product prices ¶ from around the globe | infrastructure essential to America’s ¶ economic vitality nation’s ¶ surface transportation infrastructure has been ¶ deteriorating leaves a ¶ significant and mounting burden on the U.S. ¶ economy decreases reliability of transportation facilities, detract from businesses to be ¶ productive projected deficiencies in a extended scenario cost the national economy more than ¶ 400,000 jobs 2020 deteriorating nfrastructur increase by 82%¶ 2040 351 most affected regions with largest concentrations of urban areas job losses mitigated by more¶ people working for less money less productively | [The American Society of Civil Engineers – a report prepared by the Economic Development Research Group, which focuses on evaluating economic development performance and opportunities. The group is comprised of economists and planners who specialize in transportation engineering. “Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Surface Transportation Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers Report, Summer 2014. http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Report_Card/ASCE-FailureToActFinal.pdf//GBS-JV]
The nation’s surface transportation infrastructure includes the critical highways, bridges, ¶ railroads, and transit systems that enable people ¶ and goods to access the markets, services, and ¶ inputs of production essential to America’s ¶ economic vitality. For many years, the nation’s ¶ surface transportation infrastructure has been ¶ deteriorating. Yet because this deterioration has ¶ been diffused throughout the nation, and has ¶ occurred gradually over time, its true costs and ¶ economic impacts are not always immediately ¶ apparent. In practice, the transportation funding that is appropriated is spent on a mixture ¶ of system expansion and preservation projects. ¶ Although these allocations have often been sufficient to avoid the imminent failure of key ¶ facilities, the continued deterioration leaves a ¶ significant and mounting burden on the U.S. ¶ economy. This burden will be explored further ¶ in this report.¶ Deteriorating conditions and performance ¶ impose costs on American households and businesses in a number of ways. Facilities in poor ¶ condition lead to increases in operating costs for ¶ trucks, cars, and rail vehicles. Additional costs ¶ include damage to vehicles from deteriorated ¶ roadway surfaces, imposition of both additional ¶ miles traveled, time expended to avoid unusable or heavily congested roadways or due to the ¶ breakdown of transit vehicles, and the added cost ¶ of repairing facilities after they have deteriorated ¶ as opposed to preserving them in good condition. In addition, increased congestion decreases ¶ the reliability of transportation facilities, meaning that travelers are forced to allot more time for ¶ trips to assure on-time arrivals (and for freight ¶ vehicles, on-time delivery). Moreover, it increases ¶ environmental and safety costs by exposing more ¶ travelers to substandard travel conditions and ¶ requiring vehicles to operate at less efficient levels. As conditions continue to deteriorate over ¶ time, they will increasingly detract from the ability of American households and businesses to be ¶ productive and prosperous at work and at home. ¶ This report is about the effect that surface ¶ transportation deficiencies have, and will ¶ continue to have, on U.S. economic performance. ¶ For the purpose of this report, the term “deficiency” is defined as the extent to which roads, ¶ bridges, and transit services fall below standards ¶ defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation as “minimum tolerable conditions” (for ¶ roads and bridges) and “state of good repair” for ¶ transit¶ . These standards are substantially lower ¶ than ideal conditions, such as “free-flow¶ 1¶ ,” t¶ hat ¶ are used by some researchers as the basis for ¶ highway analysis. This report is about the effect ¶ these deficiencies have, and will continue to ¶ have, on U.S. economic performance.¶ In 2010, it was estimated that deficiencies ¶ in America’s surface transportation systems ¶ cost households and businesses nearly $130 ¶ billion. This included approximately $97 billion ¶ in vehicle operating costs, $32 billion in travel ¶ time delays, $1.2 billion in safety costs and $590 ¶ million in environmental costs. ¶ In 2040, America’s projected infrastructure ¶ deficiencies in a trends extended scenario are ¶ expected to cost the national economy more than ¶ 400,000 jobs. Approximately 1.3 million more ¶ jobs could exist in key knowledge-based and ¶ technology-related economic sectors if sufficient ¶ transportation infrastructure were maintained. These losses are balanced against almost ¶ 900,000 additional jobs projected in traditionally lower-paying service sectors of the economy ¶ that would benefit by deficient transportation ¶ (such as auto repair services) or by declining ¶ productivity in domestic service related sectors ¶ (such as truck driving and retail trade).¶ If present trends continue, by 2020 the ¶ annual costs imposed on the U.S. economy by deteriorating infrastructure will increase by 82%¶ to $210 billion, and by 2040 the costs will have¶ increased by 351% to $520 billion (with cumulative¶ costs mounting to $912 billion and $2.9 trillion by¶ 2020 and 2040, respectively). Table 1 summarizes¶ the economic and societal costs of today’s deficiencies,¶ and¶ how¶ the¶ present¶ values¶ of¶ these¶ costs¶ are¶ expected¶ to¶ accumulate¶ by¶ 2040.¶ Table¶ 2¶ provides¶ a¶ summary¶ of¶ impacts¶ these¶ costs¶ have¶ on¶ economic¶ performance¶ today,¶ and¶ how¶ these¶ impacts¶ are¶ expected¶ to¶ increase¶ over¶ time.¶ Cost of DefiCienCies¶ Performance area in 2010 by 2020 by 2040¶ Pavement and Bridge Conditions $10 $58 $651¶ Highway Congestion $27 $276 $1,272¶ Rail Transit Conditions $41 $171 $370¶ Bus Transit Conditions $49 $398 $659¶ Inter-City Rail Conditions $2 $10 $20¶ totA¶ L Cost to sYsteM UseRs $130 $912 $2,972¶ *Present value of cost stream in billions of constant 2010 Dollars¶ SOURCE EDR Group analysis using Transportation Economic Impact System (TREDIS), 2011 NOTE Totals may not add due to rounding.¶ table ¶ 1¶ 2¶ ¶ ★¶ The avoidable transportation costs that hinder¶ the nation’s economy are imposed primarily by¶ pavement and bridge conditions, highway congestion,¶ and¶ transit¶ and¶ train¶ vehicle¶ conditions¶ that¶ are¶ operating¶ well¶ below¶ minimum¶ tolerable¶ levels¶ for¶ the¶ level¶ of¶ traffic¶ they¶ carry.¶ If¶ the¶ nation’s¶ infrastructure¶ were¶ free¶ of¶ deficient¶ conditions¶ in¶ pavement,¶ bridges,¶ transit¶ vehicles,¶ and¶ track¶ and¶ transit¶ facilities,¶ Americans¶ would¶ earn¶ more¶ personal¶ income¶ and¶ industry¶ would¶ be¶ more¶ productive,¶ as¶ demonstrated¶ by¶ the¶ gross¶ domestic¶ product¶ (value¶ added)¶ that will be lost if surface transportation infrastructure is not brought up to a standard of “minimum ¶ tolerable conditions.” As of 2010, the loss of GDP ¶ approached $125 billion due to deficient surface ¶ transportation infrastructure. The expected losses ¶ in GDP and personal income through 2040 are displayed in Table 2.¶ Across the U.S., regions are affected differently ¶ by deficient and deteriorating infrastructure. The ¶ most affected regions are those with the largest ¶ concentrations of urban areas, because urban highways, bridges and transit systems are in worse ¶ condition today than rural facilities. Peak commuting patterns also place larger burdens on urban ¶ capacities. However, because the nation is so dependent on the Interstate Highway System, impacts ¶ on interstate performance in some regions or area ¶ types are felt throughout the nation. Nationally, ¶ for highways and transit, 630 million vehicle hours ¶ traveled were lost due to congestion in 2010. This ¶ total is expected to triple to 1.8 billion hours by 2020 ¶ and further increase to 6.2 billion hours in 2040.¶ ¶ These vehicle hours understate person hours and ¶ underscore the severity of the loss in productivity.¶ The specific economic implications of the ¶ further deterioration of the U.S. national surface ¶ transportation system are as follows:¶ ««¶ Deficient surface transportation infrastructure¶ will¶ cost¶ Americans¶ nearly¶ $3¶ trillion¶ by 2040, as shown in Table 1, which represents more than $1.1 trillion in added business ¶ expenses and nearly $1.9 trillion from household budgets. ¶ ««¶ This cost to business will reduce the¶ productivity and competitiveness of ¶ American firms relative to global competitors. ¶ Increased cumulative cost to businesses will ¶ reach $430 billion by 2020. Businesses will have ¶ to divert increasing portions of earned income ¶ to pay for transportation delays and vehicle ¶ repairs, draining money that would otherwise ¶ be invested in innovation and expansion. ¶ ««¶ Households will be forced to forgo discretionary¶ purchases such as vacations, cultural ¶ 3¶ events, educational opportunities, and restaurant meals, reduce health related purchases ¶ along with other expenditures that affect quality ¶ of life, in order to pay transportation costs that ¶ could be avoided if infrastructure were built to ¶ sufficient levels. Increased cumulative costs to ¶ households will be $482 billion in 2020. ¶ ««¶ The U.S. will lose jobs in high value, high-paying¶ services¶ and¶ manufacturing¶ industries. ¶ Overall, this will result in employee income in ¶ 2040 that is $252 billion less than would be the ¶ case in a transportation-sufficient economy. ¶ In general three distinct forces are projected to ¶ affect employment: First, a negative impact is due to larger costs ¶ of transportation services in terms of time ¶ expended and vehicle costs. These costs absorb ¶ money from businesses and households that ¶ would otherwise be directed to investment, ¶ innovation and “quality of life purchases.” ¶ Thus, not only will business and personal ¶ income be lower, but more of that income will ¶ need to be diverted to transportation related ¶ costs. This dynamic will create lower demand ¶ in key economic sectors associated with business investments for expansion and research ¶ and development, and in consumer sectors. Second, the impact of declining business ¶ productivity, due to inefficient surface ¶ transportation, tends to push up employment, even if income is declining. Productivity ¶ deteriorates¶ with¶ infrastructure¶ degradation, so¶ more¶ resources are wasted in each sector.¶ In other words,it may take two jobs to complete the tasks that one job could handle without delays due to worsening surface transportation infrastructure. Third, related to productivity effects, degrading surface transportation conditions will generate jobs to address problems created by worsening conditions in sectors such as transportation services and automobile repair services. Overall job losses are mitigated by more¶ people working for less money and less ¶ productively due to the diminished effectiveness of the U.S. surface transportation ¶ system. Recasting the 2020 and 2040 initial ¶ job impacts based on income and productivity ¶ lost reduces worker effectiveness by an additional 27% (another 234,000 jobs). By 2040, ¶ this drain on wages and productivity implies ¶ an additional 115% effect if income and productivity were stable (another 470,000 jobs). ¶ ««¶ By 2040 the cost of infrastructure deficiencies¶ are¶ expected¶ to¶ result¶ in¶ the¶ U.S.¶ losing¶ more than $72 billion in foreign exports in ¶ comparison with the level of exports from ¶ a transportation-sufficient U.S. economy. ¶ These exports are lost due to lost productivity ¶ and the higher costs of American goods and ¶ services, relative to competing product prices ¶ from around the globe. | 11,119 | <h4>Transportation infrastructure’s <u>crumbling now</u> – this makes <u>economic calamity</u> an <u>inevitability </u> --<strong> greater investment key </h4><p>ASCE ‘14</p><p></strong>[The American Society of Civil Engineers – a report prepared by the Economic Development Research Group, which focuses on evaluating economic development performance and opportunities. The group is comprised of economists and planners who specialize in transportation engineering. “Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Surface Transportation Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers Report, Summer 2014. http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Report_Card/ASCE-FailureToActFinal.pdf//GBS-JV]</p><p><u>The nation’s surface transportation <mark>infrastructure</mark> includes the critical highways, bridges, ¶ railroads, and transit systems that enable people ¶ and goods to access the markets, services, and ¶ inputs of production <mark>essential to America’s ¶ economic vitality</u></mark>. For many years, <u><strong>the <mark>nation’s </u></strong>¶<u><strong> surface transportation infrastructure has been </u></strong>¶<u><strong> deteriorating</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u>because this deterioration has ¶ been diffused</u> throughout the nation, <u>and has ¶ occurred gradually over time, its true costs</u> and ¶ economic impacts <u>are not always immediately ¶ apparent</u>. In practice, the transportation funding that is appropriated is spent on a mixture ¶ of system expansion and preservation projects. ¶ Although these <u>allocations have often been sufficient to avoid the imminent failure</u> of key ¶ facilities, <u><strong>the continued deterioration <mark>leaves a </u></strong>¶<u><strong> significant and mounting burden on the U.S. </u></strong>¶<u><strong> economy</u></strong></mark>. This burden will be explored further ¶ in this report.¶ <u>Deteriorating conditions and performance ¶ impose costs on American households and businesses</u> in a number of ways. <u>Facilities in poor ¶ condition lead to increases in operating costs for ¶ trucks, cars, and rail vehicles</u>. Additional <u>costs ¶ include damage to vehicles</u> from deteriorated ¶ roadway surfaces, imposition of both additional ¶ miles traveled, <u>time expended to avoid unusable or heavily congested roadways</u> or due to the ¶ breakdown of transit vehicles, <u>and the added cost ¶ of repairing facilities </u>after they have deteriorated ¶ <u>as opposed to preserving them in good condition</u>. In addition, <u>increased congestion <mark>decreases</mark> ¶ the <mark>reliability of transportation facilities,</mark> meaning that travelers are forced to allot more time for ¶ trips to assure on-time arrivals</u> (and for freight ¶ vehicles, on-time delivery). Moreover, <u>it increases ¶ environmental and safety costs by exposing more ¶ travelers to substandard travel conditions and ¶ requiring vehicles to operate at less efficient levels</u>. <u>As conditions continue to deteriorate</u> over ¶ time, <u>they will increasingly <mark>detract</mark> <mark>from</mark> the ability of American households and <mark>businesses to be ¶ productive</mark> and prosperous at work and at home</u>. ¶ This report is about <u>the effect that surface ¶ transportation deficiencies have, </u>and will ¶ continue to have<u>, on U.S. economic performance.</u> ¶ For the purpose of this report, the term “deficiency” is defined as the extent to which roads, ¶ bridges, and transit services fall below standards ¶ defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation as “minimum tolerable conditions” (for ¶ roads and bridges) and “state of good repair” for ¶ transit¶ . These standards are substantially lower ¶ than ideal conditions, such as “free-flow¶ 1¶ ,” t¶ hat ¶ are used by some researchers as the basis for ¶ highway analysis. This report is about the effect ¶ these deficiencies have, and will continue to ¶ have, on U.S. economic performance.¶ In 2010, <u>it was estimated that deficiencies ¶ in America’s surface transportation systems ¶ cost households and businesses nearly $130 ¶ billion</u>. This included approximately $97 billion ¶ in vehicle operating costs, $32 billion in travel ¶ time delays, $1.2 billion in safety costs and $590 ¶ million in environmental costs. ¶ In 2040, <u>America’s <mark>projected</mark> infrastructure ¶ <mark>deficiencies</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>a</mark> trends <mark>extended scenario</mark> are ¶ expected to <strong><mark>cost the national economy more than </u></strong>¶<u><strong> 400,000 jobs</u></strong></mark>. Approximately <u>1.3 million more ¶ jobs could exist in key knowledge-based and ¶ technology-related economic sectors <strong>if sufficient </u></strong>¶<u><strong> transportation infrastructure were maintained</u></strong>. These losses are balanced against almost ¶ 900,000 additional jobs projected in traditionally lower-paying service sectors of the economy ¶ that would benefit by deficient transportation ¶ (such as auto repair services) or by declining ¶ productivity in domestic service related sectors ¶ (such as truck driving and retail trade).¶ <u><strong>If present trends continue, by <mark>2020</mark> the </u></strong>¶<u><strong> annual costs imposed on the U.S. economy by <mark>deteriorating</mark> i<mark>nfrastructur</mark>e will <mark>increase by 82%</u></strong>¶<u><strong></mark> to $210 billion, and by <mark>2040</mark> the costs will have</u></strong>¶<u><strong> increased by <mark>351</mark>% to $520 billion</u></strong> (with cumulative¶ costs mounting to $912 billion and $2.9 trillion by¶ 2020 and 2040, respectively). Table 1 summarizes¶ the economic and societal costs of today’s deficiencies,¶ and¶ how¶ the¶ present¶ values¶ of¶ these¶ costs¶ are¶ expected¶ to¶ accumulate¶ by¶ 2040.¶ Table¶ 2¶ provides¶ a¶ summary¶ of¶ impacts¶ these¶ costs¶ have¶ on¶ economic¶ performance¶ today,¶ and¶ how¶ these¶ impacts¶ are¶ expected¶ to¶ increase¶ over¶ time.¶ Cost of DefiCienCies¶ Performance area in 2010 by 2020 by 2040¶ Pavement and Bridge Conditions $10 $58 $651¶ Highway Congestion $27 $276 $1,272¶ Rail Transit Conditions $41 $171 $370¶ Bus Transit Conditions $49 $398 $659¶ Inter-City Rail Conditions $2 $10 $20¶ totA¶ L Cost to sYsteM UseRs $130 $912 $2,972¶ *Present value of cost stream in billions of constant 2010 Dollars¶ SOURCE EDR Group analysis using Transportation Economic Impact System (TREDIS), 2011 NOTE Totals may not add due to rounding.¶ table ¶ 1¶ 2¶ ¶ ★¶ <u>The avoidable transportation costs that hinder¶ the nation’s economy are imposed primarily by¶ pavement and bridge conditions, highway congestion,¶ and¶ transit¶ and¶ train¶ vehicle¶ conditions¶ that¶ are¶ operating¶ well¶ below¶ minimum¶ tolerable¶ levels</u>¶ for¶ the¶ level¶ of¶ traffic¶ they¶ carry.¶ <u>If¶ the¶ nation’s¶ infrastructure¶ were¶ free¶ of¶ deficient¶ conditions¶</u> in¶ pavement,¶ bridges,¶ transit¶ vehicles,¶ and¶ track¶ and¶ transit¶ facilities,¶ <u>Americans¶ would¶ earn¶ more¶ personal¶ income¶ and¶ industry¶ would¶ be¶ more¶ productive</u>,¶ as¶ demonstrated¶ by¶ the¶ gross¶ domestic¶ product¶ (value¶ added)¶ that will be lost if surface transportation infrastructure is not brought up to a standard of “minimum ¶ tolerable conditions.” As of 2010, the loss of GDP ¶ approached $125 billion due to deficient surface ¶ transportation infrastructure. The expected losses ¶ in GDP and personal income through 2040 are displayed in Table 2.¶ Across the U.S., <u>regions are affected differently ¶ by deficient and deteriorating infrastructure. <strong>The </u></strong>¶<u><strong> <mark>most affected regions</mark> are those <mark>with</mark> the <mark>largest</mark> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> <mark>concentrations of urban areas</u></strong></mark>, because urban highways, bridges and transit systems are in worse ¶ condition today than rural facilities. Peak commuting patterns also place larger burdens on urban ¶ capacities. However, <u>because the nation is so dependent on the Interstate Highway System, impacts ¶ on interstate performance in some regions or area ¶ types are felt throughout the nation</u>. Nationally, ¶ for highways and transit, <u>630 million vehicle hours ¶ traveled were lost due to congestion in 2010. This ¶ total is expected to</u> triple to 1.8 billion hours by 2020 ¶ and further <u>increase to 6.2 billion hours in 2040</u>.¶ ¶ <u><strong>These vehicle hours understate person hours and </u></strong>¶<u><strong> underscore the severity of the loss in productivity</u></strong>.¶ <u>The specific economic implications of the ¶ further deterioration of the U.S. national surface ¶ transportation system are</u> as follows:¶ ««¶ <u>Deficient surface transportation infrastructure¶ will¶ cost¶ Americans¶ nearly¶ $3¶ trillion¶ by 2040</u>, as shown in Table 1, which represents more than $1.1 trillion in added business ¶ expenses and nearly $1.9 trillion from household budgets. ¶ ««¶ <u>This cost to business will reduce the¶ productivity and competitiveness of ¶ American firms relative to global competitors. ¶ Increased cumulative cost to businesses will ¶ reach $430 billion by 2020. Businesses will have ¶ to divert increasing portions of earned income ¶ to pay for transportation delays and vehicle ¶ repairs, draining money that would otherwise ¶ be invested in innovation and expansion</u>. ¶ ««¶ <u>Households will be forced to forgo discretionary¶ purchases</u> such as vacations, cultural ¶ 3¶ events, educational opportunities, and restaurant meals, reduce health related purchases ¶ along with other expenditures that affect quality ¶ of life, <u>in order to pay transportation costs that ¶ could be avoided if infrastructure were built to ¶ sufficient levels</u>. Increased cumulative costs to ¶ households will be $482 billion in 2020. ¶ ««¶ <u>The U.S. will lose jobs in high value, high-paying¶ services¶ and¶ manufacturing¶ industries</u>. ¶ Overall, <u><strong>this will result in employee income in </u></strong>¶<u><strong> 2040 that is $252 billion less</u></strong> than would be the ¶ case in a transportation-sufficient economy. ¶ In general three distinct forces are projected to ¶ affect employment<u>: First, a negative impact is due to larger costs ¶ of transportation services in terms of time ¶ expended and vehicle costs. These costs absorb ¶ money from businesses and households that ¶ would otherwise be directed to investment, ¶ innovation and “quality of life purchases.”</u> ¶ Thus, not only will business and personal ¶ income be lower, but more of that income will ¶ need to be diverted to transportation related ¶ costs. <u>This dynamic will create lower demand ¶ in key economic sectors</u> associated with business investments for expansion and research ¶ and development, and in consumer sectors. Second, the impact of declining business ¶ productivity, due to inefficient surface ¶ transportation, tends to push up employment, even if income is declining<u>. Productivity ¶ deteriorates¶ with¶ infrastructure¶ degradation, so¶ more¶ resources are wasted in each sector.</u>¶ In other words,it may take two jobs to complete the tasks that one job could handle without delays due to worsening surface transportation infrastructure. Third, related to productivity effects, degrading surface transportation conditions will generate jobs to address problems created by worsening conditions in sectors such as transportation services and automobile repair services. Overall <u><strong><mark>job losses</mark> are <mark>mitigated</mark> <mark>by more</u></strong>¶<u><strong> people working for less money</mark> and <mark>less</mark> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> <mark>productively</mark> due to the diminished effectiveness of the U.S. surface transportation </u></strong>¶<u><strong> system</u></strong>. Recasting the 2020 and 2040 initial ¶ job impacts based on income and productivity ¶ lost reduces worker effectiveness by an additional 27% (another 234,000 jobs). By 2040, ¶ <u>this drain on wages and productivity implies ¶ an additional 115% effect if income and productivity were stable</u> (another 470,000 jobs). ¶ ««¶ By 2040 the cost of infrastructure deficiencies¶ are¶ expected¶ to¶ result¶ in¶ the¶ U.S.¶ losing¶ more than $72 billion in foreign exports in ¶ comparison with the level of exports from ¶ a transportation-sufficient U.S. economy. ¶ <u>These exports are lost due to lost productivity ¶ and the higher costs of American goods and ¶ services, relative to competing product prices ¶ from around the globe</u>.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Politics | 225,829 | 3 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,180 | Their failure to discuss the resolution undermines switch side heuristic debate -- That’s key to the development of argumentative and decision making skills which are THE ONLY WAY to tear down existing power structures | null | The state controls what we know to be true | nomos-physis debate more about where power comes from and how it’s assigned teaching of rhetoric key to productive citizens who participate by making laws knowledge derived in community through debate backed by institutions laws not on the books equally valid other bodies could make political decisions, maybe better ones one’s “right” to power is unstable laws could be deemed “just.” a society’s common sense about things is structured by those in power, those making decisions Laws and political decisions are about maintaining, consolidating, and restricting power the power residing in the body of the Greek citizen is not inherent, nor is his virtue to know what is just a natural quality citizen is structured politically as powerful and virtuous power and virtue would be established through rhetoric and laws and solidified through decisions and acts done nomos over physis, or structured power relationships over inherent power relationships Protagorean teachings were practical and based largely on persuasive speaking, training pupils to argue both sides of a case practice of taking either side in an argument founded on theories of knowledge and being The practice of antilogic heuristic helped find success in various contexts and with a variety of audiences Rhetorical success wasn’t about finding truth but finding successful and persuasive arguments less certain that one could know any kind of absolute truth or justice more confident in the articulation of persuasive opinion antilogic emphasizes the best that language can offer us in the way of socially sanctioned knowledge It’s an agnostic view towards truth but not one that leads to inaction One could haggle philosophically with others indefinitely about what’s true or right but for a state to run effectively and efficiently, decisions need to be made quickly and actions taken from them “the right” decisions need backing since rhetoric is more about power relationships not the articulation of absolute truth Protagoras would be dangerous to the Greek state and the power relationships it nurtured | null | Means the citizen has no unique power without challenging that knowledge by discussing both sides of every issue
A true citizen is established through debate
Protogoras taught to debate both sides to best learn argumentative skills
Not about finding truth but about learning how to persuade people
Alternative leads to inaction and leftist infighting
Protogoras would’ve been dangerous to those in power
INOUE 05{ASAO B. INOUE – at the time of this writing, Asao held an MA in Rhetoric and Communication from Oregon State. He is currently an Associate Professor of Rhetoric and Composition at Fresno State, focusing on writing assessment and race studies. This dissertation was approved by Dissertation Chair: Victor Villanueva. Dr. Victor Villanueva received his PhD in English from the University of Washington in 1986. Since then, he has worked not only as a professor of rhetoric and writing, but as an Equal Opportunity Program Director, Writing Project Director, a Director of Composition, twice as Department Chair (at Washington State University and at Auburn University), and Interim Associate Dean , "THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RACISM AND COMMUNITY-BASED ASSESSMENT PRACTICE" –submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Department of English May 2005, http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Dissertations/Spring2005/a_inoue_012205.pdf}
Gutherie’s definition of nomos helps us also see the nomos-physis debate as one not solely about the nature of knowledge, or whether laws and ideals of truth were “natural” or derived from social customs. Using the epistemology of racism as a lens to see this debate, structural reasons and implications of power surface.82 The nomos-physis debate is less about absolute or relative knowledge and more about where power comes from and how it’s assigned. If the teaching of rhetoric was a key to reproducing productive citizens, ones who would participate in the polis by making laws and societal decisions, then understanding knowledge and laws as beliefs derived in community through decisions and debate (rhetoric), backed by the authority of the state (a set of institutions that minister the authenticity and value of the rhetoric of the polis), meant that other laws not on the books could be equally valid – other bodies could make political decisions, maybe better ones. The implications to this conclusion are grand: there would be other ways to define a citizen; one’s “right” to power is unstable; and other laws could be deemed “just.” At the epistemological level, accepting nomos means a society’s common sense about things is structured by those in power, those making decisions. Laws and political decisions are no longer about finding justice and truth, but about maintaining, consolidating, and restricting power. A nomos-centered rhetoric would mean that the power residing in the body of the Greek citizen is not inherent, nor is his virtue to know what is just a natural quality. A citizen is structured politically as powerful and virtuous. In fact, power and virtue would be, to use Vico’s commonsensical notions, verum-factum (established through rhetoric and laws) and verum-certum (solidified through decisions and acts done and celebrated). Protagoras had one of the earliest most coherent sophistic philosophies of nomos over physis, or structured power relationships over inherent power relationships. This affected the debate over the teachability of arête (discussed later in this chapter). The nomos-physis controversy and Protagoras’ position in it is seen in his man-measure doctrine,83 but it can also be seen in his philosophies on the teaching of rhetoric. Gutherie explains Protagorean teachings, saying they were practical and based “largely on the art of persuasive speaking, training his pupils to argue both sides of a case.” This practice of “taking either side in an argument . . . was founded on theories of knowledge and being which constituted an extreme reaction from the Eleatic antithesis of knowledge and opinion [episteme and doxa], the one true the other false” (Gutherie 267). The practice of antilogic (“taking either side in an argument”) was a heuristic that Protagoras perfected and taught his pupils because it helped them find success in various contexts and with a variety of audiences. Rhetorical success, thus, wasn’t about finding truth but finding successful and persuasive arguments. While Protagoras advocates a protreptic function for rhetoric,84 he’s less certain that one could know any kind of absolute truth or justice (for the polis), instead he’s more confident in the articulation of persuasive doxa (opinion), supported by observable nomos; thus, antilogic emphasizes the best that language can offer us in the way of socially sanctioned knowledge. It’s an agnostic view towards truth, but not a hopeless one, or one that leads to inaction. It is, in a way, a reaction to the need many politicians and statesmen had in Athens at the time. One could haggle philosophically with others indefinitely about what’s true or right, but for a state to run effectively and efficiently, decisions need to be made quickly and actions taken from them. In a nomos-centered world, the appeals that justified “the right” decisions needed more backing since rhetoric is more about power relationships and not the articulation of absolute and divine “truth,” which could not be questioned. In short, a sophist like Protagoras would be dangerous to the Greek state and the power relationships it nurtured. | 5,573 | <h4>Their failure to discuss the resolution undermines switch side heuristic debate -- That’s key to the development of argumentative and decision making skills which are THE ONLY WAY to tear down existing power structures</h4><p>The state controls what we know to be true</p><p>Means the citizen has no unique power without challenging that knowledge by discussing both sides of every issue</p><p>A true citizen is established through debate</p><p>Protogoras taught to debate both sides to best learn argumentative skills</p><p>Not about finding truth but about learning how to persuade people</p><p>Alternative leads to inaction and leftist infighting</p><p>Protogoras would’ve been dangerous to those in power</p><p><strong>INOUE 05</strong>{ASAO B. INOUE – at the time of this writing, Asao held an MA in Rhetoric and Communication from Oregon State. He is currently an Associate Professor of Rhetoric and Composition at Fresno State, focusing on writing assessment and race studies. This dissertation was approved by Dissertation Chair: Victor Villanueva. Dr. Victor Villanueva received his PhD in English from the University of Washington in 1986. Since then, he has worked not only as a professor of rhetoric and writing, but as an Equal Opportunity Program Director, Writing Project Director, a Director of Composition, twice as Department Chair (at Washington State University and at Auburn University), and Interim Associate Dean , "THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RACISM AND COMMUNITY-BASED ASSESSMENT PRACTICE" –submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Department of English May 2005, http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Dissertations/Spring2005/a_inoue_012205.pdf}</p><p>Gutherie’s definition of nomos helps us also see the nomos-physis debate as one not solely about the nature of knowledge, or whether laws and ideals of truth were “natural” or derived from social customs. Using the epistemology of racism as a lens to see this debate, structural reasons and implications of power surface.82 The <u>nomos-physis debate </u>is less about absolute or relative knowledge and <u>more about where power comes from and how it’s assigned</u>. If the <u>teaching of rhetoric</u> was a <u>key to</u> reproducing <u>productive citizens</u>, ones <u>who</u> would <u>participate</u> in the polis <u>by making laws</u> and societal decisions, then understanding <u>knowledge</u> and laws as beliefs <u>derived in community through</u> decisions and <u>debate</u> (rhetoric), <u>backed by</u> the authority of the state (a set of <u>institutions</u> that minister the authenticity and value of the rhetoric of the polis), meant that other <u>laws not on the books</u> could be <u>equally valid</u> – <u>other bodies could make political decisions, maybe better ones</u>. The implications to this conclusion are grand: there would be other ways to define a citizen; <u>one’s “right” to power is unstable</u>; and other <u>laws could be deemed “just.”</u> At the epistemological level, accepting nomos means <u>a <strong>society</strong>’s common sense about things is <strong>structured by those in power</strong>, those <strong>making decisions</u></strong>. <u>Laws and political decisions are</u> no longer about finding justice and truth, but <u><strong>about maintaining</strong>, consolidating, and restricting</u> <u><strong>power</u></strong>. A nomos-centered rhetoric would mean that <u>the <strong>power</strong> residing in the body of the Greek</u> <u><strong>citizen </strong>is <strong>not inherent</strong>, <strong>nor is his virtue to know</strong> what is just a natural quality</u>. A <u>citizen is <strong>structured</strong> politically as <strong>powerful</strong> and <strong>virtuous</u></strong>. In fact, <u>power and virtue would be</u>, to use Vico’s commonsensical notions, verum-factum (<u>established through <strong>rhetoric</u></strong> <u>and laws</u>) <u>and</u> verum-certum (<u><strong>solidified through decisions</u></strong> <u>and <strong>acts</strong> done</u> and celebrated). Protagoras had one of the earliest most coherent sophistic philosophies of <u><strong>nomos over physis</strong>, or structured power relationships over inherent power relationships</u>. This affected the debate over the teachability of arête (discussed later in this chapter). The nomos-physis controversy and Protagoras’ position in it is seen in his man-measure doctrine,83 but it can also be seen in his philosophies on the teaching of rhetoric. Gutherie explains <u>Protagorean teachings</u>, saying they <u>were practical and based</u> “<u>largely on </u>the art of<u> <strong>persuasive speaking</strong>, training </u>his<u> pupils to argue <strong>both sides of a case</u></strong>.” This<u> practice of</u> “<u><strong>taking either side</strong> in an argument</u> . . . was <u>founded on theories of <strong>knowledge</strong> and being </u>which constituted an extreme reaction from the Eleatic antithesis of knowledge and opinion [episteme and doxa], the one true the other false” (Gutherie 267). <u>The practice of <strong>antilogic</u></strong> (“taking either side in an argument”) was a <u><strong>heuristic</u></strong> that Protagoras perfected and taught his pupils because it <u>helped</u> them <u><strong>find success</strong> in various contexts and with a variety of</u> <u><strong>audiences</u></strong>. <u>Rhetorical success</u>, thus, <u>wasn’t about <strong>finding truth</strong> but <strong>finding </strong>successful and</u> <u><strong>persuasive arguments</u></strong>. While Protagoras advocates a protreptic function for rhetoric,84 he’s <u>less certain that one could know any kind of <strong>absolute truth</strong> or justice</u> (for the polis), instead he’s <u>more confident in the articulation of persuasive</u> doxa (<u>opinion</u>), supported by observable nomos; thus, <u>antilogic emphasizes <strong>the best that language can offer us</strong> in the way of socially sanctioned knowledge</u>. <u>It’s an agnostic view towards truth</u>, <u>but not</u> a hopeless one, or <u>one that leads to <strong>inaction</u></strong>. It is, in a way, a reaction to the need many politicians and statesmen had in Athens at the time. <u>One could <strong>haggle</strong> philosophically with others <strong>indefinitely about what’s true</strong> or right</u>, <u>but for a state to run effectively and efficiently, <strong>decisions need to be made</strong> quickly and actions taken from them</u>. In a nomos-centered world, the appeals that justified <u>“the right” decisions need</u>ed more <u>backing since rhetoric is</u> <u><strong>more about power relationships</u></strong> and <u>not the articulation of</u> <u><strong>absolute</u></strong> and divine “<u><strong>truth</u></strong>,”<u> </u>which could not be questioned. In short, a sophist like <u>Protagoras would be <strong>dangerous to the</strong> Greek <strong>state</strong> and the <strong>power relationships</strong> it nurtured</u>.</p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 123,673 | 47 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,181 | 3) China wont submit to LOST just because of the aff---Hague ruling proves they wont follow ILAW. They’ll just draw a big circle around the ECS and say its theirs. | Phillips 16 | Tom Phillips 16, the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, “Beijing rejects tribunal's ruling in South China Sea case”, 7/12/16, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china | In terms of China’s domestic politics [the ruling] is unacceptable to the regime there will be huge pressures on Beijing to save face, to demonstrate with more than just words that it doesn’t abide by and doesn’t credit the ruling with any legal validity and will not adhere to it and will defend its ‘sovereign space’ in the South China Sea.” it had “brazenly violated China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.” The judgment does not allocate any of the outcrops or islands to rival countries but instead indicates which maritime features are capable under international law of generating territorial rights over surrounding seas. China has previously stated that it “will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines”. The tribunal ruled, however, that China’s refusal to participate did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. | the ruling] is unacceptable to the regime there will be huge pressures on Beijing to save face, to demonstrate with more than just words that it doesn’t abide by and doesn’t credit the ruling and will defend its ‘sovereign space’ in the South China Sea China has previously stated that it “will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration | “In terms of China’s domestic politics [the ruling] is unacceptable to the regime and unfortunately the regime will perceive that the Chinese people view that as unacceptable,” Townshend predicted. “So there will be huge pressures on Beijing to respond, to save face, to demonstrate with more than just words that it doesn’t abide by and doesn’t credit the ruling with any legal validity and will not adhere to it and will defend its ‘sovereign space’ in the South China Sea.” Townshend said he did not expect Beijing to lash out militarily but believed further military drills in the South China Sea were possible as well as the establishment of an air defence identification zone somewhere over the region. Xu Liping, a pro-Beijing scholar from China’s National Institute of International Strategy, told the Guardian he believed the ruling was “biased and unfair”, “absolutely terrible” and “a joke”. The nationalistic Global Times tabloid attacked the ruling in an English language editorial on Tuesday night as “more radical and shameless than many people had ever expected”, saying it had “brazenly violated China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.” The newspaper, which is controlled by the Communist party and sometimes reflects its thinking, also warned of a military escalation. “If the US and Japan use [the ruling] to pile military and political pressure on Beijing, Chinese people will firmly support our government to launch a tit-for-tat counterpunch,” it said. “We trust Chinese law enforcement and military forces have been well-prepared.” The case at the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague, the UN-appointed tribunal that adjudicates in international disputes over maritime territory, has been running since 2013. Philippe Sands QC, who represented the Philippines in the hearing, said: “This is the most significant international legal case for almost the past 20 years since the Pinochet judgment.” The judgment does not allocate any of the outcrops or islands to rival countries but instead indicates which maritime features are capable under international law of generating territorial rights over surrounding seas. Last year, US officials claimed the Chinese had built up an extra 800 hectares (2,000 acres) on their occupied outposts across the South China Sea over the previous 18 months. The main focus of activity has been on Mischief Reef, where satellite images reveal the island is growing bigger, and is surrounded by fleets of dredgers and tankers. China has previously stated that it “will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines”. The tribunal ruled, however, that China’s refusal to participate did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. | 2,744 | <h4>3) China wont submit to LOST just because of the aff---Hague ruling proves they wont follow ILAW. They’ll just draw a big circle around the ECS and say its theirs.</h4><p>Tom <strong>Phillips 16<u></strong>, the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, “Beijing rejects tribunal's ruling in South China Sea case”, 7/12/16, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china</p><p></u>“<u><strong>In terms of China’s domestic politics [<mark>the ruling] is unacceptable to the regime</u></strong></mark> and unfortunately the regime will perceive that the Chinese people view that as unacceptable,” Townshend predicted. “So <u><strong><mark>there will be huge pressures on Beijing to</mark> </u></strong>respond, to <u><strong><mark>save face</strong>, to demonstrate with more than just words that it doesn’t abide by and doesn’t credit the ruling</mark> with any legal validity and will not adhere to it <mark>and <strong>will defend its ‘sovereign space’</strong> in the South China Sea</mark>.” </u>Townshend said he did not expect Beijing to lash out militarily but believed further military drills in the South China Sea were possible as well as the establishment of an air defence identification zone somewhere over the region. Xu Liping, a pro-Beijing scholar from China’s National Institute of International Strategy, told the Guardian he believed the ruling was “biased and unfair”, “absolutely terrible” and “a joke”. The nationalistic Global Times tabloid attacked the ruling in an English language editorial on Tuesday night as “more radical and shameless than many people had ever expected”, saying <u>it had “brazenly violated China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.” </u>The newspaper, which is controlled by the Communist party and sometimes reflects its thinking, also warned of a military escalation. “If the US and Japan use [the ruling] to pile military and political pressure on Beijing, Chinese people will firmly support our government to launch a tit-for-tat counterpunch,” it said. “We trust Chinese law enforcement and military forces have been well-prepared.” The case at the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague, the UN-appointed tribunal that adjudicates in international disputes over maritime territory, has been running since 2013. Philippe Sands QC, who represented the Philippines in the hearing, said: “This is the most significant international legal case for almost the past 20 years since the Pinochet judgment.” <u>The judgment does not allocate any of the outcrops or islands to rival countries but instead indicates which maritime features are capable under international law of generating territorial rights over surrounding seas. </u>Last year, US officials claimed the Chinese had built up an extra 800 hectares (2,000 acres) on their occupied outposts across the South China Sea over the previous 18 months. The main focus of activity has been on Mischief Reef, where satellite images reveal the island is growing bigger, and is surrounded by fleets of dredgers and tankers. <u><mark>China has previously stated that it “will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration</mark> unilaterally initiated by the Philippines”. The tribunal ruled, however, that China’s refusal to participate did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.</p></u> | Case | ECS | null | 181,311 | 6 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,182 | GMO’s alone can’t solve – Setting impossible standards kills progress | Johnson 15 | Johnson 15
