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3,782,945	Contention 2: Solvency	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><strong>Contention 2: Solvency</h4></strong>	null	1AC	1AC v 3.0	1,560,595	1	125,780	./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	655,495	A	Casady	1	Casady	Julia the dog	1AC MAR	hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	null	55,540	ThHo	Casady ThHo	null	An.....	Th.....	El.....	Ho.....	20,062	Casady	Casady	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,946	US pressures on rights in every conversation with Xi	Lewis 16	Lewis 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}	null	null	Today, the impending change in presidents presents an opportune time to reflect on the AND the United States is working to regain its moral authority in the world.	163	<h4>US pressures on rights in <u>every</u> conversation with Xi </h4><p><strong>Lewis 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}</p><p>Today, the impending change in presidents presents an opportune time to reflect on the </p><p>AND</p><p>the United States is working to regain its moral authority in the world. </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Preempts	1,560,597	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,947	1. Interpretation: The aff has to be unconditional --- qpqs are not engagement.	Smith, 2005	Smith, 2005(Karen E, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics, “Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” May 2005, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14)	Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state engagement entail building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking of perceived benefits to the fulfilment of conditions Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy conditionality more of a top-down strategy	Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with another state engagement entail building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking of benefits to the fulfilment of conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings	First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economy ic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy	1,393	<h4>1. Interpretation: The aff has to be unconditional --- qpqs are not engagement. </h4><p><u><strong>Smith, 2005</u></strong>(Karen E, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics, “Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” May 2005, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14)</p><p>First, a few definitions. ‘<u><strong><mark>Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with</mark> the government and/or civil society and/or business community of <mark>another state</u></strong></mark>. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economy ic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of <u><strong><mark>engagement entail</u></strong></mark> primarily <u><strong><mark>building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment</u></strong></mark> in particular. Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19‘<u><strong><mark>Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking</u></strong></mark>, by a state or international organisation, <u><strong><mark>of</mark> perceived <mark>benefits</u></strong></mark> to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) <u><strong><mark>to the fulfilment of</u></strong></mark> economic and/or political <u><strong><mark>conditions</u></strong>. ‘<u><strong>Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions</mark>; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions</u></strong> (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 <u><strong>To put it simply, <mark>engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings</u></strong></mark>. In another way of looking at it, <u><strong>engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy</u></strong> to induce change in another country, <u><strong>conditionality more of a top-down strategy</p></u></strong>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	T Must be QPQ	164,630	239	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,948	The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.</h4>	null	1AC	1AC — Plan	1,560,598	1	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,949	But those conversations fail absent the aff – plan creates cohesion and clarity across the executive	Lewis 16	Lewis 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}	How should the incoming president approach rights in the context of the bilateral AND over sheer quantity	null	How then should the incoming president approach human rights in the context of the bilateral AND discussing human rights over the sheer quantity of times human rights are mentioned.	181	<h4>But those conversations fail absent the aff – plan creates <u>cohesion</u> and <u>clarity</u> across the <u>executive</u> </h4><p><strong>Lewis 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR<u>}</p><p>How</u> then <u>should the</u> <u><strong>incoming president</strong> approach</u> human <u>rights in the context of the bilateral </p><p>AND</p><p></u>discussing human rights <u>over</u> the <u>sheer quantity</u> of times human rights are mentioned. </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Preempts	1,560,599	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,950	2. Neg ground - QPQ affs ensure that any aff can just tie a different quo to the quid every aff debate and read advantages based on that --- all of their limits and ground args will apply.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>2. Neg ground</u> - QPQ affs ensure that any aff can just tie a different quo to the quid every aff debate and read advantages based on that --- all of their limits and ground args will apply.</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	T Must be QPQ	1,560,600	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,951	Plan solves – Mutually Assured Restraint institutionalizes communication, confidence building, and verification mechanisms which removes uncertainty and preemptive capabilities.	Etzioni 7/7	Etzioni 7/7	That China’s economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military Above all, China has developed a series of A2/AD weapons capable of preventing the U S from protecting Taiwan and Japan or exercising free navigation in the region; these developments are viewed as a challenge to the United States’ position in the region. In response, the United States developed the Air–Sea Battle concept It seeks to build ships and weapons that can neutralize Chinese A2/AD Critics have been alarmed that the A S B calls for striking anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such an attack is likely to result in full-fledged war rather than a local skirmish If current trends continue, with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war may be proven correct. For this reason, curbing tensions and military buildups both objectives of mutually assured restraint are paramount. As a paradigm of action, mutually assured restraint seeks to inject substance into the vague phrases mouthed by both powers: China aims to have a “new model of major-country relations” with the United States, and the United States seeks to build a “cooperative partnership” with China Mutually assured restraint is based on mutual respect confidence building, and new institutionalized arrangements that move both powers away from situations that could escalate into major conflicts each side would limit its military buildup and use of coercive diplomacy as long as the other side does the same. China would be free to take the steps it deems necessary for self-defense and maintenance of its relationships without threatening other nations or international commons. At the same time, the U S would be free to take the steps it believes are necessary to preserve self-defense, its obligations to allies and the international order. Critics might suggest self-restraint would be anathema to the militaries of both However, self-restraint defined as not impulse but rather deliberating before acting For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward Self-restraint can be verified by the other side, is not externally imposed restraint There is a precedent for mutually assured restraint this follows Ronald Reagan’s line “trust but verify,” reflected in START	China has developed A2/AD weapons capable of preventing the U S from protecting Taiwan and Japan these are viewed as a challenge to the U S In response, the U S developed A S B It seeks to build ships and weapons that can neutralize A2/AD A S B calls for striking anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such attack is kely to result in full-fledged war with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war may be correct curbing tensions and military buildups—both objectives of m a r are paramount m a r seeks to inject substance in the phrases mouthed by both powers and is based on mutual respect confidence building, and new institutionalized arrangements that move both away from situations that could escalate each side would limit military buildup and coercive diplomacy China would be free to take steps for self-defense and maintenance of its relationships At the same time, the U S would take the steps necessary to preserve self-defense to allies and the international order Self-restraint follows trust but verify reflected in START	(Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook) That China’s economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military. Its annual GDP percentage growth rate is still more than twice that of the United States’ GDP in 2012 despite a recent slowdown.6 Above all, China has developed a series of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons reportedly capable of preventing the United States from effectively protecting Taiwan and Japan or exercising free navigation in the region; these developments are viewed by the U.S. military as a challenge to the United States’ position in the region. The most prominent example of these A2/AD weapons is anti-ship missiles, which cost little and can incapacitate the expensive American aircraft carriers that represent a key component of U.S. power projection. In response, the United States developed the Air–Sea Battle concept.7 It seeks to build faster, smaller ships and develop weapons—including direct energy arms, a type of laser that if positioned on ships could “burn” incoming missiles—that can neutralize the new Chinese A2/AD ones. Critics have been particularly alarmed that, because direct energy arms have yet to be developed, the Air–Sea Battle concept calls for striking anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such an attack is more likely to result in full-fledged war with China rather than a local skirmish over control of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.8 If current trends continue, with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war between a rising power and an established one may be proven correct. For this reason, curbing tensions and capping military buildups—both objectives of mutually assured restraint—are paramount. As a paradigm of action, mutually assured restraint seeks to inject substance into the vague phrases mouthed by both powers: China aims to have a “new model of major-country relations” with the United States, and the United States seeks to build a “cooperative partnership” with China.9 Mutually assured restraint is a foreign policy based on mutual respect, a quest for confidence building, and a set of new institutionalized arrangements that would move both powers away from situations that could escalate into major conflicts. Accordingly, each side would limit its own military buildup and use of coercive diplomacy as long as the other side does the same. Furthermore, these self-restraint measures would be vetted in ways spelled out below. Thus, China would be free to take the steps it deems necessary for its self-defense and the maintenance of its ally relationships without threatening other nations or the international commons. At the same time, the United States would be free to take the steps it believes are necessary to preserve its self-defense, its obligations to its allies in the region, and the international order. Critics of mutually assured restraint might suggest that any strategy that includes the term “self-restraint” would be anathema to the militaries of both the United States and China. However, self-restraint—defined as not yielding to impulse but rather deliberating before acting and having the capacity to choose a course of action rather than following urges—is a mark of civilization. For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling the forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward unprepared at the slightest provocation. Self-restraint also involves refraining from going “a bridge too far,” outrunning supply lines, or exhausting one’s stock of ammunition.10 Self-restraint, albeit of the kind that can be verified by the other side, is not to be conflated with externally imposed restraint, which is frustrating as is typical for imposed limitations. There is a precedent for one element of mutually assured restraint, that of mutual vetting. In this sense mutually assured restraint follows President Ronald Reagan’s line “trust but verify,” a concept whose value is reflected in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and New Start), the vetted treaties between the United States and Russia that limit strategic weapons. That both nations agreed to help each other verify the limitations each nation imposed on strategic forces was an essential element of both treaties. Aside from relying on satellite surveillance for verification, START stipulates on-site inspections in the United States by Russian officials and vice-versa, including examinations of the location and number of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads.11	4,679	<h4><strong>Plan solves – Mutually Assured Restraint institutionalizes communication, confidence building, and verification mechanisms which removes uncertainty and preemptive capabilities.