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3,783,045 | Permutation do an episteomological reflection and then the aff | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Permutation do an episteomological reflection and then the aff</h4></strong> | Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source | 2AC | Security K | 1,560,649 | 1 | 125,826 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx | 655,667 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 3 | Marist AE | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma
1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k
2NR-- T must be qpq | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,046 | Abandoning Taiwan leads to both Japan and South Korea prolif | Rehman 14 | Iskander Rehman 14, fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, DC, “Why Taiwan Matters: A small island of great strategic importance,” The National Interest, February 28, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=4 | Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. Japan, in particular, would feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South Korea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korean aggression that a growing proportion of the South Korean public now favors the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal. An abandonment of Taiwan could thus lead to a creeping Finlandization—or rapid nuclearization—of large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters. | null | Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race.¶ Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. Japan, in particular, would feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches. Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability.¶ The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South Korea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korean aggression. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of the South Korean public now favors the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States’ security guarantee.¶ Meanwhile, smaller regional states might find themselves both disinclined to place their faith in the United States, and cowed into submission by a more self-assured and advantageously positioned China. An abandonment of Taiwan could thus lead to a creeping Finlandization—or rapid nuclearization—of large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters. | 1,810 | <h4>Abandoning Taiwan leads to both Japan and South Korea prolif</h4><p>Iskander <strong>Rehman 14<u></strong>, fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, DC, “Why Taiwan Matters: A small island of great strategic importance,” The National Interest, February 28, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=4</p><p>Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race</u>.¶ Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. <u>Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. Japan, in particular, would feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches</u>. <u>Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could <strong>lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability</u></strong>.¶ <u>The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South Korea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korean aggression</u>. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated <u>that a growing proportion of the South Korean public now favors <strong>the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal</strong>. </u>Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States’ security guarantee.¶ Meanwhile, smaller regional states might find themselves both disinclined to place their faith in the United States, and cowed into submission by a more self-assured and advantageously positioned China. <u>An abandonment of Taiwan could thus lead to a creeping Finlandization—or rapid nuclearization—of large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters.</p></u> | 1NC v GBN KR | 2 | null | 66,449 | 213 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,047 | Policy debates over racial issues are productive and important. Meaningful dialogue about what actions the government should take overcomes the conversational impasse and paves the way for material change. Disavowing the policy consequences of one’s ideological positions makes things worse, not better. | Bracey 6 | Bracey 6 — Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of African & African American Studies at Washington University in St. Louis, holds a B.S. from the University of North Carolina and a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2006 (“The Cul De Sac of Race Preference Discourse,” Southern California Law Review (79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231), September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis) | the avoidance of a rapid retreat into ideological trench warfare not only preserves space for reasoned, substantive debate but also allows for the possibility of advancing the conversation to reach the larger issue of producing a more racially inclusive society Our failing public conversation on race matters not only presents a particularly tragic moment in American race relations, but also evinces a greater failure of democracy. Sustained, meaningful dialogue is a critical, if not indispensable feature of our liberal democracy It is through meaningful public conversation about what actions government should take (or refrain from taking) that public policy determinations ultimately gain legitimacy. Conversation is particularly important in our democracy, given the profoundly diverse and often contradictory cultural and political traditions that are the sine qua non of American life. Under these particular circumstances, "persons ought to strive to engage in a mutual process of critical interaction, because if they do not, no uncoerced common understanding can possibly be attained." In addition to legitimizing the exercise of state authority in a liberal democracy, dialogue works to promote individual freedom. The power to hash over our alternatives is an important exercise of human agency If democracy is taken to mean rule by the people themselves, then conversation and deliberation are the principal means through which we declare and assert the power to shape our own belief systems dialogue as democratic modus operandi can be understood both as a material expression of freedom and as a mechanism to promote individual freedom Robust dialogue on public policy matters also promotes the individual growth of the dialogue participants. Conversation helps people become more knowledgeable and hold better developed opinions because "opinions can be tested and enlarged only where there is a genuine encounter with differing opinions." because political dialogue is a material manifestation of democracy in action, it promotes a feeling of democratic community and instills in the people a will for political action to advance reasoned public policy in the spirit of promoting the public good For these reasons, the collective aspiration of those interested in pursing serious, sustained, and policy-legitimating dialogue on race matters must be to cultivate a reasoned discourse that is relatively free of retrograde ideological baggage that feeds skepticism, engenders distrust, and effectively forecloses constructive conversation on the most corrosive and divisive issue in American history and contemporary life wholesale rejection would serve only to concretize the existing conversational impasse and subvert the larger aspiration of seeking constructive solutions to pressing racial issues. It creates an incentive to view race matters in purely ideological terms and further subverts the possibility of reasoned policy debate. Speaking of race matters in purely ideological terms poses a serious impediment to racial conversation | the avoidance of ideological trench warfare preserves space for reasoned, substantive debate advancing the conversation to produc more racially inclusive society Sustained, meaningful dialogue is critical an important exercise of human agency dialogue a material expression of freedom and as a mechanism to promote individual freedom helps people become more knowledgeable and hold better developed opinions opinions can be tested and enlarged dialogue on race matters cultivate a reasoned discourse that is free of ideological baggage that forecloses constructive conversation wholesale rejection. would serve only to concretize the existing conversational impasse It creates an incentive to view race matters in purely ideological terms poses a serious impediment to racial conversation | IV. A Foundation for Renewed Racial Dialogue A deepened appreciation and open acknowledgment of this pedigree is crucial to restoring public conversation on race preferences. Opponents of race preferences must come to understand that this pedigree, if left unaddressed, tends to overwhelm the underlying merit of arguments against race preferences in the eyes of proponents. At the same time, proponents should understand that the deployment of these pedigreed rhetorical themes does not necessarily signal agreement with the nineteenth-century racial norms from which they are sourced. For both proponents and opponents, the avoidance of a rapid retreat into ideological trench warfare not only preserves space for reasoned, substantive debate regarding race preferences, but also allows for the possibility of overcoming our collective fixation on race preferences as the issue in American race relations and advancing the conversation to reach the larger issue of producing a more racially inclusive society. Our failing public conversation on race matters not only presents a particularly tragic moment in American race relations, but also evinces a greater failure of democracy. Sustained, meaningful dialogue is a critical, if not indispensable feature of our liberal democracy. n260 It is through [*1312] meaningful public conversation about what actions government should take (or refrain from taking) that public policy determinations ultimately gain legitimacy. Conversation is particularly important in our democracy, given the profoundly diverse and often contradictory cultural and political traditions that are the sine qua non of American life. Under these particular circumstances, "persons ought to strive to engage in a mutual process of critical interaction, because if they do not, no uncoerced common understanding can possibly be attained." n261 Sincere deliberation, in its broadest idealized form, ensures that a broad array of input is heard and considered, legitimizing the resulting decision. Under this view, "if the preferences that determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, then they lose their claim to political authority over us." n262 In the absence of self-conscious, reflective dialogue, "democracy loses its capacity to generate legitimate political power." n263 In addition to legitimizing the exercise of state authority in a liberal democracy, dialogue works to promote individual freedom. The power to hash over our alternatives is an important exercise of human agency. n264 If democracy is taken to mean rule by the people themselves, then conversation and deliberation are the principal means through which we declare and assert the power to shape our own belief systems. The roots of this idea of dialogue as freedom-promoting are traceable to the Kantian view that individual motivation that is either uncriticized or uncontested can be understood on a deeper level as a mode of subjugation. As Frank Michelman explains, "in Kantian terms we are free only insofar as we are self-governing, directing our actions in accordance with law-like reasons [*1313] that we adopt for ourselves, as proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our identities (or natures) and social situations." n265 Because "self-cognition and ensuing self-legislation must, to a like extent, be socially situated," Michelman continues, "norms must be formed through public dialogue and expressed as public law." n266 In this way, dialogue as democratic modus operandi can be understood both as a material expression of freedom and as a mechanism to promote individual freedom. Robust dialogue on public policy matters also promotes the individual growth of the dialogue participants. Conversation helps people become more knowledgeable and hold better developed opinions because "opinions can be tested and enlarged only where there is a genuine encounter with differing opinions." n267 Moreover, meaningful conversation serves to broaden people's moral perspectives to include matters of public good, because appeals to the public good are often the most persuasive arguments available in public deliberation. n268 Indeed, even if people are thinking self-interested thoughts while making public good arguments, cognitive dissonance will create an incentive for such individuals to reconcile their self interest with the public good. n269 At the same time, because political dialogue is a material manifestation of democracy in action, it promotes a feeling of democratic community and instills in the people a will for political action to advance reasoned public policy in the spirit of promoting the public good. n270 For these reasons, the collective aspiration of those interested in pursing serious, sustained, and policy-legitimating dialogue on race matters must be to cultivate a reasoned discourse that is relatively free of retrograde ideological baggage that feeds skepticism, engenders distrust, and effectively forecloses constructive conversation on the most corrosive and divisive issue in American history and contemporary life. As the forgoing sections suggest, the continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetorical themes has and continues to poison racial legal discourse. Given the various normative and ideological commitments that might be ascribed to [*1314] opponents of race preferences, the question thus becomes, how are we to approach the task of breaking through the conversational impasse and creating intellectual space for meaningful discourse on this issue? One can imagine at least three responses to this question. As an initial matter, one might subscribe to the view that pedigree is not destiny, and thus conclude that the family resemblance tells us little, if anything, definitive about the normative commitments of today's opponents of race preferences. Consider the argument that the benefits of white privilege do not extend equally among all whites, and that policies that treat all whites as equally guilty of racial subordination advance a theory of undesirable rough justice. n271 Although this argument is a staple of modern opponents of race preferences, it would be a mistake to conclude that it can only be deployed by those persons who normatively oppose race preferences. Indeed, one might very well support race preferences, but believe quite strongly that such programs should be particularly sensitive to individual candidate qualifications. Similarly, although one might believe that diversity does not comport with merit based decisionmaking in education and employment, it would be incorrect to interpret this belief as necessarily indicative of a greater commitment to preserving status quo racial inequality. One might reject the diversity rational as insufficient to justify a system of race preferences that one strongly believes must be justified. In short, one may be inclined to simply engage the argument and ignore the possibility of retrograde normative underpinnings. Interestingly, a small cadre of scholars has adopted this approach. Derrick Bok and William Bowen, in The Shape of the River, investigated whether racial minorities feel stigmatized or otherwise adversely affected as a result of being denoted beneficiaries of affirmative action policy in college admissions. n272 Thomas Ross has critically examined claims of collective white innocence. n273 More recently, Goodwin Lui has researched the scope of the burden that affirmative action in college admissions imposes upon aspiring white students. n274 In each instance, these scholars chose to place to one side their skepticism about the normative commitments of those advancing the viewpoint, and launch directly into substantive critiques of that viewpoint. [*1315] This approach, however, may prove unsatisfactory for those more strongly committed to racial justice - those for whom it is not enough to simply challenge ideas in the abstract. As the late Robert Cover famously wrote, "legal interpretation takes place within a field of pain and death." n275 By this, he meant that the stakes of legal discourse are elevated when bodies are on the line. A vigorous critique of the substantive position alone leaves the normative underpinnings - the motivational force behind the proposal - dangerously intact. It may stymie the particular vehicle that attempts to reinforce racial subordination, but it leaves unaddressed the fundamental motive driving policy positions that seek to undermine racial minorities in the first place. At the other end of the responsive spectrum is wholesale rejection. One might view the pedigree as providing good reason to dismiss opponents of race entirely. Proponents of this view may choose to indulge fully this liberal skepticism and simply reject the message along with the messenger. n276 The tradition of legal discourse on American race relations [*1316] has been one steeped in racial animus and characterized by circumlocution, evasiveness, reluctance and denial. When opponents avail themselves of rhetorical strategies used by nineteenth-century legal elites, they necessarily invoke the specter of this tragic racial past. Moreover, their continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric to justify a system that only modestly responds to persistent racial disparities in the material lives of racial minorities suggests a deep, unarticulated normative commitment to preserving the racial status quo in which whites remain comfortably above blacks. The steadfast reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric, coupled with the apparent disconnect between claims of racial egalitarianism and material conditions of racial subordination as a result of persistent racial disparities, spoils the credibility of modern opponents of race preferences and creates an incentive for proponents to dismiss them without serious interrogation, consideration, and weighing of the arguments they advance. The principal deficit of this approach is that it would serve only to concretize the existing conversational impasse and subvert the larger aspiration of seeking constructive solutions to pressing racial issues. It creates an incentive to view race matters in purely ideological terms and further subverts the possibility of reasoned policy debate. Speaking of race matters in purely ideological terms poses a serious impediment to racial conversation because, in advancing one's position, one essentially argues that a particular set of circumstances demands a particular outcome. In this [*1317] way, purely ideological race rhetoric functions much like philosopher Immanuel Kant described in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. | 10,660 | <h4>Policy debates over racial issues are <u>productive</u> and <u>important</u>. Meaningful dialogue about <u>what actions the government should take</u> overcomes the <u>conversational impasse</u> and paves the way for <u>material change</u>. Disavowing the policy consequences of one’s ideological positions makes things <u>worse</u>, not better. </h4><p><strong>Bracey 6</strong> — Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of African & African American Studies at Washington University in St. Louis, holds a B.S. from the University of North Carolina and a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2006 (“The Cul De Sac of Race Preference Discourse,” Southern California Law Review (79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231), September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)</p><p>IV. A Foundation for Renewed Racial Dialogue A deepened appreciation and open acknowledgment of this pedigree is crucial to restoring public conversation on race preferences. Opponents of race preferences must come to understand that this pedigree, if left unaddressed, tends to overwhelm the underlying merit of arguments against race preferences in the eyes of proponents. At the same time, proponents should understand that the deployment of these pedigreed rhetorical themes does not necessarily signal agreement with the nineteenth-century racial norms from which they are sourced. For both proponents and opponents, <u><mark>the avoidance of</mark> a rapid retreat into <strong><mark>ideological trench warfare</strong></mark> not only <mark>preserves space for <strong>reasoned, substantive debate</u></strong></mark> regarding race preferences, <u>but also allows for the possibility of</u> overcoming our collective fixation on race preferences as the issue in American race relations and <u><strong><mark>advancing the conversation</strong> to</mark> reach the larger issue of <mark>produc</mark>ing a <mark>more racially inclusive society</u></mark>. <u>Our failing public conversation on race matters not only presents a particularly tragic moment in American race relations, but also evinces a greater failure of democracy. <strong><mark>Sustained, meaningful dialogue</strong> is</mark> a <mark>critical</mark>, if not indispensable feature of our liberal democracy</u>. n260 <u>It is through</u> [*1312] <u>meaningful public conversation about <strong>what actions government should take (or refrain from taking)</strong> that public policy determinations ultimately gain legitimacy. Conversation is particularly important in our democracy, given the profoundly diverse and often contradictory cultural and political traditions that are the sine qua non of American life. Under these particular circumstances, "persons ought to strive to engage in a mutual process of <strong>critical interaction</strong>, because if they do not, no uncoerced common understanding can possibly be attained."</u> n261 Sincere deliberation, in its broadest idealized form, ensures that a broad array of input is heard and considered, legitimizing the resulting decision. Under this view, "if the preferences that determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, then they lose their claim to political authority over us." n262 In the absence of self-conscious, reflective dialogue, "democracy loses its capacity to generate legitimate political power." n263 <u>In addition to legitimizing the exercise of state authority in a liberal democracy, dialogue works to promote individual freedom. The power to hash over our alternatives is <strong><mark>an important exercise of human agency</u></strong></mark>. n264 <u>If democracy is taken to mean rule by the people themselves, then conversation and deliberation are the principal means through which we declare and assert the power to shape our own belief systems</u>. The roots of this idea of dialogue as freedom-promoting are traceable to the Kantian view that individual motivation that is either uncriticized or uncontested can be understood on a deeper level as a mode of subjugation. As Frank Michelman explains, "in Kantian terms we are free only insofar as we are self-governing, directing our actions in accordance with law-like reasons [*1313] that we adopt for ourselves, as proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our identities (or natures) and social situations." n265 Because "self-cognition and ensuing self-legislation must, to a like extent, be socially situated," Michelman continues, "norms must be formed through public dialogue and expressed as public law." n266 In this way, <u><mark>dialogue</mark> as democratic modus operandi can be understood both as <strong><mark>a material expression of freedom</strong> and as <strong>a mechanism to promote individual freedom</u></strong></mark>. <u>Robust dialogue on <strong>public policy matters</strong> also promotes the individual growth of the dialogue participants. Conversation <mark>helps people become <strong>more knowledgeable</strong> and hold <strong>better developed opinions</strong></mark> because "<mark>opinions can be <strong>tested</strong> and <strong>enlarged</strong></mark> only where there is a <strong>genuine encounter with differing opinions</strong>."</u> n267 Moreover, meaningful conversation serves to broaden people's moral perspectives to include matters of public good, because appeals to the public good are often the most persuasive arguments available in public deliberation. n268 Indeed, even if people are thinking self-interested thoughts while making public good arguments, cognitive dissonance will create an incentive for such individuals to reconcile their self interest with the public good. n269 At the same time, <u>because political dialogue is a <strong>material manifestation</strong> of democracy in action, it promotes a feeling of <strong>democratic community</strong> and instills in the people a will for political action to advance <strong>reasoned public policy</strong> in the spirit of promoting the public good</u>. n270 <u>For these reasons, the collective aspiration of those interested in pursing <strong>serious</strong>, <strong>sustained</strong>, and <strong>policy-legitimating <mark>dialogue</strong> on race matters</mark> must be to <mark>cultivate a <strong>reasoned discourse</strong> that is</mark> relatively <mark>free of</mark> retrograde <mark>ideological baggage that</mark> feeds <strong>skepticism</strong>, engenders <strong>distrust</strong>, and effectively <strong><mark>forecloses constructive conversation</strong></mark> on the most corrosive and divisive issue in American history and contemporary life</u>. As the forgoing sections suggest, the continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetorical themes has and continues to poison racial legal discourse. Given the various normative and ideological commitments that might be ascribed to [*1314] opponents of race preferences, the question thus becomes, how are we to approach the task of breaking through the conversational impasse and creating intellectual space for meaningful discourse on this issue? One can imagine at least three responses to this question. As an initial matter, one might subscribe to the view that pedigree is not destiny, and thus conclude that the family resemblance tells us little, if anything, definitive about the normative commitments of today's opponents of race preferences. Consider the argument that the benefits of white privilege do not extend equally among all whites, and that policies that treat all whites as equally guilty of racial subordination advance a theory of undesirable rough justice. n271 Although this argument is a staple of modern opponents of race preferences, it would be a mistake to conclude that it can only be deployed by those persons who normatively oppose race preferences. Indeed, one might very well support race preferences, but believe quite strongly that such programs should be particularly sensitive to individual candidate qualifications. Similarly, although one might believe that diversity does not comport with merit based decisionmaking in education and employment, it would be incorrect to interpret this belief as necessarily indicative of a greater commitment to preserving status quo racial inequality. One might reject the diversity rational as insufficient to justify a system of race preferences that one strongly believes must be justified. In short, one may be inclined to simply engage the argument and ignore the possibility of retrograde normative underpinnings. Interestingly, a small cadre of scholars has adopted this approach. Derrick Bok and William Bowen, in The Shape of the River, investigated whether racial minorities feel stigmatized or otherwise adversely affected as a result of being denoted beneficiaries of affirmative action policy in college admissions. n272 Thomas Ross has critically examined claims of collective white innocence. n273 More recently, Goodwin Lui has researched the scope of the burden that affirmative action in college admissions imposes upon aspiring white students. n274 In each instance, these scholars chose to place to one side their skepticism about the normative commitments of those advancing the viewpoint, and launch directly into substantive critiques of that viewpoint. [*1315] This approach, however, may prove unsatisfactory for those more strongly committed to racial justice - those for whom it is not enough to simply challenge ideas in the abstract. As the late Robert Cover famously wrote, "legal interpretation takes place within a field of pain and death." n275 By this, he meant that the stakes of legal discourse are elevated when bodies are on the line. A vigorous critique of the substantive position alone leaves the normative underpinnings - the motivational force behind the proposal - dangerously intact. It may stymie the particular vehicle that attempts to reinforce racial subordination, but it leaves unaddressed the fundamental motive driving policy positions that seek to undermine racial minorities in the first place. At the other end of the responsive spectrum is <u><mark>wholesale rejection</u>.</mark> One might view the pedigree as providing good reason to dismiss opponents of race entirely. Proponents of this view may choose to indulge fully this liberal skepticism and simply reject the message along with the messenger. n276 The tradition of legal discourse on American race relations [*1316] has been one steeped in racial animus and characterized by circumlocution, evasiveness, reluctance and denial. When opponents avail themselves of rhetorical strategies used by nineteenth-century legal elites, they necessarily invoke the specter of this tragic racial past. Moreover, their continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric to justify a system that only modestly responds to persistent racial disparities in the material lives of racial minorities suggests a deep, unarticulated normative commitment to preserving the racial status quo in which whites remain comfortably above blacks. The steadfast reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric, coupled with the apparent disconnect between claims of racial egalitarianism and material conditions of racial subordination as a result of persistent racial disparities, spoils the credibility of modern opponents of race preferences and creates an incentive for proponents to dismiss them without serious interrogation, consideration, and weighing of the arguments they advance. The principal deficit of this approach is that it <u><mark>would serve only to <strong>concretize the existing conversational impasse</strong></mark> and subvert the larger aspiration of seeking <strong>constructive solutions to pressing racial issues</strong>. <mark>It creates an incentive to view race matters in <strong>purely ideological terms</strong></mark> and further subverts the possibility of <strong>reasoned policy debate</strong>. Speaking of race matters in purely ideological terms <mark>poses a <strong>serious impediment</strong> to racial conversation</u><strong></mark> because, in advancing one's position, one essentially argues that a particular set of circumstances demands a particular outcome. In this [*1317] way, purely ideological race rhetoric functions much like philosopher Immanuel Kant described in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. </p></strong> | 1nc | Case | null | 41,912 | 679 | 125,888 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | 657,845 | N | Michigan | 1 | Lane Tech HC | Shreee | K aff went for FW we also read anthro! | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,048 | CCP accusations of terror become a self-fulfilling prophecy – final effect is violent lash-in and crackdown – they’re key as other ethnic minorities have witnessed a thaw in tensions | Grieboski 14 | Grieboski 14 {Joe, Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies (Georgetown), honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters (Marywood University), “Tension, Repression, and Discrimination: China’s Uyghurs Under Threat,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9/24, http://journal.georgetown.edu/tension-repression-and-discrimination-chinas-uyghurs-under-threat/#THUR} | discrimination provoked violent unrest amongst some Uyghur factions and
AND
find religion is being used as a tool of control.” | null | These restrictions and cases of discrimination have provoked violent unrest amongst some Uyghur factions and
AND
, find that their religion is being used as a tool of control.” | 176 | <h4>CCP accusations of terror become a <u>self-fulfilling prophecy</u> – final effect is violent <u>lash-in</u> and <u>crackdown</u> – they’re key as other ethnic minorities have witnessed a thaw in tensions</h4><p><strong>Grieboski 14</strong> {Joe, Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies (Georgetown), honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters (Marywood University), “Tension, Repression, and Discrimination: China’s Uyghurs Under Threat,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9/24, http://journal.georgetown.edu/tension-repression-and-discrimination-chinas-uyghurs-under-threat/#THUR<u>}</p><p></u>These restrictions and cases of <u>discrimination</u> have <u>provoked</u> <u><strong>violent unrest</u></strong> <u>amongst</u> <u><strong>some</u></strong> <u>Uyghur factions and </p><p><strong>AND</p><p></u></strong>, <u>find</u> that their <u>religion is being used <strong>as a tool of control.”</p></u></strong> | null | Organized Crime Aff | ICCPR | 1,560,651 | 1 | 125,889 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx | 657,725 | A | MBA | 5 | Isidore Newman AI | Toby Whisenhunt | 1AC New Organized Crime Aff
2NR Neolib K | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx | null | 55,800 | BaSc | Glenbrook South BaSc | null | Jo..... | Ba..... | Br..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,049 | U.S.-China conflict could go nuclear because of China’s fears of conventional counterforce. | Talmadge 16 | Talmadge 16 — Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Member of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at The George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016 (“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.–China Conflict,” Policy Brief — U.S.-China Nuclear Project, February, Available Online at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 1) | Conventional war between the U S and China remains a low-probability event. But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation likely would be higher than many observers realize. Some aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could
This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander
Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation. It can arise when one side’s conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side’s ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal
a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch
Ultimately, escalation depends on how a state perceives an aggressive conventional campaign against it. The state waging the campaign might use conventional force to target the opponent’s nuclear capabilities inadvertently, not realizing that the conventional campaign was starting to look to the opponent like counterforce. Or it might do so deliberately, actively embracing this risk as a way to increase pressure on the adversary. Either way, the target state’s fear of disarmament could lead that state to use nuclear weapons | Conventional war remains low-probability But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation would be higher a U.S. conventional war could look like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could
Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes a pathway to nuclear escalation
a state may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so
The state waging the campaign might target the opponent’s nuclear capabilities inadvertently, not realizing that the campaign was starting to look like counterforce. Or it might do so deliberately Either way, the target state’s fear could lead that state to use nuclear weapons | Conventional Counterforce as a Pathway to Nuclear Escalation
Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation—that is, actual detonation of nuclear weapons— likely would be higher than many observers realize. Some aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could.
This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For example, in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses.
Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation. It can arise when one side’s conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side’s ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other’s command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side’s conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location).
For all of these reasons, a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch.
Ultimately, escalation depends on how a state perceives an aggressive conventional campaign against it. The state waging the campaign might use conventional force to target the opponent’s nuclear capabilities inadvertently, not realizing that the conventional campaign was starting to look to the opponent like counterforce. Or it might do so deliberately, actively embracing this risk as a way to increase pressure on the adversary. Either way, the target state’s fear of disarmament could lead that state to use nuclear weapons. | 3,475 | <h4>U.S.-China conflict could go nuclear because of China’s fears of <u>conventional counterforce</u>. </h4><p><strong>Talmadge 16</strong> — Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Member of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at The George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016 (“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.–China Conflict,” Policy Brief — U.S.-China Nuclear Project, February, Available Online at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 1)</p><p>Conventional Counterforce as a Pathway to Nuclear Escalation</p><p><u><mark>Conventional war</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>remains</mark> a <mark>low-probability</mark> event. <mark>But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation</u></mark>—that is, actual detonation of nuclear weapons— <u>likely <mark>would be <strong>higher</strong></mark> than many observers realize. Some aspects of <mark>a</mark> likely <mark>U.S.</mark> campaign in a <mark>conventional war</mark> against China <mark>could look</mark> to China <mark>like an attempt at conventional counterforce, <strong>pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use</u>. For example, <u>in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption</u>, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. <u>Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander</u> who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses.</p><p><u><mark>Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes a</mark>n alternative <strong><mark>pathway to nuclear escalation</strong></mark>. It can arise when one side’s conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side’s ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal</u>. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other’s command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side’s conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location).</p><p>For all of these reasons, <u><mark>a state</mark> subject to attack on these targets <mark>may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is</mark> merely <mark>conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to <strong>escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so</strong></mark>. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch</u>.</p><p><u>Ultimately, escalation depends on how a state perceives an aggressive conventional campaign against it. <mark>The state waging the campaign might</mark> use conventional force to <mark>target the opponent’s nuclear capabilities <strong>inadvertently</strong>, not realizing that the</mark> conventional <mark>campaign was starting to look</mark> to the opponent <mark>like counterforce. Or it might do so deliberately</mark>, actively embracing this risk as a way to increase pressure on the adversary. <mark>Either way, the target state’s fear</mark> of disarmament <mark>could lead that state to <strong>use nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | Case Backlines | They Say: “No Nuclear Escalation” | 71,002 | 129 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,050 | Only continued scale up of clean technology can solve—their author | Nagel, 2015 | Nagel, 2015 | Stanford energy experts released a study that compares the experiences of three large economies in ramping up renewable energy deployment and concludes that renewables can make a major and increasingly cost-effective contribution to climate change mitigation The report analyzes the experiences of Germany, California and Texas, the world’s fourth, eighth and 12th largest economies, respectively Germany, which gets about half as much sunshine as California and Texas, nevertheless generates electricity from solar installations at a cost comparable to that of Texas As policymakers from around the world gather for the climate negotiations our report draws on the experiences of three leaders in renewable-energy deployment to shed light on some of the most prominent and controversial themes said Reicher, executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center findings suggest that renewable energy has entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role in mitigating global climate change Germany’s success in deploying renewable energy at scale is due largely to favorable treatment of “soft cost” factors a higher share of renewables does not automatically translate to higher electricity bills for ratepayers An increase in the share of intermittent solar and wind power need not jeopardize the stability of the electric grid From 2006 to 2013, Germany tripled the amount of electricity generated from solar and wind to a market share of 26 percent, while managing to reduce average annual outage times for electricity customers in its grid from an already impressive 22 minutes to just 15 minutes California tripled the amount of electricity produced from solar and wind to a joint market share of 8 percent and reduced its outage times from more than 100 minutes to less than 90 minute . The study may inform the energy debate in the United States, where expanding the nation’s renewable energy infrastructure is a top priority | energy experts released a study and concludes renewables can make a major contribution to climate mitigation. The report analyzes Germany, California and Texas findings suggest renewable energy entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role a higher share does not translate to higher electricity bills increase need not jeopardize the grid Germany tripled the amount of electricity generated while managing to reduce outage times for electricity customers to 15 minutes California tripled electricity produced from solar and reduced its outage times | Terry, Stanford News, “Stanford study finds promise in expanding renewables based on results in three major economies” 12/1 http://news.stanford.edu/2015/12/01/renewable-energy-economies-120115/
Stanford energy experts have released a study that compares the experiences of three large economies in ramping up renewable energy deployment and concludes that renewables can make a major and increasingly cost-effective contribution to climate change mitigation. The report from Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance analyzes the experiences of Germany, California and Texas, the world’s fourth, eighth and 12th largest economies, respectively. It found, among other things, that Germany, which gets about half as much sunshine as California and Texas, nevertheless generates electricity from solar installations at a cost comparable to that of Texas and only slightly higher than in California. The report was released in time for the United Nations Climate Change Conference that started this week, where international leaders are gathering to discuss strategies to deal with global warming, including massive scale-ups of renewable energy. “As policymakers from around the world gather for the climate negotiations in Paris, our report draws on the experiences of three leaders in renewable-energy deployment to shed light on some of the most prominent and controversial themes in the global renewables debate,” said Dan Reicher, executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center, which is a joint center between Stanford Law School and Stanford Graduate School of Business. Reicher also is interim president and chief executive officer of the American Council on Renewable Energy. “Our findings suggest that renewable energy has entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role in mitigating global climate change,” said Felix Mormann, associate professor of law at the University of Miami, faculty fellow at the Steyer-Taylor Center and lead author of the report. Other conclusions of the report, “A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Solar and Wind Deployment Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany,” include: Germany’s success in deploying renewable energy at scale is due largely to favorable treatment of “soft cost” factors such as financing, permitting, installation and grid access. This approach has allowed the renewable energy policies of some countries to deliver up to four times the average deployment of other countries, despite offering only half the financial incentives. Contrary to widespread concern, a higher share of renewables does not automatically translate to higher electricity bills for ratepayers. While Germany’s residential electric rates are two to three times those of California and Texas, this price differential is only partly due to Germany’s subsidies for renewables. The average German household’s electricity bill is, in fact, lower than in Texas and only slightly higher than in California, partly as a result of energy-efficiency efforts in German homes. An increase in the share of intermittent solar and wind power need not jeopardize the stability of the electric grid. From 2006 to 2013, Germany tripled the amount of electricity generated from solar and wind to a market share of 26 percent, while managing to reduce average annual outage times for electricity customers in its grid from an already impressive 22 minutes to just 15 minutes. During that same period, California tripled the amount of electricity produced from solar and wind to a joint market share of 8 percent and reduced its outage times from more than 100 minutes to less than 90 minutes. However, Texas increased its outage times from 92 minutes to 128 minutes after ramping up its wind-generated electricity sixfold to a market share of 10 percent. The study may inform the energy debate in the United States, where expanding the nation’s renewable energy infrastructure is a top priority of the Obama administration and the subject of debate among presidential candidates. | 4,032 | <h4><u><strong>Only continued scale up of clean technology can solve—their author</h4><p>Nagel, 2015</p><p></u></strong>Terry, Stanford News, “Stanford study finds promise in expanding renewables based on results in three major economies” 12/1 http://news.stanford.edu/2015/12/01/renewable-energy-economies-120115/</p><p><u><strong>Stanford <mark>energy experts</mark> </u></strong>have <u><strong><mark>released a study</mark> that compares the experiences of three large economies in ramping up renewable energy deployment</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>and concludes</mark> that <mark>renewables can</mark> <mark>make a major</mark> and increasingly cost-effective <mark>contribution to climate</mark> change <mark>mitigation</u></strong>. <u><strong>The</mark> <mark>report</u></strong></mark> from Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance <u><strong><mark>analyzes</mark> the experiences of <mark>Germany, California and</mark> <mark>Texas</mark>, the world’s fourth, eighth and 12th largest economies, respectively</u></strong>. It found, among other things, that <u><strong>Germany, which gets about half as much sunshine as California and Texas, nevertheless generates electricity from solar installations at a cost comparable to that of Texas</u></strong> and only slightly higher than in California. The report was released in time for the United Nations Climate Change Conference that started this week, where international leaders are gathering to discuss strategies to deal with global warming, including massive scale-ups of renewable energy. “<u><strong>As policymakers from around the world gather for the climate negotiations</u></strong> in Paris, <u><strong>our report draws on the experiences of three leaders in renewable-energy deployment to shed light on some of the most prominent and controversial themes</u></strong> in the global renewables debate,” <u><strong>said</u></strong> Dan <u><strong>Reicher, executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center</u></strong>, which is a joint center between Stanford Law School and Stanford Graduate School of Business. Reicher also is interim president and chief executive officer of the American Council on Renewable Energy. “Our <u><strong><mark>findings suggest</mark> that <mark>renewable energy</mark> has <mark>entered the mainstream and is ready to play a leading role</mark> in mitigating global climate change</u></strong>,” said Felix Mormann, associate professor of law at the University of Miami, faculty fellow at the Steyer-Taylor Center and lead author of the report. Other conclusions of the report, “A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Solar and Wind Deployment Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany,” include: <u><strong>Germany’s success in deploying renewable energy at scale is due largely to favorable treatment of “soft cost” factors</u></strong> such as financing, permitting, installation and grid access. This approach has allowed the renewable energy policies of some countries to deliver up to four times the average deployment of other countries, despite offering only half the financial incentives. Contrary to widespread concern, <u><strong><mark>a higher share</mark> of renewables <mark>does not</mark> automatically <mark>translate to higher electricity bills</mark> for ratepayers</u></strong>. While Germany’s residential electric rates are two to three times those of California and Texas, this price differential is only partly due to Germany’s subsidies for renewables. The average German household’s electricity bill is, in fact, lower than in Texas and only slightly higher than in California, partly as a result of energy-efficiency efforts in German homes. <u><strong>An <mark>increase</mark> in the share of intermittent solar and wind power <mark>need not jeopardize</mark> the stability of <mark>the</mark> electric <mark>grid</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>From 2006 to 2013, <mark>Germany</mark> <mark>tripled the amount of electricity generated</mark> from solar and wind to a market share of 26 percent, <mark>while managing to reduce</mark> average annual <mark>outage times for electricity customers</mark> in its grid from an already impressive 22 minutes <mark>to</mark> just <mark>15 minutes</u></strong></mark>. During that same period, <u><strong><mark>California tripled</mark> the amount of <mark>electricity produced from solar</mark> and wind to a joint market share of 8 percent <mark>and</mark> <mark>reduced its outage times</mark> from more than 100 minutes to less than 90 minute</u></strong>s<u><strong>.</u></strong> However, Texas increased its outage times from 92 minutes to 128 minutes after ramping up its wind-generated electricity sixfold to a market share of 10 percent. <u><strong>The study may inform the energy debate in the United States, where expanding the nation’s renewable energy infrastructure is a top priority</u></strong> of the Obama administration and the subject of debate among presidential candidates.</p> | Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source | 1AR | Dedev | 1,482,272 | 13 | 125,826 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx | 655,667 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 3 | Marist AE | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma
1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k
2NR-- T must be qpq | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,051 | Japan prolif causes nuke war – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes preemptive conflicts and kills heg | null | -Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization | } **Modified for ableist language
Nuclear allies become security risks Narang demonstrates when [junior] states gain nuclear weapons they coerce senior partners into intervening by threatening to use nuclear weapons That’s Israel at 73 South Africa during 88 And Pakistan with India Instead of relieving U S more nuclear allies increase risk U S would get involved in conflicts that turn nuclear were Japan to develop nuclear weapons rivals might launch preventive military strikes which research suggests has been frequently considered road to acquisition is rocky and increases likelihood of militarized conflict Soviet worries West Germany would acquire trigger Berlin Crisis if Japan actually acquired weapons, we could see nuclear arms race in Asia Japan’s neighbors, including So Ko would fear Japanese militarism No Ko would expand capabilities. China would expand its arsenal Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common But that’s largely because of U.S. efforts to stop them. Research suggests NPT has been instrumental in limiting spread of nuclear weapons by coordinating beliefs about commitments. To develop Japan would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt allies and adversaries including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran to question the treaty and consider their own nuclear arsenals Would this be so bad? no nuclear states have fought major war But conclusion nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate no war may be due to other factors quantitative evidence is limited at best theoretical and historical evidence suggests accidents and miscalculations are likely More countries mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes nuclear prolif is anything but inevitable U.S. efforts have been successful Without U.S. opposition to spread of nuclear weapons through “carrots” like alliances world would have more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. research suggests nuclear prolif would reduce U.S. world influence undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war. | null | -NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif
-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances
-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based
Miller 16 {Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/#THUR} **Modified for ableist language
Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker [junior] states gain nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India. Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could increase the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear. Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis. And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals. Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best. Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war. | 4,391 | <h4>Japan prolif causes nuke war – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes preemptive conflicts and kills heg</h4><p>-Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization</p><p>-NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif </p><p>-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances </p><p><strong>-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based</p><p>Miller 16 </strong>{Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/#THUR<u><strong>} **Modified for ableist language </p><p></strong>Nuclear allies</u> can also <u>become <strong>security risks</u></strong>. Vipin <u>Narang demonstrates</u> that <u>when</u> weaker <u>[junior] states gain nuclear weapons</u>, <u>they</u> often seek to <u><strong>coerce</u></strong> their <u>senior partners into intervening</u> on their behalf <u>by threatening to use nuclear weapons</u>. <u>That’s</u> what <u>Israel</u> did <u>at</u> the height of the 19<u><strong>73</u></strong> Arab-Israeli War. That’s what <u>South Africa</u> did <u>during</u> its 19<u><strong>88 </u></strong>confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. <u>And</u> that’s what <u>Pakistan</u> did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis <u>with India</u>. <u>Instead of relieving</u> the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having <u>more nuclear allies</u> could <u><strong>increase</u></strong> the <u>risk</u> that the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>would get involved in conflicts that</u> might <u><strong>turn nuclear</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u>were</u> South Korea or <u>Japan to</u> begin <u>develop</u>ing <u>nuclear weapons</u>, their <u>rivals might</u> be tempted to <u><strong>launch preventive military strikes</u></strong>, <u>which research suggests has been <strong>frequently considered</u></strong> in the past. The <u>road to</u> nuclear <u>acquisition is</u> often <u>rocky and increases</u> the <u>likelihood of <strong>militarized conflict</u></strong>. For example, <u>Soviet worries</u> that <u>West Germany would acquire</u> nuclear weapons helped <u>trigger</u> the <u>Berlin Crisis</u>. And <u>if Japan </u>or South Korea <u>actually acquired</u> nuclear <u>weapons, we could</u> possibly <u>see</u> a <u><strong>nuclear arms race in Asia</u></strong>. <u>Japan’s neighbors, including</u> <u><strong>So</u></strong>uth <u><strong>Ko</u></strong>rea, <u>would fear </u>resurgent <u>Japanese militarism</u>. <u><strong>No</u></strong>rth <u><strong>Ko</u></strong>rea <u>would expand</u> its nuclear <u>capabilities. China would</u> continue to <u>expand its</u> own nuclear <u>arsenal</u>. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? <u>Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common</u> historically. <u><strong>But</u></strong> <u>that’s largely because of</u> determined <u><strong>U.S. efforts to stop them. </u></strong>Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). <u>Research suggests</u> the <u>NPT has been <strong>instrumental</u></strong> <u>in limiting</u> the <u>spread of nuclear weapons</u>, in part <u>by coordinating</u> states’ <u>beliefs about</u> one another’s nonproliferation <u>commitments. To develop</u> nuclear weapons, <u>Japan</u> and South Korea <u>would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt</u> U.S. <u><strong>allies and adversaries</u></strong> in other regions — <u>including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran</u> — <u>to question the treaty</u>’s viability <u>and consider</u> seeking <u><strong>their own nuclear arsenals</u></strong>. <u>Would this be so bad?</u> After all, <u>no</u> two <u>nuclear</u> armed <u>states have fought</u> a <u>major war</u> with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. <u><strong>But</u></strong> the <u>conclusion</u> that <u>nuclear weapons produce peace is <strong>subject to debate</u></strong>. It’s true that there has been <u>no war</u> between major powers since 1945. But that <u>may be due to other factors</u>. The <u><strong>quantitative evidence</u></strong> linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict <u>is limited at best</u>. Further, <u>theoretical and historical evidence suggests</u> that nuclear <u><strong>accidents and miscalculations</u></strong> <u>are likely</u>. <u>More countries</u> with nuclear weapons would <u>mean more opportunities</u> <u>for <strong>catastrophic nuclear mistakes</u></strong>. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that <u>nuclear prolif</u>eration <u><strong>is anything but inevitable</u></strong>. <u>U.S.</u> nonproliferation <u>efforts have been</u> surprisingly <u><strong>successful</u></strong>, even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. <u>Without</u> firm <u>U.S. opposition to</u> the <u>spread of nuclear weapons</u> — a policy implemented <u><strong>through “carrots” like alliances</u></strong> and “sticks” like sanctions — the <u>world would</u> probably <u>have</u> far <u>more than nine countries with nuclear weapons.</u> What’s more, <u>research suggests</u> that <u>nuclear prolif</u>eration <u>would <strong>reduce U.S. world influence</u></strong>, <u><strong>undermine global stability</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u>increase the risk of</u> <u><strong>nuclear war.</p></u></strong> | 1NC v GBN KR | 2 | null | 8,149 | 224 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,052 | Rejection of the state accomplishes NOTHING – they need a pragmatic reimagination of politics to prevent failure of their movement | Pasha ’96 | Pasha ’96 [July-Sept. 1996, Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, “Security as Hegemony”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 283-302, JSTOR] | An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communities. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions on this logic modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building The attack on the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built. there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. A rejection of the state continues to straitjacket the imagination must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order a reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions.A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state. An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state | The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization. The state is also seen as an expression of greater capacities against injustice; A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built. A rejection of the state must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order a reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by powerful institutions | An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence and its drive to produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communities. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building. The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built. Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. A rejection of the state as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to straitjacket the South Asian imagination must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, a reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions.A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state. An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state. | 3,593 | <h4><strong>Rejection of the state accomplishes NOTHING – they need a pragmatic reimagination of politics to prevent failure of their movement </h4><p>Pasha ’96</strong> [July-Sept. 1996, Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, “Security as Hegemony”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 283-302, JSTOR]</p><p><u><strong>An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence</u></strong> and its drive to produce a modern citizenry <u><strong>may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communities. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions</u></strong> said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, <u><strong>on this logic</u></strong>, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; <u><strong>modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence</u></strong> and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. <u><strong>Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building</u></strong>. <u><strong>The attack on the</u></strong> institution of the <u><strong>state appears to substitute teleology for ontology</u></strong>. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. <u><strong><mark>The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization.</u></strong></mark> The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. <u><strong>The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism.<mark> The state is also seen as an expression of greater capacities against </mark>want, hunger, and <mark>injustice; </mark>as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. <mark>A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built.</u></strong></mark> Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But <u><strong>there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. <mark>A rejection of the state</u></strong></mark> as a superfluous leftover of modernity that <u><strong>continues to straitjacket the</u></strong> South Asian <u><strong>imagination <mark>must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order</mark> </u></strong>based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, <u><strong><mark>a reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by </mark>Western-centered globalization and its<mark> powerful institutions</mark>.A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state. An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state</u></strong>.<strong> </p></strong> | 1nc | Case | null | 130,789 | 30 | 125,888 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | 657,845 | N | Michigan | 1 | Lane Tech HC | Shreee | K aff went for FW we also read anthro! | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,053 | Permute: do both — this avoids the Deterrence DA link because the addition of the counterplan to the grand bargain clarifies U.S. resolve. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Permute: do both</u> — this avoids the Deterrence DA link because the addition of the counterplan to the grand bargain <u>clarifies U.S. resolve</u>. </h4> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Permutations | 1,560,652 | 1 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,054 | China will crack down with WMD---wrecks the global taboo and causes nuclear war | Brown 10 | Brown 10 (Mike, Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at Elliott School of International Affairs (George Washington University), former Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies (Georgetown University), Ph.D. in Government (Cornell University), The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, 104-105, http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745647029) | weapons of mass destruction added a new
AND
Iraq used chemical on Kurd sh civilians in the 1980s. | null | The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has added a new
AND
Iraqi government used chemical weapons in attacks on Kurdish civilians in the 1980s. | 179 | <h4>China will <u>crack down</u> with WMD---wrecks the <u>global taboo</u> and causes <u>nuclear war</h4><p></u><strong>Brown 10 </strong>(Mike, Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at Elliott School of International Affairs (George Washington University), former Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies (Georgetown University), Ph.D. in Government (Cornell University), The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration<u>, 104-105, http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745647029)</p><p></u>The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other <u><strong>w</strong>eapons of <strong>m</strong>ass <strong>d</strong>estruction</u> has<u> added a new </p><p>AND</p><p>Iraq</u>i government <u>used chemical</u> weapons in attacks <u>on</u> <u>Kurd</u>i<u>s<strong>h civilians in the 1980s.</p></u></strong> | null | Organized Crime Aff | ICCPR | 1,560,653 | 1 | 125,889 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx | 657,725 | A | MBA | 5 | Isidore Newman AI | Toby Whisenhunt | 1AC New Organized Crime Aff
2NR Neolib K | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx | null | 55,800 | BaSc | Glenbrook South BaSc | null | Jo..... | Ba..... | Br..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,055 | Xi is consolidating power ahead of the next Politburo Standing Committee meeting – He’s winning now | Manila Times 2016 | Manila Times 2016 (Philippines news, “Faction-fighting in China’s ruling party”, http://www.manilatimes.net/faction-fighting-in-chinas-ruling-party/259233/), 4/30 | Allies of Xi are moving against a Communist organization that is the power base of Premier Li in what analysts say may be a sign of faction-fighting at the top The Communist Youth League has been a proving ground for young up-and-comers to demonstrate their political talent, particularly those who are not party “princelings as Xi moves to consolidate power, the group has come under sustained attack the charges, may be a convenient cover for helping Xi jockey for position ahead of next year’s 19th Party Congress, which will decide the new line-up for the Politburo Standing Committee the top organ of political power in China This operation will certainly contribute to consolidating Xi’s position. Xi and Li are locked in a struggle to fill the vacancies Xi is trying to reduce the influence of the Youth League ahead of the event | Allies of Xi are moving against a Communist organization that is the power base of Premier Li in what analysts say may be a sign of faction-fighting at the top The Communist Youth League has been a proving ground for young up-and-comers to demonstrate their political talent, particularly those who are not party “princelings as Xi moves to consolidate power, the group has come under sustained attack the charges, may be a convenient cover for helping Xi jockey for position ahead of next year’s 19th Party Congress, which will decide the new line-up for the Politburo Standing Committee the top organ of political power in China This operation will certainly contribute to consolidating Xi’s position. Xi and Li are locked in a struggle to fill the vacancies Xi is trying to reduce the influence of the Youth League ahead of the event | Allies of Chinese President Xi Jinping are moving against a Communist organization that is the power base of Premier Li Keqiang, in what analysts say may be a sign of faction-fighting at the top of the ruling party. The Communist Youth League (CYL) has long been a proving ground for young up-and-comers to demonstrate their political talent, particularly those who—unlike Xi— are not party “princelings” with the advantage of high-ranking parents. It has produced some of the country’s top leaders, including Xi’s presidential predecessor Hu Jintao as well as Li, and its alumni are seen as a leading faction within the Communist party. But as Xi moves to consolidate power, the group has come under sustained attack, including direct reprimands from the president himself. The party’s internal corruption watchdog, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), this week took the group to task for losing sight of its core mission to guide young people’s ideological development. On its website, the CCDI published an extensive self-criticism by the CYL’s central committee, acknowledging that it must have a greater “sense of responsibility and mission” to the party leadership and the country’s young people. The declaration came after an investigation into the CYL found evidence of embezzlement and influence-peddling, according to the Global Times newspaper, which is close to the ruling party. The CCDI is headed by Wang Qishan, widely considered to be Xi’s top lieutenant. Analysts say that the charges, although likely legitimate, may also be a convenient cover for the CCDI’s real goal: helping Xi jockey for position ahead of next year’s 19th Party Congress, which will decide the new line-up for the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the top organ of political power in China. “To investigate the CYL is a highly political endeavor,” said Jean-Pierre Cabestan of Hong Kong Baptist University. “This operation will certainly contribute to consolidating Xi’s position.” Five of the current seven PSC members are expected to retire at the Congress, and many experts believe Xi and Li are locked in a struggle to fill the vacancies with their own supporters, not to mention protect their own positions. “All indications are that Xi Jinping is trying to reduce the influence of the Youth League” ahead of the event, China expert Willy Lam of the Chinese University of Hong Kong told Agence France-Presse. | 2,443 | <h4><u>Xi is consolidating power ahead of the next Politburo Standing Committee meeting – He’s winning now</h4><p><strong>Manila Times 2016</strong> (Philippines news, “Faction-fighting in China’s ruling party”, </u>http://www.manilatimes.net/faction-fighting-in-chinas-ruling-party/259233/<u>), 4/30</p><p><strong><mark>Allies of</u></strong></mark> Chinese President <u><strong><mark>Xi</u></strong></mark> Jinping <u><strong><mark>are moving against a Communist organization that is the power base of</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Premier Li</u></strong></mark> Keqiang, <u><strong><mark>in what analysts say may be a sign of faction-fighting at the top</mark> </u></strong>of the ruling party. <u><strong><mark>The Communist Youth League</u></strong></mark> (CYL) <u><strong><mark>has</u></strong></mark> long <u><strong><mark>been a proving ground for young up-and-comers to demonstrate their political talent, particularly those who</u></strong></mark>—unlike Xi— <u><strong><mark>are not party “princelings</u></strong></mark>” with the advantage of high-ranking parents. It has produced some of the country’s top leaders, including Xi’s presidential predecessor Hu Jintao as well as Li, and its alumni are seen as a leading faction within the Communist party. But <u><strong><mark>as Xi moves to consolidate power, the group has come under sustained attack</u></strong></mark>, including direct reprimands from the president himself. The party’s internal corruption watchdog, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), this week took the group to task for losing sight of its core mission to guide young people’s ideological development. On its website, the CCDI published an extensive self-criticism by the CYL’s central committee, acknowledging that it must have a greater “sense of responsibility and mission” to the party leadership and the country’s young people. The declaration came after an investigation into the CYL found evidence of embezzlement and influence-peddling, according to the Global Times newspaper, which is close to the ruling party. The CCDI is headed by Wang Qishan, widely considered to be Xi’s top lieutenant. Analysts say that <u><strong><mark>the charges,</u></strong></mark> although likely legitimate, <u><strong><mark>may</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>be a convenient cover for</u></strong></mark> the CCDI’s real goal: <u><strong><mark>helping Xi jockey for position ahead of next year’s 19th Party Congress, which will decide the new line-up for the</u></strong></mark> Communist Party’s <u><strong><mark>Politburo Standing Committee</u></strong></mark> (PSC), <u><strong><mark>the top organ of political power in China</u></strong></mark>. “To investigate the CYL is a highly political endeavor,” said Jean-Pierre Cabestan of Hong Kong Baptist University. “<u><strong><mark>This operation will certainly contribute to consolidating Xi’s position.</u></strong></mark>” Five of the current seven PSC members are expected to retire at the Congress, and many experts believe <u><strong><mark>Xi and Li are locked in a struggle to fill the vacancies</u></strong></mark> with their own supporters, not to mention protect their own positions. “All indications are that <u><strong><mark>Xi</mark> </u></strong>Jinping <u><strong><mark>is trying to reduce the influence of the Youth League</u></strong></mark>” <u><strong><mark>ahead of the event</u></strong></mark>, China expert Willy Lam of the Chinese University of Hong Kong told Agence France-Presse.</p> | Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source | 1AR | Xi Bad Ptx | 162,589 | 4 | 125,826 | ./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx | 655,667 | A | Johns Creek Gladiator Debates | 3 | Marist AE | judge | 1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma
1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k