Nathanael, Nathanael Johnson is Grist's food writer and author (“So can we really feed the world? Yes — and here’s how”, http://grist.org/food/so-can-we-really-feed-the-world-yes-and-heres-how/, Girst)//DG | Farmers in poor countries have more important priorities than strictly dividing organic from industrial farm tools farm technology isn’t a war between good and evil — it’s a quest for whatever works farmers have proven that they can use tools of industrial ag in a non-industrial way They use high-tech hybrid seeds to get record-breaking yields with an alternative cropping technique. Across India, small farmers have found that genetically engineered cotton decreases their pesticide exposure while increasing their earnings. And in Niger, farmers developed a method of using Big Ag fertilizer on a tiny scale: by filling a soda-cap with a mix of phosphorus and nitrogen, and dumping this micro-dose in with each seed. GMOs are especially controversial I’ve heard the argument that we won’t be able to feed the world without GMO . I doubt that’s true. Genetic engineering is not a silver bullet. the goal of helping small farmers improve their lives gets a lot harder if they are held to an impossibly Edenic standard, and we keep rejecting the tools that they’d like to use people worry giving poor farmers industrial technology will lock them into an industrial path If it’s easy to get nitrogen, you may not want to do all the work, and develop the skills needed, to nurture nitrogen-fixing trees to maturity small farmers are already taking a middle path When I looked at path-dependency in agriculture, I found that it exists in many small forms, but can be overcome with government assistance and regulation many small farmers already suffer from path-dependency: They are locked into generational poverty | Farmers have more important priorities than organic from industrial tech isn’t good and evil GMOs are especially controversial I doubt that’s true Genetic engineering is not a silver bullet. helping farmers gets a lot harder if they are held to an impossibly Edenic standard, people worry giving industrial tech will lock them into an industrial pat | Farmers in poor countries have more important priorities than strictly dividing organic from industrial farm tools. As I put it in this story, farm technology isn’t a war between good and evil — it’s a quest for whatever works. Small farmers have proven that they can use tools of industrial ag in a non-industrial way. They use high-tech hybrid seeds to get record-breaking yields with an alternative cropping technique. Across India, small farmers have found that genetically engineered cotton decreases their pesticide exposure while increasing their earnings. And in Niger, farmers developed a method of using Big Ag fertilizer on a tiny scale: by filling a soda-cap with a mix of phosphorus and nitrogen, and dumping this micro-dose in with each seed. GMOs, because they are politicized, are especially controversial. I’ve heard the argument that we won’t be able to feed the world without GMOs. I doubt that’s true. Genetic engineering is not a silver bullet. At the same time, the goal of helping small farmers improve their lives gets a lot harder if they are held to an impossibly Edenic standard, and we keep rejecting the tools that they’d like to use. Many people worry that giving poor farmers industrial technology will lock them into an industrial path. There’s no doubt that is true, as far as it goes. If it’s easy to get nitrogen, you may not want to do all the work, and develop the skills needed, to nurture nitrogen-fixing trees to maturity. But as I’ve argued here, small farmers are already taking a middle path — it’s not as if use of some modern technology will forever corrupt them. When I looked at path-dependency in agriculture, I found that it exists in many small forms, but can be overcome with government assistance and regulation. It’s also worth noting that many small farmers already suffer from path-dependency: They are locked into generational poverty. For me at least, the most important goal is breaking out of poverty, even if that leaves people short of true sustainability. How can I demand perfect sustainability from the poor, when I haven’t achieved it myself? | 2,107 | <h4><strong>GMO’s alone can’t solve – Setting impossible standards kills progress</h4><p>Johnson 15</p><p></strong>Nathanael, Nathanael Johnson is Grist's food writer and author (“So can we really feed the world? Yes — and here’s how”, http://grist.org/food/so-can-we-really-feed-the-world-yes-and-heres-how/, Girst)//DG</p><p><u><mark>Farmers</mark> in poor countries <mark>have more important priorities than</mark> strictly dividing <mark>organic from industrial</mark> farm tools</u>. As I put it in this story, <u><strong>farm <mark>tech</mark>nology <mark>isn’t</mark> a war between <mark>good and evil</mark> — it’s a quest for whatever works</u></strong>. Small <u>farmers have proven that they can use tools of industrial ag in a non-industrial way</u>. <u>They use high-tech hybrid seeds to get record-breaking yields with an alternative cropping technique. Across India, small farmers have found that genetically engineered cotton decreases their pesticide exposure while increasing their earnings. And in Niger, farmers developed a method of using Big Ag fertilizer on a tiny scale: by filling a soda-cap with a mix of phosphorus and nitrogen, and dumping this micro-dose in with each seed. <strong><mark>GMOs</u></strong></mark>, because they are politicized, <u><strong><mark>are especially controversial</u></strong></mark>. <u>I’ve heard the argument that we won’t be able to feed the world without GMO</u>s<u><strong>. <mark>I doubt that’s true</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Genetic engineering is not a silver bullet.</u></strong></mark> At the same time, <u>the goal of <mark>helping</mark> small <mark>farmers</mark> improve their lives <mark>gets a lot harder if they are held to an impossibly Edenic standard,</mark> and we keep rejecting the tools that they’d like to use</u>. Many <u><mark>people worry</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>giving</mark> poor farmers <mark>industrial tech</mark>nology <mark>will lock them into an industrial pat</mark>h</u></strong>. There’s no doubt that is true, as far as it goes. <u>If it’s easy to get nitrogen, you may not want to do all the work, and develop the skills needed, to nurture nitrogen-fixing trees to maturity</u>. But as I’ve argued here, <u><strong>small farmers are already taking a middle path</u></strong> — it’s not as if use of some modern technology will forever corrupt them. <u>When I looked at path-dependency in agriculture, I found that it exists in many small forms, but can be overcome with government assistance and regulation</u>. It’s also worth noting that <u>many small farmers already suffer from path-dependency: They are locked into generational poverty</u>. For me at least, the most important goal is breaking out of poverty, even if that leaves people short of true sustainability. How can I demand perfect sustainability from the poor, when I haven’t achieved it myself?</p> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 1,560,697 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,183 | Engagement is an ongoing process that relies on increasing diplomatic and economic contacts to develop interdependence---that’s distinct from military engagement | Resnick 2001 | Evan Resnick 2001, Assistant Professor, Coordinator of the United States Programme, Coordinator of External Teaching, and Deputy Coordinator of the International Relations Programme at RSIS, Spring 2001, “Defining Engagment” , Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 551- 566 | I
AND
be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions. | null | In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I
AND
be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions. | 170 | <h4>Engagement is an <u>ongoing process</u> that relies on <u>increasing diplomatic and economic contacts</u> to develop interdependence---that’s distinct from military engagement </h4><p>Evan <strong>Resnick 2001</strong>, Assistant Professor, Coordinator of the United States Programme, Coordinator of External Teaching, and Deputy Coordinator of the International Relations Programme at RSIS, Spring 2001, “Defining Engagment<u>” , Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 551- 566</p><p></u>In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, <u>I </p><p>AND</p><p>be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.</p></u> | null | null | Military T | 1,560,034 | 12 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,184 | Next is Chinese Policy Literacy: Debates between students about U.S. policy toward China are essential to global peace and stability. | McGiffert 15 | McGiffert 15 (Carola McGiffert, President of the 100,000 Strong Foundation (now called the U.S.-China Strong Foundation)—a nonprofit organization that seeks to strengthen US-China relations by investing in a new generation of leaders who have the knowledge and skills to engage with China, former Senior Advisor and Director of the 100,000 Strong Initiative at the U.S. Department of State, former Vice President and Chief of Staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Special Assistant at The White House during the Clinton Administration, holds an M.A. in Chinese Studies and International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2015, “Preface,” Strengthening U.S.-China Relations One Student At A Time: Perspectives From Leaders In The Field, Signature Report of The 100,000 Strong Foundation, Available Online at http://asiasociety.org/files/[ENG]%20Strengthening-US-China-Relations-One-Student-at-a-Time-Perspectives-From-Leaders-in-the-Field.pdf) | The US-China relationship stands at a critical juncture
, and succeed in a world in which China plays a central role | null | The US-China relationship stands at a critical juncture. Long marked by competition
AND
, and succeed in a world in which China plays a central role. | 149 | <h4>Next is Chinese Policy Literacy: Debates between <u>students</u> about <u>U.S. policy toward China</u> are essential to <u>global peace and stability</u>. </h4><p><strong>McGiffert 15</strong> (Carola McGiffert, President of the 100,000 Strong Foundation (now called the U.S.-China Strong Foundation)—a nonprofit organization that seeks to strengthen US-China relations by investing in a new generation of leaders who have the knowledge and skills to engage with China, former Senior Advisor and Director of the 100,000 Strong Initiative at the U.S. Department of State, former Vice President and Chief of Staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Special Assistant at The White House during the Clinton Administration, holds an M.A. in Chinese Studies and International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2015, “Preface,” Strengthening U.S.-China Relations One Student At A Time: Perspectives From Leaders In The Field, Signature Report of The 100,000 Strong Foundation, Available Online at http://asiasociety.org/files/[ENG]%20Strengthening-US-China-Relations-One-Student-at-a-Time-Perspectives-From-Leaders-in-the-Field.pdf)</p><p><u>The US-China relationship stands at a critical juncture</u>. Long marked by competition </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>, and succeed</strong> in a world in which China plays <strong>a central role</u></strong>.</p> | null | null | Framework | 1,560,698 | 12 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,185 | ( ) That controls every impact – a vibrant US economy is the lynchpin of global stability | Bremmer and Roubini ‘11 | Bremmer and Roubini ‘11 | Following crises in emerging markets policymakers in those economies committed themselves to running current account surpluses, and self-insuring against liquidity runs Deficit countries see such accumulations of reserves as a form of trade mercantilism Emerging-market economies complain that U.S. deficits could cause the collapse of the U.S. dollar the country that produces the reserve currency must run deficits to provide international liquidity that eventually debase the currency’s value as a stable international reserve debates over alternatives to the U.S. dollar are going nowhere because Washington has no interest in any move that would undermine the dollar. Nor is it likely that China’s yuan will supplant the dollar because to do so, Beijing would have to allow its exchange rate to fluctuate, reduce its controls liberalize capital markets, and create markets for yuan debt That process would present many near-term threats to China’s stability energy producers are resisting policies aimed at stabilizing price volatility net energy exporters continue to use threats to halt the flow of gas as a foreign policy weapon Net energy consumers are resisting policies that would reduce their dependency on fossil fuels Similar tensions derive from the rising prices of food economic anxiety is high no single country or bloc has the clout to help drive a truly international approach the global balance of power was defined primarily by military capability Today, it is the centrality of emerging powers to the future of the global economy that make their choices crucial for the U S This is the core of the G-Zero dilemma there is no collective economic security in a globalized economy. there is fear of a contagion within the walls that might one day bring down the eurozone enterprise. Beyond Europe, those who make policy must worry about growth and jobs at home Ambitions to bolster the global economy are a distant second There is no longer a Washington consensus, but nor will there ever be a Beijing consensus, because Chinese-style state capitalism is designed to meet China’s unique needs. It is that rare product that China has no interest in exporting. state capitalism is a system that must be unique to every country that practices it. This is why protectionism is alive and well. the process of creating a new international financial architecture is unlikely to create a structure that complies with any credible building code | U.S. deficits collapse the dollar debates over alternatives are going nowhere Washington has no interest in any move Nor is it likely China will supplant economic anxiety is high no single country or bloc has the clout to drive a international approach balance of power was defined by military capability there is no collective security in a globalized economy those who make policy must worry about jobs There is no Washington consensus nor Beijing consensus protectionism is alive and well creating a new international architecture is unlikely | [Ian – President of the Eurasia Political Risk Consulting Group. And Nouriel, Prof Econ @ NYU. “A G-Zero World” Foreign Affairs, Winter 2011. ln//GBS-JV]
Following previous crises in emerging markets, such as the Asian financial meltdown of the late 1990s, policymakers in those economies committed themselves to maintaining weak currencies, running current account surpluses, and self-insuring against liquidity runs by accumulating huge foreign exchange reserves. This strategy grew in part from a mistrust that the IMF could be counted on to act as the lender of last resort. Deficit countries, such as the United States, see such accumulations of reserves as a form of trade mercantilism that prevents undervalued currencies from appreciating. Emerging-market economies, in turn, complain that U.S. fiscal and current account deficits could eventually cause the collapse of the U.S. dollar, even as these deficits help build up the dollar assets demanded by those countries accumulating reserves. This is a rerun of the old Triffin dilemma, an economic observation of what happens when the country that produces the reserve currency must run deficits to provide international liquidity, deficits that eventually debase the currency’s value as a stable international reserve. Meanwhile, debates over alternatives to the U.S. dollar, including that of giving a greater role to Special Drawing Rights (an international reserve asset based on a basket of five national currencies created by the IMF to supplement gold and dollar reserves), as China has recommended, are going nowhere, largely because Washington has no interest in any move that would undermine the central role of the dollar. Nor is it likely that China’s yuan will soon supplant the dollar as a major reserve currency, because for the yuan to do so, Beijing would have to allow its exchange rate to fluctuate, reduce its controls on capital inflows and outflows, liberalize its domestic capital markets, and create markets for yuan-denominated debt. That is a long-term process that would present many near-term threats to China’s political and economic stability. In addition, energy producers are resisting policies aimed at stabilizing price volatility through a more flexible energy supply. Meanwhile, net energy exporters, especially Russia, continue to use threats to halt the flow of gas as a primary foreign policy weapon against neighboring states. Net energy consumers, for their part, are resisting policies, such as carbon taxes, that would reduce their dependency on fossil fuels. Similar tensions derive from the sharply rising prices of food and other commodities. Conflicts over these issues come at a time when economic anxiety is high and no single country or bloc of countries has the clout to help drive a truly international approach to resolving them. From 1945 until 1990, the global balance of power was defined primarily by relative differences in military capability. It was not market-moving innovation or cultural dynamism that bolstered the Soviet bloc’s prominence within a bipolar international system. It was raw military power. Today, it is the centrality of China and other emerging powers to the future of the global economy, not the numbers of their citizens under arms or the weapons at their disposal, that make their choices crucial for the United States’ future. This is the core of the G-Zero dilemma. The phrase “collective security” conjures up NATO and its importance for peace and prosperity across Europe. But as the eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates, there is no collective economic security in a globalized economy. Whereas Europe’s interest rates once converged based on the assumption that southern European countries were immune to default risks and eastern European states were lined up to join the euro, now there is fear of a contagion within the walls that might one day bring down the entire eurozone enterprise. Beyond Europe, those who make policy, whether in a market-based democracy such as the United States or an authoritarian capitalist state such as China, must worry first and foremost about growth and jobs at home. Ambitions to bolster the global economy are a distant second. There is no longer a Washington consensus, but nor will there ever be a Beijing consensus, because Chinese-style state capitalism is designed to meet China’s unique needs. It is that rare product that China has no interest in exporting. Indeed, because each government must work to build domestic security and prosperity to fit its own unique political, economic, geographic, cultural, and historical circumstances, state capitalism is a system that must be unique to every country that practices it. This is why, despite pledges recorded in G-20 communiqués to “avoid the mistakes of the past,” protectionism is alive and well. It is why the process of creating a new international financial architecture is unlikely to create a structure that complies with any credible building code. And it is why the G-Zero era is more likely to produce protracted conflict than anything resembling a new Bretton Woods. | 5,122 | <h4>( ) That <u>controls every impact</u> – a <u>vibrant US economy</u> is the <u>lynchpin</u><strong> of global stability</h4><p>Bremmer and Roubini ‘11</p><p></strong>[Ian – President of the Eurasia Political Risk Consulting Group. And Nouriel, Prof Econ @ NYU. “A G-Zero World” Foreign Affairs, Winter 2011. ln//GBS-JV]</p><p><u>Following</u> previous <u>crises in emerging markets</u>, such as the Asian financial meltdown of the late 1990s, <u>policymakers in those economies committed themselves to</u> maintaining weak currencies, <u>running current account surpluses, and self-insuring against liquidity runs</u> by accumulating huge foreign exchange reserves. This strategy grew in part from a mistrust that the IMF could be counted on to act as the lender of last resort. <u>Deficit countries</u>, such as the United States, <u>see such accumulations of reserves as a form of trade mercantilism</u> that prevents undervalued currencies from appreciating. <u>Emerging-market economies</u>, in turn, <u>complain that <mark>U.S.</u></mark> fiscal and current account <u><mark>deficits</mark> could</u> eventually <u>cause the <mark>collapse</mark> of <mark>the</mark> U.S. <mark>dollar</u></mark>, even as these deficits help build up the dollar assets demanded by those countries accumulating reserves. This is a rerun of the old Triffin dilemma, an economic observation of what happens when <u>the country that produces the reserve currency must run deficits to provide international liquidity</u>, deficits <u>that eventually debase the currency’s value as a stable international reserve</u>. Meanwhile, <u><mark>debates over alternatives</mark> to the U.S. dollar</u>, including that of giving a greater role to Special Drawing Rights (an international reserve asset based on a basket of five national currencies created by the IMF to supplement gold and dollar reserves), as China has recommended, <u><mark>are going nowhere</u></mark>, largely <u>because <mark>Washington has no interest in any move</mark> that would undermine</u> the central role of <u>the dollar. <mark>Nor is it likely</mark> that <mark>China</mark>’s yuan <mark>will</u></mark> soon <u><mark>supplant</mark> the dollar</u> as a major reserve currency, <u>because</u> for the yuan <u>to do so, Beijing would have to allow its exchange rate to fluctuate, reduce its controls</u> on capital inflows and outflows, <u>liberalize</u> its domestic <u>capital markets, and create markets for yuan</u>-denominated <u>debt</u>. <u>That</u> is a long-term <u>process</u> that <u>would present many near-term threats to China’s</u> political and economic <u>stability</u>. In addition, <u>energy producers are resisting policies aimed at stabilizing price volatility</u> through a more flexible energy supply. Meanwhile, <u>net energy exporters</u>, especially Russia, <u>continue to use threats to halt the flow of gas as a</u> primary <u>foreign policy weapon</u> against neighboring states. <u>Net energy consumers</u>, for their part, <u>are resisting policies</u>, such as carbon taxes, <u>that would reduce their dependency on fossil fuels</u>. <u>Similar tensions derive from the</u> sharply <u>rising prices of food</u> and other commodities. Conflicts over these issues come at a time when <u><mark>economic anxiety is high</u></mark> and <u><mark>no single country or bloc</u></mark> of countries <u><mark>has the clout to</mark> help <mark>drive a</mark> truly <mark>international approach</u></mark> to resolving them. From 1945 until 1990, <u>the global <mark>balance of power was defined</mark> primarily <mark>by</u></mark> relative differences in <u><mark>military capability</u></mark>. It was not market-moving innovation or cultural dynamism that bolstered the Soviet bloc’s prominence within a bipolar international system. It was raw military power. <u>Today, it is the centrality of</u> China and other <u>emerging powers to the future of the global economy</u>, not the numbers of their citizens under arms or the weapons at their disposal, <u>that make their choices crucial for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates’ future. <u>This is the core of the G-Zero dilemma</u>. The phrase “collective security” conjures up NATO and its importance for peace and prosperity across Europe. But as the eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates, <u><mark>there is no collective</mark> economic <mark>security in a globalized economy</mark>.</u> Whereas Europe’s interest rates once converged based on the assumption that southern European countries were immune to default risks and eastern European states were lined up to join the euro, now <u>there is fear of a contagion within the walls that might one day bring down the</u> entire <u>eurozone enterprise.</u> <u>Beyond Europe, <mark>those who make policy</u></mark>, whether in a market-based democracy such as the United States or an authoritarian capitalist state such as China, <u><mark>must worry</u></mark> first and foremost <u><mark>about</mark> growth and <mark>jobs</mark> at home</u>.<u> Ambitions to bolster the global economy are a distant second</u>. <u><mark>There is no</mark> longer a <mark>Washington consensus</mark>, but <mark>nor</mark> will there ever be a <mark>Beijing consensus</mark>, because Chinese-style state capitalism is designed to meet China’s unique needs. It is that rare product that China has no interest in exporting.</u> Indeed, because each government must work to build domestic security and prosperity to fit its own unique political, economic, geographic, cultural, and historical circumstances, <u>state capitalism is a system that must be unique to every country that practices it.</u> <u>This is why</u>, despite pledges recorded in G-20 communiqués to “avoid the mistakes of the past,” <u><mark>protectionism is alive and well</mark>.</u> It is why <u>the process of <mark>creating a new international</mark> financial <mark>architecture is unlikely</mark> to create a structure that complies with any credible building code</u>. And it is why the G-Zero era is more likely to produce protracted conflict than anything resembling a new Bretton Woods.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Politics | 225,876 | 3 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,186 | There isn’t an internal link – Their evidence is in the context of worldwide carbon sequestration, while they only access Chinese reforms | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>There isn’t an internal link – Their evidence is in the context of worldwide carbon sequestration, while they only access Chinese reforms</h4> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 1,560,699 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,187 | Infrastructure reform will pass | Kincer 2-6 | Kincer 2-6 | the new administration emphasized a record of putting partisanship aside voiced bipartisan support for a comprehensive infrastructure plan that would repair existing infrastructure to provide a backbone for a strong economy On Capitol Hill policy insiders believe an infrastructure plan will be a priority for 2017 Many see the issue as one upon which Democrats and Republicans could cooperate if a financing strategy can be agreed upon. Ryan Schumer had made significant progress in discussing the terms of infrastructure legislation and are expected to continue such deliberations given Trump has made infrastructure a top priority The plan released during President Donald Trump’s campaign calls for $137 billion in tax credits to fund the equity portion of a $1 trillion infrastructure plan. And such a model has bipartisan support Wyden and Hoeven introduced the Move America Act in the last Congress, which includes a provision to create an infrastructure tax credit The Trump infrastructure tax credit as it stands is a framework While details remain to be seen the creation of a credit to incentivize infrastructure is a new, exciting idea in the federal system. This credit is designed to incentivize new construction of transmission lines, power substations, gas lines, rail facilities, road improvement projects, water self-supply projects and water removal system projects The federal infrastructure tax credit proposal has received criticism but leaders have said that a bill will be forthcoming Senate Democrats unveiled a $1 trillion infrastructure plan that largely relied upon public funding Democrats are expected to push for spending in any infrastructure deal, but the final deal is likely not to be based on a tax credit only or spending only, but rather a combination of both approaches While GOP budget hawks are unlikely to jump on board examples show the possibilities of tax-credit financing of infrastructure programs The fight to determine the best infrastructure financing model may be on, but with pressure from the states and the need for infrastructure, this may be one of the few areas of agreement in Washington There is reason to hope the administration and Congress will succeed in getting an infrastructure plan passed | null | [“Reason to Hope for Possibility of a Federal Infrastructure Tax Credit” 2/6/17 https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/reason-hope-possibility-federal-infrastructure-tax-credit //GBS-JV]
As the new administration and Congress adjust to working together in Washington, the nation’s governors came together Jan. 25 to outline priorities for 2017 and emphasized a record of putting partisanship aside to make progress in their states. During the annual state of the states address, NGA Chairman Terry McAulliffe of Virginia and Vice Chairman Brian Sandoval of Nevada voiced bipartisan support for a comprehensive infrastructure plan that would repair existing infrastructure, create stability for the Highway Trust Fund and address water and energy needs, all in order to provide a backbone for a strong economy. On Capitol Hill, many policy insiders believe an infrastructure plan will be a priority for 2017, but likely not during the first 100 days of the new administration. Many see the issue as one upon which Democrats and Republicans could cooperate if a financing strategy can be agreed upon. Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wis., and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., had made significant progress in discussing the terms of infrastructure legislation in the last Congress, and are expected to continue such deliberations given that President Trump has made infrastructure a top priority. The plan released during President Donald Trump’s campaign calls for $137 billion in tax credits to fund the equity portion of a $1 trillion infrastructure plan. A transition team version of the plan changed this figure to $550 billion. According to a summary document by Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro released in October, the plan is intended to address the issue of America’s crumbling infrastructure. With 82 percent of the costs supported by revenues, the plan may lend itself to new infrastructure that generates predictable and robust revenue streams to pay for debt. This could come in the form of tolls for highways, airport fees, fees for port usage, etc. As the Ross and Navarro piece indicates, “Much more needs to be built anew...” A criticism of the plans is that current infrastructure investors, such as pension funds, typically are not interested in tax incentives because of their tax status. However, this may open the door for a whole new source of equity for infrastructure development. With a focus on new infrastructure, the credit concept could work similarly to the other tax credits. The equity piece is something Novogradac & Company readers understand well: a tax credit to cover equity contributions. And such a model has bipartisan support as well. Sens. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and John Hoeven, R-N.D., introduced the Move America Act in the last Congress, which includes a provision to create an infrastructure tax credit, largely modeled after the low-income housing tax credit. Both senators are expected to reintroduce the bill soon. The Trump infrastructure tax credit as it stands is a framework with many details left undetermined. Equity return seems to be from tax benefits, generated without necessarily owning any assets. The Treasury Department has generally preferred tax credit recipients also have equity ownership in assets, with a potential for at least a minimal amount of cash return. That means the return mechanism may need to be modified. The Novogradac Federal Infrastructure Tax Credit (FITC) Working Group is currently drafting a white paper that will make design recommendations. While lots of details remain to be seen, the creation of a credit to incentivize infrastructure is a new, exciting idea in the federal system. However, states may be leading the way. A new credit in Utah was passed in 2015 (Utah S.B. 216, Utah High Cost Infrastructure Development Tax Credit). This credit is designed to incentivize new construction of transmission lines, power substations, gas lines, rail facilities, road improvement projects, water self-supply projects and water removal system projects, among other things. The mechanism is familiar to those in the tax credit industry, with the program providing tax incentives over a 20-year period of up to 50 percent of qualifying infrastructure costs incurred by a business. The goal is to provide rural Utah with economic expansion opportunities. The evolution and development of this program will be interesting. The federal infrastructure tax credit proposal has received criticism from Democrats, but House leaders including Speaker Ryan and House Transportation Chairman Bill Schuster, R-Pa., have said that a bill will be forthcoming. Schuster held a hearing about infrastructure on Feb. 1 and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee is slated to hold a similar hearing on Feb. 8. On Jan. 24, Senate Democrats unveiled a $1 trillion infrastructure plan that largely relied upon public funding. Certainly Democrats are expected to push for spending in any infrastructure deal, but the final deal is likely not to be based on a tax credit only or spending only, but rather a combination of both approaches. While GOP budget hawks are unlikely to jump on board for any plan that increases the federal deficit, examples such as the one in Utah show the possibilities of tax-credit financing of infrastructure programs. The fight to determine the best infrastructure financing model may be on, but with pressure from the states and the need for infrastructure, this may be one of the few areas of agreement in Washington. There is reason to hope the administration and Congress will succeed in getting an infrastructure plan, including an infrastructure tax credit, passed. | 5,680 | <h4><strong>Infrastructure reform will pass </h4><p>Kincer 2-6</p><p></strong>[“Reason to Hope for Possibility of a Federal Infrastructure Tax Credit” 2/6/17 https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/reason-hope-possibility-federal-infrastructure-tax-credit //GBS-JV]</p><p>As <u>the new administration</u> and Congress adjust to working together in Washington, the nation’s governors came together Jan. 25 to outline priorities for 2017 and <u>emphasized a record of putting partisanship aside</u> to make progress in their states. During the annual state of the states address, NGA Chairman Terry McAulliffe of Virginia and Vice Chairman Brian Sandoval of Nevada <u>voiced</u> <u><strong>bipartisan support</u></strong> <u>for a comprehensive infrastructure plan that would repair existing infrastructure</u>, create stability for the Highway Trust Fund and address water and energy needs, all in order <u>to provide a backbone for a strong economy</u>. <u>On Capitol Hill</u>, many <u><strong>policy insiders believe an infrastructure plan will be a priority for 2017</u></strong>, but likely not during the first 100 days of the new administration. <u>Many see the issue as one upon which <strong>Democrats and Republicans could cooperate</strong> if a financing strategy can be agreed upon.</u> Speaker Paul <u>Ryan</u>, R-Wis., and Senate Minority Leader Chuck <u>Schumer</u>, D-N.Y., <u>had made significant progress in discussing the terms of infrastructure legislation</u> in the last Congress, <u>and are expected to continue such deliberations given </u>that President <u>Trump</u> <u><strong>has made infrastructure a top priority</u></strong>. <u>The plan released during President Donald Trump’s campaign calls for $137 billion in tax credits to fund the equity portion of a $1 trillion infrastructure plan.</u> A transition team version of the plan changed this figure to $550 billion. According to a summary document by Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro released in October, the plan is intended to address the issue of America’s crumbling infrastructure. With 82 percent of the costs supported by revenues, the plan may lend itself to new infrastructure that generates predictable and robust revenue streams to pay for debt. This could come in the form of tolls for highways, airport fees, fees for port usage, etc. As the Ross and Navarro piece indicates, “Much more needs to be built anew...” A criticism of the plans is that current infrastructure investors, such as pension funds, typically are not interested in tax incentives because of their tax status. However, this may open the door for a whole new source of equity for infrastructure development. With a focus on new infrastructure, the credit concept could work similarly to the other tax credits. The equity piece is something Novogradac & Company readers understand well: a tax credit to cover equity contributions. <u><strong>And such a model has bipartisan support</u></strong> as well. Sens. Ron <u>Wyden</u>, D-Ore., <u>and</u> John <u>Hoeven</u>, R-N.D., <u>introduced the Move America Act in the last Congress, which includes a provision to create an infrastructure tax credit</u>, largely modeled after the low-income housing tax credit. Both senators are expected to reintroduce the bill soon. <u>The Trump infrastructure tax credit as it stands is a framework</u> with many details left undetermined. Equity return seems to be from tax benefits, generated without necessarily owning any assets. The Treasury Department has generally preferred tax credit recipients also have equity ownership in assets, with a potential for at least a minimal amount of cash return. That means the return mechanism may need to be modified. The Novogradac Federal Infrastructure Tax Credit (FITC) Working Group is currently drafting a white paper that will make design recommendations. <u>While</u> lots of <u>details remain to be seen</u>, <u>the creation of a credit to incentivize infrastructure is a new, exciting idea in the federal system.</u> However, states may be leading the way. A new credit in Utah was passed in 2015 (Utah S.B. 216, Utah High Cost Infrastructure Development Tax Credit). <u>This credit is designed to incentivize new construction of transmission lines, power substations, gas lines, rail facilities, road improvement projects, water self-supply projects and water removal system projects</u>, among other things. The mechanism is familiar to those in the tax credit industry, with the program providing tax incentives over a 20-year period of up to 50 percent of qualifying infrastructure costs incurred by a business. The goal is to provide rural Utah with economic expansion opportunities. The evolution and development of this program will be interesting. <u>The federal infrastructure tax credit proposal has received criticism</u> from Democrats, <u>but</u> House <u><strong>leaders</u></strong> including Speaker Ryan and House Transportation Chairman Bill Schuster, R-Pa., <u>have said that a bill will be forthcoming</u>. Schuster held a hearing about infrastructure on Feb. 1 and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee is slated to hold a similar hearing on Feb. 8. On Jan. 24, <u>Senate Democrats unveiled a $1 trillion infrastructure plan that largely relied upon public funding</u>. Certainly <u>Democrats are expected to push for spending in any infrastructure deal, but the final deal is likely not to be based on a tax credit only or spending only, but rather a combination of both approaches</u>. <u>While GOP budget hawks are unlikely to jump on board</u> for any plan that increases the federal deficit, <u>examples</u> such as the one in Utah <u>show the possibilities of tax-credit financing of infrastructure programs</u>. <u>The fight to determine the best infrastructure financing model may be on,</u> <u><strong>but with pressure from the states and the need for infrastructure, this may be one of the few areas of agreement in Washington</u></strong>. <u>There is</u> <u><strong>reason to hope the administration and Congress will succeed</u></strong> <u>in getting an infrastructure plan</u>, including an infrastructure tax credit, <u>passed</u>.</p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 2 | null | 1,560,700 | 2 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,188 | But it won’t escalate anyway | Dibb 14 | Paul Dibb 14, emeritus professor of strategic studies @ The Australian National University, “Why A Major War In Asia Is Unlikely,” March 31, East Asia Forum, Economy Watch, http://www.economywatch.com/features/why-a-major-war-in-asia-is-unlikely.31-03.html | rising tensions has led some experts to draw parallels with World War I an all-out war is unlikely There is risk that China’s increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea and the South China Sea will result in a military confrontation But a sunk warship or military aircraft collision is a long way from all-out war. These sorts of incidents have occurred in the past and have not escalated — for example 2010 South Korean warship and collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter plane with a US reconnaissance aircraft. | all-out war is unlikely There is risk China’s aggressiveness in the S C S will result in a military confrontation But a sunk warship or military aircraft collision is a long way from war. These incidents have occurred in the past and not escalated for example 2010 Korean warship and collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter plane | The rising tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has led some experts to draw parallels with the Sarajevo incident, which sparked off World War I in Europe. Yet while is a significant risk that the conflict will result in a military confrontation, an all-out war is unlikely given economic reasons. The Jeremiah prophets are coming out of the woodwork to predict that there will be an outbreak of war between the major powers in Asia, just like in Europe 100 years ago. The idea is that a rising China will inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or through conflict with Japan. Some commentators are even suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked World War I will be replicated between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has likened this situation to what he calls ‘a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago — a tinderbox on water’. My colleague Hugh White recently proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan is now very real. There is undoubtedly a significant risk that China’s increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea and the South China Sea over its territorial claims will result in a military confrontation, either by miscalculation or design. But a sunk warship or military aircraft collision is a long way from all-out war. These sorts of incidents have occurred in the past and have not escalated — for example, the North Korean sinking in 2010 of a South Korean warship, and the collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter plane with a US reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan might be more serious. | 1,735 | <h4>But it won’t escalate anyway</h4><p>Paul <strong>Dibb 14</strong>, emeritus professor of strategic studies @ The Australian National University, “Why A Major War In Asia Is Unlikely,” March 31, East Asia Forum, Economy Watch, http://www.economywatch.com/features/why-a-major-war-in-asia-is-unlikely.31-03.html</p><p>The <u>rising tensions</u> between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands <u>has led some experts to draw parallels with</u> the Sarajevo incident, which sparked off <u>World War I </u>in Europe. Yet while is a significant risk that the conflict will result in a military confrontation, <u>an <strong><mark>all-out war is unlikely</u></strong></mark> given economic reasons.