</h4><p>Etzioni 7/7</p><p></strong>(Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook)</p><p><u>That China’s economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military</u>. Its annual GDP percentage growth rate is still more than twice that of the United States’ GDP in 2012 despite a recent slowdown.6 <u>Above all, <mark>China has developed</mark> a series of</u> anti-access/area denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u></mark>) <u><mark>weapons</u></mark> reportedly <u><mark>capable of preventing the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>from</u></mark> effectively <u><mark>protecting Taiwan and Japan</mark> or exercising free navigation in the region; <mark>these</mark> developments <mark>are viewed</u></mark> by the U.S. military <u><mark>as a challenge to the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates’ position in the region.</u> The most prominent example of these A2/AD weapons is anti-ship missiles, which cost little and can incapacitate the expensive American aircraft carriers that represent a key component of U.S. power projection. <u><mark>In response, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>developed</mark> the <mark>A</mark>ir–<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle concept</u>.7<mark> <u>It seeks to build</mark> </u>faster, smaller<u> <mark>ships and</mark> </u>develop<u> <mark>weapons</u></mark>—including direct energy arms, a type of laser that if positioned on ships could “burn” incoming missiles—<u><mark>that can neutralize</u></mark> the new <u>Chinese <mark>A2/AD</u></mark> ones. <u>Critics have been</u> particularly <u>alarmed that</u>, because direct energy arms have yet to be developed, <u>the <mark>A</u></mark>ir–<u><mark>S</u></mark>ea <u><mark>B</u></mark>attle concept <u><mark>calls for <strong>striking anti-ship missiles</strong> on the <strong>Chinese</strong> <strong>mainland</strong>. Such</mark> an <mark>attack is</u></mark> more <u>li<mark>kely to result <strong>in full-fledged war</u></strong></mark> with China <u>rather than a local skirmish</u> over control of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.8 <u>If current trends continue, <mark>with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war</u></mark> between a rising power and an established one <u><strong><mark>may be</mark> proven <mark>correct</strong></mark>. For this reason, <mark>curbing tensions and</u></mark> capping <u><mark>military buildups</u>—<u>both objectives of m</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>r</mark>estraint</u>—<u><strong><mark>are paramount</strong></mark>. As a paradigm of action, <mark>m</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>r</mark>estraint <mark>seeks to inject substance in</mark>to <mark>the</mark> vague <mark>phrases mouthed by both powers</mark>: China aims to have a “new model of major-country relations” with the United States, <mark>and</mark> the United States seeks to build a “cooperative partnership” with China</u>.9 <u>Mutually assured restraint <mark>is</u></mark> a foreign policy <u><mark>based on <strong>mutual respect</u></strong></mark>, a quest for <u><strong><mark>confidence building</strong>, and</u></mark> a set of <u><strong><mark>new institutionalized arrangements</strong> that</mark> </u>would <u><mark>move both</mark> powers <mark>away from situations that could escalate </mark>into major conflicts</u>. Accordingly, <u><mark>each side would limit</mark> its</u> own <u><mark>military buildup and</mark> use of <mark>coercive diplomacy</mark> as long as the other side does the same. </u>Furthermore, these self-restraint measures would be vetted in ways spelled out below. Thus, <u><mark>China would be free to take</mark> the <mark>steps</mark> it deems necessary <mark>for</mark> </u>its<u> <mark>self-defense and</u></mark> the <u><mark>maintenance of its</u></mark> ally <u><mark>relationships</mark> without threatening other nations or </u>the <u>international commons<strong>. <mark>At the same </strong>time, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>would</mark> be free to <mark>take the steps</mark> it believes are <mark>necessary to preserve</u></mark> its <u><mark>self-defense</mark>, its obligations <mark>to</u></mark> its <u><mark>allies</u></mark> in the region, <u><mark>and the international order</mark>. Critics</u> of mutually assured restraint <u>might suggest</u> that any strategy that includes the term “<u>self-restraint</u>” <u>would be anathema to the militaries of both</u> the United States and China. <u>However, self-restraint</u>—<u>defined as not</u> yielding to <u>impulse but rather <strong>deliberating before acting</u></strong> and having the capacity to choose a course of action rather than following urges—is a mark of civilization. <u>For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling</u> the <u>forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward</u> unprepared at the slightest provocation. Self-restraint also involves refraining from going “a bridge too far,” outrunning supply lines, or exhausting one’s stock of ammunition.10 <u><mark>Self-restraint</u></mark>, albeit of the kind that <u>can be verified by the other side, <strong>is not</strong> </u>to be conflated with<u> <strong>externally imposed restraint</u></strong>, which is frustrating as is typical for imposed limitations. <u><strong>There is a precedent</strong> for</u> one element of <u>mutually assured restraint</u>, that of mutual vetting. In <u>this</u> sense mutually assured restraint <u><mark>follows</u></mark> President <u>Ronald Reagan’s line “<strong><mark>trust but verify</strong></mark>,”</u> a concept whose value is <u><mark>reflected in</mark> </u>the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (<u><mark>START</u></mark> I and New Start), the vetted treaties between the United States and Russia that limit strategic weapons. That both nations agreed to help each other verify the limitations each nation imposed on strategic forces was an essential element of both treaties. Aside from relying on satellite surveillance for verification, START stipulates on-site inspections in the United States by Russian officials and vice-versa, including examinations of the location and number of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads.11</p>	null	1AC	1AC v 3.0	1,560,338	5	125,780	./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	655,495	A	Casady	1	Casady	Julia the dog	1AC MAR	hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	null	55,540	ThHo	Casady ThHo	null	An.....	Th.....	El.....	Ho.....	20,062	Casady	Casady	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,952	Contention One: Nuclear War	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>Contention One: Nuclear War</h4></u>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	1,560,601	1	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,953	Contention Two: China/US Coop	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Contention Two: <u>China/US Coop</h4></u>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,602	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,954	3. Predictability – Smith has clear intent to define—tacking on a non t part makes debates unpredictable	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>3. Predictability</u> – Smith has clear intent to define—tacking on a non t part makes debates unpredictable</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	T Must be QPQ	1,560,603	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,955	China says yes – plan is flexible, mutually beneficial, and resolves the primary security concerns of both countries.	Etzioni 7/7	Etzioni 7/7	” Routledge Publishing, eBook) China is highly dependent on maritime trade. China sees itself as vulnerable because the American naval presence gives the U S the ability to block these imports Some openly discuss the option of a blockade, which is considered moderate relative to the Air–Sea Battle concept In response to these concerns China increased its naval presence and developed a network of ports some Chinese view American opposition as attempts to contain China under mutually assured restraint the United States would assume unless clear evidence is presented that extending pathways will make China less inclined to build up its military, particularly the naval forces Therefore, China’s creation of pathways would be a winwin situation China holds that it needs A2/AD weapons for self-defense Meanwhile, the U S views these weapons as a threat to its obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states Both powers should agree to limit their A2/AD missiles. These should be verified using methods agreed upon by both parties Furthermore, small numbe, such as Japan, thereby rs of defensive missiles could be provided to other nations in the region curbing one source of the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military the number of anti-ship missiles have bearing on whether they are classed as offensive or defensive weapons Critics may argue that China began its buildup from a weaker position thus even-handed restraints would lock China into military inferiority. However, allowances might be made for this difference by permitting China to place a limited number of short-range anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves Countermoves by the United States would be impossible Mutually assured restraint assumes the opposite, holding that if China restrains its military buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States’ and China’s military capabilities while defusing overall tensions.	China is dependent on maritime trade. China sees itself as vulnerable because American naval presence gives the U S the ability to block imports Some openly discuss a blockade, which is considered moderate relative to A S B In response ina increased its naval presence some Chinese view America as attempts to contain China mutually assured restraint will make China less inclined to build up its military Therefore, China’s creation of pathways would be a winwin China holds it needs A2/AD weapons for defense Meanwhile, the U S views these weapons as a threat Both powers should agree to limit A2/AD missiles. These should be verified by both parties small numbe rs of defensive missiles could be provided to nations in the region curbing the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military the number of missiles have bearing on whether they are classed as offensive or defensive Critics may argue that restraints would lock China into military inferiority. However, allowances might be made by permitting China to place a limited number of anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves M a r assumes that if China restrains its buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby defusing overall tensions.	(Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,” Routledge Publishing, eBook) China is highly dependent on imports of raw materials and energy, a great deal of which comes from maritime trade. China sees itself as highly vulnerable because the strong American naval presence in the region gives the United States the ability to readily block these imports.31 Some American commentators openly discuss the option of such a blockade, which is considered a moderate way of confronting China relative to the Air–Sea Battle concept.32 In response to these concerns and as a result of its broader interest in commercial expansion, China increased its naval presence in the South China Sea and developed a network of ports—termed the “string of pearls”—in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.33 Additionally, China attempted to reduce the country’s reliance on shipping lanes by developing plans, including new Silk Roads, for transporting oil and gas resources by land.34 Indeed, a system of roads, railways, and pipelines now extends across continental Asia.35 Some Americans view these pathways as a sign of China’s expansionist tendencies and interest in asserting global dominance.36 Meanwhile, some Chinese view American opposition to select pathways (for instance, a pipeline from Iran to China) as attempts to contain China’s growth. However, under mutually assured restraint the United States would assume—unless clear evidence is presented to the contrary—that extending land-based pathways for the flow of energy resources and raw materials will make China less inclined to build up its military, particularly the naval forces needed to secure ocean pathways. Therefore, China’s creation of a system of pathways would be considered a winwin situation for both powers. Limiting Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) Weapons China holds that it needs Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) weapons, especially anti-ship missiles, for self-defense.37 Meanwhile, the United States views these weapons—which are designed to gain control of a territory and limit one’s adversary’s ability to conduct military operations there—as a threat to its ability to discharge its obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states as well as the ability to freely navigate in the region.38 Both powers should agree to limit the number and range of their A2/AD missiles. These limitations should be verified using methods agreed upon by both parties. Such vetting could entail satellite surveillance or mutual inspections of the kind provided by START. Furthermore, small numbe, such as Japan, thereby rs of short-range, defensive missiles could also be provided to other nations in the region curbing one recent source of the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military forces. The idea that A2/AD weapons should be limited has been criticized on the grounds that it is difficult to differentiate defensive from offensive weapons.39 Although it is possible to imagine circumstances in which defensive arms would aid an offensive strategy, there are clearly differences between the two. Indeed, a particular weapons system may be classified based on whether it is more efficient as an offensive weapon or a defensive one. For example, although tanks can serve defensive purposes, they are much more effective for offensive purposes.40 Similarly, international relations scholars have pointed out that “nearly all historical advances in military mobility—chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor trucks, aircraft, mobile bridging equipment—are generally considered to have favored the offense, while major counter-mobility innovations—moats, barbed wire, tank traps, land mines—have favored defense.”41 Similarly, the range, placement, and number of anti-ship missiles have bearing on whether they are more accurately classed as offensive or defensive weapons. If their range and number are limited and they are placed on a nation’s shorelines it is likely that they are meant to ward off an attack and are defensive in nature. If an inordinate number of long-range missiles are placed on ships or outlying islands it is more likely that they are offensive. Mutual surveillance, already in place, can help determine whether the placement and range of these weapons is more defensive, and thus evidence of restraint, or offensive. Critics may argue that China began its military buildup from a much weaker position than the United States, and thus even-handed restraints would lock China into perpetual military inferiority. However, allowances might be made for this difference by permitting China to place a limited number of short-range anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves by the United States. Countermoves by the United States would be impossible if the number, range, and position of the anti-ship missiles were clearly associated with an offensive stance. Additionally, critics’ conclusions assume that the best way for a weaker nation to respond to differences in military prowess is to dedicate its resources to a military buildup rather than to urgent domestic needs. Mutually assured restraint assumes the opposite, holding that if China restrains its military buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States’ and China’s military capabilities while defusing overall tensions.	5,496	<h4>China says yes – plan is <u>flexible</u>, <u>mutually beneficial</u>, and resolves the primary security concerns of <u>both countries</u><strong>. </h4><p>Etzioni 7/7</p><p></strong>(Amitai, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, "Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box ,<u>” Routledge Publishing, eBook)</p><p><mark>China is</mark> highly <mark>dependent on</u></mark> imports of raw materials and energy, a great deal of which comes from <u><mark>maritime trade. China sees itself as</mark> </u>highly <u><mark>vulnerable because</mark> the</u> strong <u><mark>American naval presence</u></mark> in the region <u><mark>gives the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>the ability to</u></mark> readily <u><mark>block</mark> these <mark>imports</u></mark>.31 <u><mark>Some</u></mark> American commentators <u><mark>openly discuss</mark> the option of</u> such <u><mark>a blockade, <strong>which is considered</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>moderate</u></strong></mark> way of confronting China <u><strong><mark>relative to</mark> the <mark>A</mark>ir–<mark>S</mark>ea <mark>B</mark>attle concept</u></strong>.32 <u><mark>In response</mark> to these concerns</u> and as a result of its broader interest in commercial expansion, <u>Ch<mark>ina increased its naval presence</mark> </u>in the South China Sea <u>and developed a network of ports</u>—termed the “string of pearls”—in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.33 Additionally, China attempted to reduce the country’s reliance on shipping lanes by developing plans, including new Silk Roads, for transporting oil and gas resources by land.34 Indeed, a system of roads, railways, and pipelines now extends across continental Asia.35 Some Americans view these pathways as a sign of China’s expansionist tendencies and interest in asserting global dominance.36 Meanwhile, <u><mark>some Chinese view America</mark>n opposition</u> to select pathways (for instance, a pipeline from Iran to China) <u><mark>as attempts to contain China</u></mark>’s growth. However, <u>under <mark>mutually assured restraint</mark> the United States would assume</u>—<u>unless clear evidence is presented</u> to the contrary—<u>that extending</u> land-based <u>pathways</u> for the flow of energy resources and raw materials <u><mark>will make China less inclined to build up its military<strong></mark>, particularly the naval forces</u></strong> needed to secure ocean pathways. <u><mark>Therefore, China’s creation of</u></mark> a system of <u><mark>pathways would be</u></mark> considered <u><mark>a winwin</mark> situation</u> for both powers. Limiting Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) Weapons <u><mark>China holds</mark> that <mark>it needs</u></mark> Anti-Access/Area Denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u></mark>) <u><mark>weapons</u></mark>, especially anti-ship missiles, <u><mark>for</mark> self-<mark>defense</u></mark>.37 <u><mark>Meanwhile, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>views these weapons</u></mark>—which are designed to gain control of a territory and limit one’s adversary’s ability to conduct military operations there—<u><mark>as a threat</mark> to its</u> ability to discharge its <u>obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states</u> as well as the ability to freely navigate in the region.38 <u><mark>Both powers should agree to limit</mark> </u>the number and range of <u>their <mark>A2/AD missiles. These</u></mark> limitations <u><mark>should be verified</mark> using methods <strong>agreed upon <mark>by both parties</u></strong></mark>. Such vetting could entail satellite surveillance or mutual inspections of the kind provided by START. <u>Furthermore, <mark>small numbe</mark>, such as Japan, thereby <mark>rs of</mark> </u>short-range, <u><mark>defensive missiles could</u></mark> also <u><mark>be provided to</mark> other <mark>nations in the region</mark> <mark>curbing</mark> one </u>recent<u> source of <mark>the pressure on China’s neighbors to build up their military</mark> </u>forces. The idea that A2/AD weapons should be limited has been criticized on the grounds that it is difficult to differentiate defensive from offensive weapons.39 Although it is possible to imagine circumstances in which defensive arms would aid an offensive strategy, there are clearly differences between the two. Indeed, a particular weapons system may be classified based on whether it is more efficient as an offensive weapon or a defensive one. For example, although tanks can serve defensive purposes, they are much more effective for offensive purposes.40 Similarly, international relations scholars have pointed out that “nearly all historical advances in military mobility—chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor trucks, aircraft, mobile bridging equipment—are generally considered to have favored the offense, while major counter-mobility innovations—moats, barbed wire, tank traps, land mines—have favored defense.”41 Similarly, <u><mark>the</u></mark> range, placement, and <u><mark>number of</mark> anti-ship <mark>missiles have bearing on whether they are</u></mark> more accurately <u><mark>classed as offensive or defensive</mark> weapons</u>. If their range and number are limited and they are placed on a nation’s shorelines it is likely that they are meant to ward off an attack and are defensive in nature. If an inordinate number of long-range missiles are placed on ships or outlying islands it is more likely that they are offensive. Mutual surveillance, already in place, can help determine whether the placement and range of these weapons is more defensive, and thus evidence of restraint, or offensive. <u><mark>Critics may argue that</mark> China began its</u> military <u>buildup from a</u> much <u>weaker position</u> than the United States, and <u>thus even-handed <mark>restraints would lock China into</u></mark> perpetual <u><mark>military inferiority. <strong>However</strong>, allowances might be made </mark>for this difference <mark>by permitting China to place a limited number of</mark> short-range <mark>anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves</u></mark> by the United States. <u>Countermoves by the United States would be impossible</u> if the number, range, and position of the anti-ship missiles were clearly associated with an offensive stance. Additionally, critics’ conclusions assume that the best way for a weaker nation to respond to differences in military prowess is to dedicate its resources to a military buildup rather than to urgent domestic needs. <u><mark>M</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>r</mark>estraint <mark>assumes</mark> the opposite, holding <mark>that if China restrains its</mark> military <mark>buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the “home front”—thereby</mark> reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States’ and China’s military capabilities while <mark>defusing overall tensions.</p></u></mark>	null	1AC	1AC v 3.0	1,560,343	5	125,780	./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	655,495	A	Casady	1	Casady	Julia the dog	1AC MAR	hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	null	55,540	ThHo	Casady ThHo	null	An.....	Th.....	El.....	Ho.....	20,062	Casady	Casady	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,956	Resolving underlying rights fights vital to alliance bandwidth – General US and China relations successfully prevent prolif – immediacy key	Lewis citing Clinton and Posner 16	Lewis citing Clinton and Posner 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}	Clinton stated U S is working to regain moral authority	null	Turning back the clock to 2009, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that AND the United States is working to regain its moral authority in the world.	160	<h4>Resolving <u>underlying</u> rights fights vital to <u>alliance bandwidth</u> – <u>General</u> US and China relations successfully prevent <u>prolif</u> – immediacy key</h4><p><strong>Lewis citing Clinton and Posner 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}</p><p>Turning back the clock to 2009, then Secretary of State Hillary <u>Clinton stated</u> that </p><p>AND</p><p>the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>is working to regain</u> its <u>moral authority</u> in the world. </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,605	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,957	First, China is hardening its position on Taiwan. This risks a major crisis.	