2NR-- T must be qpq | hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx | null | 55,551 | AdMu | Chattahoochee AdMu | null | Za..... | Ad..... | Pr..... | Mu..... | 20,067 | Chattahoochee | Chattahoochee | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,056 | Text: The United States federal government should condition economically and/or diplomatically engaging the People's Republic of China over various security measures of a staged Framework Agreement concerning Taiwan on the People’s Republic of China agreeing to the Republic of India’s entrance into the Nuclear Suppliers Group | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should condition economically and/or diplomatically engaging the People's Republic of China over various security measures of a staged Framework Agreement concerning Taiwan on the People’s Republic of China agreeing to the Republic of India’s entrance into the Nuclear Suppliers Group</h4> | 1NC v GBN KR | 3 | null | 1,560,654 | 1 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,057 | Permute: plan plus threat of counterplan — as part of negotiations, inform China that the U.S. will enact the counterplan if the PRC doesn’t agree to the grand bargain. This increases U.S. leverage. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>Permute: plan plus threat of counterplan</u> — as part of negotiations, inform China that the U.S. will enact the counterplan if the PRC doesn’t agree to the grand bargain. This <u>increases U.S. leverage</u>. </h4> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Permutations | 1,560,655 | 1 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,058 | Plan: The United States federal government should repatriate nearly all of the People's Republic of China’s most wanted fugitives and/or prosecute them in exchange for the People's Republic of China’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and diplomatic assurances regarding returned fugitives. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Plan: The United States federal government should repatriate nearly all of the People's Republic of China’s most wanted fugitives and/or prosecute them in exchange for the People's Republic of China’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and diplomatic assurances regarding returned fugitives. </h4> | null | Organized Crime Aff | Plan | 1,560,656 | 1 | 125,889 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx | 657,725 | A | MBA | 5 | Isidore Newman AI | Toby Whisenhunt | 1AC New Organized Crime Aff
2NR Neolib K | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx | null | 55,800 | BaSc | Glenbrook South BaSc | null | Jo..... | Ba..... | Br..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,059 | Their theses of social death and ontology ignore the history of resistance to enslavement and persistence of culture that retroactively denies agency to the slave—we should refigure narrations of history around the generative potential of resistance to social death rather than just the conditions of it | Brown 9 ) | Brown 9 (Vincent Brown [Professor of History and of African and African-American Studies at Harvard University.] “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery” The American Historical Review, Vol. 114, No. 5 (DECEMBER 2009), pp. 1231-1249 Oxford University Press, mjb) | The premise of Patterson that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated was challenged by scholars concerned with "survivals" or "retentions" of African culture and by historians of slave resistance it was assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds Herskovits examined "Africanisms" practices that seemed to be identifiably African as useful symbols of cultural survival to analyze change and con tinuity in African American culture , the preservation of dis tinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved they often equated acts of will with humanity itself As these writ ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of "the slave" with what they were learning about the en slaved If slaves were in fact 'generally dishonored "how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of 'reputation' and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?" How could they have formed fragile families if they had been "natally alienated" by definition if slaves had been uniformly subjected to "permanent violent domination," they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the "varied manifestations of their resistance" that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes "fatally." The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson's description of slavery African American history has grown from the kinds of people's histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved de pend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken "agency," or the self-willed activity of choice-making sub jects, to be their starting point Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would find themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been "pictured principally as a negative or limiting force" that "restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave. the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence. | The premise of that Africans were alienated , was challenged by scholars of African culture and historians of slave resistance. research supported hile enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions they did maintain their cultural backgrounds the preservation cultural forms served as an index of a resilient social personhood, or identit , and resistance to slavery itself "If slaves were in fact 'generally dishonored how does the degrees of rank among slaves—that is, the scale of 'reputation' and authority accorded, by slave and master alike?" The dynamics of social control falsified Patterson's description of slavery African American history has grown that emphasize a progressive struggle toward victory e these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life the power of slaveholders and damage by slavery have been "pictured principally as a negative or limiting force the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it. a different image of slavery slides into view, not simply the power of slaveholders, but terms and conditions of social existence. | The premise of Orlando Patterson s major work, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with "survivals" or "retentions" of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park's view of "the Negro" predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits examined "Africanisms"—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and con tinuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park's, who empha sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Flerskovits's line of thought, enhancing our un derstanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more pre cise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of dis tinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself.35 Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by "slave crime."36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writ ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of "the slave" with what they were learning about the en slaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson's definition of slavery. "If slaves were in fact 'generally dishonored,' " Craton asked, "how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of 'reputation' and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?" How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been "natally alienated" by definition? Finally, and per haps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to "permanent violent domination," they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the "varied manifestations of their resistance" that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes "fatally."38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson's description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their "tropical temperament." The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re sistance, Culture, and. Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker's analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul tural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom "the rupture was the story" of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the "perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creóles."39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City's 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a "shared cultural heritage" that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the "various steps Africans made in the process of becoming 'African American' in culture, ori entation, and identity."40 Like scholars of resistance before him, Rucker effectively refutes any contention that the enslaved were socially dead. At the same time, his focus on the making of African American culture obscures a crucial dimension of the politics of slavery. In The River Flows On, resistance is the expression of culture, and peoplehood is the outcome of resistance, but Rucker places much less emphasis on the kinds of ex istential problems highlighted by Hartman and Smallwood. He does not ignore the violence of slavery, but he invokes bondage and its depredations as the antithesis of black self-making, rather than as a constitutive part of it. If for Hartman dispos session "had made us an us," Rucker believes that resistance was the crucible in which black people forged identity from a vital inheritance.41 How might his ap proach account for the dislocations, physical violations, and cosmic crises that pre occupy Hartman and Smallwood? Here is where scholars of retention and resistance may yet have something to learn from the concept of social death, viewed properly as a compelling metaphysical threat. African American history has grown from the kinds of people's histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved de pend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study.42 Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken "agency," or the self-willed activity of choice-making sub jects, to be their starting point.43 Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would find themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites. The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been "pictured principally as a negative or limiting force" that "restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave."44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery's cor rosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assump tion. However, the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it. If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force—a peril that motivated enslaved activ ity—a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence. | 8,330 | <h4><strong>Their theses of social death and ontology ignore the history of resistance to enslavement and persistence of culture that retroactively denies agency to the slave—we should refigure narrations of history around the generative potential of resistance to social death rather than just the conditions of it</h4><p>Brown 9</strong> (Vincent Brown [Professor of History and of African and African-American Studies at Harvard University.] “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery” The American Historical Review, Vol. 114, No. 5 (DECEMBER 2009), pp. 1231-1249 Oxford University Press, mjb<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>The premise</mark> <mark>of</u></strong></mark> Orlando <u><strong>Patterson</u></strong> s major work, <u><strong><mark>that</mark> enslaved <mark>Africans</mark> <mark>were</mark> natally <mark>alienated</mark> and culturally isolated</u></strong><mark>, <u><strong>was challenged</u></strong></mark> even before he published his influential thesis, primarily <u><strong><mark>by scholars</mark> concerned with "survivals" or "retentions" <mark>of African culture</mark> <mark>and</mark> by <mark>historians of slave resistance</u></strong>.</mark> In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park's view of "the Negro" predominated among scholars, <u><strong>it was</u></strong> generally <u><strong>assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa.</u></strong> The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their <u><strong><mark>research supported</mark> the conclusion that w<mark>hile enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions</mark> with them to the Americas, <mark>they did maintain</mark> significant aspects of <mark>their cultural backgrounds</u></strong></mark>.32 <u><strong>Herskovits examined</u></strong> <u><strong>"Africanisms"</u></strong>—any <u><strong>practices that seemed to be identifiably African</u></strong>—<u><strong>as useful symbols of cultural survival</u></strong> that would help him <u><strong>to analyze change and con tinuity in African American culture</u></strong>.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park's, who empha sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Flerskovits's line of thought, enhancing our un derstanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more pre cise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars<u><strong>, <mark>the preservation</mark> of dis tinctive <mark>cultural forms</mark> has <mark>served as an index</mark> both <mark>of a resilient</mark> <mark>social personhood, or identit</mark>y<mark>, and</mark> of <mark>resistance to slavery itself</mark>.</u></strong>35 <u><strong>Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death.</u></strong> The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by "slave crime."36 Soon after, <u><strong>studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved</u></strong>—indeed, <u><strong>they often equated acts of will with humanity itself</u></strong>. <u><strong>As these writ ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of "the slave" with what they were learning about the en slaved</u></strong>.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson's definition of slavery. <mark>"<u><strong>If slaves were in fact 'generally dishonored</u></strong></mark>,' " Craton asked, <u><strong>"<mark>how does</mark> he explain <mark>the degrees of rank</mark> found <mark>among</mark> all groups of <mark>slaves—that is, the scale of 'reputation' and authority accorded,</mark> or at least acknowledged, <mark>by slave and master alike?"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>How could they have formed</u></strong> the <u><strong>fragile families</u></strong> documented by social historians <u><strong>if they had been "natally alienated" by definition</u></strong>? Finally, and per haps most tellingly, <u><strong>if slaves had been uniformly subjected to "permanent violent domination," they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the "varied manifestations of their resistance"</u></strong> <u><strong>that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes "fatally."</u></strong>38 <u><strong><mark>The dynamics of social control</mark> and slave resistance <mark>falsified Patterson's description of slavery</u></strong></mark> even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their "tropical temperament." The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re sistance, Culture, and. Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker's analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul tural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom "the rupture was the story" of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the "perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creóles."39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City's 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a "shared cultural heritage" that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the "various steps Africans made in the process of becoming 'African American' in culture, ori entation, and identity."40 Like scholars of resistance before him, Rucker effectively refutes any contention that the enslaved were socially dead. At the same time, his focus on the making of African American culture obscures a crucial dimension of the politics of slavery. In The River Flows On, resistance is the expression of culture, and peoplehood is the outcome of resistance, but Rucker places much less emphasis on the kinds of ex istential problems highlighted by Hartman and Smallwood. He does not ignore the violence of slavery, but he invokes bondage and its depredations as the antithesis of black self-making, rather than as a constitutive part of it. If for Hartman dispos session "had made us an us," Rucker believes that resistance was the crucible in which black people forged identity from a vital inheritance.41 How might his ap proach account for the dislocations, physical violations, and cosmic crises that pre occupy Hartman and Smallwood? Here is where scholars of retention and resistance may yet have something to learn from the concept of social death, viewed properly as a compelling metaphysical threat. <u><strong><mark>African American history has grown</mark> from the kinds of people's histories <mark>that emphasize</mark> <mark>a progressive struggle</mark> <mark>toward</mark> an ultimate <mark>victory</mark> over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved de pend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study</u></strong>.42 <u><strong>Becaus<mark>e these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life</mark> beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair.</u></strong> Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, <u><strong>studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken "agency," or the self-willed activity of choice-making sub jects, to be their starting point</u></strong>.43 <u><strong>Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would find themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all.</u></strong> <u><strong>Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites</u></strong>. The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, <u><strong><mark>the power of slaveholders</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>damage</mark> wrought <mark>by</mark> <mark>slavery</mark> <mark>have been "pictured principally as a negative or limiting force</mark>" that "restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave.</u></strong>"44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery's cor rosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assump tion. However, <u><strong><mark>the violent domination of slavery</mark> <mark>generated political action; it was not antithetical to it</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force</u></strong>—a peril that motivated enslaved activ ity—<u><strong><mark>a different image of slavery</mark> <mark>slides into view,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>one in which the object of slave politics is <mark>not simply the power of slaveholders, but</mark> the very <mark>terms and conditions of social existence.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1nc | Case | null | 57,086 | 128 | 125,888 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | 657,845 | N | Michigan | 1 | Lane Tech HC | Shreee | K aff went for FW we also read anthro! | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,060 | China says yes---China WANTS India to join the NSG due to political isolation and indian relations but is scared of the political fallout of going back against their word. The CP is the “diplomatic out” and “Political cover” china is looking for | null | China doesn’t want to appear as completely caving in | eight years ago China backed down under pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the NSG With India’s membership up for consideration an outright repeat appears unlikely China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules Beijing’s position on Indian membership is undoubtedly politically hyphenated with the largely successful diplomatic push by the Indian government reaching the final stages China will be left as the only hold-out once again China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated, virtually always seeking some degree of political cover from others Beijing was wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India The sole countervailing factor is that China will not want to cause real damage to its relationship with India over the NSG China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues the future scope of U.S.-India ties As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy isolation alone is unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to China blocking over Indian membership in the NSG | null | Their position is purely political and not about whether or not they acutally want India to join the NSG
China seeks political cover for their decision and doesn’t want to be isolated
They don’t want to damage indian relations
They don’t want to be the only one opposed
They are looking for a diplomatic out aka an excuse to grant India NSG
Andrew Small 2016 (senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Wire, June 20, http://thewire.in/43991/why-china-is-playing-a-tougher-game-on-the-nsg-this-time-around/
Nearly eight years ago, after being left in a minority of one, China backed down under intense pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG). With India’s membership up for consideration this week at the NSG’s plenary meeting in Seoul, an outright repeat of these events appears unlikely. In contrast to 2008, when Beijing hid behind other opponents until each and every one of them had been peeled off, this time China has made its position clear. Unless a deal is done in the coming days, most observers are betting that China will stick to its guns. What has changed? And how far is Beijing’s opposition likely to go? On Monday, China responded to the Indian external affairs minister’s statement that Beijing was not opposed to Indian membership. “The inclusion of non-NPT members has never been a topic on the agenda of NSG meetings. In Seoul this year, there is no such topic,” the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said. “We have stressed that the NSG is still divided about non-NPT countries entry into the NSG and under the current circumstances we hope that NSG will make thorough discussions to make a decision based on consultation.” China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules. The nuclear plants that China is building in Pakistan may help to address that country’s dire energy situation but no other member of the NSG accepts the claim by Chinese officials that each and every new reactor was “grandfathered” into China’s original membership agreement. While this violation has not been deemed sufficient to warrant blowing the group up, it has been an ongoing demonstration that China sees the institution through a largely political prism. And Beijing’s position on Indian membership is undoubtedly politically hyphenated: boiled down to its essentials, China is willing to back India’s entry if there is a clear route for Pakistan to join the club too. Beijing did belatedly attempt a similar manoeuvre during the late stages of the negotiations in 2008 but the proposal that Pakistan might be granted a matching exemption to India’s attracted more incredulity than support from other NSG members. This time, Chinese attempts to push for a conditions-based process that would keep the door open to Pakistan’s future entry elicit greater sympathy. Other countries also have their reservations about an ad hominem approach to membership for non-NPT states. Nonetheless, with the largely successful diplomatic push by the Indian government and its supporters reaching the final stages, it is possible that China will be left as the only hold-out once again. Under Hu Jintao, that would likely have proved sufficient. China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated, virtually always seeking some degree of political cover from others. Beijing was wary about going toe-to-toe with Washington on issues deemed to be top-tier strategic priorities, which the NSG waiver certainly was. It had a counter-move in its back pocket too, in the shape of its deal with Pakistan on a new phase of Chashma reactors, an NSG exemption by fiat, from which only its own nuclear industry would benefit. And Beijing was wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India for the sake of a Pakistan that was still reeling from the A.Q. Khan proliferation scandal, one in which China was itself implicated – the bomb designs that showed up in Libya, to take just one example, being of Chinese origin. Very few considerations suggested that this was a propitious moment to make a stand, though even then it was a close, last-minute call. This time, virtually none of these conditions are the same. President Xi Jinping is a more forceful leader than his predecessor, more comfortable with playing great power politics and less anxious about the repercussions of throwing China’s weight around. The United States has less capacity to press China to change its position, and the dynamics between Washington and Beijing are far more competitive than they were in 2008. U.S. officials, however hard they push, will not be able to repeat the same trick. There is also no obvious back-up plan if China agrees to Indian membership without concomitant assurances about Pakistan’s future position, which, given the requirement for unanimous decision-making at the NSG, could permanently entrench a framework that disadvantages its closest partner. And this time, there is more at stake for China in being seen to stick up for the interests of its Pakistani friends. China is not about to make a fundamental break with its non-alignment policies but in a context where Beijing is in the process of establishing its first overseas military facilities, and engaging in an intensifying strategic contest with the United States, credibility with friends and quasi-allies matters more than it did. Pakistan has been the surprising pace-setter in Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative, and over the last year Chinese intellectuals have taken to describing the country as China’s “one real ally”, with the relationship a “model to follow”. For all the supposed constancy of their “all-weather friendship”, this was not the tone in 2008. Standing up for Pakistan now is not only about the bilateral relationship but also about China’s reliability as a partner, and the demonstration effect in this high stakes case would have resonance well beyond Seoul. The sole countervailing factor is that China will not want to cause real damage to its relationship with India over the NSG, which matters far more to New Delhi than it does to Beijing. China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues, such as the South China Sea and the future scope of U.S.-India ties. It will also be uncomfortable about the prospect of its relationships with India and Pakistan being re-coupled at just the moment where it finally appeared to be having some success in developing them along parallel tracks. As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy. But that would require a compromise that will allow China to credibly claim that it has preserved an opening for the Pakistanis, a possibility that is still on the table. Short of that, no matter how effectively Beijing is diplomatically boxed in, isolation alone is unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to China blocking the emerging consensus over Indian membership in the NSG, and last-minute phone calls from the White House will not swing it. The sole reason China would move is because it calculates that the costs to the Sino-Indian relationship outweigh those of being seen as a fair-weather friend. | 7,284 | <h4>China <u>says yes</u>---China WANTS India to join the NSG due to <u>political isolation</u> and <u>indian relations</u> but is scared of the <u>political fallout of </u>going back against their word. The CP is the “<u>diplomatic out</u>” and “<u>Political cover</u>” china is looking for</h4><p>China doesn’t want to appear as completely caving in</p><p>Their position is purely political and not about whether or not they acutally want India to join the NSG</p><p>China seeks political cover for their decision and doesn’t want to be isolated</p><p>They don’t want to damage indian relations</p><p>They don’t want to be the only one opposed</p><p>They are looking for a diplomatic out aka an excuse to grant India NSG</p><p>Andrew <strong>Small 2016</strong> (senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Wire, June 20, http://thewire.in/43991/why-china-is-playing-a-tougher-game-on-the-nsg-this-time-around/ </p><p>Nearly <u>eight years ago</u>, after being left in a minority of one, <u>China backed down under</u> intense <u>pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the</u> Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (<u>NSG</u>). <u>With India’s membership up for consideration</u> this week at the NSG’s plenary meeting in Seoul, <u>an outright repeat</u> of these events <u>appears unlikely</u>. In contrast to 2008, when Beijing hid behind other opponents until each and every one of them had been peeled off, this time China has made its position clear. Unless a deal is done in the coming days, most observers are betting that China will stick to its guns. What has changed? And how far is Beijing’s opposition likely to go? On Monday, China responded to the Indian external affairs minister’s statement that Beijing was not opposed to Indian membership. “The inclusion of non-NPT members has never been a topic on the agenda of NSG meetings. In Seoul this year, there is no such topic,” the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said. “We have stressed that the NSG is still divided about non-NPT countries entry into the NSG and under the current circumstances we hope that NSG will make thorough discussions to make a decision based on consultation.” <u>China’s stance certainly cannot be attributed to any profound attachment to the NSG’s rules</u>. The nuclear plants that China is building in Pakistan may help to address that country’s dire energy situation but no other member of the NSG accepts the claim by Chinese officials that each and every new reactor was “grandfathered” into China’s original membership agreement. While this violation has not been deemed sufficient to warrant blowing the group up, it has been an ongoing demonstration that China sees the institution through a largely political prism. And <u>Beijing’s position on Indian membership is <strong>undoubtedly politically</strong> hyphenated</u>: boiled down to its essentials, China is willing to back India’s entry if there is a clear route for Pakistan to join the club too. Beijing did belatedly attempt a similar manoeuvre during the late stages of the negotiations in 2008 but the proposal that Pakistan might be granted a matching exemption to India’s attracted more incredulity than support from other NSG members. This time, Chinese attempts to push for a conditions-based process that would keep the door open to Pakistan’s future entry elicit greater sympathy. Other countries also have their reservations about an ad hominem approach to membership for non-NPT states. Nonetheless, <u>with the largely successful diplomatic push by the Indian government </u>and its supporters <u>reaching the final stages</u>, it is possible that <u>China will be left as the only hold-out once again</u>. Under Hu Jintao, that would likely have proved sufficient. <u>China was reluctant to be diplomatically isolated, virtually always <strong>seeking</strong> some degree of <strong>political cover from others</u></strong>. Beijing was wary about going toe-to-toe with Washington on issues deemed to be top-tier strategic priorities, which the NSG waiver certainly was. It had a counter-move in its back pocket too, in the shape of its deal with Pakistan on a new phase of Chashma reactors, an NSG exemption by fiat, from which only its own nuclear industry would benefit. And <u><strong>Beijing was wary of doing too much damage to its bilateral relationship with India</u></strong> for the sake of a Pakistan that was still reeling from the A.Q. Khan proliferation scandal, one in which China was itself implicated – the bomb designs that showed up in Libya, to take just one example, being of Chinese origin. Very few considerations suggested that this was a propitious moment to make a stand, though even then it was a close, last-minute call. This time, virtually none of these conditions are the same. President Xi Jinping is a more forceful leader than his predecessor, more comfortable with playing great power politics and less anxious about the repercussions of throwing China’s weight around. The United States has less capacity to press China to change its position, and the dynamics between Washington and Beijing are far more competitive than they were in 2008. U.S. officials, however hard they push, will not be able to repeat the same trick. There is also no obvious back-up plan if China agrees to Indian membership without concomitant assurances about Pakistan’s future position, which, given the requirement for unanimous decision-making at the NSG, could permanently entrench a framework that disadvantages its closest partner. And this time, there is more at stake for China in being seen to stick up for the interests of its Pakistani friends. China is not about to make a fundamental break with its non-alignment policies but in a context where Beijing is in the process of establishing its first overseas military facilities, and engaging in an intensifying strategic contest with the United States, credibility with friends and quasi-allies matters more than it did. Pakistan has been the surprising pace-setter in Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative, and over the last year Chinese intellectuals have taken to describing the country as China’s “one real ally”, with the relationship a “model to follow”. For all the supposed constancy of their “all-weather friendship”, this was not the tone in 2008. Standing up for Pakistan now is not only about the bilateral relationship but also about China’s reliability as a partner, and the demonstration effect in this high stakes case would have resonance well beyond Seoul. <u>The sole countervailing factor is that China will not want to cause real damage to its relationship with India over the NSG</u>, which matters far more to New Delhi than it does to Beijing. <u>China knows that there would be repercussions for higher-salience issues</u>, such as the South China Sea and <u>the future scope of U.S.-India ties</u>. It will also be uncomfortable about the prospect of its relationships with India and Pakistan being re-coupled at just the moment where it finally appeared to be having some success in developing them along parallel tracks. <u><strong>As a result, Beijing will be looking for an “out” rather than wanting to make a point of its obduracy</u></strong>. But that would require a compromise that will allow China to credibly claim that it has preserved an opening for the Pakistanis, a possibility that is still on the table. Short of that, no matter how effectively Beijing is diplomatically boxed in, <u>isolation alone is unlikely to prove a sufficient deterrent to China blocking</u> the emerging consensus <u>over Indian membership in the NSG</u>, and last-minute phone calls from the White House will not swing it. The sole reason China would move is because it calculates that the costs to the Sino-Indian relationship outweigh those of being seen as a fair-weather friend.</p> | 1NC v GBN KR | 3 | null | 414,567 | 12 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,061 | The U.S. can’t effectively defend Taiwan and China knows it — deterrence fails. | White 15 | White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016) | But the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing
Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions are simply unthinkable
This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification But it understands that China's patience is not inexhaustible — eventually China wants to get Taiwan back
Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile it can build support among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification
Alas, this seems an illusion. There is a real danger that the Taiwanese overestimate the international support they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough
the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually | there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing
in 96 the US could simply send aircraft carriers to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions are unthinkable
China's patience is not inexhaustible — eventually China wants to get Taiwan back
There is a real danger the Taiwanese overestimate international support
no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China to help Taiwan China is too important economically and too powerful militarily for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf | But the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing.
Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply unthinkable.
This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification by preserving the status quo. But it understands that China's patience is not inexhaustible — eventually China wants to get Taiwan back.
Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile within the status quo — without seeking independence — it can build support among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification.
Alas, this seems an illusion. There is a real danger that the Taiwanese overestimate the international support they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough.
No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually. | 1,832 | <h4>The U.S. <u>can’t effectively defend</u> Taiwan and China knows it — <u>deterrence fails</u>. </h4><p><strong>White 15</strong> — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p><u>But the stark reality is that these days, <mark>there is <strong>not much</strong> the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Back <mark>in</mark> 19<mark>96</mark> when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, <mark>the US could simply send</mark> a couple of <mark>aircraft carriers</mark> into the area <mark>to force China to back off. <strong>Today the balance of power is vastly different</strong>: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions</u></mark> of the kind the US used against Russia recently <u><mark>are</mark> simply <strong><mark>unthinkable</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification</u> by preserving the status quo. <u>But it understands that <mark>China's patience is not inexhaustible — <strong>eventually China wants to get Taiwan back</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile</u> within the status quo — without seeking independence — <u>it can build support among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification</u>.</p><p><u>Alas, this seems <strong>an illusion</strong>. <mark>There is a <strong>real danger</strong></mark> that <mark>the Taiwanese overestimate</mark> the <mark>international support</mark> they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough</u>.</p><p>No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But <u>the harsh reality is that <mark>no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China</mark> in order <mark>to help Taiwan</mark> preserve the status quo. <mark>China is</mark> simply <strong><mark>too important economically</strong></mark>, <mark>and <strong>too powerful militarily</strong></mark>, <mark>for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf</mark>, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually</u>.</p> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Deterrence Fails | 66,508 | 151 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,062 | Action based pragmatism is the best orientation for anti-racist politics. | Glaude 07 | Glaude 07 – (2007, Eddie, William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of Religion, and Chair, Center for African American Studies at Princeton, “In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America,” p. x-xii) | knowledge without action is useless In a room full of young people with varied backgrounds and challenges in their lives, we found ourselves thinking with distinctly pragmatic tools about epistemology and how our thoughts about the subject could affect how we seek to change the world.
pragmatism, when attentive to the darker dimensions of human living can address many of the conceptual problems that plague contemporary African American political life How we think about black identity and how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape bad racial reasoning - reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply because they are black, or that short- circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting actual black people
To embrace pragmatism is to hold close a fundamental faith in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their circumstances while rejecting assumptions that would deny them that capacity To bind pragmatism and African American politics together is to open up new avenues for thinking about both
it seeks instead to open up deliberative space within African American communities and throughout the country for reflection on how we think about the pressing matters confronting black communities and our nation
of the 1960s is the only frame of reference, obscuring their ability to see clearly the distinctive challenges of our current moment.
The book continuously asserts the primacy of participatory democracy the necessity for responsibility and accountability, and the pressing need for more imaginative thinking about African American conditions of living.
On college campuses from New Haven to Denver I have invoked my pragmatic commitments as a basis for reimagining African American politics-to reject specious conceptions of black identity I have insisted that we hold one another accountable and responsible in light of an understanding that democracy is a way of life that it involves a certain moral and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive virtues of free and open debate I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge to forge a politics that speaks to the particular problems of this moment and not simply to mimic the strategies and approaches of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s that publics come into and out of existence all the time and that our challenge is to find the requisite tools to respond to the shifts and transformations that call new publics into being.
pragmatism offers resources for thinking about African American politics in the twenty-first century | knowledge without action is useless
pragmatism, can address conceptual problems that plague African American political life how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape racial reasoning - reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply because they are black or that short- circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting actual black people
To embrace pragmatism is to hold close a fundamental faith in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their circumstances To bind pragmatism and African American politics together is to open up new avenues for thinking about both.
invoked pragmatic commitments as a basis for reimagining African American politics- o reject conceptions of black identity democracy is a way of life it involves a certain moral and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive virtues of open debate I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge to forge a politics that speaks to the particular problems of this moment and not simply to mimic the strategies of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s publics come into and out of existence all the time
pragmatism offers resources for thinking about African American politics in the twenty-first century | Another young man stood up and offered a slight correction to his colleague's impassioned remarks. He said, "I agree with what has just been said, but we should know that knowledge without action is useless. We must do something with that knowledge." The conversation that followed was instructive. Students weighed in on the matter. West and Smiley of- fered their views. I asked, "What if we understand knowledge not as sepa- rate from doing, but rather as a consequence of it? What if knowledge is s simply the fruit of our undertaking? To use one of Tavis Smiley's favorite words, we proceeded to "marinate" for a while on the implications of the relation between how we think and how we act. At one level, my questions had been aimed simply at countering an implicit anti-intellectualism. But what I had also done was to invoke, verbatim, John Dewey's definition of knowledge as the "fruit of our undertakings." In a room full of young people with varied backgrounds and challenges in their lives, we found ourselves thinking with distinctly pragmatic tools about epistemology and how our thoughts about the subject could affect how we seek to change the world.
Why John Dewey in this context? Because I believe that the tradition of American pragmatism exemplified by Dewey offers powerful resources for redefining African American leadership and politics. This book seeks to make that case. I argue that pragmatism, when attentive to the darker dimensions of human living (what we often speak of as the blues), can address many of the conceptual problems that plague contemporary African American political life. How we think about black identity, how we imagine black history, and how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape bad racial reasoning - reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply because they are black, or that short- circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting actual black people.
The relationship I propose between pragmatism and African American politics is mutually beneficial. Pragmatism must reckon with the blues or remain a stale academic exercise. The blues, of course, are much more than a musical idiom. They constitute, as Albert Murray notes in his classic book on the subject, "a statement about confronting the complexities inherent in the human situation and about improvising or experiment- ing or riffing or otherwise playing with (or even gambling with) such posibiliteis as are inherent in the obstacles, the disjunctures, and the jeopardy." Murray goes on to say, in words that I hope will resonate through the pages that follow, that the blues are "a statement about perseverance and .about resilience and thus also about the maintenance"of equilibrium despite precarious circumstances and about achieving elegance in the very process of coping with the rudiments of subsistence." In one sense, to take up the subject of African American politics is inevitably to take up the blues. That is to say, the subject cannot but account for the incredible efforts of ordinary black folk to persevere with elegance and a smile as they confront a world fraught with danger and tragedy. To embrace pragmatism is to hold close a fundamental faith in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their circumstances while rejecting hidden and not- so-hidden assumptions that would deny them that capacity. To bind pragmatism and African American politics together, I hope to show, is to open up new avenues for thinking about both.
My book does not offer a political blueprint nor is it concerned with putting forwad concrete solution to specific political problems, it seeks instead to open up deliberative space within African American communities and throughout the country for reflection on how we think about the pressing matters confronting black communities and our nation. Reflection is not opposed to action. I hope to make clear how the theoretical and the practical are intimately connected.
To be sure, the bleak realities of our country constitute the backdrop of my efforts. Our democratic way of life is in jeopardy. Fear and our clamoring need for security have revealed the more unsavory features of American culture. The foundational elements of a free and open society are being eroded, and our political leaders lie to justify their destruction. The corrosive effects of corporate greed on the form and content of our democ- racy are also apparent: the top 1 percent of the population is getting richer while the vast majority of Americans, of whatever color, struggle to make ends meet. In many African American communities in particular, we see the signs of crisis: deteriorating health, alarming rates of incarceration, the devastating effects of drug economies, and the hypercon- centration of poverty because work has simply disappeared. Political fac- tions stay the course, exploiting faith communities, stoking the fires of homophobia (while denying the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in black commu- nities), and appealing to uncritical views of black solidarity that often blind our fellow citizens to the destructive policies that, ultimately, undermine the values of democratic life. All the while, established African American leaders seem caught in a time warp in which the black revolu- tion of the 1960s is the only frame of reference, obscuring their ability to see clearly the distinctive challenges of our current moment.
In dark and trying times, particularly in democracies, it is incumbent upon citizens to engage one another in order to imagine possibilities and to see beyond the recalcitrance of their condition. Participatory democracies are always fragile, and moments of crisis serve as easy excuses to discard the values that sustain them. When we stop talking with and provoking our fellows we in effect cede our democratic forms of life to those forces that would destroy it. In a Shade of Blue seeks, among other things, to make explicit the values and commitments that inform my own think- ing about African American politics and democratic life. The book continuously asserts the primacy of participatory democracy the necessity for responsibility and accountability, and the pressing need for more imaginative thinking about African American conditions of living.
For me, these are not abstract concerns. I have been blessed over the last couple of years to be able to speak all around the country and talk with fel- low citizens about the challenges confronting African American commu- nities specifically and our democratic form of life generally. On college campuses from New Haven to Denver to Urbana, and in town-hall meet- ings from Oakland to Houston, I have invoked my pragmatic commitments as a basis for reimagining African American politics-to reject specious conceptions of black identity, facile formulations of black history, and easy appeals to black agency. I have insisted that we hold one another accountable and responsible in light of an understanding that democracy is a way of life and not merely a set of procedures—that it involves a certain moral and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive virtues of free and open debate. I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge to forge a politics that speaks to the particular problems of this moment and not simply to mimic the strategies and approaches of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s. I have done so because of my philosophical commitment to the idea that publics come into and out of existence all the time and that our challenge is to find the requisite tools to respond to the shifts and transformations that call new publics into being.
This book emerged out of these encounters. It carries the burden of making the case that pragmatism, rightly understood, offers resources for thinking about African American politics in the twenty-first century. As such, In a Shade of Blue isn't for the philosophically faint of heart. Chapter 1 is perhaps the most challenging, as it seeks to make clear the significance of John Dewey's moral and political philosophy. I hope that the gen- eral reader will find it worthwhile to persevere through the book's more difficult passages. My argument ends with the call for a "post-soul politics"—a form of political engagement that steps out of the shadows of the black freedom struggles of the sixties and rises to the challenges of our current moment with new voices, innovative thinking, and an unshakable commitment to the values of participatory democracy. | 8,588 | <h4>Action based pragmatism is the best orientation for anti-racist politics.</h4><p><strong>Glaude 07 </strong>– (2007, Eddie, William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of Religion, and Chair, Center for African American Studies at Princeton, “In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America,” p. x-xii)</p><p>Another young man stood up and offered a slight correction to his colleague's impassioned remarks. He said, "I agree with what has just been said, but we should know that <u><strong><mark>knowledge without action is useless</u></strong></mark>. We must do something with that knowledge." The conversation that followed was instructive. Students weighed in on the matter. West and Smiley of- fered their views. I asked, "What if we understand knowledge not as sepa- rate from doing, but rather as a consequence of it? What if knowledge is s simply the fruit of our undertaking? To use one of Tavis Smiley's favorite words, we proceeded to "marinate" for a while on the implications of the relation between how we think and how we act. At one level, my questions had been aimed simply at countering an implicit anti-intellectualism. But what I had also done was to invoke, verbatim, John Dewey's definition of knowledge as the "fruit of our undertakings." <u>In a room full of young people with varied backgrounds and challenges in their lives, we found ourselves thinking with distinctly pragmatic tools about epistemology and how our thoughts about the subject could affect how we seek to change the world.</u> </p><p>Why John Dewey in this context? Because I believe that the tradition of American pragmatism exemplified by Dewey offers powerful resources for redefining African American leadership and politics. This book seeks to make that case. I argue that <u><mark>pragmatism, </mark>when attentive to the darker dimensions of human living</u> (what we often speak of as the blues), <u><strong><mark>can address </mark>many of the <mark>conceptual problems that plague </mark>contemporary <mark>African American political life</u></strong></mark>. <u>How we think about black identity</u>, how we imagine black history, <u>and <mark>how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape </mark>bad <mark>racial reasoning - reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply because they are black</mark>, <mark>or that short- circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting actual black people</u></mark>.</p><p>The relationship I propose between pragmatism and African American politics is mutually beneficial. Pragmatism must reckon with the blues or remain a stale academic exercise. The blues, of course, are much more than a musical idiom. They constitute, as Albert Murray notes in his classic book on the subject, "a statement about confronting the complexities inherent in the human situation and about improvising or experiment- ing or riffing or otherwise playing with (or even gambling with) such posibiliteis as are inherent in the obstacles, the disjunctures, and the jeopardy." Murray goes on to say, in words that I hope will resonate through the pages that follow, that the blues are "a statement about perseverance and .about resilience and thus also about the maintenance"of equilibrium despite precarious circumstances and about achieving elegance in the very process of coping with the rudiments of subsistence." In one sense, to take up the subject of African American politics is inevitably to take up the blues. That is to say, the subject cannot but account for the incredible efforts of ordinary black folk to persevere with elegance and a smile as they confront a world fraught with danger and tragedy. <u><mark>To embrace pragmatism is to hold close a <strong>fundamental faith</strong> in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their circumstances</mark> while rejecting </u>hidden and not- so-hidden <u>assumptions that would <strong>deny them that capacity</u>.</strong> <u><mark>To bind <strong>pragmatism and African American politics</strong> together</u></mark>, I hope to show,<u> <mark>is to open up <strong>new avenues for thinking about both</u></strong>.</p><p></mark>My book does not offer a political blueprint nor is it concerned with putting forwad concrete solution to specific political problems, <u>it seeks instead to open up deliberative space within African American communities and throughout the country for reflection on how we think about the pressing matters confronting black communities and our nation</u>. Reflection is not opposed to action. I hope to make clear how the theoretical and the practical are intimately connected.</p><p>To be sure, the bleak realities of our country constitute the backdrop of my efforts. Our democratic way of life is in jeopardy. Fear and our clamoring need for security have revealed the more unsavory features of American culture. The foundational elements of a free and open society are being eroded, and our political leaders lie to justify their destruction. The corrosive effects of corporate greed on the form and content of our democ- racy are also apparent: the top 1 percent of the population is getting richer while the vast majority of Americans, of whatever color, struggle to make ends meet. In many African American communities in particular, we see the signs of crisis: deteriorating health, alarming rates of incarceration, the devastating effects of drug economies, and the hypercon- centration of poverty because work has simply disappeared. Political fac- tions stay the course, exploiting faith communities, stoking the fires of homophobia (while denying the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in black commu- nities), and appealing to uncritical views of black solidarity that often blind our fellow citizens to the destructive policies that, ultimately, undermine the values of democratic life. All the while, established African American leaders seem caught in a time warp in which the black revolu- tion<u> of the 1960s is the only frame of reference, obscuring their ability to see clearly the distinctive challenges of our current moment.</p><p></u>In dark and trying times, particularly in democracies, it is incumbent upon citizens to engage one another in order to imagine possibilities and to see beyond the recalcitrance of their condition. Participatory democracies are always fragile, and moments of crisis serve as easy excuses to discard the values that sustain them. When we stop talking with and provoking our fellows we in effect cede our democratic forms of life to those forces that would destroy it. In a Shade of Blue seeks, among other things, to make explicit the values and commitments that inform my own think- ing about African American politics and democratic life. <u>The book continuously asserts the primacy of participatory democracy the necessity for responsibility and accountability, and the pressing need for more imaginative thinking about African American conditions of living.</p><p></u>For me, these are not abstract concerns. I have been blessed over the last couple of years to be able to speak all around the country and talk with fel- low citizens about the challenges confronting African American commu- nities specifically and our democratic form of life generally. <u>On college campuses from New Haven to Denver</u> to Urbana, and in town-hall meet- ings from Oakland to Houston, <u>I have <mark>invoked </mark>my <mark>pragmatic commitments as a basis for reimagining African American politics-</mark>t<mark>o reject </mark>specious <mark>conceptions of black identity</u></mark>, facile formulations of black history, and easy appeals to black agency. <u>I have insisted that we hold one another accountable and responsible in light of an understanding that <mark>democracy is a way of life</u></mark> and not merely a set of procedures—<u>that <mark>it involves a certain moral and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive virtues of</mark> free and <strong><mark>open debate</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge to forge a politics that speaks to the <strong>particular problems</strong> of this moment and not simply to mimic the strategies</mark> and approaches <mark>of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s</u></mark>. I have done so because of my philosophical commitment to the idea <u>that <mark>publics come <strong>into and out of existence all the time</strong></mark> and that our challenge is to find the requisite tools to respond to the shifts and transformations that call new publics into being.</p><p></u>This book emerged out of these encounters. It carries the burden of making the case that <u><mark>pragmatism</u></mark>, rightly understood, <u><mark>offers resources for thinking about African American politics in the twenty-first century</u></mark>. As such, In a Shade of Blue isn't for the philosophically faint of heart. Chapter 1 is perhaps the most challenging, as it seeks to make clear the significance of John Dewey's moral and political philosophy. I hope that the gen- eral reader will find it worthwhile to persevere through the book's more difficult passages. My argument ends with the call for a "post-soul politics"—a form of political engagement that steps out of the shadows of the black freedom struggles of the sixties and rises to the challenges of our current moment with new voices, innovative thinking, and an unshakable commitment to the values of participatory democracy.</p> | 1nc | Case | null | 130,453 | 31 | 125,888 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | 657,845 | N | Michigan | 1 | Lane Tech HC | Shreee | K aff went for FW we also read anthro! | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,063 | China blocks entry now---CP key | Castro 2016 | Bhavani Castro 2016 (fellow of Indian Studies at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil “The International Nuclear Community Should Pressure China to Accept India’s NSG Membership”; June 21, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-international-nuclear-community-should-pressure-china-to-accept-indias-nsg-membership/ | Indian Prime Minister Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG But not all NSG countries are convinced of India’s membership most importantly, China which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition would be a deal breaker Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community. | null | Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently embarked on an impressive five-nation tour that included countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Mexico. Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results, bolstering diplomatic ties and giving India more visibility in the international community. The six-day tour included visits to Afghanistan, Qatar, Switzerland, the United States, and Mexico, and while the visit to the first two countries reinforced India’s partnership with the Islamic world, the highlights of the trip concerned the other three nations. Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a club of 48 countries that holds to established guidelines for trading nuclear-related technology. But not all NSG countries are convinced of the benefits of India’s membership, among them Austria, New Zealand, South Africa and, most importantly, China, which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club. The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition to India’s accession — to be discussed in the Group’s Annual Plenary in Seoul on June 24 — would be a deal breaker. Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community. | 1,574 | <h4>China blocks entry now---CP key</h4><p>Bhavani <strong>Castro 2016<u></strong> (fellow of Indian Studies at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil “The International Nuclear Community Should Pressure China to Accept India’s NSG Membership”; June 21, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-international-nuclear-community-should-pressure-china-to-accept-indias-nsg-membership/</p><p>Indian Prime Minister</u> Narendra Modi recently embarked on an impressive five-nation tour that included countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Mexico. <u>Modi’s international travels have rendered fruitful results</u>, bolstering diplomatic ties and giving India more visibility in the international community. The six-day tour included visits to Afghanistan, Qatar, Switzerland, the United States, and Mexico, and while the visit to the first two countries reinforced India’s partnership with the Islamic world, the highlights of the trip concerned the other three nations. <u>Most importantly, Modi obtained endorsement from the United States, Mexico, and Switzerland for India’s bid to enter the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group</u> (<u>NSG</u>), a club of 48 countries that holds to established guidelines for trading nuclear-related technology. <u>But not all NSG countries are convinced of</u> the benefits of <u>India’s membership</u>, among them Austria, New Zealand, South Africa and, <u><strong>most importantly, China</u></strong>, <u>which considers being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – which India is not – a prerequisite for entering the club</u>. <u>The NSG works by consensus, so Chinese opposition</u> to India’s accession — to be discussed in the Group’s Annual Plenary in Seoul on June 24 — <u><strong>would be a deal breaker</u></strong>. <u>Convincing China will be a hard task, but there are good arguments for why the NSG should consider accepting India as a new member – and why China’s opposition would undermine Beijing’s quest to be recognized as a constructive member of the international community.</p></u> | 1NC v GBN KR | 3 | null | 1,560,020 | 6 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
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3,783,064 | China won’t take the threat of the counterplan seriously — they think the U.S. will eventually back down. | Mearsheimer 14 | Mearsheimer 14 — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, 2014 (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, March/April, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016) | While the U S has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the U S to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today
geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the U S When it comes to a competition between China and the U S over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage | Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition is not sustainable over the long term at some point it will become impossible for the U S to help Taiwan defend itself
geography works in China’s favor When it comes to a competition over projecting military power China wins hands down in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would be reluctant to launch major attacks for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would work to China’s advantage | While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today.
In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage. | 1,010 | <h4>China won’t take the threat of the counterplan <u>seriously</u> — they think the U.S. will <u>eventually back down</u>. </h4><p><strong>Mearsheimer 14</strong> — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, 2014 (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, March/April, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p><u>While the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has good reasons to want <mark>Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition</u></mark> it will build against China, <u>there are also reasons to think this relationship <mark>is <strong>not sustainable</strong> over the long term</u></mark>. For starters, <u><mark>at some point</mark> in the next decade or so <mark>it will become impossible for the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>to help Taiwan defend itself</mark> against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today</u>.</p><p>In addition, <u><mark>geography works in China’s favor</mark> in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>When it comes to a competition</mark> between China and the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>over projecting military power</mark> into Taiwan, <strong><mark>China wins hands down</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would</mark> surely <mark>be reluctant to launch major attacks</mark> against Chinese forces on the mainland, <mark>for fear <strong>they might precipitate nuclear escalation</strong>. This reticence would</mark> also <mark>work to China’s advantage</u></mark>.</p> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Deterrence Fails | 58,476 | 164 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,065 | NSG controversy causes Indo-China tensions---Escalates border disputes | WICKER 7/19 | WICKER 7/19 (McDaniel; Asia Security Fellow at the Wilson Center, “Only America Can Keep a China-India War from Erupting,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/only-america-can-stop-china-india-war-17036) | India and China are on a collision course China’s move to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is merely the latest sign of tension to emerge between the two Asian giants Further competition and even confrontation await. This particular case shows China’s intent to remain the sole Asian power demonstrated when China led the push to exclude India from the NSG Membership in the prestigious group Indians saw as purely political. Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations for such large, neighboring countries China and India clashing on multiple fronts Border issues the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries | null | India and China are on a collision course. They boast the world’s two largest populations, two of the fastest growing economies on the globe and aspirations to lead the way into a new Asian century. The two nations’ fates will be intertwined for decades to come. Troublingly, China’s move last week to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is merely the latest sign of tension to emerge between the two Asian giants. Further competition and even confrontation await. Competition between rising powers is hardly new or surprising. This particular case, however, shows China’s intent to remain the sole Asian power stretching from Siberia to the Arabian Sea. This was most recently demonstrated last week when China led the push to exclude India from the NSG. Membership in the prestigious group, which controls the trade of nuclear material and related technologies, would facilitate India’s nuclear power production. While legitimate concerns remain about India’s status as a nuclear state, Prime Minister Modi’s bid was backed by the United States, Britain, France and many others. These advocates could not overcome resistance spearheaded by the Chinese delegation, in a move that many Indians saw as purely political. China’s NSG position could been seen as warranted given India’s failure to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage. India’s push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and China’s opposition to that move highlight this fact. Of the five current permanent members, only China has yet to offer even token support for the second-largest country in the world joining the exclusive group. China and India have historically maintained relatively positive relations for such large, neighboring countries. The height of the Himalayas, and the long sea route between the two, have buffered most competition. Beijing’s foreign policy concerns have chiefly resided east and southeast of the country, while India has contented itself in dealing with immediate neighbors and holding fast to the nonalignment policy of the Cold War. The border war of 1962 notwithstanding, relations between the two countries have been relatively sanguine. An increasingly powerful and adventurous China and a more engaged India now appear to be clashing on multiple fronts. Border issues linger still, and reports of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control surface regularly in Indian and Western media. While conflict is unlikely to break out, China has been updating and reinforcing its forces stationed in Tibet, and the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries. | 2,729 | <h4>NSG controversy causes Indo-China tensions---Escalates border disputes</h4><p> <strong>WICKER 7/19</strong> (McDaniel; Asia Security Fellow at the Wilson Center, “Only America Can Keep a China-India War from Erupting,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/only-america-can-stop-china-india-war-17036)</p><p><u>India and China are on a <strong>collision course</u></strong>. They boast the world’s two largest populations, two of the fastest growing economies on the globe and aspirations to lead the way into a new Asian century. The two nations’ fates will be intertwined for decades to come. Troublingly, <u><strong>China’s move</strong> </u>last week<u> to <strong>block Indian membership</strong> in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (<strong>NSG</strong>) is merely the latest sign of <strong>tension</strong> to emerge between the two Asian giants</u>. <u>Further competition and even <strong>confrontation</strong> await. </u>Competition between rising powers is hardly new or surprising. <u>This particular case</u>, however, <u>shows China’s intent to remain the <strong>sole Asian power</u></strong> stretching from Siberia to the Arabian Sea. This was most recently <u>demonstrated</u> last week <u>when China <strong>led the push to exclude India from the NSG</u></strong>. <u>Membership in the prestigious group</u>, which controls the trade of nuclear material and related technologies, would facilitate India’s nuclear power production. While legitimate concerns remain about India’s status as a nuclear state, Prime Minister Modi’s bid was backed by the United States, Britain, France and many others. These advocates could not overcome resistance spearheaded by the Chinese delegation, in a move that many <u>Indians saw as purely political. </u>China’s NSG position could been seen as warranted given India’s failure to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but <u>Beijing routinely blocks Delhi’s efforts to play a larger role on the international stage</u>. India’s push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and China’s opposition to that move highlight this fact. Of the five current permanent members, only China has yet to offer even token support for the second-largest country in the world joining the exclusive group. <u>China and India have historically maintained <strong>relatively positive relations</strong> for such large, neighboring countries</u>. The height of the Himalayas, and the long sea route between the two, have buffered most competition. Beijing’s foreign policy concerns have chiefly resided east and southeast of the country, while India has contented itself in dealing with immediate neighbors and holding fast to the nonalignment policy of the Cold War. The border war of 1962 notwithstanding, relations between the two countries have been relatively sanguine. An increasingly powerful and adventurous <u>China</u> <u>and</u> a more engaged <u>India</u> now appear to be <u><strong>clashing</strong> on multiple fronts</u>. <u><strong>Border issues</u></strong> linger still, and reports of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control surface regularly in Indian and Western media. While conflict is unlikely to break out, China has been updating and reinforcing its forces stationed in Tibet, and <u>the disagreement serves as a foundation for other worries</u>.</p> | 1NC v GBN KR | 3 | null | 126,334 | 10 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
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3,783,066 | Only the plan addresses the fundamental issue that risks war and ruins relations. | Glaser 16 | Glaser 16 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse) | proponents of the U S ’ current China policy tend to underestimate the risks inherent in the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, including its role in fueling military competition and supporting Chinese elites’ negative views of U.S. motives. Neither Kim nor Easley says much about these risks, and certain of their remarks suggest they are not small Kim’s and Easley’s recommendations are likely inadequate to meet the challenges currently facing the U S The advantage of my proposed grand bargain is that it confronts the challenge posed by China’s rise head on. It offers a path for eliminating the most serious geopolitical disagreement between the U S and China and for moderating the concomitant political strains and military competition, while providing valuable information about the limited nature of China’s goals that, in turn, reduces the risks of accommodation. And, in combination with policies that reaffirm and deepen the commitment of the U S to its East Asian allies, it would enable the U S to protect its key interests in the region. Notwithstanding the points raised by Kim and Easely, the grand bargain remains the best bet available to the U S | The grand bargain confronts the challenge posed by China’s rise head on. It offers a path for eliminating the most serious geopolitical disagreement and for moderating political strains and military competition it would enable the U S to protect its key interests in the region the grand bargain remains the best bet available | Kim and Easley prefer the United States’ current policy to a grand bargain. Both recommend some modifications designed to reassure and engage China, including joint participation in humanitarian missions, naval cooperation on counter-piracy operations, deepening of economic interdependence via the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, and support of initiatives that would increase China’s role in international organizations. As I argue in my article, there is much to like about the current U.S. policy toward China and East Asia more broadly. If the United States adheres to this policy, then many of these recommendations would be useful refinements.