<strong> </strong>The Jeremiah prophets are coming out of the woodwork to predict that there will be an outbreak of war between the major powers in Asia, just like in Europe 100 years ago. The idea is that a rising China will inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or through conflict with Japan. Some commentators are even suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked World War I will be replicated between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has likened this situation to what he calls ‘a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago — a tinderbox on water’. My colleague Hugh White recently proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan is now very real. <u><mark>There is</u></mark> undoubtedly a significant <u><mark>risk</mark> that <mark>China’s</mark> increasing <mark>aggressiveness in the</mark> East China Sea and the <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>outh <strong><mark>C</strong></mark>hina <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ea</u> over its territorial claims <u><mark>will result in a military confrontation</u></mark>, either by miscalculation or design. <u><strong><mark>But a sunk warship or military aircraft collision is a long way from </mark>all-out <mark>war.</u></strong> <u>These</mark> sorts of <mark>incidents have occurred in the past and</mark> have <strong><mark>not escalated</strong></mark> — <mark>for example</u></mark>, the North Korean sinking in <u><mark>2010</u></mark> of a <u>South <mark>Korean warship</u></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the <u><mark>collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter plane</mark> with a US reconnaissance aircraft. </u>Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan might be more serious.</p> | Case | ECS | null | 173,360 | 29 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,189 | Violation: The plan violates because they are military engagement--- | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Violation: The plan violates because they are military engagement--- </h4> | null | null | Military T | 1,560,701 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,190 | Congress will lose their minds if we give them heroin and other drugs. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Congress will lose their minds if we give them heroin and other drugs. </h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 2 | null | 1,560,702 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,191 | Engagement requires specific concessions in return. The aff is appeasement | Dueck, 6 | Dueck, 6 - Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in George Mason University’s School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs (“Strategies for Managing Rogue States”, Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.01.004 | democracies have always had five alternatives in relation to adversaries: appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, and non-entanglement appeasement refers only to those cases where one country attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through unilateral political, economic concessions drawbacks of appeasement lie in the fact that concrete concessions are made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from hostile to benign there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing its gains Engagement has several possible meanings It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial activism (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact 3) using such political or economic contact as a strategy in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence (4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements or (5) the very act of diplomacy Only the third definition is analytically useful The first is too vague the second is a condition rather than a strategy and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words “diplomacy Observers often call for the United States to “engage” states when what they seem to mean is “negotiate.” one cannot speak of “negotiations” in the abstract: it all depends on the precise bargain that is on offer Yet this is exactly what observers so often do when they urge the United States to “try diplomacy” without regard to the particular terms that are actually available from the other side | appeasement refers to where one country attempts to alter the intentions of another through unilateral political, economic, concessions concrete concessions are made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions Engagement, using such political or economic contact as a strategy of cooperation Only the third definition is analytically useful. one cannot speak of “negotiations” in the abstract: it all depends on the precise bargain that is on offer. | The term “rogue state,” which has come into wide usage only over the past decade, has more to do with American political culture than with international law.1 Nevertheless, it does capture certain undeniable international realities, namely, the continuing existence of numerous authoritarian states that support terrorism, seek weapons of mass destruction, and harbor revisionist foreign policy ambitions. Loosening this definition a bit, we can see that rogue states are really nothing new. Over the past century, Western democracies have been faced with a series of challenges from autocratic, revisionist, and adversarial states of varying scope and size. The democracies have always had five basic strategic alternatives in relation to such adversaries: appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, and non-entanglement. Appeasement The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently attracted surprising and favorable attention from scholars of international relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a failure to agree on its meaning. Properly speaking, appeasement is not synonymous with diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic concessions, but refers only to those cases where one country attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through unilateral political, economic, and/or military concessions.3 It is sometimes argued that appeasement can work under certain circumstances, and that Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich in 1938 was simply a case of appeasement badly handled.4 The drawbacks of appeasement, however, are inherent. They lie in the fact that concrete concessions are made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from hostile to benign. With this strategy, there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing its gains and moving on to the next aggression.5 Britain's rapprochement with the United States in the 1890s is often described as a successful case of appeasement.6 Skillful British diplomacy indeed played a part in significantly improving relations between the two over the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve the term. The United States was not particularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and no vital conflicts of interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-American rapprochement was more the result than the cause of that commonality of interests.7 In sum, appeasement—strictly defined—is a strategy best avoided. Realistic bargaining or negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably fixed intentions is another matter entirely, however, and should not be confused with appeasement. Engagement Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible meanings and is used in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact with an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using such political or economic contact as a strategy in itself, in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence with a rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements, alongside continued rivalry or competition;10 or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining, regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on integration through contact, is analytically useful. The first is too vague to be of much use; the second is a condition rather than a strategy; the fourth is more accurately captured by détente; and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words “diplomacy,” “negotiating,” or “bargaining” when they have served very well up to now. 11 Engagement as a strategy of integration through contact rests upon liberal assumptions regarding international affairs. Specifically, it typically assumes that increased economic interdependence, membership in international organizations, and transnational contact between civil societies will combine to shape adversarial regimes in a more democratic and peaceful direction.12 In the 1970s, Western analysts viewed America's détente with the Soviet Union as this sort of strategy, and the collapse of the ussr is in fact frequently attributed in large part to the subversive influence of increased contact with the West. But Western trade, technology, and recognition in the second half of the Cold War did as much to prop up as to undermine the Soviet bloc.13 Western policies toward various rogue states (and toward China) over the last twenty years have often been predicated on the assumption that increased political and economic contact with the outside world will undermine these regimes. Yet there is remarkably little evidence that integration through contact has ever actually worked in managing existing international adversaries. The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team, with which détente is most closely linked, did not see it primarily as a strategy of integration, but rather as a strategy of disciplined rivalry alongside expanded areas of cooperation.14 In other words, they held to the more traditional definition, in which tensions were reduced while continued competition with one's adversary was considered inevitable. In this very limited sense, the Soviet-American détente of the early 1970s was indeed a positive achievement, in that the risks of war were reduced for both sides. Only when liberals came to view détente as having more ambitious, overarching goals—as restraining Soviet expansion through a web of interdependence—did it have to be considered a failure. Engagement as integration, engagement as détente—what about engagement as diplomacy? Observers often call for the United States to “engage” rogue states such as North Korea or Iran when what they seem to mean is “negotiate.” Obviously one cannot speak of “negotiations” in the abstract: it all depends on the precise bargain that is on offer. Yet this is exactly what observers so often do when they urge the United States to “try diplomacy” without regard to the particular terms that are actually available from the other side. If a rogue state is willing to come to an agreement, however limited, that advances American interests, then diplomatic efforts should be embraced. If not, then we ought to recognize that diplomacy is not an end in itself. | 6,513 | <h4>Engagement requires <u>specific concessions</u> in return. The aff is <u>appeasement</u> </h4><p><strong>Dueck, 6 </strong>- Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in George Mason University’s School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs (“Strategies for Managing Rogue States”, Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.01.004</p><p>The term “rogue state,” which has come into wide usage only over the past decade, has more to do with American political culture than with international law.1 Nevertheless, it does capture certain undeniable international realities, namely, the continuing existence of numerous authoritarian states that support terrorism, seek weapons of mass destruction, and harbor revisionist foreign policy ambitions. Loosening this definition a bit, we can see that rogue states are really nothing new. Over the past century, Western democracies have been faced with a series of challenges from autocratic, revisionist, and adversarial states of varying scope and size. The <u>democracies have always had five</u> basic strategic <u>alternatives in relation to</u> such <u>adversaries: appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, and non-entanglement</u>. Appeasement The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently attracted surprising and favorable attention from scholars of international relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a failure to agree on its meaning. Properly speaking, <u><mark>appeasement</u></mark> is not synonymous with diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic concessions, but <u><mark>refers</mark> only <mark>to</mark> those cases <mark>where one country attempts to alter</mark> or satiate <mark>the</mark> aggressive <mark>intentions of another through unilateral political, economic</u>,</mark> and/or military <u><mark>concessions</u></mark>.3 It is sometimes argued that appeasement can work under certain circumstances, and that Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich in 1938 was simply a case of appeasement badly handled.4 The <u>drawbacks of appeasement</u>, however, are inherent. They <u>lie in the fact that <mark>concrete concessions are made by <strong>one side only</strong>,</u> <u>while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions</mark> from hostile to benign</u>. With this strategy, <u>there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing its gains</u> and moving on to the next aggression.5 Britain's rapprochement with the United States in the 1890s is often described as a successful case of appeasement.6 Skillful British diplomacy indeed played a part in significantly improving relations between the two over the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve the term. The United States was not particularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and no vital conflicts of interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-American rapprochement was more the result than the cause of that commonality of interests.7 In sum, appeasement—strictly defined—is a strategy best avoided. Realistic bargaining or negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably fixed intentions is another matter entirely, however, and should not be confused with appeasement. Engagement <u><mark>Engagement</u>,</mark> a popular concept in recent years, actually <u>has several possible meanings</u> and is used in a number of different ways. <u>It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial activism</u> internationally;8 <u>(2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact</u> with an existing counterpart or adversary; (<u>3) <mark>using such political or economic contact as a <strong>strategy</u></strong></mark> in itself, <u>in the hopes that this contact will create patterns <mark>of cooperation</mark>, integration, and interdependence</u> with a rogue state;9 <u>(4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements</u>, alongside continued rivalry or competition;10 <u>or (5) the very act of diplomacy</u>, negotiating, or bargaining, regardless of its content. <u><strong><mark>Only the third definition</u></strong></mark>, focusing on integration through contact, <u><mark>is analytically useful</u>.</mark> <u>The first is too vague</u> to be of much use; <u>the second is a condition rather than a strategy</u>; the fourth is more accurately captured by détente; <u>and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words “diplomacy</u>,” “negotiating,” or “bargaining” when they have served very well up to now. 11 Engagement as a strategy of integration through contact rests upon liberal assumptions regarding international affairs. Specifically, it typically assumes that increased economic interdependence, membership in international organizations, and transnational contact between civil societies will combine to shape adversarial regimes in a more democratic and peaceful direction.12 In the 1970s, Western analysts viewed America's détente with the Soviet Union as this sort of strategy, and the collapse of the ussr is in fact frequently attributed in large part to the subversive influence of increased contact with the West. But Western trade, technology, and recognition in the second half of the Cold War did as much to prop up as to undermine the Soviet bloc.13 Western policies toward various rogue states (and toward China) over the last twenty years have often been predicated on the assumption that increased political and economic contact with the outside world will undermine these regimes. Yet there is remarkably little evidence that integration through contact has ever actually worked in managing existing international adversaries. The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team, with which détente is most closely linked, did not see it primarily as a strategy of integration, but rather as a strategy of disciplined rivalry alongside expanded areas of cooperation.14 In other words, they held to the more traditional definition, in which tensions were reduced while continued competition with one's adversary was considered inevitable. In this very limited sense, the Soviet-American détente of the early 1970s was indeed a positive achievement, in that the risks of war were reduced for both sides. Only when liberals came to view détente as having more ambitious, overarching goals—as restraining Soviet expansion through a web of interdependence—did it have to be considered a failure. Engagement as integration, engagement as détente—what about engagement as diplomacy? <u>Observers often call for the United States to “engage”</u> rogue <u>states</u> such as North Korea or Iran <u>when what they seem to mean is “negotiate.”</u> Obviously <u><mark>one cannot speak of “negotiations” in the abstract: it <strong>all depends on the precise bargain</strong> that is on offer</u>.</mark> <u>Yet this is exactly what observers so often do when they urge the United States to “try diplomacy” without regard to the particular terms that are actually available from the other side</u>. If a rogue state is willing to come to an agreement, however limited, that advances American interests, then diplomatic efforts should be embraced. If not, then we ought to recognize that diplomacy is not an end in itself.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | T | 172,722 | 171 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,192 | Sequestration fails – Takes too long, is too expensive, won’t work, and uses too much land | Richard 6 | Richard 6 [Michael, Michael started writing for TreeHugger in 2005. It was reading The Ecology of Commerce by Paul Hawken and Good News For A Change by David Suzuki and Holly Dressel that changed his life, 7/31/06, “Important! Why Carbon Sequestration Won't Save Us”, http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/important-why-carbon-sequestration-wont-save-us.html, Accessed 10/5/16] DG | The stream of CO2 emitted is dilute making CO2 capture unrealistic. coal industry has staked its future on a new process known as coal gasification Let's assume that some plants are built and the CO2 is captured. For every tonne of anthracite [coal] burned, 3.7 tonnes of CO2 is generated. If this voluminous waste could be pumped back into the ground below the power station it would not matter as much, but the rocks that produce coal are not often useful for storing CO2, which means that the gas much be transported. Once the CO2 arrives at its destination it must be compressed into a liquid so it can be injected into the ground--a step that typically consumes 20 per cent of the energy yielded by burning coal in the first place. Then a kilometre-deep hole must be drilled and the CO2 injected. From that day on, the geological formation must be closely monitored; should the gas ever escape, it has the potential to kill even more energy is lost by compressing the CO2 to liquid form and we must monitor for leaks. What else? Earth's crust is not a purpose-built vessel for holding CO2, and the storage must last thousands of years so the risk of leak must be taken seriously Even when compressed to liquid form, that daily output would take up a cubic kilometre, and Australia accounts for less than 2 per cent of global emissions! Imagine injecting 50 cubic kilometre of liquid CO2 into the Earth's crust every day of the year for the next century or two. If geosequestration were to be practised on the scale needed to offset all the emissions from coal, the world would very quickly run out of A-grade reservoirs near power stations and, especially if the power companies are not liable for damages resulting from leaks, pressure would be on to utilise B, C, D and E grade reservoirs. burying it in the ground is not so simple or safe - as the oil industry likes to remind us, drilling is expensive - and it's not a long-term solution since we will run out of convenient places to sequester the liquid CO2. All of this suggests that the best case scenario for geosequestration is that it will play a small role (at most perhaps 10 per cent by 2050) in the world's energy future. Because action is needed now to combat climate change, both the public and the marketplace need to see proof of geosequestration's potential despite offers of government assistance, very little is happening with geosequestration. [...] Imagine the cost of building the new generation coal gasification power plants, the separation, storage, pipelines, compressors and injection wells. Politicians have been seduced by the coal industry's spin All this talk of carbon sequestration can basically be seen as a delaying tactic, as a way to get government support and to keep the operation and construction of coal power plants more socially acceptable. It's the equivalent of saying: "Don't bother us, we're working on it!" they want to build new ones and keep the old ones. They almost certainly won't bear the liability of CO2 leaks from underground storage, so that's an extra cost for taxpayers, not to mention that the electricity coming from coal gasification plants that do carbon sequestration will be more expensive because a lot of energy is lost in the process of running the plants, in the actual sequestration operating, and the huge costs of building the pipelines, the plants, drilling the holes, maintenance & monitoring, etc, will be passed on to the customers it'll take decades which we don't have, be extremely expensive, probably won't work that well, and we'll run out of good burying sites before long The fastest and cheapest way to close down coal plants soon is probably investments in efficiency. As a society civilization species, we must back the right horse and stop being misled by the coal industry's delaying tactics. There's a big opportunity cost in time and resources to going down the wrong path. Each new power plant big coal builds means decades of fat profit for it, but for the rest of us here on Earth, it's just bad, bad news. | Let's assume CO2 is captured. For every tonne of anthracite burned, 3.7 tonnes of CO2 is generated. even more energy is lost by compressing the CO2 to liquid form and we must monitor for leaks Even when compressed to liquid form, that daily output would take up a cubic kilometre, and Australia accounts for less than 2 per cent of global emissions the equivalent of saying we're working on it!" it'll take decades which we don't have, be extremely expensive, probably won't work that well, and we'll run out of good burying sites before lon fastest and cheapest way to close down coal plants soon is probably investments in efficiency | The stream of CO2 emitted there is relatively dilute, making CO2 capture unrealistic. The coal industry has staked its future on a new process known as coal gasification. These power plants resemble chemical works more than conventional coal-fired power plants. In them, water and oxygen are mixed with the coal to create carbon monoxide and hydrogen. The hydrogen is used as a fuel source, while the carbon monoxide is converted to a concentrated stream of CO2. These plants are not cheap to run: around one-quarter of the energy they produce is consumed just in keeping them operating. All indications suggest that building them on a commercial scale will be expensive and that it will take decades to make a significant contribution to power production. So about 25% of the energy they make is used just to keep them operating, they are more expensive and it will take decades (an amount of time we don't have) before they make a significant contribution. Meanwhile, old coal power plants have an average lifetime of 60 years. What's next? Let's assume that some plants are built and the CO2 is captured. For every tonne of anthracite [coal] burned, 3.7 tonnes of CO2 is generated. If this voluminous waste could be pumped back into the ground below the power station it would not matter as much, but the rocks that produce coal are not often useful for storing CO2, which means that the gas much be transported. In the case of Australia's Hunter Valley coal mines, for example, it needs to be conveyed over Australia's Great Dividing Range and hundreds of kilometres to the west. [pipelines cost about $1 million per mile, more when terrain is rough and uneven.] Once the CO2 arrives at its destination it must be compressed into a liquid so it can be injected into the ground--a step that typically consumes 20 per cent of the energy yielded by burning coal in the first place. Then a kilometre-deep hole must be drilled and the CO2 injected. From that day on, the geological formation must be closely monitored; should the gas ever escape, it has the potential to kill. [...] The largest recent disaster caused by CO2 occurred in 1986, in Cameroon, central Africa. A volcanic crater-lake known as Nyos belched bubbles of CO2 into the still night air and the gas settled around the lake's shore, where it killed 1800 people and countless thousands of animals. Okay, so even more energy is lost by compressing the CO2 to liquid form and we must monitor for leaks. What else? Earth's crust is not a purpose-built vessel for holding CO2, and the storage must last thousands of years so the risk of leak must be taken seriously. Even the volume of CO2 generated by a sparsely populated country such as Australia beggars belief. Imagine a pile of 200-litre drums, ten kilometres long and five across, stacked ten drums high. [1.3 billion drums] Even when compressed to liquid form, that daily output would take up a cubic kilometre, and Australia accounts for less than 2 per cent of global emissions! Imagine injecting 50 cubic kilometre of liquid CO2 into the Earth's crust every day of the year for the next century or two. If geosequestration were to be practised on the scale needed to offset all the emissions from coal, the world would very quickly run out of A-grade reservoirs near power stations and, especially if the power companies are not liable for damages resulting from leaks, pressure would be on to utilise B, C, D and E grade reservoirs. Okay, so burying it in the ground is not so simple or safe - as the oil industry likes to remind us, drilling is expensive - and it's not a long-term solution since we will run out of convenient places to sequester the liquid CO2. Anything else? All of this suggests that the best case scenario for geosequestration is that it will play a small role (at most perhaps 10 per cent by 2050) in the world's energy future. Because action is needed now to combat climate change, both the public and the marketplace need to see proof of geosequestration's potential. Big coal should already be building trial coal gasification plants with geosequestration as a test of the economic and technological viability of their approach. Yet, despite offers of government assistance, very little is happening with geosequestration. [...] Imagine the cost of building the new generation coal gasification power plants, the separation, storage, pipelines, compressors and injection wells. So they're not even rushing to test it and make it happen? Politicians have been seduced by the coal industry's spin. [...] the Australian government set up [behind closed doors] a $500 million research fund for low emission technologies, precisely tailored in its brief to accommodate geosequestration. That's half a billion dollars that will never be fairly shared between all energy options to ensure the best outcome for the nation. [...] What is at stakes is [...] that Australia must increase its power production by more than 50 per cent by 2020 (a slow rate of growth compared with China [the biggest coal user in the world]), and the coal industry would like to secure as large a share of the cake as possible. All this talk of carbon sequestration can basically be seen as a delaying tactic, as a way to get government support and to keep the operation and construction of coal power plants more socially acceptable. It's the equivalent of saying: "Don't bother us, we're working on it!" But even if we suppose that big coal starts to build the expensive gasification plants soon and that they can solve most of the technical problems with geosequestration, they are not saying that they want to replace old, extremely dirty plants with the new ones; they want to build new ones and keep the old ones. They almost certainly won't bear the liability of CO2 leaks from underground storage, so that's an extra cost for taxpayers, not to mention that the electricity coming from coal gasification plants that do carbon sequestration will be more expensive because a lot of energy is lost in the process of running the plants, in the actual sequestration operating, and the huge costs of building the pipelines, the plants, drilling the holes, maintenance & monitoring, etc, will be passed on to the customers (or they'll ask for subsidies - same difference). So it'll take decades which we don't have, be extremely expensive, probably won't work that well, and we'll run out of good burying sites before long. Meanwhile, the clean energy industry (solar, wind, wave, geothermal) will keep growing very fast at exponential rates, their costs will keep going down and the efficiency of their production units (wind turbines, solar panels, hydrokinetic buoys, Gorlov helical turbines, geothermal heat pumps) will keep going up. The fastest and cheapest way to close down coal plants soon is probably investments in efficiency. Remember, it's a lot cheaper to save a watt of electricity than to produce one. As a society civilization species, we must back the right horse and stop being misled by the coal industry's delaying tactics. There's a big opportunity cost in time and resources to going down the wrong path. Each new power plant big coal builds means decades of fat profit for it, but for the rest of us here on Earth, it's just bad, bad news. | 7,284 | <h4><strong>Sequestration fails – Takes too long, is too expensive, won’t work, and uses too much land </h4><p>Richard 6 </strong>[Michael, Michael started writing for TreeHugger in 2005. It was reading The Ecology of Commerce by Paul Hawken and Good News For A Change by David Suzuki and Holly Dressel that changed his life, 7/31/06, “Important! Why Carbon Sequestration Won't Save Us”,<strong> </strong>http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/important-why-carbon-sequestration-wont-save-us.html<u>, Accessed 10/5/16] DG</p><p>The stream of CO2 emitted</u> there <u>is</u> relatively <u>dilute</u>, <u>making CO2 capture unrealistic.</u> The <u>coal industry has staked its future on a new process known as coal gasification</u>. These power plants resemble chemical works more than conventional coal-fired power plants. In them, water and oxygen are mixed with the coal to create carbon monoxide and hydrogen. The hydrogen is used as a fuel source, while the carbon monoxide is converted to a concentrated stream of CO2. These plants are not cheap to run: around one-quarter of the energy they produce is consumed just in keeping them operating. All indications suggest that building them on a commercial scale will be expensive and that it will take decades to make a significant contribution to power production. So about 25% of the energy they make is used just to keep them operating, they are more expensive and it will take decades (an amount of time we don't have) before they make a significant contribution. Meanwhile, old coal power plants have an average lifetime of 60 years. What's next? <u><mark>Let's assume</mark> that some plants are built and the <mark>CO2 is captured. For every tonne of anthracite</mark> [coal] <mark>burned, 3.7 tonnes of CO2 is generated.</mark> If this voluminous waste could be pumped back into the ground below the power station it would not matter as much, but the rocks that produce coal are not often useful for storing CO2, which means that the gas much be transported. </u>In the case of Australia's Hunter Valley coal mines, for example, it needs to be conveyed over Australia's Great Dividing Range and hundreds of kilometres to the west. [pipelines cost about $1 million per mile, more when terrain is rough and uneven.] <u>Once the CO2 arrives at its destination it must be compressed into a liquid so it can be injected into the ground--a step that typically consumes 20 per cent of the energy yielded by burning coal in the first place. Then a kilometre-deep hole must be drilled and the CO2 injected. From that day on, the geological formation must be closely monitored; should the gas ever escape, it has the potential to kill</u>. [...] The largest recent disaster caused by CO2 occurred in 1986, in Cameroon, central Africa. A volcanic crater-lake known as Nyos belched bubbles of CO2 into the still night air and the gas settled around the lake's shore, where it killed 1800 people and countless thousands of animals. Okay, so <u><strong><mark>even more energy is lost by compressing the CO2 to liquid form and we must monitor for leaks</mark>. What else? </strong>Earth's crust is not a purpose-built vessel for holding CO2, and the storage must last thousands of years so the risk of leak must be taken seriously</u>. Even the volume of CO2 generated by a sparsely populated country such as Australia beggars belief. Imagine a pile of 200-litre drums, ten kilometres long and five across, stacked ten drums high. [1.3 billion drums] <u><mark>Even when compressed to liquid form, that daily output would take up a cubic kilometre, and Australia accounts for less than 2 per cent of global emissions</mark>! Imagine injecting 50 cubic kilometre of liquid CO2 into the Earth's crust every day of the year for the next century or two. If geosequestration were to be practised on the scale needed to offset all the emissions from coal, the world would very quickly run out of A-grade reservoirs near power stations and, especially if the power companies are not liable for damages resulting from leaks, pressure would be on to utilise B, C, D and E grade reservoirs. </u>Okay, so <u>burying it in the ground is not so simple or safe - as the oil industry likes to remind us, drilling is expensive - and it's not a long-term solution since we will run out of convenient places to sequester the liquid CO2. </u>Anything else? <u>All of this suggests that the best case scenario for geosequestration is that it will play a small role (at most perhaps 10 per cent by 2050) in the world's energy future. Because action is needed now to combat climate change, both the public and the marketplace need to see proof of geosequestration's potential</u>. Big coal should already be building trial coal gasification plants with geosequestration as a test of the economic and technological viability of their approach. Yet, <u>despite offers of government assistance, very little is happening with geosequestration. [...] Imagine the cost of building the new generation coal gasification power plants, the separation, storage, pipelines, compressors and injection wells. </u>So they're not even rushing to test it and make it happen? <u>Politicians have been seduced by the coal industry's spin</u>. [...] the Australian government set up [behind closed doors] a $500 million research fund for low emission technologies, precisely tailored in its brief to accommodate geosequestration. That's half a billion dollars that will never be fairly shared between all energy options to ensure the best outcome for the nation. [...] What is at stakes is [...] that Australia must increase its power production by more than 50 per cent by 2020 (a slow rate of growth compared with China [the biggest coal user in the world]), and the coal industry would like to secure as large a share of the cake as possible. <u>All this talk of carbon sequestration can basically be seen as a delaying tactic, as a way to get government support and to keep the operation and construction of coal power plants more socially acceptable. I<strong>t's <mark>the equivalent of saying</mark>: "Don't bother us, <mark>we're working on it!"</strong></mark> </u>But even if we suppose that big coal starts to build the expensive gasification plants soon and that they can solve most of the technical problems with geosequestration, they are not saying that they want to replace old, extremely dirty plants with the new ones; <u>they want to build new ones and keep the old ones. They almost certainly won't bear the liability of CO2 leaks from underground storage, so that's an extra cost for taxpayers, not to mention that the electricity coming from coal gasification plants that do carbon sequestration will be more expensive because a lot of energy is lost in the process of running the plants, in the actual sequestration operating, and the huge costs of building the pipelines, the plants, drilling the holes, maintenance & monitoring, etc, will be passed on to the customers</u> (or they'll ask for subsidies - same difference). So <u><strong><mark>it'll take decades which we don't have, be extremely expensive, probably won't work that well, and we'll run out of good burying sites before lon</mark>g</u></strong>. Meanwhile, the clean energy industry (solar, wind, wave, geothermal) will keep growing very fast at exponential rates, their costs will keep going down and the efficiency of their production units (wind turbines, solar panels, hydrokinetic buoys, Gorlov helical turbines, geothermal heat pumps) will keep going up. <u>The <mark>fastest and cheapest way to close down coal plants soon is probably investments in efficiency</mark>.</u> Remember, it's a lot cheaper to save a watt of electricity than to produce one. <u>As a society civilization species, we must back the right horse and stop being misled by the coal industry's delaying tactics. There's a big opportunity cost in time and resources to going down the wrong path. Each new power plant big coal builds means decades of fat profit for it, but for the rest of us here on Earth, it's just bad, bad news.</p></u> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 1,560,704 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,193 | Two Impacts: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Two Impacts:</h4> | null | null | Military T | 1,560,703 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,194 | Violation – the plan is an unconditional offer | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Violation – the plan is an unconditional offer </h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | T | 1,560,705 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,195 | WARMING IS INEVITABLE | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>WARMING IS INEVITABLE</h4> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 1,560,706 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,196 | TI investment solves a New Madrid Seismic Zone quake | Taff et al ‘11 | Taff et al ‘11 | In the event of a large magnitude earthquake on the New Madrid seismic zone, the freight transportation network will be affected. In order to quickly and efficiently assess the status of the regions’ transportation system, remotely sensed data can be obtained and automatically analyzed After collapsed bridges have been identified, a transportation model of the regional highway system built in REDARS would be updated with the bridge damage status. Immediately after the earthquake, this transportation model will calculate the best detour routes for emergency personal and freight traffic the REDARS model will be an important tool used by emergency management and transportation officials to decide the order in which damaged bridges should be repaired, and to estimate total system recovery time The freight transportation network in Memphis consists of four major modes. Memphis International Airport is home of the FedEx fleet of aircraft, and handles more air freight than any other airport in the world West Memphis sits on the Mississippi and handles large of amounts of river barge cargo The railroads system in Memphis is one of the busiest of any major city And with the intersection of large cross country interstate highways like I-40, I-55, and I-69, Memphis area highways handle a large portion of the nations truck freight. A large earthquake on the New Madrid seismic zone could have disastrous effects on the regions freight transportation infrastructure the damage that could potentially happen could include liquefaction or lateral spreading induced failure of the runways and taxiways at Memphis International airport. The Port of Memphis on the Mississippi could experience a sheet-pile wall failure, or large settlement of the infill behind the retaining sheet-pile wall because of the generally high water table and the geologic conditions of the regions, liquefaction hazards could affect rail lines, or rail and highway bridge foundations or approach fills serious damage to bridges can be expected. Using images from before and after the earthquake, serious bridge damage could be automatically detected There are many different types of earthquake induced bridge damage. Collapse of the bridge would obviously result in a long term closure of the bridge | null | [Greg. And Shahram Pezeshk. And Charles Camp. All Ph.Ds of Civil Engineering. All are also part of the Heft College of Engineering at Memphis. “Remote Sensing for Post Disaster Management of Freight Transportation Networks” 2011. http://www.memphis.edu/ifti/pdfs/cifts_trasportation_project.pdf //GBS-JV]