White 15	White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)	It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the E C S and S C S have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture U S -China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949 The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify After President Ma took office in 2008 he sought to build relations with Beijing But Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead to political reunification It is now widely expected that Ma will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Ma That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority China's new leadership under President Xi seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening	It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again it has slipped into the background as tensions in the E and S C S have posed more urgent threats But questions about Taiwan's future could drive Asia into a major crisis Taiwan's status has been highly sensitive since 1949 Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo Ma sought to build relations with Beijing Ma's plans sparked massive demonstrations the new leader will be more assertive That alarms Beijing China's leadership under Xi seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity its stance on Taiwan is hardening	It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again. In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture United States-China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis. Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country. Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify. In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America. These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead sought to build relations with Beijing, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically. And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong. But that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead inexorably to precisely the political reunification that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections. It is now widely expected that when Mr Ma's term as president ends next year, he will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Mr Ma has been. That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority. China's new leadership under President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening.	3,466	<h4><u>First</u>, China is <u>hardening</u> its position on Taiwan. This risks <u>a major crisis</u>. </h4><p><strong>White 15</strong> — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p><u><mark>It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again</u></mark>.</p><p><u>In the past few years, <mark>it has slipped</mark> quietly <mark>into the background as tensions in the E</u></mark>ast <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea <u><mark>and S</u></mark>outh <u><mark>C</u></mark>hina <u><mark>S</u></mark>ea <u><mark>have posed more urgent threats</mark> to regional peace and stability. <mark>But</mark> now old <mark>questions about Taiwan's</mark> longer-term <mark>future</mark> are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan <mark>could</mark> rupture U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u>-China relations and <mark>drive Asia into <strong>a major crisis</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Taiwan's status has been</mark> a <strong><mark>highly sensitive</strong></mark> issue between Washington and Beijing ever <mark>since 1949</u></mark>, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. <u>The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. <mark>Taiwan was left in <strong>an awkward limbo</strong></mark>, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country</u>.</p><p><u>Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify</u>.</p><p>In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America.</p><p>These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo.</p><p><u>After President <mark>Ma</u></mark> Ying-jeou <u>took office in 2008</u>, <u>he</u> stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead <u><mark>sought to build relations with Beijing</u></mark>, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically.</p><p>And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong.</p><p><u>But</u> that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr <u><mark>Ma's plans</mark> for closer economic links with the mainland <mark>sparked massive</mark> "Sunflower" <mark>demonstrations</mark> in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead</u> inexorably <u>to</u> precisely the <u>political reunification</u> that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections.</p><p><u>It is now widely expected that</u> when Mr <u>Ma</u>'s term as president ends next year, he <u>will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing</u>. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, <u><mark>the new leader will</mark> almost certainly <mark>be more assertive</mark> than</u> Mr <u>Ma</u> has been.</p><p><u><mark>That</mark> naturally <strong><mark>alarms Beijing</strong></mark>, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China's</mark> new <mark>leadership under</mark> President <mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping <u><mark>seems <strong>increasingly impatient</strong> to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's <strong>centuries of humiliation</strong> and <strong>increasingly confident</strong> of its growing power to act with impunity</mark>. Already there are signs that <mark>its stance on Taiwan is <strong>hardening</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	66,508	151	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,958	4. Overlimiting - no one author says that we should ever do the plan and attach it to a specific qpq --- they ensure abusive affs	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>4. Overlimiting</u> - no one author says that we should ever do the plan and attach it to a specific qpq --- they ensure abusive affs</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	T Must be QPQ	1,560,604	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,959	nmlhzThe United States isn’t going to depart from Asia-Pacific, but securitization and the offensive approach the US has now creates a self-fulfilling prophecy – initiating an official policy of Mutually Assured Restraint ends the Air-Sea Battle strategy while maintaining regional capability and assurance	Gvosdev 14	Gvosdev 14	(Nikolas, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, a columnist for World Politics Review, and a blogger at Ethics & International Affairs, "The Ethics of Avoiding Conflict with China," https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/the-ethics-of-avoiding-conflict-with-china/) a strategy that ostensibly seeks to prevent hostilities between China and the United States might inadvertently provoking them a concern voiced by Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe Given that the United States is not prepared to depart the Asia-Pacific region and that China is not going to voluntarily halt its , is there a policy prescription that can avoid turning predictions of a Sino-American clash into a self-fulfilling prophecy Etzioni believes so a strategy of “mutually-assured restraint” where both sides limit their military build-up and coercive diplomacy as long as the other side limits itself in the same way—and the self-restraints are mutually vetted MAR is based on psychological gestures initiated by one nation will be reciprocated by others with the effect of reducing international tensions” and that “this tension reduction, in turn, will lessen the probability of international conflicts and wars. It seeks to build on the “Kennedy experiment” a period of time between June and November 1963 when unilateral measures were taken, first by the United States, then by the Soviet Union, to step back from their confrontational posture, which had nearly brought the world to the brink of nuclear war the previous year. These validated the assertion that creating the psychological space for the relaxation of tensions could channel the rivalry into more peaceful directions Skeptics fear that it calls for a withdrawal from East Asia however modern-day revolution in military affairs has given the United States the ability to engage in remote deterrence In contrast to any other great power, only the United States is able to place 100,000 troops 8,000 miles from home and sustain them indefinitely only the United States can launch aircraft from its own territory to strike anywhere on the globe; only the United States can surge massive naval task forces into any maritime domain in the world. As a result, the United States can afford to withdraw forces currently forward deployed in order to give Beijing the psychological space to, in turn, make concessions without jeopardizing America’s overall strategic position MAR might also make Beijing willing to negotiate verifiable limits on anti-ship missiles and other equipment that it deploys in an offensive capacity against neighbors. it could lead both countries agree to significant limitations on arms produced or deployed which could promote strategic stability The West does not have to “trust” the East or vice versa to lay down arms. The strategy . . . combines remote deterrence with inspection and observer forces. Its not based on trust, but on interest it is not a question of giving or breaking one’s word, but to verify and enforce commitments MAR could lay the basis for a diplomatic settlement of the outstanding maritime territorial claims in the South and East China seas there is an important precedent: the border disputes between the Soviet Union and China All outstanding territorial claims between Beijing and the Soviet Union were settled because created the psychological space needed to conduct meaningful negotiations and to reach compromise settlements.	the U S is not prepared to depart the Asia-Pacific China is not going to halt is there a policy that can avoid turning a Sino-American clash into a self-fulfilling prophecy a strategy of “mutually-assured restraint” where both limit their military and coercive diplomacy and the self-restraints are mutually vetted MAR is based on psychological gestures with the effect of reducing international tensions tension reduction, in turn lessen the probability of international conflicts and wars It seeks to build on the “Kennedy experiment”—a period when unilateral measures were taken which nearly brought the world to nuclear war These validated the assertion that creating the space for the relaxation of tensions could channel the rivalry into peaceful direction Skeptics fear it calls for withdrawal from East Asia however, revolution in military affairs has given the U S remote deterrence only the U S is able to place 100,000 troops and sustain them only the U S can launch aircraft anywhere on the globe; only the U S can surge massive naval forces into the world As a result the U S can afford to withdraw forces in order to give Beijing space in turn, make concessions—without jeopardizing America it could lead both countries to agree to limitations on arms produced or deployed which could promote stability. The strategy combines remote deterrence . with inspection and observer forces based on interest MAR could lay the basis for a diplomatic settlement territorial claims in S E C seas there is an important precedent	(Nikolas, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, a columnist for World Politics Review, and a blogger at Ethics & International Affairs, "The Ethics of Avoiding Conflict with China," https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/the-ethics-of-avoiding-conflict-with-china/) Ranged against these pessimists, such as John Mearsheimer, who see conflict (and with it a heightened risk of an armed clash) as inevitable, are the optimists (such as Aaron Friedberg), who maintain that a clash is indeed avoidable, and who argue for a robust U.S. “forward presence” and deep engagement in the area that will convince China of the futility of competing with the United States militarily and instead encourage accommodation. Some, such as Joseph Bosco, even argue for the United States to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and define clear red lines in the region so that China will not make any miscalculations that might lead to conflict.6 However, as former U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley noted in a speech in Beijing in 2013, this approach still carries the risk of a “potential confrontation between the militaries of the two countries—particularly their naval forces.”7 Indeed, just weeks after Hadley’s