Nevertheless, proponents of the United States’ current China policy tend to underestimate the risks inherent in the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, including its role in fueling military competition and supporting Chinese elites’ negative views of U.S. motives. Neither Kim nor Easley says much about these risks, and certain of their remarks suggest they are not small. Kim holds that China is “much more confidant and ambitious” than when President Nixon visited China in 1972 and that “Chinese leaders today believe that the United States is determined to contain and divide China internally.” Easley expresses similar concerns, stating that “[f]oreign policy ambition in Beijing has outgrown the 1950s and 1990s cross-strait crises; [that] Chinese internal debates tend to paint the United States as a global competitor,” and that China “is pursuing a Chinese-centered regional architecture.” Given these views of China, Kim’s and Easley’s recommendations, though useful, are likely inadequate to meet the challenges currently facing the United States. This does not mean that such a modified U.S. policy would necessarily be inferior to the grand bargain I have recommended, given that all options for dealing with China’s rise will involve costs or risks, or both. The advantage of my proposed grand bargain, however, is that it confronts the challenge posed by China’s rise head on. It offers a path for eliminating the most serious geopolitical disagreement between the United States and China and for moderating the concomitant political strains and military competition, while providing valuable information about the limited nature of China’s goals that, in turn, reduces the risks of accommodation. And, in combination with policies that reaffirm and deepen the commitment of the United States to its East Asian allies, it would enable the United States to protect its key interests in the region. Notwithstanding the points raised by Kim and Easely, the grand bargain remains the best bet available to the United States. | 2,687 | <h4><u>Only the plan</u> addresses the <u>fundamental issue</u> that risks war and ruins relations. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 16</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p>Kim and Easley prefer the United States’ current policy to a grand bargain. Both recommend some modifications designed to reassure and engage China, including joint participation in humanitarian missions, naval cooperation on counter-piracy operations, deepening of economic interdependence via the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, and support of initiatives that would increase China’s role in international organizations. As I argue in my article, there is much to like about the current U.S. policy toward China and East Asia more broadly. If the United States adheres to this policy, then many of these recommendations would be useful refinements.</p><p>Nevertheless, <u>proponents of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u>’ current China policy tend to underestimate the risks inherent in the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, including its role in fueling military competition and supporting Chinese elites’ negative views of U.S. motives. Neither Kim nor Easley says much about these risks, and certain of their remarks suggest they are not small</u>. Kim holds that China is “much more confidant and ambitious” than when President Nixon visited China in 1972 and that “Chinese leaders today believe that the United States is determined to contain and divide China internally.” Easley expresses similar concerns, stating that “[f]oreign policy ambition in Beijing has outgrown the 1950s and 1990s cross-strait crises; [that] Chinese internal debates tend to paint the United States as a global competitor,” and that China “is pursuing a Chinese-centered regional architecture.” Given these views of China, <u>Kim’s and Easley’s recommendations</u>, though useful, <u>are likely inadequate to meet the challenges currently facing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. This does not mean that such a modified U.S. policy would necessarily be inferior to the grand bargain I have recommended, given that all options for dealing with China’s rise will involve costs or risks, or both. <u><mark>The</mark> advantage of my proposed <mark>grand bargain</u></mark>, however, <u>is that it <mark>confronts the challenge posed by China’s rise <strong>head on</strong>. It offers a path for eliminating the most serious geopolitical disagreement</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>and for moderating</mark> the concomitant <mark>political strains and military competition</mark>, while providing valuable information about the limited nature of China’s goals that, in turn, reduces the risks of accommodation. And, in combination with policies that reaffirm and deepen the commitment of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>to its East Asian allies, <mark>it would enable the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>to protect its key interests in the region</mark>. Notwithstanding the points raised by Kim and Easely, <mark>the grand bargain remains <strong>the best bet available</strong></mark> to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.</p> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Resolving Taiwan Key | 66,417 | 9 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,067 | Next off is the CSCAP CP | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Next off is the CSCAP CP </h4> | 1nc v glancy | 1 | null | 1,560,657 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,068 | Nuclear war | Goswami ‘13 | Goswami ‘13 | [Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears intractable Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear weapons will fight a future war. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs. Security analysts argued internal problems within India and China would create large disincentives for conflict. However wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions over land can lead to conflict As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a particular level is inevitable both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity Hence managing the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for. | null | [Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears intractable. Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear weapons, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, will fight a future war. This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs. Security analysts have argued that internal problems within India and China would create large disincentives for conflict. However, despite such constraints, wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions. Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions over land can lead to conflict, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While competition at a particular level is inevitable, both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity. Hence, managing and resolving the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for. | 4,211 | <h4><strong>Nuclear war </h4><p>Goswami ‘13</p><p><u>[Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,” http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]</p><p></strong>China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of the most vibrant economies of Asia</u>. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However, <u>despite growing bilateral economic relations, <strong>the border dispute appears intractable</u></strong>. Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated. The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. <u>Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict</u>, <u><strong>any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. </u></strong>This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world. <u>Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario <strong>where a nuclear-armed China and India</u></strong> <u><strong>with more than 300 nuclear weapons</u></strong>, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, <u><strong>will fight a future war.</u></strong> This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. <u><strong>The physical proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations if war occurs.</u></strong> <u>Security analysts</u> have <u>argued</u> that <u>internal problems within India and China would create large</u> <u>disincentives for conflict. <strong>However</u></strong>, despite such constraints, <u>wars have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's intentions.</u> Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it <u>is pertinent that both China and India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation,</u> <u><strong>political tensions over land can lead to conflict</u></strong>, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. <u><strong>As a result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. </strong>While competition at a particular level is inevitable</u>, <u>both countries must ensure that Asia remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity</u>. <u>Hence</u>, <u>managing</u> and resolving <u><strong>the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth seriously working for.</p></u></strong> | 1NC v GBN KR | 3 | null | 105,715 | 11 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,069 | The counterplan crushes U.S.-China relations and increases the risk of war over Taiwan. | Kastner 16 | Kastner 16 — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse) | U.S. policymakers should be skeptical of calls to dramatically increase the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security or to more visibly incorporate Taiwan into rebalancing initiatives Such moves would be viewed as inflammatory in Beijing and could generate renewed pessimism about long-term trends in the strait a much stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan would stoke increased tensions in the U.S.-China relationship a key component of China’s expected costs of a Taiwan Strait conflict—regardless of whether the U S intervened—is the damage such a conflict would likely inflict on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the U.S.-China relationship is in tatters to begin with, then Beijing has less to lose in a cross-strait war policies that increase U.S. support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship risk being self-defeating, as the increased stability generated by slowing the cross-strait power shift is canceled out by decreasing expected costs of war for China | policymakers should be skeptical of calls to increase commitment to Taiwan’s security Such moves would be viewed as inflammatory in Beijing and could generate renewed pessimism about long-term trends a stronger U.S. commitment would stoke increased tensions in the U.S.-China relationship a key component of China’s expected costs of a Taiwan conflict is the damage on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the relationship is in tatters to begin with Beijing has less to lose policies that increase support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship risk being self-defeating as increased stability is canceled out by decreasing expected costs of war for China | For similar reasons, U.S. policymakers should be skeptical of calls to dramatically increase the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security or to more visibly incorporate Taiwan into rebalancing initiatives.104 Such moves would be viewed as inflammatory in Beijing and could generate renewed pessimism about long-term trends in the strait. Perhaps more fundamentally, a much stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan would stoke increased tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. As alluded to earlier, a key component of China’s expected costs of a Taiwan Strait conflict—regardless of whether the United States intervened—is the damage such a conflict would likely inflict on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the U.S.-China relationship is in tatters to begin with, then Beijing has less to lose in a cross-strait war. In essence, policies that increase U.S. support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship risk being self-defeating, as the increased stability generated by slowing the cross-strait power shift is canceled out by decreasing expected costs of war for China. | 1,094 | <h4>The counterplan <u>crushes U.S.-China relations</u> and <u>increases the risk of war</u> over Taiwan. </h4><p><strong>Kastner 16</strong> — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p>For similar reasons, <u>U.S. <mark>policymakers should be skeptical of calls to</mark> dramatically <mark>increase</mark> the U.S. <mark>commitment to Taiwan’s security</mark> or to more visibly incorporate Taiwan into rebalancing initiatives</u>.104 <u><mark>Such moves would be viewed as <strong>inflammatory</strong> in Beijing and could generate <strong>renewed pessimism</strong> about long-term trends</mark> in the strait</u>. Perhaps more fundamentally, <u><mark>a</mark> much <mark>stronger U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan <mark>would stoke <strong>increased tensions in the U.S.-China relationship</u></strong></mark>. As alluded to earlier, <u><mark>a key component of China’s expected costs of a Taiwan</mark> Strait <mark>conflict</mark>—regardless of whether the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>intervened—<mark>is the damage</mark> such a conflict would likely inflict <mark>on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the</mark> U.S.-China <mark>relationship is <strong>in tatters to begin with</strong></mark>, then <mark>Beijing has less to lose</mark> in a cross-strait war</u>. In essence, <u><mark>policies that increase</mark> U.S. <mark>support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship risk being <strong>self-defeating</strong></mark>, <mark>as</mark> the <mark>increased stability</mark> generated by slowing the cross-strait power shift <mark>is <strong>canceled out</strong> by decreasing expected costs of war for China</u></mark>.</p> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Hardline Bad DA | 77,981 | 162 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,070 | Next off is the Japan DA | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Next off is the Japan DA</h4> | 1NC | null | Japan | 1,560,658 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,071 | Text: The United States federal government should | null | -propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of diplomatically engaging the People's Republic of China by proposing a negotiation over the security measures of a staged framework agreement, including, but not limited to, reciprocal reductions in military commitments over the Republic of China and implement the negotiated framework. | null | null | -encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and
-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile. | 218 | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should</h4><p>-propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of diplomatically engaging the People's Republic of China by proposing a negotiation over the security measures of a staged framework agreement, including, but not limited to, reciprocal reductions in military commitments over the Republic of China and implement the negotiated framework. </p><p>-encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and</p><p>-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile.</p> | 1nc v glancy | 1 | null | 1,559,478 | 8 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,072 | Text: The United States federal government should fully acknowledge the One China Principle, including the formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. The United States federal government should remove its opposition to the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should fully acknowledge the One China Principle, including the formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. The United States federal government should remove its opposition to the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan. </h4> | 1NC v GBN KR | 4 | null | 1,560,659 | 1 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,073 | Every delay in reaching a grand bargain increases the risk of war. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | waiting not only delays the possibility of improving U.S. relations with China, but also reduces the probability of improving them in the future. The likely growing strains in the countries' relationship during the waiting period would reduce the probability of eventually reaching a grand bargain. Given the likelihood that China will meet its economic potential, albeit with stumbles along the way, negotiating a grand bargain now is less risky than waiting | waiting not only delays the possibility of improving relations but reduces the probability of improving them in the future. The likely growing strains in the relationship during the waiting period would reduce the probability of eventually reaching a grand bargain negotiating a grand bargain now is less risky than waiting | China May Not Rise
A third counterargument focuses on the possibility that China's economic growth may falter, preventing China from becoming a fully capable major power. Under these conditions, U.S. accommodation would be wasted, with the United States unnecessarily suffering the costs of the grand bargain.109 According to this argument, the United States should wait to learn more about China's economic trajectory.
As with many of the knotty issues raised by the strategy of accommodation, this argument involves weighing a number of uncertain outcomes. Waiting would not be without its own risks. Most directly, waiting not only delays the possibility of improving U.S. relations with China, but also reduces the probability of improving them in the future. The likely growing strains in the countries' relationship during the waiting period would reduce the probability of eventually reaching a grand bargain. Given the likelihood that China will meet its economic potential, albeit with stumbles along the way, negotiating a grand bargain now is less risky than waiting. | 1,078 | <h4>Every delay in reaching a grand bargain increases the risk of war. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>China May Not Rise</p><p>A third counterargument focuses on the possibility that China's economic growth may falter, preventing China from becoming a fully capable major power. Under these conditions, U.S. accommodation would be wasted, with the United States unnecessarily suffering the costs of the grand bargain.109 According to this argument, the United States should wait to learn more about China's economic trajectory.</p><p>As with many of the knotty issues raised by the strategy of accommodation, this argument involves weighing a number of uncertain outcomes. Waiting would not be without its own risks. Most directly, <u><mark>waiting not only delays the possibility of improving</mark> U.S. <mark>relations</mark> with China, <mark>but</mark> also <mark>reduces the probability of improving them in the future. The likely growing strains in the</mark> countries' <mark>relationship during the waiting period would reduce the probability of eventually reaching a grand bargain</mark>. Given the likelihood that China will meet its economic potential, albeit with stumbles along the way, <mark>negotiating a grand bargain <strong>now</strong> is less risky than waiting</u></mark>.</p> | null | Strategic Clarity CP Answers | Delay DA | 69,306 | 25 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,074 | Plan crushes US-Japan ties and broader allied assurance – changes to US/China policy require close consultation – turns case – degraded ties allow unfettered North Korean vertical proliferation/aggression, Chinese military modernization, China rise, US/China/Russian war, allied proliferation, new horizontal proliferators, and NPT collapse | Roberts 13 | Roberts 13 {Brad, former visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Obama Administration, Ph.D. in Political Science (Erasmus University Rotterdam), M.Sc. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science), B.A. in International Relations (Stanford University), Director designate at the Center for Global Security Research (Livermore National Laboratory), “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 8/9, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf#THUR} | In Northeast Asia, extended deterrence and strategic stability have regained an importance not known since the darkest days of the Cold War North Korea’s continued progress in developing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons brings new challenges, as does China’s progress in military modernization and increasingly prominent regional military role. for the earlier era extended deterrence was a term used to describe protection of U.S. allies by the nuclear policies and capabilities This nuclear umbrella was to deter and assure Today, the nuclear umbrella has the same purposes—to deter and assure. But the context is entirely different and the tools of extended deterrence are no longer just nuclear strategic stability was a term used to describe the relationship of mutual deterrence between East and West Today, the ingredients of strategic stability are much less clear, especially in the U.S.-China relationship, which is unique in various ways The work of updating these analytic frameworks has begun inside and outside government and has proceeded in parallel with the work of updating policy frameworks To meet challenges of extended deterrence and strategic stability, the United States has set out a comprehensive agenda, following close consultations with its allies. The United States is committed to adapting regional deterrence architectures for 21st century purposes and to strengthening extended deterrence to meet new challenges such efforts are not inconsistent with nonproliferation and the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. In fact, failure to ensure extended deterrence and strategic stability could seriously set back nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Failure to ensure effective extended deterrence could encourage new proliferation by two types of states challengers to regional order, emboldened by success of North Korea and Iran and U.S. allies, worried by the perceived ineffectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence The cascade of nuclear proliferation long feared by the U N S C could result from a failure of extended deterrence. Similarly, failure to ensure strategic stability could result in new forms of nuclear competition and even arms racing among the major powers, with a corrosive effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime and on their willingness to cooperate on problems in the nonproliferation regime deterrence and stability are essential to the effort to deepen international nuclear order and continue practical steps toward nuclear elimination. This recognition informs the strategy in the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review It enjoys support in Japan reaffirm the concept of extended nuclear deterrence should not be taken as retrogression. It is a necessary step to solidify a strategic basis for the efforts to attain a world free from nuclear weapon This paper provides an overview of issues of extended deterrence from the U.S.-Japan alliance The paper describes the comprehensive strategy of the U S and the contributions of Japan to that strategy The U S is confident that deterrence is effective today and will remain so over the coming decade. It is also cautiously optimistic that strategic stability can be preserved. It is important for Japan’s expert community to understand the basis of this U.S. confidence | extended deterrence regained importance nuclear weapons brings challenges, as does China’s modernization and increasing role U S has close consultations with its allies Failure could encourage proliferation by challengers emboldened by Korea and Iran and allies, worried by ineffectiveness This recognition enjoys support in Japan The paper describes strategy and contributions of Japan U S is confident deterrence is effective It is important for Japan’s community to understand the basis of confidence | In Northeast Asia, extended deterrence and strategic stability have regained an importance not known since the darkest days of the Cold War. This is a natural result of developments in the security environment. North Korea’s continued progress in developing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons brings with it new challenges, as does China’s progress in military modernization and increasingly prominent regional military role. As these challenges have emerged, it has been necessary and appropriate to return to analytical and policy frameworks developed for the earlier era. In that era, extended deterrence was a term used to describe the protection of U.S. allies provided by the nuclear policies and capabilities of the United States. This nuclear umbrella was intended to both deter and assure—to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the vital interests of the United States and its allies and to assure those allies that the United States could and would stand by its commitment to assist in their defense in even the most extreme circumstances. Today, the nuclear umbrella has the same purposes—to deter and assure. But the context is entirely different, and the tools of extended deterrence are no longer just nuclear. Also in the Cold War, strategic stability was a term used to describe the relationship of mutual deterrence between East and West; the situation was deemed stable if each side had confidence that the “balance of terror” would be maintained because the other side would not ever (1) see advantage in initiating nuclear war or (2) seek or be able to alter that situation by expanding its military forces. Today, the ingredients of strategic stability are much less clear, especially in the U.S.-China relationship, which is unique in various ways. The work of updating these analytic frameworks has begun inside and outside government and has proceeded in parallel with the work of updating policy frameworks. To meet the new challenges of extended deterrence and strategic stability, the United States has set out a comprehensive agenda, following close consultations with its allies. From a U.S. perspective, this is a global challenge, requiring policy approaches that comprehensively address problems in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. After all, in each region there are new challenges associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and with neighboring major powers. The United States is committed to adapting regional deterrence architectures for 21st century purposes and to strengthening extended deterrence to meet new challenges. It is also committed to working to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China even as it adapts regional deterrence architectures. From a U.S. perspective, such efforts are not inconsistent with the effort to strengthen nonproliferation and make continued progress toward the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. In fact, the very opposite is true: failure to ensure extended deterrence and strategic stability could seriously set back nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Failure to ensure effective extended deterrence could encourage new proliferation by two types of states: (1) challengers to regional order, emboldened by the success of North Korea and Iran in negating U.S. extended deterrence and (2) U.S. allies, worried by the perceived ineffectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. The cascade of nuclear proliferation long feared by the United Nations Security Council could result from a significant failure of extended deterrence. Similarly, failure to ensure strategic stability could result in new forms of nuclear competition and even arms racing among the major powers, with a corrosive effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime and on their willingness to cooperate on problems in the nonproliferation regime. In sum, deterrence and stability are essential to the effort to deepen international nuclear order and continue practical steps toward the long-term goal of nuclear elimination. This recognition informs the balanced nuclear strategy set out in the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 and in the twin commitments of the government of Japan to lead global efforts for nonproliferation and disarmament while also strengthening deterrence. It also enjoys support in Japan. As Yukio Satoh has argued, “to reaffirm the concept of extended nuclear deterrence at this stage should not be taken as retrogression. It is a necessary step to solidify a strategic basis for the efforts to attain a world free from nuclear weapons.”1 This paper provides an overview of issues of extended deterrence and strategic stability from the perspective of the U.S.-Japan alliance. It begins with a review of key developments in the security environment in terms of their relevance for nuclear deterrence and stability. This section of the paper highlights some of the key issues in updating the cold war conceptual inheritance. The paper then describes the comprehensive strategy of the United States and the contributions of Japan to that strategy. The paper then turns to the future. Arguing that the tasks of strengthening regional architectures and preserving strategic stability are long-term tasks, the paper identifies four issues that are likely to be the focus of continuing discussion and analysis within the U.S.-Japan alliance (and more broadly) over the decade ahead. The paper provides some initial insights on each issue with an eye to encouraging further analysis within the U.S.-Japan security studies community. The paper closes with some conclusions about the nuclear security of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States is confident that deterrence is effective today and will remain so over the coming decade. It is also cautiously optimistic that strategic stability can be preserved. It is important for Japan’s expert community to understand the basis of this U.S. confidence. | 5,960 | <h4>Plan crushes US-Japan ties and broader allied assurance – changes to US/China policy require <u>close consultation</u> – turns case – degraded ties allow unfettered North Korean vertical proliferation/aggression, Chinese military modernization, China rise, <strong>US/China/Russian war, allied proliferation, new horizontal proliferators, and NPT collapse</h4><p>Roberts 13 </strong>{Brad, former visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Obama Administration, Ph.D. in Political Science (Erasmus University Rotterdam), M.Sc. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science), B.A. in International Relations (Stanford University), Director designate at the Center for Global Security Research (Livermore National Laboratory), “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 8/9, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf#THUR}<strong> </p><p><u></strong>In Northeast Asia, <mark>extended deterrence </mark>and strategic stability have <mark>regained</mark> an <strong><mark>importance </mark>not known since the darkest days of the Cold War</u></strong>. This is a natural result of developments in the security environment. <u>North Korea’s <strong>continued progress</strong> in developing long-range missiles and <mark>nuclear weapons brings</u></mark> with it <u>new <mark>challenges, as does China’s</mark> progress in military <mark>modernization and <strong>increasing</mark>ly prominent regional military <mark>role</mark>. </u></strong>As these challenges have emerged, it has been necessary and appropriate to return to analytical and policy frameworks developed <u>for the earlier era</u>. In that era, <u>extended deterrence was a term used to describe </u>the <u>protection of U.S. allies</u> provided <u>by the nuclear policies and capabilities</u> of the United States. <u>This nuclear umbrella was</u> intended <u>to</u> both <u>deter and assure</u>—to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the vital interests of the United States and its allies and to assure those allies that the United States could and would stand by its commitment to assist in their defense in even the most extreme circumstances. <u>Today, the nuclear umbrella has the same purposes—to <strong>deter and assure</strong>. But the context is <strong>entirely different</u></strong>, <u>and the tools of extended deterrence are <strong>no longer just nuclear</u></strong>. Also in the Cold War, <u>strategic stability was a term used to describe the relationship of mutual deterrence between East and West</u>; the situation was deemed stable if each side had confidence that the “balance of terror” would be maintained because the other side would not ever (1) see advantage in initiating nuclear war or (2) seek or be able to alter that situation by expanding its military forces. <u>Today, the ingredients of strategic stability are much less clear, especially in the U.S.-China relationship, which is unique in various ways</u>. <u>The work of updating</u> <u>these analytic frameworks <strong>has begun</strong> inside and outside government</u> <u>and has proceeded in parallel with the work of updating policy frameworks</u>. <u>To meet</u> the new <u>challenges of extended deterrence and strategic stability, the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has </mark>set out a comprehensive agenda, <strong>following <mark>close consultations</u></strong> <u>with its allies</mark>. </u>From a U.S. perspective, this is a global challenge, requiring policy approaches that comprehensively address problems in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. After all, in each region there are new challenges associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and with neighboring major powers.<u> The United States is <strong>committed to adapting regional deterrence architectures</strong> for 21st century purposes and to <strong>strengthening extended deterrence</strong> <strong>to meet new challenges</u></strong>. It is also committed to working to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China even as it adapts regional deterrence architectures. From a U.S. perspective, <u>such efforts are not inconsistent with</u> the effort to strengthen <u>nonproliferation and</u> make continued progress toward <u>the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. In fact,</u> the very opposite is true: <u>failure to ensure extended deterrence and strategic stability could <strong>seriously set back nonproliferation and disarmament</strong> efforts. <mark>Failure</mark> to ensure effective extended deterrence <strong><mark>could encourage</mark> new <mark>proliferation</strong> by</mark> two types of states</u>: (1) <u><mark>challengers</mark> to regional order, <mark>emboldened by</u></mark> the <u>success of North <mark>Korea</u> <u>and Iran</u></mark> in negating U.S. extended deterrence <u><mark>and</u></mark> (2) <u>U.S. <mark>allies, worried by</mark> the perceived <mark>ineffectiveness</mark> of U.S. extended deterrence</u>. <u>The <strong>cascade of nuclear proliferation</u></strong> <u>long feared by the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>N</u></strong>ations <u><strong>S</u></strong>ecurity <u><strong>C</u></strong>ouncil <u>could result from a</u> significant <u>failure of extended deterrence. Similarly, failure to ensure strategic stability could result in <strong>new forms of nuclear competition and even arms racing</strong> among the <strong>major powers</strong>,</u> <u>with a <strong>corrosive effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime</strong> and on their willingness to cooperate on problems in the nonproliferation regime</u>. In sum, <u>deterrence and stability are <strong>essential</u></strong> <u>to the effort to deepen international nuclear order</u> <u>and continue practical steps toward</u> the long-term goal of <u>nuclear elimination. <mark>This recognition</mark> informs the</u> balanced nuclear <u>strategy</u> set out <u>in the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review </u>of 2010 and in the twin commitments of the government of Japan to lead global efforts for nonproliferation and disarmament while also strengthening deterrence. <u>It</u> also <u><strong><mark>enjoys support in Japan</u></strong></mark>. As Yukio Satoh has argued, “to <u>reaffirm the concept of extended nuclear deterrence</u> at this stage <u>should not be taken as retrogression. <strong>It is a necessary step</strong> to solidify a strategic basis for the efforts to attain a world free from nuclear weapon</u>s.”1 <u>This paper provides an overview of issues of extended deterrence</u> and strategic stability <u>from</u> the perspective of <u>the U.S.-Japan alliance</u>. It begins with a review of key developments in the security environment in terms of their relevance for nuclear deterrence and stability. This section of the paper highlights some of the key issues in updating the cold war conceptual inheritance. <u><mark>The paper</mark> </u>then <u><mark>describes</mark> the comprehensive <mark>strategy</mark> of the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>and</mark> the <mark>contributions of Japan</mark> to that strategy</u></strong>. The paper then turns to the future. Arguing that the tasks of strengthening regional architectures and preserving strategic stability are long-term tasks, the paper identifies four issues that are likely to be the focus of continuing discussion and analysis within the U.S.-Japan alliance (and more broadly) over the decade ahead. The paper provides some initial insights on each issue with an eye to encouraging further analysis within the U.S.-Japan security studies community. The paper closes with some conclusions about the nuclear security of the U.S.-Japan alliance. <u>The</u> <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>is confident</mark> that <mark>deterrence is <strong>effective</mark> today</u></strong> <u>and will remain so over the coming decade. It is also cautiously optimistic that strategic stability can be preserved. <mark>It is important for Japan’s</mark> expert <mark>community to understand the basis of</mark> this U.S. <mark>confidence</u></mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | Japan | 1,560,660 | 3 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,075 | CSCAP cooperation solves best via preventative diplomacy and spurs follow on – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation | null | -Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development | This book provide assessment of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific and CSCAP widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization It describes CSCAP’s relationship with ARF its Track 1 counterpart It also identifies perceived weaknesses in CSCAP which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The CSCAP was set up to provide “a structured process of non-governmental nature to contribute to confidence building and enhancing regional security 1 It was the most ambitious proposal for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process and one of the most important developments since the Cold War CSCAP is a generally recognized feature of the architecture of Asia achievements have been extraordinary ARF is centrepiece of institutionalization of multilateral dialogue and confidence building CSCAP’s ability to provide policy-relevant studies for the ARF has been accorded highest priority Simon found CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 He reported CSCAP achieved noteworthy successes including preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF agreements on oceanic management taken up by the ARF and database on nuclear energy safety other recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and attained important place on the latter’s own agenda CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific Job argues they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security Kraft argues blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis | book assess CSCAP widely regarded as premier Track 2 weaknesses derive from connections with Track 1 CSCAP contribute to confidence building and security It was one of most important developments achievements have been extraordinary CSCAP’s ability to provide policy for ARF has been highest priority CSCAP achieved successes, including preventive diplomacy adopted oceanic management taken up by ARF and nuclear safety recommendations attained place on latter’s agenda CSCAP epistemic community played “a significant role in Track 1 deliberations they served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis | Ball 10 {Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}
This book is intended to provide a critical assessment of the role of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization in the region. It describes CSCAP’s formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its declared Track 1 counterpart. It also identifies and analyses perceived weaknesses in CSCAP’s organization and failures in its processes, some of which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. CSCAP was set up in 1992–1993 to provide “a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.1 It was described at the time as “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters”,2 and as “one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. CSCAP is now a generally recognized feature of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Its achievements since 1992–1993 have been extraordinary. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The ARF is the centrepiece of the institutionalization of multilateral security dialogue and confidence building in the region. Among the different views about CSCAP’s purposes, its ability to provide policy-relevant studies and analyses for the ARF has generally been accorded highest priority. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by Simon published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He found that CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 diplomacy. He reported that CSCAP had “achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition of preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF, a number of agreements on oceanic management which have been taken up by the ARF, and the establishment of a database on nuclear energy safety practices”, and that “these and a number of other CSCAP recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and have attained an important place on the latter’s own agenda”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. Job addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he argues that, ideationally, “they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities (both individual and collective), and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman Kraft, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He argues that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests. | 7,235 | <h4>CSCAP cooperation <u>solves best</u> via preventative diplomacy and <u>spurs follow on</u> – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation</h4><p>-Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development </p><p><strong>Ball 10 </strong>{Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}</p><p><u>This <mark>book</u></mark> is intended to <u>provide</u> a critical <u><mark>assess</mark>ment of</u> the role of <u>Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific</u> region, <u>and</u>, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (<u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark>), <u><strong><mark>widely regarded</u></strong> <u>as</mark> the</u> <u><mark>premier Track 2</mark> organization</u> in the region. <u>It describes CSCAP’s</u> formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its <u>relationship with</u> the ASEAN Regional Forum (<u>ARF</u>), <u>its</u> declared <u>Track 1 counterpart</u>. <u>It also identifies</u> and analyses <u><strong>perceived <mark>weaknesses</u></strong></mark> <u>in CSCAP</u>’s organization and failures in its processes, some of <u>which <mark>derive from</mark> its fundamental <mark>connections with</mark> official (governmental) agencies constituting <mark>Track 1</mark>. The</u> main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> was set up</u> in 1992–1993 <u>to provide “a</u> more <u>structured</u> regional <u>process of</u> a <u><strong>non-governmental</u></strong> <u>nature</u> <u>to <mark>contribute to</u></mark> the efforts towards regional <u><strong><mark>confidence building</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong>enhancing regional <mark>security</u></strong></mark> through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.<u>1 <mark>It was</u></mark> described at the time as “<u><strong>the most ambitious</u></strong> <u>proposal</u> to date <u>for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process</u> on Pacific security matters”,2 <u>and</u> as “<u><mark>one of</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>most important developments</u></strong></mark> in regional security <u>since</u> the end of <u>the Cold War</u>”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. <u>CSCAP is</u> now <u><strong>a generally recognized feature</u></strong> <u>of the</u> security <u>architecture of</u> the <u>Asia</u>-Pacific region. Its <u><mark>achievements</u></mark> since 1992–1993 <u><strong><mark>have been extraordinary</u></strong></mark>. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The <u>ARF is</u> the <u><strong>centrepiece</u></strong> <u>of</u> the <u>institutionalization of multilateral</u> security <u>dialogue and confidence building</u> in the region. Among the different views about <u><mark>CSCAP’s</u></mark> purposes, its <u><mark>ability to provide</u> <u><strong>policy</mark>-relevant studies</u></strong> and analyses <u><mark>for</mark> the <mark>ARF has</u></mark> generally <u><mark>been</mark> accorded</u> <u><strong><mark>highest priority</u></strong></mark>. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by <u>Simon</u> published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He <u>found</u> that <u>CSCAP was a</u> <u><strong>“fine exemplar”</u></strong> <u>of Track 2</u> diplomacy. <u>He reported</u> that <u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark> had “<u><mark>achieved</u></mark> some <u>noteworthy <mark>successes</u>, <u>including</u></mark> a definition of <u><strong><mark>preventive diplomacy adopted</mark> by the ARF</u></strong>, a number of <u>agreements on</u> <u><mark>oceanic management</u></mark> which have been <u><strong><mark>taken up by</mark> the <mark>ARF</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the establishment of a <u>database on <mark>nuclear</mark> energy</u> <u><mark>safety</u></mark> practices”, and that “these and a number of <u>other</u> CSCAP <u><mark>recommendations</u></mark> <u><strong>have been passed on to the ARF</u></strong> <u>and</u> have <u><mark>attained</u></mark> an <u><strong>important <mark>place on</mark> the <mark>latter’s</mark> own <mark>agenda</u></strong></mark>”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> formed an “<mark>epistemic</u> <u>community</mark>”, which <mark>played “a significant role in Track 1</mark> security <mark>deliberations</mark> in the Asia Pacific</u>”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. <u>Job</u> addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he <u>argues</u> that, ideationally, “<u><mark>they</mark> have <mark>served as</u> <u><strong>agents of change and norm entrepreneurs</u></strong></mark> <u>working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities</u> (both individual and collective), <u>and</u> <u>acceptance of the key principles of</u> <u><strong>open regionalism</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>cooperative security</u></strong>”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman <u>Kraft</u>, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He <u>argues</u> that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly <u><mark>blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis</u></mark>. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests.</p> | 1nc v glancy | 1 | null | 1,126,294 | 22 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,076 | No Alliance DA — other policies solve and the plan will push allies toward the U.S., not China. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 3) | Possibly the most frequently raised objection to the U S ending its commitment to Taiwan is that it would undermine the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to its East Asia allies. This concern is overstated. U.S. entry into a grand bargain with China would undoubtedly send political shockwaves throughout the Asia Pacific, but the U S could take a variety of actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments. For example, it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint U.S.- Japan military planning and high-level discussions on the requirements for extended deterrence. In fact, the U S has already begun taking some of these measures
U.S. alliances are likely to endure because its allies do not have options that are more appealing. Meanwhile, their need for security is likely to continue to grow as China rises. Any doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the U S not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China | the U S could take actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint military planning and high-level discussions the U S has already begun taking some of these measures
alliances are likely to endure because allies do not have options more appealing doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the U S not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China | Reassuring U.S. Allies
Possibly the most frequently raised objection to the United States ending its commitment to Taiwan is that it would undermine the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to its East Asia allies. This concern is overstated. U.S. entry into a grand bargain with China would undoubtedly send political shockwaves throughout the Asia Pacific, but the United States could take a variety of actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments. For example, it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint U.S.- Japan military planning and high-level discussions on the requirements for extended deterrence. In fact, the United States has already begun taking some of these measures.
U.S. alliances are likely to endure because its allies do not have options that are more appealing. Meanwhile, their need for security is likely to continue to grow as China rises. Any doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the United States, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China. | 1,120 | <h4>No Alliance DA — <u>other policies solve</u> and the plan will push allies toward <u>the U.S.</u>, not China. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 3)</p><p>Reassuring U.S. Allies </p><p><u>Possibly the most frequently raised objection to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>ending its commitment to Taiwan is that it would undermine the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to its East Asia allies. This concern is overstated. U.S. entry into a grand bargain with China would undoubtedly send political shockwaves throughout the Asia Pacific, but <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could take</mark> a variety of <mark>actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments</mark>. For example, <mark>it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint</mark> U.S.- Japan <mark>military planning and high-level discussions</mark> on the requirements for extended deterrence. In fact, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>has already begun taking some of these measures</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>U.S. <mark>alliances are likely to endure because</mark> its <mark>allies do not have options</mark> that are <mark>more appealing</mark>. Meanwhile, their need for security is likely to continue to grow as China rises. Any <mark>doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, <u><mark>not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China</u></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Alliances” | 69,499 | 53 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,077 | Counterplan’s obviously competitive – you are the grand bargain, which requires reciprocal concessions from China – the counterplan just removes US support for Taiwan – solves the whole aff. | Norton 16 | Norton 16 — J.M. Norton, Fellow at the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Managing Editor of the Cross-Strait Peace Initiative, former Research Fellow at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University (China), holds a Ph.D. from the University of Georgia, 2016 (“'One China,' 5 Interpretations,” The Diplomat, July 27th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/one-china-5-interpretations/, Accessed 01-27-2017) | The United States The American government follows the “One China Policy” The policy, as interpreted by Washington, is based on informal and formal institutions that serve as the basis for U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. The “three communiqués” framework undergirds ties with the PRC, while U.S.-Taiwan relations are based on a second framework consisting of the TRA the Six Assurances and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. Both frameworks support the peaceful settlement of the cross-strait issue but contain contradictions The communiqué framework is the foundation of U.S.-China relations. The American position states there is but “one China and Taiwan is part of China,” and it has no intention to pursue “a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The second framework provides political and military recognition to the Taiwanese authorities through a defense arrangement as well as weapon sales. The second framework, especially the Six Assurances does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. It implies the sovereignty of Taiwan remains to be formalized. The second framework also advocates for the creation of international space for Taiwan. Even though the U.S. government has consistently implemented the “One China Policy,” the Policy contains contradictions because of the two competing frameworks that separately support U.S. relations with China and with Taiwan Beijing’s “One China Policy” The Chinese leadership wants the American government to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports The Three Non-supports are: no support for “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or Taiwan’s membership to international organizations that require statehood . The Chinese government actively opposes the second framework that directs U.S.-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese de facto sovereignty over Taiwan Beijing is against the U.S. government’s campaign to create international space for Taiwan. Thus two interpretations of the U S “One China Policy” exist, with the Chinese leadership’s version promoting only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports, while actively opposing the second framework that guides U.S.-Taiwan ties The Chinese Principle and the American Policy Both support the peaceful settlement of issues with Taiwan. And both sides object to an overt move toward de jure independence by Taiwan. Even though the two nuclear powers share common ground, their versions of “One China” contain divergences The Chinese and American leaders disagree over the use of force as well as the status of Taiwan. The “One China Principle” reserves the CPC’s right to resort to the use of force to resolve matters with Taiwan, whereas the Policy objects to the use of force and other coercive measures the Principle establishes the terms for the reunification process as well as the formula for post-reunification the U.S. “One China Policy” asserts the Chinese on both sides of the strait need to determine the final settlement, indicating the American side perceives that Taiwan’s sovereignty remains to be determined Both the American and Taiwanese sides are in agreement regarding the aforementioned condition. The differences contain a mix that could trigger some form of conflict among all players. | null | The United States The American government follows the “One China Policy” (一个中国的政策). The policy, as interpreted by Washington, is based on informal and formal institutions that serve as the basis for U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. The “three communiqués” framework (1972; 1979; 1982) undergirds ties with the PRC, while U.S.-Taiwan relations are based on a second framework consisting of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances (1982), and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. Both frameworks support the peaceful settlement of the cross-strait issue but contain contradictions. The communiqué framework is the foundation of U.S.-China relations. The American position states there is but “one China and Taiwan is part of China,” and it has no intention to pursue “a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The second framework, however, provides political and military recognition to the Taiwanese authorities through a defense arrangement as well as weapon sales. The second framework, especially the Six Assurances (which previously were a verbal pledge but have now passed the House and the Senate as a concurrent resolution), does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. It implies the sovereignty of Taiwan remains to be formalized. The second framework also advocates for the creation of international space for Taiwan. Even though the U.S. government has consistently implemented the “One China Policy,” the Policy contains contradictions because of the two competing frameworks that separately support U.S. relations with China and with Taiwan. Beijing’s “One China Policy” The Chinese leadership wants the American government to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports (三不支持). The Three Non-supports or Three Nos are: no support for “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or Taiwan’s membership to international organizations that require statehood . The Chinese government actively opposes the second framework that directs U.S.-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese de facto sovereignty over Taiwan. Furthermore, Beijing is against the U.S. government’s campaign to create international space for Taiwan. Thus two interpretations of the United States’ “One China Policy” exist, with the Chinese leadership’s version promoting only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports, while actively opposing the second framework that guides U.S.-Taiwan ties. The Chinese Principle and the American Policy have two similarities. Both sides support the peaceful settlement of issues with Taiwan. And both sides object to an overt move toward de jure independence by Taiwan. Even though the two nuclear powers share common ground, their versions of “One China” contain divergences. The Chinese and American leaders disagree over the use of force as well as the status of Taiwan. The “One China Principle” reserves the CPC’s right to resort to the use of force to resolve matters with Taiwan, whereas the Policy objects to the use of force and other coercive measures. Second, the Principle establishes the terms for the reunification process as well as the formula for post-reunification (a loose version of the “one country, two system” model). In contrast, the U.S. “One China Policy” asserts the Chinese on both sides of the strait need to determine the final settlement, indicating the American side perceives that Taiwan’s sovereignty remains to be determined — and the resolution must consider the will of the Taiwanese people. Both the American and Taiwanese sides are in agreement regarding the aforementioned condition. The differences contain a mix that could trigger some form of conflict among all players. | 3,852 | <h4>Counterplan’s obviously competitive – you are the grand bargain, which requires <u>reciprocal concessions</u> from China – the counterplan <u>just removes US support for Taiwan</u> – solves the whole aff.</h4><p><strong>Norton 16</strong> — J.M. Norton, Fellow at the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Managing Editor of the Cross-Strait Peace Initiative, former Research Fellow at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University (China), holds a Ph.D. from the University of Georgia, 2016 (“'One China,' 5 Interpretations,” The Diplomat, July 27th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/one-china-5-interpretations/, Accessed 01-27-2017)</p><p><u>The United States The American government follows the “One China Policy”</u> (一个中国的政策). <u>The policy, as interpreted by Washington, is based on informal and formal institutions that serve as the basis for U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. The <strong>“three communiqués” framework</u></strong> (1972; 1979; 1982) <u>undergirds ties with the PRC, while U.S.-Taiwan relations are based on a <strong>second framework</strong> consisting of the</u> 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (<u>TRA</u>), <u>the Six Assurances</u> (1982), <u>and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. Both frameworks support the peaceful settlement of the cross-strait issue but <strong>contain contradictions</u></strong>. <u>The communiqué framework is the foundation of U.S.-China relations. The American position states there is but “one China and Taiwan is part of China,” and it has no intention to pursue “a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The second framework</u>, however, <u>provides political and military recognition to the Taiwanese authorities through a defense arrangement as well as weapon sales. The second framework, especially the Six Assurances</u> (which previously were a verbal pledge but have now passed the House and the Senate as a concurrent resolution), <u>does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. It implies the sovereignty of Taiwan <strong>remains to be formalized</strong>. The second framework also advocates for the creation of international space for Taiwan. Even though the U.S. government has consistently implemented the “One China Policy,” the Policy <strong>contains contradictions</strong> because of the <strong>two competing frameworks</strong> that separately support U.S. relations with China and with Taiwan</u>. <u>Beijing’s “One China Policy” The Chinese leadership wants the American government to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of <strong>only the communiqué framework</strong> and the Three Non-supports</u> (三不支持). <u>The Three Non-supports</u> or Three Nos <u>are: no support for “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or Taiwan’s membership to international organizations that require statehood . The Chinese government <strong>actively opposes the second framework</strong> that directs U.S.-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese de facto sovereignty over Taiwan</u>. Furthermore, <u>Beijing is against the U.S. government’s campaign to create international space for Taiwan. Thus two interpretations of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates’ <u>“One China Policy” exist, with the Chinese leadership’s version promoting <strong>only the communiqué framework</strong> and the Three Non-supports, while <strong>actively opposing the second framework</strong> that guides U.S.-Taiwan ties</u>. <u>The Chinese <strong>Principle</strong> and the American <strong>Policy</u></strong> have two similarities. <u>Both</u> sides <u>support the <strong>peaceful settlement</strong> of issues with Taiwan. And both sides object to an overt move toward <strong>de jure independence</strong> by Taiwan. Even though the two nuclear powers share common ground, their versions of “One China” contain divergences</u>. <u>The Chinese and American leaders disagree over the use of force as well as the status of Taiwan. The “One China Principle” reserves the CPC’s right to resort to the use of force to resolve matters with Taiwan, whereas the Policy objects to the use of force and other coercive measures</u>. Second, <u>the Principle establishes the terms for the reunification process as well as the formula for post-reunification</u> (a loose version of the “one country, two system” model). In contrast, <u>the U.S. “One China Policy” asserts the Chinese on both sides of the strait need to determine the final settlement, indicating the American side perceives that Taiwan’s sovereignty remains to be determined</u> — and the resolution must consider the will of the Taiwanese people. <u>Both the American and Taiwanese sides are <strong>in agreement</strong> regarding the aforementioned condition. The differences contain a mix that could <strong>trigger some form of conflict among all players</strong>.</p></u> | 1NC v GBN KR | 4 | null | 1,171,190 | 26 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,078 | Prolif leads to nuke war; Any east Asian conflict goes nuclear | Tan 15 — | Tan 15 — Andrew T.H. Tan, Used to work in King’s college in London, recently appointed as Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, MA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2015 (Security and Conflict in East Asia, April 14th, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=33OhCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Security+and+Conflict+in+East+Asia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiA3q-YqsHNAhVM0h4KHUndBboQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=east%20asia's%20arms%20race&f=false, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP) | East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions conflict spirals heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula and otherwise put a stop to the arms race None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia Within East Asia itself The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas As a key player in East Asia which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long | East Asia’s arms race leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict No confidence- and security-building measures exist in East Asia arms race in East Asia increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception ny conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long | East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, and otherwise put a stop to the arms race. None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons. | 2,832 | <h4>Prolif leads to nuke war<u>; Any east Asian conflict goes nuclear</h4><p></u><strong>Tan 15 — </strong>Andrew T.H. Tan, Used to work in King’s college in London, recently appointed as Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, MA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2015 (Security and Conflict in East Asia, April 14th, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=33OhCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Security+and+Conflict+in+East+Asia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiA3q-YqsHNAhVM0h4KHUndBboQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=east%20asia's%20arms%20race&f=false, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)</p><p><u><mark>East Asia’s arms race leads to</mark> the classic problem of the security dilemma</u>, <u>in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to <mark>counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions</u>, <u>conflict spirals</u>, <u>heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict</u></mark>, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, <u>leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula</u>. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, <u>and otherwise put a stop to the arms race</u>. <u><mark>No</mark>ne of the distinctive <mark>confidence- and security-building measures</mark> which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race <mark>exist in</mark> Asia Within <mark>East Asia</mark> itself</u>, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. <u>The <mark>arms race in East Asia</mark> is dangerous owing to the <mark>increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception</u></mark>. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, <u>it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas</u>. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. <u>As a key player in East Asia</u>, the USA, <u>which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea</u>, <u>residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific</u>, will be drawn in. <u>The problem is that a<mark>ny conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long</u></mark>. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons. </p> | 1NC | null | Japan | 19,152 | 626 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,079 | ACA repeal passes now | Hughes 1-2 | Hughes 1-2 | , 1/2/17 ln//GBS-JV]
the first goal is to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. The Senate’s opening move will be to initiate a controversial process to repeal parts of the law the effort is creating a maze of challenges most pressing is how to develop a replacement without triggering disruptions that accompanied the Democrats’ loss of their Senate majority in 2014. health insurers have stopped writing policies on the exchanges under the law Some Republican lawmakers, whose votes will be crucial to any repeal-and-replace plan, are worried that a repeal would yank the rug out from under people’s coverage. a confirmation hearing for Price will become an early focal point for debate over any repeal plan given years of working to replace the health law’s mandates with tax credits for the purchase of insurance. Republicans will start a legislative process that would allow them to repeal much of the law with a simple majority vote a political necessity given that they hold 52 seats in the chamber, shy of the 60 needed to pass most legislation The resolution would direct Senate committees to reconcile tax and spending legislation with the budget blueprint, also carry the broader goal of dismantling key pillars of the Affordable Care Act. The resulting package would have special procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority
Taiwan's position vis-a-vis* the US is almost certainly going to improve Forbes is a longtime supporter of Taiwan Alexander Gray also likes Taiwan Randy Schriver, very pro-Taiwan, and Steve Yates ), very pro-Taiwan Richard Armitage, who has long worked on Taiwan issues Trump Advisor China is behaving like a bullying thug against Taiwan John Bolton, a longtime Taiwan supporter, has been rumored to be a possibility for Sec of State. Trump Administration will take a much harder line on China when the US moves away from China, it moves towards Taiwan. Trump Administration represents a fresh start for US-Taiwan relations the US is becoming even more hardline | The Senate’s opening move maze of challenges to develop a replacement without disruptions with a simple majority vote given that they hold 52 seats resolution would reconcile tax and spending legislation The package have procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority
Taiwan's position certainly going to improve Trump will take a much harder line move towards Taiwan Trump represents a fresh start for US-Taiwan relations US becoming more hardline | [“Republican Congress Promises to Move Quickly Toward Goals” Wall Street Journal, 1/2/17 ln//GBS-JV]
One of the first goals for Republican leaders is to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. The Senate’s opening move, coming as soon as Tuesday, will be to initiate a controversial process to repeal parts of the law, which has brought health insurance to more than 19 million people but has taken a hit as the number of insurers offering coverage on the ACA’s exchanges has shrunk and premiums for exchange plans have jumped. As with many of the Republican goals, the effort is creating a maze of challenges. The most pressing is how to develop a replacement for the 2010 health law without triggering the sort of disruptions that accompanied the law’s rollout, which in turn contributed to the Democrats’ loss of their Senate majority in 2014. Many health insurers have stopped writing policies on the exchanges under the law, leaving individual insurance markets struggling in some states, including GOP-leaning Arizona, Alaska and Tennessee. Some Republican lawmakers, whose votes will be crucial to any repeal-and-replace plan, are worried that a repeal would yank the rug out from under people’s coverage. Republicans also know that a confirmation hearing for Rep. Tom Price (R., Ga.), nominated to serve as Health and Human Services secretary, will become an early focal point for debate over any repeal plan, given the congressman’s years of working to replace the health law’s mandates with tax credits for the purchase of insurance. Senate Republicans as soon as Tuesday will start a legislative process that would allow them to repeal much of the law with a simple majority vote—a political necessity, given that they hold 52 seats in the chamber, shy of the 60 needed to pass most legislation. The first step would be to introduce and start debate on a budget resolution for the 2017 fiscal year, setting up passage by next week. The resolution would direct Senate committees to reconcile tax and spending legislation with the budget blueprint, but also carry the broader goal of dismantling key pillars of the Affordable Care Act. The resulting package would have special procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority.