In the event of a large magnitude earthquake on the New Madrid seismic zone, the freight transportation network in the Memphis, TN metropolitan area will be affected. In order to quickly and efficiently assess the status of the regions’ transportation system, remotely sensed data can be obtained and automatically analyzed to detect major bridge damage. After collapsed bridges have been identified, a transportation model of the regional highway system built in REDARS would be updated with the bridge damage status. Immediately after the earthquake, this transportation model will calculate the best detour routes for emergency personal and freight traffic. In the recovery phase, the REDARS model will be an important tool used by emergency management and transportation officials to decide the order in which damaged bridges should be repaired, and to estimate total system recovery time. The freight transportation network in Memphis consists of four major modes. Memphis International Airport is home of the FedEx fleet of aircraft, and handles more air freight than any other airport in the world. West of Memphis Metropolitan area sits on the Mississippi river and handles large of amounts of river barge cargo. The railroads system in Memphis is one of the busiest of any major city in the United States. And with the intersection of large cross country interstate highways like I-40, I-55, and the future I-69, Memphis area highways handle a large portion of the nations truck freight. A large earthquake on the New Madrid seismic zone, which comes within 50 miles of downtown Memphis, could potentially have disastrous effects on the regions freight transportation infrastructure. Some of the damage that could potentially happen could include liquefaction or lateral spreading induced failure of the runways and taxiways at Memphis International airport. The Port of Memphis on the Mississippi could experience a sheet-pile wall failure, or large settlement of the infill behind the retaining sheet-pile wall. Given the generally flat terrain of Mississippi embayment, there will not be a large landslide hazard. But because of the generally high water table and the geologic conditions of the regions, liquefaction hazards could affect rail lines, or rail and highway bridge foundations or approach fills. And with expected ground motions predicted by some models approaching 1g, serious damage to bridges can be expected. Using satellite or fixed-wing airplane optical images from before and after the earthquake, serious bridge damage could be automatically detected. There are many different types of earthquake induced bridge damage. A popular hazard loss estimation tool (HAZUS), separates bridge damage from earthquakes into five categories (FEMA 2002). Level 1 represents no damage. Level 2 includes minor cracking or spalling of abutment, column or deck requiring only cosmetic repair. Level 3 includes moderate cracking or spalling of concrete without causing structural instability, failure of minor bridge elements like shear keys and rocker bearings, and moderate abutment settlement. Level 4 represents shear failure of columns without collapse, significant connection deformation, and major abutment settlement. And level 5 includes all “collapsed” bridges which is defined by the collapse of any column, deck collapse, and foundation failure. Traffic most likely would not be greatly affected for level 2 damage, the bridge would open soon after inspection if it was closed at all, and repairs would only require lane closures. Level 3 damage would most likely result in the closing of the bridge or a severe reduction in traffic (multiple lane closures, no heavy traffic) for several weeks or months. For level 4 damage, the bridge would be closed and require several months of repairs, may require a complete replacement of the bridge. Collapse of the bridge would obviously result in a long term closure of the bridge. This information is summarized in Tables 1 and 2. | 4,306 | <h4><strong>TI investment solves a New Madrid Seismic Zone quake </h4><p>Taff et al ‘11</p><p></strong>[Greg. And Shahram Pezeshk. And Charles Camp. All Ph.Ds of Civil Engineering. All are also part of the Heft College of Engineering at Memphis. “Remote Sensing for Post Disaster Management of Freight Transportation Networks” 2011. http://www.memphis.edu/ifti/pdfs/cifts_trasportation_project.pdf //GBS-JV]</p><p><u>In the event of a large magnitude earthquake on the New Madrid seismic zone, the freight transportation network</u> in the Memphis, TN metropolitan area <u>will be affected. In order to quickly and efficiently assess the status of the regions’ transportation system, remotely sensed data can be obtained and automatically analyzed</u> to detect major bridge damage. <u>After collapsed bridges have been identified, a transportation model of the regional highway system built in REDARS would be updated with the bridge damage status. Immediately after the earthquake, this transportation model will calculate the best detour routes for emergency personal and freight traffic</u>. In the recovery phase, <u>the REDARS model will be an important tool used by emergency management and transportation officials to decide the order in which damaged bridges should be repaired, and to estimate total system recovery time</u>. <u>The freight transportation network in Memphis consists of four major modes. Memphis International Airport is home of the FedEx fleet of aircraft, and handles more air freight than any other airport in the world</u>. <u>West</u> of <u>Memphis</u> Metropolitan area <u>sits on the Mississippi</u> river <u>and handles large of amounts of river barge cargo</u>. <u>The railroads system in Memphis is one of the busiest of any major city</u> in the United States. <u>And with the intersection of large cross country interstate highways like I-40, I-55, and</u> the future <u>I-69, Memphis area highways handle a large portion of the nations truck freight. A large earthquake on the New Madrid seismic zone</u>, which comes within 50 miles of downtown Memphis, <u>could </u>potentially <u>have <strong>disastrous effects</strong> on the regions freight transportation infrastructure</u>. Some of <u>the damage that could potentially happen could include liquefaction or lateral spreading induced failure of the runways and taxiways at Memphis International airport. The Port of Memphis on the Mississippi could experience a sheet-pile wall failure, or large settlement of the infill behind the retaining sheet-pile wall</u>. Given the generally flat terrain of Mississippi embayment, there will not be a large landslide hazard. But <u>because of the generally high water table and the geologic conditions of the regions, liquefaction hazards could affect rail lines, or rail and highway bridge foundations or approach fills</u>. And with expected ground motions predicted by some models approaching 1g, <u><strong>serious damage to bridges can be expected</strong>. Using </u>satellite or fixed-wing airplane optical <u>images from before and after the earthquake, serious bridge damage could be <strong>automatically detected</u></strong>. <u>There are many different types of earthquake induced bridge damage.</u> A popular hazard loss estimation tool (HAZUS), separates bridge damage from earthquakes into five categories (FEMA 2002). Level 1 represents no damage. Level 2 includes minor cracking or spalling of abutment, column or deck requiring only cosmetic repair. Level 3 includes moderate cracking or spalling of concrete without causing structural instability, failure of minor bridge elements like shear keys and rocker bearings, and moderate abutment settlement. Level 4 represents shear failure of columns without collapse, significant connection deformation, and major abutment settlement. And level 5 includes all “collapsed” bridges which is defined by the collapse of any column, deck collapse, and foundation failure. Traffic most likely would not be greatly affected for level 2 damage, the bridge would open soon after inspection if it was closed at all, and repairs would only require lane closures. Level 3 damage would most likely result in the closing of the bridge or a severe reduction in traffic (multiple lane closures, no heavy traffic) for several weeks or months. For level 4 damage, the bridge would be closed and require several months of repairs, may require a complete replacement of the bridge. <u>Collapse of the bridge would obviously result in a long term closure of the bridge</u>. This information is summarized in Tables 1 and 2.</p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 2 | null | 1,560,480 | 3 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,197 | Limits – The aff’s interp doesn’t set a limit on the topic. They double the size of the topic by ignoring the different types of engagement. A limited topic is key to gain portable skills from debate | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Limits – The aff’s interp doesn’t set a limit on the topic. They double the size of the topic by ignoring the different types of engagement. A limited topic is key to gain portable skills from debate</h4> | null | null | Military T | 1,560,707 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,198 | Voting issue – to protect limits and ground. The number of solvency advocates defending a QPQ is narrow, and there are an infinite amount of things we could do towards china. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Voting issue – to protect limits and ground. The number of solvency advocates defending a QPQ is narrow, and there are an infinite amount of things we could do towards china. </h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | T | 1,560,708 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,199 | Trump---vows to end all climate coop with china AND more broadly kill global warming efforts | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Trump---vows to end all climate coop with china AND more broadly kill global warming efforts</h4> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 1,560,709 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,200 | It turns every single conceivable impact because a New Madrid earthquake would split America in half. It also causes Fukushima times 15 | Synder ‘15 | Synder ‘15 | North America almost divided along a very deep subsurface rift that rift system and the faults associated with it are known as the New Madrid fault zone last year the U.S. Geological Survey released a report that warned that the New Madrid fault zone has the “potential for larger and more powerful quakes than previously thought that the number of significant earthquakes in the middle part of the country has more than quintupled in recent years the U.S. government and large corporations are so concerned about the potential for a major New Madrid earthquake that they have held major exercises that simulate one there is an area of significant geological weakness under the New Madrid fault zone This area of weakness formed when the continents were breaking up faults responsible for the New Madrid Seismic Zone are embedded in a subsurface geological feature known as the Reelfoot Rift The resulting rift system failed to split the continent, but has remained as an a scar or zone of weakness deep underground its ancient faults appear to have made the Earth’s crust in the New Madrid area mechanically weaker than much of the rest of North America. would allow the relatively small east-west compressive forces associated with the continuing continental drift of the North American plate to reactivate old faults around New Madrid the stench of fire and brimstone hung in the air for months afterwards there is evidence of other superquakes in the distant past And now earthquake activity in the central portion of the nation is increasing again The number of earthquakes has increased dramatically over the past few years within the central and eastern United States what would happen if a major earthquake did strike the New Madrid fault zone thousands would die, hundreds of thousands of buildings would be damaged, and the economic losses would be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars there are 15 nuclear reactors along the New Madrid fault zone. In the event of a major New Madrid earthquake, we could be looking at Fukushima times 15. the federal government simulated an earthquake so massive, it killed 100,000 Midwesterners instantly, and forced more than 7 million people out of their homes A major quake happens there once every several generations Nobody knows when it is going to happen. But this is a real threat | null | [Michael. “The New Madrid Earthquake That Will Divide The United States In Half” 2/23/15 http://www.infowars.com/the-new-madrid-earthquake-that-will-divide-the-united-states-in-half/ //GBS-JV]
Once upon a time, North America almost divided along a very deep subsurface rift. Today, that rift system and the faults associated with it are known as the New Madrid fault zone. This fault zone is six times larger than the San Andreas fault zone in California and it covers portions of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi. Back in 1811 and 1812, four of the largest earthquakes in U.S. history struck that area of the country. The movement of the ground was so powerful that it changed the course of the Mississippi River and it rang church bells in Boston, Massachusetts. So could such an earthquake (or worse) strike today? Well, last year the U.S. Geological Survey released a report that warned that the New Madrid fault zone has the “potential for larger and more powerful quakes than previously thought“, and the USGS also admits that the number of significant earthquakes in the middle part of the country has more than quintupled in recent years. We also know that the U.S. government and large corporations are so concerned about the potential for a major New Madrid earthquake that they have held major exercises that simulate one. Scientists tell us that it is just a matter of time until another superquake hits the region, and personally I am one of the millions of Americans that believe that we will eventually see a New Madrid earthquake that will divide the United States in half. That is one of the reasons why I included a New Madrid earthquake in my novel. But others are skeptical. They point out that we have not seen a truly devastating earthquake in that region for more than 200 years. So why be concerned about one now? What everyone can agree on is that there is an area of significant geological weakness under the New Madrid fault zone. This area of weakness formed when the continents were breaking up. The rift that formed did not end up splitting the North American continent at that time, but the area of weakness remains. The following comes from Wikipedia… The faults responsible for the New Madrid Seismic Zone are embedded in a subsurface geological feature known as the Reelfoot Rift that formed during the breakup of thesupercontinent Rodinia in the Neoproterozoic Era (about 750 million years ago). The resulting rift system failed to split the continent, but has remained as an aulacogen (a scar or zone of weakness) deep underground, and its ancient faults appear to have made the Earth’s crust in the New Madrid area mechanically weaker than much of the rest of North America. This relative weakness is important, because it would allow the relatively small east-west compressive forces associated with the continuing continental drift of the North American plate to reactivate old faults around New Madrid, making the area unusually prone to earthquakes in spite of it being far from the nearest tectonic plate boundary. And indeed, there have been some awesome earthquakes in this region throughout history. Back in 1811 and 1812, there were four earthquakes along the New Madrid fault zone there were so immensely powerful that they are still talked about today. Those earthquakes opened deep fissures in the ground, caused the Mississippi River to run backwards, and were reportedly felt more than 1,000 miles away. It is said that the stench of fire and brimstone hung in the air for months afterwards. The most powerful of this series of quakes was on December 16th, 1811. The following is one description of what happened on that day… This powerful earthquake was felt widely over the entire eastern United States. People were awakened by the shaking in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Charleston, S.C. Perceptible ground shaking was in the range of one to three minutes depending upon the observer’s location. The ground motions were described as “most alarming and frightening” in places like Nashville, Tenn., and Louisville, Ky. Reports also describe houses and other structures being severely shaken, with many chimneys knocked down. In the epicentral area the ground surface was described as being in great convulsion, with sand and water ejected tens of feet into the air — a process called liquefaction. But there have also been others times throughout history when we have seen a major earthquake along the New Madrid fault. For example, according to scientists there is evidence of other superquakes in the distant past… Geological evidence indicates that two such super-earthquakes happened twice in the past 1,200 years: the first some time between 800 and 1000 A.D., and the second between 1300 and 1600 A.D. And now earthquake activity in the central portion of the nation is increasing again. As I noted above, the USGS says that the frequency of earthquakes in the central and eastern portions of the United States has more than quintupled in recent years. And the USGS has now gone so far as to point out the relationship between human activity and the increase in earthquakes. The following comes from an article done by the U.S. Geological Survey… The number of earthquakes has increased dramatically over the past few years within the central and eastern United States. Nearly 450 earthquakes magnitude 3.0 and larger occurred in the four years from 2010-2013, over 100 per year on average, compared with an average rate of 20 earthquakes per year observed from 1970-2000. This increase in earthquakes prompts two important questions: Are they natural, or man-made? And what should be done in the future as we address the causes and consequences of these events to reduce associated risks? USGS scientists have been analyzing the changes in the rate of earthquakes as well as the likely causes, and they have some answers. USGS scientists have found that at some locations the increase in seismicity coincides with the injection of wastewater in deep disposal wells. Much of this wastewater is a byproduct of oil and gas production and is routinely disposed of by injection into wells specifically designed for this purpose. So what would happen if a major earthquake did strike the New Madrid fault zone? This is something that scientists have studied. If a magnitude 7.7 earthquake hit the region today, thousands would die, hundreds of thousands of buildings would be damaged, and the economic losses would be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The following comes from Wikipedia… In October 2009, a team composed of University of Illinoisand Virginia Tech researchers headed by Amr S. Elnashai, funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), considered a scenario where all three segments of the New Madrid fault ruptured simultaneously with a total earthquake magnitude of 7.7. The report found that there would be significant damage in the eight states studied – Alabama,Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouriand Tennessee – with the probability of additional damage in states farther from the NMSZ. Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri would be most severely impacted, and the cities of Memphis, Tennessee and St. Louis, Missouri would be severely damaged. The report estimated 86,000 casualties, including 3,500 fatalities; 715,000 damaged buildings; and 7.2 million people displaced, with 2 million of those seeking shelter, primarily due to the lack of utility services. Direct economic losses, according to the report, would be at least $300 billion. But remember, that study only considered a magnitude 7.7 earthquake. If we had an earthquake of magnitude 8 or magnitude 9, we could be talking about an earthquake many, many times more powerful. It is also important to note that there are 15 nuclear reactors along the New Madrid fault zone. In the event of a major New Madrid earthquake, we could be looking at Fukushima times 15. Of course most Americans are completely oblivious to all of this. In fact, most Americans don’t even know what the New Madrid fault zone is or where it is located. But there are people in the government that are very aware of this threat. In fact, the federal government considered it important enough to hold a major five day simulation known as “National Level Exercise 11″ just a few years ago… In May, the federal government simulated an earthquake so massive, it killed 100,000 Midwesterners instantly, and forced more than 7 million people out of their homes. At the time, National Level Exercise 11 went largely unnoticed; the scenario seemed too far-fetched — states like Illinois and Missouri are in the middle of a tectonic plate, not at the edge of one. A major quake happens there once every several generations. … National Level Exercise 11, or NLE 11, was, in essence, a replay of a disaster that happened 200 years earlier. On Dec. 16, 1811, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake hit the New Madrid fault line, which lies on the border region of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi. It’s by far the largest earthquake ever to strike the United States east of the Rockies. Up to 129,000 square kilometers [50,000 square miles] were hit with “raised or sunken lands, fissures, sinks, sand blows, and large landslides,” according to the U.S. Geological Service. “Huge waves on the Mississippi River overwhelmed many boats and washed others high onto the shore. High banks caved and collapsed into the river; sand bars and points of islands gave way; whole islands disappeared.” People as far away as New York City were awakened by the shaking. More quakes, of a similar size, followed. But the loss of life was minimal: Not too many people lived in the area at the time. Today, there are more than 15 million people living in the quake zone. If a similar quake hit, “7.2 million people could be displaced, with 2 million seeking temporary shelter” in the first three days, FEMA Associate Adminsitrator William Carwile told a Congressional panel in 2010. “Direct economic losses for the eight states could total nearly $300 billion, while indirect losses at least twice that amount.” And major corporations are also concerned about what could happen. For example, in a previous article I noted that Wal-Mart had “participated in an exercise” that simulated a major earthquake in the New Madrid fault zone… Buried in a Wall Street Journal article from about a week ago was a startling piece of information. According to a Wal-Mart executive, Wal-Mart “participated in an exercise to prepare for an earthquake on the New Madrid fault line” earlier this summer. Nobody knows when it is going to happen. But this is a real threat. | 10,764 | <h4><strong>It turns every single conceivable impact because a New Madrid earthquake would split America in half. It also causes Fukushima times 15</h4><p>Synder ‘15</p><p></strong>[Michael. “The New Madrid Earthquake That Will Divide The United States In Half” 2/23/15 http://www.infowars.com/the-new-madrid-earthquake-that-will-divide-the-united-states-in-half/ //GBS-JV]</p><p>Once upon a time, <u>North America</u> <u><strong>almost</u></strong> <u>divided along a very deep subsurface rift</u>. Today, <u>that rift system and the faults associated with it are known as <strong>the New Madrid fault</strong> zone</u>. This fault zone is six times larger than the San Andreas fault zone in California and it covers portions of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi. Back in 1811 and 1812, four of the largest earthquakes in U.S. history struck that area of the country. The movement of the ground was so powerful that it changed the course of the Mississippi River and it rang church bells in Boston, Massachusetts. So could such an earthquake (or worse) strike today? Well, <u>last year the U.S. Geological Survey released a report that warned that the New Madrid fault zone has the “potential for larger and more powerful quakes than previously thought</u>“, and the USGS also admits <u>that the number of significant earthquakes in the middle part of the country has more than quintupled in recent years</u>. We also know that <u>the U.S. government and large corporations are so concerned about the potential for a major New Madrid earthquake that they have held major exercises that simulate one</u>. Scientists tell us that it is just a matter of time until another superquake hits the region, and personally I am one of the millions of Americans that believe that we will eventually see a New Madrid earthquake that will divide the United States in half. That is one of the reasons why I included a New Madrid earthquake in my novel. But others are skeptical. They point out that we have not seen a truly devastating earthquake in that region for more than 200 years. So why be concerned about one now? What everyone can agree on is that <u><strong>there is an area of significant geological weakness under the New Madrid fault zone</u></strong>. <u>This area of weakness formed when the continents were breaking up</u>. The rift that formed did not end up splitting the North American continent at that time, but the area of weakness remains. The following comes from Wikipedia… The <u>faults responsible for the New Madrid Seismic Zone are embedded in a subsurface geological feature known as the Reelfoot Rift</u> that formed during the breakup of thesupercontinent Rodinia in the Neoproterozoic Era (about 750 million years ago). <u>The resulting rift system failed to split the continent, but has remained as an </u>aulacogen (<u>a scar or</u> <u><strong>zone of weakness</u></strong>) <u><strong>deep underground</u></strong>, and <u>its ancient faults appear to have made the Earth’s crust in the New Madrid area mechanically <strong>weaker</strong> than much of the rest of North America. </u>This relative weakness is important, because it <u>would allow the relatively small east-west compressive forces associated with the continuing continental drift of the North American plate to reactivate old faults around New Madrid</u>, making the area unusually prone to earthquakes in spite of it being far from the nearest tectonic plate boundary. And indeed, there have been some awesome earthquakes in this region throughout history. Back in 1811 and 1812, there were four earthquakes along the New Madrid fault zone there were so immensely powerful that they are still talked about today. Those earthquakes opened deep fissures in the ground, caused the Mississippi River to run backwards, and were reportedly felt more than 1,000 miles away. It is said that <u><strong>the stench of fire and brimstone hung in the air for months afterwards</u></strong>. The most powerful of this series of quakes was on December 16th, 1811. The following is one description of what happened on that day… This powerful earthquake was felt widely over the entire eastern United States. People were awakened by the shaking in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Charleston, S.C. Perceptible ground shaking was in the range of one to three minutes depending upon the observer’s location. The ground motions were described as “most alarming and frightening” in places like Nashville, Tenn., and Louisville, Ky. Reports also describe houses and other structures being severely shaken, with many chimneys knocked down. In the epicentral area the ground surface was described as being in great convulsion, with sand and water ejected tens of feet into the air — a process called liquefaction. But there have also been others times throughout history when we have seen a major earthquake along the New Madrid fault. For example, according to scientists <u>there is evidence of other superquakes in the distant past</u>… Geological evidence indicates that two such super-earthquakes happened twice in the past 1,200 years: the first some time between 800 and 1000 A.D., and the second between 1300 and 1600 A.D. <u><strong>And now earthquake activity in the central portion of the nation is increasing again</u></strong>. As I noted above, the USGS says that the frequency of earthquakes in the central and eastern portions of the United States has more than quintupled in recent years. And the USGS has now gone so far as to point out the relationship between human activity and the increase in earthquakes. The following comes from an article done by the U.S. Geological Survey… <u>The number of earthquakes has increased dramatically over the past few years within the central and eastern United States</u>. Nearly 450 earthquakes magnitude 3.0 and larger occurred in the four years from 2010-2013, over 100 per year on average, compared with an average rate of 20 earthquakes per year observed from 1970-2000. This increase in earthquakes prompts two important questions: Are they natural, or man-made? And what should be done in the future as we address the causes and consequences of these events to reduce associated risks? USGS scientists have been analyzing the changes in the rate of earthquakes as well as the likely causes, and they have some answers. USGS scientists have found that at some locations the increase in seismicity coincides with the injection of wastewater in deep disposal wells. Much of this wastewater is a byproduct of oil and gas production and is routinely disposed of by injection into wells specifically designed for this purpose. So <u>what would happen if a major earthquake did strike the New Madrid fault zone</u>? This is something that scientists have studied. If a magnitude 7.7 earthquake hit the region today, <u><strong>thousands would die, hundreds of thousands of buildings would be damaged, and the economic losses would be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars</u></strong>. The following comes from Wikipedia… In October 2009, a team composed of University of Illinoisand Virginia Tech researchers headed by Amr S. Elnashai, funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), considered a scenario where all three segments of the New Madrid fault ruptured simultaneously with a total earthquake magnitude of 7.7. The report found that there would be significant damage in the eight states studied – Alabama,Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouriand Tennessee – with the probability of additional damage in states farther from the NMSZ. Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri would be most severely impacted, and the cities of Memphis, Tennessee and St. Louis, Missouri would be severely damaged. The report estimated 86,000 casualties, including 3,500 fatalities; 715,000 damaged buildings; and 7.2 million people displaced, with 2 million of those seeking shelter, primarily due to the lack of utility services. Direct economic losses, according to the report, would be at least $300 billion. But remember, that study only considered a magnitude 7.7 earthquake. If we had an earthquake of magnitude 8 or magnitude 9, we could be talking about an earthquake many, many times more powerful. It is also important to note that <u>there are 15 nuclear reactors along the New Madrid fault zone. In the event of a major New Madrid earthquake, <strong>we could be looking at Fukushima times 15</strong>. </u>Of course most Americans are completely oblivious to all of this. In fact, most Americans don’t even know what the New Madrid fault zone is or where it is located. But there are people in the government that are very aware of this threat. In fact, the federal government considered it important enough to hold a major five day simulation known as “National Level Exercise 11″ just a few years ago… In May, <u>the federal government simulated an earthquake so massive, it killed 100,000 Midwesterners instantly, and forced more than 7 million people out of their homes</u>. At the time, National Level Exercise 11 went largely unnoticed; the scenario seemed too far-fetched — states like Illinois and Missouri are in the middle of a tectonic plate, not at the edge of one. <u><strong>A major quake happens there once every several generations</u></strong>. … National Level Exercise 11, or NLE 11, was, in essence, a replay of a disaster that happened 200 years earlier. On Dec. 16, 1811, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake hit the New Madrid fault line, which lies on the border region of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi. It’s by far the largest earthquake ever to strike the United States east of the Rockies. Up to 129,000 square kilometers [50,000 square miles] were hit with “raised or sunken lands, fissures, sinks, sand blows, and large landslides,” according to the U.S. Geological Service. “Huge waves on the Mississippi River overwhelmed many boats and washed others high onto the shore. High banks caved and collapsed into the river; sand bars and points of islands gave way; whole islands disappeared.” People as far away as New York City were awakened by the shaking. More quakes, of a similar size, followed. But the loss of life was minimal: Not too many people lived in the area at the time. Today, there are more than 15 million people living in the quake zone. If a similar quake hit, “7.2 million people could be displaced, with 2 million seeking temporary shelter” in the first three days, FEMA Associate Adminsitrator William Carwile told a Congressional panel in 2010. “Direct economic losses for the eight states could total nearly $300 billion, while indirect losses at least twice that amount.” And major corporations are also concerned about what could happen. For example, in a previous article I noted that Wal-Mart had “participated in an exercise” that simulated a major earthquake in the New Madrid fault zone… Buried in a Wall Street Journal article from about a week ago was a startling piece of information. According to a Wal-Mart executive, Wal-Mart “participated in an exercise to prepare for an earthquake on the New Madrid fault line” earlier this summer. <u><strong>Nobody knows when it is going to happen. But this is a real threat</u></strong>.</p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 2 | null | 1,560,483 | 3 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,201 | They build off of past engagement which is a voting issue | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They build off of past engagement which is a voting issue</h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | Inherency | 1,560,710 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,202 | Topic Education – excluding military engagement is key to focus the topic around diplomatic/economic cooperation. An unlimited topic spreads out research and the content of debates, leading to shallow education. An in depth analysis of cooperation is necessary | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Topic Education – excluding military engagement is key to focus the topic around diplomatic/economic cooperation. An unlimited topic spreads out research and the content of debates, leading to shallow education. An in depth analysis of cooperation is necessary</h4> | null | null | Military T | 1,560,711 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,203 | Meltdowns cause extinction | Stein, 12 | Stein, 12 - Matthew Stein is a design engineer, green builder and author of "When Disaster Strikes: A Comprehensive Guide to Emergency Planning and Crisis Survival" and "When Technology Fails: A Manual for Self-Reliance, Sustainability, and Surviving the Long Emergency," both published by Chelsea Green (“Why a Likely Natural Event Could Cause Nuclear Reactors to Melt Down and Our Grid to Crash”, AlterNet January 20, 2012 | There are nearly 450 nuclear reactors in the world, with hundreds more under construction Imagine the havoc it would wreak on our civilization and the planet's ecosystems if we were to suddenly experience not just one or two nuclear meltdowns, but many more Consider the millions of innocent victims who have already died or continue to suffer from horrific radiation-related health problems resulting from the Chernobyl reactor explosions Earth has been struck by roughly 100 solar storms causing significant geomagnetic disturbances If an extreme GMD of such magnitude were to occur today, it could initiate a chain of events leading to catastrophic failures our world's nuclear reactors, similar to Chernobyl and Fukushima, but multiplied many times The good news is that relatively affordable equipment and processes could be installed to protect critical components in the electric power grid and its nuclear reactors, thereby averting this "end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it" scenario the grid" -- upon which every facet of our modern life is utterly dependent, in its current form is extremely vulnerable to severe geomagnetic storms We depend on this grid to maintain food production and distribution, telecommunications, Internet services, medical services, military defense, transportation, government, water treatment, sewage and garbage removal, refrigeration, oil refining and gas pumping, and to conduct all forms of commerce. the world's nuclear power plants are critically dependent upon maintaining connection to a functioning electrical grid, for all but relatively short periods of electrical blackouts, in order to keep their reactor cores continuously cooled so as to avoid catastrophic reactor core meltdowns fter a few days without electricity to run the cooling system pumps, the water bath covering the spent fuel rods stored in spent fuel ponds will boil away, allowing the stored fuel rods to melt down and burn To do nothing is to behave like ostriches with our heads in the sand as our world inexorably drifts towards the next naturally recurring, 100 percent inevitable, super solar storm and resultant extreme GMD | null | http://www.alternet.org/story/153833/why_a_likely_natural_event_could_cause_nuclear_reactors_to_melt_down_and_our_grid_to_crash
There are nearly 450 nuclear reactors in the world, with hundreds more either under construction or in the planning stages. There are 104 of these reactors in the USA and 195 in Europe. Imagine the havoc it would wreak on our civilization and the planet's ecosystems if we were to suddenly experience not just one or two nuclear meltdowns, but many more of them. How likely is it that our world might experience an event that could ultimately cause multiple reactors to fail and melt down at approximately the same time? Unless we take significant protective measures, this apocalyptic scenario is possible. Consider the ongoing problems caused by three reactor core meltdowns, explosions and breached containment vessels at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi facility, and the subsequent health and environmental issues. Consider the millions of innocent victims who have already died or continue to suffer from horrific radiation-related health problems ("Chernobyl AIDS," epidemic cancers, chronic fatigue, etc.) resulting from the Chernobyl reactor explosions, fires and fallout. If just two serious nuclear disasters, spaced 25 years apart, could cause such horrendous environmental catastrophes, it is hard to imagine how we could ever hope to recover from hundreds of similar nuclear incidents occurring simultaneously across the planet. Since more than one third of all Americans live within 50 miles of a nuclear power plant, this is a serious issue that should be given top priority. In the past 152 years, the Earth has been struck by roughly 100 solar storms causing significant geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), two of which were powerful enough to rank as "extreme GMDs." If an extreme GMD of such magnitude were to occur today, it could initiate a chain of events leading to catastrophic failures our world's nuclear reactors, quite similar to the disasters at both Chernobyl and Fukushima, but multiplied many times. When massive solar flares launch a huge mass of highly charged plasma (a coronal mass ejection, or CME) directly toward Earth, colliding with our planet's outer atmosphere and magnetosphere, the result is a significant geomagnetic disturbance. Since an extreme GMD last occurred in May of 1921, long before the advent of modern electronics, widespread electric power grids and nuclear power plants, we are for the most part blissfully unaware of this threat and totally unprepared for its consequences. The good news is that relatively affordable equipment and processes could be installed to protect critical components in the electric power grid and its nuclear reactors, thereby averting this "end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it" scenario. The bad news is that even though panels of scientists and engineers have studied the problem, and the bipartisan congressional EMP commission has presented a list of specific recommendations to Congress, our leaders have yet to approve and implement a single significant preventative measure. Most of us believe something like this could never happen. If it could, certainly our "authorities" would do everything in their power to prevent such an apocalypse from ever taking place. Unfortunately, the opposite is true. Nuclear Power Plants and the Electric Power Grid Our global system of electrical power generation and distribution -- "the grid" -- upon which every facet of our modern life is utterly dependent, in its current form is extremely vulnerable to severe geomagnetic storms of a magnitude that tends to strike our planet on an average of approximately once every 70 to 100 years. We depend on this grid to maintain food production and distribution, telecommunications, Internet services, medical services, military defense, transportation, government, water treatment, sewage and garbage removal, refrigeration, oil refining and gas pumping, and to conduct all forms of commerce. Unfortunately, the world's nuclear power plants are critically dependent upon maintaining connection to a functioning electrical grid, for all but relatively short periods of electrical blackouts, in order to keep their reactor cores continuously cooled so as to avoid catastrophic reactor core meltdowns and spent fuel rod storage pond fires. If an extreme GMD were to cause widespread grid collapse (which it most certainly will), in as little as one or two hours after each nuclear reactor facility's backup generators either fail to start, or run out of fuel, the reactor cores will start to melt down. After a few days without electricity to run the cooling system pumps, the water bath covering the spent fuel rods stored in spent fuel ponds will boil away, allowing the stored fuel rods to melt down and burn. Since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently mandates that only one week's supply of backup generator fuel needs to be stored at each reactor site, it is likely that after we witness the spectacular celestial light show from the next extreme GMD we will have about one week in which to prepare ourselves for potential disaster. To do nothing is to behave like ostriches with our heads in the sand, blindly believing that "everything will be okay," as our world inexorably drifts towards the next naturally recurring, 100 percent inevitable, super solar storm and resultant extreme GMD. | 5,391 | <h4>Meltdowns cause extinction</h4><p><strong>Stein, 12 </strong>- Matthew Stein is a design engineer, green builder and author of "When Disaster Strikes: A Comprehensive Guide to Emergency Planning and Crisis Survival" and "When Technology Fails: A Manual for Self-Reliance, Sustainability, and Surviving the Long Emergency," both published by Chelsea Green (“Why a Likely Natural Event Could Cause Nuclear Reactors to Melt Down and Our Grid to Crash”, AlterNet January 20, 2012</p><p>http://www.alternet.org/story/153833/why_a_likely_natural_event_could_cause_nuclear_reactors_to_melt_down_and_our_grid_to_crash</p><p> <u><strong>There are nearly 450 nuclear reactors in the world, with hundreds more</u></strong> either <u><strong>under construction</u></strong> or in the planning stages. There are 104 of these reactors in the USA and 195 in Europe. <u><strong>Imagine the havoc it would wreak on our civilization and the planet's ecosystems if we were to suddenly experience not just one or two nuclear meltdowns, but many more</u></strong> of them. How likely is it that our world might experience an event that could ultimately cause multiple reactors to fail and melt down at approximately the same time? Unless we take significant protective measures, this apocalyptic scenario is possible. Consider the ongoing problems caused by three reactor core meltdowns, explosions and breached containment vessels at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi facility, and the subsequent health and environmental issues. <u><strong>Consider the millions of innocent victims who have already died or continue to suffer from horrific radiation-related health problems</u></strong> ("Chernobyl AIDS," epidemic cancers, chronic fatigue, etc.) <u><strong>resulting from the Chernobyl reactor explosions</u></strong>, fires and fallout. If just two serious nuclear disasters, spaced 25 years apart, could cause such horrendous environmental catastrophes, it is hard to imagine how we could ever hope to recover from hundreds of similar nuclear incidents occurring simultaneously across the planet. Since more than one third of all Americans live within 50 miles of a nuclear power plant, this is a serious issue that should be given top priority. In the past 152 years, the <u><strong>Earth has been struck by roughly 100 solar storms causing significant geomagnetic disturbances</u></strong> (GMD), two of which were powerful enough to rank as "extreme GMDs." <u><strong>If an extreme GMD of such magnitude were to occur today, it could initiate a chain of events leading to catastrophic failures our world's nuclear reactors,</u></strong> quite <u><strong>similar to</u></strong> the disasters at both <u><strong>Chernobyl and Fukushima, but multiplied many times</u></strong>. When massive solar flares launch a huge mass of highly charged plasma (a coronal mass ejection, or CME) directly toward Earth, colliding with our planet's outer atmosphere and magnetosphere, the result is a significant geomagnetic disturbance. Since an extreme GMD last occurred in May of 1921, long before the advent of modern electronics, widespread electric power grids and nuclear power plants, we are for the most part blissfully unaware of this threat and totally unprepared for its consequences. <u><strong>The good news is that relatively affordable equipment and processes could be installed to protect critical components in the electric power grid and its nuclear reactors, thereby averting this "end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it" scenario</u></strong>. The bad news is that even though panels of scientists and engineers have studied the problem, and the bipartisan congressional EMP commission has presented a list of specific recommendations to Congress, our leaders have yet to approve and implement a single significant preventative measure. Most of us believe something like this could never happen. If it could, certainly our "authorities" would do everything in their power to prevent such an apocalypse from ever taking place. Unfortunately, the opposite is true. Nuclear Power Plants and the Electric Power Grid Our global system of electrical power generation and distribution -- "<u><strong>the grid" -- upon which every facet of our modern life is utterly dependent, in its current form is extremely vulnerable to severe geomagnetic storms</u></strong> of a magnitude that tends to strike our planet on an average of approximately once every 70 to 100 years. <u><strong>We depend on this grid to maintain food production and distribution, telecommunications, Internet services, medical services, military defense, transportation, government, water treatment, sewage and garbage removal, refrigeration, oil refining and gas pumping, and to conduct all forms of commerce. </u></strong>Unfortunately, <u><strong>the world's nuclear power plants are critically dependent upon maintaining connection to a functioning electrical grid, for all but relatively short periods of electrical blackouts, in order to keep their reactor cores continuously cooled so as to avoid catastrophic reactor core meltdowns</u></strong> and spent fuel rod storage pond fires. If an extreme GMD were to cause widespread grid collapse (which it most certainly will), in as little as one or two hours after each nuclear reactor facility's backup generators either fail to start, or run out of fuel, the reactor cores will start to melt down. A<u><strong>fter a few days without electricity to run the cooling system pumps, the water bath covering the spent fuel rods stored in spent fuel ponds will boil away, allowing the stored fuel rods to melt down and burn</u></strong>. Since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently mandates that only one week's supply of backup generator fuel needs to be stored at each reactor site, it is likely that after we witness the spectacular celestial light show from the next extreme GMD we will have about one week in which to prepare ourselves for potential disaster. <u><strong>To do nothing is to behave like ostriches with our heads in the sand</u></strong>, blindly believing that "everything will be okay," <u><strong>as our world inexorably drifts towards the next naturally recurring, 100 percent inevitable, super solar storm and resultant extreme GMD</u></strong>. </p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 2 | null | 44,791 | 8 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,204 | Catastrophic warming inevitable even if all emissions are cut | Chavez 13 | Anthony Chavez 13, Associate Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University, “A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The Geoengineering Branch”, Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 5.1, 9/1/13, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=jece | Even if we eliminate the anthropogenic sources of global warming immediately and completely, the global temperature will continue to rise for decades before it stabilize CO2 remains in the atmosphere for centuries the Earth’s oceans absorb heat and radiate it gradually, for hundreds of years natural processes cannot remove all such CO2 because of the thermal inertia of the Earth’s oceans, the global temperature will continue to rise, even if carbon emissions were to cease were society to stop emitting all carbon today, the planet’s temperature would not stabilize the temperature would continue to increase for a few decades the rate of warming will increase due to carbon-cycle feedback cycles that accelerate warming feedbacks will more than double the direct effect of increasing CO2 levels without feedbacks feedbacks are accelerating the rate at which the Arctic ice cap melts Additional feedbacks will accelerate the rate at which the atmosphere warms Such feedbacks include water vapor the weakening of carbon sinks and the impairment of terrestrial hydrology mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent significant climate change international agreements to reduce emissions have had limited success implementation of alternative energy technologies is unlikely to take effect soon enough international agreements have set goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions emissions have continued their upward trajectory collective emissions had dropped only 1.4% below their 1990 emissions emissions from the non-industrialized countries had increased by 100.6% over 1990 levels, structural aspects of the energy industry, will require decades to convert a significant portion of the industry to clean technologies the energy industry requires several decades to adopt and implement new technologies average, energy technologies have required thirty years to advance from being technically available to reaching materiality massive amounts of capital must be invested to alter significantly the mix of energy sources amounts that dwarf the scale of the industry conversion to renewable energy systems will often require other developments, such as land acquisitions, different transmission methods, enabling technologies, market systems, and other changes, which may not yet be foreseeable current emissions targets are not stringent enough. Despite mitigation efforts atmospheric CO2 concentrations have risen steadily Since 2002, annual CO2 concentrations have increased on average by 2 ppm per year Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, thus necessitating much sharper cuts to attain the same level.99 stabilization at 450 ppm appears to be “virtually impossible even if aggressive mitigation were to begin today. two degrees Celsius would be too high the current level of CO2 is already too high to maintain current planetary conditions 2° C warming may cause significant sea-level rises, storms, floods, droughts, and heat waves | Even if we eliminate anthropogenic sources of global warming immediately and completely temperature will rise for decades CO2 remains in the atmosphere for centuries Earth’s oceans radiate it gradually cannot remove all CO2 thermal inertia of Earth’s oceans the rate of warming will increase due to feedback cycles feedbacks will more than double the effect feedbacks are accelerating mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent significant climate change agreements to reduce emissions have had limited success, emissions from non-industrialized countries had increased 100.6% structural aspects of the energy industry will require decades to convert current emissions targets are not stringent enough stabilization at 450 ppm appears virtually impossible even if aggressive mitigation were to begin today. the current level of CO2 is already too high to maintain current conditions 2° warming significant | [Graphs omitted]