remarks a near-collision between U.S. and Chinese naval vessels in the South China Sea (which occurred in international waters as an American vessel shadowed the deployment of China’s new aircraft carrier) highlighted the very dangers he was warning about. So a strategy that ostensibly seeks to prevent hostilities between China and the United States might end up inadvertently provoking them—either setting up conditions for a new cold war or, even worse, for events to spiral out of control, as they did a century ago in the run-up to World War I, a concern voiced both by academics such as Margaret Macmillan and political leaders such as Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe.8 Given that the United States is not prepared to depart the Asia-Pacific region and that China is not going to voluntarily halt its rise as a great power, is there a policy prescription that can avoid turning predictions of a Sino-American clash into a self-fulfilling prophecy? Amitai Etzioni believes so. Drawing upon his earlier body of work developed at the height of the cold war—most notably The Hard Way to Peace (1962) and Winning Without War (1964)—Etzioni proposes what he terms a strategy of “mutually-assured restraint” (MAR) wherein “both sides limit their military build-up and coercive diplomacy as long as the other side limits itself in the same way—and the self-restraints are mutually vetted.”9 MAR is based on Etzioni’s longstanding contention that “psychological gestures initiated by one nation will be reciprocated by others with the effect of reducing international tensions” and that “this tension reduction, in turn, will lessen the probability of international conflicts and wars.”10 It seeks to build on what has been described as the “Kennedy experiment”—a period of time between June and November 1963 when unilateral measures were taken, first by the United States, then by the Soviet Union, to step back from their confrontational posture, which had nearly brought the world to the brink of nuclear war the previous year. These actions validated the assertion that creating the psychological space for the relaxation of tensions could lead to more substantive agreements designed to channel the U.S.-Soviet rivalry into more peaceful directions. While this fragile détente did not survive the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the overthrow of Nikita S. Khrushchev, elements of this approach resurfaced in the early 1970s and characterized the successful winding down of the cold war by the late 1980s. Skeptics of the mutually-assured restraint approach fear that it calls for a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, leaving a vacuum that many believe a rising China would be only too happy to fill. Etzioni has always believed, however, that the modern-day revolution in military affairs—including recent developments in transport, logistics, and targeting—has given the United States a unique luxury: the ability to engage in what he termed sixty years ago as “remote deterrence.” In contrast to any other great power, only the United States is able to place over 100,000 troops 8,000 miles from home and sustain them indefinitely under combat conditions; only the United States can launch aircraft from its own territory to strike targets anywhere on the globe; only the United States can surge massive naval task forces into any maritime domain in any part of the world. As a result, Etzioni has maintained, the United States can afford to withdraw forces that are currently forward deployed in the Western Pacific in order to give Beijing the psychological space to, in turn, make diplomatic concessions—without significantly jeopardizing America’s overall strategic position should China fail to respond to such overtures. Etzioni maintains that a redeployment would not expose the American strategic position in the Western Pacific to unnecessary risk—even though it could complicate matters for U.S. strategic planners—while other means of technical collection would make up any of the gaps in intelligence that termination of the existing ship and air patrols would entail. Etzioni hopes that MAR might also make Beijing more willing to negotiate verifiable limits on the number of anti-ship missiles and other pieces of military equipment that it currently deploys in an offensive capacity against Taiwan and other neighbors. This, in turn, could be followed by a U.S. commitment to keep its most advanced weapons systems out of the region. Over time, it could lead both countries to agree to significant limitations on various types of arms produced or deployed by either country, which in turn could help promote strategic stability. This approach is an outgrowth of Etzioni’s 1964 recommendations for moving the cold war away from its reliance on the balance of nuclear terror as the basis for avoiding conflict. This approach does not, however, ask either side to take any step based on faith alone. Indeed, as Etzioni argued The West does not have to “trust” the East or vice versa to lay down arms. The strategy . . . combines remote deterrence in third countries and a pure retaliatory posture . . . with inspection and observer forces. Its limitation to peaceful means is not based on trust, but on interest; it is not a question of giving or breaking one’s word, but of setting up the necessary machinery to verify and enforce commitments.11 With both sides pulling back their militaries, and thus reducing the prospects of an incident or accident that could spark confrontation, Etzioni is hopeful that MAR could lay the basis for a diplomatic settlement of the outstanding maritime territorial claims in the South and East China seas. If restraint prevails over a head-to-head approach—with the assumption being that the United States will back the claims of its allies to the hilt—Etzioni believes compromise solutions (including proposals for joint sovereignty over disputed islands or consortia to allocate resources to all claimants), which have been used to settle disputes over similarly contested territories in Europe and Eurasia, could similarly come to pass in East Asia. If the military postures now present in the area could be relaxed, it might be possible to discuss compromises, swaps, and collaborative regimes to share resources. Indeed, there is an important precedent: the seemingly-intractable border disputes between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which flared up into open conflict in 1969 and which were similarly judged to be insolvable, began to be seriously addressed after Mikhail Gorbachev took deliberate steps to reduce the Soviet military posture in the Far East. All outstanding territorial claims between Beijing and the successor states of the Soviet Union were settled during the 1990s—in part because the collapse of the USSR removed what was seen as an existential threat to the People’s Republic and created the psychological space needed to conduct meaningful negotiations and to reach compromise settlements.	8,258	<h4> nmlhz<strong>The United States isn’t going to depart from Asia-Pacific, but securitization and the offensive approach the US has now creates a self-fulfilling prophecy – initiating an official policy of Mutually Assured Restraint ends the Air-Sea Battle strategy while maintaining regional capability and assurance</h4><p>Gvosdev 14</p><p><u>(Nikolas, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, a columnist for World Politics Review, and a blogger at Ethics & International Affairs, "The Ethics of Avoiding Conflict with China," https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/the-ethics-of-avoiding-conflict-with-china/)</p><p></u></strong>Ranged against these pessimists, such as John Mearsheimer, who see conflict (and with it a heightened risk of an armed clash) as inevitable, are the optimists (such as Aaron Friedberg), who maintain that a clash is indeed avoidable, and who argue for a robust U.S. “forward presence” and deep engagement in the area that will convince China of the futility of competing with the United States militarily and instead encourage accommodation. Some, such as Joseph Bosco, even argue for the United States to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and define clear red lines in the region so that China will not make any miscalculations that might lead to conflict.6 However, as former U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley noted in a speech in Beijing in 2013, this approach still carries the risk of a “potential confrontation between the militaries of the two countries—particularly their naval forces.”7 Indeed, just weeks after Hadley’s remarks a near-collision between U.S. and Chinese naval vessels in the South China Sea (which occurred in international waters as an American vessel shadowed the deployment of China’s new aircraft carrier) highlighted the very dangers he was warning about. So <u>a strategy that ostensibly seeks to prevent hostilities between China and the United States might </u>end up <u>inadvertently provoking them</u>—either setting up conditions for a new cold war or, even worse, for events to spiral out of control, as they did a century ago in the run-up to World War I, <u>a concern voiced</u> both <u>by</u> academics such as Margaret Macmillan and political leaders such as <u>Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe</u>.8 <u>Given that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is not prepared to depart the Asia-Pacific</mark> region and that <mark>China is not going to</mark> voluntarily <mark>halt</mark> its </u>rise as a great power<u>, <mark>is there a <strong>policy</mark> prescription</strong> <mark>that can avoid turning</mark> predictions of <mark>a Sino-American clash <strong>into a self-fulfilling prophecy</u></strong></mark>? Amitai <u>Etzioni believes so</u>. Drawing upon his earlier body of work developed at the height of the cold war—most notably The Hard Way to Peace (1962) and Winning Without War (1964)—Etzioni proposes what he terms <u><mark>a strategy of “mutually-assured restraint”</mark> </u>(MAR) <u><mark>where</u></mark>in “<u><mark>both</mark> sides <mark>limit their military </mark>build-up <mark>and coercive diplomacy</mark> as long as the other side limits itself in the same way—<mark>and the self-restraints are mutually vetted</u></mark>.”9 <u><mark>MAR is based on</u></mark> Etzioni’s longstanding contention that “<u><mark>psychological gestures </mark>initiated by one nation will be reciprocated by others <mark>with the effect of reducing international tensions</mark>” and that “this <mark>tension reduction, in turn</mark>, will <mark>lessen the probability of international conflicts and wars</mark>.</u>”10 <u><mark>It seeks to build on</u></mark> what has been described as <u><mark>the “Kennedy experiment”</u>—<u>a period</mark> of time between June and November 1963 <mark>when unilateral measures were taken</mark>, first by the United States, then by the Soviet Union, to step back from their confrontational posture, <mark>which</mark> had <mark>nearly brought the world to </mark>the brink of <mark>nuclear war </mark>the previous year. <mark>These</u></mark> actions <u><mark>validated the assertion that creating the </mark>psychological <mark>space for the relaxation of tensions could</u></mark> lead to more substantive agreements designed to <u><mark>channel the</u></mark> U.S.