Obviously trump fights the plan
Turton 11/13{Michael Turton, writer, blogger, and teacher based in Taichung, Taiwan, author of The View from Taiwan—a popular scholarly blog about Taiwanese politics, 2016 (“Geopolitically, you can relax... for a while,” The View from Taiwan—a blog, November 13th, Available Online at https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2016/11/geopolitically-you-can-relax-for-while.html, SCOTT}
The speculation over Taiwan and the new Trump Administration has included some very strange assertions, especially from the KMT, that Taiwan might well become some kind of bargaining chip. Nope. Not gonna happen. In fact, Taiwan's position vis-a-vis* the US is almost certainly going to improve. For starters, the new Sec of the Navy might well be Randy Forbes. Forbes is a longtime supporter of Taiwan. Forbes' staffer Alexander Gray will be on the Asia team -- also likes Taiwan. Other names mentioned include Randy Schriver, very pro-Taiwan, and perhaps the very gracious Steve Yates (a quiet inspiration for this blogger), very pro-Taiwan. Richard Armitage, who has long worked on Taiwan issues, has also been mentioned. Most of those names will be familiar, but others might not be. Just in Taiwan very recently was Ed Feulner (note this 2011 piece), obvious where his sympathies are. And then there is Peter Navarro, in the news here with strong statements: Trump Advisor indicates Taiwan stance? "China is behaving like a bullying thug against Taiwan" (video). John Bolton, a longtime Taiwan supporter, has been rumored to be a possibility for Sec of State. Most of these people worked in the Bush Administration as well. All of these people, and any eventual Trump Administration, will likely take a much harder line than the Clinton Administration on China, or so some insiders have already declared. The Trump Administration is not going to have any of those "We will achieve a breakthrough!" delusions that afflicted the Clinton Administration, nor do any of its people come out of consulting firms doing business with China. And in the geopolitical calculus that governs the Strait, when the US moves away from China, it moves towards Taiwan. Indeed, suggestions that the Trump Administration represents a fresh start for US-Taiwan relations are already flying into mags where such pieces appear. But for those of you making mental calculations about when war is going to break out here in Asia, you should probably advance your timetables. Xi is not going to become less hardline, and the US is becoming even more hardline. Just last week Chinese "coast guard" vessels once again tested the Senkaku waters. And David Feith argued in WSJ that Trump will increase the Nuke Crisis in Asia | 4,953 | <h4><strong>ACA repeal passes now</h4><p>Hughes 1-2</p><p></strong>[“Republican Congress Promises to Move Quickly Toward Goals” Wall Street Journal<u>, 1/2/17 ln//GBS-JV]</p><p></u>One of <u>the first goal</u>s for Republican leaders <u><strong>is to dismantle the Affordable Care Act.</u></strong> <u><mark>The Senate’s <strong>opening move</u></strong></mark>, coming as soon as Tuesday, <u>will be to initiate a controversial process to repeal parts of the law</u>, which has brought health insurance to more than 19 million people but has taken a hit as the number of insurers offering coverage on the ACA’s exchanges has shrunk and premiums for exchange plans have jumped. As with many of the Republican goals, <u>the effort is creating a <strong><mark>maze</strong> of challenges</u></mark>. The <u>most pressing is how <mark>to develop a replacement</u></mark> for the 2010 health law <u><mark>without</mark> triggering </u>the sort of <u><mark>disruptions</mark> that accompanied</u> the law’s rollout, which in turn contributed to <u>the Democrats’ loss of their Senate majority in 2014. </u>Many <u>health insurers have stopped writing policies on the exchanges under the law</u>, leaving individual insurance markets struggling in some states, including GOP-leaning Arizona, Alaska and Tennessee. <u>Some Republican lawmakers, <strong>whose votes will be crucial</strong> to any repeal-and-replace plan, are worried that a repeal would <strong>yank the rug out from under people’s coverage. </u></strong>Republicans also know that <u>a confirmation hearing for</u> Rep. Tom <u>Price</u> (R., Ga.), nominated to serve as Health and Human Services secretary, <u>will become an early focal point for debate over any repeal plan</u>, <u>given</u> the congressman’s <u>years of working to replace the health law’s mandates with tax credits for the purchase of insurance. </u>Senate <u>Republicans</u> as soon as Tuesday<u> will start a legislative process that would allow them to repeal much of the law <strong><mark>with a simple majority vote</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>a political necessity</u></strong>, <u><mark>given that they</mark> <mark>hold 52 seats</mark> in the chamber, shy of the 60 needed to pass most legislation</u>. The first step would be to introduce and start debate on a budget resolution for the 2017 fiscal year, setting up passage by next week. <u>The <mark>resolution would</mark> direct Senate committees to <mark>reconcile tax and spending legislation</mark> with the budget blueprint,</u> but <u>also</u> <u><strong>carry the broader goal of dismantling key pillars of the Affordable Care Act</strong>. <mark>The</mark> resulting <mark>package</mark> would <mark>have</mark> special <mark>procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority</u><strong></mark>.</p><p>Obviously trump fights the plan</p><p>Turton 11/13</strong>{Michael Turton, writer, blogger, and teacher based in Taichung, Taiwan, author of The View from Taiwan—a popular scholarly blog about Taiwanese politics, 2016 (“Geopolitically, you can relax... for a while,” The View from Taiwan—a blog, November 13th, Available Online at https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2016/11/geopolitically-you-can-relax-for-while.html, SCOTT}</p><p>The speculation over Taiwan and the new Trump Administration has included some very strange assertions, especially from the KMT, that Taiwan might well become some kind of bargaining chip. Nope. Not gonna happen. In fact, <u><mark>Taiwan's position</mark> vis-a-vis* the US is almost <strong><mark>certainly</strong> going to <strong>improve</u></strong></mark>. For starters, the new Sec of the Navy might well be Randy Forbes. <u>Forbes is a longtime supporter of Taiwan</u>. Forbes' staffer <u>Alexander Gray</u> will be on the Asia team -- <u>also likes Taiwan</u>. Other names mentioned include <u>Randy Schriver, very pro-Taiwan, and</u> perhaps the very gracious <u>Steve Yates</u> (a quiet inspiration for this blogger<u>), very pro-Taiwan</u>. <u>Richard Armitage, who has long worked on Taiwan issues</u>, has also been mentioned. Most of those names will be familiar, but others might not be. Just in Taiwan very recently was Ed Feulner (note this 2011 piece), obvious where his sympathies are. And then there is Peter Navarro, in the news here with strong statements: <u>Trump Advisor</u> indicates Taiwan stance? "<u>China is behaving like a bullying thug against Taiwan</u>" (video). <u>John Bolton, a longtime Taiwan supporter, has been rumored to be a possibility for Sec of State.</u> Most of these people worked in the Bush Administration as well. All of these people, and any eventual <u><strong><mark>Trump</strong></mark> Administration</u>, <u><mark>will</u></mark> likely <u><mark>take a <strong>much harder line</u></strong></mark> than the Clinton Administration <u>on China</u>, or so some insiders have already declared. The Trump Administration is not going to have any of those "We will achieve a breakthrough!" delusions that afflicted the Clinton Administration, nor do any of its people come out of consulting firms doing business with China. And in the geopolitical calculus that governs the Strait, <u>when the US moves away from China, it <strong><mark>move</mark>s <mark>towards Taiwan</strong></mark>.</u> Indeed, suggestions that the <u><mark>Trump</mark> Administration <mark>represents a <strong>fresh start for US-Taiwan relations</u></strong></mark> are already flying into mags where such pieces appear. But for those of you making mental calculations about when war is going to break out here in Asia, you should probably advance your timetables. Xi is not going to become less hardline, and <u>the <mark>US</mark> is <mark>becoming</mark> even <strong><mark>more hardline</u></strong></mark>. Just last week Chinese "coast guard" vessels once again tested the Senkaku waters. And David Feith argued in WSJ that Trump will increase the Nuke Crisis in Asia</p> | 1nc v glancy | 2 | null | 1,560,661 | 2 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,080 | The plan and permutation induce CCP collapse | 1AC Swaine 1/11 | 1AC Swaine 1/11 — Michael Swaine, Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Coordinator of the U.S.-China Crisis Management Program co-sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment and the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, Contributor to China Leadership Monitor—a journal published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, former Senior Policy Analyst and RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy Chair in Northeast Asian Security at the RAND Corporation, former Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, former Research Associate at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2017 (“Nelson Report on China/Taiwan/US in wake of Tsai's visit to Houston,” The Nelson Report reprinted in The View From Taiwan—a blog, January 11th, Available Online at https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2017/01/nelson-report-on-chinataiwanus-in-wake.html, Accessed 01-11-2017) | In the case of Taiwan, what China means by declaring it a "core" interest is that the political status of Taiwan as an "indisputable" part of China is a non-negotiable element of Chinese national identity and hence a vital pillar of the legitimacy of ANY Chinese government any acquiescence in or acceptance by any Chinese government of perceived moves by the U.S. to establish the permanent separation of Taiwan would be a Casus Belli To not resist such an action would ensure the downfall of the government, or at the very least throw Chinese state and society into an unpredictable period of chaos. Every U.S. administration since 1979 has clearly understood this fact, and no amount of reinterpreting of the Six Assurances or the T R A can change it | null | MICHAEL SWAINE, Carnegie:
Chris,
In the case of Taiwan, what China means by declaring it a "core" interest is that the political status of Taiwan as an "indisputable" part of China is a non-negotiable element of Chinese national identity and hence a vital pillar of the legitimacy of ANY Chinese government. Therefore, any acquiescence in or acceptance by any Chinese government of perceived moves by the U.S. to establish the permanent separation of Taiwan from the Mainland would be a Casus Belli. To not resist such an action would ensure the downfall of the government, or at the very least throw Chinese state and society into an unpredictable period of chaos. Every U.S. administration since at least 1979 has clearly understood this fact, and no amount of reinterpreting of the Six Assurances or the Taiwan Relations Act can change it.
* FYI: “Casus Belli” is a Latin expression meaning “an act or event that provokes or is used to justify war” — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casus_belli | 995 | <h4>The plan and permutation induce <u>CCP collapse </h4><p></u><strong>1AC Swaine 1/11</strong> — Michael Swaine, Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Coordinator of the U.S.-China Crisis Management Program co-sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment and the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, Contributor to China Leadership Monitor—a journal published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, former Senior Policy Analyst and RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy Chair in Northeast Asian Security at the RAND Corporation, former Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, former Research Associate at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2017 (“Nelson Report on China/Taiwan/US in wake of Tsai's visit to Houston,” The Nelson Report reprinted in The View From Taiwan—a blog, January 11th, Available Online at https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2017/01/nelson-report-on-chinataiwanus-in-wake.html, Accessed 01-11-2017)</p><p>MICHAEL SWAINE, Carnegie:</p><p>Chris,</p><p><u>In the case of Taiwan, what China means by declaring it a "core" interest is that the political status of Taiwan as an "indisputable" part of China is a <strong>non-negotiable element of Chinese national identity</strong> and hence a <strong>vital pillar of the legitimacy of ANY Chinese government</u></strong>. Therefore, <u>any acquiescence in or acceptance by any Chinese government of perceived moves by the U.S. to establish the permanent separation of Taiwan</u> from the Mainland <u>would be a <strong>Casus Belli</u></strong>. <u>To not resist such an action would <strong>ensure the downfall of the government</strong>, or at the very least throw Chinese state and society into <strong>an unpredictable period of chaos</strong>. Every U.S. administration since</u> at least <u>1979 has clearly understood this fact, and no amount of reinterpreting of the Six Assurances or the T</u>aiwan <u>R</u>elations <u>A</u>ct <u>can change it</u>. </p><p>* FYI: “Casus Belli” is a Latin expression meaning “an act or event that provokes or is used to justify war” — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casus_belli</p> | 1NC v GBN KR | 4 | null | 84,148 | 84 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,081 | No Japan DA — it’s a different and deeper alliance. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | critics believe that ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could lead the Japanese to doubt America's commitment to defend Japan, which would undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance and in turn reduce U.S. security
Although a decision by the U S to end its commitment to Taiwan would certainly send political shock waves across the region, these concerns are overstated. There are similarities between the U.S. commitments to Taiwan and Japan, but also clear differences. U.S. security interests in Japan are much greater; as a result, the alliance involves much stronger political commitments and the deep integration of U.S. and Japanese military capabilities. In addition, the U S has a clear rationale for ending its commitment to Taiwan that does not apply to Japan: the U.S. commitment to Taiwan strains the U.S.-China relationship and increases the probability of war in ways that the U.S. commitment to Japan does not. Japan should appreciate these differences and therefore recognize that the ending of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would not indicate a coming diminution of the U.S. commitment to Japan. U.S. leaders could work to make sure that their Japanese counterparts fully appreciate these differences | U.S. security interests in Japan are much greater the alliance involves much stronger political commitments and the deep integration of military capabilities the U S rationale for ending Taiwan does not apply to Japan: Taiwan strains the U.S.-China relationship and increases the probability of war in ways that the commitment to Japan does not. Japan should appreciate these differences and recognize that ending Taiwan would not indicate coming diminution of the commitment to Japan. U.S. leaders could make sure Japanese counterparts fully appreciate these differences | A third potential security danger is that accommodation by the United States could undermine its allies' assessments of the credibility of the United States to come to their aid if attacked by China. More specifically, critics believe that ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could lead the Japanese to doubt America's commitment to defend Japan, which would undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance and in turn reduce U.S. security. Tucker and Glaser argue, “A U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan—leading to unification of an unwilling Taiwan with China— would be particularly alarming to Japan. … If Japan begins to doubt U.S. reliability, that could deal a fatal blow to the U.S.-Japan alliance.”97
Although a decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan would certainly send political shock waves across the region, these concerns are overstated. There are similarities between the U.S. commitments to Taiwan and Japan, but also clear differences. U.S. security interests in Japan are much greater; as a result, the alliance involves much stronger political commitments and the deep integration of U.S. and Japanese military capabilities. In addition, the United States has a clear rationale for ending its commitment to Taiwan that does not apply to Japan: the U.S. commitment to Taiwan strains the U.S.-China relationship and increases the probability of war in ways that the U.S. commitment to Japan does not. Japan should appreciate these differences and therefore recognize that the ending of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would not indicate a coming diminution of the U.S. commitment to Japan. U.S. leaders could work to make sure that their Japanese counterparts fully appreciate these differences. | 1,716 | <h4>No Japan DA — it’s a <u>different</u> and <u>deeper</u> alliance. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>A third potential security danger is that accommodation by the United States could undermine its allies' assessments of the credibility of the United States to come to their aid if attacked by China. More specifically, <u>critics believe that ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could lead the Japanese to doubt America's commitment to defend Japan, which would undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance and in turn reduce U.S. security</u>. Tucker and Glaser argue, “A U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan—leading to unification of an unwilling Taiwan with China— would be particularly alarming to Japan. … If Japan begins to doubt U.S. reliability, that could deal a fatal blow to the U.S.-Japan alliance.”97</p><p><u>Although a decision by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>to end its commitment to Taiwan would certainly send political shock waves across the region, these concerns are overstated. There are similarities between the U.S. commitments to Taiwan and Japan, but also clear differences. <mark>U.S. security interests in Japan are much greater</mark>; as a result, <mark>the alliance involves much stronger political commitments and the deep integration of</mark> U.S. and Japanese <mark>military capabilities</mark>. In addition, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has a clear <mark>rationale for ending</mark> its commitment to <mark>Taiwan</mark> that <mark>does not apply to Japan:</mark> the U.S. commitment to <mark>Taiwan strains the U.S.-China relationship and increases the probability of war in ways that the</mark> U.S. <mark>commitment to Japan does not. Japan should appreciate these differences and</mark> therefore <mark>recognize that</mark> the <mark>ending</mark> of the U.S. commitment to <mark>Taiwan would not indicate</mark> a <mark>coming diminution of the</mark> U.S. <mark>commitment to Japan. U.S. leaders could</mark> work to <mark>make sure</mark> that their <mark>Japanese counterparts fully appreciate these differences</u></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Alliances” | 66,391 | 315 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,082 | Defense budget is top of the docket – push starts next week | Bertuca 3-11 | Bertuca 3-11 | Office of Management and Budget will release Trump skinny budget on March 16 Congressional request for supplemental FY-17 defense spending the White House announced plans to boost defense spending by $54 billion in FY-18 above the $549 billion cap The budget would provide the Pentagon with a $573 billion base topline and would amount to a 3 percent increase, or $17 billion above Obama | O M B will release Trump skinny budget on March 16 Congressional request for defense spending the White House boost defense spending by $54 billion above the cap The budget would provide the Pentagon with a 3 percent increase | [Tony. “Trump's budget blueprint to be released March 16” Inside Defense, 3/11/17 ln//GBS-JV]
White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said today that Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney will release the Trump administration's "skinny budget" for fiscal year 2018 on March 16. Congressional staffers also expect a request for supplemental FY-17 defense spending, along with funds for President Trump's proposed wall on the southern border with Mexico, to be released March 16. The final FY-18 budget request is due to Congress in May. On Feb. 27, the White House announced plans to boost defense spending by $54 billion in FY-18 above the $549 billion cap mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act. The increase, which would bring total defense spending to $603 billion, would be paid for by steep cuts to domestic agencies. The budget would provide the Pentagon with a $573 billion base topline and would amount to a 3 percent increase, or $17 billion above what the Obama administration had planned. | 1,017 | <h4>Defense budget is top of the docket – push starts <strong>next week</h4><p>Bertuca 3-11</p><p></strong>[Tony. “Trump's budget blueprint to be released March 16” Inside Defense, 3/11/17 ln//GBS-JV]</p><p>White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said today that <u><mark>O</mark>ffice of <mark>M</mark>anagement and <mark>B</mark>udget</u> Director Mick Mulvaney <u><mark>will</mark> <mark>release</u></mark> the <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> administration's "<u><strong><mark>skinny budget</u></strong></mark>" for fiscal year 2018 <u><strong><mark>on March 16</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Congressional</u></mark> staffers also expect a <u><mark>request for</mark> supplemental FY-17 <mark>defense spending</u></mark>, along with funds for President Trump's proposed wall on the southern border with Mexico, to be released March 16. The final FY-18 budget request is due to Congress in May. On Feb. 27, <u><strong><mark>the White House</mark> announced plans to <mark>boost defense spending by $54 billion</mark> in FY-18 <mark>above the</mark> $549 billion <mark>cap</u></strong></mark> mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act. The increase, which would bring total defense spending to $603 billion, would be paid for by steep cuts to domestic agencies. <u><mark>The budget would provide the Pentagon with</mark> a $573 billion base topline and would amount to <mark>a 3 percent increase</mark>, or $17 billion above</u> what the <u>Obama</u> administration had planned.</p> | 1NC | null | PTX | 1,560,662 | 2 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,083 | Losers lose | Loomis 7 | Loomis 7 {Andrew, Deputy Director of the Operations Team 3 at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, former Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Senior Research Analyst at The Brookings Institution and Adjunct Professor (George Washington University and College of William and Mary), Ph.D. in International Relations (Georgetown University), Masters in International Affairs (Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs), BA in Peace and Conflict Studies (Juniata College), “Leveraging Legitimacy in the Crafting of U.S. Foreign Policy”, 3/2, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-1.php#THUR} | Presidents are vested with certain structural powers But have varying degrees of success in exercising their political will in governing Because structural factors are stable variance can be ascribed to the oscillating levels of authority they receive authority is a reflection of the legitimacy of the policies the president expects to implement. The perception of legitimacy is the active ingredient that converts historical circumstances and prestige into political leverage Neustadt’s argument the modern president must understand and closely guard his ability to exert influence and Skowronek’s work on authority present impressive evidence of how presidential leadership builds on power To have his way, the president had to conserve his power resources and expend them strategically to advance his agenda. “Prestige,” a source of presidential influence moves in accordance with perceptions certain configurations of events grant the president latitude in which to operate The ability of the president to exert influence varies in accordance with political overreach, legislative success, and bargaining failures. Declining political authority encourages defection. Ornstein writes of the domestic context, where a President has limited formal power perception matters. reputation for success is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have Conversely, the belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster In simple terms, winners win and losers lose Failure begets failure a president experiencing declining political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president Incapacity leads to political failure which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point is that the sources of presidential influence and thus their prospects for enjoying success go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic. | The perception of legitimacy converts to political leverage influence, moves with perceptions belief that occupant is on the defensive or without the ability to win can lead to disaster winners win and losers lose president experiencing declining political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals | American Presidents are vested with certain structural powers, such as those powers granted by the Constitution or the particular political distribution of power across the executive and legislative branches. But presidents have varying degrees of success in exercising their political will in the governing process. Because structural factors are relatively stable, this variance can reasonably be ascribed to the oscillating levels of authority they receive from the public that affects the degree of influence they are able to exercise. These sources of authority include individual factors, such as personal skill, temperament, and expertise. But authority is also a reflection of the legitimacy of the policies the president expects to implement. Beyond the powers granted by the Constitution and U.S. law, presidents rely on resources that lie at the confluence of historical context and personal prestige to have his way with Congress and with the public. The perception of legitimacy is the active ingredient that converts historical circumstances and prestige into political leverage. In his book The President as Leader, Erwin Hargove inspects the combined impact of political skill and moral direction on leadership effectiveness. “A full and complete political 32 leader must combine elements of craft and moral purpose in his character as well as his work… moral character is itself a skill and thus a component of effective leadership.” 48 Richard Neustadt’s argument that the modern president must understand and closely guard his ability to exert influence and Stephen Skowronek’s work on authority and compliance based on appropriate command present impressive evidence of how presidential leadership builds on sources of non-material power. 49 These works describe a dynamic of effective leadership that is enhanced when presidents contend with normative expectations in charting policy directions. In his path-breaking work on the deficiencies of the literature on presidential power, Richard Neustadt suggested that formal powers as established by the Constitution are not consistent with the personal power required to exert influence over the government bureaucracy. To have his way, the president had to conserve his power resources and expend them strategically to advance his agenda. “Prestige,” a source of presidential influence, moves in accordance with the public’s perceptions. 50 Stephen Skowronek does not fully accept Neustadt’s thesis of presidential weakness, but he does suggest that the institutional structure of time and the corresponding modulation of authority coupled with shifting legitimacy norms constrain presidential effectiveness. He posits that certain historical patterns provide greater or lesser influence to individual presidents and that for the president to enjoy significant presidential leverage, the public must grant the authority to repudiate the old order in his exercise of power. 51 ¶ Skowronek suggests that compliance based on authority results from public perceptions that the president’s request is “appropriate” in a given context. “A president’s authority hinges on the warrants that can be drawn from the moment at hand to justify action and secure the legitimacy of the changes affected.” 52 He suggests that in order to exercise power, a president must be granted the authority to challenge conventional practice. Where Neustadt tracks the influence of public support on presidential influence, Skowronek offers a contextual variable that influences presidential authority—certain configurations of events grant the president latitude in which to operate. Examples include critical junctures such as the onset of the Great Depression in the early 1930s granting Franklin Roosevelt authority to embark on the New Deal policies upon entering office in 1933; oil shocks and the hostage crisis in Iran late in President Carter’s administration gave a substantial lift to President Reagan’s level of authority with the public; and the late-term recession under George H.W. Bush gave some maneuver room to President Clinton to contend with international trade and broader economic issues as he took office in 1993. It is one reason, he suggests, that strong presidents have historically followed weak ones. In the twentieth century, the pairs of McKinley-Theodore Roosevelt, Hoover-Franklin Roosevelt, and Carter-Reagan all follow this trend. This same logic adds credence to the argument that September 11 sufficiently shocked the American public that it granted President Bush the authority to radically depart from the traditional norms guiding U.S. foreign policy. The public granted authority to a president in accordance with the legitimacy of each president’s claim. The ability of the president to exert influence varies in accordance with such non- structural factors as political overreach, legislative success, and bargaining failures. By most accounts, President Bush’s political capital is now at a nadir in his Administration—as measured by low poll numbers and a recent dearth of examples of effective exercise of power—yet the structural factors are unchanged, including his Constitutional authority.¶ Authority is affected by interjection of the intervening variable of historical context and¶ perceptions of legitimacy. Increasing fatalities and instability in Iraq, limited progress in¶ advancing the Administration’s goal of social security privatization, a perceived inept federal response to Hurricane Katrina, and a range of Republican ethical and legal difficulties all eroded¶ President Bush’s ability to pursue his preferred policies and resulted in the end of the Republican¶ majorities in both chambers of Congress. Furthermore, as President Bush’s political capital¶ erodes, his ability to hold together the disparate parts of the Republican Party under his¶ leadership correspondingly declines. The current intra-party debate between Republican¶ members of Congress also reflects the President’s inability to maintain party discipline over the¶ Iraq war strategy.¶ Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic. | 7,944 | <h4>Losers lose </h4><p><strong>Loomis 7 </strong>{Andrew, Deputy Director of the Operations Team 3 at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, former Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Senior Research Analyst at The Brookings Institution and Adjunct Professor (George Washington University and College of William and Mary), Ph.D. in International Relations (Georgetown University), Masters in International Affairs (Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs), BA in Peace and Conflict Studies (Juniata College), “Leveraging Legitimacy in the Crafting of U.S. Foreign Policy”, 3/2, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-1.php#THUR}</p><p>American <u>Presidents are vested with certain structural powers</u>, such as those powers granted by the Constitution or the particular political distribution of power across the executive and legislative branches. <u>But </u>presidents<u> have <strong>varying degrees of success</strong> in exercising their political will in</u> the <u>governing</u> process. <u>Because structural factors are</u> relatively <u>stable</u>, this <u>variance can</u> reasonably <u>be</u> <u>ascribed to the oscillating levels of authority they receive</u> from the public that affects the degree of influence they are able to exercise. These sources of authority include individual factors, such as personal skill, temperament, and expertise. But <u>authority is</u> also <u>a reflection of the legitimacy</u> <u>of the policies the president expects to implement.</u> Beyond the powers granted by the Constitution and U.S. law, presidents rely on resources that lie at the confluence of historical context and personal prestige to have his way with Congress and with the public. <u><mark>The <strong>perception of legitimacy</mark> is the active ingredient that <mark>converts</mark> historical circumstances and prestige in<mark>to</mark> <mark>political leverage</u></strong></mark>. In his book The President as Leader, Erwin Hargove inspects the combined impact of political skill and moral direction on leadership effectiveness. “A full and complete political 32 leader must combine elements of craft and moral purpose in his character as well as his work… moral character is itself a skill and thus a component of effective leadership.” 48 Richard <u>Neustadt’s argument</u> that <u>the modern president must understand</u> <u><strong>and closely guard his ability to exert influence</u></strong> <u>and</u> Stephen <u>Skowronek’s work on authority</u> and compliance based on appropriate command <u>present impressive evidence of how presidential leadership builds on </u>sources of non-material<u> power</u>. 49 These works describe a dynamic of effective leadership that is enhanced when presidents contend with normative expectations in charting policy directions. In his path-breaking work on the deficiencies of the literature on presidential power, Richard Neustadt suggested that formal powers as established by the Constitution are not consistent with the personal power required to exert influence over the government bureaucracy. <u>To have his way, the</u> <u>president had to conserve his power</u> <u>resources and <strong>expend them strategically</strong> to advance his agenda. “Prestige,”</u> <u>a source of <strong>presidential <mark>influence</u></strong>, <u>moves</mark> in accordance <mark>with</u></mark> the public’s <u><strong><mark>perceptions</u></strong></mark>. 50 Stephen Skowronek does not fully accept Neustadt’s thesis of presidential weakness, but he does suggest that the institutional structure of time and the corresponding modulation of authority coupled with shifting legitimacy norms constrain presidential effectiveness. He posits that certain historical patterns provide greater or lesser influence to individual presidents and that for the president to enjoy significant presidential leverage, the public must grant the authority to repudiate the old order in his exercise of power. 51 ¶ Skowronek suggests that compliance based on authority results from public perceptions that the president’s request is “appropriate” in a given context. “A president’s authority hinges on the warrants that can be drawn from the moment at hand to justify action and secure the legitimacy of the changes affected.” 52 He suggests that in order to exercise power, a president must be granted the authority to challenge conventional practice. Where Neustadt tracks the influence of public support on presidential influence, Skowronek offers a contextual variable that influences presidential authority—<u>certain</u> <u>configurations of events grant the president latitude in which to operate</u>. Examples include critical junctures such as the onset of the Great Depression in the early 1930s granting Franklin Roosevelt authority to embark on the New Deal policies upon entering office in 1933; oil shocks and the hostage crisis in Iran late in President Carter’s administration gave a substantial lift to President Reagan’s level of authority with the public; and the late-term recession under George H.W. Bush gave some maneuver room to President Clinton to contend with international trade and broader economic issues as he took office in 1993. It is one reason, he suggests, that strong presidents have historically followed weak ones. In the twentieth century, the pairs of McKinley-Theodore Roosevelt, Hoover-Franklin Roosevelt, and Carter-Reagan all follow this trend. This same logic adds credence to the argument that September 11 sufficiently shocked the American public that it granted President Bush the authority to radically depart from the traditional norms guiding U.S. foreign policy. The public granted authority to a president in accordance with the legitimacy of each president’s claim. <u>The ability of the president to exert influence</u> <u>varies</u> <u>in accordance with</u> such non- structural factors as <u>political overreach, legislative success, and bargaining failures.</u> By most accounts, President Bush’s political capital is now at a nadir in his Administration—as measured by low poll numbers and a recent dearth of examples of effective exercise of power—yet the structural factors are unchanged, including his Constitutional authority.¶ Authority is affected by interjection of the intervening variable of historical context and¶ perceptions of legitimacy. Increasing fatalities and instability in Iraq, limited progress in¶ advancing the Administration’s goal of social security privatization, a perceived inept federal response to Hurricane Katrina, and a range of Republican ethical and legal difficulties all eroded¶ President Bush’s ability to pursue his preferred policies and resulted in the end of the Republican¶ majorities in both chambers of Congress. Furthermore, as President Bush’s political capital¶ erodes, his ability to hold together the disparate parts of the Republican Party under his¶ leadership correspondingly declines. The current intra-party debate between Republican¶ members of Congress also reflects the President’s inability to maintain party discipline over the¶ Iraq war strategy.¶ <u>Declining</u> <u>political authority encourages defection. </u>American political analyst Norman <u>Ornstein writes of</u> <u>the domestic context,</u> In a system <u>where a President has limited formal power</u>, <u><strong>perception matters.</u></strong> The <u>reputation for success</u>—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—<u>is the <strong>most valuable resource</strong> <strong>a chief executive can have</u></strong>. <u>Conversely, the</u> widespread <u><mark>belief that</mark> the Oval Office <mark>occupant is on the <strong>defensive</u></strong></mark>, <u>on the wane <mark>or <strong>without the ability to win</strong></mark> under adversity <mark>can lead to disaster</u></mark>, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. <u>In simple terms, <strong><mark>winners win and losers lose</u></strong></mark> more often than not.<u> <strong>Failure begets failure</u></strong>. In short, <u>a <mark>president experiencing declining</u></mark> amounts of <u><mark>political capital</u> <u>has</u> <u><strong>diminished capacity</strong> to advance his goals</u></mark>. As a result, <u>political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president</u>, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. <u>Incapacity leads to political failure</u>, <u>which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay</u> both <u>in leadership</u> <u>capacity</u> <u>and defection by key allies. The central point</u> of this review of the presidential literature <u>is that the sources of <strong>presidential influenc</strong>e</u>—<u>and thus their prospects for <strong>enjoying success</u></strong> in pursuing preferred foreign policies—<u>go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by</u> ideational resources in the form of public <u><strong>perceptions of legitimacy.</strong> The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.</p></u> | 1nc v glancy | 2 | null | 88,524 | 110 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,084 | Causes extinction. | Perkinson 12 | Perkinson 12 — Jessica Perkinson, Program Coordinator at the Center for Asian Studies at American University, M.A. Candidate at the School of International Service at American University, holds a B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture from Indiana University, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” M.A. Thesis — American University, Available Online at http://hdl.handle.net/1961/10330, Accessed 10-25-2016, p. 9-10) | Should the CCP undergo collapse the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and instability within the Chinese government could lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the U S the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US
It is with this in mind that China scholars should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the U S the potential for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China | null | Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US.
It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof – for [end page 9] reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US. | 2,047 | <h4>Causes <u>extinction</u>. </h4><p><strong>Perkinson 12</strong> — Jessica Perkinson, Program Coordinator at the Center for Asian Studies at American University, M.A. Candidate at the School of International Service at American University, holds a B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture from Indiana University, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” M.A. Thesis — American University, Available Online at http://hdl.handle.net/1961/10330, Accessed 10-25-2016, p. 9-10)</p><p><u>Should the CCP undergo</u> some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete <u>collapse</u>, as some radical China scholars predict2 – <u>the implications for international and US national security are <strong>vast</strong>. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a <strong>significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region</strong>, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for <strong>foreign direct investment</strong>, <strong>economic stability</strong> and <strong>trade</strong>. China plays a key role in <strong>maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula</u></strong> as one of North Korea’s only allies, <u>and</u> it is argued that <u>instability within the Chinese government could</u> also <u>lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the <strong>Taiwan Strait</strong>. For the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>the effect of instability within the CCP would be <strong>widespread and dramatic</strong>. As the</u> United States’ <u>largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could <strong>threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation</strong> in the US</u>. In addition, <u>China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US</u>.</p><p><u>It is with this in mind that China scholars</u> within the United States and around the world <u>should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for</u> reform, instability or even <u>collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to <strong>the stability of the international order as a whole</strong>. For the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates specifically, <u>the potential</u> - or lack thereof – <u>for</u> [end page 9] <u>reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China</u>. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.</p> | 1NC v GBN KR | 4 | null | 76,723 | 385 | 125,898 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | 657,902 | N | Kanellis | 4 | Glenbrook North KR | Zuckerman | 1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,085 | Their internal link is backward — Japan will react to the plan by tightening the Alliance. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | as China's power continues to grow, Japan's need for U.S. security guarantees will also grow. Doubts about U.S. reliability are therefore likely to convince Japan to work harder to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China | as China's power continues to grow, Japan's need for U.S. security guarantees will also grow. Doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince Japan to work harder to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China | Finally, as China's power continues to grow, Japan's need for U.S. security guarantees will also grow. Doubts about U.S. reliability are therefore likely to convince Japan to work harder to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China.99 | 273 | <h4>Their internal link is <u>backward</u> — Japan will react to the plan by <u>tightening the Alliance</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>Finally, <u><mark>as China's power continues to grow, Japan's need for U.S. security guarantees will also grow. Doubts about U.S. reliability are</mark> therefore <mark>likely to convince Japan to work harder to <strong>strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance</strong>, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China</u></mark>.99</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Alliances” | 66,391 | 315 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,086 | Plan is a political nightmare – Their author | Perles 12 | Perles 12 (Joshua Perles 12, Perles is a J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law, 2013. This paper on enforcement of intellectual property rights received NYU Law’s award for best student note on international law. Before law school, Perles spent several years working in China, most recently as a research fellow at Peking University’s Schools of Environment and Energy and Transnational Law. He advised the Office of Senator Mark Kirk on matters of Chinese law and politics as a summer foreign policy fellow. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 45, pg. 259-289, http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/45.1-Perles.pdf )//DG | BIT covers all forms of investment,162 but sectoral investment treaties are not unheard of Thus, there is no structural barrier to the United States and China concluding a sectoral BIT limited to important IP-generating sectors such as renewable energy, software development, and entertainment. current U.S.-China BIT negotiation is predicted to be “the most difficult one in history By focusing on a relatively innocuous and popular area like green technology, the United States and China could demonstrate the advantages of Chinese equity ownership to U.S. IP producers. U.S. subsidies for Chinese firms politically unpalatable more likely to generate jobs domestically than current subsidies Lowering the cost of investing in IP-producing firms through subsidy would increase Chinese investors’ expected profit, encouraging investment despite the perceived risk. lower the effective cost of Chinese investment in U.S. innovative firms. | sectoral treaties negotiation is “the most difficult one in history.” By focusing on area like tech could demonstrate U.S. subsidies for firms politically unpalatable Lowering the cost of investing in IP-producing firms would increase Chinese investors’ expected profit lower the effective cost of Chinese investment | Typically, a BIT covers all forms of investment,162 but sectoral investment treaties are not unheard of. For example, the Energy Charter Treaty contains broad rights and has been ratified by virtually all of Europe, yet it is limited in scope to energy-related investments.163 Moreover, some general BITs include sectoral exceptions to their legal protections.164 Thus, there is no structural barrier to the United States and China concluding a sectoral BIT limited to important IP-generating sectors such as renewable energy, software development, and entertainment. Unfortunately, the current U.S.-China BIT negotiation is predicted to be “the most difficult one in history.”165 However, this difficulty originates in large part from U.S. adherence to the Model BIT.166 In contrast, a sectoral approach would have the advantage of allowing the United States and China to sell a mtore limited treaty to their domestic constituents. By focusing on a relatively innocuous and popular area like green technology, the United States and China could demonstrate the advantages of Chinese equity ownership to U.S. IP producers. Often, the most effective international trust building measures are incremental iterations of low-stakes agreements. While U.S. subsidies for Chinese firms may be politically unpalatable, they are far more likely to generate jobs domestically than current subsidies (i.e., tax incentives) on U.S. companies that “outsource.”168 Just as Chinese tax-free “special economic zones” attracted billions of dollars in U.S. FDI beginning in the late 1970s,169 targeted U.S. subsidies would generate reciprocal FDI and employment in the innovative sectors. As discussed in Part III.B.1 above, due to CFIUS review Chinese investors are understandably wary of committing to FDI in the U.S.170 Lowering the cost of investing in IP-producing firms through subsidy would increase Chinese investors’ expected profit, encouraging investment despite the perceived risk. These subsidies could take any form, such as tax holidays, tax rate reductions, or entry cost subsidies like research grants, so long as they lower the effective cost of Chinese investment in U.S. innovative firms.171 | 2,192 | <h4>Plan is a political nightmare – Their author</h4><p><strong>Perles 12</strong> (Joshua Perles 12, Perles is a J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law, 2013. This paper on enforcement of intellectual property rights received NYU Law’s award for best student note on international law. Before law school, Perles spent several years working in China, most recently as a research fellow at Peking University’s Schools of Environment and Energy and Transnational Law. He advised the Office of Senator Mark Kirk on matters of Chinese law and politics as a summer foreign policy fellow. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 45, pg. 259-289, http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/45.1-Perles.pdf )//DG</p><p>Typically, a <u>BIT covers all forms of investment,162 but <mark>sectoral</mark> investment <mark>treaties</mark> are not unheard of</u>. For example, the Energy Charter Treaty contains broad rights and has been ratified by virtually all of Europe, yet it is limited in scope to energy-related investments.163 Moreover, some general BITs include sectoral exceptions to their legal protections.164 <u>Thus, there is no structural barrier to the United States and China concluding a sectoral BIT limited to important IP-generating sectors such as renewable energy, software development, and entertainment. </u>Unfortunately, the <u>current U.S.-China BIT <mark>negotiation is </mark>predicted to be <mark>“the most difficult one in history</u>.”</mark>165 However, this difficulty originates in large part from U.S. adherence to the Model BIT.166 In contrast, a sectoral approach would have the advantage of allowing the United States and China to sell a mtore limited treaty to their domestic constituents. <u><mark>By focusing on</mark> a relatively innocuous and popular <mark>area like</mark> green <mark>tech</mark>nology, the United States and China <mark>could demonstrate</mark> the advantages of Chinese equity ownership to U.S. IP producers. </u>Often, the most effective international trust building measures are incremental iterations of low-stakes agreements. While <u><strong><mark>U.S. subsidies for </mark>Chinese <mark>firms</mark> </u></strong>may be<u><strong> <mark>politically unpalatable</u></strong></mark>, they are far <u>more likely to generate jobs domestically than current subsidies</u> (i.e., tax incentives) on U.S. companies that “outsource.”168 Just as Chinese tax-free “special economic zones” attracted billions of dollars in U.S. FDI beginning in the late 1970s,169 targeted U.S. subsidies would generate reciprocal FDI and employment in the innovative sectors. As discussed in Part III.B.1 above, due to CFIUS review Chinese investors are understandably wary of committing to FDI in the U.S.170 <u><mark>Lowering the cost of investing in IP-producing firms</mark> through subsidy <mark>would increase Chinese investors’ expected profit</mark>, encouraging investment despite the perceived risk.</u> These subsidies could take any form, such as tax holidays, tax rate reductions, or entry cost subsidies like research grants, so long as they <u><mark>lower the effective cost of Chinese investment</mark> in U.S. innovative firms.</u>171</p> | 1NC | null | PTX | 184,070 | 4 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,087 | Trump’s inter-party credibility is key – there is a narrow margin for error and a united GOP front is key to hammer out details and break democrat resistance | Hulse 1-3 | Hulse 1-3 | It’s put-up or shut-up time for Republicans. as they seize control of the House, Senate and the White House That political triad will leave them with a splendid opportunity for success But there is little room for failure if they hope to deliver on bold promises to reshape the nation’s health care delivery system they must show they can deliver That will not be easy There is a mutual wariness between many Republicans in Congress and Trump leaving it unclear how often their interests and priorities will coalesce or collide the biggest fights might well be between Republicans on Capitol Hill and the White House Republicans must also maneuver while facing slightly expanded Democratic minorities in the House and Senate, in a climate that is even more hostile than it was before the November elections Republicans themselves are going to need something of an attitude adjustment. The contemporary Republican Party has been built out of fierce opposition to Obama Nearly two-thirds of current House Republicans have never served with a Republican president and their entire time in Washington has been spent fighting the executive branch. Republicans have had the luxury of being able to argue for positions that appealed to their conservative base but that they knew would not become law because Senate Democrats would block them or because the president would veto them Now, if they can assemble the votes, their ideas will become law Republicans who have shied from the responsibility of government will now be called upon to support increases in the debt limit, approve annual budgets, endorse spending bills and back other must-pass measures With Democrats unlikely to help the Republicans who belonged to the “vote no, hope yes” caucus will have to vote yes and hope things go well. Tensions could arise between House and Senate Republicans as well. with Trump soon to occupy the Oval Office, it is unlikely that House Republicans will be willing to watch Democrats bottle up legislation in the Senate Demands that their Senate counterparts eliminate the filibuster could mount quickly Republicans are jubilant at their enviable position. Republicans have won their chance. Now it is time to see what they can do with it | there is little room for failure mutual wariness between many Republicans in Congress and Trump, leaving it unclear how their interests will collide biggest fights migh e between Republicans on Capitol Hill and the White House Republicans facing Democratic minorities in a climate that is hostile Democrats unlikely to help Tensions could arise between House and Senate Republicans | [Carl. “Republicans Stonewalled Obama. Now the Ball Is in Their Court.” New York Times, 1/3/17 ln//GBS-JV]
It’s put-up or shut-up time for Republicans. After a tumultuous decade that has seen profound changes in the makeup and character of their party, Republicans are poised to complete their slow but steady climb back to power as they seize control of the House, Senate and the White House for the first time since 2006. That political triad will leave them with a splendid opportunity for success. But there is little room for failure if they hope to satisfy their impatient constituents and deliver on bold promises to reshape the nation’s health care delivery system, restructure the tax code, drive job creation, muscle up American foreign policy, rebuild a crumbling infrastructure and set America on a new course. Republicans who will take command of the Senate and House as the 115th Congress convenes on Tuesday have long been itching for a chance to do it their way, constantly grousing that President Obama and Congressional Democrats held back American progress and economic growth. Now they must show they can deliver. And they know it. “When you have both houses and the presidency, there is no acceptable excuse for not passing major legislation,” said Representative Tom Cole, a senior Republican from Oklahoma. “There is a lot of pressure on Republican members to produce and to produce quickly.” That will not be easy. There is a mutual wariness between many Republicans in Congress and President-elect Donald J. Trump, leaving it unclear how often their interests and priorities will coalesce or collide. Some of the biggest fights might well be between Republicans on Capitol Hill and the White House occupied by a man who campaigned against the establishment and some of the very Republicans running Congress. Republicans must also maneuver while facing slightly expanded Democratic minorities in the House and Senate, in a climate that is, in many respects, even more hostile than it was before the November elections. Democrats remain angry at how Republicans treated President Obama, including their refusal to consider the nomination of federal Judge Merrick B. Garland to the United States Supreme Court. Democrats want payback for the cold shoulder given to Mr. Garland’s nomination to satisfy themselves and to show their supporters that they are not going to roll over for the new Republican government. While they cannot employ the filibuster to block most nominations, they still retain it for Supreme Court picks and legislation — at least for now. Perhaps most important, Republicans themselves are going to need something of an attitude adjustment. The contemporary Republican Party has been built out of fierce opposition to Mr. Obama and deep disdain for activist government. Nearly two-thirds of current House Republicans have never served with a Republican president and their entire time in Washington has been spent fighting the executive branch. As a result, Republicans have had the luxury of being able to argue for positions that appealed to their conservative base but that they knew would not become law because Senate Democrats would block them or because the president would veto them. Now, if they can assemble the votes, their ideas will become law — with all the attendant consequences. Republicans who have shied from the responsibility of government will now be called upon to support increases in the debt limit, approve annual budgets, endorse spending bills and back other must-pass measures that they formerly left to the Democrats and some of their more compromising colleagues. With Democrats unlikely to help on many of those votes after being castigated for them by Republicans, the Republicans who belonged to the “vote no, hope yes” caucus when it came to critical legislation in recent years now will have to vote yes and hope things go well. This isn’t the same style of Republican majority pushed from power after being routed in the 2006 midterm elections after the public backlash to the administration of President George W. Bush and his handling of the war in Iraq. Forged by the Tea Party revolt that restored Republicans to control of the House in the 2010 elections, and in the Senate in 2014, this party is much more conservative with a membership that tends to see government as an impediment to be leveled, not as a force to be shaped to their views to the benefit of their constituents. Eight years of railing against the Obama administration has infused them and their constituents with a hostility and disregard for the government that Republicans must now lead rather than ridicule. Tensions could arise between House and Senate Republicans as well. When the Newt Gingrich-led party took over the House in 1995 for the first time in four decades, newly empowered Republicans sent a raft of legislation to the Senate, only to see it stall there. With President Bill Clinton in the White House at the time, Republicans knew much of it would not be enacted. Now, with Mr. Trump soon to occupy the Oval Office, it is unlikely that House Republicans will be willing to watch Democrats bottle up legislation in the Senate. Demands that their Senate counterparts eliminate the filibuster could mount quickly. While they understand the challenges, Republicans are nonetheless jubilant at their enviable position. “A Republican in the White House and a Republican majority in Congress present tremendous opportunity to make real progress,” Senator Cory Gardner, Republican of Colorado, said in the party’s weekly radio address on Saturday. “We assume that responsibility with the promise that we’ll work hard to do everything that we can to deliver more opportunities to Americans tomorrow than they have today.” “I am pretty giddy,” said Mr. Cole as he looked ahead. Republicans have won their chance. Now it is time to see what they can do with it. | 5,923 | <h4>Trump’s <u>inter-party credibility</u> is key – there is a <u>narrow margin for error</u> and a <u>united GOP front is key</u> to <u>hammer out details</u> and <strong>break democrat resistance </h4><p>Hulse 1-3</p><p></strong>[Carl. “Republicans Stonewalled Obama. Now the Ball Is in Their Court.” New York Times, 1/3/17 ln//GBS-JV]</p><p><u><strong>It’s put-up or shut-up time for Republicans. </u></strong>After a tumultuous decade that has seen profound changes in the makeup and character of their party, Republicans are poised to complete their slow but steady climb back to power <u>as they seize control of the House, Senate and the White House </u>for the first time since 2006. <u>That political triad will leave them with a splendid opportunity for success</u>. <u><strong>But <mark>there is little room for failure</u></strong></mark> <u>if they hope to</u> satisfy their impatient constituents and <u>deliver on bold promises to reshape the nation’s health care delivery system</u>, restructure the tax code, drive job creation, muscle up American foreign policy, rebuild a crumbling infrastructure and set America on a new course. Republicans who will take command of the Senate and House as the 115th Congress convenes on Tuesday have long been itching for a chance to do it their way, constantly grousing that President Obama and Congressional Democrats held back American progress and economic growth. Now <u><strong>they must show they can deliver</u></strong>. And they know it. “When you have both houses and the presidency, there is no acceptable excuse for not passing major legislation,” said Representative Tom Cole, a senior Republican from Oklahoma. “There is a lot of pressure on Republican members to produce and to produce quickly.” <u>That will <strong>not be easy</u></strong>. <u>There is a <mark>mutual wariness between many Republicans in Congress and</u></mark> President-elect Donald J. <u><mark>Trump</u>, <u>leaving it unclear how</mark> often <mark>their interests</mark> and priorities <mark>will</mark> coalesce or <mark>collide</u></mark>. Some of <u><strong>the <mark>biggest fights migh</mark>t well b<mark>e between Republicans on Capitol Hill and the White House</u></strong></mark> occupied by a man who campaigned against the establishment and some of the very Republicans running Congress. <u><mark>Republicans</mark> must also maneuver while <mark>facing</mark> slightly expanded <mark>Democratic minorities</mark> in the House and Senate, <mark>in a climate that is</u></mark>, in many respects, <u><strong>even more <mark>hostile</mark> than it was before the November elections</u></strong>. Democrats remain angry at how Republicans treated President Obama, including their refusal to consider the nomination of federal Judge Merrick B. Garland to the United States Supreme Court. Democrats want payback for the cold shoulder given to Mr. Garland’s nomination to satisfy themselves and to show their supporters that they are not going to roll over for the new Republican government. While they cannot employ the filibuster to block most nominations, they still retain it for Supreme Court picks and legislation — at least for now. Perhaps most important, <u>Republicans themselves are going to need something of an attitude adjustment. The contemporary Republican Party has been built out of fierce opposition to</u> Mr. <u>Obama</u> and deep disdain for activist government. <u>Nearly two-thirds of current House Republicans have never served with a Republican president and their entire time in Washington has been spent fighting the executive branch. </u>As a result, <u>Republicans have had the luxury of being able to argue for positions that appealed to their conservative base but that they knew would not become law because Senate Democrats would block them or because the president would veto them</u>. <u><strong>Now, if they can assemble the votes, their ideas will become law </u></strong>— with all the attendant consequences. <u>Republicans who have shied from the responsibility of government will now be called upon to support increases in the debt limit, approve annual budgets, endorse spending bills and back other must-pass measures </u>that they formerly left to the Democrats and some of their more compromising colleagues. <u>With <mark>Democrats unlikely to help</u></mark> on many of those votes after being castigated for them by Republicans, <u>the Republicans who belonged to the “vote no, hope yes” caucus</u> when it came to critical legislation in recent years now <u>will have to vote yes and hope things go well. </u>This isn’t the same style of Republican majority pushed from power after being routed in the 2006 midterm elections after the public backlash to the administration of President George W. Bush and his handling of the war in Iraq. Forged by the Tea Party revolt that restored Republicans to control of the House in the 2010 elections, and in the Senate in 2014, this party is much more conservative with a membership that tends to see government as an impediment to be leveled, not as a force to be shaped to their views to the benefit of their constituents. Eight years of railing against the Obama administration has infused them and their constituents with a hostility and disregard for the government that Republicans must now lead rather than ridicule. <u><mark>Tensions could arise between House and Senate Republicans</mark> as well.</u> When the Newt Gingrich-led party took over the House in 1995 for the first time in four decades, newly empowered Republicans sent a raft of legislation to the Senate, only to see it stall there. With President Bill Clinton in the White House at the time, Republicans knew much of it would not be enacted. Now, <u>with</u> Mr. <u>Trump soon to occupy the Oval Office, it is unlikely that House Republicans will be willing to watch Democrats bottle up legislation in the Senate</u>. <u>Demands that their Senate counterparts eliminate the filibuster could mount quickly</u>. While they understand the challenges, <u>Republicans are </u>nonetheless <u><strong>jubilant at their enviable position. </u></strong>“A Republican in the White House and a Republican majority in Congress present tremendous opportunity to make real progress,” Senator Cory Gardner, Republican of Colorado, said in the party’s weekly radio address on Saturday. “We assume that responsibility with the promise that we’ll work hard to do everything that we can to deliver more opportunities to Americans tomorrow than they have today.” “I am pretty giddy,” said Mr. Cole as he looked ahead. <u><strong>Republicans have won their chance. Now it is time to see what they can do with it</u></strong>.</p> | 1nc v glancy | 2 | null | 1,560,663 | 2 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,088 | The plan results in other policies that strengthen the Japan alliance. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | the U S could take other actions that would starkly distinguish its policies toward Japan from its policies toward Taiwan, which should help to offset doubts that accommodation on Taiwan might create the U S could increase the size and improve the quality of the forces it commits to Japan's protection. Other policies could include further deepening U.S.-Japan joint military planning and continuing high-level discussions of the requirements for extending deterrence to Japan. Growth in Chinese conventional and nuclear forces has increased the importance of these interactions; ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would make them still more valuable | the U S could take actions that starkly distinguish its policies toward Japan from Taiwan, which should help to offset doubts the U S could increase the size and improve the quality of forces Other policies could include deepening joint military planning and continuing high-level discussions of extending deterrence Growth in Chinese forces has increased the importance of these interactions; ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would make them still more valuable | In addition, the United States could take other actions that would starkly distinguish its policies toward Japan from its policies toward Taiwan, which should help to offset doubts that accommodation on Taiwan might create. Most obviously, the United States could increase the size and improve the quality of the forces it commits to Japan's protection. Other policies could include further deepening U.S.-Japan joint military planning and continuing high-level discussions of the requirements for extending deterrence to Japan. Growth in Chinese conventional and nuclear forces has increased the importance of these interactions; ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would make them still more valuable.98 | 706 | <h4>The plan results in <u>other policies</u> that <u>strengthen</u> the Japan alliance. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>In addition, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could take</mark> other <mark>actions that</mark> would <mark>starkly distinguish its policies toward Japan from</mark> its policies toward <mark>Taiwan, which should help to offset doubts</mark> that accommodation on Taiwan might create</u>. Most obviously, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could increase the size and improve the quality of</mark> the <mark>forces</mark> it commits to Japan's protection. <mark>Other policies could include</mark> further <mark>deepening</mark> U.S.-Japan <mark>joint military planning and continuing high-level discussions of</mark> the requirements for <mark>extending deterrence</mark> to Japan. <mark>Growth in Chinese</mark> conventional and nuclear <mark>forces has increased the importance of these interactions; ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would make them <strong>still more valuable</u></strong></mark>.98</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Alliances” | 66,391 | 315 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,089 | Political capital’s key – and a robust defense budget solves ISIS and broad military strength that will collapse now due to lack of funds | Tritten 1-24 | Tritten 1-24 | McCain convened a Senate hearing and urged a costly and long-term build-up of the military to reverse years of falling budgets fired the opening salvo in a coming political debate in Congress this year over Trump’s promise to rebuild a “depleted” military with an historic increase in defense spending for troops, ships and aircraft. Reed shot back with calls to also fund domestic security programs, which also have been squeezed by spending caps in recent years. The defense budget fight is only beginning McCain is pushing for a $640-billion base defense budget that would shatter a $549-billion spending cap imposed by federal law, meaning Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement to ease the limits. Rebuilding America’s military will require spending political capital and making policy trade-offs national defense must be a political priority on par with repealing and replacing Obamacare, rebuilding infrastructure and reforming the tax code. Republicans will likely be forced to meet some demands of Senate Democrats, who still control 48 seats in the chamber and could filibuster Despite Trump’s victory and Republican control of Congress, lawmakers are still stuck with federal budget caps McCain’s budget proposal was released last week and lays out a five-year build-up, calling for: The Army to grow by 8,000 soldiers each year through 2022. Navy plans for 41 new ships to increase by 18 and additional purchases of 58 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 16 EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Marine Corps to grow by 3,000 Marines each year and reach at total of 200,000 by 2022, as well as an additional 20 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the service. The Air Force to have 1,500 combat aircraft, up from 1,100 now. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have warned that falling defense budgets in recent years have stressed and eroded the military as it carries out a variety of global tasks such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS], Afghanistan and deterrence against China | McCain fired t in a political debate in Congress over defense spending The defense budget fight is only beginning Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement Rebuilding will require spending political capital making trade-offs national defense on par with Obamacare infrastructure and reforming tax code Republicans will be forced to meet some demands of Democrats McCain’s budget call for The Army to grow additional 20 F-35 Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have warned that falling defense budgets have stressed and eroded the military as it carries out global tasks such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS], Afghanistan and deterrence against China | [Travis. “McCain kicks off debate in Senate over military buildup” 1/24/17 https://www.stripes.com/news/mccain-kicks-off-debate-in-senate-over-military-buildup-1.450584//GBS-JV]
Sen. John McCain on Tuesday convened a Senate hearing and urged a costly and long-term build-up of the military to reverse years of falling budgets. The Arizona Republican fired the opening salvo in a coming political debate in Congress this year over President Donald Trump’s promise to rebuild a “depleted” military with an historic increase in defense spending for troops, ships and aircraft. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee – in a possible preview of the party’s political strategy toward the Republican plans – shot back with calls to also fund domestic security programs, which also have been squeezed by spending caps in recent years. The defense budget fight is only beginning and the Armed Services Committee will play a central role in crafting 2018 military plans passed later this year by Congress. McCain is pushing for a $640-billion base defense budget that would shatter a $549-billion spending cap imposed by federal law, meaning Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement to ease the limits. “It will not be easy,” McCain said. “Rebuilding America’s military will require spending political capital and making policy trade-offs. That’s why national defense must be a political priority on par with repealing and replacing Obamacare, rebuilding infrastructure and reforming the tax code.” Indeed, Republicans will likely be forced to meet some demands of Senate Democrats, who still control 48 seats in the chamber and could filibuster efforts to remove or sidestep the spending caps that now stand in the way of the McCain and Trump plans. Democrats have demanded a deal to boost defense spending also must include more money for programs such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and the FBI. “Many of my colleagues will maintain that the defense bill is not a vehicle to discuss the fate of domestic spending,” Reed said Tuesday. “However, for the past several years, I have argued that when it comes to questions of adequate funding, we need to consider all the security responsibilities of our nation, not just those that are executed by the Department of Defense.” Despite Trump’s victory and Republican control of Congress, lawmakers are still stuck with federal budget caps passed in 2011 that block increases for the military and other programs. The Trump administration has yet to release its plans for the Defense Department but the president’s earlier proposals for a much bigger Navy fleet as well as more soldiers and Marines could require an extra $80 billion per year above planned spending, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C. think tank. McCain’s budget proposal was released last week and lays out a five-year build-up, calling for: The Army to grow by 8,000 soldiers each year through 2022. Navy plans for 41 new ships to increase by 18 and additional purchases of 58 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 16 EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Marine Corps to grow by 3,000 Marines each year and reach at total of 200,000 by 2022, as well as an additional 20 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the service. The Air Force to have 1,500 combat aircraft, up from 1,100 now. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have warned that falling defense budgets in recent years have stressed and eroded the military as it carries out a variety of global tasks such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS], stability operations in Afghanistan and deterrence against China in the Pacific region. | 3,734 | <h4>Political capital’s key – and a robust defense budget solves ISIS and <u>broad military strength</u> that will <u>collapse now</u><strong> due to lack of funds </h4><p>Tritten 1-24</p><p></strong>[Travis. “McCain kicks off debate in Senate over military buildup” 1/24/17 https://www.stripes.com/news/mccain-kicks-off-debate-in-senate-over-military-buildup-1.450584//GBS-JV]</p><p>Sen. John <u><mark>McCain</u></mark> on Tuesday <u>convened a Senate hearing and urged a costly and long-term build-up of the military to reverse years of falling budgets</u>. The Arizona Republican <u><strong><mark>fired t</mark>he opening salvo <mark>in a</mark> coming <mark>political debate in Congress</mark> this year <mark>over</u></strong></mark> President Donald <u>Trump’s promise to rebuild a “depleted” military with an historic increase in <mark>defense spending</mark> for troops, ships and aircraft. </u>Sen. Jack <u>Reed</u>, D-R.I., the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee – in a possible preview of the party’s political strategy toward the Republican plans – <u>shot back with calls to also fund domestic security programs, which also have been squeezed by spending caps in recent years. <strong><mark>The defense budget fight is only beginning</u></strong></mark> and the Armed Services Committee will play a central role in crafting 2018 military plans passed later this year by Congress. <u>McCain is pushing for a $640-billion base defense budget that would shatter a $549-billion spending cap imposed by federal law, meaning <strong><mark>Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement </mark>to ease the limits</strong>. </u>“It will not be easy,” McCain said. “<u><mark>Rebuilding</mark> America’s military</u> <u><strong><mark>will require spending political capital </mark>and <mark>making </mark>policy <mark>trade-offs</u></strong></mark>. That’s why <u><mark>national defense </mark>must be a political priority <strong><mark>on par with</mark> repealing and replacing <mark>Obamacare</mark>, rebuilding <mark>infrastructure</mark> <mark>and reforming</mark> the <mark>tax code</mark>.</u></strong>” Indeed, <u><mark>Republicans</mark> <mark>will</mark> likely <mark>be forced to meet some demands of</mark> Senate <mark>Democrats</mark>, who still control 48 seats in the chamber and could filibuster</u> efforts to remove or sidestep the spending caps that now stand in the way of the McCain and Trump plans. Democrats have demanded a deal to boost defense spending also must include more money for programs such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and the FBI. “Many of my colleagues will maintain that the defense bill is not a vehicle to discuss the fate of domestic spending,” Reed said Tuesday. “However, for the past several years, I have argued that when it comes to questions of adequate funding, we need to consider all the security responsibilities of our nation, not just those that are executed by the Department of Defense.” <u>Despite Trump’s victory and Republican control of Congress, lawmakers are still stuck with federal budget caps </u>passed in 2011 that block increases for the military and other programs. The Trump administration has yet to release its plans for the Defense Department but the president’s earlier proposals for a much bigger Navy fleet as well as more soldiers and Marines could require an extra $80 billion per year above planned spending, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C. think tank. <u><mark>McCain’s budget</mark> proposal was released last week and lays out a five-year build-up, <mark>call</mark>ing <mark>for</mark>: <mark>The Army to grow</mark> by 8,000 soldiers each year through 2022. Navy plans for 41 new ships to increase by 18 and additional purchases of 58 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 16 EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Marine Corps to grow by 3,000 Marines each year and reach at total of 200,000 by 2022, as well as an <mark>additional <strong>20 F-35</mark> Joint Strike Fighters</strong> for the service. The Air Force to have 1,500 combat aircraft, up from 1,100 now. <mark>Lawmakers on</u> <u><strong>both sides of the aisle</u></strong> <u>have warned that falling defense budgets</mark> in recent years <mark>have</mark> <mark>stressed and eroded the military as it carries out</mark> a variety of <mark>global tasks</u> <u><strong>such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS],</u></strong></mark> stability operations in <u><mark>Afghanistan</u> <u>and</u> <u>deterrence against China</u></mark> in the Pacific region.</p> | 1NC | null | PTX | 1,559,188 | 12 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,090 | The ACA causes a new wave of patent trolling | Kouyoumdjian ‘13 | Kouyoumdjian ‘13
[Philip Y. Kouyoumdjian is a Member of Cozen O’Connor’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. He litigates patent infringement cases across a range of technologies on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, manufacturers of magnetics, modules, circuit protection devices and interconnect products, and makers of communications and electronics parts and devices. “IP: Obamacare’s constitutional impact on patents” 4/30/13 http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/04/30/ip-obamacares-constitutional-impact-on-patents //GBS-JV] | Enactment of Obamacare resulted in the impact on patents and the concomitant, unintended consequences will invariably follow patent issues arise from a portion of the ACA Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act BPCIA Under the BPCIA applicants can file a biologics license application The BPCIA creates an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products shown to be biosimilar with an FDA-licensed reference product. this abbreviated licensure pathway tramples intellectual property rights consequences of the BPCIA came to the forefront when one company challenged the biosimilars approval process Abbott filed a citizen petition asking the FDA not to accept biosimilars the petition asserts that accepting a biosimilars application referencing a pre-enactment BLA constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. | Obamacare) resulted in patents and consequences creates an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products this abbreviated licensure pathway tramples i p rights | Enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as the PPACA or Obamacare) resulted in barrage of media coverage that has endured as the law nears its 2014 implementation date. An important aspect of the PPACA that is rarely discussed, however, is the impact this law will most certainly have on patents and the concomitant, but unintended consequences that will invariably follow. In particular, patent issues arise from a portion of the PPACA known as the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). Under the BPCIA, applicants can file a biologics license application (BLA), commonly known as a biosimilars application, under 351(k) of the Public Health Service Act. The BPCIA creates an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products shown to be biosimilar to or interchangeable with an FDA-licensed reference product. In essence, this pathway creates a more efficient route for cheaper drugs to enter the market. Certain entities, however, believe that this abbreviated licensure pathway tramples not only their intellectual property rights, but also their constitutional rights. The consequences of the BPCIA came to the forefront when at least one company challenged the biosimilars approval process. On April 2, 2012, Abbott Laboratories filed a citizen petition asking the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) not to accept biosimilars applications referencing BLA 125057, for its multibillion-dollar drug Humira (adalimumab), or any other BLA submitted to the FDA before March 23, 2010. The basis for that petition rests on the Fifth Amendment. Essentially, the petition asserts that accepting a biosimilars application referencing a pre-enactment BLA constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. | 1,764 | <h4>The ACA causes a new wave of <strong>patent trolling</h4><p>Kouyoumdjian ‘13</p><p></strong>[Philip Y. Kouyoumdjian is a Member of Cozen O’Connor’s Intellectual Property Practice Group. He litigates patent infringement cases across a range of technologies on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, manufacturers of magnetics, modules, circuit protection devices and interconnect products, and makers of communications and electronics parts and devices. “IP: Obamacare’s constitutional impact on patents” 4/30/13 http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/04/30/ip-obamacares-constitutional-impact-on-patents<u> //GBS-JV]</p><p>Enactment of</u> the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as the PPACA or <u><mark>Obamacare</u>) <u>resulted in</u></mark> barrage of media coverage that has endured as the law nears its 2014 implementation date. An important aspect of the PPACA that is rarely discussed, however, is <u>the impact</u> this law will most certainly have <u><strong>on <mark>patents and</mark> the concomitant,</u></strong> but <u><strong>unintended <mark>consequences</u></strong></mark> that <u>will</u> <u><strong>invariably</u></strong> <u>follow</u>. In particular, <u>patent issues arise from a portion of the</u> PP<u>ACA</u> known as the <u><strong>Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act</u></strong> (<u><strong>BPCIA</u></strong>). <u>Under the BPCIA</u>, <u>applicants can file a biologics license application</u> (BLA), commonly known as a biosimilars application, under 351(k) of the Public Health Service Act. <u><strong>The BPCIA <mark>creates an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products</u></strong></mark> <u>shown to be biosimilar</u> to or interchangeable <u>with an FDA-licensed reference product.</u> In essence, this pathway creates a more efficient route for cheaper drugs to enter the market. Certain entities, however, believe that <u><mark>this</u> <u><strong>abbreviated</u></strong> <u><strong>licensure</u></strong> <u><strong>pathway</u></strong> <u>tramples</u></mark> not only their <u><strong><mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>rights</u></strong></mark>, but also their constitutional rights. The <u>consequences of the BPCIA came to the forefront when</u> at least <u>one company challenged the biosimilars approval process</u>. On April 2, 2012, <u>Abbott</u> Laboratories <u>filed a <strong>citizen petition</u></strong> <u>asking the</u> Food and Drug Administration (<u>FDA</u>) <u>not to accept biosimilars</u> applications referencing BLA 125057, for its multibillion-dollar drug Humira (adalimumab), or any other BLA submitted to the FDA before March 23, 2010. The basis for that petition rests on the Fifth Amendment. Essentially, <u>the petition asserts that accepting a biosimilars application referencing a pre-enactment BLA constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. </p></u> | 1nc v glancy | 2 | null | 1,560,664 | 2 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,091 | The plan resolves every conflict that might prompt Chinese expansionism. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the immediate possibility of the U S fighting China to protect Taiwan and are not adequately captured by focusing solely on the cross-strait relationship. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the key factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term a grand bargain would deal fully with this counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes | The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the key factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term a grand bargain would deal fully with this by requiring resolution of these other disputes | Taiwan Is No Longer The Key Issue
A second counterargument is that Taiwan is no longer the key issue straining U.S.-China relations. Consequently, focusing on Taiwan is misguided. As discussed earlier, cross-strait relations have been improving for many years. At the same time, China's disputes with its neighbors in the South China and East China Seas have become more intense, and increasingly define day-to-day tensions in the region. Possibly most worrisome, Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly strained in the past few years, taking the spotlight off Taiwan.