Even if we eliminate the anthropogenic sources27 of global warming immediately and completely, the global temperature will continue to rise for decades before it stabilizes.28 Several factors will cause this continued rise.29 First, carbon dioxide (CO2), which remains in the atmosphere for centuries, will continue to trap heat.30 Second, the thermal inertia of the Earth’s oceans means that they absorb heat and radiate it gradually, for hundreds of years.31 Second, feedbacks increase the rate of global warming.¶ First, although natural processes, such as photosynthesis and absorption by ocean waters, remove some of the anthropogenic CO2 that is released into the atmosphere, these processes cannot remove all such CO2, meaning that CO2 will continue to accumulate in the atmosphere.33 Moreover, natural processes become less successful at removing CO2 as emissions increase,34 and climate change itself suppresses carbon absorption by both land and ocean processes.¶ Second, because of the thermal inertia of the Earth’s oceans, the global temperature will continue to rise, even if carbon emissions were to cease.36 Thus, the warming currently experienced is only about sixty percent of the warming that would be expected at the atmosphere’s current level of CO2 concentration.37 For this reason, were society to stop emitting all carbon today, the planet’s temperature would not immediately return to pre-industrial levels or even stabilize.38 Actually, the temperature would continue to increase for a few decades,39 and only then remain at that new level for at least one thousand years.¶ Third, not only will global warming continue for several decades, but the rate of warming will increase due to carbon-cycle feedback cycles that accelerate warming.41 Indeed, models suggest that feedbacks will more than double the direct effect of increasing CO2 levels without feedbacks.42 For example, feedbacks are accelerating the rate at which the Arctic ice cap melts.43 As the global temperature has warmed, less snow has fallen on the Arctic ice cap.44 Because snow reflects approximately eighty-five percent of the sunlight that it receives,45 snow acts as sunscreen for ice. The decline in snowfall has exposed ice to sunlight, which increases melting.46 As the melting increases, the planetary surface albedo47 decreases, thus prompting greater melting.48 Ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar radiation than does sea ice, thereby increasing temperatures.¶ Additional feedbacks will accelerate the rate at which the atmosphere warms.51 Such feedbacks include, among others, the increase of water vapor,52 the weakening of carbon sinks,53 and the impairment of terrestrial hydrology and its impact on vegetation.54¶ C. Mitigation Alone Is Unlikely to Avert Significant Climate Change¶ For several reasons, mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent significant climate change. First, international agreements to reduce emissions have had limited success, and are unlikely to be successful in the future.55 Second, implementation of alternative energy technologies is unlikely to take effect soon enough to avert significant temperature increases.56 Finally, scientists now believe that initial targets for acceptable warming were too lenient, necessitating a stronger response to climate change than previously anticipated.57 ¶ To avoid catastrophic climate change, international agreements have set goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.58 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)59 set an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to address climate change.60 In 1997, the parties to the UNFCCC developed the Kyoto Protocol,61 which committed industrialized nations to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2012.62 These countries committed themselves to collective reductions averaging more than five percent from 1990 emissions levels.63 Unfortunately, emissions have continued their upward trajectory.64 As of 2007, their collective emissions had dropped only 1.4% below their 1990 emissions.65 At the same time, emissions from the non-industrialized countries had increased by 100.6% over 1990 levels, so that combined global emissions had increased by 34.7% since 1990.66 As discussed below in Part IV, similar efforts are likely to be unsuccessful in the future.¶ Second, even if nations decide to reduce CO2 emissions, structural aspects of the energy industry, which generates one-quarter of global greenhouse gases,67 will require decades to convert a significant portion of the industry to clean technologies.68 Although society adopts certain technologies with lightning rapidity,69 conversion to new energy technologies occurs much more slowly.70 Indeed, two “laws” of energy technology development dictate that the energy industry requires several decades to adopt and implement new technologies.71 On average, energy technologies have required thirty years to advance from being technically available to reaching materiality.72 This pattern was consistent across all technologies, including nuclear power, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar photovoltaic.¶ Figure 274 below illustrates that several energy technologies grew during the last century in accordance with these “laws”: ¶ Adoption of new technologies in the energy field requires significant time because of several inherent characteristics of the power industry. First, historical patterns show that the industry needs almost a full decade to build and test new technologies: three years to build a demonstration plant, one year to commence operations, and two to five years to identify problems and reach satisfactory operability.75 Second, massive amounts of capital must be invested to alter significantly the mix of energy sources,76 amounts that dwarf the scale of the industry.77 Third, once a technology reaches materiality, growth rates flatten (see Figure 3).78 This growth trend results in part from the nature of energy infrastructure. Power plants have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, though some have operational lives of up to 100 years.79 Consequently, only two to four percent of existing sources require replacement in a given year.80 Besides replacing power plants, conversion to renewable energy systems will often require other developments, such as land acquisitions, different transmission methods, enabling technologies, market systems, and other changes, which may not yet be foreseeable.¶ Royal Dutch Shell projected that renewable sources of energy could reach materiality by 2030, sooner than others have forecast.82 Royal Dutch Shell further projected that by 2050 total energy demand would be one-third lower than a business-as-usual scenario.83 Even if these projections are correct, CO2 concentrations would not stabilize until they reached 550 ppm.84¶ Not only are we unlikely to meet current emissions targets, but scientists now believe that even these targets are not stringent enough.85 Despite mitigation efforts during the past three decades, atmospheric CO2 concentrations have risen steadily.86 Figure 387 presents the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1980¶ During this period, atmospheric CO2 increased from 338.7 ppm to 393.8 ppm, a rise of 16.3%.88 Atmospheric CO2 increased every year.89 Furthermore, the annual increase in CO2 is actually rising.90 Since 2002, annual CO2 concentrations have increased on average by 2 ppm per year.91 Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult to achieve,92 they may also be too lenient.93 The following example illustrates the obstacles that prevent abatement of atmospheric levels of CO2. At the 2010 UN Climate Change Summit in Cancun, the delegates agreed to limit warming to a global mean temperature increase of two degrees Celsius,94 which requires an atmospheric content of 450 ppm of CO2. 95 To achieve this target, global emissions immediately need to begin declining by more than one percent per year,96 in contrast to the annual global increase.97 Small delays in emissions cuts, moreover, necessitate much larger reductions in future emissions.98 Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, thus necessitating much sharper cuts to attain the same level.99 For this reason, stabilization at 450 ppm appears to be “virtually impossible even if aggressive mitigation were to begin today.”¶ Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult to achieve,101 these targets may also be too lenient.102 Scientists have set a rise of two degrees Celsius as a target to avert catastrophic consequences. Recent analyses, however, suggest that this rise would be too high.104 Comparison to prehistoric records indicate that the current level of CO2 (approximately 394 ppm) is already too high to maintain current planetary conditions.105 Indeed, current analyses suggest that 2° C warming may cause significant sea-level rises, storms, floods, droughts, and heat waves.106 Maintaining climate conditions comparable to those of the Holocene Era, during which civilization developed, requires reducing the atmospheric CO2 level to 350 ppm.10 | 9,175 | <h4>Catastrophic warming inevitable even if all emissions are cut</h4><p>Anthony<strong> Chavez 13</strong>, Associate Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University, “A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The Geoengineering Branch”, Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 5.1, 9/1/13, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=jece</p><p>[Graphs omitted]</p><p><u><strong><mark>Even if we eliminate</mark> the <mark>anthropogenic sources</u></strong></mark>27 <u><strong><mark>of global warming immediately and completely</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>the global <mark>temperature will</mark> continue to <mark>rise for decades</mark> before it stabilize</u></strong>s.28 Several factors will cause this continued rise.29 First, carbon dioxide (<u><strong><mark>CO2</u></strong></mark>), which <u><strong><mark>remains in the atmosphere for centuries</u></strong></mark>, will continue to trap heat.30 Second, the thermal inertia of <u><strong>the <mark>Earth’s oceans</u></strong></mark> means that they <u><strong>absorb heat and <mark>radiate it gradually</mark>, for hundreds of years</u></strong>.31 Second, feedbacks increase the rate of global warming.¶ First, although <u><strong>natural processes</u></strong>, such as photosynthesis and absorption by ocean waters, remove some of the anthropogenic CO2 that is released into the atmosphere, these processes <u><strong><mark>cannot remove all</mark> such <mark>CO2</u></strong></mark>, meaning that CO2 will continue to accumulate in the atmosphere.33 Moreover, natural processes become less successful at removing CO2 as emissions increase,34 and climate change itself suppresses carbon absorption by both land and ocean processes.¶ Second, <u><strong>because of the <mark>thermal inertia of </mark>the <mark>Earth’s oceans</mark>, the global temperature will continue to rise, even if carbon emissions were to cease</u></strong>.36 Thus, the warming currently experienced is only about sixty percent of the warming that would be expected at the atmosphere’s current level of CO2 concentration.37 For this reason, <u><strong>were society to stop emitting all carbon today, the planet’s temperature would not</u></strong> immediately return to pre-industrial levels or even <u><strong>stabilize</u></strong>.38 Actually, <u><strong>the temperature would continue to increase for a few decades</u></strong>,39 and only then remain at that new level for at least one thousand years.¶ Third, not only will global warming continue for several decades, but <u><strong><mark>the rate of</mark> <mark>warming will increase due to</mark> carbon-cycle <mark>feedback cycles</mark> that accelerate warming</u></strong>.41 Indeed, models suggest that <u><strong><mark>feedbacks will more than double the</mark> direct <mark>effect</mark> of increasing CO2 levels without feedbacks</u></strong>.42 For example, <u><strong><mark>feedbacks are accelerating</mark> the rate at which the Arctic ice cap melts</u></strong>.43 As the global temperature has warmed, less snow has fallen on the Arctic ice cap.44 Because snow reflects approximately eighty-five percent of the sunlight that it receives,45 snow acts as sunscreen for ice. The decline in snowfall has exposed ice to sunlight, which increases melting.46 As the melting increases, the planetary surface albedo47 decreases, thus prompting greater melting.48 Ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar radiation than does sea ice, thereby increasing temperatures.¶ <u><strong>Additional feedbacks will accelerate the rate at which the atmosphere warms</u></strong>.51 <u><strong>Such feedbacks include</u></strong>, among others, the increase of <u><strong>water vapor</u></strong>,52 <u><strong>the weakening of carbon sinks</u></strong>,53 <u><strong>and the impairment of terrestrial hydrology</u></strong> and its impact on vegetation.54¶ C. Mitigation Alone Is Unlikely to Avert Significant Climate Change¶ For several reasons, <u><strong><mark>mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent significant climate change</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong>international <mark>agreements to reduce emissions have had limited success</u></strong>,</mark> and are unlikely to be successful in the future.55 Second, <u><strong>implementation of alternative energy technologies is unlikely to take effect soon enough</u></strong> to avert significant temperature increases.56 Finally, scientists now believe that initial targets for acceptable warming were too lenient, necessitating a stronger response to climate change than previously anticipated.57 ¶ To avoid catastrophic climate change, <u><strong>international agreements have set goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions</u></strong>.58 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)59 set an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to address climate change.60 In 1997, the parties to the UNFCCC developed the Kyoto Protocol,61 which committed industrialized nations to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2012.62 These countries committed themselves to collective reductions averaging more than five percent from 1990 emissions levels.63 Unfortunately, <u><strong>emissions have continued their upward trajectory</u></strong>.64 As of 2007, their <u><strong>collective emissions had dropped only 1.4% below their 1990 emissions</u></strong>.65 At the same time, <u><strong><mark>emissions from</mark> the <mark>non-industrialized countries</mark> <mark>had increased</mark> by <mark>100.6%</mark> over 1990 levels,</u></strong> so that combined global emissions had increased by 34.7% since 1990.66 As discussed below in Part IV, similar efforts are likely to be unsuccessful in the future.¶ Second, even if nations decide to reduce CO2 emissions, <u><strong><mark>structural aspects of the energy industry</mark>,</u></strong> which generates one-quarter of global greenhouse gases,67 <u><strong><mark>will require decades to convert</mark> a significant portion of the industry to clean technologies</u></strong>.68 Although society adopts certain technologies with lightning rapidity,69 conversion to new energy technologies occurs much more slowly.70 Indeed, two “laws” of energy technology development dictate that <u><strong>the energy industry requires several decades to adopt and implement new technologies</u></strong>.71 On <u><strong>average, energy technologies have required thirty years to advance from being technically available to reaching materiality</u></strong>.72 This pattern was consistent across all technologies, including nuclear power, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar photovoltaic.¶ Figure 274 below illustrates that several energy technologies grew during the last century in accordance with these “laws”: ¶ Adoption of new technologies in the energy field requires significant time because of several inherent characteristics of the power industry. First, historical patterns show that the industry needs almost a full decade to build and test new technologies: three years to build a demonstration plant, one year to commence operations, and two to five years to identify problems and reach satisfactory operability.75 Second, <u><strong>massive amounts of capital must be invested to alter significantly the mix of energy sources</u></strong>,76 <u><strong>amounts that dwarf the scale of the industry</u></strong>.77 Third, once a technology reaches materiality, growth rates flatten (see Figure 3).78 This growth trend results in part from the nature of energy infrastructure. Power plants have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, though some have operational lives of up to 100 years.79 Consequently, only two to four percent of existing sources require replacement in a given year.80 Besides replacing power plants, <u><strong>conversion to renewable energy systems will often require other developments, such as land acquisitions, different transmission methods, enabling technologies, market systems, and other changes, which may not yet be foreseeable</u></strong>.¶ Royal Dutch Shell projected that renewable sources of energy could reach materiality by 2030, sooner than others have forecast.82 Royal Dutch Shell further projected that by 2050 total energy demand would be one-third lower than a business-as-usual scenario.83 Even if these projections are correct, CO2 concentrations would not stabilize until they reached 550 ppm.84¶ Not only are we unlikely to meet <u><strong><mark>current emissions targets</u></strong></mark>, but scientists now believe that even these targets <u><strong><mark>are not stringent enough</mark>.</u></strong>85 <u><strong>Despite mitigation efforts</u></strong> during the past three decades, <u><strong>atmospheric CO2 concentrations have risen steadily</u></strong>.86 Figure 387 presents the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1980¶ During this period, atmospheric CO2 increased from 338.7 ppm to 393.8 ppm, a rise of 16.3%.88 Atmospheric CO2 increased every year.89 Furthermore, the annual increase in CO2 is actually rising.90 <u><strong>Since 2002, annual CO2 concentrations have increased on average by 2 ppm per year</u></strong>.91 Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult to achieve,92 they may also be too lenient.93 The following example illustrates the obstacles that prevent abatement of atmospheric levels of CO2. At the 2010 UN Climate Change Summit in Cancun, the delegates agreed to limit warming to a global mean temperature increase of two degrees Celsius,94 which requires an atmospheric content of 450 ppm of CO2. 95 To achieve this target, global emissions immediately need to begin declining by more than one percent per year,96 in contrast to the annual global increase.97 Small delays in emissions cuts, moreover, necessitate much larger reductions in future emissions.98 <u><strong>Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, thus necessitating much sharper cuts to attain the same level.99</u></strong> For this reason, <u><strong><mark>stabilization at 450 ppm appears</mark> to be “<mark>virtually</mark> <mark>impossible even if aggressive mitigation</mark> <mark>were to begin today.</u></strong></mark>”¶ Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult to achieve,101 these targets may also be too lenient.102 Scientists have set a rise of <u><strong>two degrees Celsius</u></strong> as a target to avert catastrophic consequences. Recent analyses, however, suggest that this rise <u><strong>would be too high</u></strong>.104 Comparison to prehistoric records indicate that <u><strong><mark>the current level of</mark> <mark>CO2</u></strong></mark> (approximately 394 ppm) <u><strong><mark>is already too high to maintain</mark> <mark>current</mark> planetary <mark>conditions</u></strong></mark>.105 Indeed, current analyses suggest that <u><strong><mark>2°</mark> C <mark>warming </mark>may cause <mark>significant</mark> sea-level rises, storms, floods, droughts, and heat waves</u></strong>.106 Maintaining climate conditions comparable to those of the Holocene Era, during which civilization developed, requires reducing the atmospheric CO2 level to 350 ppm.10</p> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 110,739 | 25 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,205 | The United States federal government should openly clarify that it would defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression and reinforce its military capability to defend Taiwan. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States federal government should openly clarify that it would defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression and reinforce its military capability to defend Taiwan. </h4> | null | null | Strategic Clarity CP | 1,560,712 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,206 | Only forcing affs to be structurally inherent solves limits and gives us link uniqueness | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Only forcing affs to be structurally inherent solves limits and gives us link uniqueness</h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | Inherency | 1,560,713 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,207 | We have enough food–shortages are a question of distribution, which the aff doesn't solve | Koba 13 | Koba 13, Mark Koba is a senior editor at CNBC.com. Topics for his feature story writing include the business of politics, health care, employment and the economy(Mark, "A hungry world: Lots of food, in too few places," CNBC, 7/22/13, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100893540)//ADravid | Of the roughly 7 billion people in the world, an estimated 870 million suffer each day from hunger. The consistently massive population of hungry people—along with variables like severe weather and economic downturns—sometimes spark warnings that the planet faces impending food shortages. And yet more people in the world—1.7 billion—are considered obese or overweight from a daily caloric intake that in some cases is at least six to seven times the minimum. This paradox is nothing new, experts say. It just shows the problem isn't that we have too little food, it's what we do with the food we have. More than enough food? We have two or three times the amount of food right now that is needed to feed the number of people in the world," We don't have food shortage problem "What we have is a distribution problem and an income problem People aren't getting the food, ... and even if [they] did, they don't have enough money to buy it." If there is enough food, a major problem causing scarcity is what we do with it "Something in the area of up to half of all that's produced is wasted, the waste happens before the food gets to people, from lack of roads and proper storage facilities, and the food rots In the developed world, it's the staggering amount of food that's thrown out after it gets to our plates." | Of 7 billion people in the world 870 million suffer from hunger The massive population of hungry people with variables like severe weather and economic downturns spark warnings that the planet faces food shortages yet more people are considered obese or overweight This paradox shows the problem isn't that we have too little food, it's what we do with the food we have. We have two or three times the amount of food right now that is needed to feed the number of people in the world," we have a distribution problem and an income problem People aren't getting food they don't have enough money to buy it." Something in the area of up to half of all that's produced is wasted, waste happens before food gets to people from lack of roads and proper storage facilities, food rots | Of the roughly 7 billion people in the world, an estimated 870 million suffer each day from hunger. ¶ That's hunger from malnutrition or not eating even the lowest amount of daily recommended calories—1,800—while often enduring food insecurity, or not knowing where the next meal is coming from. ¶ The consistently massive population of hungry people—along with variables like severe weather and economic downturns—sometimes spark warnings that the planet faces impending food shortages.¶ And yet more people in the world—1.7 billion—are considered obese or overweight from a daily caloric intake that in some cases is at least six to seven times the minimum. ¶ This paradox is nothing new, experts say. It just shows the problem isn't that we have too little food, it's what we do with the food we have. More than enough food?¶ "We have two or three times the amount of food right now that is needed to feed the number of people in the world," said Joshua Muldavin, a geography professor at Sarah Lawrence College who focuses on food and agricultural instruction. ¶ (Read more: Who cares about calories? Menu labels don't work: Study)¶ "A lot of people aren't analyzing the situation correctly. We can deal with short-term food shortages after a disaster, but fixing long term hunger gets ignored," he said. ¶ "We don't have food shortage problem," said Emelie Peine, a professor of international politics and economy at the University of Puget Sound. ¶ "What we have is a distribution problem and an income problem," Peine said. "People aren't getting the food, ... and even if [they] did, they don't have enough money to buy it." ¶ If there is enough food, a major problem causing scarcity is what we do with it, said Roger Johnson, president of the National Farmers Union, an advocacy group for U.S. farmers. ¶ "Something in the area of up to half of all that's produced is wasted," said Johnson, who runs his own farm in North Dakota. ¶ "In the undeveloped world, the waste happens before the food gets to people, from lack of roads and proper storage facilities, and the food rots," Johnson said. "In the developed world, it's the staggering amount of food that's thrown out after it gets to our plates." | 2,210 | <h4>We have enough food–shortages are a question of distribution, which the aff doesn't solve</h4><p><strong>Koba 13</strong>, Mark Koba<u> is a senior editor at CNBC.com. Topics for his feature story writing include the business of politics, health care, employment and the economy(Mark, "A hungry world: Lots of food, in too few places," CNBC, 7/22/13, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100893540)//ADravid </p><p><mark>Of</mark> the roughly <mark>7 billion</mark> <mark>people in the world</mark>, an estimated <mark>870</mark> <mark>million</mark> <mark>suffer</mark> each day <mark>from</mark> <mark>hunger</mark>.<strong> </u></strong>¶ That's hunger from malnutrition or not eating even the lowest amount of daily recommended calories—1,800—while often enduring food insecurity, or not knowing where the next meal is coming from. ¶ <u><mark>The</mark> consistently <mark>massive</mark> <mark>population</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>hungry</mark> <mark>people</mark>—along <mark>with</mark> <mark>variables</mark> <mark>like</mark> <mark>severe</mark> <mark>weather</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>economic</mark> <mark>downturns</mark>—sometimes <mark>spark</mark> <mark>warnings</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>planet</mark> <mark>faces</mark> impending <mark>food</mark> <mark>shortages</mark>.</u>¶ <u>And <mark>yet</mark> <mark>more</mark> <mark>people</mark> in the world—1.7 billion—<mark>are</mark> <mark>considered</mark> <mark>obese</mark> <mark>or</mark> <mark>overweight</mark> from a daily caloric intake that in some cases is at least six to seven times the minimum.<strong> </u></strong>¶ <u><mark>This paradox</mark> is nothing new, experts say. It just <mark>shows</mark> <mark>the problem isn't that we have too little food, it's what we do with the food we have.</mark> More than enough food?</u>¶ "<u><mark>We have two or three times the amount of food right now that is needed to feed the number of people in the world,"</u></mark> said Joshua Muldavin, a geography professor at Sarah Lawrence College who focuses on food and agricultural instruction. ¶ (Read more: Who cares about calories? Menu labels don't work: Study)¶ "A lot of people aren't analyzing the situation correctly. We can deal with short-term food shortages after a disaster, but fixing long term hunger gets ignored," he said. ¶ "<u>We don't have food shortage problem</u>," said Emelie Peine, a professor of international politics and economy at the University of Puget Sound. ¶ <u><strong>"</strong>What <mark>we</mark> <mark>have</mark> is <mark>a</mark> <mark>distribution</mark> <mark>problem</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>an</mark> <mark>income</mark> <mark>problem</u></mark>," Peine said. "<u><mark>People</mark> <mark>aren't</mark> <mark>getting</mark> the <mark>food</mark>, ... and even if [they] did, <mark>they don't have enough money to buy it."<strong></mark> </u></strong>¶ <u>If there is enough food, a major problem causing scarcity is what we do with it</u>, said Roger Johnson, president of the National Farmers Union, an advocacy group for U.S. farmers. ¶ <u>"<mark>Something in the area of up to half of all that's produced is wasted,</u></mark>" said Johnson, who runs his own farm in North Dakota. ¶ "In the undeveloped world, <u>the <mark>waste</mark> <mark>happens</mark> <mark>before</mark> the <mark>food</mark> <mark>gets</mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>people</mark>, <mark>from</mark> <mark>lack of roads and proper storage facilities,</mark> and the <mark>food</mark> <mark>rots</u></mark>," Johnson said. "<u>In the developed world, it's the staggering amount of food that's thrown out after it gets to our plates." </p></u> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 14,005 | 6 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,208 | The counterplan deters China from acting aggressively toward Taiwan — U.S. strategic ambiguity is the only reason they might miscalculate and invade. | Colby and Slocombe 16 | Colby and Slocombe 16 — Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, formerly served as a Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as an Expert Advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as a staff member on the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding WMD, with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and with the State Department, recipient of the Exceptional Public Service Award from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the Department of State, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, and Walter Slocombe, Senior Counsel at Caplin & Drysdale—a law firm, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former Senior Advisor for National Defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq, former Member of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2016 (“U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous,” Wall Street Journal, May 23rd, Available Online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837, Accessed 06-28-2016) | If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense
AND
it might very well have deterred. Clarity would be controversial but safer | null | If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense
AND
it might very well have deterred. Clarity would be controversial but safer. | 162 | <h4>The counterplan <u>deters</u> China from acting aggressively toward Taiwan — U.S. strategic ambiguity is the <u>only reason</u> they might miscalculate and invade. </h4><p><strong>Colby and Slocombe 16</strong> — Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, formerly served as a Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as an Expert Advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as a staff member on the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding WMD, with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and with the State Department, recipient of the Exceptional Public Service Award from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the Department of State, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, and Walter Slocombe, Senior Counsel at Caplin & Drysdale—a law firm, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former Senior Advisor for National Defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq, former Member of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2016 (“U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous,” Wall Street Journal, May 23rd, Available Online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837<u>, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p>If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense</p><p>AND</p><p>it might very well have deterred. Clarity would be controversial but safer</u>.</p> | null | null | Strategic Clarity CP | 1,560,400 | 9 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,209 | Squo solves --- coop now | Kershner, 15 | Kershner, 15 – Public Affairs Specialist at U.S. Army Europe (Angela, “Disaster Management Exchange 2015 concludes in China”, 1/26/15, https://www.army.mil/article/141698/Disaster_Management_Exchange_2015_concludes_in_China, //11) | The DME is a U.S.-China humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exchange, which included an expert academic discussion a tabletop exchange, or TTE and a practical field exchange The DME is among the most substantive of U.S. military engagement activities with China This long established exchange underscores the commitment of the U.S. and the People's Republic of China to a comprehensive and strong military-to-military relationship in order to address security cooperation and humanitarian and disaster relief challenges across the region A team of U.S. military and civilian experts in HA/DR, participated in numerous briefings and site visits to exchange lessons learned, best practices and mitigation efforts U.S. participants and their PLA counterparts examined how they would best be able to respond to a large-scale disaster in a fictional third country. The fictional scenario was based on flooding following a typhoon, a disaster that remains a constant threat in the Asia-Pacific region. Multinational response efforts occur at the request of the affected nation participants coordinated and synchronized support U.S. Coast Guard personnel observed and shared best practices while PLA helicopters and watercraft performed a quick reconnaissance of the damage and a search of the surrounding waters Search-and-rescue, or SAR, personnel from the Hawaii Army National Guard worked shoulder-to-shoulder with their Chinese counterparts to extract victims from destroyed buildings amid downed trees and power lines the success of the event was evident in the smiles of the participants, handshakes and mutual pats on the back Everyone has expressed their pleasure at the remarkable cooperation between our two countries Through the DME, both the U.S. and PRC armies have built a strong and compelling model of cooperation to improve not only the security of our countries and the safety of our citizens, but to enhance the stability of the region. | DME included an expert academic discussion The DME is among the most substantive of U.S. military engagement activities with Chin exchange lessons learned, best practices and mitigation efforts Multinational response efforts occur at the request of the affected nation participants coordinated and synchronized support Everyone expressed pleasure at cooperation between our two countries Through the DME, both the U.S. and PRC armies have built a strong and compelling model of cooperation | The 2015 DME is a U.S.