-Soviet <u><strong><mark>rivalry into</mark> more <mark>peaceful direction</mark>s</u></strong>. While this fragile détente did not survive the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the overthrow of Nikita S. Khrushchev, elements of this approach resurfaced in the early 1970s and characterized the successful winding down of the cold war by the late 1980s. <u><mark>Skeptics</u></mark> of the mutually-assured restraint approach <u><mark>fear</mark> that <mark>it calls for</mark> a</u> U.S. <u><mark>withdrawal from East Asia</u></mark>, leaving a vacuum that many believe a rising China would be only too happy to fill. Etzioni has always believed, <u><mark>however</u>,</mark> that the <u>modern-day <mark>revolution in military affairs</u></mark>—including recent developments in transport, logistics, and targeting—<u><mark>has given the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u> a unique luxury: <u>the ability to engage in</u> what he termed sixty years ago as “<u><mark>remote deterrence</u></mark>.” <u>In contrast to any other great power, <mark>only the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is able to place</u></mark> over <u><mark>100,000 troops</mark> 8,000 miles from home <mark>and sustain them</mark> indefinitely</u> under combat conditions; <u><mark>only the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>can launch aircraft </mark>from its own territory to strike</u> targets <u><mark>anywhere on the globe; only the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>can surge massive naval</mark> task <mark>forces into </mark>any maritime domain in </u>any part of <u><mark>the world</mark>. <mark>As a result</mark>,</u> Etzioni has maintained, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>can afford to withdraw forces</u></mark> that are <u><strong>currently forward deployed</u></strong> in the Western Pacific <u><mark>in order to give Beijing</mark> the psychological <mark>space</mark> to, <mark>in turn, <strong>make</strong></mark> </u>diplomatic <u><strong><mark>concessions</u></strong>—<u>without</u></mark> significantly <u><mark>jeopardizing America</mark>’s overall strategic position</u> should China fail to respond to such overtures. Etzioni maintains that a redeployment would not expose the American strategic position in the Western Pacific to unnecessary risk—even though it could complicate matters for U.S. strategic planners—while other means of technical collection would make up any of the gaps in intelligence that termination of the existing ship and air patrols would entail. Etzioni hopes that <u>MAR might also make Beijing </u>more <u>willing to negotiate verifiable limits on</u> the number of <u>anti-ship missiles and other </u>pieces of military <u>equipment that it</u> currently <u>deploys in an offensive capacity <strong>against</strong> </u>Taiwan and other <u><strong>neighbors</strong>. </u>This, in turn, could be followed by a U.S. commitment to keep its most advanced weapons systems out of the region. Over time, <u><mark>it could lead both countries</u> to <u>agree to</mark> significant <mark>limitations on</u></mark> various types of <u><mark>arms produced or deployed</u></mark> by either country, <u><mark>which</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>could</u></mark> help <u><mark>promote</mark> strategic <mark>stability</u>.</mark> This approach is an outgrowth of Etzioni’s 1964 recommendations for moving the cold war away from its reliance on the balance of nuclear terror as the basis for avoiding conflict. This approach does not, however, ask either side to take any step based on faith alone. Indeed, as Etzioni argued <u>The West does not have to “trust” the East or vice versa to lay down arms. <mark>The strategy</mark> . . . <mark>combines remote deterrence</u></mark> in third countries and a pure retaliatory posture . . <mark>. <u><strong>with inspection and observer forces</strong></mark>. Its</u> limitation to peaceful means is <u>not <mark>based on</mark> trust, <strong>but on <mark>interest</u></strong></mark>; <u>it is not a question of giving or breaking one’s word, but </u>of setting up the necessary machinery <u>to verify and enforce commitments</u>.11 With both sides pulling back their militaries, and thus reducing the prospects of an incident or accident that could spark confrontation, Etzioni is hopeful that <u><mark>MAR could lay the basis for a diplomatic settlement </mark>of the outstanding maritime <mark>territorial claims in</mark> the <mark>S</mark>outh and <mark>E</mark>ast <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>seas</u></mark>. If restraint prevails over a head-to-head approach—with the assumption being that the United States will back the claims of its allies to the hilt—Etzioni believes compromise solutions (including proposals for joint sovereignty over disputed islands or consortia to allocate resources to all claimants), which have been used to settle disputes over similarly contested territories in Europe and Eurasia, could similarly come to pass in East Asia. If the military postures now present in the area could be relaxed, it might be possible to discuss compromises, swaps, and collaborative regimes to share resources. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>there is an important precedent</strong></mark>: the</u> seemingly-intractable <u>border disputes between the Soviet Union and</u> the People’s Republic of <u>China</u>, which flared up into open conflict in 1969 and which were similarly judged to be insolvable, began to be seriously addressed after Mikhail Gorbachev took deliberate steps to reduce the Soviet military posture in the Far East. <u>All outstanding territorial claims between Beijing and the</u> successor states of the <u>Soviet Union were settled</u> during the 1990s—in part <u>because </u>the collapse of the USSR removed what was seen as an existential threat to the People’s Republic and <u><strong>created the psychological space needed to conduct meaningful negotiations and to reach compromise settlements.</p></u></strong>	null	1AC	1AC v 3.0	142,974	27	125,780	./documents/hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	655,495	A	Casady	1	Casady	Julia the dog	1AC MAR	hspolicy16/Casady/ThHo/Casady-Throgmorton-Horton-Aff-Casady-Round1.docx	null	55,540	ThHo	Casady ThHo	null	An.....	Th.....	El.....	Ho.....	20,062	Casady	Casady	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,960	Prolif causes global nuclear war – empirics, clearly, aren’t predictive	Sokolski 9	Sokolski 9 (Henry, Executive Director – Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd”, Policy Review, June/July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)	new nuclear weapons contenders are likely to emerge in the next None of this, however, is inevitable.	null	Finally, several new nuclear weapons contenders are also likely to emerge in the next AND , would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.	148	<h4>Prolif causes <u>global nuclear war</u> – empirics, clearly, aren’t predictive </h4><p><strong>Sokolski 9</strong> (Henry, Executive Director – Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd”, Policy Review, June/July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html) </p><p>Finally, several <u>new nuclear weapons contenders are</u> also <u><strong>likely to emerge</strong> in the next </p><p></u>AND</p><p>, would ever want. <u><strong>None of this, however, is inevitable.</u></strong> </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	86,170	93	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,961	Second, political pressure in China will continue to grow — the CCP will be forced to act aggressively toward Taiwan.	Glaser 15	Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)	A common counterpoint is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification [P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U S from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses	it is hard to be confident that relations will remain good. Taiwan might elect a pro-independence government or China might ramp up pressures for unification [P]olitical pressures are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U S Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses	A common counterpoint to the argument above is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “[P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the United States from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses.”67	1,035	<h4><u>Second</u>, <u>political pressure in China</u> will continue to grow — the CCP will be <u>forced</u> to act aggressively toward Taiwan. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u>A common counterpoint</u> to the argument above <u>is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low</u>.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. <u>Although this argument has merit, <mark>it is hard to be confident that</mark> cross-strait <mark>relations will remain good. Taiwan might</mark> again <mark>elect a</mark> more <mark>pro-independence government</mark>, <mark>or China might ramp up pressures for unification</u></mark>. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “<u><strong><mark>[P]olitical pressures</mark> </strong>on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan <mark>are <strong>tremendous</strong> and <strong>growing</strong>. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>from selling weapons to Taiwan. <mark>Now, many believe that China should <strong>no longer tolerate</strong> such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP</u></mark> [Chinese Communist Party] <u><mark>is finding it <strong>increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses</u></strong></mark>.”67</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	1,651,053	456	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,962	5. Substantial checks abuse	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>5. Substantial</u> checks abuse</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	T Must be QPQ	1,560,606	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,963	Third, tensions are already rising because Taiwan’s new government refuses to accept the ‘92 consensus.	Reuters 16	Reuters 16 — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 26th, Available Online at http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html, Accessed 06-29-2016)	The Chinese government stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two China is deeply suspicious of Tsai as they suspect she will push for formal independence China has insisted she recognise the "1992 consensus" Because Taiwan has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped	The Chinese stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the new government to recognise the "one China" principle in the latest show of tension China is deeply suspicious of Tsai as they suspect she will push for formal independence Because Taiwan has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped	The Chinese government said on Saturday it had stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the self-ruled island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two. China, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, is deeply suspicious of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, who took office last month, as they suspect she will push for formal independence. Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace. But China has insisted she recognise something called the "1992 consensus" reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means. In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus. "Because the Taiwan side has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped," spokesman An Fengshan said.	1,269	<h4><u>Third</u>, tensions are <u>already rising</u> because Taiwan’s <u>new government</u> refuses to accept the <u>‘92 consensus</u>. </h4><p><strong>Reuters 16</strong> — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 26th, Available Online at http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p><u><mark>The Chinese</mark> government</u> said on Saturday it had <u><strong><mark>stopped a communication mechanism</strong> with Taiwan because of the refusal of the</u></mark> self-ruled <u>island's <mark>new government to recognise the "one China" principle</mark>, <mark>in <strong>the latest show of tension</strong></mark> between the two</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China</u></mark>, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, <u><mark>is deeply suspicious of</u></mark> Taiwan President <u><mark>Tsai</u></mark> Ing-wen, who took office last month, <u><mark>as they suspect she will <strong>push for formal independence</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace.</p><p>But <u>China has insisted she recognise</u> something called <u>the "1992 consensus"</u> reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means.</p><p>In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus.</p><p>"<u><mark>Because</u></mark> the <u><mark>Taiwan</u></mark> side <u><mark>has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus</u></mark>, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, <u><mark>the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism <strong>has already stopped</u></strong></mark>," spokesman An Fengshan said.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	1,651,053	456	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,964	Even if war isn’t purposeful, prolif causes miscalc – escalates	Kleiner 16	Kleiner 16 {Sam, postdoctoral fellow at Yale Law School, former Senior Policy Advisor for the US Trade Representative, former Adjunct Researcher at the RAND Corporation, J.D. (Yale Law School), D. Phil and M. Phil in International Relations (University of Oxford), B.A. in Political Science & American Studies (Northwestern University), “With His Finger on the Trigger,” 6/3, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/485504/#THUR}	comfort AND for nuclear war to break out, whether by design or by accident.	null	A nuclear-armed Trump is indeed a scary thought. But his apparent comfort AND for nuclear war to break out, whether by design or by accident.	