Two rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective. As I have already argued, the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the immediate possibility of the United States fighting China to protect Taiwan and, therefore, are not adequately captured by focusing solely on the cross-strait relationship. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the key factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term. Second, a grand bargain would deal fully with this counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes. | 1,401 | <h4>The plan <u>resolves every conflict</u> that might prompt Chinese expansionism. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>Taiwan Is No Longer The Key Issue</p><p>A second counterargument is that Taiwan is no longer the key issue straining U.S.-China relations. Consequently, focusing on Taiwan is misguided. As discussed earlier, cross-strait relations have been improving for many years. At the same time, China's disputes with its neighbors in the South China and East China Seas have become more intense, and increasingly define day-to-day tensions in the region. Possibly most worrisome, Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly strained in the past few years, taking the spotlight off Taiwan.</p><p>Two rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective. As I have already argued, <u>the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the immediate possibility of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>fighting China to protect Taiwan and</u>, therefore, <u>are not adequately captured by focusing solely on the cross-strait relationship. <mark>The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among <strong>the key factors</strong> fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to <strong>military competition</strong> and <strong>strained political relations</strong>, thereby <strong>increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term</u></strong></mark>. Second, <u><mark>a grand bargain would deal fully with this</mark> counterargument <strong><mark>by requiring resolution of these other disputes</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Causes Chinese Expansionism” | 176,703 | 47 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,092 | F35 supremacy key to airpower | Matthews ‘8 | Matthews ‘8
William Matthews, Air Forces Journal, “Pumping Up The Numbers,” 6-30-2008 (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/04/3392707) | The Air Force today struggles “with the oldest inventory in history, battered by 17 years of continuous combat The service’s “ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested If we don’t get into some coherent, integrated, synchronized plan, then we won’t serve our nation the way we should Corley spoke of an Air Force whose air dominance was now being challenged. “Our F-15s and F-16s are overmatched by China and Russia and this poses a significant risk to our air dominance and to our nation’s safety He spoke of the need for a hybrid solution that would include ramping up production of the Joint Strike Fighter you need those aircraft in sufficient capacity | service’s “ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested this poses a significant risk to our air dominance to safety, hybrid solution would ramping up production of Joint Strike Fighter | **Michael Moseley is Chief of Staff of the US Air Force
In February, Moseley released a “chief of staff’s white paper.” The Air Force today struggles “with the oldest inventory in history, battered by 17 years of continuous combat,” Moseley said. The service’s “ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested.” Air Combat Command chief Gen. John Corley also revealed in February that a Combat Air Force Strategic Master Plan to create a roadmap for the command was being drafted and would be released in three to six months. “I no longer want to play the whack-a-mole game. If we don’t get into some coherent, integrated, synchronized plan, then we won’t serve our nation the way we should,” Corley said at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla. Corley spoke of an Air Force whose air dominance was now being challenged. “Our F-15s and F-16s are overmatched by China and Russia and this poses a significant risk to our air dominance and to our nation’s safety,” Corley said. He spoke of the need for a hybrid solution that would include ramping up production of the F-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but insisted neither could be done at the expense of the other. “It’s my belief that you need to have both of those aircraft in sufficient capacity and I am not about cannibalizing either program or cannibalizing the bomber program. I think you need all of these,” he said. | 1,412 | <h4><strong>F35 supremacy key to airpower </h4><p>Matthews ‘8</p><p></strong>William <u><strong><mark>Matthews</u></strong></mark>, Air Forces Journal, “Pumping Up The Numbers,” 6-30-<u><strong>20<mark>08</u></strong></mark> (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/04/3392707)</p><p>**Michael Moseley is Chief of Staff of the US Air Force</p><p>In February, Moseley released a “chief of staff’s white paper.” <u>The Air Force today struggles “with the oldest inventory in history, battered by 17 years of continuous combat</u>,” Moseley said. <u>The <mark>service’s</mark> <mark>“ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested</u></mark>.” Air Combat Command chief Gen. John Corley also revealed in February that a Combat Air Force Strategic Master Plan to create a roadmap for the command was being drafted and would be released in three to six months. “I no longer want to play the whack-a-mole game. <u>If we don’t get into some coherent, integrated, synchronized plan, then we won’t serve our nation the way we should</u>,” Corley said at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla. <u>Corley spoke of an Air Force whose air dominance was now being challenged. “Our F-15s and F-16s are overmatched by China and Russia and <mark>this poses a <strong>significant risk to our air dominance</strong></mark> and <mark>to</mark> our nation’s <mark>safety</u>,</mark>” Corley said. <u>He spoke of the need for a <mark>hybrid solution</mark> that <mark>would</mark> include <mark>ramping up production of</mark> the</u> F-22 and F-35 <u><mark>Joint Strike Fighter</u></mark>, but insisted neither could be done at the expense of the other. “It’s my belief that <u>you need</u> to have both of <u>those aircraft in sufficient capacity</u> and I am not about cannibalizing either program or cannibalizing the bomber program. I think you need all of these,” he said.</p> | 1NC | null | PTX | 1,559,191 | 6 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,093 | The plan gives China a status quo it can live with — removing the motivation for expansionism. | Kastner 16 | Kastner 16 — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse) | This is not to say that a concept such as Glaser’s grand bargain, where the U S would end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for the PRC peacefully settling other regional maritime disputes and accepting a U.S. role in the region, would necessarily contribute to instability in the Taiwan Strait. Rather the destabilizing effect of a shifting military balance is conditional on the evolution of other trends, particularly those that affect China’s expected costs of war and those that affect the degree to which Chinese policymakers are optimistic or pessimistic about where Taiwan is heading over the long term a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan should occur only in the context of a broader understanding that significantly increases China’s stake in a stable status quo | This is not to say that a concept such as Glaser’s grand bargain would contribute to instability the destabilizing effect of a shifting military balance is conditional on the evolution of other trends that affect China’s expected costs of war and the degree to which Chinese policymakers are optimistic about where Taiwan is heading a reduced U.S. commitment should occur only in the context of a broader understanding that significantly increases China’s stake in a stable status quo | The analysis presented in this article has significant implications for U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the potential dangers posed by a shifting cross-strait balance of power suggest that proposals calling for a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security carry with them significant risks. For instance, a U.S. decision to terminate arms sales to the island would almost certainly exacerbate changes in the cross-strait balance of power. Such an effect could occur both directly, by undercutting Taiwan’s access to advanced [End Page 90] weaponry, and indirectly, by signaling a reduced U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security (and hence reduced willingness to intervene in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait). This is not to say that a concept such as Charles Glaser’s grand bargain, where the United States would end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for the PRC peacefully settling other regional maritime disputes and accepting a U.S. role in the region,103 would necessarily contribute to instability in the Taiwan Strait. Rather, I have argued that the destabilizing effect of a shifting military balance is conditional on the evolution of other trends, particularly those that affect China’s expected costs of war and those that affect the degree to which Chinese policymakers are optimistic or pessimistic about where Taiwan is heading over the long term. Yet, because a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan would affect the cross-strait military balance, such a policy shift is risky and should occur only in the context of a broader understanding that significantly increases China’s stake in a stable status quo. | 1,652 | <h4>The plan gives China <u>a status quo it can live with</u> — removing the motivation for expansionism. </h4><p><strong>Kastner 16</strong> — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p>The analysis presented in this article has significant implications for U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the potential dangers posed by a shifting cross-strait balance of power suggest that proposals calling for a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security carry with them significant risks. For instance, a U.S. decision to terminate arms sales to the island would almost certainly exacerbate changes in the cross-strait balance of power. Such an effect could occur both directly, by undercutting Taiwan’s access to advanced [End Page 90] weaponry, and indirectly, by signaling a reduced U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security (and hence reduced willingness to intervene in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait). <u><mark>This is not to say that a concept such as</u></mark> Charles <u><mark>Glaser’s grand bargain</mark>, where the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>would end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for the PRC peacefully settling other regional maritime disputes and accepting a U.S. role in the region,</u>103 <u><mark>would</mark> necessarily <mark>contribute to instability</mark> in the Taiwan Strait. Rather</u>, I have argued that <u><mark>the destabilizing effect of a shifting military balance is <strong>conditional on the evolution of other trends</strong></mark>, particularly those <mark>that affect China’s expected costs of war and</mark> those that affect <mark>the degree to which Chinese policymakers are optimistic</mark> or pessimistic <mark>about where Taiwan is heading</mark> over the long term</u>. Yet, because <u><mark>a reduced U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan</u> would affect the cross-strait military balance, such a policy shift is risky and <u><mark>should occur <strong>only in the context of a broader understanding that significantly increases China’s stake in a stable status quo</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Causes Chinese Expansionism” | 77,981 | 162 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,094 | Collapse the economy and innovation – this evidence is reverse causal | Shapiro ’14. | Shapiro ’14.
[Shapiro is president and CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA)®, the U.S. trade association representing more than 2,000 consumer electronics companies, and author of the New York Times best-selling books, Ninja Innovation: The Ten Killer Strategies of the World's Most Successful Businesses and The Comeback: How Innovation Will Restore the American Dream. “Senate should finish off the patent trolls.” 3/26/14. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/201701-senate-should-finish-off-the-patent-trolls ] STRYKER | Recent strong action by Congress and the White House against patent trolls is a rare and welcome example of policymakers doing exactly what they were put in place to do: work in a serious, bipartisan way to address a grievous problem that is harming our economy and killing American jobs. Senate inaction is disturbing because there is no time to waste. American businesses are being swamped by bogus patent threats, which are increasing at an alarming rate. While I represent the innovation industry, this is not just about tech companies the brunt is borne by small businesses In 2011 alone, patent abusers raked in at least $29 billion on these types of threats, costing the U.S. economy $80 billion. this is an economic issue Senate patent troll fix must include a fee shifting provision similar to the one found in the House bill There is no silver bullet to the patent troll problem, but simple, common-sense reforms like these would go a long way to driving the trolls back under the bridge. Patent trolls are scaring off investors and killing innovation, putting a serious drag on our economy. The Senate must follow the president and enact solutions that drive at the heart of the problem, instead of tiptoeing around the edges. Let’s end the patent troll plague once and for all, and allow innovators to thrive. | patent threats increasing at an alarming rate cost U.S. economy $80 billion this is an economic issue trolls are scaring off investors and killing innovation, putting a serious drag on our economy end the patent troll plague and allow innovators to thrive. | Recent strong action by Congress and the White House against patent trolls is a rare and welcome example of policymakers doing exactly what they were put in place to do: work in a serious, bipartisan way to address a grievous problem that is harming our economy and killing American jobs.¶ Sadly, none of this fierce urgency seems to have impacted the Senate, which is treading water despite the introduction of several strong bills targeting patent abuse.¶ Senate inaction is disturbing because there is no time to waste. American businesses are being swamped by bogus patent threats, which are increasing at an alarming rate. While I represent the innovation industry, this is not just about tech companies: restaurants, realtors, retailers, the gaming industry, and even coffee shop owners are now losing billions to patent extortionists.¶ Of course, the brunt is borne by small businesses, which now make up 90 percent of patent troll victims. The trolls are crafty: it makes good sense to target startups and entrepreneurs without legal resources for a prolonged patent fight. In fact, one in three startups has been blindsided by patent litigation, and 40 percent of small technology companies say abusive patent suits have had a serious, negative impact on their businesses.¶ One troll infamously demanded $1,000 per worker from small companies that use a basic document scanner feature. Another attacked small businesses like coffee shops that were using Wi-Fi routers. In 2011 alone, patent abusers raked in at least $29 billion on these types of threats, costing the U.S. economy $80 billion. If you are a troll, there is little downside: you face few costs or consequences for spamming the world with patent demands, even if the underlying claim is bogus.¶ Essentially, this is an economic issue. Patent lawsuits are incredibly simple and inexpensive to bring, and extremely complex and costly to defend. Fighting a patent lawsuit can easily cost more than seven figures. No wonder so many victims are forced to “pay the toll to the troll” or simply shut their doors and go out of business.¶ Fixing the problem requires changing the economic incentives and imposing a penalty on the trolls for their so-called “business model.” To truly free innovators and spark our economy, the system should follow the model of other countries and put the burden of frivolous lawsuits squarely on the shoulders of the trolls.¶ That is why any Senate patent troll fix must include a fee shifting provision similar to the one found in the House bill. With this provision, if a troll brings a bogus lawsuit and loses, it could pay the winning party’s legal fees. Fee shifting gives defendants a chance to fight back against racketeers who capitalize on the outrageous expense of patent litigation to extort settlements. It does not disadvantage legitimate patent holders bringing actions to enforce their claims. Finally, it imposes a price tag on the patent trolls, which is important since the trolls overwhelmingly lose when their weak patents are actually litigated.¶ A similarly important provision involves bonding – requiring patent trolls to put up some money at the outset of new litigation. Many trolls work through networks of dozens or even hundreds of thinly-capitalized shell companies. If the defendant manages to win a judgment against the troll, the troll simply declares bankruptcy and disappears, leaving the defendant empty-handed.¶ A bonding provision would allow a court, if it suspects that a patent is weak, to require that plaintiff put aside money to cover the defendant's eventual legal fees. If the troll litigates and loses a bogus claim, it would be rightfully liable for the costs, and could no longer simply vanish into thin air.¶ There is no silver bullet to the patent troll problem, but simple, common-sense reforms like these would go a long way to driving the trolls back under the bridge.¶ Patent trolls are scaring off investors and killing innovation, putting a serious drag on our economy. This must end, for the sake of small businesses and the people they employ. The Senate must follow the president and Congress and enact solutions that drive at the heart of the problem, instead of tiptoeing around the edges. Let’s end the patent troll plague once and for all, and allow innovators to thrive. | 4,333 | <h4><strong>Collapse the economy and innovation – this evidence is reverse causal</h4><p>Shapiro ’14.</p><p></strong>[Shapiro is president and CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA)®, the U.S. trade association representing more than 2,000 consumer electronics companies, and author of the New York Times best-selling books, Ninja Innovation: The Ten Killer Strategies of the World's Most Successful Businesses and The Comeback: How Innovation Will Restore the American Dream. “Senate should finish off the patent trolls.” 3/26/14. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/201701-senate-should-finish-off-the-patent-trolls ] <u>STRYKER</p><p>Recent strong action by Congress and the White House against patent trolls is a rare and welcome example of policymakers doing exactly what they were put in place to do: work in a serious, bipartisan way to address a grievous problem that is harming our economy and killing American jobs.</u>¶ Sadly, none of this fierce urgency seems to have impacted the Senate, which is treading water despite the introduction of several strong bills targeting patent abuse.¶ <u>Senate inaction is disturbing because there is no time to waste. American businesses are being swamped by bogus <mark>patent threats</mark>, which are <mark>increasing at an alarming rate</mark>. While I represent the innovation industry, this is not just about tech companies</u>: restaurants, realtors, retailers, the gaming industry, and even coffee shop owners are now losing billions to patent extortionists.¶ Of course, <u>the brunt is borne by small businesses</u>, which now make up 90 percent of patent troll victims. The trolls are crafty: it makes good sense to target startups and entrepreneurs without legal resources for a prolonged patent fight. In fact, one in three startups has been blindsided by patent litigation, and 40 percent of small technology companies say abusive patent suits have had a serious, negative impact on their businesses.¶ One troll infamously demanded $1,000 per worker from small companies that use a basic document scanner feature. Another attacked small businesses like coffee shops that were using Wi-Fi routers. <u>In 2011 alone, patent abusers raked in at least $29 billion on these types of threats, <mark>cost</mark>ing the <mark>U.S. economy $80 billion</mark>.</u> If you are a troll, there is little downside: you face few costs or consequences for spamming the world with patent demands, even if the underlying claim is bogus.¶ Essentially, <u><strong><mark>this is an economic issue</u></strong></mark>. Patent lawsuits are incredibly simple and inexpensive to bring, and extremely complex and costly to defend. Fighting a patent lawsuit can easily cost more than seven figures. No wonder so many victims are forced to “pay the toll to the troll” or simply shut their doors and go out of business.¶ Fixing the problem requires changing the economic incentives and imposing a penalty on the trolls for their so-called “business model.” To truly free innovators and spark our economy, the system should follow the model of other countries and put the burden of frivolous lawsuits squarely on the shoulders of the trolls.¶ That is why any <u>Senate patent troll fix must include a fee shifting provision similar to the one found in the House bill</u>. With this provision, if a troll brings a bogus lawsuit and loses, it could pay the winning party’s legal fees. Fee shifting gives defendants a chance to fight back against racketeers who capitalize on the outrageous expense of patent litigation to extort settlements. It does not disadvantage legitimate patent holders bringing actions to enforce their claims. Finally, it imposes a price tag on the patent trolls, which is important since the trolls overwhelmingly lose when their weak patents are actually litigated.¶ A similarly important provision involves bonding – requiring patent trolls to put up some money at the outset of new litigation. Many trolls work through networks of dozens or even hundreds of thinly-capitalized shell companies. If the defendant manages to win a judgment against the troll, the troll simply declares bankruptcy and disappears, leaving the defendant empty-handed.¶ A bonding provision would allow a court, if it suspects that a patent is weak, to require that plaintiff put aside money to cover the defendant's eventual legal fees. If the troll litigates and loses a bogus claim, it would be rightfully liable for the costs, and could no longer simply vanish into thin air.¶ <u>There is no silver bullet to the patent troll problem, but simple, common-sense reforms like these would go a long way to driving the trolls back under the bridge.</u>¶ <u><strong>Patent <mark>trolls are scaring off investors and killing innovation, putting a serious drag on our economy</mark>.</u></strong> This must end, for the sake of small businesses and the people they employ. <u><strong>The Senate must follow the president</u></strong> and Congress <u>and enact solutions that drive at the heart of the problem, instead of tiptoeing around the edges. Let’s <mark>end the patent troll plague</mark> once and for all, <mark>and allow innovators to thrive.</p></u></mark> | 1nc v glancy | 2 | null | 1,560,665 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,095 | Economic decline causes nuclear war | Tønnesson 15 | Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311 | recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so Deterrence could lose its credibility great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war | Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but negative trade expectations generate tensions If leaders anticipate decline they may contemplate force and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms changes in the economy render peace precarious . Deterrence lose credibility great powers might gamble in war | Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene. | 3,361 | <h4>Economic decline causes nuclear war </h4><p>Stein <strong>Tønnesson 15</strong>, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311</p><p>Several <u>recent works</u> on China and Sino–US relations <u>have made</u> substantial <u>contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances</u> a combination of <u>nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers</u>. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that <u>interdependence may <strong>both inhibit and drive conflict</u></strong> are right. <u><mark>Interdependence raises the cost of conflict</u></mark> for all sides <u><mark>but</u></mark> <u>asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and <strong><mark>negative trade expectations</u></strong></mark> may <u><mark>generate tensions </mark>leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that</u> in turn <u>increase the risk of military conflict</u> (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, <u>decisions for war</u> and peace <u>are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations</u>. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. <u><mark>If leaders</u></mark> on either side of the Atlantic <u>begin to seriously <strong>fear or <mark>anticipate </mark>their own nation’s <mark>decline</u></strong></mark> then <u><mark>they may <strong></mark>blame</u></strong> this on <u>external dependence, appeal to <strong>anti-foreign sentiments</strong>, <mark>contemplate</mark> the use of <strong><mark>force</strong></mark> to gain</u> respect or <u>credibility, adopt <strong>protectionist policies</strong>, <mark>and</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>refuse to be deterred by</u></strong></mark> either <u><strong><mark>nuclear arms</strong></mark> or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen <strong>abruptly</u></strong>, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions <u>in East Asia</u> are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. <u>The greatest risk is <strong>not</u></strong> that <u><strong>a territorial dispute</u></strong> leads to war under present circumstances <u>but that <strong><mark>changes in the </mark>world <mark>economy</strong></mark> alter those circumstances in ways that <mark>render </mark>inter-state <mark>peace</mark> more <mark>precarious</u></mark>. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. <u>This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to <strong>protect the world from Armageddon</strong>, and <strong>unreliably so</u></strong><mark>. <u>Deterrence </mark>could <strong><mark>lose</mark> its <mark>credibility</u></strong></mark>: one of the two <u><mark>great powers might gamble</mark> that the other yield <mark>in <strong></mark>a cyber-war or conventional limited <mark>war</u></strong></mark>, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.</p> | 1nc v glancy | 2 | null | 142 | 3,586 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,096 | Decline in airpower causes global nuclear war | Pfaltzgraff 10 | Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9 | potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which adversaries use a mix of capabilities against the U S a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors
constraints will have important implications for budget and procurement programs and maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention
with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the U S and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the U S can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent
the U S faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk major challenges for the U S and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of WMD) use cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states
Technology proliferation is accelerating export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by biological agents are likely to be more lethal and as global
the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing weaponry “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region These threats include ballistic missiles the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of WMD is a logical projection scenarios are illustrative A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy∂ An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists∂ A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war∂ A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula∂ What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management | potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which adversaries use a mix of capabilities against the U S
the speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare Control of the air has become indispensable to national security the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain
biological agents are likely to be more global
world contains flashpoints North Korea Iran China the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically An unstable Pakistan Taiwan Straits indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management. | The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority.
As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent.
General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmen who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment.∂ System Versatility∂ In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity.∂ Space Access and Control∂ Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability.∂ Cyber Capabilities∂ The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration.∂ Challenges for the Air Force∂ General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included:∂ • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness?∂ • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century?∂ • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables?∂ • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments?∂ • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations?∂ • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats?∂ • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment?∂ • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges?∂ • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests?∂ These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The∂ QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort.∂ The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states.
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments.
PROLIFERATION TRENDS
The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions.∂ First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats.∂ Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities.∂ Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets.∂ Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations.∂ Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so.∂ Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor.∂ Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales.∂ Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive:∂ • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy∂ • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists∂ • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war∂ • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula∂ What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management. | 16,579 | <h4>Decline in airpower causes <u>global nuclear war</h4><p></u><strong>Pfaltzgraff 10</strong> – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9</p><p>The <u><mark>potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which</u></mark> state <u><mark>adversaries</u></mark> and/or non-state actors <u><mark>use a mix of</u></mark> conventional and unconventional <u><mark>capabilities against the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, <u>a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors</u>. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority.</p><p>As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts <u>constraints</u> that <u>will have important implications for budget and procurement programs</u>, basic research and development (R&D), <u>and</u> the <u>maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention</u>. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).</p><p>THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES</p><p>In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of <mark>the</mark> Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, <u>with its inherent characteristics of <strong><mark>speed</strong>, <strong>range</strong>, and <strong>flexibility</strong>, airpower has forever changed warfare</u></mark>. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. <u><mark>Control of the air has become <strong>indispensable to national security</strong></mark> because it allows the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains <mark>the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring <strong>global mobility</strong>, <strong>long-range strike</strong>, and intelligence, surveillance, and </mark>reconnaissance <mark>(<strong>ISR</strong>). The benefits of airpower <strong>extend beyond</strong> the air domain</mark>, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are <strong>increasingly interdependent</u></strong>.</p><p>General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, <u>the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk</u>. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmen who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment.∂ System Versatility∂ In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity.∂ Space Access and Control∂ Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability.∂ Cyber Capabilities∂ The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration.∂ Challenges for the Air Force∂ General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included:∂ • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness?∂ • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century?∂ • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables?∂ • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments?∂ • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations?∂ • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats?∂ • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment?∂ • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges?∂ • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests?∂ These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The∂ QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort.∂ The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines <u>major challenges for the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of</u> weapons of mass destruction (<u>WMD) use</u> against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a <u><strong>cyber or space attack</strong>; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as <strong>Arctic security</strong>, U.S. <strong>energy dependence</strong>, <strong>demographic shifts</strong> and urbanization, the potential for <strong>resource wars</strong> (particularly over access to <strong>water</strong>), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or <strong>failing states</u></strong>.</p><p>TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION</p><p><u>Technology proliferation is accelerating</u>. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international <u>export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by</u> dual-use technologies and chemical/<u><strong><mark>biological</strong> agents</u></mark>. The battlefields of the future <u><mark>are likely to be more</mark> lethal</u> as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems <u>and as <strong><mark>global</u></strong></mark> and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments.</p><p>PROLIFERATION TRENDS</p><p>The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions.∂ First, <u>the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD</u> and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats.∂ Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities.∂ Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets.∂ Fourth, <u>the twenty-first-century <mark>world contains <strong>flashpoints</strong></mark> for state-to-state conflict. This includes <strong><mark>North Korea</strong></mark>, which possesses nuclear weapons, and <strong><mark>Iran</strong></mark>, which is developing them. In addition, <strong><mark>China</strong></mark> is developing</u> an impressive array of <u>weaponry</u> which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears <u>“designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region</u> and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 <u>These threats include ballistic missiles</u>, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations.∂ Fifth, <u><mark>the potential for irregular warfare is <strong>rising dramatically</strong></mark> with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of</u> more lethal capabilities, including <u>WMD</u>, to armed non-state actors <u>is a logical projection</u> of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so.∂ Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor.∂ Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales.∂ Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop <u>scenarios</u> such as the following, which <u>are</u> more <u>illustrative</u> than comprehensive:∂ • <u>A <strong>nuclear Iran</strong> that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy∂ </u>• <u><mark>An <strong>unstable Pakistan</strong></mark> that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists∂ </u>• <u>A <strong><mark>Taiwan Straits</strong></mark> crisis that escalates to war∂ </u>• <u>A <strong>nuclear North Korea</strong> that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula∂ What all of these have in common is the <strong><mark>indispensable role</strong> that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and <strong>crisis management</u></strong>.</p></mark> | 1NC | null | PTX | 105,823 | 172 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,097 | The “recognize the U.S.’s security role” QPQ gets China to commit to the new status quo. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | A component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the U S ' long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces
Especially in light of Beijing's increasingly negative assessment, official recognition and acceptance of the U S ' continuing alliance commitments would be a valuable signal (not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others and the Chinese leadership's willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China's foreign policy. Such action would provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a revised geopolitical status quo if China were unwilling (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the U S would have to be more worried that China's leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the U S out of the region | A component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the U S ' long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces
official recognition and acceptance would be a valuable signal (not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others Such action would provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a revised status quo | A second component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the United States' long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. There have been periods when China viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance relatively favorable. For example, in 1980 China's leader, Hua Guofeng, stated: “We appreciate Japan's efforts to strengthen its alliance with the United States.”103 Since then a variety of factors, including the decline of Soviet power and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance starting in the mid-1990s have reduced, if not eliminated, China's positive assessment.104 In recent years, some Chinese elites have begun expressing harshly negative views. For example, in 2014 the deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army described the U.S. alliance system as “an antiquated relic of the Cold War that should be replaced by an Asia-centric security architecture.”105 Although open to varying interpretations, President Xi Jinping's call for an Asian security order managed by Asian countries and his criticism of “alliances as unhelpful for the region's security” can be viewed as offering a vision of the future in which the United States no longer plays a security role in East Asia. Increasingly, there is support in China for the conclusion that “in Beijing's eyes, the U.S. led security architecture is outliving the usefulness it once provided by ensuring the regional stability necessary for China's development. Instead, China views the alliance system as increasingly incapable of providing lasting security and itself a potential source of threat.”106
Especially in light of Beijing's increasingly negative assessment, official recognition and acceptance of the United States' continuing alliance commitments would be a valuable signal (not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others and the Chinese leadership's willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China's foreign policy. Such action would not guarantee stability in China's policy, but it would provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a revised geopolitical status quo. Maybe more important, if China were unwilling (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the United States would have to be more worried that China's leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the United States out of the region. | 2,449 | <h4>The “recognize the U.S.’s security role” QPQ gets China to <u>commit to the new status quo</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u><mark>A</u></mark> second <u><mark>component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates<u><mark>' long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces</u></mark>. There have been periods when China viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance relatively favorable. For example, in 1980 China's leader, Hua Guofeng, stated: “We appreciate Japan's efforts to strengthen its alliance with the United States.”103 Since then a variety of factors, including the decline of Soviet power and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance starting in the mid-1990s have reduced, if not eliminated, China's positive assessment.104 In recent years, some Chinese elites have begun expressing harshly negative views. For example, in 2014 the deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army described the U.S. alliance system as “an antiquated relic of the Cold War that should be replaced by an Asia-centric security architecture.”105 Although open to varying interpretations, President Xi Jinping's call for an Asian security order managed by Asian countries and his criticism of “alliances as unhelpful for the region's security” can be viewed as offering a vision of the future in which the United States no longer plays a security role in East Asia. Increasingly, there is support in China for the conclusion that “in Beijing's eyes, the U.S. led security architecture is outliving the usefulness it once provided by ensuring the regional stability necessary for China's development. Instead, China views the alliance system as increasingly incapable of providing lasting security and itself a potential source of threat.”106</p><p><u>Especially in light of Beijing's increasingly negative assessment, <mark>official recognition and acceptance</mark> of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u>' continuing alliance commitments <mark>would be <strong>a valuable signal</strong> (<strong>not cheap talk</strong>). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others</mark> and the Chinese leadership's willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China's foreign policy. <mark>Such action would</u></mark> not guarantee stability in China's policy, but it would <u><mark>provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a <strong>revised</mark> geopolitical <mark>status quo</u></strong></mark>. Maybe more important, <u>if China were unwilling (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>would have to be more worried that China's leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>out of the region</u>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Causes Chinese Expansionism” | 69,187 | 345 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,098 | Next off is the CP | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Next off is the CP </h4> | 1NC | null | IP conditions | 1,560,666 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,099 | Abandoning Taiwan leads to both Japan and South Korea prolif | Rehman 14 | Iskander Rehman 14, fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, DC, “Why Taiwan Matters: A small island of great strategic importance,” The National Interest, February 28, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=4 | Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. Japan, in particular, would feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South Korea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korean aggression that a growing proportion of the South Korean public now favors the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal. An abandonment of Taiwan could thus lead to a creeping Finlandization—or rapid nuclearization—of large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters. | Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would question U.S. resolve to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability South Korea might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korea South Korean public now favors the development of a nuclear arsenal abandonment could lead to rapid nuclearization | Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race.¶ Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. Japan, in particular, would feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches. Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability.¶ The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South Korea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korean aggression. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of the South Korean public now favors the development of a South Korean nuclear arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States’ security guarantee.¶ Meanwhile, smaller regional states might find themselves both disinclined to place their faith in the United States, and cowed into submission by a more self-assured and advantageously positioned China. An abandonment of Taiwan could thus lead to a creeping Finlandization—or rapid nuclearization—of large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters. | 1,810 | <h4>Abandoning Taiwan leads to both Japan and South Korea prolif</h4><p>Iskander <strong>Rehman 14<u></strong>, fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, DC, “Why Taiwan Matters: A small island of great strategic importance,” The National Interest, February 28, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=4</p><p><mark>Abandoning Taiwan</mark> <mark>would erode American credibility</mark> in the Indo-Pacific <mark>and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race</u></mark>.¶ Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. <u><mark>Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would</mark> naturally <mark>question U.S. resolve</mark> and Washington’s commitment <mark>to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan</mark>. Japan, in particular, would feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches</u>. <u><mark>Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo</mark>, <mark>if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S.</mark> conventional and nuclear deterrence, <mark>could <strong>lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability</u></strong></mark>.¶ <u>The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as <mark>South Korea</mark>, which <mark>might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korea</mark>n aggression</u>. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated <u>that a growing proportion of the <mark>South Korean public now favors <strong>the development of a </mark>South Korean <mark>nuclear arsenal</strong></mark>. </u>Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States’ security guarantee.¶ Meanwhile, smaller regional states might find themselves both disinclined to place their faith in the United States, and cowed into submission by a more self-assured and advantageously positioned China. <u>An <mark>abandonment</mark> of Taiwan <mark>could </mark>thus <mark>lead to</mark> a creeping Finlandization—or <mark>rapid nuclearization</mark>—of large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters.</p></u> | 1nc v glancy | 3 | null | 66,449 | 213 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,100 | The plan eliminates the flashpoints that spur arms races. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | The grand bargain is designed to capture the benefits of U.S. accommodation with China, while reducing its risks. China's concessions on its territorial and maritime disputes would communicate information to the U S about the limited extent of its aims, thereby reducing Washington's concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the U S out of East Asia resolution of these disputes would eliminate flash points that fuel regional military competition and crises that could draw the U S into a war | The grand bargain is designed to capture benefits while reducing risks. China's concessions on its territorial and maritime disputes would communicate info reducing Washington's concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the U S out of East Asia resolution of these disputes would eliminate flash points that fuel regional military competition and crises that could draw the U S into a war | The grand bargain I propose is designed to capture the benefits of U.S. accommodation with China, while reducing its risks. China's concessions on its territorial and maritime disputes would communicate information to the United States about the limited extent of its aims, thereby reducing Washington's concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the United States out of East Asia. In addition, resolution of these disputes would eliminate flash points that fuel regional military competition and crises that could draw the United States into a war. | 570 | <h4>The plan <u>eliminates the flashpoints</u> that spur arms races.</h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u><mark>The grand bargain</u></mark> I propose <u><mark>is designed to capture</mark> the <mark>benefits</mark> of U.S. accommodation with China, <mark>while reducing</mark> its <mark>risks. China's concessions on its <strong>territorial and maritime disputes</strong> would communicate info</mark>rmation to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>about the limited extent of its aims, thereby <mark>reducing Washington's concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>out of East Asia</u></mark>. In addition, <u><mark>resolution of these disputes would <strong>eliminate flash points</strong> that fuel <strong>regional military competition and crises</strong> that could draw the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>into a war</u></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Causes Global Arms Races” | 69,284 | 61 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,101 | Text: The United States federal government should offer a sectoral bilateral investment treaty on biotechnology to the People's Republic of China if, and only if, the People’s Republic of China agrees to enforce a framework protecting intellectual property, potentially including a shift in the trial of cases to a system of adjudication with significantly high monetary damages, increased support for local agencies targeting theft, and reformed relevant courts. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should offer a sectoral bilateral investment treaty on biotechnology to the People's Republic of China <u>if, and only if, the People’s Republic of China agrees to enforce a framework protecting intellectual property, potentially including a shift in the trial of cases to a system of adjudication with significantly high monetary damages, increased support for local agencies targeting theft, and reformed relevant courts.</h4></u> | 1NC | null | IP conditions | 1,560,667 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,102 | Japan prolif causes nuke war – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes preemptive conflicts and kills heg | null | -Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization | language
Nuclear allies become security risks Narang demonstrates when [junior] states gain nuclear weapons they coerce senior partners into intervening by threatening to use nuclear weapons That’s Israel at 73 South Africa during 88 And Pakistan with India Instead of relieving U S more nuclear allies increase risk U S would get involved in conflicts that turn nuclear were Japan to develop nuclear weapons rivals might launch preventive military strikes which research suggests has been frequently considered road to acquisition is rocky and increases likelihood of militarized conflict Soviet worries West Germany would acquire trigger Berlin Crisis if Japan actually acquired weapons, we could see nuclear arms race in Asia Japan’s neighbors, including So Ko would fear Japanese militarism No Ko would expand capabilities. China would expand its arsenal Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common But that’s largely because of U.S. efforts to stop them. Research suggests NPT has been instrumental in limiting spread of nuclear weapons by coordinating beliefs about commitments. To develop Japan would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt allies and adversaries including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran to question the treaty and consider their own nuclear arsenals Would this be so bad? no nuclear states have fought major war But conclusion nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate no war may be due to other factors quantitative evidence is limited at best theoretical and historical evidence suggests accidents and miscalculations are likely More countries mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes nuclear prolif is anything but inevitable U.S. efforts have been successful Without U.S. opposition to spread of nuclear weapons through “carrots” like alliances world would have more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. research suggests nuclear prolif would reduce U.S. world influence undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war. | allies coerce senior partners into intervening by threatening nuclear nuclear allies increase risk U S get in conflicts that turn nuclear Japan rivals might launch preventive strikes road to acquisition increases militarized conflict if Japan acquired we could see arms race So Ko would fear militarism No Ko would expand China would expand domino have not been But that’s because of U.S. efforts NPT has limit spread by beliefs Japan would withdraw That prompt Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran to consider nuclear accidents and miscalc are likely. More mean catastrophic nuclear mistakes prolif is anything but inevitable Without U.S. opposition through “carrots” like alliances world would have more weapons prolif reduce influence, undermine stability and increase nuclear war | -NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif
-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances
-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based
Miller 16 {Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/#THUR} **Modified for ableist language
Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker [junior] states gain nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India. Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could increase the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear. Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis. And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals. Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best. Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war. | 4,391 | <h4>Japan prolif causes nuke war – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes preemptive conflicts and kills heg</h4><p>-Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization</p><p>-NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif </p><p>-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances </p><p><strong>-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based</p><p>Miller 16 </strong>{Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/#THUR} **Modified for ableist<u><strong> language </p><p></strong>Nuclear <mark>allies</u></mark> can also <u>become <strong>security risks</u></strong>. Vipin <u>Narang demonstrates</u> that <u>when</u> weaker <u>[junior] states gain nuclear weapons</u>, <u>they</u> often seek to <u><strong><mark>coerce</u></strong></mark> their <u><mark>senior partners into intervening</u></mark> on their behalf <u><mark>by threatening</mark> to use <mark>nuclear</mark> weapons</u>. <u>That’s</u> what <u>Israel</u> did <u>at</u> the height of the 19<u><strong>73</u></strong> Arab-Israeli War. That’s what <u>South Africa</u> did <u>during</u> its 19<u><strong>88 </u></strong>confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. <u>And</u> that’s what <u>Pakistan</u> did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis <u>with India</u>. <u>Instead of relieving</u> the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having <u>more <mark>nuclear allies</u></mark> could <u><strong><mark>increase</u></strong></mark> the <u><mark>risk</u></mark> that the <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u>would <mark>get</mark> involved <mark>in conflicts that</u></mark> might <u><strong><mark>turn nuclear</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>were</u> South Korea or <u><mark>Japan</mark> to</u> begin <u>develop</u>ing <u>nuclear weapons</u>, their <u><mark>rivals might</u></mark> be tempted to <u><strong><mark>launch</mark> <mark>preventive</mark> military <mark>strikes</u></strong></mark>, <u>which research suggests has been <strong>frequently considered</u></strong> in the past. The <u><mark>road to</u></mark> nuclear <u><mark>acquisition</mark> is</u> often <u>rocky and <mark>increases</u></mark> the <u>likelihood of <strong><mark>militarized conflict</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u>Soviet worries</u> that <u>West Germany would acquire</u> nuclear weapons helped <u>trigger</u> the <u>Berlin Crisis</u>. And <u><mark>if Japan</mark> </u>or South Korea <u>actually <mark>acquired</u></mark> nuclear <u>weapons, <mark>we could</u></mark> possibly <u><mark>see</u></mark> a <u><strong>nuclear <mark>arms race </mark>in Asia</u></strong>. <u>Japan’s neighbors, including</u> <u><strong><mark>So</u></strong></mark>uth <u><strong><mark>Ko</u></strong></mark>rea, <u><mark>would fear</mark> </u>resurgent <u>Japanese <mark>militarism</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>No</u></strong></mark>rth <u><strong><mark>Ko</u></strong></mark>rea <u><mark>would expand</u></mark> its nuclear <u>capabilities. <mark>China would</u></mark> continue to <u><mark>expand</mark> its</u> own nuclear <u>arsenal</u>. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? <u>Nuclear “<mark>domino</mark> effects” <mark>have not been</mark> common</u> historically. <u><strong><mark>But</u></strong> <u>that’s</mark> largely <mark>because of</u></mark> determined <u><strong><mark>U.S. efforts</mark> to stop them. </u></strong>Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). <u>Research suggests</u> the <u><mark>NPT has</mark> been <strong>instrumental</u></strong> <u>in <mark>limit</mark>ing</u> the <u><mark>spread</mark> of nuclear weapons</u>, in part <u><mark>by</mark> coordinating</u> states’ <u><mark>beliefs</mark> about</u> one another’s nonproliferation <u>commitments. To develop</u> nuclear weapons, <u><mark>Japan</u></mark> and South Korea <u><mark>would</mark> need to violate or <mark>withdraw</mark> from the NPT. <mark>That</mark> could <mark>prompt</u></mark> U.S. <u><strong>allies and adversaries</u></strong> in other regions — <u>including <mark>Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran</u></mark> — <u><mark>to</mark> question the treaty</u>’s viability <u>and <mark>consider</u></mark> seeking <u><strong>their own <mark>nuclear</mark> arsenals</u></strong>. <u>Would this be so bad?</u> After all, <u>no</u> two <u>nuclear</u> armed <u>states have fought</u> a <u>major war</u> with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. <u><strong>But</u></strong> the <u>conclusion</u> that <u>nuclear weapons produce peace is <strong>subject to debate</u></strong>. It’s true that there has been <u>no war</u> between major powers since 1945. But that <u>may be due to other factors</u>. The <u><strong>quantitative evidence</u></strong> linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict <u>is limited at best</u>. Further, <u>theoretical and historical evidence suggests</u> that nuclear <u><strong><mark>accidents and miscalc</mark>ulations</u></strong> <u><mark>are likely</u>. <u>More</mark> countries</u> with nuclear weapons would <u><mark>mean</mark> more opportunities</u> <u>for <strong><mark>catastrophic nuclear mistakes</u></strong></mark>. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that <u>nuclear <mark>prolif</u></mark>eration <u><strong><mark>is anything but inevitable</u></strong></mark>. <u>U.S.</u> nonproliferation <u>efforts have been</u> surprisingly <u><strong>successful</u></strong>, even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. <u><mark>Without</u></mark> firm <u><mark>U.S. opposition</mark> to</u> the <u>spread of nuclear weapons</u> — a policy implemented <u><strong><mark>through “carrots” like alliances</u></strong></mark> and “sticks” like sanctions — the <u><mark>world would</u></mark> probably <u><mark>have</u></mark> far <u><mark>more</mark> than nine countries with nuclear <mark>weapons</mark>.</u> What’s more, <u>research suggests</u> that <u>nuclear <mark>prolif</u></mark>eration <u>would <strong><mark>reduce</mark> U.S. world <mark>influence</u></strong>, <u><strong>undermine</mark> global <mark>stability</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u>increase</mark> the risk of</u> <u><strong><mark>nuclear war</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1nc v glancy | 3 | null | 8,149 | 224 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,103 | The plan gets China to resolve disputes and agree to U.S. presence — it solves the root cause of arms races. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2) | To reduce the potential risk to Taiwan, the U S should make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent of two Chinese concessions. First, China must resolve its disputes in the South China and East China Seas on fair terms. This could include placing the disputed territories under international control. Such action would not only eliminate dangerous flash points, but also provide evidence of China’s limited aims
Second, China would officially accept the U S ’ long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. This would reflect the Chinese leadership’s willingness to incur the domestic political costs of confronting influential hard-liners who favor more ambitious Chinese policies in East Asia | the U S should make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent of two concessions China must resolve its disputes in the South and East China Seas on fair terms. This could include placing the disputed territories under international control. Such action would eliminate dangerous flash points
China would officially accept the U S ’ long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. This would reflect the Chinese leadership’s willingness to confront influential hard-liners | Requiring Chinese Concessions
To reduce the potential risk to Taiwan, the United States should make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent of two Chinese concessions. First, China must resolve its disputes in the South China and East China Seas on fair terms. This could include placing the disputed territories, some of which have valuable gas and oil reserves, under international control. Such action would not only eliminate dangerous flash points, but also provide evidence of China’s limited aims.