-China humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exchange, which included an expert academic discussion, or EAD, a tabletop exchange, or TTE and a practical field exchange, or PFE. The DME is among the most substantive of U.S. military engagement activities with China. "This long established exchange underscores the commitment of the U.S. and the People's Republic of China to a comprehensive and strong military-to-military relationship in order to address security cooperation and humanitarian and disaster relief challenges across the region," said Maj. Gen. Edward Dorman, commanding general of 8th Theater Sustainment Command. Sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific and hosted by China's People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the DME 2015 included participants from the Hawaii Army National Guard, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force and the State Department. A small team of U.S. military and civilian experts in the field of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response, or HA/DR, participated in numerous briefings and site visits in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, and Haikou, Hainan Province, to exchange lessons learned, best practices and mitigation efforts. Some of the site visits included the Guangdong Provincial Meteorological Television Propaganda Center, the Guangzhou Center Observatory, the Provincial Disaster Management Command, materiel stocks and Dashatou Pier. During the event, the EAD participants also joined a larger team for the TTE and PFE portions of the DME. Approximately 70 U.S. participants and their PLA counterparts examined how they would best be able to respond to a large-scale disaster in a fictional third country. The fictional scenario was based on flooding following a typhoon, a disaster that remains a constant threat in the Asia-Pacific region. Multinational response efforts occur at the request of the affected nation. Simulating such a request for assistance, TTE participants specializing in civil coordination, planning, rescue operations, and information and logistical support used the United Nations Multinational Coordination Center, or MNCC, construct to work through numerous possible scenarios. The participants coordinated and synchronized support, dividing up responsibilities and assigning tasks through four stages: initial assessment, multinational HA/DR response, HA/DR activities and transfer to host nation. The PFE ran concurrently with the TTE, but picked up the simulation of response efforts at the HA/DR activities stage. U.S. and Chinese medical personnel worked to establish a medical treatment area during the PFE. Dozens of tents and medical vehicles were set up to provide for the orderly assessment and treatment of casualties. Several dozen tents were also set up to provide food and shelter for resettlement of displaced persons, one of the major HA/DR responsibilities of the PLA. This is a significant difference from U.S. HA/DR response which designates resettlement duties to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, and numerous nongovernmental organizations. This proved to be one of only a few major differences between the response efforts of both countries. "We have more similarities than we do differences," said Capt. Melissa Kodani, a medical planner with 18th MEDCOM in Hawaii. "We drew out our roles of care on paper and they are actually pretty much the same." Language barriers proved less challenging than many would expect as participants worked hands-on in their respective training environments. Improvised sign language and sketches on paper supplemented the interpreters who worked diligently to be everywhere at once. Universal procedures were followed that included wearing masks and booties in sterile surgical environments. U.S. Coast Guard personnel observed and shared best practices while PLA helicopters and watercraft performed a quick reconnaissance of the damage and a search of the surrounding waters. Numerous water rescues were conducted while a PLA landing craft launched for the disaster site carrying search and rescue, medical and numerous other personnel. Damage, caused previously by super typhoon Rammasun, which downed trees, damaged buildings and household debris in the exercise area on Hainan Island, provided a realistic platform for the PFE, a realism that was increased by the numerous volunteers, children, livestock and even family pets that were staged throughout the disaster area. U.S. Marines observed Chinese route clearance techniques and shared their own debris removal best practices, ensuring the medical teams and search and rescue personnel would be working in a safer environment. Search-and-rescue, or SAR, personnel from the Hawaii Army National Guard worked shoulder-to-shoulder with their Chinese counterparts to extract victims from destroyed buildings amid downed trees and power lines. Medical personnel from 18th Medical Command worked side-by-side with their Chinese counterparts to stabilize injured civilians and prepare them for transport across the waterway to the medical treatment area. As both the TTE and the PFE concluded, the success of the event was evident in the smiles of the participants, handshakes and mutual pats on the back. The exchange helped U.S. Soldiers, Marines and Airmen increase their understanding and respect for their Chinese counterparts. "Everyone with whom I have spoken has expressed their pleasure at the remarkable cooperation between our two countries and enjoyment at being part of such a superb opportunity to foster and enhance our relationship," Dorman said. U.S. Army Pacific, or USARPAC, commander Gen. Vincent K. Brooks described the relationship of our two militaries as the foundations for the bridge that is being built between the U.S. and China. "I am filled with excitement because of what I've seen here during these last two days," Brooks said. "I am certain that I can say with great confidence this has been an outstanding exercise and has built upon the strong foundation built over the last 10 years." This is the 10th iteration of the DME, an annual security cooperation activity between USARPAC and the PLA. Through the DME, both the U.S. and PRC armies have built a strong and compelling model of cooperation to improve not only the security of our countries and the safety of our citizens, but to enhance the stability of the region. | 6,376 | <h4>Squo solves --- coop now</h4><p><strong>Kershner, 15</strong> – Public Affairs Specialist at U.S. Army Europe (Angela, “Disaster Management Exchange 2015 concludes in China”, 1/26/15, https://www.army.mil/article/141698/Disaster_Management_Exchange_2015_concludes_in_China<u>, //11)</p><p>The</u> 2015 <u><mark>DME</mark> is a U.S.-China humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exchange, which <mark>included an <strong>expert academic discussion</u></strong></mark>, or EAD, <u>a tabletop exchange, or TTE and a practical field exchange</u>, or PFE. <u><strong><mark>The DME is among the most substantive of U.S. military engagement activities with Chin</mark>a</u></strong>. "<u>This long established exchange underscores the commitment of the U.S. and the People's Republic of China to a comprehensive and strong military-to-military relationship in order to address security cooperation and humanitarian and disaster relief challenges across the region</u>," said Maj. Gen. Edward Dorman, commanding general of 8th Theater Sustainment Command. Sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific and hosted by China's People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the DME 2015 included participants from the Hawaii Army National Guard, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force and the State Department. <u>A</u> small <u>team of U.S. military and civilian experts in</u> the field of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response, or <u>HA/DR, participated in numerous briefings and site visits</u> in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, and Haikou, Hainan Province, <u>to <strong><mark>exchange lessons learned</strong>, <strong>best practices and mitigation efforts</u></strong></mark>. Some of the site visits included the Guangdong Provincial Meteorological Television Propaganda Center, the Guangzhou Center Observatory, the Provincial Disaster Management Command, materiel stocks and Dashatou Pier. During the event, the EAD participants also joined a larger team for the TTE and PFE portions of the DME. Approximately 70 <u>U.S. participants and their PLA counterparts examined how they would best be able to respond to a large-scale disaster in a fictional third country. The fictional scenario was based on flooding following a typhoon, a disaster that remains a constant threat in the Asia-Pacific region. <strong><mark>Multinational response efforts occur at the request of the affected nation</u></strong></mark>. Simulating such a request for assistance, TTE participants specializing in civil coordination, planning, rescue operations, and information and logistical support used the United Nations Multinational Coordination Center, or MNCC, construct to work through numerous possible scenarios. The <u><mark>participants</mark> <strong><mark>coordinated and synchronized support</u></strong></mark>, dividing up responsibilities and assigning tasks through four stages: initial assessment, multinational HA/DR response, HA/DR activities and transfer to host nation. The PFE ran concurrently with the TTE, but picked up the simulation of response efforts at the HA/DR activities stage. U.S. and Chinese medical personnel worked to establish a medical treatment area during the PFE. Dozens of tents and medical vehicles were set up to provide for the orderly assessment and treatment of casualties. Several dozen tents were also set up to provide food and shelter for resettlement of displaced persons, one of the major HA/DR responsibilities of the PLA. This is a significant difference from U.S. HA/DR response which designates resettlement duties to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, and numerous nongovernmental organizations. This proved to be one of only a few major differences between the response efforts of both countries. "We have more similarities than we do differences," said Capt. Melissa Kodani, a medical planner with 18th MEDCOM in Hawaii. "We drew out our roles of care on paper and they are actually pretty much the same." Language barriers proved less challenging than many would expect as participants worked hands-on in their respective training environments. Improvised sign language and sketches on paper supplemented the interpreters who worked diligently to be everywhere at once. Universal procedures were followed that included wearing masks and booties in sterile surgical environments. <u>U.S. Coast Guard personnel observed and shared best practices while PLA helicopters and watercraft performed a quick reconnaissance of the damage and a search of the surrounding waters</u>. Numerous water rescues were conducted while a PLA landing craft launched for the disaster site carrying search and rescue, medical and numerous other personnel. Damage, caused previously by super typhoon Rammasun, which downed trees, damaged buildings and household debris in the exercise area on Hainan Island, provided a realistic platform for the PFE, a realism that was increased by the numerous volunteers, children, livestock and even family pets that were staged throughout the disaster area. U.S. Marines observed Chinese route clearance techniques and shared their own debris removal best practices, ensuring the medical teams and search and rescue personnel would be working in a safer environment. <u>Search-and-rescue, or SAR, personnel from the Hawaii Army National Guard worked shoulder-to-shoulder with their Chinese counterparts to extract victims from destroyed buildings amid downed trees and power lines</u>. Medical personnel from 18th Medical Command worked side-by-side with their Chinese counterparts to stabilize injured civilians and prepare them for transport across the waterway to the medical treatment area. As both the TTE and the PFE concluded, <u>the success of the event was evident in the smiles of the participants, handshakes and mutual pats on the back</u>. The exchange helped U.S. Soldiers, Marines and Airmen increase their understanding and respect for their Chinese counterparts. "<u><mark>Everyone</u></mark> with whom I have spoken <u>has <mark>expressed</mark> their <mark>pleasure at</mark> the <strong>remarkable <mark>cooperation between our two countries</u></strong></mark> and enjoyment at being part of such a superb opportunity to foster and enhance our relationship," Dorman said. U.S. Army Pacific, or USARPAC, commander Gen. Vincent K. Brooks described the relationship of our two militaries as the foundations for the bridge that is being built between the U.S. and China. "I am filled with excitement because of what I've seen here during these last two days," Brooks said. "I am certain that I can say with great confidence this has been an outstanding exercise and has built upon the strong foundation built over the last 10 years." This is the 10th iteration of the DME, an annual security cooperation activity between USARPAC and the PLA. <u><strong><mark>Through the DME, both the U.S. and PRC armies have built a strong and compelling model of cooperation</strong></mark> to improve not only the security of our countries and the safety of our citizens, but to enhance the stability of the region.</p></u> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 182,091 | 2 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,210 | No war – scarcity triggers cooperation | null | -Your studies are trash (inconclusive results, confuse correlation and causation, space/time errors, third variables, and selection bias) | }
"Climate change increases war and terrorism," Obama said But what is the basis of these claims? Do we have good evidence to support the connection between climate, conflict, and war? Not really. there has been spirited debate among researchers about the links between climate and violent conflict with a significant number of studies showing weak, non-existent, and even negative correlations between climate stress and conflict. For example, one set of researchers finds strong statistical links Others find weak or no relationships between temperatures and conflict in parts of Africa, pointing out that other factors - such as poverty and poor governance - are much more important and that since 2002, conflict has decreased while climate hazards have become worse Another problem with many climate conflict studies is that they confuse correlation with causation and make fundamental errors in the way they deal with space and time. there is also the challenge of scale where a strong relationship at one scale disappears when analyzed at another even though the individual data points are the same Some studies correlate data without controlling for the size of the country and find it difficult to account for how past conflicts and histories strongly influence the present. Even those that compensate struggle with the lack of geographically detailed data studies also make some fundamental errors in research design. Rather than looking at the full range of climate extremes they instead look for conflicts and then try and link them back to climatic causes Science published an article that claimed to analyze and synthesize 60 studies concluding a robust link between climate and conflict. to my mind there is a fundamental flaw in the experimental design. In only selecting cases where climate causes conflict it's not surprising that they, find proof of the relationship Why didn't they broaden the study to see how many studies of climate impacts result in no conflict or cooperation? it should be possible to analyze the full range of responses to drought and other hazards including cooperation its already been done for water shortages to resolve debates over water wars researchers and policy makers became convinced competition lead to conflict in regions such as the Middle East But when Wolf did a careful study he found that in almost all cases, competition over water led to greater cooperation between nations and communities rather than conflict Even in the case of Israel Wolf's research shows peaceful resolution Where cooperation resulted in robust management institutions there is great potential to resolve challenges water management institutions are already preparing for climate change by commissioning studies, adjusting allocations, and rethinking infrastructure the U.S. and Mexico recently agreed to more flexible arrangements Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam are cooperating through the Mekong River Commission These are just a few of the cases where climate change is prompting peaceful cooperation rather than violent conflict. I was pleased the I P C C provides a more nuanced analysis of climate change risks to security. The report draws on research studies that propose a focus on 'human security' rather than 'national security' authors conclude evidence on a climate connection to violence is inconclusive It is time for us to consider the possibility that climate change can trigger cooperation, not conflict There are many examples We are in the third decade of worldwide intergovernmental cooperation We have a climate convention that has brought nations together to peacefully negotiate the I P C C brings together thousands Despite criticisms of lack of progress negotiations have resulted in transfer of funds collective efforts and intensive collaboration to understand the causes and consequences when climatic disasters strike, such as Hurricane Haiyan, we see outpourings of humanitarian response founded in the long tradition of cooperation across international boundaries So, conflict or cooperation? To decide, we need better-designed studies, more rigorous analysis and less melodramatic claims Rather than raise fears of conflict, scholars and strategists should seek best practices for cooperative and peaceful responses to the stresses of climate change. | studies show non-existent, and negative correlations between climate and conflict Others point out other factors conflict decreased while climate become worse studies confuse causation and make fundamental errors in space and time Some correlate without controlling for size and past conflicts those that compensate struggle with lack of data studies make fundamental errors in design they look for conflicts it should analyze the range of responses its been done to resolve water wars Wolf found almost all led to cooperation Where cooperation resulted in institutions there is great potential to resolve challenges U.S Mexico Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam are cases where climate is prompting cooperation I P C C propose 'human rather than 'national security' consider climate can trigger cooperation We are in worldwide intergovernmental cooperation We have a convention the I P C C brings together thousands negotiations resulted in efforts founded in tradition of cooperation we need less melodrama | -Long tradition of cooperation and current efforts prove no war
Liverman 14 {Diana, co-director of the University of Arizona Institute of the Environment, Professor in the School of Geography and Development (University of Arizona), visiting professor of Environmental Policy and Development in the School of Geography and Environment (Oxford University), fellow in the Environmental Change Institute, PhD/MS/BA in Geography (UCLA/Toronto/UCL), “What If Climate Change Triggers Cooperation, Not Conflict?” Huffington Post – Green, 7/18, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diana-liverman/what-if-climate-change-tr_b_5599886.html}
"Climate change increases the likelihood of war and terrorism," President Obama said earlier this summer. The Pentagon and a distinguished committee of retired generals and admirals both produced reports earlier this year highlighting the accelerating risks of climate change to US national security. A recent Showtime series on climate change had Tom Friedman linking climate change to political instability in the Middle East. But what is the basis of these claims? Do we have good evidence to support the connection between climate, conflict, and war? Not really. For a start, there has been a spirited debate among researchers about the links between climate and violent conflict with a significant number of studies showing weak, non-existent, and even negative correlations between climate stress and conflict. For example, one set of researchers finds strong statistical links between higher temperatures and conflict in Africa between 1981 and 2002, and predict a 50% increase in conflict as a result of global warming. Others find weak or no relationships between temperatures, rainfall and conflict in parts of Africa, pointing out that other factors - such as poverty and poor governance - are much more important and that since 2002, conflict has decreased while climate hazards have become worse. Another problem with many of the climate conflict studies is that they - or those that read them - confuse correlation with causation and make fundamental errors in the way they deal with space and time. And there is also the challenge of scale where a strong relationship at one scale of aggregation disappears when analyzed at another even though the individual data points are the same. Some studies correlate country level data without controlling for the size of the country or its population, and find it difficult to account for how past conflicts and histories strongly influence the present. Even those that try to compensate for the varying size of countries by using an even grid struggle with the lack of geographically detailed data on climate, conflict and other factors. The research studies that support the climatic basis of conflict also make some fundamental errors in research design. Rather than looking at the full range of climate extremes in a region and analyzing which of these led to conflict, which had no effect, and which led to cooperation, they instead look for conflicts and then try and link them back to climatic causes. For example, the prestigious journal Science recently published an article that claimed to analyze and synthesize more than 60 studies of climate and conflict, concluding that in the majority of cases the studies showed a robust link between climate and conflict. Although they had strict criteria for selecting the studies, to my mind there is a fundamental flaw in the experimental design. In only selecting cases where climate causes conflict it's not surprising that they, and other researchers, find proof of the relationship! Why didn't they broaden the study to see how many studies of climate impacts result in no conflict or cooperation? To be sure this poses a challenge because although a number of groups collect data on international and domestic conflict, it is harder to corresponding data on incidents of peace and cooperation. But it should be possible to look at data on climate extremes and analyze the full range of responses to drought and other hazards including examples of cooperation, no response, and conflict - its already been done for water shortages to resolve debates over water wars. Many researchers and policy makers became convinced that increasing competition over water would lead to conflict in regions such as the Middle East. But when geographer Aaron Wolf did a careful study of 189 river basins he found that in almost all cases, competition over water led to greater cooperation between nations and communities rather than conflict. Even in the case of Israel's relationship to their Arab neighbors Wolf's research shows that the Jordan River and other shared waters have been a source of peaceful resolution rather than serious conflict. Where cooperation resulted in robust management institutions to manage shared waters, there is great potential to resolve the challenges posed by climate change. Across the world, many water management institutions are already preparing for climate change by commissioning studies, adjusting allocations, and rethinking infrastructure. On the Colorado River, the U.S. and Mexico recently agreed to more flexible arrangements to share flows during high and low years and to restore flows to the ecosystems of the Colorado delta. In Southeast Asia Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam are cooperating through the Mekong River Commission to adapt to climate change. These are just a few of the cases where climate change is prompting peaceful cooperation rather than violent conflict. I was pleased that the most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provides a more nuanced analysis of climate change risks to security. The report draws on research studies that propose a focus on 'human security' rather than 'national security' - the risks that climate change poses to livelihoods, homes, and health. The authors conclude that the evidence on a climate connection to violence is inconclusive, including the literature that suggests that past climate changes have contributed to the collapse of civilizations and the argument that climate change and drought triggered the violence in Darfur in the last decade. It is time for us to consider the possibility that climate change can trigger cooperation, not conflict. There are many examples of cooperation. We are in the third decade of worldwide intergovernmental cooperation to respond to the risks of climate change. We have a climate convention (UNFCCC) that has brought nations together to peacefully negotiate a shared solution to dealing with climate risks and an unprecedented series of international scientific assessments - the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - that brings together thousands of researchers to communicate climate risks to policy makers. Despite criticisms of lack of progress, the climate negotiations have resulted in transfer of funds from richer to poorer countries, collective efforts to reduce emissions, and intensive collaboration to understand the causes and consequences of climate change. And when climatic disasters strike, such as Hurricane Haiyan, we see outpourings of humanitarian response founded in the long tradition of cooperation across international boundaries in response to hazards and the military helping with peaceful emergency response and recovery. So, conflict or cooperation? To decide, we need better-designed studies, more rigorous analysis and less melodramatic claims. We need studies that hypothesize peaceful resolution to tensions connected to resource competition and climate change, and statistical studies that use research designs that are open to the possibilities that climate extremes might have no influence on conflict and might, in fact, have positive outcomes. Rather than raise fears of conflict, scholars and strategists should seek best practices for cooperative and peaceful responses to the stresses of climate change. | 7,955 | <h4>No war – scarcity triggers cooperation</h4><p>-Your studies are trash (inconclusive results, confuse correlation and causation, space/time errors, third variables, and selection bias)</p><p>-Long tradition of cooperation and current efforts prove no war</p><p><strong>Liverman 14 </strong>{Diana, co-director of the University of Arizona Institute of the Environment, Professor in the School of Geography and Development (University of Arizona), visiting professor of Environmental Policy and Development in the School of Geography and Environment (Oxford University), fellow in the Environmental Change Institute, PhD/MS/BA in Geography (UCLA/Toronto/UCL), “What If Climate Change Triggers Cooperation, Not Conflict?” Huffington Post – Green, 7/18, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diana-liverman/what-if-climate-change-tr_b_5599886.html<u>}</p><p>"Climate change increases </u>the likelihood of <u>war and terrorism,"</u> President <u>Obama said</u> earlier this summer. The Pentagon and a distinguished committee of retired generals and admirals both produced reports earlier this year highlighting the accelerating risks of climate change to US national security. A recent Showtime series on climate change had Tom Friedman linking climate change to political instability in the Middle East. <u><strong>But</u></strong> <u>what is the basis of these claims? Do we have good evidence to support the connection between climate, conflict, and war?</u> <u><strong>Not really. </u></strong>For a start, <u>there has been</u> a <u>spirited debate among researchers about the links between climate and violent conflict with a <strong>significant number</u></strong> <u>of <mark>studies</u> <u>show</mark>ing <strong>weak, <mark>non-existent, and </mark>even <mark>negative correlations</u></strong> <u>between climate</mark> stress <mark>and conflict</mark>. For example, one set of researchers finds strong statistical links</u> between higher temperatures and conflict in Africa between 1981 and 2002, and predict a 50% increase in conflict as a result of global warming. <u><mark>Others</mark> find weak or no relationships between temperatures</u>, rainfall <u>and conflict in parts of Africa, <mark>point</mark>ing <mark>out</mark> that <mark>other factors</mark> - such as poverty and poor governance - are much more important and that since 2002, <strong><mark>conflict</mark> has <mark>decreased while climate</mark> hazards have <mark>become worse</u></strong></mark>. <u>Another problem with many</u> of the <u>climate conflict <mark>studies</mark> is that they</u> - or those that read them - <u><mark>confuse </mark>correlation with <mark>causation and make <strong>fundamental errors</u></strong> <u>in</mark> the way they deal with <mark>space and time</mark>. </u>And <u>there is also the challenge of scale where a strong relationship at one scale</u> of aggregation <u><strong>disappears</u></strong> <u>when analyzed at another even though the individual data points are the same</u>. <u><mark>Some</mark> studies <mark>correlate</mark> </u>country level <u>data <strong><mark>without controlling</u></strong> <u>for</mark> the <mark>size</mark> of the country</u> or its population, <u><mark>and</mark> find it difficult to account for how <mark>past conflicts</mark> and histories strongly influence the present. Even <mark>those that</u></mark> try to <u><mark>compensate</u></mark> for the varying size of countries by using an even grid <u><strong><mark>struggle</strong> with</mark> the <mark>lack of</mark> geographically detailed <mark>data</mark> </u>on climate, conflict and other factors. The research <u><mark>studies</u></mark> that support the climatic basis of conflict <u>also <mark>make</mark> some <strong><mark>fundamental errors</strong> in</mark> research <mark>design</mark>. Rather than looking at the full range of climate extremes</u> in a region and analyzing which of these led to conflict, which had no effect, and which led to cooperation, <u><mark>they</mark> instead <strong><mark>look for conflicts </mark>and then try and link them back</strong> to climatic causes</u>. For example, the prestigious journal <u>Science</u> recently <u>published an article that claimed to analyze and synthesize</u> more than <u>60 studies</u> of climate and conflict, <u>concluding</u> that in the majority of cases the studies showed <u>a robust link between</u> <u>climate and conflict. </u>Although they had strict criteria for selecting the studies, <u>to my mind there is a fundamental flaw in the experimental design. In only</u> <u>selecting cases where climate causes conflict it's not surprising that they,</u> and other researchers, <u>find proof of the relationship</u>! <u><strong>Why didn't they broaden the study to see how many studies of climate impacts result in no conflict or cooperation? </u></strong>To be sure this poses a challenge because although a number of groups collect data on international and domestic conflict, it is harder to corresponding data on incidents of peace and cooperation. But <u><mark>it should</mark> be possible to</u> look at data on climate extremes and <u><mark>analyze the</mark> full <mark>range of responses</mark> to drought and other hazards including </u>examples of <u>cooperation</u>, no response, and conflict - <u><mark>its</mark> already <mark>been done</mark> for water shortages <mark>to <strong>resolve</mark> debates over <mark>water wars</u></strong></mark>. Many <u>researchers and policy makers became convinced</u> that increasing <u>competition</u> over water would <u>lead to conflict in regions such as the Middle East</u>. <u>But when</u> geographer Aaron <u><mark>Wolf</mark> did a careful study</u> of 189 river basins <u>he <mark>found</mark> that in <strong><mark>almost all </mark>cases,</u></strong> <u>competition over water <mark>led to</mark> greater</u> <u><mark>cooperation</u></mark> <u>between nations and communities</u> <u><strong>rather than conflict</u></strong>. <u>Even in the case of Israel</u>'s relationship to their Arab neighbors <u>Wolf's research shows</u> that the Jordan River and other shared waters have been a source of <u>peaceful resolution</u> rather than serious conflict. <u><mark>Where cooperation resulted in</mark> <strong>robust management <mark>institutions</u></strong></mark> to manage shared waters, <u><mark>there is <strong>great potential</u></strong> <u>to</mark> <mark>resolve</u></mark> the <u><mark>challenges</u></mark> posed by climate change. Across the world, many <u>water management institutions are already preparing for climate change by commissioning studies, adjusting</u> <u>allocations, and rethinking infrastructure</u>. On the Colorado River, <u>the <mark>U.S</mark>. and <mark>Mexico</mark> recently agreed to more flexible arrangements</u> to share flows during high and low years and to restore flows to the ecosystems of the Colorado delta. In Southeast Asia <u><mark>Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam</mark> are cooperating through the Mekong River Commission</u> to adapt to climate change. <u>These <mark>are</mark> just a few of the <mark>cases where climate</mark> change <mark>is prompting</mark> <strong>peaceful <mark>cooperation</mark> rather than violent conflict</strong>. I was pleased</u> that the most recent report of <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>ntergovernmental <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>anel on <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>limate <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>hange <u>provides a more nuanced analysis of climate change risks to</u> <u>security. The report draws on research studies that <mark>propose</mark> a focus on <mark>'human </mark>security' <strong><mark>rather than 'national security'</u></strong></mark> - the risks that climate change poses to livelihoods, homes, and health. The <u>authors conclude</u> that the <u>evidence on a climate connection to violence is <strong>inconclusive</u></strong>, including the literature that suggests that past climate changes have contributed to the collapse of civilizations and the argument that climate change and drought triggered the violence in Darfur in the last decade. <u>It is time for us to <mark>consider</mark> the possibility that <mark>climate</mark> change <strong><mark>can trigger cooperation</mark>, not conflict</u></strong>. <u>There are many examples</u> of cooperation. <u><mark>We are in</u></mark> <u>the third decade of <mark>worldwide</mark> <mark>intergovernmental cooperation</u></mark> to respond to the risks of climate change. <u><mark>We have a </mark>climate <mark>convention</u></mark> (UNFCCC) <u>that has brought nations together to peacefully negotiate</u> a shared solution to dealing with climate risks and an unprecedented series of international scientific assessments - <u><mark>the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>ntergovernmental <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>anel on <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>limate <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>hange - that <u><strong><mark>brings together</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>thousands</u></mark> of researchers to communicate climate risks to policy makers. <u>Despite criticisms of lack of progress</u>, the climate <u><mark>negotiations</mark> have <mark>resulted in</mark> transfer of funds</u> from richer to poorer countries, <u>collective <mark>efforts</mark> </u>to reduce emissions,<u> and intensive collaboration to understand the causes and consequences </u>of climate change. And <u>when climatic disasters strike, such as</u> <u>Hurricane Haiyan, we see outpourings of humanitarian response</u> <u><strong><mark>founded in </mark>the long <mark>tradition of cooperation</u></strong></mark> <u>across international boundaries</u> in response to hazards and the military helping with peaceful emergency response and recovery. <u>So, conflict or cooperation? To decide, <mark>we need</mark> better-designed studies, more rigorous analysis and <strong><mark>less melodrama</mark>tic claims</u></strong>. We need studies that hypothesize peaceful resolution to tensions connected to resource competition and climate change, and statistical studies that use research designs that are open to the possibilities that climate extremes might have no influence on conflict and might, in fact, have positive outcomes. <u>Rather than raise fears of conflict, scholars and strategists should seek best practices for cooperative and peaceful responses to the stresses of climate change.</p></u> | 1NC | Case | Ag | 129,204 | 6 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,211 | peace will be maintained in the status quo balancing strategies | Roy 12 | Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” Time, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016) | Many see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon,
AND
Pacific region and pull its influence back to the Western Hemisphere | null | Many observers see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon,
AND
Pacific region and pull its influence back to the Western Hemisphere. | 165 | <h4>peace will be maintained in the status quo balancing strategies</h4><p><strong>Roy 12</strong> — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” Time, December 6th<u>, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p>Many</u> observers <u>see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon, </p><p>AND</p><p><strong>Pacific region</strong> and <strong>pull its influence back to the Western Hemisphere</u></strong>.</p> | null | null | Deterrence DA | 1,560,715 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,212 | They don’t solve---they only help clean up after earthquakes not preventing them which still ensures the structural impact | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>They don’t solve---they only help clean up after earthquakes not preventing them which still ensures the structural impact</h4></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 1,560,714 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,213 | the plan increases the risk of nuclear war — it emboldens China, destroys the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and crushes U.S. hegemony in Asia --- turns case | Lee 11 | Lee 11 — Shyu-Tu Lee, President of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, 2011 (“Disengaging From Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite) | military alliance, the U S would be forced to retreat to Hawaii | null | According to Charles Glaser, the prospects for avoiding war between the United States and
AND
military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii. | 168 | <h4>the plan <u>increases</u> the risk of nuclear war — it <u>emboldens China</u>, destroys the <u>U.S.-Japan Alliance</u>, and <u>crushes U.S. hegemony</u> in Asia --- turns case</h4><p><strong>Lee 11</strong> — Shyu-Tu Lee, President of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, 2011 (“Disengaging From Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)</p><p>According to Charles Glaser, the prospects for avoiding war between the United States and </p><p>AND</p><p><u>military alliance, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>would be forced to <strong>retreat to Hawaii</u></strong>.</p> | null | null | Deterrence DA | 1,560,716 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,214 | Utilitarianism 1st – it’s the only rational model of decisionmaking – our evidence cites the best studies | null | Greene ‘10 | What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions anyone who claims to have such a theory almost certainly doesn't rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what deontologists are all about Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view may be misleading The problem is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics consequentialists have respect for persons are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get answers will be tautological "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means But these answers don't really explain anything if you give the same people the trolley case they'll make the opposite judgment Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question | turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us that moral judgment is not a rational enterprise Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any coherent moral theory that can accommodate moral intuitions consequentialists have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share by counting every person's well-being consequentialist principles give equal weight to everyone's interests If you ask a deontologically- person why it's wrong to push someone save five others answers will be tautological: " there seems to be "something deeply right" because they give voice to powerful moral emotions | [Josh. Assc Prof Social Science (Psychology) at Harvard. “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul” published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, 2010]
What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question. | 6,327 | <h4><strong>Utilitarianism 1st – it’s the only rational model of decisionmaking – our evidence cites the best studies </h4><p></strong>Greene ‘10</p><p>[Josh. Assc Prof Social Science (Psychology) at Harvard. “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul” published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, 2010]</p><p><u><strong>What <mark>turn-of-the-millennium science</u></strong> <u><strong>is telling us</mark> is <mark>that</mark> human <mark>moral judgment is not a</mark> pristine <mark>rational enterprise</u></strong></mark>, that our <u><strong>moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any</mark> rationally <mark>coherent</mark> normative <mark>moral theory that can accommodate</mark> our <mark>moral intuitions</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, <u><strong>anyone who claims to have such a theory</u></strong>, or even part of one, <u><strong>almost certainly doesn't</u></strong>. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.<mark> </mark>It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide.<mark> </mark>How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).<mark> </mark>Missing the Deontological Point<mark> </mark>I suspect that <u><strong>rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here</u></strong>. Instead, I suspect, <u><strong>they</u></strong> <u><strong>will insist that I have simply misunderstood what</u></strong> Kant and like-minded <u><strong>deontologists are all about</u></strong>. <u><strong>Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition</u></strong>. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. <u><strong>Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously</u></strong>. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). <u><strong>This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view</u></strong>, as I've suggested, <u><strong>may be misleading</u></strong>. <u><strong>The problem</u></strong>, more specifically, <u><strong>is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological</u></strong>, though they may appear to be from the inside. <u><strong>Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love</u></strong>, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." <u><strong>This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things</u></strong>. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.<mark> </mark>In the same way, I believe that most of <u><strong>the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics</u></strong>. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that <u><strong><mark>consequentialists</u></strong></mark>, as much as anyone else, <u><strong><mark>have respect for persons</u></strong>, <u><strong>are against treating people as mere objects,</u></strong> <u><strong>wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share</mark>, etc</u></strong>. <u><strong>A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, <mark>by counting every person's well-being</mark> in the decision-making process</u></strong>. <u><strong>Likewise, a <mark>consequentialist</mark> attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to <mark>principles</mark> that <mark>give equal weight to everyone's interests</mark>, i.e. that are impartial</u></strong>. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.<mark> </mark>What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. <u><strong><mark>If you ask a deontologically-</mark>minded <mark>person why it's wrong to push someone </mark>in front of speeding trolley in order to <mark>save five others</mark>, you will get</u></strong> characteristically deontological <u><strong><mark>answers</u></strong></mark>. Some <u><strong><mark>will be tautological</u></strong>: <u><strong>"</mark>Because it's murder!"</u></strong> <u><strong>Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means</u></strong>." "You have to respect people's rights." <u><strong>But</u></strong>, as we know, <u><strong>these answers don't really explain anything</u></strong>, because <u><strong>if you give the same people</u></strong> (on different occasions) <u><strong>the trolley case</u></strong> or the loop case (See above), <u><strong>they'll make the opposite judgment</u></strong>, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. <u><strong>Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism</u></strong>. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, <u><strong><mark>there seems to be "something deeply right"</mark> about them <mark>because they give voice to powerful moral emotions</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question</u></strong>. </p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 10,110 | 1,812 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,215 | this sparks global arms races and nuclear proliferation. | Cole 15 | Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the Taipei Times, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” The National Interest, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016) | White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough
AND
Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation | null | White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough
AND
nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation. | 178 | <h4>this sparks <u>global arms races</u> and <u>nuclear proliferation</u>. </h4><p><strong>Cole 15</strong> — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the Taipei Times, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” The National Interest, May 7th<u>, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)</p><p>White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s <strong>a recipe for chaos</strong>. By accumulating enough </p><p>AND</p><p></u>nuclear warheads? <u>Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage <strong>miscalculation</u></strong>.</p> | null | null | Deterrence DA | 84,873 | 109 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,216 | Impossible to say war is not possible --- multiple global hotspots | Mead 14 | Mead 14 [Walter Russell Mead, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, “Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?,” 7/7/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html] | the world is keeping its eyes peeled for chauffeurs and asking whether history could repeat great powers are at peace, and trade and cultural ties seem closer than ever before, yet international scene is brittle rising naval power is challenging established hegemon, and powder keg" region replete with ethnic and religious quarrels looks less stable In 1914, Germany was rising U.K. the weary hegemon and Balkans was the powder keg. In 2014, China is rising United States is staggering and the Middle East is the powder keg a few years ago western observers believed age of geopolitical rivalry and great power war was over religious wars exploding across the Middle East, and territorial disputes leading to one crisis after another outlook is darker Serious people ask whether we moved into a pre-war world MIDDLE EAST POWDER KEG the powder keg. cause of the fighting in World War I was the set of ethnic and religious conflicts in Balkans Middle East bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand China has emerged as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of growing wealth in military spending.¶ AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from the military balance isn't close Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.¶ If the slide into regional chaos continues and countries like China and Japan believe that direct action is needed to secure their oil supplies, almost anything could happen in a few years. ASIA IN 2014 IS NOT EUROPE IN 1914¶ RAILROADS THEN, DIGITAL NETWORKS AND DRONES NOW There was one more factor that contributed to the outbreak of World War I: technological change introduced new factors into warfare that policymakers failed to understand. the disruptive effect of technological change is greater than ever. New weapons systems emerge (like drones) that transform balance of power and set off new and unpredictable arms races information technology transforms battlefield, tech itself becomes a battleground in a new era in war. Disrupting the enemy's communications, attacking its information systems (through viruses, attacks on communications satellites and EMPs for example) and otherwise wreaking havoc in cyberspace is a new frontier in war which nobody really understands.¶ rapid pace of technological change makes it harder for policymakers to assess strength of their opponents even as it puts them under pressure to speed their deliberations in a time of crisis DON'T FORGET ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS existence of nuclear weapons has changed the terms on which great powers engage nations could hurl everything they had at one another in a struggle to the death; nuclear weapons change dynamic. No major war can be as politically straightforward as war has been prospect of nuclear escalation will inhibit both sides in future crises as it did the U.S. and the USSR The one thing we can say with certainty about the 21st century is this: peaceful or war-torn, it isn't going to be boring. | international scene is brittle naval power is challenging an established hegemon, an powder keg region replete with ethnic and religious quarrels looks less stab Germany was rising .K. the weary hegemon and Balkans was the powder keg China is rising, United States is staggering and the Middle East is the powder keg outlook is darker. Serious people ask whether we moved into MIDDLE EAST POWDER KEG Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from military balance isn't close almost anything could happen in a few years.¶ RAILROADS THEN, DIGITAL NETWORKS AND DRONES NOW disruptive effect of technological change is greater than ever DON'T FORGET ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS | One hundred years later, the world is nervously keeping its eyes peeled for misguided chauffeurs and asking itself whether history could repeat. The great powers are at peace, and trade and cultural ties between nations seem closer than ever before, yet the international scene is in many ways surprisingly brittle. In particular, a rising naval power is challenging an established hegemon, and a "powder keg" region replete with ethnic and religious quarrels looks less stable by the day.¶ In 1914, Germany was the rising power, the U.K. the weary hegemon and the Balkans was the powder keg. In 2014, China is rising, the United States is staggering under the burden of world leadership and the Middle East is the powder keg.¶ Only a few years ago, most western observers believed that the age of geopolitical rivalry and great power war was over. Today, with Russian forces in Ukraine, religious wars exploding across the Middle East, and territorial disputes leading to one crisis after another in the East and South China seas, the outlook is darker. Serious people now ask whether we have moved from a post-war into a pre-war world. Could some incident somewhere in the world spark another global war?¶ MIDDLE EAST POWDER KEG¶ Let's start with the powder keg. The immediate cause of the fighting in World War I was the set of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans. In the second half of the 19th century, economic development and modernization led to heightened competition among the region's peoples. The drive for self-determination set Croats, Serbs, Magyars, Kosovars, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks and others at one another's throats. The death toll mounted and the hatred grew as massacres and ethnic cleansing spread -- and the ability of the outside powers to control the region's dynamics shrank as the imperial powers were themselves undermined by rising social and nationalist tensions.¶ The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago.¶ GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW¶ What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms.¶ Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending.¶ But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible.¶ AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES¶ And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain.¶ Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close.¶ While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.¶ On the other hand, the Middle East's supplies of oil will keep China, as well as other powers, more involved in events there than geography would suggest. The Balkans had no products in 1914 that the rest of the world much cared about; the Middle East looms much larger in the global economy than the Balkan peninsula ever has. Already, countries including Russia and Iran have been involving themselves in Iraq. If the slide into regional chaos continues and countries like China and Japan believe that direct action is needed to secure their oil supplies, almost anything could happen in a few years.¶ ASIA IN 2014 IS NOT EUROPE IN 1914¶ Furthermore, the geopolitical situation of Xi's China is more different from that of Wilhelm's Germany than many observers realize. While it is true that many of the same forces that drove Germany toward war 100 years ago are present in China today (especially a public mood of nationalism and an aggressive military psychology among some of the armed forces leadership), there are differences as well.¶ In 1914, Germany was a rising empire surrounded by powers who were, and who felt themselves to be, in decline: Russia, Austria-Hungary, Britain, the Ottoman Empire and France all felt themselves to be in decline. China's neighbors today are growing China militarily and economically: South Korea, Australia, India, and the nations of South-East Asia. Germany's growing preponderance in Europe was tipping the balance of power toward instability. It's not yet clear that something like that will or can happen in Asia.¶ Besides the Germany/China parallel, there is the question of whether the U.S. today is beginning to resemble Great Britain. In 1914, Britain was the only global superpower in the sense that nobody had an empire as large, played as important a role in managing the world financial system, or provided the same kind of political and military security to the international system, but many in Britain were beginning to think that its best days were behind it.¶ By 1914, both the U.S. and Germany had passed Britain in economic terms, and internal political paralysis was turning the country inward. (The political struggles that would result in the partition of Ireland had much of the British army in a state approaching mutiny in the months before Sarajevo.)¶ A small but significant number of historians blame Great Britain, as well as Germany, for the outbreak of that conflict. France was the bitterest and most committed of Germany's enemies, but Germany (then Prussia) had beaten her soundly in the Franco-Prussian War one generation previously. France's ally Russia was a formidable power on paper, but the Japanese had savaged the Russians in the past decade, and a wave of revolutionary agitation nearly brought the Tsarist system to its knees.¶ Germany didn't think a war against those two powers would be a cakewalk, but Wilhelm and many of his advisors thought that Britain would stay out of any war over Serbia. The Kaiser, some argue, would probably have thought twice had he known that he would be fighting the full weight of Britain and her Empire. If the British had made clear to the Germans that they would stand by Russia and France, it is possible that German diplomacy in the fateful month of July 1914 would have reined in Austria-Hungary rather than egging it on.¶ AMERICA IN 2014 IS NOT QUITE BRITAIN IN 1914¶ Despite worries about the rise of China, the place of the United States at the pinnacle of world power is more secure today than Britain's was 100 years ago. The U.S. economy is a larger share of GDP, the U.S. military advantage is qualitatively greater than anything Britain ever enjoyed, and none of its political problems are as polarizing as the Irish question or the rise of a socialist working class party were for the U.K. in 1914.¶ Even so, it is possible that other powers may not be sure how committed the United States is to defending its allies or its interests around the world, and that can make bold or even rash moves look attractive.¶ It's possible, for example, that some people in the Chinese leadership look at President Obama's mixed messages about his "red lines" in Syria and wonder how seriously to take American red lines in the Pacific. Would the U.S. really go to war over a handful of uninhabited rocks scattered through the East and South China seas? Would we take stronger steps against an invasion of Taiwan than we have against Russia's conquest of the Crimea? Russia and Iran may be asking themselves similar questions and looking for places where they can push against what they see as weak spots in the U.S. alliance system. At the same time, countries that depend on U.S. guarantees (like Israel and Japan) may become more aggressive to deter potential adversaries.¶ RAILROADS THEN, DIGITAL NETWORKS AND DRONES NOW¶ There was one more factor that contributed to the outbreak of World War I: technological change introduced new factors into warfare that policymakers failed to understand. A driving force in the tragedy of 1914 was the impact that mobilization timetables had on diplomatic and military choices.¶ The development of national railroad networks in the 19th century allowed countries to call up reserves and mobilize their forces for war on an unprecedented scale. On the other hand, once your neighbor began to mobilize, you had to move yourself; otherwise, your armies would still be scattered while your neighbor had a large and powerful force on the frontier. Russia had the largest armies, but the size of its territory and the relatively backward state of its railroad network meant that it had to mobilize early in a crisis or risk being caught unprepared. But once Russia began to mobilize, Germany could not delay its own move much longer, and German mobilization forced France's hand. Few European policymakers on the day of Franz Ferdinand's death understood how railroad timetables would force their hands in the weeks ahead. ¶ Today the disruptive effect of technological change is greater than ever. New weapons systems emerge (like drones) that transform the balance of power and set off new and unpredictable arms races. As information technology transforms the battlefield, tech itself becomes a battleground in a new era in war. Disrupting the enemy's communications, attacking its information systems (through viruses, attacks on communications satellites and EMPs for example) and otherwise wreaking havoc in cyberspace is a new frontier in war which nobody really understands.¶ The rapid pace of technological change makes it harder for policymakers to assess the strength of their opponents even as it puts them under pressure to speed their deliberations in a time of crisis. No one wants to be the victim of a cyberspace version of Pearl Harbor, so leaders may feel forced to accelerate the move toward war before suffering a devastating attack.¶ Technological change had another, deeper role in the making of World War I. The unprecedented social shifts that accompanied the Industrial Revolution had a lot to do with the shifts in the balance of power and the rise of ideologies like nationalism and socialism that made the period so turbulent. We are certainly seeing that again today; globalization put societies all over the world under stress, and that stress often results in the rise of nationalist and even chauvinist political movements in some countries and religious fanaticism in others.¶ DON'T FORGET ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS¶ One more factor needs to be noted. The existence of nuclear weapons has changed the terms on which great powers engage. In 1914, nations could still hurl everything they had at one another in a struggle to the death; nuclear weapons change that dynamic. No major war can be as politically straightforward as war traditionally has been; the prospect of nuclear escalation will inhibit both sides in future crises as it did the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War.¶ ¶ NOT THE SAME, BUT ALSO NOT SO DIFFERENT¶ History, perhaps unfortunately, can't give us a clear answer to the question of whether we face anything like another Great War. Looking into the rear view mirror can only tell you so much about the conditions ahead. Our situation today is different enough from that of a century ago to make renewed great power war much less than a certainty, but there are enough troubling similarities that we can't rule the prospect out.¶ The one thing we can say with certainty about the 21st century is this: peaceful or war-torn, it isn't going to be boring. | 13,553 | <h4>Impossible to say war is not possible --- multiple global hotspots</h4><p><strong>Mead 14 </strong>[Walter Russell Mead, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, “Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?,” 7/7/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html]</p><p>One hundred years later, <u>the world is</u> nervously <u>keeping its eyes peeled for</u> misguided <u>chauffeurs and asking</u> itself <u>whether history could repeat</u>. The <u>great powers are at peace, and trade and cultural ties</u> between nations <u>seem closer than ever before, yet</u> the <u><mark>international scene</u> <u>is</u> </mark>in many ways surprisingly <u><strong><mark>brittle</u></strong></mark>. In particular, a <u>rising <mark>naval power is challenging</u> an <u>established hegemon, an</mark>d</u> a "<u><mark>powder keg</mark>" <mark>region</u> <u>replete with ethnic and religious quarrels looks less stab</mark>le</u> by the day.¶ <u><strong>In 1914, <mark>Germany was</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>rising</u></strong></mark> power, the <u><strong>U<mark>.K. the weary hegemon and</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>Balkans was the powder keg</mark>. In 2014, <mark>China is rising</u></strong>,</mark> the <u><strong><mark>United States is staggering</u></strong></mark> under the burden of world leadership <u><strong><mark>and the Middle East is the powder keg</u></strong></mark>.¶ Only <u>a few years ago</u>, most <u>western observers believed</u> that the <u>age of geopolitical rivalry and great power war was over</u>. Today, with Russian forces in Ukraine, <u>religious wars exploding across the Middle East, and territorial disputes leading to one crisis after another</u> in the East and South China seas, the <u><strong><mark>outlook is darker</u></strong>. <u>Serious people</u></mark> now <u><mark>ask whether</mark> <mark>we</u></mark> have <u><mark>moved</u></mark> from a post-war <u><strong><mark>into</mark> a pre-war world</u></strong>. Could some incident somewhere in the world spark another global war?¶ <u><strong><mark>MIDDLE EAST POWDER KEG</u></strong></mark>¶ Let's start with <u>the powder keg. </u>The immediate <u>cause of the fighting in World War I was the set of ethnic and religious conflicts in</u> the <u>Balkans</u>. In the second half of the 19th century, economic development and modernization led to heightened competition among the region's peoples. The drive for self-determination set Croats, Serbs, Magyars, Kosovars, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks and others at one another's throats. The death toll mounted and the hatred grew as massacres and ethnic cleansing spread -- and the ability of the outside powers to control the region's dynamics shrank as the imperial powers were themselves undermined by rising social and nationalist tensions.¶ The <u>Middle East</u> today <u>bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans</u> of that period. The <u>contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend</u> <u>of ethnicities and religions</u> uneasily <u>coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires</u>. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The <u>great powers</u> <u>are losing the ability to hold their clients in check</u>; the <u><strong><mark>Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region</u></strong></mark> was a century ago.¶ <u><strong><mark>GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW</u></strong></mark>¶ What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms.¶ Could something like that happen again? <u>China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand</u>. Like Germany in 1914, <u>China has emerged</u> in the last 30 years <u>as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of</u> its <u>growing wealth in military spending.¶</u> But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible.¶ <u><strong>AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES</u></strong>¶ And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain.¶ <u>Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer</u>; <u><strong><mark>while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from</u></strong></mark>, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, <u>the <mark>military balance isn't</u></mark> even <u><mark>close</u></mark>.¶ While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. <u>Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.¶</u> On the other hand, the Middle East's supplies of oil will keep China, as well as other powers, more involved in events there than geography would suggest. The Balkans had no products in 1914 that the rest of the world much cared about; the Middle East looms much larger in the global economy than the Balkan peninsula ever has. Already, countries including Russia and Iran have been involving themselves in Iraq. <u>If the slide into regional chaos continues and countries like China and Japan believe that direct action is needed to secure their oil supplies, <mark>almost <strong>anything could happen in a few years.</u></strong>¶</mark> <u>ASIA IN 2014 IS NOT EUROPE IN 1914¶</u> Furthermore, the geopolitical situation of Xi's China is more different from that of Wilhelm's Germany than many observers realize. While it is true that many of the same forces that drove Germany toward war 100 years ago are present in China today (especially a public mood of nationalism and an aggressive military psychology among some of the armed forces leadership), there are differences as well.¶ In 1914, Germany was a rising empire surrounded by powers who were, and who felt themselves to be, in decline: Russia, Austria-Hungary, Britain, the Ottoman Empire and France all felt themselves to be in decline. China's neighbors today are growing China militarily and economically: South Korea, Australia, India, and the nations of South-East Asia. Germany's growing preponderance in Europe was tipping the balance of power toward instability. It's not yet clear that something like that will or can happen in Asia.¶ Besides the Germany/China parallel, there is the question of whether the U.S. today is beginning to resemble Great Britain. In 1914, Britain was the only global superpower in the sense that nobody had an empire as large, played as important a role in managing the world financial system, or provided the same kind of political and military security to the international system, but many in Britain were beginning to think that its best days were behind it.¶ By 1914, both the U.S. and Germany had passed Britain in economic terms, and internal political paralysis was turning the country inward. (The political struggles that would result in the partition of Ireland had much of the British army in a state approaching mutiny in the months before Sarajevo.)¶ A small but significant number of historians blame Great Britain, as well as Germany, for the outbreak of that conflict. France was the bitterest and most committed of Germany's enemies, but Germany (then Prussia) had beaten her soundly in the Franco-Prussian War one generation previously. France's ally Russia was a formidable power on paper, but the Japanese had savaged the Russians in the past decade, and a wave of revolutionary agitation nearly brought the Tsarist system to its knees.¶ Germany didn't think a war against those two powers would be a cakewalk, but Wilhelm and many of his advisors thought that Britain would stay out of any war over Serbia. The Kaiser, some argue, would probably have thought twice had he known that he would be fighting the full weight of Britain and her Empire. If the British had made clear to the Germans that they would stand by Russia and France, it is possible that German diplomacy in the fateful month of July 1914 would have reined in Austria-Hungary rather than egging it on.¶ AMERICA IN 2014 IS NOT QUITE BRITAIN IN 1914¶ Despite worries about the rise of China, the place of the United States at the pinnacle of world power is more secure today than Britain's was 100 years ago. The U.S. economy is a larger share of GDP, the U.S. military advantage is qualitatively greater than anything Britain ever enjoyed, and none of its political problems are as polarizing as the Irish question or the rise of a socialist working class party were for the U.K. in 1914.¶ Even so, it is possible that other powers may not be sure how committed the United States is to defending its allies or its interests around the world, and that can make bold or even rash moves look attractive.¶ It's possible, for example, that some people in the Chinese leadership look at President Obama's mixed messages about his "red lines" in Syria and wonder how seriously to take American red lines in the Pacific. Would the U.S. really go to war over a handful of uninhabited rocks scattered through the East and South China seas? Would we take stronger steps against an invasion of Taiwan than we have against Russia's conquest of the Crimea? Russia and Iran may be asking themselves similar questions and looking for places where they can push against what they see as weak spots in the U.S. alliance system. At the same time, countries that depend on U.S. guarantees (like Israel and Japan) may become more aggressive to deter potential adversaries.¶ <u><strong><mark>RAILROADS THEN, DIGITAL NETWORKS AND DRONES NOW</u></strong></mark>¶ <u>There was one more factor that contributed to the outbreak of World War I: technological change introduced new factors into warfare that policymakers failed to understand.</u> A driving force in the tragedy of 1914 was the impact that mobilization timetables had on diplomatic and military choices.¶ The development of national railroad networks in the 19th century allowed countries to call up reserves and mobilize their forces for war on an unprecedented scale. On the other hand, once your neighbor began to mobilize, you had to move yourself; otherwise, your armies would still be scattered while your neighbor had a large and powerful force on the frontier. Russia had the largest armies, but the size of its territory and the relatively backward state of its railroad network meant that it had to mobilize early in a crisis or risk being caught unprepared. But once Russia began to mobilize, Germany could not delay its own move much longer, and German mobilization forced France's hand. Few European policymakers on the day of Franz Ferdinand's death understood how railroad timetables would force their hands in the weeks ahead. ¶ Today <u>the <mark>disruptive effect of technological change is greater than ever</mark>. New weapons systems emerge (like drones) that transform</u> the <u>balance of power and set off new and <strong>unpredictable arms races</u></strong>. As <u><strong>information technology transforms</u></strong> the <u><strong>battlefield, tech itself becomes a battleground in a new era in war. </strong>Disrupting the enemy's communications, attacking its information systems (through viruses, attacks on communications satellites and EMPs for example) and otherwise wreaking havoc in cyberspace is a new frontier in war which nobody really understands.¶</u> The <u>rapid pace of technological change makes it harder for policymakers to assess</u> the <u>strength of their opponents even as it puts them under pressure to speed their <strong>deliberations in a time of crisis</u></strong>. No one wants to be the victim of a cyberspace version of Pearl Harbor, so leaders may feel forced to accelerate the move toward war before suffering a devastating attack.¶ Technological change had another, deeper role in the making of World War I. The unprecedented social shifts that accompanied the Industrial Revolution had a lot to do with the shifts in the balance of power and the rise of ideologies like nationalism and socialism that made the period so turbulent. We are certainly seeing that again today; globalization put societies all over the world under stress, and that stress often results in the rise of nationalist and even chauvinist political movements in some countries and religious fanaticism in others.¶ <u><strong><mark>DON'T FORGET ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS</u></strong></mark>¶ One more factor needs to be noted. The <u>existence of nuclear weapons has changed the terms on which great powers engage</u>. In 1914, <u>nations could</u> still <u>hurl everything they had at one another in a struggle to the death; nuclear weapons change</u> that <u>dynamic. No major war</u> <u>can be as politically straightforward as war</u> traditionally <u>has been</u>; the <u><strong>prospect of nuclear escalation will inhibit both sides</u></strong> <u>in future crises as it did the U.S. and the USSR</u> during the Cold War.¶ ¶ NOT THE SAME, BUT ALSO NOT SO DIFFERENT¶ History, perhaps unfortunately, can't give us a clear answer to the question of whether we face anything like another Great War. Looking into the rear view mirror can only tell you so much about the conditions ahead. Our situation today is different enough from that of a century ago to make renewed great power war much less than a certainty, but there are enough troubling similarities that we can't rule the prospect out.¶ <u>The one thing we can say with certainty about the 21st century is this: peaceful or war-torn, it isn't going to be boring. </p></u> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 66,347 | 161 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,217 | proliferation causes nuclear war — turns the case. | Utgoff 2 , Volume 44, Number 2, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90) | Utgoff 2 — Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and senior member of the National Security Council Staff, 2002 (“Proliferation, Missile Defence And American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out | AND
a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations | null | AND
a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. | 67 | <h4>proliferation causes <u>nuclear war</u> — turns the case. </h4><p><strong>Utgoff 2</strong> — Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and senior member of the National Security Council Staff, 2002 (“Proliferation, Missile Defence And American Ambitions,” Survival<u><strong>, Volume 44, Number 2, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90)</p><p></strong>In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional <strong>shoot-out </p><p>AND</p><p></strong>a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even <strong>whole nations</u></strong>.</p> | null | null | Deterrence DA | 1,560,717 | 2 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,218 | High magnitude, low probability events first – aggregate probability meets your framework, math yo, scientific uncertainty | Bostrom 13 #THUR} | Bostrom 13 {Nick, Philosopher and professor (Oxford), Ph.D. (LSOE), director of The Future of Humanity Institute and the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, of course, he’s also the inaugural recipient of “The Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement,” “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy, Vol 4, Issue 1, http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html#THUR} | existential risk threatens the premature extinction of Earth Although it is difficult to assess the probability of existential risks, there are reasons to suppose that the total such risk is significant Estimates of 20% risk are fairly typical the strongest reason for judging the total existential risk within the next few centuries to be significant is the extreme magnitude of the values at stake. Even a small probability of existential catastrophe could be highly practically significant Humanity has survived natural existential risks for hundreds of thousands of years; In contrast our species is introducing new kinds threats we have no track record of surviving Consideration of specific existential-risk scenarios bears out the suspicion that the great bulk of existential risk consists of anthropogenic existential risks As our powers expand, so will the scale of their potential consequences The bulk of existential risk over the next century may thus reside in rather speculative scenarios to which we cannot assign precise probabilities But the fact that the probability of some risk is difficult to quantify does not imply that the risk is negligible. Probability can be understood in different senses here If something cannot presently be known to be objectively safe, it is risky at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making The uncertainty and error-proneness of our first-order assessments of risk is something we must factor into our all-things-considered probability assignments This dominates in low-probability, high-consequence risks especially involving poorly understood phenomena social dynamics, or technology that are difficult to assess Suppose analysis A indicates catastrophe X has an extremely small probability Then the probability A has some hidden crucial flaw may easily be much greater Furthermore, the conditional probability of X given that A is crucially flawed may be high We may then find that most of the risk of X resides in the uncertainty of our scientific assessment | existential risk threatens premature extinction Although difficult to assess probability there are reasons to suppose that such risk is significant the extreme magnitude of the values at stake Even a small probability could be highly practically significant our species is introducing new threats Consideration of specific existential-risk scenarios bears The bulk of scenarios which we cannot assign precise probabilities But that does not imply the risk is negligible The uncertainty and error-proneness of our first-order assessments of risk is something we must factor in This dominates -probability, high-consequence risks | 1. The maxipok rule 1.1. Existential risk and uncertainty An existential risk is one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development (Bostrom 2002). Although it is often difficult to assess the probability of existential risks, there are many reasons to suppose that the total such risk confronting humanity over the next few centuries is significant. Estimates of 10-20% total existential risk in this century are fairly typical among those who have examined the issue, though inevitably such estimates rely heavily on subjective judgment.1 The most reasonable estimate might be substantially higher or lower. But perhaps the strongest reason for judging the total existential risk within the next few centuries to be significant is the extreme magnitude of the values at stake. Even a small probability of existential catastrophe could be highly practically significant (Bostrom 2003; Matheny 2007; Posner 2004; Weitzman 2009). Humanity has survived what we might call natural existential risks for hundreds of thousands of years; thus it is prima facie unlikely that any of them will do us in within the next hundred.2 This conclusion is buttressed when we analyze specific risks from nature, such as asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, earthquakes, gamma-ray bursts, and so forth: Empirical impact distributions and scientific models suggest that the likelihood of extinction because of these kinds of risk is extremely small on a time scale of a century or so.3 In contrast, our species is introducing entirely new kinds of existential risk — threats we have no track record of surviving. Our longevity as a species therefore offers no strong prior grounds for confident optimism. Consideration of specific existential-risk scenarios bears out the suspicion that the great bulk of existential risk in the foreseeable future consists of anthropogenic existential risks — that is, those arising from human activity. In particular, most of the biggest existential risks seem to be linked to potential future technological breakthroughs that may radically expand our ability to manipulate the external world or our own biology. As our powers expand, so will the scale of their potential consequences — intended and unintended, positive and negative. For example, there appear to be significant existential risks in some of the advanced forms of biotechnology, molecular nanotechnology, and machine intelligence that might be developed in the decades ahead. The bulk of existential risk over the next century may thus reside in rather speculative scenarios to which we cannot assign precise probabilities through any rigorous statistical or scientific method. But the fact that the probability of some risk is difficult to quantify does not imply that the risk is negligible. Probability can be understood in different senses. Most relevant here is the epistemic sense in which probability is construed as (something like) the credence that an ideally reasonable observer should assign to the risk's materializing based on currently available evidence.4 If something cannot presently be known to be objectively safe, it is risky at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. An empty cave is unsafe in just this sense if you cannot tell whether or not it is home to a hungry lion. It would be rational for you to avoid the cave if you reasonably judge that the expected harm of entry outweighs the expected benefit. The uncertainty and error-proneness of our first-order assessments of risk is itself something we must factor into our all-things-considered probability assignments. This factor often dominates in low-probability, high-consequence risks — especially those involving poorly understood natural phenomena, complex social dynamics, or new technology, or that are difficult to assess for other reasons. Suppose that some scientific analysis A indicates that some catastrophe X has an extremely small probability P(X) of occurring. Then the probability that A has some hidden crucial flaw may easily be much greater than P(X).5 Furthermore, the conditional probability of X given that A is crucially flawed, P(X|¬A), may be fairly high. We may then find that most of the risk of X resides in the uncertainty of our scientific assessment that P(X) was small (figure 1) (Ord, Hillerbrand and Sandberg 2010). | 4,459 | <h4>High magnitude, low probability events first – aggregate probability meets your framework, math yo, scientific uncertainty </h4><p><strong>Bostrom 13 </strong>{Nick, Philosopher and professor (Oxford), Ph.D. (LSOE), director of The Future of Humanity Institute and the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, of course, he’s also the inaugural recipient of “The Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement,” “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy, Vol 4, Issue 1, http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html<strong>#THUR}</p><p></strong>1. The maxipok rule 1.1. Existential risk and uncertainty An <u><mark>existential risk</mark> </u>is one that <u><mark>threatens</mark> the <mark>premature extinction</mark> of Earth</u>-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development (Bostrom 2002). <u><mark>Although</mark> it is</u> often <u><mark>difficult to assess</mark> the <mark>probability</mark> of existential risks, <mark>there are</u></mark> many <u><mark>reasons to suppose that </mark>the total <mark>such risk</u></mark> confronting humanity over the next few centuries <u><mark>is <strong>significant</u></strong></mark>. <u>Estimates of </u>10-<u>20%</u> total existential <u>risk</u> in this century <u>are fairly typical</u> among those who have examined the issue, though inevitably such estimates rely heavily on subjective judgment.1 The most reasonable estimate might be substantially higher or lower. But perhaps <u>the strongest reason for judging the total existential risk within the next few centuries to be significant is <mark>the <strong>extreme magnitude of the values</strong> at stake</mark>. <strong><mark>Even a small probability</strong></mark> of existential catastrophe <strong><mark>could be highly practically significant</strong></mark> </u>(Bostrom 2003; Matheny 2007; Posner 2004; Weitzman 2009). <u>Humanity has survived</u> what we might call <u>natural existential risks for hundreds of thousands of years;</u> thus it is prima facie unlikely that any of them will do us in within the next hundred.2 This conclusion is buttressed when we analyze specific risks from nature, such as asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, earthquakes, gamma-ray bursts, and so forth: Empirical impact distributions and scientific models suggest that the likelihood of extinction because of these kinds of risk is extremely small on a time scale of a century or so.3 <u>In contrast</u>, <u><mark>our species is introducing</u></mark> entirely <u><mark>new</u></mark> <u>kinds </u>of existential risk — <u><mark>threats</mark> we have no track record of surviving</u>. Our longevity as a species therefore offers no strong prior grounds for confident optimism. <u><mark>Consideration of specific existential-risk scenarios bears</mark> out the suspicion that the great bulk of existential risk </u>in the foreseeable future <u>consists of anthropogenic existential risks </u>— that is, those arising from human activity. In particular, most of the biggest existential risks seem to be linked to potential future technological breakthroughs that may radically expand our ability to manipulate the external world or our own biology. <u>As our powers expand, so will the scale of their potential consequences</u> — intended and unintended, positive and negative. For example, there appear to be significant existential risks in some of the advanced forms of biotechnology, molecular nanotechnology, and machine intelligence that might be developed in the decades ahead. <u><mark>The bulk of</mark> existential risk over the next century may thus reside in rather speculative <mark>scenarios</mark> to <mark>which <strong>we cannot assign precise probabilities</u></strong></mark> through any rigorous statistical or scientific method. <u><mark>But</mark> the fact <mark>that</mark> the probability of some risk is difficult to quantify <strong><mark>does not imply</mark> that <mark>the risk is negligible</strong></mark>. Probability can be understood in <strong>different senses</u></strong>. Most relevant <u>here</u> is the epistemic sense in which probability is construed as (something like) the credence that an ideally reasonable observer should assign to the risk's materializing based on currently available evidence.4 <u>If something cannot presently be known to be objectively safe, it is risky at least in the subjective sense</u> <u>relevant to decision making</u>. An empty cave is unsafe in just this sense if you cannot tell whether or not it is home to a hungry lion. It would be rational for you to avoid the cave if you reasonably judge that the expected harm of entry outweighs the expected benefit. <u><mark>The <strong>uncertainty and error-proneness</strong> of our first-order assessments of risk is</u></mark> itself <u><mark>something <strong>we must factor</strong> in</mark>to our all-things-considered probability assignments</u>. <u><mark>This</u></mark> factor often <u><strong><mark>dominates</mark> in low<mark>-probability, high-consequence</strong> <strong>risks</u></strong></mark> — <u>especially</u> those <u>involving</u> <u>poorly</u> <u>understood</u> natural <u>phenomena</u>, complex <u>social dynamics, or</u> new <u>technology</u>, or <u>that are difficult to assess</u> for other reasons. <u>Suppose</u> that some scientific <u>analysis A indicates</u> that some <u>catastrophe X has an extremely small probability</u> P(X) of occurring. <u>Then the probability</u> that <u>A has some hidden crucial flaw may easily be much greater</u> than P(X).5 <u>Furthermore, the conditional probability of X given that A is crucially flawed</u>, P(X|¬A), <u>may be</u> fairly <u>high</u>. <u>We may then find that most of the risk of X resides in the uncertainty of our scientific assessment</u> that P(X) was small (figure 1) (Ord, Hillerbrand and Sandberg 2010). </p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 49,097 | 500 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,219 | The DA turns the case — the plan accelerates Chinese expansionism and increases the risk of war. | Cole 15 | Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the Taipei Times, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” The National Interest, April 23rd, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-let-china-swallow-taiwan-12708?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016) | the punditry is
, rather than ease tensions, would risk much greater instability in future | null | With the prospects of a transition of power next year, the punditry is once
AND