141	<h4><strong>Even if war isn’t purposeful, prolif causes miscalc – escalates</h4><p>Kleiner 16 </strong>{Sam, postdoctoral fellow at Yale Law School, former Senior Policy Advisor for the US Trade Representative, former Adjunct Researcher at the RAND Corporation, J.D. (Yale Law School), D. Phil and M. Phil in International Relations (University of Oxford), B.A. in Political Science & American Studies (Northwestern University), “With His Finger on the Trigger,” 6/3, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/485504/#THUR<u>}</p><p></u>A nuclear-armed Trump is indeed a scary thought. But his apparent <u>comfort </p><p>AND</p><p>for</u> <u><strong>nuclear war</u></strong> <u>to break out, whether by design <strong>or by accident</strong>.</p></u>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	68,940	29	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,965	6. Reasonability—good is good enough, competiting interpretations causes a race to the most confined version of the topic	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>6. <u>Reasonability</u>—good is good enough, competiting interpretations causes a race to the most confined version of the topic</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	T Must be QPQ	1,560,607	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,966	Our interpretation is that the affirmative should defend the United States federal government increasing its economic and or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China as their advocacy—this does not mandate any particular means of impact calculus, but requires the defense of a topical action	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Our interpretation is that the affirmative should defend the United States federal government increasing its economic and or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China as their advocacy—this does not mandate any particular means of impact calculus, but requires the defense of a topical action</h4>	1nc	1	null	1,560,609	1	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,967	Independently – Aff ensures sustainable and successful law enforcement coop – China says yes because of significance of fugitives – absent the plan, US blocks coop because of rights fears	Lewis 16	Lewis 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}	China wants U S help: on hundred most wanted AND insistent on U.S. assistance	null	China wants the United States’ help: on the list of a hundred most wanted AND so insistent on U.S. assistance (Part A.2).	121	<h4>Independently – Aff ensures <u>sustainable</u> and <u>successful</u> law enforcement coop – China <u>says yes</u> because of significance of <u>fugitives</u> – absent the plan, US blocks coop because of <u>rights fears</h4><p></u><strong>Lewis 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR<u>}</p><p>China</u> <u><strong>wants</u></strong> the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates’ <u>help: on</u> the list of a <u>hundred most wanted </p><p>AND</p><p></u>so <u><strong>insistent</u></strong> <u>on U.S. assistance</u> (Part A.2).</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,611	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,968	Fourth, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — nuclear war is likely.	Littlefield and Lowther 15	Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)	While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U S and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U S To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its A2/AD strategy If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the U S may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks on China will include strikes against PLA command and control nodes the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon as a means of forcing de-escalation In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U S an outside aggressor, not China nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U S China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U S – far more is at stake for China than it is for the U S the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck Given that MAD is not part of China’s strategic thinking the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U S China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U S It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate	analysts believe a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action could incur the wrath of the U S To prevent the U.S. intervening China will turn to its A2/AD strategy If thwarted the U S may resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China Given the regime’s weakness and the probability that attacks will include strikes against PLA command and control nodes the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon In the view of China, a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as aggression far more is at stake for China than for the U S the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one Reunification is necessary for China to reach its goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests and the lengths to which China will ultimately go to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons China is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits China has not forgotten 96 nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate or capitulate	Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.	5,723	<h4><u>Fourth</u>, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — <u>nuclear war</u> is likely. </h4><p><strong>Littlefield and Lowther 15</strong> — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p>Possible Scenario</p><p><u>While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China is possible, some <mark>analysts believe</mark> that <mark>a conflict over Taiwan remains <strong>the most likely place</strong> where the PRC and</mark> the <mark>U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action</mark> on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination <mark>could incur the wrath of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u><mark>To prevent the U.S.</mark> from <mark>intervening</mark> in the region, <mark>China will</mark> certainly <mark>turn to its</u></mark> anti-access/area-denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u></mark>) <u><mark>strategy</u></mark>, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.</p><p><u><mark>If thwarted</mark> in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>may</mark> be tempted to <mark>resort to stronger measures and <strong>attack mainland China</u></strong></mark>. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. <u><mark>Given the regime’s</mark> relative <mark>weakness and the probability that</mark> American <mark>attacks</u></mark> (cyber and conventional) <u>on China <mark>will include strikes against PLA command and control</u></mark> (C2) <u><mark>nodes</u></mark>, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, <u><mark>the Chinese may <strong>escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon</u></strong></mark> (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) <u>as a means of forcing de-escalation</u>.</p><p><u><mark>In the view of China,</mark> such <mark>a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy</mark> because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. <mark>Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as</mark> an act of <mark>aggression</mark>. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>an outside aggressor, not China</u>.</p><p>It is also important to remember that <u>nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>– <strong><mark>far more is at stake for China than</mark> it is <mark>for the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates.</p><p>In essence, <u><mark>the <strong>only</strong> effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one</u></mark>. Without making too crude a point, <u>the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck</u>, or yuan. <u>Given that</u> mutually assured destruction (<u>MAD</u>) <u>is not part of China’s strategic thinking</u> – in fact it is explicitly rejected – <u>the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.</p><p><u>China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. <mark>Reunification is necessary for China to reach its</mark> unstated <mark>goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence</mark> of China <mark>it acts as <strong>a literal and symbolic barrier</strong> to China’s power projection</mark> beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood</u>.</p><p><u>China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. <mark>With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is <strong>greatly diminished</u></strong></mark>. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.</p><p>Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.</p><p><u><mark>Central to China’s ability to <strong>guarantee</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>prosperity</strong> is the return of Taiwan</mark>, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies</u>. Unfortunately, <u><mark>too many Americans <strong>underestimate the importance of these core interests</mark> to China</strong> <mark>and the lengths to which China will ultimately go</mark> in order <mark>to guarantee them – <strong>even the use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.</p><p><u><mark>China</mark> sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it <mark>is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely <strong>instigate, control, and conclude</strong> in the Taiwan Straits</mark>. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits</u> in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, <u>ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis</u>. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.</p><p>Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, <u>China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China has not forgotten</mark> the humiliation it faced in 19<mark>96</mark> and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ <mark>nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is <strong>caught off-guard</strong>, <strong>overwhelmed</strong>, and forced to <strong>either escalate</mark> a crisis <mark>or capitulate</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	8,673	565	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,969	Rachman is a direct internal link turn to the disad—reforms are key to sustain the economy	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Rachman is a direct internal link turn to the disad—reforms are key to sustain the economy</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Xi Bad Ptx	1,560,610	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,970	“United States should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism	Ericson ‘03	Ericson ‘03	The Debater’s Guide each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.	each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S should adopt The verb should urges action should means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur	(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4) The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.	1,420	<h4><strong>“United States should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism</h4><p>Ericson ‘03</p><p></strong>(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., <u>The Debater’s Guide</u>, Third Edition, p. 4)</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions<u>. 1. <mark>An agent doing the acting</mark> ---“The United States” in “<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should adopt</u></mark> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u>the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. <mark>The verb should</u></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase <u>that <mark>urges action</u></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. <u>For example, <mark>should</mark> adopt</u> here <u><strong><mark>means to put a</u></strong></mark> program or <u><strong><mark>policy into action though governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><mark>The <strong>entire debate</strong> is about whether something ought to occur</mark>.</u> What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p>	1nc	1	null	1,149	3,809	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,971	Fifth, any U.S. attempt to protect Taiwan will escalate to full-scale nuclear war.	