Second, China would officially accept the United States’ long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. This would reflect the Chinese leadership’s willingness to incur the domestic political costs of confronting influential hard-liners who favor more ambitious Chinese policies in East Asia. | 844 | <h4>The plan gets China to <u>resolve disputes</u> and <u>agree to U.S. presence</u> — it solves the <u>root cause</u> of arms races. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)</p><p>Requiring Chinese Concessions </p><p><u>To reduce the potential risk to Taiwan, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent of two</mark> Chinese <mark>concessions</mark>. First, <mark>China must resolve its disputes in the South</mark> China <mark>and East China Seas <strong>on fair terms</strong>. This could include placing the disputed territories</u></mark>, some of which have valuable gas and oil reserves, <u><mark>under international control. Such action would</mark> not only <strong><mark>eliminate dangerous flash points</strong></mark>, but also provide evidence of China’s limited aims</u>.</p><p><u>Second, <mark>China would <strong>officially accept</strong> the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates<u><mark>’ long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. This would reflect the Chinese leadership’s willingness to</mark> incur the domestic political costs of <mark>confront</mark>ing <mark>influential hard-liners</mark> who favor more ambitious Chinese policies in East Asia</u>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Causes Global Arms Races” | 168,080 | 11 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,104 | CP locks-in IP protections – New Chinese laws inevitable, but it’s a question of enforcement – Capturing internal motives gets change across the finish line | null | Squo doesn’t give money and is underfunded | }
Barriers to IP Enforcement economic and political factors on both a national and a local level also act as disincentives of Chinese IP enforcement However majority of cases are handled by administrative processes administrative decisions do not award monetary damages to victims of infringement Local administrative agencies also tend to be underfunded because local officials benefit from kickbacks and bribes and because counterfeiting often drives local economies overall result is a failure to report piracy and to fund administrative agencies responsible for enforcement Even if infringement cases are settled through litigation inadequate judicial transparency judicial ties to the agenda of the Chinese Communist Party, and delays in adjudications involving foreigners lead to legal inconsistencies among localities and hinder IP enforcement in general Furthermore, current Chinese patent, trademark, and copyright laws strictly limit civil fines to awards significantly below real economic harm and do not mandate strong enough punishments to deter counterfeiters from highly-profitable piracy lack of coordination among Chinese government ministries and agencies, local protectionism and corruption, high thresholds for criminal prosecution, lack of training, and weak punishments are responsible for the lack of IP enforcement in China Despite the existence of a relatively robust legal IP framework practical inadequacies in Chinese administrative procedures and civil and criminal adjudication prevent the creation of disincentives sufficient to deter illegal counterfeiting until the Chinese government finds adequate incentives to restructure the legal system to better combat corruption and allow for proper infringement remedies pressure from external sources is unlikely to have any practical effect In sum, attempts at IP reform will not be successful in China until the benefits of IP protection exceed the benefits of infringement for domestic businesses and, by extension, the Chinese government. | disincentives of Chinese IP enforcement majority of cases are handled by administrative processes do not award damages tend to be underfunded overall result is failure to report piracy and fund administrative agencies responsible for enforcement inadequate judicial transparency hinder IP enforcement Despite IP framework inadequacies prevent the creation of disincentives until the Chinese government finds adequate incentives pressure from external sources is unlikely to have any practical effect attempts at IP reform will not be successful until benefits exceed the benefits of infringement | No transparency for enforcement
=> china being disencentivized from reforming
China just needs some incentive
Pressure seriously fails, positive incentives key
There is a low barrier for positive incentives to ow negative incentives
Kassner 12 {Gillian, Litigation Associate at Covington & Burling LLP, former Law Clerk for Judge Charles F. Lettow (United States Court of Federal Claims), Doctor of Law (Harvard Law School), B.A. in Physics (University of Pennsylvania), “China’s IP Reform: State Interests Align with Intellectual Property Protection (Again),” Jolt Digest – Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 4/24, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/chinas-ip-reform-state-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again#THUR}
Practical Barriers to IP Enforcement: Practical economic and political factors on both a national and a local level also act as disincentives of Chinese IP enforcement. China enforces its patent, trademark, and copyright protections through both administrative procedures and civil and criminal forms of adjudication. However, due to administrative reluctance to pass along cases to the judiciary and cultural norms which favor social harmony over antagonistic dispute, the majority of cases are handled by administrative processes. Unlike litigation, administrative decisions do not award monetary damages to victims of infringement. Local administrative agencies also tend to be underfunded because local officials benefit from kickbacks and bribes and because counterfeiting often drives local economies. The overall result[ii] is a failure to report piracy and to fund administrative agencies responsible for enforcement. Even if infringement cases are settled through litigation, inadequate judicial transparency, judicial ties to the agenda of the Chinese Communist Party, and delays in adjudications involving foreigners lead to legal inconsistencies among localities and hinder IP enforcement in general. Furthermore, current Chinese patent, trademark, and copyright laws strictly limit civil fines to awards significantly below real economic harm and do not mandate strong enough punishments to deter counterfeiters from highly-profitable piracy. A 2005 U.S. International Trade Commission report summarized the problems by asserting, “lack of coordination among Chinese government ministries and agencies, local protectionism and corruption, high thresholds for criminal prosecution, lack of training, and weak punishments” are responsible for the lack of IP enforcement in China. Despite the existence of a relatively robust legal IP framework, practical inadequacies in Chinese administrative procedures and civil and criminal adjudication prevent the creation of disincentives sufficient to deter illegal counterfeiting. Failures in enforcement of IP legislation in some ways merely embody greater fundamental structural problems in China’s legal system. As long as local economies benefit from piracy and local officials accept bribes or other rewards from counterfeiters, governmental policies will not curb enforcement on a local level. Furthermore, until the Chinese government finds adequate incentives to restructure the legal system to better combat corruption and allow for proper infringement remedies, pressure from external sources is unlikely to have any practical effect. In sum, attempts at IP reform will not be successful in China until the benefits of IP protection exceed the benefits of infringement for domestic businesses and, by extension, the Chinese government. | 3,549 | <h4>CP locks-in <u>IP protections</u> – New Chinese laws <u>inevitable</u>, but it’s a question of <u>enforcement</u> – Capturing <u>internal motives</u> gets change <u>across the finish line</h4><p></u>Squo doesn’t give money and is underfunded</p><p>No transparency for enforcement</p><p>=> china being disencentivized from reforming</p><p>China just needs some incentive</p><p>Pressure seriously fails, positive incentives key</p><p>There is a low barrier for positive incentives to ow negative incentives</p><p><strong>Kassner 12</strong> {Gillian, Litigation Associate at Covington & Burling LLP, former Law Clerk for Judge Charles F. Lettow (United States Court of Federal Claims), Doctor of Law (Harvard Law School), B.A. in Physics (University of Pennsylvania), “China’s IP Reform: State Interests Align with Intellectual Property Protection (Again),” Jolt Digest – Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 4/24, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/chinas-ip-reform-state-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again#THUR<u>}</p><p></u>Practical <u>Barriers to IP Enforcement</u>: Practical <u>economic and political factors on both a national and a local level also act as <strong><mark>disincentives</strong> of Chinese IP enforcement</u></mark>. China enforces its patent, trademark, and copyright protections through both administrative procedures and civil and criminal forms of adjudication. <u><strong>However</u></strong>, due to administrative reluctance to pass along cases to the judiciary and cultural norms which favor social harmony over antagonistic dispute, the <u><mark>majority of cases are handled by <strong>administrative processes</u></strong></mark>. Unlike litigation, <u>administrative decisions <mark>do not award</mark> monetary <mark>damages</mark> to victims of <strong>infringement</u></strong>. <u>Local administrative agencies also <mark>tend to be <strong>underfunded</strong></mark> because local officials benefit from kickbacks and bribes and because counterfeiting often drives local economies</u>. The <u><strong><mark>overall result</u></strong></mark>[ii] <u><mark>is</mark> a <strong><mark>failure to report piracy</strong> and</mark> to <strong><mark>fund administrative agencies responsible for enforcement</u></strong></mark>. <u>Even if infringement cases are settled through litigation</u>, <u><strong><mark>inadequate judicial transparency</u></strong></mark>, <u>judicial ties to the agenda of the Chinese Communist Party, and delays in adjudications involving foreigners lead to legal inconsistencies among localities and</u> <u><strong><mark>hinder IP enforcement</u></strong></mark> <u>in general</u>. <u>Furthermore, current Chinese patent, trademark, and copyright laws strictly limit civil fines to awards significantly below real economic harm and do not mandate strong enough punishments to deter counterfeiters from highly-profitable piracy</u>. A 2005 U.S. International Trade Commission report summarized the problems by asserting, “<u>lack of coordination among Chinese government ministries and agencies, local <strong>protectionism</strong> and <strong>corruption</strong>, high thresholds for criminal prosecution, lack of training, and weak punishments</u>” <u>are responsible for the lack of IP enforcement in China</u>. <u><strong><mark>Despite</mark> the existence of a relatively robust legal <mark>IP framework</u></strong></mark>, <u>practical <mark>inadequacies</mark> in Chinese administrative procedures and civil and criminal adjudication <strong><mark>prevent the creation of disincentives</strong></mark> sufficient to deter illegal counterfeiting</u>. Failures in enforcement of IP legislation in some ways merely embody greater fundamental structural problems in China’s legal system. As long as local economies benefit from piracy and local officials accept bribes or other rewards from counterfeiters, governmental policies will not curb enforcement on a local level. Furthermore, <u><mark>until the Chinese government finds</u> <u><strong>adequate incentives</u></strong></mark> <u>to restructure the legal system to better combat corruption and allow for proper infringement remedies</u>, <u><strong><mark>pressure from external sources is unlikely to have any practical effect</u></strong></mark>. <u>In sum, <mark>attempts at IP reform will not be successful</mark> in China <mark>until</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>benefits</u></strong></mark> <u>of IP protection <strong><mark>exceed the benefits of infringement</strong></mark> for domestic businesses and, by extension, the Chinese government.</p></u> | 1NC | null | IP conditions | 1,559,197 | 8 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,105 | Plan’s bargain leads to withdrawal from Japan – won’t occur now | Gross 12 | Gross 12 {Donald, Senior Advisor at the Albright Stonebridge Group, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, Adjunct Fellow of the Pacific Forum CSIS, Ph.D. in Political Science (U Chicago), “The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War,” 11/8, 203, http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-china-fallacy-9781441132345/#THUR#THUR} | While Japan could make minor, incremental improvements in relations with China American sensitivities will grow difficult for Japan to surmount if current trends continue realignment on Okinawa is most sensitive issue at the present time. The initial vehement U.S. response to Tokyo’s efforts to alter basing reveals depth of American opposition Japan can expect to other changes
improvement in U.S.-China relations eliminate obstacles Japan now faces in policy improvement would facilitate a “grand bargain” between China and Japan which remains a major component of Japan thinking.
Resolution of outstanding issues with China would allow the U.S. to reduce its military “footprint” in Japan. burden on Japan would be far less. U S would find it considerably easier to shift American forces away and reduce number of deployed personnel, when the “China threat” is significantly diminished. | Japan could make minor improvements with China Okinawa is most sensitive vehement U.S. response to efforts to alter reveals opposition
improvement in U.S.-China relations eliminate obstacles Japan faces improvement facilitate “grand bargain” between China and Japan
Resolution of issues with China allow U.S. to reduce military “footprint U S would find it considerably easier to shift and reduce personnel, when China threat” is diminished | While it is possible Japan could make minor, incremental improvements in its relations with China during the years ahead, American sensitivities will grow increasingly difficult for Japan to surmount if current trends continue. Clearly, the “realignment” of U.S. forces on Okinawa is the most sensitive issue at the present time. The initial vehement U.S. response to Tokyo’s efforts to alter basing arrangements there reveals the depth of American opposition that Japan can expect to other changes it may propose in U.S. military deployments.
The best way for Japan to achieve its foreign policy goals is therefore to diplomatically help the United States transform its relations with China. A major improvement in U.S.-China relations would eliminate a number of obstacles Japan now faces in pursuing its foreign policy. This improvement would facilitate a “grand bargain” between China and Japan, as outlined by former Deputy Foreign Minister Tanaka, which remains a major component of Japanese strategic thinking.
Resolution of outstanding security issues with China would in turn allow the U.S. to reduce its military “footprint” in Japan. While some American deployments would remain necessary to ensure deterrence, hedge against uncertainty and uphold security, the burden on Japan would be far less. The United States would find it considerably easier to shift American forces away from populated areas and reduce the number of deployed personnel, when the “China threat” is significantly diminished. | 1,508 | <h4>Plan’s bargain leads to <u>withdrawal</u> from Japan – <u>won’t</u> occur now</h4><p><strong>Gross 12 </strong>{Donald, Senior Advisor at the Albright Stonebridge Group, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, Adjunct Fellow of the Pacific Forum CSIS, Ph.D. in Political Science (U Chicago), “The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War,” 11/8, 203, http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-china-fallacy-9781441132345/#THUR#THUR}</p><p><u>While</u> it is possible<u> <mark>Japan could make</u> <u><strong>minor</mark>, incremental</u></strong> <u><mark>improvements </mark>in</u> its <u>relations <mark>with China</u></mark> during the years ahead, <u>American sensitivities will grow</u> increasingly <u>difficult for Japan to surmount</u> <u><strong>if current trends continue</u></strong>. Clearly, the “<u>realignment</u>” of U.S. forces <u>on <mark>Okinawa is</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>most sensitive</mark> issue</u></strong> <u>at the present time. The</u> <u><strong>initial <mark>vehement</u></strong> <u>U.S. response to</mark> Tokyo’s <mark>efforts to alter</mark> basing</u> arrangements there <u><mark>reveals</u></mark> the <u>depth of</u> <u><strong>American <mark>opposition</u></strong></mark> that <u>Japan can expect to other changes</u> it may propose in U.S. military deployments.</p><p>The best way for Japan to achieve its foreign policy goals is therefore to diplomatically help the United States transform its relations with China. A major <u><mark>improvement in U.S.-China relations</u></mark> would <u><strong><mark>eliminate</u></strong></mark> a number of <u><mark>obstacles Japan</mark> now <mark>faces</mark> in</u> pursuing its foreign <u>policy</u>. This <u><mark>improvement</mark> would <mark>facilitate</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>“grand bargain”</u></strong> <u>between China and Japan</u></mark>, as outlined by former Deputy Foreign Minister Tanaka, <u>which remains a <strong>major component</u></strong> <u>of Japan</u>ese strategic <u>thinking.</p><p><mark>Resolution of</mark> outstanding</u> security <u><mark>issues with China</mark> would</u> in turn <u><strong><mark>allow</mark> the <mark>U.S. to reduce</mark> its <mark>military “footprint</mark>” in Japan.</u></strong> While some American deployments would remain necessary to ensure deterrence, hedge against uncertainty and uphold security, the <u>burden on Japan would be</u> <u><strong>far less.</u></strong> The <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>would find it <strong>considerably easier</u></strong> <u>to shift</mark> American forces away</u> from populated areas <u><strong><mark>and reduce</u></strong></mark> the <u>number of deployed <mark>personnel, when</mark> the “<mark>China threat” is</mark> significantly <mark>diminished</mark>.</p></u> | 1nc v glancy | 4 | null | 414,609 | 39 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,106 | The plan doesn’t get rid of the rest of the U.S.’s China policy — it maintains credibility. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2-3) | A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy toward China. Unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of U.S. policy In response to improvements in China’s forces, the U S should invest in maintaining the military capabilities necessary to protect its allies, to preserve those allies’ confidence in U.S. commitments, to deter crises and war, and to fight effectively if deterrence fails | A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy toward China. Unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components the U S should invest in maintaining the military capabilities necessary to protect its allies, to preserve allies’ confidence in U.S. commitments, to deter crises and war, and to fight effectively if deterrence fails | A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy toward China. Unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of U.S. policy. When uncertain about a state’s motives and goals, a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies. In response to improvements in China’s forces, the United States should invest in maintaining the military capabilities [end page 2] necessary to protect its allies, to preserve those allies’ confidence in U.S. commitments, to deter crises and war, and to fight effectively if deterrence fails. | 576 | <h4>The plan doesn’t get rid of the <u>rest</u> of the U.S.’s China policy — it maintains credibility. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2-3)</p><p><u><mark>A grand bargain would not constitute <strong>the entirety</strong> of U.S. policy toward China. Unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components</mark> of U.S. policy</u>. When uncertain about a state’s motives and goals, a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies. <u>In response to improvements in China’s forces, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should invest in maintaining the military capabilities</u></mark> [end page 2] <u><mark>necessary to protect its allies, to preserve</mark> those <mark>allies’ confidence in U.S. commitments, to deter crises and war, and to fight effectively if deterrence fails</u></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Credibility” | 1,563,496 | 7 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,107 | Interpretation—the aff should defend topical action based on the resolution | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Interpretation—the aff should defend topical action based on the resolution</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,668 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,108 | Misawa Air Base withdrawal crushes the credibility of US deterrence of North Korea and alliance commitments | null | -Specifically angers Japanese strategic elites | #THUR}
Actions all carry significant negative consequences For Air Force action, Japan raised objection to Misawa AB withdrawal, especially as viewed in the context of the growing threat from North Korea A Misawa AB drawdown undermines an example of an existing shared-use facility. For Engagement, this action limits training options and opportunities to shape interoperability bilaterally and among potential coalition partners. All actions would raise concerns among other global and regional partners and embolden potential adversaries in contravention of U.S. national interests | Japan raised objection to Misawa withdrawal in the context of the growing threat from North Korea drawdown undermines an existing shared-use facility actions raise concerns among global partners and embolden adversaries | -Crushes shared-use facility model, which is key to training and interoperability
Green 12 {Michael J., senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair (Center for Strategic and International Studies), associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Georgetown University), former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, former assistant professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (Johns Hopkins University), nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute and a distinguished scholar at the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, master’s and doctoral degrees in various international studies (Johns Hopkins University), bachelor’s degree in history (Kenyon College), “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment,” August, http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf#THUR}
Geostrategic Security/Political Military—Actions all carry significant negative consequences, especially in the Army action. While ROK ground forces are capable, removing U.S. ground forces would raise alarms regarding U.S. commitment. This would weaken U.S. ability to enhance joint capabilities, interoperability, and partnership capacity, while significantly reducing U.S. influence over escalation control and coalition formation in Northeast Asia. For the USMC action, reduction of USMC presence decreases the ability to shape partnership capacity building, including Expeditionary Defense and amphibious operations with Japanese, ROK, Australian and New Zealand forces. It would also reduce the capacity to respond to smaller regional crises that have the potential to escalate or draw in larger powers. While Japanese political opinion would be divided, since many political leaders would welcome an accelerated reduction of Marines on Okinawa, strategically influential elites in Japan could easily read the move as the beginning of overall U.S. disengagement from the region, triggering fears of abandonment. For the Air Force action, the Government of Japan has previously raised objection to Misawa AB withdrawal, especially as viewed in the context of the growing threat from North Korea but not for specific operational reasons. A Misawa AB drawdown undermines an example of an existing shared-use facility. For Engagement, this action limits training options and opportunities to shape interoperability bilaterally and among potential coalition partners. All actions would raise concerns among other global and regional partners and embolden potential adversaries in contravention of U.S. national interests | 2,618 | <h4>Misawa Air Base withdrawal crushes the <u>credibility</u> of US deterrence of North Korea and alliance commitments </h4><p>-Specifically angers Japanese strategic elites</p><p>-Crushes shared-use facility model, which is key to training and interoperability </p><p><strong>Green 12 </strong>{Michael J., senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair (Center for Strategic and International Studies), associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Georgetown University), former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, former assistant professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (Johns Hopkins University), nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute and a distinguished scholar at the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, master’s and doctoral degrees in various international studies (Johns Hopkins University), bachelor’s degree in history (Kenyon College), “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment,” August, http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf<u>#THUR}</p><p></u>Geostrategic Security/Political Military—<u>Actions all carry <strong>significant negative consequences</u></strong>, especially in the Army action. While ROK ground forces are capable, removing U.S. ground forces would raise alarms regarding U.S. commitment. This would weaken U.S. ability to enhance joint capabilities, interoperability, and partnership capacity, while significantly reducing U.S. influence over escalation control and coalition formation in Northeast Asia. For the USMC action, reduction of USMC presence decreases the ability to shape partnership capacity building, including Expeditionary Defense and amphibious operations with Japanese, ROK, Australian and New Zealand forces. It would also reduce the capacity to respond to smaller regional crises that have the potential to escalate or draw in larger powers. While Japanese political opinion would be divided, since many political leaders would welcome an accelerated reduction of Marines on Okinawa, strategically influential elites in Japan could easily read the move as the beginning of overall U.S. disengagement from the region, triggering fears of abandonment. <u>For</u> the <u>Air Force action, </u>the Government of <u><mark>Japan</u></mark> has previously <u><strong><mark>raised objection</u></strong> <u>to Misawa </mark>AB <mark>withdrawal</mark>, especially as viewed <mark>in the context of the <strong>growing threat from North</mark> <mark>Korea</u></strong></mark> but not for specific operational reasons. <u>A Misawa AB <mark>drawdown <strong>undermines</strong></mark> an example of <mark>an existing shared-use facility</mark>. For Engagement, this action <strong>limits training options and opportunities </strong>to shape interoperability bilaterally and among potential coalition partners. <strong>All</u></strong> <u><mark>actions</mark> would <strong><mark>raise concerns</strong> among</mark> other <strong><mark>global</mark> and regional <mark>partners</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>embolden</mark> potential <mark>adversaries</strong></mark> in contravention of U.S. national interests</p></u> | 1nc v glancy | 4 | null | 423,698 | 19 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,109 | China says yes and CP locks-in enforcement – key to Chinese economy | null | China wants to solve | }
Growing Incentives for IP Enforcement in China little has developed in terms of the external pressures imposed by foreign governments one key factor has changed – the nature of the Chinese economy China has replaced the United States as the world’s largest producer of manufactured goods and seen average annual GDP growth rates of around 10 percent number-one priority on the Chinese Communist Party agenda is self-preservation, which depends on its ability to sustain China’s current economic growth and development As China seeks to complete this transition, cooperating within the global market is essential, and IP protection is a key element of such cooperation capitalists have been generally reluctant to invest financial resources in Chinese businesses and high tech companies have reduced Chinese accessibility to latest technology China increasingly depends on gaining access global resources IP protection will become more important strict IP enforcement will also benefit domestic companies and consumers piracy has had unsettling long-term effects on the Chinese domestic economy The piracy of domestic products creates an environment of suspicion and distrust and curbs investment, innovation, and cooperation higher prices of brand name products The more that Chinese businesses turn to innovation and services rather than manufacturing, the more Chinese consumers will additionally become creative producers and stakeholders in IP reform As China continues to transition from a developing nation to a more sophisticated global economy, the stage is being set for incentives to favor stronger IP enforcement Chinese government has acknowledged the growing importance of IP reform in achieving its economic goals Intellectual Property Reform was also a conspicuous topic addressed by Xi Jinping Chinese government announcements are certainly no guarantee of change, they identify IPR as an area of development, underscoring its presence on the CCP agenda pressures from foreign nations and international organizations which have only a limited effect on Chinese enforcement in practice immediate future is less certain China surpassed the U.S. to file more patents in 2011 than any other country offering a picture of the rift between the intellectual property ideal and current reality. signs of change are conspicuous Due to the development of the Chinese economy, the struggle over IP protection is shifting from the international to the domestic realm incentives will favor the Chinese government fully opening its market to foreign companies by taking IP enforcement seriously opening the door to more extensive judicial reform END OF THE ARTICLE | Growing Incentives for IP Enforcement in China number-one priority on the C C P is economic growth IP protection is key capitalists have been reluctant to invest China depends on global resources IP protection will become more important will benefit domestic companies piracy has unsettling long-term effects on the Chinese economy curbs investment, innovation, and cooperation the stage is being set for incentives to favor stronger IP enforcement Chinese government announcements underscor presence on the CCP agenda pressures only a limited effect immediate future is less certain rift between i p ideal and current reality signs of change are conspicuous incentives will favor the Chinese government taking IP enforcement seriously, opening the door to judicial reform | Bc k2 econ and that is most important issue
IP is key to econ
Squo deters investment
K2 domestic econ too
Their authors are wrong, only we take into account long term effects and trends
Incentives are sufficient
China wants to look like they are reforming but doesn’t know how
US can solve
Kassner 12 {Gillian, Litigation Associate at Covington & Burling LLP, former Law Clerk for Judge Charles F. Lettow (United States Court of Federal Claims), Doctor of Law (Harvard Law School), B.A. in Physics (University of Pennsylvania), “China’s IP Reform: State Interests Align with Intellectual Property Protection (Again),” Jolt Digest – Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 4/24, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/chinas-ip-reform-state-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again#THUR}
Long-Term Signs of Change and Growing Incentives for IP Enforcement in China: In the past decade, little has developed in terms of the external pressures imposed by foreign governments and the internal practical and cultural barriers to IP enforcement. However, one key factor has changed – the nature of the Chinese economy. Over the past few years, China has replaced the United States as the world’s largest producer of manufactured goods and seen average annual GDP growth rates of around 10 percent. The number-one priority on the Chinese Communist Party agenda is self-preservation, which depends on its ability to sustain China’s current economic growth and development. To achieve this goal, the government indicated in its 12th Five Year Plan its intention to shift the focus of its economy from low-productivity manufacturing to a balanced economy with a stronger service sector and a focus on scientific innovation. As China seeks to complete this transition, cooperating within the global market is essential, and IP protection is a key element of such cooperation. While some foreign companies have been willing to invest in China despite the lack of adequate IP protection in order to take advantage of lower production costs, venture capitalists have been generally reluctant to invest financial resources in Chinese businesses and high tech companies have reduced Chinese accessibility to latest technology. As China increasingly depends on gaining access global resources, IP protection will become more important. Furthermore, strict IP enforcement will also benefit domestic companies and consumers. While beneficial to China in the short run, piracy has had unsettling long-term effects on the Chinese domestic economy. Some estimates indicate that up to 80 percent of Chinese counterfeit products are knockoffs of Chinese brands. The piracy of domestic products creates an environment of suspicion and distrust and curbs investment, innovation, and cooperation. In addition, the costs retailers incur in combating piracy are ultimately reflected in higher prices of brand name products and lower accessibility of original products to Chinese consumers. The more that Chinese businesses turn to innovation and services rather than manufacturing, the more Chinese consumers will additionally become creative producers and stakeholders in IP reform. For these reasons, Chinese businesses have started to demand reforms to strengthen IP enforcement within China and a handful of businesses have ventured into foreign courts to protect their intellectual property rights abroad. As China continues to transition from a developing nation to a more sophisticated global economy, the stage is being set for incentives to favor stronger IP enforcement. As it approaches its 2012 leadership turnover, the Chinese government has acknowledged the growing importance of IP reform in achieving its economic goals. The government has recently employed awareness campaigns and propaganda to make its commitment to IP reform as visible as current infringement. Two ambitious plans have been announced in the past few years: the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2008 and the National Patent Development Strategy for 2011-2020 in 2010. Intellectual Property Reform was also a conspicuous topic addressed by Xi Jinping, current Chinese Vice President and likely future state president and Chinese Communist Party general secretary, in his February 2012 visit to Washington. In a planned written response to the Washington Post, Xi stated, “We have taken active steps to meet legitimate U.S. concerns over IPR [intellectual-property rights] protection and trade imbalance, and we will continue to do so.” While Chinese government announcements and Xi’s political sound bite are certainly no guarantee of change, they identify IPR as an area of development, underscoring its presence on the CCP agenda. Unlike pressures from foreign nations and international organizations which have only a limited effect on Chinese enforcement in practice, the CCP is woven into every level of legal practice in China. Should the CCP choose to make enforcement a priority (and the economic climate indicates that it will), we can have confidence that IPR reform will be undertaken. Temporary Setbacks on the Road to Ultimate Reform: While IP enforcement seems inevitable in the long run, the immediate future is less certain. The Chinese government’s recent zeal for intellectual property protection and current reality offer a sharp and interesting contrast. In 2011, China surpassed the U.S. to file more patents in 2011 than any other country. Similar trends apply to trademarks; in 2010, 1.07 million trademark applications were filed in China, the most in the world for the ninth consecutive year. China currently serves simultaneously as the world’s source of the most annual patent and trademark filings and the most widespread IP infringement. This contrast has also been highlighted through propaganda. In 2006, a Beijing Higher People’s Court affirmed a judgment in a suit brought by five luxury brands (Prada, Chanel, Louis Vuitton, Gucci and Burberry) against landlords of China’s “Silk Market” for condoning IP infringement. The Silk Market, housed a six-story building, is a famous Beijing tourist attraction where customers haggle to purchase predominantly counterfeit goods. The court judgment, which imposed damages equivalent to about $2,500 per plaintiff against the landlord, was recognized by China’s Supreme People’s Court as one of the “Top Ten” IP cases decided that year. The damages imposed by the court did little to deter counterfeiting, and the Silk Market remains a site of flagrant infringement (and ongoing law suits). Last year a banner was hung in the market’s entryway; it states, “Protect Intellectual Property Rights, Be Law-Abiding Vendors,” offering a picture of the rift between the intellectual property ideal and current reality. Nonetheless, signs of change are conspicuous. IP rights suits are becoming more affordable and more socially acceptable and increasing numbers of IPR cases are filed in China every year (in 2009, 30,626 cases were filed in local courts, a 25 percent increase from 2008). Cases like the Apple/Proview trademark conflict and the Pfizer Viagra patent case have gained widespread public attention. Due to the development of the Chinese economy, the struggle over IP protection is shifting from the international to the domestic realm. Chinese businesses are compiling IP portfolios and beginning to realize the economic benefits of protection. Today, approximately 95 percent of IP cases in China are disputes between two Chinese companies. If current economic trends continue, as in the Han and Tang dynasties, the interests of the state will overlap once again with intellectual property protection: this time around in terms of protection of individual rights rather than preservation of dynastic hierarchy. While the development of adequate enforcement mechanisms will take time, the incentives will eventually favor the Chinese government fully opening its market to foreign companies by taking IP enforcement seriously, opening the door to more extensive judicial reform in general. END OF THE ARTICLE | 8,077 | <h4>China <u>says yes</u> and CP <u>locks-in</u> enforcement – key to <u>Chinese economy</h4><p></u>China wants to solve</p><p>Bc k2 econ and that is most important issue</p><p>IP is key to econ</p><p>Squo deters investment</p><p>K2 domestic econ too</p><p>Their authors are wrong, only we take into account long term effects and trends</p><p>Incentives are sufficient</p><p>China wants to look like they are reforming but doesn’t know how</p><p>US can solve</p><p><strong>Kassner 12</strong> {Gillian, Litigation Associate at Covington & Burling LLP, former Law Clerk for Judge Charles F. Lettow (United States Court of Federal Claims), Doctor of Law (Harvard Law School), B.A. in Physics (University of Pennsylvania), “China’s IP Reform: State Interests Align with Intellectual Property Protection (Again),” Jolt Digest – Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 4/24, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/chinas-ip-reform-state-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again#THUR<u><strong>}</p><p></u></strong>Long-Term Signs of Change and <u><strong><mark>Growing Incentives for IP Enforcement in China</u></strong></mark>: In the past decade, <u>little has developed in terms of the external pressures imposed by foreign governments</u> and the internal practical and cultural barriers to IP enforcement. However, <u>one key factor has changed – the nature of the Chinese economy</u>. Over the past few years, <u>China has replaced the United States as the world’s largest producer of manufactured goods and seen average annual GDP growth rates of around 10 percent</u>. The <u><strong><mark>number-one priority</u></strong> <u>on the <strong>C</strong></mark>hinese <strong><mark>C</strong></mark>ommunist <strong><mark>P</strong></mark>arty agenda <mark>is</mark> self-preservation, which <strong>depends</strong> on its ability to sustain China’s current <strong><mark>economic growth</strong></mark> and development</u>. To achieve this goal, the government indicated in its 12th Five Year Plan its intention to shift the focus of its economy from low-productivity manufacturing to a balanced economy with a stronger service sector and a focus on scientific innovation. <u>As China seeks to complete this transition, cooperating within the global market is essential, and <strong><mark>IP protection is</mark> a <mark>key</mark> element</u></strong> <u>of such cooperation</u>. While some foreign companies have been willing to invest in China despite the lack of adequate IP protection in order to take advantage of lower production costs, venture <u><mark>capitalists have been</mark> generally <strong><mark>reluctant to invest</mark> financial resources</strong> in Chinese businesses and high tech companies have reduced Chinese accessibility to latest technology</u>. As <u><mark>China</mark> increasingly <mark>depends on</mark> gaining access <mark>global resources</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>IP protection will become more important</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>strict IP enforcement <mark>will</mark> also <mark>benefit domestic companies</mark> and consumers</u>. While beneficial to China in the short run, <u><mark>piracy has</mark> had <strong><mark>unsettling long-term effects</strong> on the Chinese</mark> domestic <mark>economy</u></mark>. Some estimates indicate that up to 80 percent of Chinese counterfeit products are knockoffs of Chinese brands. <u>The piracy of domestic products creates an environment of suspicion and distrust and <strong><mark>curbs investment, innovation, and cooperation</u></strong></mark>. In addition, the costs retailers incur in combating piracy are ultimately reflected in <u>higher prices of brand name products</u> and lower accessibility of original products to Chinese consumers. <u>The more that Chinese businesses turn to innovation and services rather than manufacturing, the more Chinese consumers will additionally become creative producers and stakeholders in IP reform</u>. For these reasons, Chinese businesses have started to demand reforms to strengthen IP enforcement within China and a handful of businesses have ventured into foreign courts to protect their intellectual property rights abroad. <u>As China continues to transition from a developing nation to a more sophisticated global economy, <mark>the <strong>stage is being set for incentives to favor stronger IP enforcement</u></strong></mark>. As it approaches its 2012 leadership turnover, the <u>Chinese government has acknowledged the growing importance of IP reform in achieving its economic goals</u>. The government has recently employed awareness campaigns and propaganda to make its commitment to IP reform as visible as current infringement. Two ambitious plans have been announced in the past few years: the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2008 and the National Patent Development Strategy for 2011-2020 in 2010. <u>Intellectual Property Reform was also a conspicuous topic addressed by Xi Jinping</u>, current Chinese Vice President and likely future state president and Chinese Communist Party general secretary, in his February 2012 visit to Washington. In a planned written response to the Washington Post, Xi stated, “We have taken active steps to meet legitimate U.S. concerns over IPR [intellectual-property rights] protection and trade imbalance, and we will continue to do so.” While <u><mark>Chinese government announcements</u></mark> and Xi’s political sound bite <u>are certainly no guarantee of change, they identify IPR as an area of development, <mark>underscor</mark>ing its <strong><mark>presence on the CCP agenda</u></strong></mark>. Unlike <u><strong><mark>pressures</strong></mark> from foreign nations and international organizations which have <mark>only a limited effect</mark> on Chinese enforcement in practice</u>, the CCP is woven into every level of legal practice in China. Should the CCP choose to make enforcement a priority (and the economic climate indicates that it will), we can have confidence that IPR reform will be undertaken. Temporary Setbacks on the Road to Ultimate Reform: While IP enforcement seems inevitable in the long run, the <u><strong><mark>immediate future is less certain</u></strong></mark>. The Chinese government’s recent zeal for intellectual property protection and current reality offer a sharp and interesting contrast. In 2011, <u>China surpassed the U.S. to file more patents in 2011 than any other country</u>. Similar trends apply to trademarks; in 2010, 1.07 million trademark applications were filed in China, the most in the world for the ninth consecutive year. China currently serves simultaneously as the world’s source of the most annual patent and trademark filings and the most widespread IP infringement. This contrast has also been highlighted through propaganda. In 2006, a Beijing Higher People’s Court affirmed a judgment in a suit brought by five luxury brands (Prada, Chanel, Louis Vuitton, Gucci and Burberry) against landlords of China’s “Silk Market” for condoning IP infringement. The Silk Market, housed a six-story building, is a famous Beijing tourist attraction where customers haggle to purchase predominantly counterfeit goods. The court judgment, which imposed damages equivalent to about $2,500 per plaintiff against the landlord, was recognized by China’s Supreme People’s Court as one of the “Top Ten” IP cases decided that year. The damages imposed by the court did little to deter counterfeiting, and the Silk Market remains a site of flagrant infringement (and ongoing law suits). Last year a banner was hung in the market’s entryway; it states, “Protect Intellectual Property Rights, Be Law-Abiding Vendors,” <u>offering a picture of the <strong><mark>rift between</mark> the <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>ideal and current reality</mark>. </u></strong>Nonetheless, <u><strong><mark>signs of change are conspicuous</u></strong></mark>. IP rights suits are becoming more affordable and more socially acceptable and increasing numbers of IPR cases are filed in China every year (in 2009, 30,626 cases were filed in local courts, a 25 percent increase from 2008). Cases like the Apple/Proview trademark conflict and the Pfizer Viagra patent case have gained widespread public attention. <u>Due to the development of the Chinese economy, the struggle over IP protection is shifting from the international to the domestic realm</u>. Chinese businesses are compiling IP portfolios and beginning to realize the economic benefits of protection. Today, approximately 95 percent of IP cases in China are disputes between two Chinese companies. If current economic trends continue, as in the Han and Tang dynasties, the interests of the state will overlap once again with intellectual property protection: this time around in terms of protection of individual rights rather than preservation of dynastic hierarchy. While the development of adequate enforcement mechanisms will take time, the <u><strong><mark>incentives</strong> will</mark> </u>eventually <u><strong><mark>favor the Chinese government</mark> fully opening its market to foreign companies by <mark>taking IP enforcement seriously</u></strong>, <u><strong>opening the door</strong> to</mark> more extensive</u> <u><strong><mark>judicial reform</u></strong></mark> in general. <u><strong>END OF THE ARTICLE</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | IP conditions | 1,559,198 | 8 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,110 | The plan allows the U.S. to strengthen its credibility without colliding with China. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of U S policy toward Northeast Asia. When uncertain about an adversary's motives or when facing a state with mixed motives a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies Maintaining and enhancing U.S. commitments to the region would provide some of the necessary balance in the overall policy of the U S These components of U.S. policy would be necessary and appropriate even if China were unwilling to make the types of concessions discussed but they would become even more important in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the U S to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies to help accomplish this, the U S could commit additional forces to the region, forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall U.S. military capabilities, and increase the integration of alliance military planning. These measures would provide the additional benefits of helping to offset increases in China's military power and to sustain the grand bargain by enhancing the U.S. ability to deter China from breaking the agreement increased U.S. capabilities would likely appear threatening to China. But this danger would be reduced by America's ending its commitment to Taiwan because a U.S. buildup would no longer threaten this vital Chinese interest and would therefore be more clearly intended only to defend U.S. allies. If China wants to push the U S out of the East Asia, then it would be strongly opposed to, and provoked by, these measures. In this case, given the priority that U.S. grand strategy places on preserving the United States' alliances in East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security | A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components These components of U.S. policy become even more important in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the U S to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies the U S could commit additional forces forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall capabilities, and increase integration of alliance military planning. These measures would sustain the grand bargain by enhancing the U.S. ability to deter China from breaking the agreement a U.S. buildup would no longer threaten this vital Chinese interest | A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of the United States' policy toward Northeast Asia. When uncertain about an adversary's motives or when facing a state with mixed motives—a combination of security seeking and greed—a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies.107 Maintaining and enhancing U.S. commitments to the region would provide some of the necessary balance in the overall policy of the United States. These components of U.S. policy would be necessary and appropriate even if China were unwilling to make the types of concessions discussed above, but they would become even more important in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the United States to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies. As already discussed, to help accomplish this, the United States could commit additional forces to the region, forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall U.S. military capabilities, and increase the integration of alliance military planning. These measures would provide the additional benefits of helping to offset increases in China's military power and to sustain the grand bargain by enhancing the U.S. ability to deter China from breaking the agreement. There is a potential downside, however: increased U.S. capabilities would likely appear threatening to China. But this danger would be reduced by America's ending its commitment to Taiwan because a U.S. buildup would no longer threaten this vital Chinese interest and would therefore be more clearly intended only to defend U.S. allies. If, however, China wants to push the United States out of the East Asia, then it would be strongly opposed to, and provoked by, these measures. In this case, though, given the priority that U.S. grand strategy places on preserving the United States' alliances in East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security. | 1,988 | <h4>The plan allows the U.S. to strengthen its credibility <u>without</u> colliding with China. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u><mark>A grand bargain would not constitute the <strong>entirety</strong> of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components</mark> of</u> the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates' <u>policy toward Northeast Asia. When uncertain about an adversary's motives or when facing a state with mixed motives</u>—a combination of security seeking and greed—<u>a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies</u>.107 <u>Maintaining and enhancing U.S. commitments to the region would provide some of the necessary balance in the overall policy of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>These components of U.S. policy</mark> would be necessary and appropriate even if China were unwilling to make the types of concessions discussed</u> above, <u>but they would <mark>become <strong>even more important</strong> in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies</u></mark>. As already discussed, <u>to help accomplish this, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could commit additional forces</mark> to the region, <mark>forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall</mark> U.S. military <mark>capabilities, and increase</mark> the <mark>integration of alliance military planning. These measures would</mark> provide the additional benefits of helping to offset increases in China's military power and to <mark>sustain the grand bargain by enhancing the U.S. ability to <strong>deter China from breaking the agreement</u></strong></mark>. There is a potential downside, however: <u>increased U.S. capabilities would likely appear threatening to China. But this danger would be reduced by America's ending its commitment to Taiwan because <mark>a U.S. buildup would <strong>no longer threaten</strong> this vital Chinese interest</mark> and would therefore be more clearly intended only to defend U.S. allies. If</u>, however, <u>China wants to push the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>out of the East Asia, then it would be strongly opposed to, and provoked by, these measures. In this case,</u> though, <u>given the priority that U.S. grand strategy places on preserving the United States' alliances in East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security</u>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Credibility” | 69,187 | 345 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,111 | The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action | null | About debate | The Debater’s Guide
each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. | null | Definition of should
Ericson ‘03
(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. | 1,453 | <h4>The <u>text of the resolution</u> calls for debate on hypothetical government action</h4><p>About debate</p><p><strong>Definition of should</p><p>Ericson ‘03</p><p></strong>(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., <u>The Debater’s Guide</u>, Third Edition, p. 4)</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u>each topic contains certain key elements</u>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions<u>. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt</u> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u>the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should</u>—the first part of a verb phrase <u>that urges action</u>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. <u>For example, should adopt</u> here <u><strong>means to put a</u></strong> program or <u><strong>policy into action though governmental means</u></strong>. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u>The <strong>entire debate</strong> is about whether something ought to occur.</u> What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,149 | 3,809 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,112 | China econ collapse causes nuke war | Kaminski 7 | Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of Threats Central European Perspective”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58) | an economic crisis in China would have serious global repercussions A hotbed of conflict is Taiwan's status Economic recession could lead to a military crisis The likelihood of global escalation is high as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and the US clash in the region | economic crisis in China have global repercussions hotbed is Taiwan's status recession lead to military crisis likelihood of global escalation is high, as Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, US clash | As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region. | 1,301 | <h4>China econ collapse causes nuke war</h4><p><strong>Kaminski 7</strong> (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of Threats Central European Perspective”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)</p><p>As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear <u>an <mark>economic crisis in China</u></mark>. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis <u>would <mark>have </mark>serious <mark>global repercussions</u></mark>. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). <u>A</u> potential <u><mark>hotbed</mark> of conflict <mark>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>Taiwan's status</u></mark>. <u>Economic <mark>recession</u></mark> and the related destabilization of internal policies <u>could <mark>lead to </mark>a</u> political, or even <u><mark>military crisis</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>likelihood of</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>global escalation</u></strong></mark> of the conflict <u><mark>is high</u>, <u>as </mark>the interests of <mark>Russia, China, Japan, Australia and</u>,</mark> first and foremost, <u>the <mark>US clash </mark>in the region</u>.</p> | 1NC | null | IP conditions | 161,538 | 27 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,113 | Korean war causes extinction | Hayes and Green 10 | Hayes and Green 10 (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf) | The consequences are serious for the whole international community At worst there is the possibility of nuclear attack whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities key population centres are within range Japan is likely to come within North Korean range Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years A decrease in rainfall would follow nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers respond could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence including loss-of-control over warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states | nuclear attack by intention, miscalculation, or accident, leading to War exchange would result in warming hundreds of millions die from hunger impacts on the global economy nuclear breakout geopolitical turbulence and chain-reaction affects | The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. | 3,324 | <h4>Korean war causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Hayes and Green 10<u></strong> (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)</p><p>The consequences</u> of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, <u>are serious</u>, not only for the Northeast Asian region but <u>for the whole international community</u>. <u>At worst</u>, <u>there is the possibility of <mark>nuclear attack</u></mark>1, <u>whether <mark>by <strong>intention</strong>, <strong>miscalculation</strong>, or</mark> merely <strong><mark>accident</strong>, leading to</mark> the resumption of Korean <mark>War</mark> hostilities</u>. On the Korean Peninsula itself, <u><strong>key</u></strong> <u>population centres are</u> well <u>within</u> short or medium <u>range</u> missiles. The whole of <u>Japan is likely to come within North Korean</u> missile <u>range</u>. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. <u>Even a limited nuclear <mark>exchange would result in </mark>a <strong>holocaust of unprecedented proportions</u></strong>. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that <u>even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global <mark>warming</u></mark>. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the <u>soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years</u>.3 <u>In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years</u>. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. <u>A decrease in rainfall</u> over the continents <u>would</u> also <u>follow</u>…The period of <u>nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production</u> than 5% and it will continue for many years...<u><mark>hundreds of millions</mark> of people will <mark>die from hunger</u></mark>…To make matters even worse, such amounts of <u>smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone</u>.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. <u>Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on <mark>impacts on the <strong>global economy</strong> </mark>via <strong>ecological and food insecurity</strong>, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers</u>, especially the nuclear weapons states <u>respond</u> to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, <u>could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships</u>5, <u>with subsequent <strong><mark>nuclear breakout</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>geopolitical turbulence</u></strong></mark>, <u>including</u> possible <u>loss-of-control over</u> fissile material or <u>warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, <mark>and</mark> aftermath <strong><mark>chain-reaction affects</strong></mark> involving other potential proliferant states</u>. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.</p> | 1nc v glancy | 4 | null | 1,507 | 413 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,114 | Nothing about the plan precludes other policies that maintain credibility. | Glaser 16 | Glaser 16 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse) | A rejoinder is that merely proposing a grand bargain would be risky for the U S and therefore its low probability of success makes it a bad policy option. The risks concern the potential damage to U S credibility however, the U S could adopt a variety of policies that would largely preserve its credibility Such options would be available to the U S while it pursued the grand bargain and even afterward, if the bargain was not attained | the U S could adopt a variety of policies that would largely preserve its credibility Such options would be available to the U S while it pursued the grand bargain and even afterward, if the bargain was not attained | An obvious rejoinder is that merely proposing a grand bargain would be risky for the United States and, therefore, its low probability of success makes it a bad policy option. The risks concern the potential damage to the United States’ credibility for protecting its interests. As I argue in the article, however, the United States could adopt a variety of policies that would largely preserve its credibility—among them, continuing to reinforce its alliance with Japan and to cooperate with other security partners in the region. Such options would be available to the United States while it pursued the grand bargain and even afterward, if the bargain was not attained. | 672 | <h4>Nothing about the plan precludes <u>other policies</u> that maintain credibility. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 16</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p><u>A</u>n obvious <u>rejoinder is that merely proposing a grand bargain would be risky for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and</u>, <u>therefore</u>, <u>its low probability of success makes it a bad policy option. The risks concern the potential damage to</u> the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates’ <u>credibility</u> for protecting its interests. As I argue in the article, <u>however, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could adopt a variety of policies that would largely preserve its credibility</u></mark>—among them, continuing to reinforce its alliance with Japan and to cooperate with other security partners in the region. <u><mark>Such options would be available to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>while it pursued the grand bargain and even afterward, if the bargain was not attained</u></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Kills U.S. Credibility” | 414,561 | 10 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,115 | Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Japan on whether or not the United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by providing all funds necessary to create a joint technical committee with the mandate of encouraging and coordinating joint research for the purposes of international cooperative earthquake engineering and hazard mitigation The United States federal government will advocate the proposal during consultation and abide by the outcome of consultation. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Japan on whether or not the United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by providing all funds necessary to create a joint technical committee with the mandate of encouraging and coordinating joint research for the purposes of international cooperative earthquake engineering and hazard mitigation The United States federal government will advocate the proposal during consultation and abide by the outcome of consultation. </h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | Consult japan | 1,560,669 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,116 | “Its” is possessive, which means engagement must be done by the US federal government in DC | null | Its = relates to USFG | Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). | null | USFG = in DC, not states or any plural sense(AT: = people)
Updegrave 91 (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm)
More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct. | 1,036 | <h4> “Its” is possessive, which means engagement must be done by the US federal government in DC</h4><p>Its = relates to USFG</p><p>USFG = in DC, not states or any plural sense(AT: = people)</p><p><strong>Updegrave 91</strong> (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm)</p><p>More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. <u>Note the <strong>singular possessive</strong> pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "<strong>United States" </strong>as a corporation domiciled in the <strong>D</strong>istrict of <strong>C</strong>olumbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). </u>The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct. </p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 2,804 | 603 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,117 | Next off is the CSCAP CP | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Next off is the CSCAP CP </h4> | 1NC | null | Track 2 | 1,560,670 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,118 | The United States federal government should diplomatically engage the People's Republic of China by proposing a negotiation over the security measures of a staged framework agreement, including, but not limited to, reciprocal reductions in military commitments over the Chinese Taipei and implement the negotiated framework. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>The United States federal government should diplomatically engage the People's Republic of China by proposing a negotiation over the security measures of a staged framework agreement, including, but not limited to, reciprocal reductions in military commitments over the Chinese Taipei and implement the negotiated framework.</h4></u> | 1nc v glancy | 5 | null | 1,560,671 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,119 | No military advantage link — the plan doesn’t increase China’s power. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | A potential threat to U.S. security is that territorial accommodation could reduce U.S. military capabilities One possibility is that U.S. accommodation would free up military forces and investments that China now commits to coercing and if necessary attacking Taiwan, which would in turn enable China to shift resource to better challenge the U.S. ability to protect the East Asian SLOCs and possibly beyond
This danger is smaller than critics suggest If China decides to fully pursue more ambitious missions, it would have to make large investments that would likely dwarf the amount it is spending on Taiwan-specific missions whether China eventually gains control of Taiwan is unlikely to be decisive in determining China's ability to invest in efforts to control the South China and East China Sea SLOCs, and beyond it is likely that Chinese capabilities dedicated to Taiwan will eventually become so effective that Beijing will be able to reallocate some of its future military investment to other missions ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could reduce China's determination to pursue more challenging distant naval missions because the U S will not interrupt these SLOCs, except possibly during a severe crisis or major war. Eliminating the possibility of war over Taiwan would therefore greatly reduce Beijing's incentives to make investments in these missions one should not exaggerate the security risks of being unable to fully control these SLOCs. The U S does not need to control the Strait of Malacca and the East Asian SLOCs to enable shipping to reach Japan during a war with China. Instead, bypass routes could allow shipping to reach oil ports on Japan's east coast Also, the ability to deny China use of these SLOCs would be sufficient to preserve the U.S. ability to coerce China. | This danger is smaller than critics suggest If China decides to pursue ambitious missions it would have to make large investments that dwarf spending whether China gains Taiwan is unlikely to be decisive in determining China's efforts to control the S and E C S SLOCs ending U.S. commitment could reduce China's determination to pursue more challenging distant naval missions because the U S will not interrupt these SLOCs The U S does not need to control the Strait of Malacca and the East Asian SLOCs to enable shipping to reach Japan bypass routes could allow shipping to reach Japan's east coast the ability to deny China use of SLOCs would be sufficient | A second potential threat to U.S. security is that territorial accommodation could reduce U.S. military capabilities. Although numerous analysts suggest that China's control of Taiwan would have this effect, little sustained analysis of this issue is publically available. One possibility is that U.S. accommodation would free up military forces and investments that China now commits to coercing and if necessary attacking Taiwan, which would in turn enable China to shift resource to better challenge the U.S. ability to protect the East Asian SLOCs and possibly beyond.82 According to this argument, because the Taiwan mission has absorbed the vast majority of the Chinese army's force modernization and organizational training,83 the resources made available for other missions would be large.84