, rather than ease tensions, would risk much greater instability in future. | 155 | <h4>The DA turns the case — the plan <u>accelerates</u> Chinese expansionism and <u>increases</u> the risk of war. </h4><p><strong>Cole 15</strong> — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the Taipei Times, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” The National Interest, April 23rd, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-let-china-swallow-taiwan-12708?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p>With the prospects of a transition of power next year, <u>the punditry is</u> once </p><p>AND</p><p><u>, rather than ease tensions, would risk <strong>much greater instability</strong> in future</u>.</p> | null | null | Deterrence DA | 1,560,718 | 1 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,220 | Possibilistic thinking best for decision-making – reject their all and always that probability comes first – it balances probabilistic thinking | Clarke 5 #THUR} | Clarke 5 {Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Lee Clarke's Worst Cases: An Interview with Lee Clarke,” UChicago press, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/108597in.html#THUR} | Why focus on worst cases Why not focus on scenarios that have a greater degree of probability we can use possibilistic thinking to balance probabilistic thinking probabilism has come to be thought of as the only way to reason rationally. But I think that it sometimes makes perfectly good sense to take worst case consequences into account the chances of getting into a commercial airline crash are extremely low But they also know what happens if the plane gets into serious trouble at thirty thousand feet. That’s worst case, possibilistic thinking. It is reasonable to worry about both. worst cases probably won’t happen. Still, as Sagan said, things that have never happened before happen all the time think of Chernobyl or 9/11. They had a low probability but who would say now that we should have ignored them? It’s the same as life insurance. Is that irrational? Not at all. We say that people who don’t buy life insurance are irresponsible. | we can use possibilistic thinking to balance probabilistic thinking it sometimes makes perfectly good sense to take worst case consequences into account the chances of getting into a commercial airline crash are low But they know what happens if the plane gets into trouble It is reasonable to worry about both things that have never happened before happen all the time think of Chernobyl or 9/11 They had low probability but who would say that we should have ignored them? | Question: Why focus on worst cases? They probably won’t happen, right? Why not focus on scenarios that have a greater degree of probability? Lee Clarke: One of the main ideas in Worst Cases is that we can use possibilistic thinking to balance probabilistic thinking. Over the past couple of hundred years probabilism has come to be thought of as the only way to reason rationally. But I think that it sometimes makes perfectly good sense to take worst case consequences into account when people are making decisions. For example, the chances of getting into a commercial airline crash are extremely low. People who fly know that, and that’s why they’re willing to defy gravity every day. But they also know what happens if the plane gets into serious trouble at thirty thousand feet. That’s worst case, possibilistic thinking. It is reasonable to worry about both. It is true, in a sense, that worst cases probably won’t happen. Still, as the political scientist Scott Sagan has said, things that have never happened before happen all the time. Just think of Chernobyl or 9/11. They had a low probability of occurring at any given time, but who would say now that we should have ignored them? It’s the same kind of thing as when you buy life insurance. Is it likely that you will die today? Probably not. But if you have life insurance you’re actually betting the insurance company that, in fact, you will die today. Is that irrational? Not at all. We say that people who don’t buy life insurance are irresponsible. | 1,515 | <h4>Possibilistic thinking best for decision-making – reject their all and always that probability comes first – <strong>it balances probabilistic thinking </h4><p>Clarke 5 </strong>{Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Lee Clarke's Worst Cases: An Interview with Lee Clarke,” UChicago press, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/108597in.html<u><strong>#THUR}</p><p></u></strong>Question: <u>Why focus on worst cases</u>? They probably won’t happen, right? <u>Why not focus on scenarios that have a greater degree of probability</u>? Lee Clarke: One of the main ideas in Worst Cases is that <u><mark>we can use possibilistic thinking to <strong>balance probabilistic thinking</u></strong></mark>. Over the past couple of hundred years <u>probabilism has come to be thought of as the only way to reason rationally. But I think that <mark>it sometimes makes <strong>perfectly good sense</strong> to take worst case consequences into account</u></mark> when people are making decisions. For example, <u><mark>the chances of getting into a commercial airline crash are</mark> extremely <mark>low</u></mark>. People who fly know that, and that’s why they’re willing to defy gravity every day. <u><strong><mark>But they</mark> also <mark>know</strong> what happens if the plane gets into</mark> serious <mark>trouble</mark> at thirty thousand feet. That’s worst case, possibilistic thinking. <strong><mark>It is reasonable to worry about both</strong></mark>. </u>It is true, in a sense, that <u>worst cases probably won’t happen. Still, as</u> the political scientist Scott <u>Sagan</u> has <u>said, <mark>things that have never happened before <strong>happen all the time</u></strong></mark>. Just <u><mark>think of Chernobyl or 9/11</mark>. <mark>They had</mark> a <mark>low probability</u></mark> of occurring at any given time, <u><mark>but <strong>who would say</mark> now</strong> <mark>that we should have ignored them?</mark> It’s the same</u> kind of thing <u>as</u> when you buy <u>life insurance. </u>Is it likely that you will die today? Probably not. But if you have life insurance you’re actually betting the insurance company that, in fact, you will die today. <u>Is that irrational? <strong>Not at all</strong>. We say that people who don’t buy life insurance are <strong>irresponsible. </p></u></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 74,422 | 56 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,221 | Xi has the necessary clout to implement his economic reforms now | Li 15 | Li 15 (Dr. Cheng Li, master's in Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. He worked in China from 1993 to 1995 as a fellow with the U.S.-based Institute of Current World Affairs, “China’s Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India and the United States,” pg. online @ http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-china-domestic-dynamics-us-india-implications-li) | China is again at crossroads in its domestic politics in
AND | null | China is again at crossroads in its domestic politics. After becoming party boss in
AND
, which may help him build a Mao-like image and legacy. | 143 | <h4><strong>Xi has the necessary clout to implement his economic reforms now </h4><p>Li 15 <u></strong>(Dr. Cheng Li, master's in Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. He worked in China from 1993 to 1995 as a fellow with the U.S.-based Institute of Current World Affairs, “China’s Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India and the United States,” pg. online @ http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-china-domestic-dynamics-us-india-implications-li)</p><p>China is again at crossroads in its domestic politics</u>. After becoming party boss <u>in </p><p>AND</p><p></u>, which may help him build a Mao-like image and legacy.</p> | null | null | Chinese Politics DA | 1,560,719 | 9 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,222 | Especially true for policymakers | null | Brock ‘87 | When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth--all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead--comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the public domain? What are they doing there | When philosophers become participants in policy-making are no longer academics the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to policy consequences | [Daniel. Prof of Philosophy and Ethics at Brown. “Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making” Ethics, Vol 97. N2. July 1987. Ebsco//GBS-JV]
When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth--all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead--comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead, I believe that if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly. Why is this so?¶ The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences—they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions—whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people.¶ The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the public domain? What are they doing there? | 3,018 | <h4><strong>Especially true for policymakers</h4><p></strong>Brock ‘87</p><p>[Daniel. Prof of Philosophy and Ethics at Brown. “Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making” Ethics, Vol 97. N2. July 1987. Ebsco//GBS-JV]</p><p><u><strong><mark>When philosophers become</mark> more or less direct <mark>participants in</mark> the <mark>policy-making</mark> process and so <mark>are no longer academics</mark> just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth--all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead--comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face</u></strong>. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that <u><strong><mark>the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners</mark>. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead</u></strong>, I believe that <u><strong>if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there <mark>they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will</mark> as well often <mark>fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly</u></strong></mark>. Why is this so?¶ The central point of conflict is that <u><strong><mark>the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect</u></strong></mark>. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences—they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions—whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that <u><strong>persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. <mark>When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to </mark>the <mark>policy consequences </mark>of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the public domain? What are they doing there</u>?</p></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 84,747 | 154 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,223 | Clinton winning now but it will be close---post convention bump diminishing and negative news stories damage image | Agiesta 9/2, CNN polling director, 9/2/16, “CNN Poll of Polls: Clinton's lead cut in half,” http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/politics/cnn-poll-of-polls-clinton-leads-trump/index.html | Jennifer Agiesta 9/2, CNN polling director, 9/2/16, “CNN Poll of Polls: Clinton's lead cut in half,” http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/politics/cnn-poll-of-polls-clinton-leads-trump/index.html
CNN's latest Poll of Polls finds Hillary Clinton's lead over Donald Trump has been cut | AND | null | AND
46% far outpaced Trump's 39% average in early August. | 57 | <h4>Clinton winning now but it will be <u>close</u>---post convention bump <u>diminishing</u> and negative news stories <u>damage image </h4><p></u>Jennifer <strong>Agiesta 9/2<u>, CNN polling director, 9/2/16, “CNN Poll of Polls: Clinton's lead cut in half,” http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/politics/cnn-poll-of-polls-clinton-leads-trump/index.html</p><p></u></strong>CNN's latest Poll of Polls finds Hillary <u><strong>Clinton's lead over Donald Trump has been cut </p><p>AND</p><p></u></strong>46% far outpaced Trump's 39% average in early August.</p> | null | null | Elections DA | 1,560,720 | 3 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,224 | Giving up in the SCS directly goes against the realists and hardliners in the CCP—creates factional fights and stagnation | Zheng 6/23 | Zheng 6/23 – Feng, Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs and an adjunct professor at the National Institute of South China Sea studies in China. He is the author of Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History, “The Fight in China over the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, 6/23/16, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/23/the-fight-inside-china-over-the-south-china-sea-beijing-divided-three-camps///NF | With a decision from an international ad hoc tribunal tasked with reviewing China’s maritime claims
AND
they wish only to maximize China’s self-interest. | null | With a decision from an international ad hoc tribunal tasked with reviewing China’s maritime claims
AND
the outside world; they wish only to maximize China’s self-interest. | 172 | <h4>Giving up in the SCS <u>directly</u> goes against the realists and hardliners in the CCP—creates <u>factional fights</u> and stagnation</h4><p><strong>Zheng 6/23<u></strong> – Feng, Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs and an adjunct professor at the National Institute of South China Sea studies in China. He is the author of Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History, “The Fight in China over the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, 6/23/16, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/23/the-fight-inside-china-over-the-south-china-sea-beijing-divided-three-camps///NF</p><p>With a decision from an international ad hoc tribunal tasked with reviewing China’s maritime claims </p><p><strong>AND</p><p></u></strong>the outside world; <u><strong>they wish only to maximize China’s self-interest.</p></u></strong> | null | null | Chinese Politics DA | 1,560,721 | 2 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,225 | All lives are equally valuable – you should vote to minimize the number of lives lost | null | Cummisky ‘96 | On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better. | why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can the more persons with dignity saved, the better | (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)
Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better. | 1,338 | <h4><strong>All lives are equally valuable – you should vote to minimize the number of lives lost </h4><p></strong>Cummisky ‘96</p><p>(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)</p><p>Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. <u><strong>On the extreme interpretation, <mark>why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons</mark>? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one.</u></strong> Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of one, <u><strong><mark>each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can</mark>. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that <mark>the more persons with dignity</mark> who are <mark>saved, the better</mark>.</p></u></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 84,751 | 179 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,226 | The public is opposed to positive moves toward China because of a fear of declining US status – it has the potential to become a major campaign issue | Wike, 3/30 | Wike, 3/30/2016, director of global attitudes research at Pew Research Center (Richard, “6 facts about how Americans and Chinese see each other”, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/6-facts-about-how-americans-and-chinese-see-each-other/) | Jinping is visiting Washington in a major global
AND | null | Chinese President Xi Jinping is visiting Washington this week to participate in a major global
AND
2012 poll, compared with 40% of the 50 and older group. | 154 | <h4><strong>The public is opposed to positive moves toward China because of a fear of declining US status – it has the potential to become a major campaign issue</h4><p>Wike, 3/30<u></strong>/2016, director of global attitudes research at Pew Research Center (Richard, “6 facts about how Americans and Chinese see each other”, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/6-facts-about-how-americans-and-chinese-see-each-other/)</p><p></u>Chinese President Xi <u>Jinping is visiting Washington</u> this week to participate <u>in a major global </p><p>AND</p><p></u><strong>2012 poll, compared with 40% of the 50 and older group.</p></strong> | null | null | Elections DA | 1,560,722 | 4 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,227 | That failure collapses the CCP’s economy. | Sisci, Senior Research Associate of China Renmin University, 2016 | Sisci, Senior Research Associate of China Renmin University, 2016 Frenseco, “Latest China stock crash spotlights urgent need for financial reform: Sisci”1/5 http://atimes.com/2016/01/latest-china-stock-crash-spotlights-urgent-need-for-financial-reform-sisci/
The crash of the Chinese stock market on the first day of trading in 2016 | AND
of Chinese politics | null | AND
of Chinese politics (See Xi’s Reforms to Make Military Slimmer and Stronger) | 80 | <h4>That failure collapses the CCP’s economy. </h4><p><strong>Sisci, Senior Research Associate of China Renmin University, 2016</strong> Frenseco<u>, “Latest China stock crash spotlights urgent need for financial reform: Sisci”1/5 http://atimes.com/2016/01/latest-china-stock-crash-spotlights-urgent-need-for-financial-reform-sisci/</p><p>The crash of the Chinese stock market on the first day of trading in 2016 </p><p>AND</p><p><strong>of Chinese politics</u></strong> (See Xi’s Reforms to Make Military Slimmer and Stronger)</p> | null | null | Chinese Politics DA | 1,560,723 | 5 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,228 | Nuclear war’s a game-changer | null | Bok ‘88 | No one with concern for humanity could will to risk eliminating humanity or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be , “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish | No one with concern for humanity could risk eliminating humanity for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be irrational although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish | (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)
The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. | 1,314 | <h4><strong>Nuclear war’s a game-changer</h4><p></strong>Bok ‘88</p><p>(Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)</p><p>The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” <u><mark>No one with</mark> </u>a <u><mark>concern for humanity could</mark> </u>consistently <u>will to <mark>risk eliminating humanity</u></mark> in the person of himself and every other <u>or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends <mark>for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be</u></mark>, as Rawls said<u>, “<mark>irrational</mark>, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but</u> that one <u>merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.</u> For <u><strong><mark>although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit</u></strong></mark>, the Latin maxim presents a case where <u><strong><mark>we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of</u></strong></mark> deceiving, bribing, <u><strong><mark>even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish</u></mark>.</p></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 84,753 | 176 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,229 | China policy is polarizing -- Trump will take advantage of perceived Democratic weakness to spin himself as tough on China | Sevastopulo and Donnan 2015 | Sevastopulo and Donnan, 8/26/2015, Washington Bureau Chief at Financial Times; global trade and development lead for the Financial Times (Demetri and Shawn, “Republicans line up for potshots at China”, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ced1bce8-4baa-11e5-a089-1a3e2cd1819b.html?siteedition=intl#axzz49ycfnenD) | Jinping arrives in Washington next month for his first state visit
AND
the creation of a climate that is less welcoming to foreign business | null | When Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives in Washington next month for his first state visit
AND
and the creation of a climate that is less welcoming to foreign business. | 170 | <h4><strong>China policy is polarizing -- Trump will take advantage of perceived Democratic weakness to spin himself as tough on China</h4><p>Sevastopulo and Donnan</strong>, 8/26/<strong>2015<u></strong>, Washington Bureau Chief at Financial Times; global trade and development lead for the Financial Times (Demetri and Shawn, “Republicans line up for potshots at China”, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ced1bce8-4baa-11e5-a089-1a3e2cd1819b.html?siteedition=intl#axzz49ycfnenD)</p><p></u>When Chinese President Xi <u>Jinping arrives in Washington next month for his first state visit </p><p>AND</p><p></u>and <u>the creation of a climate that is less welcoming to foreign business</u>. </p> | null | null | Elections DA | 1,560,724 | 10 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,230 | Economic collapse causes great power war and miscalculation over Taiwan and turns their territory scenarios. | Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2015 | Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2015 Ted, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?” 9/6 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784
Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence | miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned. | null | AND
miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned. | 81 | <h4>Economic collapse causes great power war and miscalculation over Taiwan and turns their territory scenarios. </h4><p><strong>Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2015</strong> Ted, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?” 9/6 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784</p><p><u>Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market</u> and mounting evidence </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.</p></u></strong> | null | null | Chinese Politics DA | 1,092,588 | 9 | 125,988 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | 659,588 | N | Berkeley | 6 | Kent Denver HR | Wayne Tang | 1AC - Taiwan Grand Bargain
1NC - Military T Deterrence DA Strategic Clarity CP Chinese Politics DA Case
2NR - Strategic Clarity CP Deterrence DA Case | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Berkeley-Round6.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,231 | Structural violence doesn’t escalate | null | Robert Hinde and Lea Pulkkinnen, Cambridge psychology professor and University of Jyväskylä psychology professor, 2000, DRAFT Background Paper for Working Group 1: HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR, 50th Pugwash Conference On Science and World Affairs: "Eliminating the Causes of War" Queens' College, Cambridge, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG1draft1.htm | anger need not give rise to hostility, and aggression Some conflict is often present between groups we are concerned with factors that make conflicts escalate bases of individual aggressiveness are different from mob violence, and pressing the button in a large war violence always has multiple causes, and the causal factors remain unexplored. | anger need not give rise to aggression Some conflict is often present between groups we are concerned with factors that make conflicts escalate bases of individual aggressiveness are different from mob violence, and pressing the button in a large war. | People are capable of perpetrating the most terrible acts of violence on their fellows. From before recorded history humans have killed humans, and violence is potentially present in every society. There is no escaping the fact that the capacity to develop a propensity for violence is part of human nature. But that does not mean that aggression is inevitable: temporary anger need not give rise to persistent hostility, and hostility need not give rise to acts of aggression. And people also have the capacity to care for the needs of others, and are capable of acts of great altruism and self-sacrifice. A subsidiary aim of this workshop is to identify the factors that make aggressive tendencies predominate over the cooperative and compassionate ones. Some degree of conflict of interest is often present in relationships between individuals, in the relations between groups of individuals within states, and in the relations between states: we are concerned with the factors that make such conflicts escalate into violence. The answer to that question depends critically on the context. While there may be some factors in common, the bases of individual aggressiveness are very different from those involved in mob violence, and they differ yet again from the factors influencing the bomb-aimer pressing the button in a large scale international war. In considering whether acts which harm others are a consequence of the aggressive motivation of individuals, it is essential to recognise the diversity of such acts, which include interactions between individuals, violence between groups, and wars of the WW2 type. We shall see that, with increasing social complexity, individual aggressiveness becomes progressively less important, but other aspects of human nature come to contribute to group phenomena. Although research on human violence has focussed too often on the importance of one factor or another, it is essential to remember that violence always has multiple causes, and the interactions between the causal factors remain largely unexplored. | 2,060 | <h4><strong>Structural violence doesn’t escalate</h4><p></strong>Robert Hinde and Lea Pulkkinnen, Cambridge psychology professor and University of Jyväskylä psychology professor, 2000, DRAFT Background Paper for Working Group 1: HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR, 50th Pugwash Conference On Science and World Affairs: "Eliminating the Causes of War" Queens' College, Cambridge, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG1draft1.htm</p><p>People are capable of perpetrating the most terrible acts of violence on their fellows. From before recorded history humans have killed humans, and violence is potentially present in every society. There is no escaping the fact that the capacity to develop a propensity for violence is part of human nature. But that does not mean that aggression is inevitable: temporary <u><strong><mark>anger need not give rise to</u></strong></mark> persistent <u><strong>hostility, and</u></strong> hostility need not give rise to acts of <u><strong><mark>aggression</u></strong></mark>. And people also have the capacity to care for the needs of others, and are capable of acts of great altruism and self-sacrifice. A subsidiary aim of this workshop is to identify the factors that make aggressive tendencies predominate over the cooperative and compassionate ones. <u><strong><mark>Some</u></strong></mark> degree of <u><strong><mark>conflict</u></strong></mark> of interest <u><strong><mark>is often present</u></strong></mark> in relationships between individuals, in the relations <u><strong><mark>between groups</u></strong></mark> of individuals within states, and in the relations between states: <u><strong><mark>we are concerned with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>factors that make</u></strong></mark> such <u><strong><mark>conflicts escalate</u></strong></mark> into violence. The answer to that question depends critically on the context. While there may be some factors in common, the <u><strong><mark>bases of individual aggressiveness are</u></strong></mark> very <u><strong><mark>different from</u></strong></mark> those involved in <u><strong><mark>mob violence, and</u></strong></mark> they differ yet again from the factors influencing the bomb-aimer <u><strong><mark>pressing the button in a large</u></strong></mark> scale international <u><strong><mark>war</u></strong>.</mark> In considering whether acts which harm others are a consequence of the aggressive motivation of individuals, it is essential to recognise the diversity of such acts, which include interactions between individuals, violence between groups, and wars of the WW2 type. We shall see that, with increasing social complexity, individual aggressiveness becomes progressively less important, but other aspects of human nature come to contribute to group phenomena. Although research on human violence has focussed too often on the importance of one factor or another, it is essential to remember that <u><strong>violence always has multiple causes, and the</u></strong> interactions between the <u><strong>causal factors remain</u></strong> largely <u><strong>unexplored.</p></u></strong> | Earthquakes neg | null | Case | 84,757 | 39 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,232 | Trump’s foreign policy would be based on surprise – that invites miscalculation | Bremmer 6-3- | Bremmer, global research professor @ New York University, 6-3-16 | )
Despite their best-laid plans, all presidents face storms they didn’t expect.
AND | null | (Ian, Trump and the World: What Could Actually Go Wrong, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-international-foreign-policy-global-risk-security-guide-213936)
Despite their best-laid plans, all presidents face storms they didn’t expect.
AND
—and increase the chances the U.S. will be provoked. | 320 | <h4>Trump’s foreign policy would be based on surprise – that invites miscalculation </h4><p><strong>Bremmer</strong>, global research professor @ New York University, <strong>6-3-</strong>16 </p><p>(Ian, Trump and the World: What Could Actually Go Wrong, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-international-foreign-policy-global-risk-security-guide-213936<u>)</p><p>Despite their best-laid plans, all presidents face storms they didn’t expect. </p><p>AND</p><p></u>—and increase the chances the U.S. will be provoked.</p> | null | null | Elections DA | 1,560,725 | 3 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,233 | Japan would say yes to the plan- they want to be a part of disaster relief cooperation because they see it as a way to get China to rise peacefully | Futori 13 | Futori 13- Hideshi, Japan Scholar with the Asia Program at the Wilson Center and a recent Japan Studies Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, Japan’s Disaster Relief Diplomacy: Fostering Military Cooperation in Asia, (http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/japan/japans-disaster-relief-diplomacy) JB | realm of HA/DR is a rare opportunity for Japan to actively engage in military cooperation with China. ample scope for increased cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese militaries. This in turn has the potential to build mutual trust, and reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two neighbors. Secondly, Japan will be better able to hedge against China’s regional influence by promoting closer Sino-Japanese HA/DR cooperation into broader regional-led initiatives. practical cooperation incorporated in the ADMM-Plus initiatives is a perfect venue for this convergence into a more stable regional institutional framework. Japan’s disaster relief diplomacy is one very practical avenue for Japan to take a leading role in ensuring that China’s rise will progress toward a peaceful and prosperous future in the Asia-Pacific region. | null | Considering China’s growing naval capabilities, there are at least two implications for Japan. First, the realm of HA/DR is a rare opportunity for Japan to actively engage in military cooperation with China. As the PLAN improves its blue water capabilities and China’s role in international HA/DR operation increases, there is ample scope for increased cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese militaries. This in turn has the potential to build mutual trust, and reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two neighbors. Secondly, Japan will be better able to hedge against China’s regional influence by promoting closer Sino-Japanese HA/DR cooperation into broader regional-led initiatives. The ASEAN-led multilateral framework and practical cooperation incorporated in the ADMM-Plus and ARF initiatives is a perfect venue for this convergence into a more stable regional institutional framework. Japan’s disaster relief diplomacy is one very practical avenue for Japan to take a leading role in ensuring that China’s rise will progress toward a peaceful and prosperous future in the Asia-Pacific region. | 1,122 | <h4>Japan would say yes to the plan- they want to be a part of disaster relief cooperation because they see it as a way to get China to rise peacefully</h4><p><strong>Futori 13</strong>- Hideshi, Japan Scholar with the Asia Program at the Wilson Center and a recent Japan Studies Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, Japan’s Disaster Relief Diplomacy: Fostering Military Cooperation in Asia, (http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/japan/japans-disaster-relief-diplomacy<u>) JB</p><p></u>Considering China’s growing naval capabilities, there are at least two implications for Japan. First, the <u>realm of HA/DR is a rare opportunity for Japan to actively engage in military cooperation with China.</u> As the PLAN improves its blue water capabilities and China’s role in international HA/DR operation increases, there is <u>ample scope for increased cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese militaries. This in turn has the potential to build mutual trust, and reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two neighbors. Secondly, Japan will be better able to hedge against China’s regional influence by promoting closer Sino-Japanese HA/DR cooperation into broader regional-led initiatives.</u> The ASEAN-led multilateral framework and <u>practical cooperation incorporated in the <strong>ADMM-Plus</u></strong> and ARF <u>initiatives is a perfect venue for this convergence into a more stable regional institutional framework.</u> <u>Japan’s disaster relief diplomacy is one very practical avenue for Japan to take a leading role in ensuring that China’s rise will progress toward a peaceful and prosperous future in the Asia-Pacific region.</p></u> | Earthquakes neg | Block ev | Japan | 182,116 | 2 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,234 | Engagement is an ongoing process that relies on increasing diplomatic and economic contacts to develop interdependence. The aff is military contacts. | Resnick 2001 | Evan Resnick 2001, Assistant Professor, Coordinator of the United States Programme, Coordinator of External Teaching, and Deputy Coordinator of the International Relations Programme at RSIS, Spring 2001, “Defining Engagment” , Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 551- 566 | I
AND
be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions. | null | In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I
AND
be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions. | 170 | <h4>Engagement is an <u>ongoing process</u> that relies on <u>increasing diplomatic and economic contacts</u> to develop interdependence. The aff is military contacts.</h4><p>Evan <strong>Resnick 2001</strong>, Assistant Professor, Coordinator of the United States Programme, Coordinator of External Teaching, and Deputy Coordinator of the International Relations Programme at RSIS, Spring 2001, “Defining Engagment<u>” , Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 551- 566</p><p></u>In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, <u>I </p><p>AND</p><p>be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.</p></u> | null | null | T-Military | 1,560,034 | 12 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,235 | Military engagement is any interaction between the US military and an element of the target state – INCLUDING CIVILLIAN AUTHORITIES. Mil to gov and Mil to Mil aren’t topical – prefer the doctrine of the US military, it’s the most precise and predictable definition | Summers 2015 | Major Robert M. Summers Jr, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2015, US Army, Citing Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, “Regionally Aligned Forces: The Critical Role of Military Engagement and Interdependence between Conventional and Special Operations Forces”, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD1001883 | null | null | Third, the Army established an engagement warfighting function because Army operations in the contemporary
AND
, to include the evolution of the concept and effects on RAF operations? | 183 | <h4>Military engagement is any interaction between the US military and an element of the target state – INCLUDING CIVILLIAN AUTHORITIES. Mil to gov and Mil to Mil aren’t topical – prefer the doctrine of the US military, it’s the most precise and predictable definition</h4><p>Major Robert M. <strong>Summers</strong> Jr, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, <strong>2015</strong>, US Army, <u>Citing Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, </u>“Regionally Aligned Forces: The Critical Role of Military Engagement and Interdependence between Conventional and Special Operations Forces”, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD1001883</p><p>Third, the Army established an engagement warfighting function because Army operations in the contemporary </p><p>AND</p><p>, to include the evolution of the concept and effects on RAF operations?</p> | null | null | T-Military | 1,560,727 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,236 | Violation: The plan violates because they are military engagement | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Violation: The plan violates because they are military engagement</h4> | null | null | T-Military | 1,560,726 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,237 | Two Impacts: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Two Impacts:</h4> | null | null | T-Military | 1,560,728 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,238 | Limits – The aff’s interp doesn’t set a limit on the topic. They double the size of the topic by ignoring the different types of engagement. A limited topic is key to gain portable skills from debate | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Limits – The aff’s interp doesn’t set a limit on the topic. They double the size of the topic by ignoring the different types of engagement. A limited topic is key to gain portable skills from debate</h4> | null | null | T-Military | 1,560,729 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,239 | Topic Education – excluding military engagement is key to focus the topic around diplomatic/economic cooperation. An unlimited topic spreads out research and the content of debates, leading to shallow education. An in depth analysis of cooperation is necessary | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Topic Education – excluding military engagement is key to focus the topic around diplomatic/economic cooperation. An unlimited topic spreads out research and the content of debates, leading to shallow education. An in depth analysis of cooperation is necessary</h4> | null | null | T-Military | 1,560,730 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,240 | China will exploit space cooperation to further its military goals and advance an illusion of cooperation that makes conflict more likely | Fisher 15 | Rick Fisher 15, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, Recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and their implications for Asia and the US, Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review, Studied at Georgetown University, BA with Honors at Eisenhower College, President of Pacific Strategies Inc., 2/18/2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf | allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space
AND
for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors | null | Furthermore, allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space
AND
for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors. | 151 | <h4>China will <u>exploit</u> space cooperation to further its military goals and advance an <u>illusion</u> of cooperation that makes conflict <u>more likely</h4><p></u>Rick <strong>Fisher 15<u></strong>, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, Recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and their implications for Asia and the US, Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review, Studied at Georgetown University, BA with Honors at Eisenhower College, President of Pacific Strategies Inc., 2/18/2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf</p><p></u>Furthermore, <u>allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space </p><p>AND</p><p>for <strong>espionage gains</strong> to <strong>strengthen its own space and military sectors</u></strong>. </p> | null | null | Espionage DA | 1,560,731 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,241 | Chinese exploitation of U.S. space assets enables a hostile Chinese bid for regional and global leadership---undermines overall U.S. power | Fisher 15 | Rick Fisher 15, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, Recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and their implications for Asia and the US, Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review, Studied at Georgetown University, BA with Honors at Eisenhower College, President of Pacific Strategies Inc., 2/18/2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf | crush democratic threats to its rule, beginning with the democracy on Taiwan | null | Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the United States-China Economic Security Review
AND
crush democratic threats to its rule, beginning with the democracy on Taiwan. | 169 | <h4>Chinese exploitation of U.S. space assets enables a hostile Chinese bid for regional and global leadership---<u>undermines</u> overall U.S. power </h4><p>Rick <strong>Fisher 15</strong>, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, Recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and their implications for Asia and the US, Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review, Studied at Georgetown University, BA with Honors at Eisenhower College, President of Pacific Strategies Inc., 2/18/2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf</p><p>Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the United States-China Economic Security Review </p><p>AND</p><p><u>crush democratic threats to its rule, beginning with the <strong>democracy on Taiwan</u></strong>. </p> | null | null | Espionage DA | 1,560,732 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,242 | That all goes nuclear | Tan 15 | Andrew T.H. Tan 15, Associate Professor in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, 2015, “Preventing the next war in East Asia,” in Security and Conflict in East Asia, ed. Tan, p. 228-230 | The absence of effective regional institutions that could regulate
AND | null | The absence of effective regional institutions, regimes, norms and laws that could regulate
AND
idle in East Asia if conflict in the region is to be avoided. | 157 | <h4>That all goes nuclear </h4><p>Andrew T.H. <strong>Tan 15<u></strong>, Associate Professor in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, 2015, “Preventing the next war in East Asia,” in Security and Conflict in East Asia, ed. Tan, p. 228-230</p><p>The <strong>absence of effective regional institutions</u></strong>, regimes, norms and laws <u>that could regulate </p><p>AND</p><p></u>idle in East Asia if conflict in the region is to be avoided.</p> | null | null | Espionage DA | 1,560,734 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,243 | Huai Chunmei, female, born on April 26, 1999, was found on May 4, 1999 to be abandoned at the doorway of Fengtai hospital, she was sent to the Children’s Welfare Institution of Huainan City by Datong Police Substation of Huaian City on May 4, 1999. Since then, the said baby has been under the case of this institution. We have tried hard to find her own parents for sixty days, but failed. Huai Chunmei is an abandoned baby definitely and her own parents and her birthplace are unknown.
The Children’s Welfare Institution of Huainan City (Seal) – July 20th, 1999 | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Huai Chunmei, female, born on April 26, 1999, was found on May 4, 1999 to be abandoned at the doorway of Fengtai hospital, she was sent to the Children’s Welfare Institution of Huainan City by Datong Police Substation of Huaian City on May 4, 1999. Since then, the said baby has been under the case of this institution. We have tried hard to find her own parents for sixty days, but failed. Huai Chunmei is an abandoned baby definitely and her own parents and her birthplace are unknown. </h4><p>The Children’s Welfare Institution of Huainan City (Seal) – July 20th, 1999</p> | 1AC | null | null | 1,560,733 | 1 | 125,715 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Calhoun/KuBe/Calhoun-Ku-Bearden-Aff-Harvard%20RR-Round6.docx | 655,076 | A | Harvard RR | 6 | LASA MS | Sheryl Kaz | 1AC - Adoption
1NC - FW Global K
2NR - Global K | hspolicy16/Calhoun/KuBe/Calhoun-Ku-Bearden-Aff-Harvard%20RR-Round6.docx | null | 55,502 | KuBe | Calhoun KuBe | null | Ha..... | Ku..... | Ch..... | Be..... | 20,057 | Calhoun | Calhoun | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,244 | The plan is driven by the capitalist need to plunder, but it won’t end there---once we’ve expanded into space we’ll just need another last frontier | Wlizlo 10, | Will Wlizlo 10, author/blogger for www.utne.com, “Space: The Final Bourgeois Frontier,” 11/12/10, http://www.utne.com/science-and-technology/capitalist-expansion-into-space.aspx | null | null | The workers of the world, despite their terrestrial solidarity, won’t unite to colonize
AND
to pilfer past and future energy sources. There is always an outside. | 161 | <h4>The plan is driven by the capitalist need to plunder, but it won’t end there---once we’ve expanded into space we’ll just need another last frontier</h4><p>Will <strong>Wlizlo 10,</strong> author/blogger for www.utne.com, “Space: The Final Bourgeois Frontier,” 11/12/10, http://www.utne.com/science-and-technology/capitalist-expansion-into-space.aspx</p><p>The workers of the world, despite their terrestrial solidarity, won’t unite to colonize </p><p>AND</p><p>to pilfer past and future energy sources. There is always an outside.</p> | null | null | Neoliberalism K | 1,560,736 | 1 | 125,999 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | 659,560 | N | Wake Forest | 5 | Niles North WM | Aly Fiebrantz | 1AC - Space Cooperation
1NC - Neoliberalism K Espionage DA Elections DA T-Military
2NR - T-Military | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round5.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
Subsets and Splits