This danger is smaller than critics suggest, however. If China decides to fully pursue more ambitious missions, it would have to make large investments that would likely dwarf the amount it is spending on Taiwan-specific missions. Consequently, whether China eventually gains control of Taiwan is unlikely to be decisive in determining China's ability to invest in efforts to control the South China and East China Sea SLOCs, and beyond. Related, it is likely that Chinese capabilities dedicated to Taiwan will eventually become so effective that Beijing will be able to reallocate some of its future military investment to other missions.85 Moreover, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could reduce China's determination to pursue more challenging distant naval missions because the United States will not interrupt these SLOCs, except possibly during a severe crisis or major war. Eliminating the possibility of war over Taiwan would therefore greatly reduce Beijing's incentives to make investments in these missions. China could, however, pursue greatly expanded power projection capabilities for a variety of other reasons,86 including worst-case planning that imagines the United States will interrupt its SLOCs under even the most unlikely conditions, a Mahanian view of naval power that connects “commercial health with naval primacy,”87 or the belief that superpower status requires power projection capabilities.88 Finally, one should not exaggerate the security risks of being unable to fully control these SLOCs. The United States does not need to control the Strait of Malacca and the East Asian SLOCs to enable shipping to reach Japan during a war with China. Instead, bypass routes could allow shipping to reach oil ports on Japan's east coast.89 Also, the ability to deny China use of these SLOCs would be sufficient to preserve the U.S. ability to coerce China. | 2,680 | <h4>No <u>military advantage</u> link — the plan doesn’t increase China’s power. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u>A</u> second <u>potential threat to U.S. security is that territorial accommodation could reduce U.S. military capabilities</u>. Although numerous analysts suggest that China's control of Taiwan would have this effect, little sustained analysis of this issue is publically available. <u>One possibility is that U.S. accommodation would free up military forces and investments that China now commits to coercing and if necessary attacking Taiwan, which would in turn enable China to shift resource to better challenge the U.S. ability to protect the East Asian SLOCs and possibly beyond</u>.82 According to this argument, because the Taiwan mission has absorbed the vast majority of the Chinese army's force modernization and organizational training,83 the resources made available for other missions would be large.84</p><p><u><mark>This danger is smaller than critics suggest</u></mark>, however. <u><mark>If China decides to</mark> fully <mark>pursue</mark> more <mark>ambitious missions</mark>, <mark>it would have to make large investments that</mark> would likely <mark>dwarf</mark> the amount it is <mark>spending</mark> on Taiwan-specific missions</u>. Consequently, <u><mark>whether China</mark> eventually <mark>gains</mark> control of <mark>Taiwan is <strong>unlikely to be decisive</strong> in determining China's</mark> ability to invest in <mark>efforts to control the S</mark>outh China <mark>and E</mark>ast <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <mark>SLOCs</mark>, and beyond</u>. Related, <u>it is likely that Chinese capabilities dedicated to Taiwan will eventually become so effective that Beijing will be able to reallocate some of its future military investment to other missions</u>.85 Moreover, <u><mark>ending</mark> the <mark>U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan <mark>could reduce China's determination to pursue more challenging distant naval missions because the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>will not interrupt these SLOCs</mark>, except possibly during a severe crisis or major war. Eliminating the possibility of war over Taiwan would therefore greatly reduce Beijing's incentives to make investments in these missions</u>. China could, however, pursue greatly expanded power projection capabilities for a variety of other reasons,86 including worst-case planning that imagines the United States will interrupt its SLOCs under even the most unlikely conditions, a Mahanian view of naval power that connects “commercial health with naval primacy,”87 or the belief that superpower status requires power projection capabilities.88 Finally, <u>one should not exaggerate the security risks of being unable to fully control these SLOCs. <mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>does not need to control the Strait of Malacca and the East Asian SLOCs to enable shipping to reach Japan</mark> during a war with China. Instead, <mark>bypass routes could allow shipping to reach</mark> oil ports on <mark>Japan's east coast</u></mark>.89 <u>Also, <mark>the ability to deny China use of</mark> these <mark>SLOCs would be sufficient</mark> to preserve the U.S. ability to coerce China.</p></u> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Gives China Military Advantages” | 66,301 | 85 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,120 | Prior, binding consultation on largescale policy changes towards China is crucial for maintaining the effectiveness and cohesiveness of the US-Japan alliance | Matake and Przystup 15 | Matake and Przystup 15
Kamiya Matake: Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR (Japan Forum on International Relations), James Przystup: Senior Research Fellow, INSS, U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage: As a Protector of a Liberal, Open, Rule-based International Order in the "Era of Smart Power,” http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study/201506.pdf, June 2015 | Avoiding Unilateral Moves the two allies have to tighten their cooperation and cohesiveness both hard and soft the two countries must avoid making unilateral moves there have been cases where the United States made bold unilateral moves to change their policies toward China without sufficient communication and coordination with the other ally beforehand These have created a sense of distrust In the face of the rise of China it is more important than ever for the two allies to cooperate in order to maintain the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Going forward, Japan and the United States need to pay close attention so as to prevent such situations from arising with regard to security issues that both the allies have concerns for. | two allies have to tighten their cohesiveness must avoid making unilateral moves e U S made unilateral moves toward China without sufficient coordination created a sense of distrust In the face of the rise of China more important than ever to maintain effectiveness of the alliance | 6) Avoiding Unilateral Moves As explained above, in order to realize the optimal scenario of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the two allies have to tighten their cooperation and cohesiveness, more than ever before, in both the aspects of hard and soft power. On the other hand, this also means that the two countries must avoid making unilateral moves on the security issues that either of the countries have strong concerns for. In the long history of the U.S.-Japan alliance to date, there have been cases where either Japan or the United States made bold unilateral moves to change their policies on issues that included policies toward China and North Korea, without sufficient communication and coordination with the other ally beforehand. These instances have created a sense of distrust in the other party. In the face of the rise of newly emerging countries such as China, it is becoming more important than ever for the two allies to cooperate in order to maintain the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Going forward, Japan and the United States need to pay close attention so as to prevent such situations from arising with regard to security issues that both the allies have concerns for. | 1,200 | <h4>Prior, binding consultation on largescale policy changes towards China is <u>crucial</u> for <u>maintaining the effectiveness and cohesiveness</u><strong> of the US-Japan alliance</h4><p>Matake and Przystup 15</p><p></strong>Kamiya Matake: Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR (Japan Forum on International Relations), James Przystup: Senior Research Fellow, INSS, U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage: As a Protector of a Liberal, Open, Rule-based International Order in the "Era of Smart Power,” http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study/201506.pdf, June 2015</p><p>6) <u>Avoiding Unilateral Moves</u> As explained above, in order to realize the optimal scenario of the U.S.-Japan alliance, <u>the <mark>two allies have to <strong>tighten</strong> their</mark> cooperation and <strong><mark>cohesiveness</u></strong></mark>, more than ever before, in <u>both</u> the aspects of <u>hard and soft</u> power. On the other hand, this also means that <u>the two countries <mark>must <strong>avoid</strong> making <strong>unilateral moves</u></strong></mark> on the security issues that either of the countries have strong concerns for. In the long history of the U.S.-Japan alliance to date, <u>there have been cases where</u> either Japan or <u>th<mark>e <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>made</mark> bold <strong><mark>unilateral moves</strong></mark> to change their policies</u> on issues that included policies <u><mark>toward <strong>China</u></strong></mark> and North Korea, <u><mark>without sufficient</mark> communication and <strong><mark>coordination</strong></mark> with the other ally beforehand</u>. <u>These</u> instances <u>have <mark>created a sense of <strong>distrust</u></strong></mark> in the other party. <u><mark>In the face of the rise of</u></mark> newly emerging countries such as <u><mark>China</u></mark>, <u>it is</u> becoming <u><mark>more <strong>important</strong> than ever</mark> for the two allies to cooperate in order <mark>to maintain</mark> the <strong><mark>effectiveness</strong> of the</mark> U.S.-Japan <mark>alliance</mark>. Going forward, Japan and the United States need to pay close attention so as to prevent such situations from arising with regard to security issues that both the allies have concerns for. </p></u> | Earthquakes neg | null | Consult japan | 178,479 | 2 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,121 | Text: The United States federal government should | null | -propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of offering a sectoral bilateral investment treaty on biotechnology to the People's Republic of China. | null | null | -encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and
-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile. | 218 | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should</h4><p>-propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of offering a sectoral bilateral investment treaty on biotechnology to the People's Republic of China.</p><p>-encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and</p><p>-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile.</p> | 1NC | null | Track 2 | 1,559,478 | 8 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,122 | Engagement requires direct state to state contact in attempt to influence the behavior of the target country -- it’s about the means | Resnick, 1 | Resnick, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete) | I define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural a list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS diplomatic recognition Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions Summit meetings MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges . Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the policy behavior of the target state This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends | null | A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions. | 4,457 | <h4>Engagement requires direct state to state contact in attempt to influence the behavior of the target country -- it’s about the means</h4><p><strong>Resnick, 1 </strong>– Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)</p><p>A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, <u>I</u> propose that we<u> define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the</u> comprehensive <u>establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural</u>). The following is <u>a</u> brief <u>list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS </u>Extension of <u>diplomatic recognition</u>; normalization of diplomatic relations <u>Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions</u> and regimes <u>Summit meetings</u> and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa <u>MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials</u> of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa <u>Arms transfers Military aid</u> <u>and cooperation</u> <u>Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants</u> <u>CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges</u>(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains<u>. <strong>Engagement is a</strong> quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the</u> domestic and/or foreign <u><strong>policy behavior of the target state</u></strong>. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. <u>This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of <strong>means rather than ends</u></strong>, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.</p> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,566,859 | 406 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,123 | Using ROC causes war and devastates relations---turns the whole case | Yee ‘15 | Yee ‘15 | Zhu mentioned the “Republic of China” There is a strict understanding that Taiwan will never use that name when dealing with mainland China in an official capacity. China has even threatened to attack Taiwan if it does use that name. There has been a “92 Consensus” For the CCP, the one China is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is a part of the PRC. For the KMT, the one China is the Republic of China (ROC) while the Chinese mainland under the CCP’s rule is a part of ROC. In reaching the 92 consensus each has made great concession. PRC admits Taiwan’s rule by Taiwanese people and will not take Taiwan by force as long as Taiwan admits that there is only one China. China cannot take Taiwan by force as the US will defend it as long as Taiwan does not seek independence If there were two Chinas, i.e. the PRC and ROC both as independent states, Taiwan would be able to have diplomatic relations with the US, EU members, Japan and most other countries in the world Taiwan is unable to be independent as the PRC will attack it by military force | “Republic of China never use that name when dealing with mainland China China has threatened to attack Taiwan if it use that name In reaching the 92 consensus PRC admits Taiwan’s rule by Taiwanese people China cannot take Taiwan by force as the US will defend it If there were two Chinas Taiwan would be able to have diplomatic relations Taiwan is unable to be independent as the PRC will attack it by military force | [Chan Kai. “Taiwan’s leader uses term “Republic of China” to mainland China’s leader Xi Jinping, despite threats by China to invade Taiwan if they ever use that name” chinadailymail.com/2015/05/09/taiwans-leader-uses-term-republic-of-china-to-mainland-chinas-leader-xi-jinping-despite-threats-by-china-to-invade-taiwan-if-they-ever-use-that-name/ //GBS-JV]
Taiwan’s United Daily News says in its report on the meeting between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s KMT leader Eric Chu today that Zhu mentioned the “Republic of China” in the face of Xi Jinping. There is a strict understanding that Taiwan will never use that name when dealing with mainland China in an official capacity. China has even threatened to attack Taiwan if it does use that name. Zhu played the trick to mention the “Republic of China” by saying, “I recall that 100 years ago, Dr. Sun Yet-sen overthrew the imperial system and founded the Republic of China.” Xi could not oppose that historical fact. According to various Taiwan and Hong Kong media reports, Taiwanese people are happy that Xi did not respond to the mentioning of the Republic of China when Chu mentioned it. There has been a “92 Consensus” between the CCP and Taiwan’s ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which means that both China and Taiwan admit that there is only one China but each has its own interpretation of the “one China.” For the CCP, the one China is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is a part of the PRC. For the KMT, the one China is the Republic of China (ROC) while the Chinese mainland under the CCP’s rule is a part of ROC. In reaching the 92 consensus in 1992 between the two sides, each has made great concession. PRC admits Taiwan’s rule by Taiwanese people and will not take Taiwan by force as long as Taiwan admits that there is only one China. In fact, China cannot take Taiwan by force as the US will defend it as long as Taiwan does not seek independence. Taiwan has made the concession that it cannot have diplomatic relations with those that have recognised the PRC as the one China. It now has diplomatic relations with only about two dozen small countries [and the Holy See, representing 1.2 billion Catholics]. If there were two Chinas, i.e. the PRC and ROC both as independent states, Taiwan would be able to have diplomatic relations with the US, EU members, Japan and most other countries in the world. Taiwan is unable to be independent as the PRC will attack it by military force while the US would not defend it. | 2,539 | <h4><strong>Using ROC causes war and devastates relations---turns the whole case</h4><p>Yee ‘15</p><p></strong>[Chan Kai. “Taiwan’s leader uses term “Republic of China” to mainland China’s leader Xi Jinping, despite threats by China to invade Taiwan if they ever use that name” chinadailymail.com/2015/05/09/taiwans-leader-uses-term-republic-of-china-to-mainland-chinas-leader-xi-jinping-despite-threats-by-china-to-invade-taiwan-if-they-ever-use-that-name/ //GBS-JV]</p><p>Taiwan’s United Daily News says in its report on the meeting between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s KMT leader Eric Chu today that <u>Zhu mentioned the <mark>“Republic of China</mark>”</u> in the face of Xi Jinping. <u>There is a strict understanding that Taiwan will <strong><mark>never use that name</u></strong> <u><strong>when dealing with mainland China</u></strong></mark> <u>in an official capacity. <mark>China has</mark> even <mark>threatened to <strong>attack Taiwan</strong> if it <strong></mark>does <mark>use that name</strong></mark>. </u>Zhu played the trick to mention the “Republic of China” by saying, “I recall that 100 years ago, Dr. Sun Yet-sen overthrew the imperial system and founded the Republic of China.” Xi could not oppose that historical fact. According to various Taiwan and Hong Kong media reports, Taiwanese people are happy that Xi did not respond to the mentioning of the Republic of China when Chu mentioned it. <u>There has been a “92 Consensus”</u> between the CCP and Taiwan’s ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which means that both China and Taiwan admit that there is only one China but each has its own interpretation of the “one China.” <u>For the CCP, the one China is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is a part of the PRC. For the KMT, the one China is the Republic of China (ROC) while the Chinese mainland under the CCP’s rule is a part of ROC. <mark>In reaching the 92 consensus</u></mark> in 1992 between the two sides, <u>each has made great concession.</u> <u><strong><mark>PRC admits Taiwan’s rule by Taiwanese people</mark> and will not take Taiwan by force as long as Taiwan admits that there is only one China.</u></strong> In fact, <u><mark>China cannot take Taiwan by force as the US will defend it</mark> as long as Taiwan does not seek independence</u>. Taiwan has made the concession that it cannot have diplomatic relations with those that have recognised the PRC as the one China. It now has diplomatic relations with only about two dozen small countries [and the Holy See, representing 1.2 billion Catholics]. <u><strong><mark>If there were two Chinas</mark>, i.e. the PRC and ROC both as independent states, <mark>Taiwan would be able to have diplomatic relations</mark> with the US, EU members, Japan and most other countries in the world</u></strong>. <u><mark>Taiwan is unable to be independent as the PRC will attack it by military force</mark> </u>while the US would not defend it.</p> | 1nc v glancy | 5 | null | 1,196,251 | 3 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,124 | Control of Taiwan doesn’t matter for China’s A2/AD strategy. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | Available analyses provide little reason to worry that possession of Taiwan would significantly increase China's military reach or its ability to project power Taiwan plays an important role in enabling the U S to form effective acoustic barriers through which Chinese submarines must pass in transiting” into the Philippine Sea The impact of losing this anti-submarine warfare barrier might not be large because China increasingly has a variety of other ways to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups and undermine their effectiveness, such as antiship cruise missiles that can be launched from a diverse array of platforms systems designed to counter U.S. space and cyber capabilities, and an emerging antiship ballistic missile capability | analyses provide little reason to worry possession of Taiwan would significantly increase China's military reach or ability to project power The impact of losing this a s w barrier might not be large because China has other ways to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups such as antiship cruise missiles systems designed to counter U.S. space and cyber capabilities, and an antiship ballistic missile capability | Taiwan's geographic location creates another possible military danger by giving China the opportunity to deploy its forces further forward.90 For example, Chinese control of Taiwan would provide China's navy more direct access to the open Pacific, which might increase China's power project capabilities.91 Chinese analysts identify the importance of Taiwan for enabling China to “break through” the barrier created by Japan, including the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines.92 In a similar vein, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, of the U.S. Naval War College, argue: “Control of Taiwan … would allow the PLA to erect its own Great Wall at sea, giving Beijing some say over the exercise of foreign naval and military power in nearby seas and skies. … Analysts view Taiwan as the one geographic asset that can grant Chinese forces direct access to the Pacific. If the island is a guard tower in an offshore Great Wall, then its offensive value is unmatched.”93
Dissecting the strategic value of Taiwan requires assessing how Chinese control would influence China's ability to perform specific military missions. Available analyses provide little reason to worry that possession of Taiwan would significantly increase China's military reach or its ability to project power.94 Control of Taiwan would, however, enhance China's A2/AD capabilities by increasing its ability to send submarines into the Philippine Sea. Owen Coté explains that Taiwan plays an important role in enabling the United States “to form effective acoustic barriers through which Chinese [diesel attack submarines/guided missile diesel submarines] must pass in transiting” from the shallow waters along China's coast into the deep water of the Philippine Sea.95 This access is valuable because the United States plans to operate carrier battle groups in the Philippine Sea and Chinese diesel submarines would make these operations more difficult and riskier. The impact of losing this anti-submarine warfare barrier might not be large, however, because China increasingly has a variety of other ways to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups and undermine their effectiveness, such as antiship cruise missiles that can be launched from a diverse array of platforms (including guided missile diesel submarines), systems designed to counter U.S. space and cyber capabilities, and an emerging antiship ballistic missile capability.96 Nevertheless, U.S. carrier battle groups would experience some reduction in effectiveness. | 2,497 | <h4>Control of Taiwan <u>doesn’t matter</u> for China’s A2/AD strategy. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>Taiwan's geographic location creates another possible military danger by giving China the opportunity to deploy its forces further forward.90 For example, Chinese control of Taiwan would provide China's navy more direct access to the open Pacific, which might increase China's power project capabilities.91 Chinese analysts identify the importance of Taiwan for enabling China to “break through” the barrier created by Japan, including the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines.92 In a similar vein, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, of the U.S. Naval War College, argue: “Control of Taiwan … would allow the PLA to erect its own Great Wall at sea, giving Beijing some say over the exercise of foreign naval and military power in nearby seas and skies. … Analysts view Taiwan as the one geographic asset that can grant Chinese forces direct access to the Pacific. If the island is a guard tower in an offshore Great Wall, then its offensive value is unmatched.”93</p><p>Dissecting the strategic value of Taiwan requires assessing how Chinese control would influence China's ability to perform specific military missions. <u>Available <mark>analyses provide <strong>little reason to worry</strong></mark> that <mark>possession of Taiwan would significantly increase China's military reach or</mark> its <mark>ability to project power</u></mark>.94 Control of Taiwan would, however, enhance China's A2/AD capabilities by increasing its ability to send submarines into the Philippine Sea. Owen Coté explains that <u>Taiwan plays an important role in enabling the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates “<u>to form effective acoustic barriers through which Chinese</u> [diesel attack submarines/guided missile diesel <u>submarines</u>] <u>must pass in transiting”</u> from the shallow waters along China's coast <u>into the</u> deep water of the <u>Philippine Sea</u>.95 This access is valuable because the United States plans to operate carrier battle groups in the Philippine Sea and Chinese diesel submarines would make these operations more difficult and riskier. <u><mark>The impact of losing this a</mark>nti-<mark>s</mark>ubmarine <mark>w</mark>arfare <mark>barrier <strong>might not be large</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><mark>because China</mark> increasingly <mark>has</mark> a variety of <mark>other ways to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups</mark> and undermine their effectiveness, <mark>such as antiship cruise missiles</mark> that can be launched from a diverse array of platforms</u> (including guided missile diesel submarines), <u><mark>systems designed to counter U.S. space and cyber capabilities, and an</mark> emerging <mark>antiship ballistic missile capability</u></mark>.96 Nevertheless, U.S. carrier battle groups would experience some reduction in effectiveness.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “Plan Gives China Military Advantages” | 66,299 | 15 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,125 | Net benefit #1 is predictable limits---allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. The lack of a plan also means the affirmative can shift their advocacy in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text, which obviates negative arguments. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Net benefit #1 is <u>predictable limits</u>---allowing the affirmative to pick <u>any</u> grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. The lack of a plan also means the affirmative can <u>shift their advocacy</u> in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text, which obviates negative arguments.</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,672 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
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3,783,126 | Japan’s international strategy towards China and the US is at a crossroads – only consultation and prior assurance on engagement with China can reverse the current track towards Sino-Japanese war | Hughes 16 | Hughes 16 | , Summer 2016
Japan now shifting from its past hedging strategy vis-à-vis China towards hard balancing conditions that in the past ensured Japan could maintain a hedging strategy have deteriorated Japanese policymakers’ previous belief in their ability to read the potential malleability of Chinese intentions through political and economic engagement the rising domestic consensus in Japan is that China’s intentions, if readable at all, are now fundamentally malign towards Japan China’s military modernization is perceived as weakening the USA’s ability to police the global commons and restrain China’s encroachment of core Japanese security interests The overall consequence has indeed been Japan’s shifting, if incrementally and certainly not entirely relinquishing hedging, towards more incipient balancing behaviour. Japan’s hard balancing has taken the form Japan has thus found itself competing in a quiet arms race with China Alongside these efforts Japan has , redoubled its support for the US–Japan alliance to buttress the USA’s potential for balancing against China , Japan’s inching towards active balancing of China has significant implications for East Asian security, Japan’s balancing is certainly not yet complete irreversible and embedded in national grand strategy Japanese behaviour will be largely determined by the condition of the US–Japan alliance and fears over entrapment and abandonment Japan’s sense of being caught between a rising China and a US ally on which it has been so dependent, but with which its security interests do not always converge, will make for hesitancy in its security stance Japan’s impulse may be to react strongly at times to perceived Chinese security provocations, but it will lack the assurance of USA backing of this behaviour This will encourage Japan to act more autonomously the struggle between Pragmatists and Revisionists will continue, albeit with the latter likely to eventually triumph Japanese international strategy that is capable of being highly confrontational If an uncertain international security environment is combined with domestic Revisionism It may be ‘Resentful Realism’, driven by fear of China, lack of trust in the USA may generate impulses towards military action , Japan’s experimentation with active balancing may become a source of unpredictability and instability USA needs to reassure Japan that it will not be ‘passed over’ and its security interests overlooked in any possible strategic accommodation with China Japan will be labelled a security risk Sino–Japanese military clash may rise consequences for the regional security order will be disastrous. | Japan now shifting towards hard balancing conditions have deteriorated Japan competing in a quiet arms race with China Alongside efforts Japan has redoubled support for the alliance to buttress the USA’s potential for balancing against China Japan’s balancing is certainly not yet irreversible Japanese behaviour will be determined by the condition of the US–Japan alliance and fears over abandonment Japan’s sense of being caught between a rising China and a US ally with which its interests do not always converge, will make for hesitancy Japan’s impulse may be to react strongly will lack the assurance of US may generate impulses towards military action US needs to reassure Japan that it will not be ‘passed over’ and its interests overlooked in any accommodation with China Sino–Japanese military clash will be disastrous | Christopher W., Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in PAIS, Research Associate at Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, degrees from Universities of Oxford, Rochester, and Sheffield, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’ and Balancing China’s Rise,” http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#aff-1, Summer 2016
Conclusion: Japan’s Own Uncertain Strategic Intentions and “Resentful Realism” Japan can now be observed to be shifting from its past hedging strategy vis-à-vis China towards a strategy of active soft and incipient hard balancing. The key conditions that in the past ensured Japan could maintain a hedging strategy have deteriorated over the last decade, so initiating this shift. Japanese policymakers’ previous belief in their ability to read China’s intentions as benign has waned, as has their confidence in the potential malleability of Chinese intentions through political and economic engagement. Japan’s own domestic regime change, characterized by the rise of Revisionism and discontent with the status quo, has reinforced the impulse to avoid ‘underbalancing’. Indeed, the rising domestic consensus in Japan is that China’s intentions, if readable at all, are now fundamentally malign towards Japan. Most strikingly, Japanese policymakers no longer trust that the balance of offence–defence capabilities is in their favour, either internally or externally. China’s military modernization is perceived as set to overwhelm the JSDF’s defensive capabilities and as weakening the USA’s ability to police the global commons and restrain China’s encroachment of core Japanese security interests. The overall consequence has indeed been Japan’s shifting, if incrementally and certainly not entirely relinquishing hedging, towards more incipient balancing behaviour. Much of this balancing is ‘soft’ in orientation, apparent in efforts to check Chinese influence through strengthening partnerships with other East Asian states on China’s periphery that are equally concerned about the negative externalities of its rise. But another component of seeking to balance China globally is apparent in vigorous diplomatic activity and resource deals in Africa and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Japan’s hard balancing has taken the form of an emerging emphasis primarily on building up JSDF defensive capabilities while also considering the selective procurement of power projection capabilities that could serve collective self-defence and even offensive purposes. Japan has thus found itself competing in a quiet arms race with China in East Asia evocative of ‘normal’ balancing behaviour on a par with that of other states facing a similar external security environment. Alongside these internal efforts Japan has, of course, redoubled its support for the US–Japan alliance to buttress the USA’s potential for balancing against China. Japan’s identification as an incipient balancer presents a range of important conclusions in answer to the questions posed at the start of this article. First, the discussion in this article and recent evidence by virtue of Japan’s behaviour is cause for reexamination of the quaint consensus among Neo-realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism on the immobility of Japanese security policy. The very conditions contained in those perspectives, especially the former two, regarding a state’s potential disposition towards hedging now demand serious review in the case of Japan. This is not to say that these perspectives are fundamentally flawed, but rather that the conclusions and orthodoxy they give rise to are outmoded because they take insufficient account of new evidence. If given due consideration, these perspectives may have ample ability to point to and explain Japan’s initiation of balancing behaviour. These perspectives, therefore, need to abandon the comfort zone of their past orthodoxy and review the dynamism of Japan’s security policy if they are to retain their full explanatory utility with regard to Japan now and in the future. In particular, Neo-realism can afford to be bolder in asserting its perspective on Japan’s remilitarization of security policy, rather than readily ceding ground to the dominance of Constructivism and Liberalism. Secondly, and even more importantly, Japan’s inching towards active balancing of China has significant implications for East Asian security, although given the nature of the process of Japan’s shift they are not entirely clear. Japan’s move towards balancing is certainly not yet complete, irreversible, or fully revealed, and embedded in national grand strategy. As outlined earlier, the Yoshida Doctrine has proved a highly resilient grand strategy in the post-war period, and will not be abandoned lightly. The result is that Japan is demonstrating, and likely to continue to demonstrate, fluctuations between the Yoshida Doctrine and more active balancing behaviour. These fluctuations will, in turn, be driven by the development of the international and domestic determinants of Japan’s strategy as already outlined, and which are themselves amid a process of volatile change. Japan will be forced to react to variations in the benignity and malignity of China’s intentions and, just as importantly, Japanese behaviour will be largely determined by the condition of the US–Japan alliance and fears over entrapment and abandonment. Japan’s sense of being caught between a rising China and a US ally on which it has been so dependent, but with which its security interests do not always converge, will make for hesitancy in its security stance. Japan’s impulse may be to react strongly at times to perceived Chinese security provocations, but it will lack the assurance of USA backing of this behaviour. This will, on the whole, encourage Japan to act more autonomously when necessary. Hence, not only China, but also the USA, may find Japan a difficult security partner to deal with. Japanese unpredictability is and will be enhanced by the continuing changes to its domestic regime. The unwinding of the post-war system is not complete, and the struggle between Pragmatists and Revisionists will continue, albeit with the latter likely to eventually triumph. Japanese dalliance with Revisionism, and the feeling of ideological antagonism it engenders towards China, and even the USA at times, amid the desire to cast off post-war constraints and restore national standing, is conducive to a Japanese international strategy that is capable of being highly confrontational. If an uncertain international security environment is combined with domestic Revisionism, then Japan can be seen as lacking confidence in the basic foundations of its security, and to be experiencing a certain sense of paranoia. The outcome is that the new ‘realism’ to which Japan is being pushed in its international strategy will not always be the cautious ‘Reluctant Realism’ that seeks a comfortable alliance with the USA and which contributes, as US policymakers would hope, to a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. It may rather at times be a ‘Resentful Realism’, driven by fear of China, lack of trust in the USA, and a desire to reassert national pride and autonomy, that could take root in Japan. This ‘Resentful Realism’ may generate impulses towards more independent national military action by Japan, facilitated by new autonomous capabilities, and will clearly be a difficult quantity for the USA, let alone China, to handle. Under this scenario, Japan’s experimentation with active balancing may not restore equilibrium and stability in the region to match China’s rise, but actually become a source of unpredictability and instability. If this is thought to be a possible outcome of Japan’s shift from hedging to incipient balancing, a third conclusion then becomes apparent. Japan’s impact on regional stability can be mitigated most obviously by China’s moderation of its security policy so as not to cross the Japanese key red lines of territory and SLOC security. The USA needs to reassure Japan that it will not be ‘passed over’ and its security interests overlooked in any possible strategic accommodation with China. For Japan itself, the lesson is that, as it reconsiders the Yoshida Doctrine and Revisionism takes hold, it must consider how this process of international strategic and domestic regime change has impact on the very same problem it has in dealing with China—that of states’ surety in the reading of the international intentions of others. Japan’s policymakers thus need to ensure they do not become trapped in the same problem of being unable to signal their intentions and maintain the sense of benignity that they accuse their Chinese counterparts of lacking. If they fail to do so, Japan will be labelled a security risk on a par with China, the risk of a Sino–Japanese military clash may rise, and the consequences for the regional security order will be disastrous. | 8,945 | <h4>Japan’s international strategy towards China and the US is <u>at a crossroads</u> – only <u>consultation and prior assurance</u> on engagement with China can <strong>reverse the current track towards Sino-Japanese war</h4><p>Hughes 16</p><p></strong>Christopher W., Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in PAIS, Research Associate at Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, degrees from Universities of Oxford, Rochester, and Sheffield, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’ and Balancing China’s Rise,” http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#aff-1<u>, Summer 2016</p><p></u>Conclusion: Japan’s Own Uncertain Strategic Intentions and “Resentful Realism” <u><mark>Japan</u></mark> can <u><mark>now</u></mark> be observed to be <u><strong><mark>shifting</strong></mark> from its past hedging strategy vis-à-vis China <mark>towards</u></mark> a strategy of active soft and incipient <u><strong><mark>hard balancing</u></strong></mark>. The key <u><mark>conditions</mark> that in the past ensured Japan could maintain a hedging strategy <mark>have deteriorated</u></mark> over the last decade, so initiating this shift. <u>Japanese policymakers’ previous belief in their ability to read</u> China’s intentions as benign has waned, as has their confidence in <u>the potential malleability of Chinese intentions through political and economic engagement</u>. Japan’s own domestic regime change, characterized by the rise of Revisionism and discontent with the status quo, has reinforced the impulse to avoid ‘underbalancing’. Indeed, <u>the rising domestic consensus in Japan is that China’s intentions, if readable at all, are now fundamentally <strong>malign towards Japan</u></strong>. Most strikingly, Japanese policymakers no longer trust that the balance of offence–defence capabilities is in their favour, either internally or externally. <u>China’s military modernization is perceived</u> as set to overwhelm the JSDF’s defensive capabilities and <u>as weakening the USA’s ability to police the global commons and restrain China’s encroachment of core Japanese security interests</u>. <u>The overall consequence has indeed been Japan’s shifting, if incrementally and certainly not entirely relinquishing hedging, towards more incipient balancing behaviour.</u> Much of this balancing is ‘soft’ in orientation, apparent in efforts to check Chinese influence through strengthening partnerships with other East Asian states on China’s periphery that are equally concerned about the negative externalities of its rise. But another component of seeking to balance China globally is apparent in vigorous diplomatic activity and resource deals in Africa and the Middle East. Meanwhile, <u>Japan’s hard balancing has taken the form</u> of an emerging emphasis primarily on building up JSDF defensive capabilities while also considering the selective procurement of power projection capabilities that could serve collective self-defence and even offensive purposes. <u><mark>Japan</mark> has thus found itself <mark>competing in a <strong>quiet arms race with China</u></strong></mark> in East Asia evocative of ‘normal’ balancing behaviour on a par with that of other states facing a similar external security environment. <u><mark>Alongside</mark> these</u> internal <u><mark>efforts Japan has</u></mark>, of course<u>, <strong><mark>redoubled</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>support</strong> for the</mark> US–Japan <mark>alliance to buttress the <strong>US</strong>A’s potential for <strong>balancing against China</u></strong></mark>. Japan’s identification as an incipient balancer presents a range of important conclusions in answer to the questions posed at the start of this article. First, the discussion in this article and recent evidence by virtue of Japan’s behaviour is cause for reexamination of the quaint consensus among Neo-realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism on the immobility of Japanese security policy. The very conditions contained in those perspectives, especially the former two, regarding a state’s potential disposition towards hedging now demand serious review in the case of Japan. This is not to say that these perspectives are fundamentally flawed, but rather that the conclusions and orthodoxy they give rise to are outmoded because they take insufficient account of new evidence. If given due consideration, these perspectives may have ample ability to point to and explain Japan’s initiation of balancing behaviour. These perspectives, therefore, need to abandon the comfort zone of their past orthodoxy and review the dynamism of Japan’s security policy if they are to retain their full explanatory utility with regard to Japan now and in the future. In particular, Neo-realism can afford to be bolder in asserting its perspective on Japan’s remilitarization of security policy, rather than readily ceding ground to the dominance of Constructivism and Liberalism. Secondly, and even more importantly<u>, Japan’s inching towards active balancing of China has <strong>significant implications</strong> for East Asian security,</u> although given the nature of the process of Japan’s shift they are not entirely clear. <u><mark>Japan’s</mark> </u>move towards <u><mark>balancing is certainly not yet</mark> complete</u>, <u><strong><mark>irreversible</u></strong></mark>, or fully revealed, <u>and embedded in national grand strategy</u>. As outlined earlier, the Yoshida Doctrine has proved a highly resilient grand strategy in the post-war period, and will not be abandoned lightly. The result is that Japan is demonstrating, and likely to continue to demonstrate, fluctuations between the Yoshida Doctrine and more active balancing behaviour. These fluctuations will, in turn, be driven by the development of the international and domestic determinants of Japan’s strategy as already outlined, and which are themselves amid a process of volatile change. Japan will be forced to react to variations in the benignity and malignity of China’s intentions and, just as importantly, <u><mark>Japanese behaviour will be</mark> largely <strong><mark>determined </strong>by the <strong>condition</strong> of the US–Japan <strong>alliance</strong> and fears over</mark> <strong>entrapment</strong> and</u> <u><strong><mark>abandonment</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Japan’s sense of being <strong>caught between</strong> a <strong>rising China</strong> and a <strong>US ally</strong></mark> on which it has been so dependent, but <mark>with which its</mark> security <strong><mark>interests do not always converge</strong>, will make for hesitancy</mark> in its security stance</u>. <u><mark>Japan’s</mark> <mark>impulse may be to <strong>react strongly</strong></mark> at times to perceived Chinese security provocations, but it <mark>will <strong>lack</strong> the <strong>assurance of US</strong></mark>A backing of this behaviour</u>. <u>This will</u>, on the whole, <u>encourage Japan to act more <strong>autonomously</u></strong> when necessary. Hence, not only China, but also the USA, may find Japan a difficult security partner to deal with. Japanese unpredictability is and will be enhanced by the continuing changes to its domestic regime. The unwinding of the post-war system is not complete, and <u>the struggle between Pragmatists and Revisionists will continue, albeit with the latter likely to eventually triumph</u>. Japanese dalliance with Revisionism, and the feeling of ideological antagonism it engenders towards China, and even the USA at times, amid the desire to cast off post-war constraints and restore national standing, is conducive to a <u>Japanese international strategy that is capable of being <strong>highly confrontational</u></strong>. <u>If an uncertain international security environment is combined with domestic Revisionism</u>, then Japan can be seen as lacking confidence in the basic foundations of its security, and to be experiencing a certain sense of paranoia. The outcome is that the new ‘realism’ to which Japan is being pushed in its international strategy will not always be the cautious ‘Reluctant Realism’ that seeks a comfortable alliance with the USA and which contributes, as US policymakers would hope, to a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. <u>It may</u> rather at times <u>be</u> a <u>‘Resentful Realism’, driven by fear of China, lack of trust in the USA</u>, and a desire to reassert national pride and autonomy, that could take root in Japan. This ‘Resentful Realism’ <u><mark>may generate <strong>impulses</strong> towards</u></mark> more independent national <u><strong><mark>military action</u></strong></mark> by Japan, facilitated by new autonomous capabilities, and will clearly be a difficult quantity for the USA, let alone China, to handle. Under this scenario<u>, Japan’s experimentation with active <strong>balancing</strong> may</u> not restore equilibrium and stability in the region to match China’s rise, but actually <u>become a source of <strong>unpredictability</strong> and <strong>instability</u></strong>. If this is thought to be a possible outcome of Japan’s shift from hedging to incipient balancing, a third conclusion then becomes apparent. Japan’s impact on regional stability can be mitigated most obviously by China’s moderation of its security policy so as not to cross the Japanese key red lines of territory and SLOC security. The <u><strong><mark>US</strong></mark>A <mark>needs to <strong>reassure Japan</strong> that it will not be <strong>‘passed over’</strong> and its</mark> security <strong><mark>interests overlooked</strong> in any</mark> possible strategic <strong><mark>accommodation</strong> with <strong>China</u></strong></mark>. For Japan itself, the lesson is that, as it reconsiders the Yoshida Doctrine and Revisionism takes hold, it must consider how this process of international strategic and domestic regime change has impact on the very same problem it has in dealing with China—that of states’ surety in the reading of the international intentions of others. Japan’s policymakers thus need to ensure they do not become trapped in the same problem of being unable to signal their intentions and maintain the sense of benignity that they accuse their Chinese counterparts of lacking. If they fail to do so, <u>Japan will be labelled a security risk</u> on a par with China, the risk of a <u><strong><mark>Sino–Japanese military clash</strong></mark> may rise</u>, and the <u>consequences for the regional security order <mark>will be <strong>disastrous</strong></mark>.</p></u> | Earthquakes neg | null | Consult japan | 80,993 | 5 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,127 | CSCAP cooperation solves best via preventative diplomacy and spurs follow on – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation | null | -Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development | This book provide assessment of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific and CSCAP widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization It describes CSCAP’s relationship with ARF its Track 1 counterpart It also identifies perceived weaknesses in CSCAP which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The CSCAP was set up to provide “a structured process of non-governmental nature to contribute to confidence building and enhancing regional security 1 It was the most ambitious proposal for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process and one of the most important developments since the Cold War CSCAP is a generally recognized feature of the architecture of Asia achievements have been extraordinary ARF is centrepiece of institutionalization of multilateral dialogue and confidence building CSCAP’s ability to provide policy-relevant studies for the ARF has been accorded highest priority Simon found CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 He reported CSCAP achieved noteworthy successes including preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF agreements on oceanic management taken up by the ARF and database on nuclear energy safety other recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and attained important place on the latter’s own agenda CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific Job argues they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security Kraft argues blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis | book assess CSCAP widely regarded as premier Track 2 weaknesses derive from connections with Track 1 CSCAP contribute to confidence building and security It was one of most important developments achievements have been extraordinary CSCAP’s ability to provide policy for ARF has been highest priority CSCAP achieved successes, including preventive diplomacy adopted oceanic management taken up by ARF and nuclear safety recommendations attained place on latter’s agenda CSCAP epistemic community played “a significant role in Track 1 deliberations they served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis | Ball 10 {Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}
This book is intended to provide a critical assessment of the role of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization in the region. It describes CSCAP’s formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its declared Track 1 counterpart. It also identifies and analyses perceived weaknesses in CSCAP’s organization and failures in its processes, some of which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. CSCAP was set up in 1992–1993 to provide “a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.1 It was described at the time as “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters”,2 and as “one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. CSCAP is now a generally recognized feature of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Its achievements since 1992–1993 have been extraordinary. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The ARF is the centrepiece of the institutionalization of multilateral security dialogue and confidence building in the region. Among the different views about CSCAP’s purposes, its ability to provide policy-relevant studies and analyses for the ARF has generally been accorded highest priority. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by Simon published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He found that CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 diplomacy. He reported that CSCAP had “achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition of preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF, a number of agreements on oceanic management which have been taken up by the ARF, and the establishment of a database on nuclear energy safety practices”, and that “these and a number of other CSCAP recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and have attained an important place on the latter’s own agenda”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. Job addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he argues that, ideationally, “they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities (both individual and collective), and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman Kraft, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He argues that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests. | 7,235 | <h4>CSCAP cooperation <u>solves best</u> via preventative diplomacy and <u>spurs follow on</u> – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation</h4><p>-Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development </p><p><strong>Ball 10 </strong>{Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}</p><p><u>This <mark>book</u></mark> is intended to <u>provide</u> a critical <u><mark>assess</mark>ment of</u> the role of <u>Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific</u> region, <u>and</u>, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (<u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark>), <u><strong><mark>widely regarded</u></strong> <u>as</mark> the</u> <u><mark>premier Track 2</mark> organization</u> in the region. <u>It describes CSCAP’s</u> formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its <u>relationship with</u> the ASEAN Regional Forum (<u>ARF</u>), <u>its</u> declared <u>Track 1 counterpart</u>. <u>It also identifies</u> and analyses <u><strong>perceived <mark>weaknesses</u></strong></mark> <u>in CSCAP</u>’s organization and failures in its processes, some of <u>which <mark>derive from</mark> its fundamental <mark>connections with</mark> official (governmental) agencies constituting <mark>Track 1</mark>. The</u> main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> was set up</u> in 1992–1993 <u>to provide “a</u> more <u>structured</u> regional <u>process of</u> a <u><strong>non-governmental</u></strong> <u>nature</u> <u>to <mark>contribute to</u></mark> the efforts towards regional <u><strong><mark>confidence building</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong>enhancing regional <mark>security</u></strong></mark> through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.<u>1 <mark>It was</u></mark> described at the time as “<u><strong>the most ambitious</u></strong> <u>proposal</u> to date <u>for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process</u> on Pacific security matters”,2 <u>and</u> as “<u><mark>one of</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>most important developments</u></strong></mark> in regional security <u>since</u> the end of <u>the Cold War</u>”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. <u>CSCAP is</u> now <u><strong>a generally recognized feature</u></strong> <u>of the</u> security <u>architecture of</u> the <u>Asia</u>-Pacific region. Its <u><mark>achievements</u></mark> since 1992–1993 <u><strong><mark>have been extraordinary</u></strong></mark>. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The <u>ARF is</u> the <u><strong>centrepiece</u></strong> <u>of</u> the <u>institutionalization of multilateral</u> security <u>dialogue and confidence building</u> in the region. Among the different views about <u><mark>CSCAP’s</u></mark> purposes, its <u><mark>ability to provide</u> <u><strong>policy</mark>-relevant studies</u></strong> and analyses <u><mark>for</mark> the <mark>ARF has</u></mark> generally <u><mark>been</mark> accorded</u> <u><strong><mark>highest priority</u></strong></mark>. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by <u>Simon</u> published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He <u>found</u> that <u>CSCAP was a</u> <u><strong>“fine exemplar”</u></strong> <u>of Track 2</u> diplomacy. <u>He reported</u> that <u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark> had “<u><mark>achieved</u></mark> some <u>noteworthy <mark>successes</u>, <u>including</u></mark> a definition of <u><strong><mark>preventive diplomacy adopted</mark> by the ARF</u></strong>, a number of <u>agreements on</u> <u><mark>oceanic management</u></mark> which have been <u><strong><mark>taken up by</mark> the <mark>ARF</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the establishment of a <u>database on <mark>nuclear</mark> energy</u> <u><mark>safety</u></mark> practices”, and that “these and a number of <u>other</u> CSCAP <u><mark>recommendations</u></mark> <u><strong>have been passed on to the ARF</u></strong> <u>and</u> have <u><mark>attained</u></mark> an <u><strong>important <mark>place on</mark> the <mark>latter’s</mark> own <mark>agenda</u></strong></mark>”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> formed an “<mark>epistemic</u> <u>community</mark>”, which <mark>played “a significant role in Track 1</mark> security <mark>deliberations</mark> in the Asia Pacific</u>”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. <u>Job</u> addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he <u>argues</u> that, ideationally, “<u><mark>they</mark> have <mark>served as</u> <u><strong>agents of change and norm entrepreneurs</u></strong></mark> <u>working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities</u> (both individual and collective), <u>and</u> <u>acceptance of the key principles of</u> <u><strong>open regionalism</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>cooperative security</u></strong>”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman <u>Kraft</u>, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He <u>argues</u> that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly <u><mark>blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis</u></mark>. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests.</p> | 1NC | null | Track 2 | 1,126,294 | 22 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,128 | Vote neg on PRESUMPTION---Their plan text only fiats “INCREMENTAL REDUCTIONS” which leads to the US changing their policy towards Taiwan in the SMALLEST POSSIBLE WAY because Trump and his administration ALL support Taiwan | Turton 11/13 | Turton 11/13{Michael Turton, writer, blogger, and teacher based in Taichung, Taiwan, author of The View from Taiwan—a popular scholarly blog about Taiwanese politics, 2016 (“Geopolitically, you can relax... for a while,” The View from Taiwan—a blog, November 13th, Available Online at https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2016/11/geopolitically-you-can-relax-for-while.html, SCOTT} | Taiwan's position vis-a-vis* the US is almost certainly going to improve Forbes is a longtime supporter of Taiwan Alexander Gray also likes Taiwan Randy Schriver, very pro-Taiwan, and Steve Yates ), very pro-Taiwan Richard Armitage, who has long worked on Taiwan issues Trump Advisor China is behaving like a bullying thug against Taiwan John Bolton, a longtime Taiwan supporter, has been rumored to be a possibility for Sec of State. Trump Administration will take a much harder line on China when the US moves away from China, it moves towards Taiwan. Trump Administration represents a fresh start for US-Taiwan relations the US is becoming even more hardline | Taiwan's position certainly going to improve Forbes Gray Schriver Yates Armitage Bolton Trump will take a much harder line move towards Taiwan Trump represents a fresh start for US-Taiwan relations US becoming more hardline | The speculation over Taiwan and the new Trump Administration has included some very strange assertions, especially from the KMT, that Taiwan might well become some kind of bargaining chip. Nope. Not gonna happen. In fact, Taiwan's position vis-a-vis* the US is almost certainly going to improve. For starters, the new Sec of the Navy might well be Randy Forbes. Forbes is a longtime supporter of Taiwan. Forbes' staffer Alexander Gray will be on the Asia team -- also likes Taiwan. Other names mentioned include Randy Schriver, very pro-Taiwan, and perhaps the very gracious Steve Yates (a quiet inspiration for this blogger), very pro-Taiwan. Richard Armitage, who has long worked on Taiwan issues, has also been mentioned. Most of those names will be familiar, but others might not be. Just in Taiwan very recently was Ed Feulner (note this 2011 piece), obvious where his sympathies are. And then there is Peter Navarro, in the news here with strong statements: Trump Advisor indicates Taiwan stance? "China is behaving like a bullying thug against Taiwan" (video). John Bolton, a longtime Taiwan supporter, has been rumored to be a possibility for Sec of State. Most of these people worked in the Bush Administration as well. All of these people, and any eventual Trump Administration, will likely take a much harder line than the Clinton Administration on China, or so some insiders have already declared. The Trump Administration is not going to have any of those "We will achieve a breakthrough!" delusions that afflicted the Clinton Administration, nor do any of its people come out of consulting firms doing business with China. And in the geopolitical calculus that governs the Strait, when the US moves away from China, it moves towards Taiwan. Indeed, suggestions that the Trump Administration represents a fresh start for US-Taiwan relations are already flying into mags where such pieces appear. But for those of you making mental calculations about when war is going to break out here in Asia, you should probably advance your timetables. Xi is not going to become less hardline, and the US is becoming even more hardline. Just last week Chinese "coast guard" vessels once again tested the Senkaku waters. And David Feith argued in WSJ that Trump will increase the Nuke Crisis in Asia | 2,298 | <h4>Vote neg on PRESUMPTION---Their plan text only fiats “INCREMENTAL REDUCTIONS” which leads to the US changing their policy towards Taiwan in the SMALLEST POSSIBLE WAY because Trump and his administration ALL support Taiwan</h4><p><strong>Turton 11/13</strong>{Michael Turton, writer, blogger, and teacher based in Taichung, Taiwan, author of The View from Taiwan—a popular scholarly blog about Taiwanese politics, 2016 (“Geopolitically, you can relax... for a while,” The View from Taiwan—a blog, November 13th, Available Online at https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2016/11/geopolitically-you-can-relax-for-while.html, SCOTT}</p><p>The speculation over Taiwan and the new Trump Administration has included some very strange assertions, especially from the KMT, that Taiwan might well become some kind of bargaining chip. Nope. Not gonna happen. In fact, <u><mark>Taiwan's position</mark> vis-a-vis* the US is almost <strong><mark>certainly</strong> going to <strong>improve</u></strong></mark>. For starters, the new Sec of the Navy might well be Randy Forbes. <u><mark>Forbes</mark> is a longtime supporter of Taiwan</u>. Forbes' staffer <u>Alexander <mark>Gray</u></mark> will be on the Asia team -- <u>also likes Taiwan</u>. Other names mentioned include <u>Randy <mark>Schriver</mark>, very pro-Taiwan, and</u> perhaps the very gracious <u>Steve <mark>Yates</u></mark> (a quiet inspiration for this blogger<u>), very pro-Taiwan</u>. <u>Richard <mark>Armitage</mark>, who has long worked on Taiwan issues</u>, has also been mentioned. Most of those names will be familiar, but others might not be. Just in Taiwan very recently was Ed Feulner (note this 2011 piece), obvious where his sympathies are. And then there is Peter Navarro, in the news here with strong statements: <u>Trump Advisor</u> indicates Taiwan stance? "<u>China is behaving like a bullying thug against Taiwan</u>" (video). <u>John <mark>Bolton</mark>, a longtime Taiwan supporter, has been rumored to be a possibility for Sec of State.</u> Most of these people worked in the Bush Administration as well. All of these people, and any eventual <u><strong><mark>Trump</strong></mark> Administration</u>, <u><mark>will</u></mark> likely <u><mark>take a <strong>much harder line</u></strong></mark> than the Clinton Administration <u>on China</u>, or so some insiders have already declared. The Trump Administration is not going to have any of those "We will achieve a breakthrough!" delusions that afflicted the Clinton Administration, nor do any of its people come out of consulting firms doing business with China. And in the geopolitical calculus that governs the Strait, <u>when the US moves away from China, it <strong><mark>move</mark>s <mark>towards Taiwan</strong></mark>.</u> Indeed, suggestions that the <u><mark>Trump</mark> Administration <mark>represents a <strong>fresh start for US-Taiwan relations</u></strong></mark> are already flying into mags where such pieces appear. But for those of you making mental calculations about when war is going to break out here in Asia, you should probably advance your timetables. Xi is not going to become less hardline, and <u>the <mark>US</mark> is <mark>becoming</mark> even <strong><mark>more hardline</u></strong></mark>. Just last week Chinese "coast guard" vessels once again tested the Senkaku waters. And David Feith argued in WSJ that Trump will increase the Nuke Crisis in Asia</p> | Case | Solvency | null | 414,742 | 9 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,129 | China won’t have the motivation to break the deal and U.S. deterrence solves. | Glaser 15 | Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals) | One could argue that a grand bargain is of little or no value because China faces a commitment problem According to this argument, as China becomes more powerful, the costs of reneging on the deal will decrease, making defection China's best option this argument holds that China will eventually be much better able to reassert its claims in the South China and East China Seas, and to pressure U.S. allies to cut their ties to the U S and therefore will pursue these more aggressive policies; consequently, a grand bargain is no better for the U S than are unilateral concessions
This argument overstates the commitment problem. Whether China faces a commitment problem depends on its aims: if China's aims are limited and would be largely satisfied by U.S. accommodation, then China does not face a commitment problem; increases in China's power would not make breaking the agreement its best option
a grand bargain could bring a variety of benefits, including providing information about China's aims, which would reduce the likelihood of a commitment problem; communicating U.S. resolve to protect American interests; and possibly contributing to a Chinese domestic consensus on limited aims the U S should pursue policies that would contribute to preserving the grand bargain and reducing the costs if it fails, including maintaining military capabilities sufficient to protect its allies, which should help convince China that breaking the agreement would harm its interests. Because neither the ability of the U S to protect its allies nor its credibility for doing so would be significantly diminished by the grand bargain or its unraveling, and because China's goals could well be sufficiently limited that the U S does not actually face a commitment problem, the grand bargain has good prospects for increasing U.S. security | This argument overstates the commitment problem if China's aims are limited and would be largely satisfied by accommodation, then China does not face a commitment problem; increases in China's power would not make breaking the agreement its best option
the U S should pursue policies that would contribute to preserving the grand bargain and reducing the costs if it fails, including maintaining military capabilities sufficient to protect its allies, which should help convince China that breaking the agreement would harm its interests. Because neither the ability of the U S to protect its allies nor its credibility would be significantly diminished by the grand bargain or its unraveling, and because China's goals could well be sufficiently limited that the U S does not actually face a commitment problem, the grand bargain has good prospects for increasing security | Commitment Problems and Bargain Breakdowns
One could argue that a grand bargain is of little or no value because China faces a commitment problem.108 According to this argument, as China becomes more powerful, the costs of reneging on the deal will decrease, making defection China's best option; recognizing this danger in advance, the United States should be unwilling to enter into a grand bargain. More specifically, this argument holds that China will eventually be much better able to reassert its claims in the South China and East China Seas, and to pressure U.S. allies to cut their ties to the United States, and therefore will pursue these more aggressive policies; consequently, a grand bargain is no better for the United States than are unilateral concessions.
This argument overstates the commitment problem. Whether China faces a commitment problem depends on its aims: if China's aims are limited and would be largely satisfied by U.S. accommodation, then China does not face a commitment problem; increases in China's power would not make breaking the agreement its best option. The barrier from the U.S. perspective is that China's aims are uncertain. Given this information problem, the United States would find itself uncertain about whether China faces a commitment problem. The more the United States believes it likely that China's aims go well beyond the terms of the grand bargain, the less attractive the grand bargain is as a long-term policy designed to respond to China's growing power.
If a grand bargain brought only risks and China was likely to break out of the bargain, then the United States should not pursue it. As I have shown, however, a grand bargain could bring a variety of benefits, including providing information about China's aims, which would reduce the likelihood of a commitment problem; communicating U.S. resolve to protect American interests; and possibly contributing to a Chinese domestic consensus on limited aims. In addition, as explained above, the United States should pursue policies that would contribute to preserving the grand bargain and reducing the costs if it fails, including maintaining military capabilities sufficient to protect its allies, which should help convince China that breaking the agreement would harm its interests. Because neither the ability of the United States to protect its allies nor its credibility for doing so would be significantly diminished by the grand bargain or its unraveling, and because China's goals could well be sufficiently limited that the United States does not actually face a commitment problem, the grand bargain has good prospects for increasing U.S. security. | 2,673 | <h4>China won’t have the <u>motivation</u> to break the deal and <u>U.S. deterrence solves</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>Commitment Problems and Bargain Breakdowns</p><p><u>One could argue that a grand bargain is of little or no value because China faces a commitment problem</u>.108 <u>According to this argument, as China becomes more powerful, the costs of reneging on the deal will decrease, making defection China's best option</u>; recognizing this danger in advance, the United States should be unwilling to enter into a grand bargain. More specifically, <u>this argument holds that China will eventually be much better able to reassert its claims in the South China and East China Seas, and to pressure U.S. allies to cut their ties to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>and therefore will pursue these more aggressive policies; consequently, a grand bargain is no better for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>than are unilateral concessions</u>.</p><p><u><mark>This argument overstates the commitment problem</mark>. Whether China faces a commitment problem depends on its aims: <mark>if China's aims are limited and would be largely satisfied by</mark> U.S. <mark>accommodation, then China <strong>does not face a commitment problem</strong>; increases in China's power <strong>would not make breaking the agreement its best option</u></strong></mark>. The barrier from the U.S. perspective is that China's aims are uncertain. Given this information problem, the United States would find itself uncertain about whether China faces a commitment problem. The more the United States believes it likely that China's aims go well beyond the terms of the grand bargain, the less attractive the grand bargain is as a long-term policy designed to respond to China's growing power.</p><p>If a grand bargain brought only risks and China was likely to break out of the bargain, then the United States should not pursue it. As I have shown, however, <u>a grand bargain could bring a variety of benefits, including providing information about China's aims, which would reduce the likelihood of a commitment problem; communicating U.S. resolve to protect American interests; and possibly contributing to a Chinese domestic consensus on limited aims</u>. In addition, as explained above, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should pursue policies that would contribute to preserving the grand bargain and reducing the costs if it fails, including maintaining military capabilities sufficient to protect its allies, which should help <strong>convince China that breaking the agreement would harm its interests</strong>. Because neither the ability of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>to protect its allies nor its credibility</mark> for doing so <mark>would be significantly diminished by the grand bargain or its unraveling, and because China's goals could well be sufficiently limited that the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>does not actually face a commitment problem, the grand bargain has <strong>good prospects for increasing</mark> U.S. <mark>security</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | Deterrence DA Answers | They Say: “China Will Break Deal In Future” | 90,487 | 20 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,130 | Next off is the CSCAP CP | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Next off is the CSCAP CP </h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | Track two | 1,560,674 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,131 | This has two impacts: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>This has two impacts:</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,673 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,132 | GMOs Bad – incentivize carpet-bombing the earth with pesticides – wrecks the environment and risks extinction | ETC 14 | ETC 14 {The ETC Group or The Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration, it is a multi-national NGO that lobbies on environmental affairs, its leaders are super-qualified: Joëlle Deschambault has a B.S. International Studies and a master degree in Foreign Politics and International Relations (University of Montreal)/ Tim Brodhead is the President of the Trudeau Foundation and has honorary Doctor of Laws from Carleton/Michael Hansen has a PhD in Evolutionary Ecology (Michigan State), is the research director and senior scientist for the Consumers Union, and was formerly a member of the USDA Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology/Darrin Qualman is the Director of Research at the National Farmers' Union and has a B.A. in Political Studies (Saskatchewan)/Nnnimo Bassey is the Executive Director of the Health Of Mother Earth Foundation, former Executive Director of Environmental Rights Action, and one of Time magazine’s Heroes of the Environment, “Why Genetically Modified Crops Pose a Threat to Peasants, Food Sovereignty, Health, and Biodiversity on the Planet,” 8/14, http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/Document-GMOs-SSPFrancisco-FINAL_EN.pdf #THUR} | GM) crops have resulted in an exponential increase in the use of agritoxins They have had serious negative impacts on public health and the environment in every country where they have been grown on a large scale Six transnational corporations control all the GM crops The same six corporations are the greatest global manufacturers of agrochemicals, which explains why 85% of GM crops are manipulated to resist large doses of herbicides and pesticides They have aggravated problems for the basis of survival on the planet. In the same period when GM crops started being grown eight of the planet’s nine most serious environmental problems— which we cannot exceed if we want the Earth to survive greatly worsened. pollution excessive amounts of phosphorus and nitrogen dumped in the oceans and soil, and chemical pollution are directly related to the corporate industrial food production system, of which GM crops are the central paradigm | GM) crops have resulted in an exponential increase in agritoxins had serious negative impacts on health and the environment They have aggravated problems for the basis of survival GM crops started eight of the planet’s nine most serious environmental problems we cannot exceed if we want the Earth to survive phosphorus and nitrogen and chemical pollution—are directly related to GM crops | Contrary to what companies promised, official statistics from the United States—the leading producer of genetically modified (GM) crops in the world—demonstrate that the truth of GM crops is that they produce less per hectare than the seeds that were already available on the market, but have resulted in an exponential increase in the use of agritoxins (Benbrook, 2012; Gurian-Sherman, 2009). They have also had serious negative impacts on both public health 1 and the environment in every country where they have been grown on a large scale. Genetically modified crops have been a key instrument to facilitate a greater corporate hold on the history of food and agriculture. Six transnational corporations control all the GM crops commercially grown in the world. The same six corporations are the greatest global manufacturers of agrochemicals, which explains why 85% of GM crops are manipulated to resist large doses of herbicides and pesticides, since this is the greatest profit area (ETC Group, 2013b). Have they helped reduce hunger around the world? No. In addition, as a result of the advancement of industrialization of the food chain at the hands of agribusiness corporations since 1996—the year when genetically modified crops started being grown—the number of undernourished and obese people—a phenomenon that is now synonymous to poverty, and not wealth—has increased (FAO, 2012; OMS, 2012). GM crop cultivation accelerated the displacement of small and mid-sized producers and impoverished them, while replacing a considerable part of the workforce with machinery, thus increasing rural unemployment. For example, in Argentina, GM crops and their so-called “sowing pools” (pools de siembra) led to a veritable “reverse agrarian reform,” eliminating a large part of small and mid-sized agricultural establishments. Aeastccording to the 1988 and 2002 censuses, in those years 87,000 such establishments disappeared, of which 75,293 were smaller than 200 hectares—a trend that continues to this day (Teubal, 2006). The consequence is that, today, 80% of farmed land is leased to 4,000 investment funds. This is not a model for food production; it is an agricultural platform for speculation. They have aggravated problems for the basis of survival on the planet. In the same period when GM crops started being grown, the climate crisis and eight of the planet’s nine most serious environmental problems—defined by the Stockholm Resilience Center as the “planet’s limits,” which we cannot exceed if we want the Earth to survive—greatly worsened. Seven of these problems—climate change, loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, pollution and scarcity of fresh water, soil erosion, excessive amounts of phosphorus and nitrogen dumped in the oceans and soil, and chemical pollution—are directly related to the corporate industrial food production system, of which GM crops are the central paradigm (Rockström, 2009; ETC Group, 2013a, GRAIN, 2011). | 2,958 | <h4>GMOs Bad – incentivize carpet-bombing the earth with pesticides – wrecks the environment and risks extinction</h4><p><strong>ETC 14 </strong>{The ETC Group or The Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration, it is a multi-national NGO that lobbies on environmental affairs, its leaders are super-qualified: Joëlle Deschambault has a B.S. International Studies and a master degree in Foreign Politics and International Relations (University of Montreal)/ Tim Brodhead is the President of the Trudeau Foundation and has honorary Doctor of Laws from Carleton/Michael Hansen has a PhD in Evolutionary Ecology (Michigan State), is the research director and senior scientist for the Consumers Union, and was formerly a member of the USDA Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology/Darrin Qualman is the Director of Research at the National Farmers' Union and has a B.A. in Political Studies (Saskatchewan)/Nnnimo Bassey is the Executive Director of the Health Of Mother Earth Foundation, former Executive Director of Environmental Rights Action, and one of Time magazine’s Heroes of the Environment, “Why Genetically Modified Crops Pose a Threat to Peasants, Food Sovereignty, Health, and Biodiversity on the Planet,” 8/14, http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/Document-GMOs-SSPFrancisco-FINAL_EN.pdf #THUR}</p><p>Contrary to what companies promised, official statistics from the United States—the leading producer of genetically modified (<u><mark>GM) crops</u></mark> in the world—demonstrate that the truth of GM crops is that they produce less per hectare than the seeds that were already available on the market, but <u><mark>have resulted in an <strong>exponential increase </strong>in</mark> the use of <mark>agritoxins</u></mark> (Benbrook, 2012; Gurian-Sherman, 2009). <u>They have</u> also <u><mark>had <strong>serious negative impacts</strong></mark> <mark>on</u></mark> both <u>public <mark>health</mark> </u>1 <u><mark>and</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>environment</u></mark> <u>in <strong>every country</strong> where they have been grown on a large scale</u>. Genetically modified crops have been a key instrument to facilitate a greater corporate hold on the history of food and agriculture. <u>Six transnational corporations control all the GM crops</u> commercially grown in the world. <u>The same six corporations are the <strong>greatest global manufacturers of agrochemicals</strong>,</u> <u>which explains why 85% of GM crops are manipulated to resist large doses of herbicides and pesticides</u>, since this is the greatest profit area (ETC Group, 2013b). Have they helped reduce hunger around the world? No. In addition, as a result of the advancement of industrialization of the food chain at the hands of agribusiness corporations since 1996—the year when genetically modified crops started being grown—the number of undernourished and obese people—a phenomenon that is now synonymous to poverty, and not wealth—has increased (FAO, 2012; OMS, 2012). GM crop cultivation accelerated the displacement of small and mid-sized producers and impoverished them, while replacing a considerable part of the workforce with machinery, thus increasing rural unemployment. For example, in Argentina, GM crops and their so-called “sowing pools” (pools de siembra) led to a veritable “reverse agrarian reform,” eliminating a large part of small and mid-sized agricultural establishments. Aeastccording to the 1988 and 2002 censuses, in those years 87,000 such establishments disappeared, of which 75,293 were smaller than 200 hectares—a trend that continues to this day (Teubal, 2006). The consequence is that, today, 80% of farmed land is leased to 4,000 investment funds. This is not a model for food production; it is an agricultural platform for speculation. <u><mark>They have aggravated problems <strong>for the basis of survival</strong></mark> on the planet.</u> <u>In the same period when <mark>GM crops started</mark> being grown</u>, the climate crisis and <u><strong><mark>eight of the planet’s nine most serious environmental problems</mark>—</u></strong>defined by the Stockholm Resilience Center as the “planet’s limits,” <u>which <mark>we cannot exceed <strong>if we want the Earth to survive</u></strong></mark>—<u>greatly worsened.</u> Seven of these problems—climate change, loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, <u>pollution</u> and scarcity of fresh water, soil erosion, <u>excessive amounts of <mark>phosphorus</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>nitrogen</mark> dumped in the oceans and soil, <mark>and chemical pollution</u>—<u><strong>are directly related </strong>to</mark> the corporate industrial food production system, of which <mark>GM crops</mark> are the <strong>central paradigm</u></strong> (Rockström, 2009; ETC Group, 2013a, GRAIN, 2011).</p> | 1NC | null | GMO | 1,560,675 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,133 | No U.S.-China war — economic ties and deterrence. | Gelb 13 | Gelb 13 — Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and columnist for the New York Times, served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and was the recipient of the Distinguished Honor Award—the State Department’s highest honor, served as Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense where he was the recipient of the Distinguished Service Award—the Defense Department’s highest honor, holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, 2013 (“Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?,” Ask CFR Experts—a Council on Foreign Relations blog, Question submitted by Josh Wartel from Lake Braddock Secondary School, September 9th, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/china/military-conflict-between-china-united-states-possible-future/p31361?cid=rss-fullfeed-is_a_military_conflict_between-090913, Accessed 09-12-2013) | There is almost never a time when people do not worry about war between major powers. The history here is not happy But there are good reasons to expect a better outcome in the 21st century
The stakes are much too high for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations. Two-way trade and investment are quite high By contrast, during the Cold War, the U S had virtually no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation into nuclear war. The nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear neither side wants to come anywhere near this ultimate danger
it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth a war or even the risk of war Chinese leaders continue to focus on their nation's economic development, and war would certainly set that back | The stakes are too high trade high U S had no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation neither side wants to come anywhere near this ultimate danger
it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth even the risk of war Chinese leaders focus on economic development, and war would set that back | Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?
There is almost never a time when people do not worry about war between major powers. The history here is not a happy one. But there are good reasons to expect a better outcome in the 21st century—as long as both sides are alert and careful.
The stakes are much too high for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations. Two-way trade and investment are quite high. China holds almost $1.2 trillion in American debt. By contrast, during the Cold War, the United States had virtually no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation into nuclear war. The nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear neither side wants to come anywhere near this ultimate danger.
None of this is to say that both sides will not continue to build up their military capability. No country is adding to its military punch faster than China. But it is still far behind the United States in usable military capability, that is, force that can be applied effectively and decidedly in various situations. Chinese military strength is limited almost entirely to lands and seas bordering its own territory. The United States is still the only global military power.
And it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth a war or even the risk of war. It has boundary disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea, and with Japan up north. Troubles should be expected there, and China will certainly be testing Washington's will in both places. Chinese leaders, however, continue to focus on their nation's economic development, and war would certainly set that back. | 1,812 | <h4><u>No</u> U.S.-China war — <u>economic ties</u> and <u>deterrence</u>. </h4><p><strong>Gelb 13</strong> — Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and columnist for the New York Times, served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and was the recipient of the Distinguished Honor Award—the State Department’s highest honor, served as Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense where he was the recipient of the Distinguished Service Award—the Defense Department’s highest honor, holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, 2013 (“Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?,” Ask CFR Experts—a Council on Foreign Relations blog, Question submitted by Josh Wartel from Lake Braddock Secondary School, September 9th, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/china/military-conflict-between-china-united-states-possible-future/p31361?cid=rss-fullfeed-is_a_military_conflict_between-090913, Accessed 09-12-2013)</p><p>Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?</p><p><u>There is almost never a time when people do not worry about war between major powers. The history here is not</u> a <u>happy</u> one. <u>But there are good reasons to expect <strong>a better outcome</strong> in the 21st century</u>—as long as both sides are alert and careful.</p><p><u><mark>The stakes are <strong></mark>much <mark>too high</strong></mark> for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations. Two-way <mark>trade </mark>and investment are <strong>quite <mark>high</u></strong></mark>. China holds almost $1.2 trillion in American debt. <u>By contrast, during the Cold War, the <mark>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>had</mark> virtually <strong><mark>no economic ties</strong> with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went <strong>out of their way</strong> to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation</mark> into nuclear war. The nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear <mark>neither side wants to come <strong>anywhere near</strong> this ultimate danger</u></mark>.</p><p>None of this is to say that both sides will not continue to build up their military capability. No country is adding to its military punch faster than China. But it is still far behind the United States in usable military capability, that is, force that can be applied effectively and decidedly in various situations. Chinese military strength is limited almost entirely to lands and seas bordering its own territory. The United States is still the only global military power.</p><p>And <u><mark>it is <strong>difficult to see</strong> what Beijing might calculate is worth</mark> a war or <mark>even <strong>the risk of war</u></strong></mark>. It has boundary disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea, and with Japan up north. Troubles should be expected there, and China will certainly be testing Washington's will in both places. <u><mark>Chinese leaders</u></mark>, however, <u>continue to <mark>focus on</mark> their nation's <strong><mark>economic development</strong>, and war would</mark> certainly <strong><mark>set that back</u></strong></mark>.</p> | Case | Taiwan | null | 66,494 | 108 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,134 | No Link and Turn — China doesn’t move the election needle, but voters overwhelmingly support the plan. | Thrall and Gomez 16 | Thrall and Gomez 16 — A. Trevor Thrall, Senior Fellow in the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Cato Institute, Associate Professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Eric Gomez, Research Associate for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2016(“The American Public Is Not Very Hawkish on China,” Cato at Liberty—the Cato Institute’s blog, June 9th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/blog/american-public-not-very-hawkish-china, Accessed 06-30-2016)
Though China’s saber rattling in East Asia and the South China Sea hasn’t made a big splash in the 2016 presidential campaign so far, the question of how the United States should respond to China’s rising military and economic power is one of the most important foreign policy challenges the next president will face. | Both candidates have staked out aggressive positions on China. Trump has promised to impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports, suggested that South Korea and Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, and has called for a strong military presence in Asia to discourage “Chinese adventurism.” Clinton was a lead architect of the “pivot to Asia”
A close look at public opinion reveals that the American public’s attitudes towards China are more sanguine than those of its fearful leaders
most Americans have always harbored concerns about the Communist nation and its intentions, and during difficult times Americans worry about the challenge China poses to their economic fortunes. But despite China’s aggressive campaign to modernize its military, and despite two decades of one-sided debate about the China threat, most Americans correctly continue to identify the U S as the stronger military power, and fewer than half view China’s military power as a serious threat
the prolonged fear mongering has failed to move the needle when it comes to how Americans feel about China. Gallup polls show a slight increase in China’s favorability rating among Americans between 1990 and 2016 the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that just 48% of the public views China as primarily a rival and 49% see it primarily as a partner
Americans overwhelming support a cooperative approach to dealing with China rather than a confrontational one. Sixty-seven percent responded that the best way to handle the rise of Chinese power is to “undertake friendly cooperation and engagement,” compared to 29% who said the U S should “actively work to limit the growth of China’s power.” And when it comes to the prospect of military conflict with China the public is truly not interested. Just 26% believe the U S should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan
An aggressive military posture not only runs contrary to public preferences, it also increases the prospects for direct conflict between the U S and China | Both candidates have staked out aggressive positions
the public’s attitudes are more sanguine than fearful leaders
fear mongering has failed to move the needle
Americans overwhelming support a cooperative approach Sixty-seven percent responded the best way to handle Chinese power is engagement compared to 29% who said actively work to limit China’s power when it comes to military conflict the public is not interested. Just 26% believe the U S should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan
An aggressive military posture runs contrary to public preferences | Both candidates have staked out aggressive positions on China. Trump has promised to impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports, suggested that South Korea and Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, and has called for a strong military presence in Asia to discourage “Chinese adventurism.” Clinton, for her part, was a lead architect of the “pivot to Asia” as Secretary of State, redirecting U.S. military and diplomatic efforts from the Middle East to Asia to confront China’s rise.
A close look at public opinion, however, reveals that although complex, the American public’s attitudes towards China are more sanguine than those of its fearful leaders.
To be sure, most Americans have always harbored concerns about the Communist nation and its intentions, and during difficult times Americans worry about the challenge China poses to their economic fortunes. But despite China’s aggressive campaign to modernize its military, and despite two decades of one-sided debate about the China threat, most Americans correctly continue to identify the United States as the stronger military power, and fewer than half view China’s military power as a serious threat (even fewer rate it a “critical threat.”)
Moreover, the prolonged fear mongering has failed to move the needle when it comes to how Americans feel about China. Gallup polls show a slight increase in China’s favorability rating among Americans between 1990 and 2016. And in 2014 the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that just 48% of the public views China as primarily a rival and 49% see it primarily as a partner.
Most importantly, though, Americans overwhelming support a cooperative approach to dealing with China rather than a confrontational one. Sixty-seven percent responded to the 2014 CCGA poll that the best way to handle the rise of Chinese power is to “undertake friendly cooperation and engagement,” compared to 29% who said the United States should “actively work to limit the growth of China’s power.” And when it comes to the prospect of military conflict with China the public is truly not interested. Just 26% believe the United States should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan.
These figures provide fair warning to the next president to think twice about how to deal with China. An aggressive military posture like the one in place today (and promoted by both candidates) not only runs contrary to public preferences, it also increases the prospects for direct conflict between the United States and China. | 2,499 | <h4><u>No Link</u> and <u>Turn</u> — China doesn’t move the election needle, but voters <u>overwhelmingly support</u> the plan. </h4><p><strong>Thrall and Gomez 16</strong> — A. Trevor Thrall, Senior Fellow in the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Cato Institute, Associate Professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Eric Gomez, Research Associate for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2016(“The American Public Is Not Very Hawkish on China,” Cato at Liberty—the Cato Institute’s blog, June 9th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/blog/american-public-not-very-hawkish-china, Accessed 06-30-2016)</p><p>Though <u><mark>China’s saber rattling</mark> in East Asia and the S</u>outh <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea <u><mark>hasn’t made a big splash in the</mark> 2016 presidential <mark>campaign</mark> so far</u>, the question of how the United States should respond to China’s rising military and economic power is one of the most important foreign policy challenges the next president will face.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Both candidates</strong> have staked out aggressive positions</mark> on China. Trump has promised to impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports, suggested that South Korea and Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, and has called for a strong military presence in Asia to discourage “Chinese adventurism.” Clinton</u>, for her part, <u>was a lead architect of the “pivot to Asia”</u> as Secretary of State, redirecting U.S. military and diplomatic efforts from the Middle East to Asia to confront China’s rise.</p><p><u>A close look at public opinion</u>, however, <u>reveals that</u> although complex, <u><mark>the</mark> American <mark>public’s attitudes</mark> towards China <mark>are <strong>more sanguine</strong> than</mark> those of its <mark>fearful leaders</u></mark>.</p><p>To be sure, <u>most Americans have always harbored concerns about the Communist nation and its intentions, and during difficult times Americans worry about the challenge China poses to their economic fortunes. But despite China’s aggressive campaign to modernize its military, and despite two decades of one-sided debate about the China threat, most Americans correctly continue to identify the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>as the stronger military power, and fewer than half view China’s military power as a serious threat</u> (even fewer rate it a “critical threat.”)</p><p>Moreover, <u>the prolonged <mark>fear mongering has <strong>failed to move the needle</strong></mark> when it comes to how Americans feel about China. Gallup polls show a slight increase in China’s favorability rating among Americans between 1990 and 2016</u>. And in 2014 <u>the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that just 48% of the public views China as primarily a rival and 49% see it primarily as a partner</u>.</p><p>Most importantly, though, <u><mark>Americans <strong>overwhelming support</strong> a cooperative approach</mark> to dealing with China rather than a confrontational one. <mark>Sixty-seven percent responded</u></mark> to the 2014 CCGA poll <u>that <mark>the best way to handle</mark> the rise of <mark>Chinese power is</mark> to “undertake friendly cooperation and <mark>engagement</mark>,” <mark>compared to 29% who said</mark> the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should “<mark>actively work to limit</mark> the growth of <mark>China’s power</mark>.” And <mark>when it comes to</mark> the prospect of <mark>military conflict</mark> with China <mark>the public is</mark> truly <strong><mark>not interested</strong>. Just <strong>26%</strong> believe the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan</u></mark>.</p><p>These figures provide fair warning to the next president to think twice about how to deal with China. <u><mark>An aggressive military posture</u></mark> like the one in place today (and promoted by both candidates) <u>not only <mark>runs <strong>contrary to public preferences</strong></mark>, it also increases the prospects for direct conflict between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China</u>. </p> | null | Election DA Answers | Link Takeout/Turn | 161,673 | 25 | 125,884 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | 657,305 | A | Damus | 1 | Santa Margeurita CW | Kezios | AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain | hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx | null | 55,757 | GaGr | Georgetown Day GaGr | null | Ma..... | Ga..... | Ca..... | Gr..... | 20,114 | GeorgetownDay | Georgetown Day | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,135 | Text: The United States federal government should | null | -propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of the plan | null | null | -encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and
-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile. | 218 | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should</h4><p>-propose that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific assess the desirability or undesirability of <mark>the plan</p><p></mark>-encourage the CSCAP to communicate its final findings to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and</p><p>-fully fund and support continual internal review focused at least on the CSCAP’s structure, policy relevance, and public profile.</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Track two | 1,559,478 | 8 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,136 | First is fairness: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>First is <u>fairness</u>:</h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,676 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,137 | BioD collapse causes extinction – cultural homogeneity destroys adaptability and causes extinction | Pearson 8 | Pearson 8 – Barbara Zurer Pearson, Research Project Manager in the Department of Communication Disorders at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Raising a Bilingual Child, p. 35-36 | we need cultural diversity as a survival mechanism for the human race Pollan's book The Botany of Desire makes this lesson clear to us by the analogy to loss of diversity In Ireland only one major variety of potato was grown there When blight wiped out this one type of potato, the country suffered famine Ireland was devastated
If we had just one worldview on earth, lack of cultural diversity would reduce our margin of adaptability to changing conditions, which is the hallmark of survival of the fittest the "Anglo-American" perspective threatens to cut us off | we need cultural diversity as a survival mechanism for the human race Pollan makes this clear by analogy In Ireland When blight wiped one type of potato country suffered famine
If we had one worldview lack of diversity would reduce adaptability the hallmark of survival | Another possible reason is that we need linguistic and cultural diversity as a survival mechanism for the human race. Michael Pollan's book The Botany of Desire makes this lesson clear to us by the analogy to loss of diversity in the plant kingdom. One of his examples involves the humble potato. In the 1800s, both Ireland and the Andes (where the potato originated) depended heavily on the potato as a staple of their diet. In the Andes, there were hundreds of different species of potato as well as a relatively varied diet in general. When blight attacked the Andean potato, the effect on the population in the Andes was almost unnoticed. In Ireland, by contrast, the Andean potato had pushed out other varieties, so by the time of the famine, only one major variety of potato was grown there. Ireland was a very poor country, and few other foods were affordable to much of the population. When blight wiped out this one type of potato, the country suffered a famine in which approximately one million people perished, and many others emigrated, over only a few years. The biodiversity that protected the people in the Andes was absent in Ireland, which was devastated as a result.
A similar principle is at work with languages. Languages express the wisdom of cultures, and different cultures represent different ways of living on earth. As we have seen above, our language shapes the way we tend to view objects and events. The perceptions imposed by our languages do not have to be confining; experience with another language can change those perceptions. Bilinguals have already broken out of the confines of the single worldview of each of their languages and have shown themselves to be more flexible, divergent thinkers and superior problem solvers. If we had just one language and one worldview on earth, the lack of cultural diversity would reduce our margin of adaptability to changing conditions, which is the hallmark of survival of the fittest. Cultural historian George Steiner calls the current power of the "Anglo-American" perspective around the globe unnatural selection, which threatens to cut us off, he says, from innumerable alternate Odysseys and creation myths or other works that offer an interpretation of our humanity. For Steiner, the stranglehold of the Anglo-American perspective represents a great loss and can only diminish the number of ways people will be able to say "hope." | 2,413 | <h4>BioD collapse causes extinction – cultural homogeneity destroys <u>adaptability</u> and causes <u>extinction</h4><p></u><strong>Pearson 8</strong> – Barbara Zurer Pearson, Research Project Manager in the Department of Communication Disorders at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Raising a Bilingual Child, p. 35-36</p><p>Another possible reason is that <u><mark>we need</u></mark> linguistic and <u><mark>cultural diversity as a <strong>survival mechanism</strong> for the human race</u></mark>. Michael <u><mark>Pollan</mark>'s book The Botany of Desire <mark>makes this</mark> lesson <mark>clear</mark> to us <mark>by</mark> the <mark>analogy</mark> to loss of diversity</u> in the plant kingdom. One of his examples involves the humble potato. In the 1800s, both Ireland and the Andes (where the potato originated) depended heavily on the potato as a staple of their diet. In the Andes, there were hundreds of different species of potato as well as a relatively varied diet in general. When blight attacked the Andean potato, the effect on the population in the Andes was almost unnoticed. <u><mark>In Ireland</u></mark>, by contrast, the Andean potato had pushed out other varieties, so by the time of the famine, <u>only one major variety of potato was grown there</u>. Ireland was a very poor country, and few other foods were affordable to much of the population. <u><mark>When blight wiped</mark> out this <mark>one type of potato</mark>, the <mark>country suffered</u></mark> a <u><mark>famine</u></mark> in which approximately one million people perished, and many others emigrated, over only a few years. The biodiversity that protected the people in the Andes was absent in <u>Ireland</u>, which <u>was devastated</u> as a result.</p><p>A similar principle is at work with languages. Languages express the wisdom of cultures, and different cultures represent different ways of living on earth. As we have seen above, our language shapes the way we tend to view objects and events. The perceptions imposed by our languages do not have to be confining; experience with another language can change those perceptions. Bilinguals have already broken out of the confines of the single worldview of each of their languages and have shown themselves to be more flexible, divergent thinkers and superior problem solvers. <u><mark>If we had</mark> just <mark>one</u></mark> language and one <u><mark>worldview</mark> on earth,</u> the <u><mark>lack of</mark> cultural <mark>diversity would <strong>reduce</mark> our margin of <mark>adaptability</strong></mark> to changing conditions, which is <mark>the <strong>hallmark of survival</strong></mark> of the fittest</u>. Cultural historian George Steiner calls the current power of <u>the "Anglo-American" perspective</u> around the globe unnatural selection, which <u>threatens to cut us off</u>, he says, from innumerable alternate Odysseys and creation myths or other works that offer an interpretation of our humanity. For Steiner, the stranglehold of the Anglo-American perspective represents a great loss and can only diminish the number of ways people will be able to say "hope."</p> | 1NC | null | GMO | 1,560,677 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,138 | No war --- Taiwan won’t seek independence post-Trump | Kyris 12-3 | Kyris 12-3 --- Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham (George Kyris, 12-3-2016, "Why is China so upset about Trump's Taiwan call – and could it lead to war?" Conversation, 12-8-2016, http://theconversation.com/why-is-china-so-upset-about-trumps-taiwan-call-and-could-it-lead-to-war-69854) | Could Trump’s call lead to war? this is why Trump’s call matters While economic and semi-formal political links between the US and Taiwan are very strong Trump has upset this balance and China isn’t happy But could this lead to war? Probably not This is because it is unlikely that Taiwan will use this opportunity to further their independence claims Taiwanese leadership has been committed to the “Three Noes” policy: no independence, no unification and no use of force allowed Taiwan to maintain good relations with China, leading to greater cooperation between the two | China isn’t happy But could this lead to war? no it is unlikely that Taiwan will use this opportunity to further independence Taiwanese leadership has been committed to no independence, no unification and no use of leading to greater cooperation between the two | Could Trump’s call lead to war? And this is exactly why Trump’s phone call matters. While economic and semi-formal political links between the US and Taiwan are actually very strong – for example, Taiwan is the US’s 10th largest trade partner and the US supplies Taiwan with weapons – Washington, like most of the rest of the world, does not formally recognize the Taiwanese government. Relations with China are seen as too important to do so. But by breaking tradition and talking to the Taiwanese president, Trump has upset this fine balance – and China isn’t happy. In fact, they have issued a formal diplomatic protest. But could this lead to war? Probably not. This is also because it is unlikely that Taiwan will use this opportunity to further their independence claims and therefore probe a Chinese reaction. In recent times, Taiwanese leadership has been committed to the “Three Noes” policy: no independence, no unification (with China), and no use of force. This has allowed Taiwan to maintain good relations with the rest of the world, including with China, leading to greater cooperation between the two. | 1,117 | <h4>No war --- Taiwan won’t seek independence post-Trump </h4><p><strong>Kyris 12-3</strong> --- Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham (George Kyris, 12-3-2016, "Why is China so upset about Trump's Taiwan call – and could it lead to war?" Conversation, 12-8-2016, http://theconversation.com/why-is-china-so-upset-about-trumps-taiwan-call-and-could-it-lead-to-war-69854)</p><p><u><strong>Could Trump’s call lead to war? </u></strong>And <u>this is</u> exactly <u>why Trump’s</u> phone <u>call matters</u>. <u>While economic and semi-formal political links between the US and Taiwan are</u> actually <u>very strong</u> – for example, Taiwan is the US’s 10th largest trade partner and the US supplies Taiwan with weapons – Washington, like most of the rest of the world, does not formally recognize the Taiwanese government. Relations with China are seen as too important to do so. But by breaking tradition and talking to the Taiwanese president, <u>Trump has upset this</u> fine <u>balance</u> – <u>and <mark>China isn’t happy</u></mark>. In fact, they have issued a formal diplomatic protest. <u><strong><mark>But could this lead to war?</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Probably <mark>no</mark>t</u></strong>. <u>This is</u> also <u>because <mark>it is <strong>unlikely</strong> that Taiwan will use this opportunity to further</mark> their <strong><mark>independence</mark> claims</u></strong> and therefore probe a Chinese reaction. In recent times, <u><mark>Taiwanese leadership has been committed to</mark> the “Three Noes” policy: <strong><mark>no independence</strong>, no unification</u></mark> (with China), <u><mark>and <strong>no use of</mark> force</u></strong>. This has <u>allowed Taiwan to maintain good relations with</u> the rest of the world, including with <u>China, <mark>leading to <strong>greater cooperation between the two</u></strong></mark>.</p> | Case | Taiwan | null | 1,560,679 | 1 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,139 | A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win </h4> | 1NC vs U. Chicago Labs | 1 | null | 1,560,678 | 1 | 125,908 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | 657,903 | N | Kanellis | 6 | UC Lab BH | Sprouse | 1AC - Opium War
1NC - T USFG Politics DA
2NR - T USFG | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round6.docx | null | 55,805 | ArSk | Glenbrook South ArSk | null | Al..... | Ar..... | Ke..... | Sk..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,140 | No war should take out most of the affs impacts — like seriously they shouldn’t be able to say this | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>No war should take out most of the affs impacts — like seriously they shouldn’t be able to say this</h4> | 1NC | Case | Solvency | 1,560,680 | 1 | 125,905 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | 657,868 | N | IDCA JV state | Octas | Northside HM | Vinayyyy, JUNE CHOE, kat sears | went for IP conditions even though that is technically the aff woops Also read ptx track dos and japan | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Octas.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,141 | CSCAP cooperation solves best via preventative diplomacy and spurs follow on – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation | null | -Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development | This book provide assessment of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific and CSCAP widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization It describes CSCAP’s relationship with ARF its Track 1 counterpart It also identifies perceived weaknesses in CSCAP which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The CSCAP was set up to provide “a structured process of non-governmental nature to contribute to confidence building and enhancing regional security 1 It was the most ambitious proposal for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process and one of the most important developments since the Cold War CSCAP is a generally recognized feature of the architecture of Asia achievements have been extraordinary ARF is centrepiece of institutionalization of multilateral dialogue and confidence building CSCAP’s ability to provide policy-relevant studies for the ARF has been accorded highest priority Simon found CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 He reported CSCAP achieved noteworthy successes including preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF agreements on oceanic management taken up by the ARF and database on nuclear energy safety other recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and attained important place on the latter’s own agenda CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific Job argues they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security Kraft argues blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis | book assess CSCAP widely regarded as premier Track 2 weaknesses derive from connections with Track 1 CSCAP contribute to confidence building and security It was one of most important developments achievements have been extraordinary CSCAP’s ability to provide policy for ARF has been highest priority CSCAP achieved successes, including preventive diplomacy adopted oceanic management taken up by ARF and nuclear safety recommendations attained place on latter’s agenda CSCAP epistemic community played “a significant role in Track 1 deliberations they served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis | Ball 10 {Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}
This book is intended to provide a critical assessment of the role of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization in the region. It describes CSCAP’s formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its declared Track 1 counterpart. It also identifies and analyses perceived weaknesses in CSCAP’s organization and failures in its processes, some of which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. CSCAP was set up in 1992–1993 to provide “a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.1 It was described at the time as “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters”,2 and as “one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. CSCAP is now a generally recognized feature of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Its achievements since 1992–1993 have been extraordinary. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The ARF is the centrepiece of the institutionalization of multilateral security dialogue and confidence building in the region. Among the different views about CSCAP’s purposes, its ability to provide policy-relevant studies and analyses for the ARF has generally been accorded highest priority. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by Simon published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He found that CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 diplomacy. He reported that CSCAP had “achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition of preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF, a number of agreements on oceanic management which have been taken up by the ARF, and the establishment of a database on nuclear energy safety practices”, and that “these and a number of other CSCAP recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and have attained an important place on the latter’s own agenda”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. Job addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he argues that, ideationally, “they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities (both individual and collective), and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman Kraft, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He argues that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interest | 7,233 | <h4>CSCAP cooperation <u>solves best</u> via preventative diplomacy and <u>spurs follow on</u> – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation</h4><p>-Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development </p><p><strong>Ball 10 </strong>{Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}</p><p><u>This <mark>book</u></mark> is intended to <u>provide</u> a critical <u><mark>assess</mark>ment of</u> the role of <u>Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific</u> region, <u>and</u>, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (<u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark>), <u><strong><mark>widely regarded</u></strong> <u>as</mark> the</u> <u><mark>premier Track 2</mark> organization</u> in the region. <u>It describes CSCAP’s</u> formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its <u>relationship with</u> the ASEAN Regional Forum (<u>ARF</u>), <u>its</u> declared <u>Track 1 counterpart</u>. <u>It also identifies</u> and analyses <u><strong>perceived <mark>weaknesses</u></strong></mark> <u>in CSCAP</u>’s organization and failures in its processes, some of <u>which <mark>derive from</mark> its fundamental <mark>connections with</mark> official (governmental) agencies constituting <mark>Track 1</mark>. The</u> main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> was set up</u> in 1992–1993 <u>to provide “a</u> more <u>structured</u> regional <u>process of</u> a <u><strong>non-governmental</u></strong> <u>nature</u> <u>to <mark>contribute to</u></mark> the efforts towards regional <u><strong><mark>confidence building</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong>enhancing regional <mark>security</u></strong></mark> through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.<u>1 <mark>It was</u></mark> described at the time as “<u><strong>the most ambitious</u></strong> <u>proposal</u> to date <u>for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process</u> on Pacific security matters”,2 <u>and</u> as “<u><mark>one of</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>most important developments</u></strong></mark> in regional security <u>since</u> the end of <u>the Cold War</u>”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. <u>CSCAP is</u> now <u><strong>a generally recognized feature</u></strong> <u>of the</u> security <u>architecture of</u> the <u>Asia</u>-Pacific region. Its <u><mark>achievements</u></mark> since 1992–1993 <u><strong><mark>have been extraordinary</u></strong></mark>. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The <u>ARF is</u> the <u><strong>centrepiece</u></strong> <u>of</u> the <u>institutionalization of multilateral</u> security <u>dialogue and confidence building</u> in the region. Among the different views about <u><mark>CSCAP’s</u></mark> purposes, its <u><mark>ability to provide</u> <u><strong>policy</mark>-relevant studies</u></strong> and analyses <u><mark>for</mark> the <mark>ARF has</u></mark> generally <u><mark>been</mark> accorded</u> <u><strong><mark>highest priority</u></strong></mark>. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by <u>Simon</u> published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He <u>found</u> that <u>CSCAP was a</u> <u><strong>“fine exemplar”</u></strong> <u>of Track 2</u> diplomacy. <u>He reported</u> that <u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark> had “<u><mark>achieved</u></mark> some <u>noteworthy <mark>successes</u>, <u>including</u></mark> a definition of <u><strong><mark>preventive diplomacy adopted</mark> by the ARF</u></strong>, a number of <u>agreements on</u> <u><mark>oceanic management</u></mark> which have been <u><strong><mark>taken up by</mark> the <mark>ARF</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the establishment of a <u>database on <mark>nuclear</mark> energy</u> <u><mark>safety</u></mark> practices”, and that “these and a number of <u>other</u> CSCAP <u><mark>recommendations</u></mark> <u><strong>have been passed on to the ARF</u></strong> <u>and</u> have <u><mark>attained</u></mark> an <u><strong>important <mark>place on</mark> the <mark>latter’s</mark> own <mark>agenda</u></strong></mark>”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> formed an “<mark>epistemic</u> <u>community</mark>”, which <mark>played “a significant role in Track 1</mark> security <mark>deliberations</mark> in the Asia Pacific</u>”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. <u>Job</u> addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he <u>argues</u> that, ideationally, “<u><mark>they</mark> have <mark>served as</u> <u><strong>agents of change and norm entrepreneurs</u></strong></mark> <u>working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities</u> (both individual and collective), <u>and</u> <u>acceptance of the key principles of</u> <u><strong>open regionalism</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>cooperative security</u></strong>”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman <u>Kraft</u>, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He <u>argues</u> that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly <u><mark>blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis</u></mark>. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interest</p> | Earthquakes neg | null | Track two | 1,126,294 | 22 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,142 | Trying to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip causes war with China -- Turns the whole case | Miura and Weiss 12-6 | Miura and Weiss 12-6
[Kacie Miura is a PhD candidate in political science at MIT. Find her on Twitter @kaciemiura. Jessica Chen Weiss is associate professor of government at Cornell. “ Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?” Washington Post, 12/6/16 ln //GBS-JV] | A scenario where Trump plays the “Taiwan card” to force China’s hand in other areas — whether on trade or the South China Sea — is likely to backfire Beijing may very well forgo cooperation and risk conflict with the United States until a new leader occupies the Oval Office. | A scenario where Trump plays the “Taiwan card” to force China’s hand in the S C S is likely to backfire Beijing may forgo cooperation and risk conflict with the U S | A scenario where Trump plays the “Taiwan card” to force China’s hand in other areas — whether on trade or the South China Sea — is likely to backfire. Given the utmost importance that China places on the Taiwan issue, if Trump persists in undermining the diplomatic foundation of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan, Beijing may very well forgo cooperation and risk conflict with the United States until a new leader occupies the Oval Office. | 442 | <h4>Trying to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip <strong>causes war with China -- Turns the whole case </h4><p>Miura and Weiss 12-6</p><p></strong>[Kacie Miura is a PhD candidate in political science at MIT. Find her on Twitter @kaciemiura. Jessica Chen Weiss is associate professor of government at Cornell. “ Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?” Washington Post<u>, 12/6/16 ln //GBS-JV]</p><p><mark>A scenario where <strong>Trump plays the “Taiwan card” to force China’s hand</strong> in</mark> other areas — whether on trade or <mark>the <strong>S</strong></mark>outh <strong><mark>C</strong></mark>hina <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ea — <mark>is likely to <strong>backfire</u></strong></mark>. Given the utmost importance that China places on the Taiwan issue, if Trump persists in undermining the diplomatic foundation of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan, <u><mark>Beijing may</mark> very well <strong><mark>forgo cooperation</strong> and <strong>risk conflict</strong> with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates until a new leader occupies the Oval Office.</p></u> | Case | Taiwan | null | 1,559,975 | 2 | 125,906 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | 657,864 | N | MBA | 2 | Niles west BG | KENNYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY | Taiwan---we went for japan again and read okinawa da ROC word PIC ACA PTX and Track two | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round2.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,143 | The affirmative’s search for the state of peace is a step away from the friend/enemy distinction – it invites a system of universal inclusion that guarantees conformity, genocide, and dehumanization. Their politics attempts to erase distinctions culminating in the destruction of ‘the political’, which is the true meaning to our life, and turns the affirmative. | Rasch 05 | Rasch 05 (William Rasch, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Ph.D. from University of Washington, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle,” South Atlantic Quarterly, March 1, 2005) // RL | AND
that this imperfection manifests itself as violence and the guilt associated with it. | null | *Enmity – The state or feeling of being actively opposed or hostile to someone
AND
that this imperfection manifests itself as violence and the guilt associated with it. | 168 | <h4>The affirmative’s search for the state of peace is a step away from the friend/enemy distinction – it invites a system of universal inclusion that guarantees conformity, genocide, and dehumanization. Their politics attempts to erase distinctions culminating in the destruction of ‘the political’, which is the true meaning to our life, and turns the affirmative.</h4><p><strong>Rasch 05</strong> (William Rasch, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Ph.D. from University of Washington, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle,” South Atlantic Quarterly, March 1, 2005) // RL</p><p>*Enmity – The state or feeling of being actively opposed or hostile to someone </p><p><u>AND</p><p>that this imperfection <strong>manifests itself as violence and the guilt associated with it</strong>.</p></u> | null | null | Liberalism K | 1,559,486 | 8 | 125,979 | ./documents/hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | 659,573 | N | Glenbrooks | 3 | Westwood SC | Andrew Halverson | 1AC - Diaoyu
1NC - Framework Liberalism K Case Turns
2NC - Framework
1NR - Case Turns
2NR - Framework | hspolicy16/IsidoreNewman/AgLy/Isidore%20Newman-Agrawal-Lynch-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round3.docx | null | 55,947 | AgLy | Isidore Newman AgLy | null | Ra..... | Ag..... | Ro..... | Ly..... | 20,149 | IsidoreNewman | Isidore Newman | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,144 | Text: The United States federal government should condition …The MANDATES of the PLAN…..on the People’s Republic of China agreeing to the Republic of India’s entrance into the Nuclear Suppliers Group | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Text: The United States federal government should condition …The MANDATES of the PLAN…..on the People’s Republic of China agreeing to the Republic of India’s entrance into the Nuclear Suppliers Group</h4> | Earthquakes neg | null | NSG CP | 1,560,681 | 1 | 125,926 | ./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | 657,858 | N | Dead prez | 1 | EARTHQUAKES aka walter payton ww | Lay judge RIP | went for T2 and ptx
also read NSG Consult Japan T QPQ and Inherency | hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Dead%20prez-Round1.docx | null | 55,804 | GoSc | Glenbrook South GoSc | null | Dy..... | Go..... | Mi..... | Sc..... | 20,117 | GlenbrookSouth | Glenbrook South | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
Subsets and Splits