White 15	White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)	this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification	Washington leaders still talk about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster far worse than reunification	Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification, in fact.	515	<h4><u>Fifth</u>, any U.S. attempt to protect Taiwan will escalate to <u>full-scale nuclear war</u>. </h4><p><strong>White 15</strong> — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” The Straits Times, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p>Even more worryingly, <u>this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in <mark>Washington</mark>, where <mark>leaders still talk</mark> boldly <mark>about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without</mark> seriously <mark>considering what that might mean in practice. <strong>Any</strong> US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be <strong>almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war</strong> and</u></mark> quite possibly a <u><strong><mark>nuclear exchange</strong>. That would be a disaster</mark> for everyone, including</u>, of course, <u>the people of Taiwan itself — <strong><mark>far worse than reunification</u></strong></mark>, in fact.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	66,508	151	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,972	Absent the plan, there’s a relations crisis over fugitives – China is sending operatives – when they’re caught, they’ll be prosecuted – China shuts down ties	Lewis 16 }	Lewis 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR}	Emphasizing links between rights and China’s hunt for fugitives also presents an AND involving law coop and called the warning a “regrettable move.”	null	Emphasizing the links between human rights and China’s global hunt for fugitives also presents an AND involving law enforcement cooperation and called the warning a “regrettable move.”282	187	<h4>Absent the plan, there’s a <u>relations crisis</u> over fugitives – China is <u>sending operatives</u> – when they’re caught, they’ll be prosecuted – <u>China shuts down ties</h4><p></u><strong>Lewis 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR<u><strong>}</p><p></strong>Emphasizing</u> the <u>links between</u> human <u>rights and China’s</u> global <u>hunt for fugitives</u> <u><strong>also presents an </p><p>AND</p><p></strong>involving law</u> enforcement <u>coop</u>eration <u>and called the warning</u> <u><strong>a “regrettable move.”</u></strong>282</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,612	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,973	Xi is consolidating power now and opponents are literally resigning but the aff’s growth is key to solve the disad	Madaus 1-20	Madaus 1-20	CCP will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event Xi Jinping may try to use the CCP’s 19th Party Congress to effect a drastic adjustment in how China is governed China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace China’s citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food If growth stalls and the population believes the government is falling short on its bargain, the state might face demands for political representation Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability Xi’s zealous anti-corruption campaign has purged many of his rivals and keeps potential adversaries in check He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was its “core,” He has also cracked down on the media, churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers in a drive to restore hard authoritarian rule to China	Xi may try to use the CCP’s Congress to effect a drastic adjustment China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food If growth stalls the government is falling short on its bargai the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability Xi’s zealous anti-corruption keeps potential adversaries in check He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him its “core,” He has cracked down on the media churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers to restore hard authoritarian rule	Roman is an editor and writer for Foreign Brief, “Xi’s the boss: China’s leadership transition”, Foreign Brief, 2017, http://www.foreignbrief.com/xis-boss-chinas-leadership-transition/, Accessed 2-4 China faces an inflection point in 2017. In the latter half of this year the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event: around 60 per cent of the party’s leaders will retire, including five out of seven members of the country’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. President Xi Jinping may try to use the CCP’s 19th Party Congress to effect a drastic adjustment in how China is governed. China only changes its paramount leader every ten years and the party congress held at the midpoint of any administration determines who will take over five years hence. Given China’s authoritarian governance and highly centralised power system, who sits at the top and how much power they have determines how the country deals with its mounting challenges. This will arguably be the most significant party congress held since the years of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” that ignited China’s meteoric rise to superpower status. The 2017 Party Congress is critical for two reasons. First, China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory. Firms, banks and the government relied on massive debt-fuelled spending to power through the Great Recession, and this debt is now a drag on growth and could catalyse future economic crises. Reform will be harrowing. Zombie firms – uncompetitive state-owned firms that cannot repay their debts – must be allowed to fail to free up capital and stagnant economic sectors, which will lead to higher unemployment. China’s exhausted investment-driven growth strategy must be replaced by one reliant on domestic consumption, meaning deregulation and liberalisation. The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace. China’s citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food in implicit exchange for ever-increasing prosperity. If growth stalls and the population believes the government is falling short on its bargain, the state might face demands for political representation in order to improve its responsiveness to its people’s needs. China’s incoming leaders will have to address these contradictions to keep the country functioning. The second reason for the congress’ importance is that in the past five years, President Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s. After the horrors of Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability. Mr Xi appears to have been systematically undermining this system over the past five years. Xi’s zealous anti-corruption campaign has purged many of his rivals, and the threat of investigation keeps potential adversaries in check. He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him – in order to concentrate decision-making power in his hands. Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was its “core,” a designation that was not bestowed upon his predecessors. The president has appropriated key portfolios from Li Keqiang, the government’s second most powerful leader and Xi’s ostensible counterweight. He has also cracked down on the media, churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers in a drive to restore hard authoritarian rule to China. Many analysts believe that Xi intends to fully do away with collective leadership and move the country towards strongman rule. This would have profound consequences for China and the world.	3,744	<h4><u><strong>Xi is consolidating power now and opponents are literally resigning but the aff’s growth is key to solve the disad</h4><p>Madaus 1-20</p><p></u></strong>Roman is an editor and writer for Foreign Brief, “Xi’s the boss: China’s leadership transition”, Foreign Brief, 2017, http://www.foreignbrief.com/xis-boss-chinas-leadership-transition/, Accessed 2-4</p><p>China faces an inflection point in 2017. In the latter half of this year the Chinese Communist Party (<u><strong>CCP</u></strong>) <u><strong>will hold its quinquennial leadership transition event</u></strong>: around 60 per cent of the party’s leaders will retire, including five out of seven members of the country’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. President <u><strong><mark>Xi</mark> Jinping <mark>may try to use the CCP’s</mark> 19th Party <mark>Congress</mark> <mark>to effect a drastic adjustment</mark> in how China is governed</u></strong>. China only changes its paramount leader every ten years and the party congress held at the midpoint of any administration determines who will take over five years hence. Given China’s authoritarian governance and highly centralised power system, who sits at the top and how much power they have determines how the country deals with its mounting challenges. This will arguably be the most significant party congress held since the years of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” that ignited China’s meteoric rise to superpower status. The 2017 Party Congress is critical for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>China must finally confront the unpleasant side effects of its economic trajectory</u></strong></mark>. Firms, banks and the government relied on massive debt-fuelled spending to power through the Great Recession, and this debt is now a drag on growth and could catalyse future economic crises. Reform will be harrowing. Zombie firms – uncompetitive state-owned firms that cannot repay their debts – must be allowed to fail to free up capital and stagnant economic sectors, which will lead to higher unemployment. China’s exhausted investment-driven growth strategy must be replaced by one reliant on domestic consumption, meaning deregulation and liberalisation. <u><strong>The leadership will have to sideline vested interests and temporarily break its social contract with the populace</u></strong>. <u><strong>China’s <mark>citizens have tolerated the contamination of their country’s air, soil, water and food</u></strong> </mark>in implicit exchange for ever-increasing prosperity. <u><strong><mark>If growth stalls</mark> and the population believes <mark>the government is falling short on its bargai</mark>n, the state might face demands for political representation</u></strong> in order to improve its responsiveness to its people’s needs. China’s incoming leaders will have to address these contradictions to keep the country functioning. The second reason for the congress’ importance is that in the past five years, President <u><strong>Xi has amassed power to an extent not seen since the 1980s</u></strong>. After the horrors of Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, <u><strong><mark>the CCP settled upon a system of collective leadership that has provided political stability</u></strong></mark>. Mr Xi appears to have been systematically undermining this system over the past five years. <u><strong><mark>Xi’s zealous anti-corruption</mark> campaign has purged many of his rivals</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> the threat of investigation <u><strong><mark>keeps potential adversaries in check</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>He has also created new authoritative bodies – personally headed by him</u></strong></mark> – in order to concentrate decision-making power in his hands. <u><strong>Discipline within the party has grown stricter, and last year it announced that Xi was <mark>its “core,”</u></strong></mark> a designation that was not bestowed upon his predecessors. The president has appropriated key portfolios from Li Keqiang, the government’s second most powerful leader and Xi’s ostensible counterweight. <u><strong><mark>He has</mark> also <mark>cracked down on the media</mark>, <mark>churches, NGOs, universities and human rights lawyers</mark> in a drive <mark>to restore hard authoritarian rule</mark> to China</u></strong>. Many analysts believe that Xi intends to fully do away with collective leadership and move the country towards strongman rule. This would have profound consequences for China and the world.</p>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Xi Bad Ptx	1,099,397	5	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,974	“Its” is possessive, which means engagement must be done by the US federal government in DC	Updegrave 91	Updegrave 91 (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm)	Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense).	singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their" carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union	More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.	856	<h4>“Its” is possessive, which means engagement must be done by the US federal government in DC</h4><p><strong>Updegrave 91</strong> (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm)</p><p>More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. <u>Note the <strong><mark>singular possessive</strong> pronoun "its", not "their"</mark>, therefore <mark>carrying the implication that it relates to the "<strong>United States" </strong>as a corporation domiciled in the <strong>D</strong>istrict of <strong>C</strong>olumbia</mark> (in the singular sense), <mark>not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union</mark> (in the plural sense). </u>The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct. </p>	1nc	1	null	2,804	603	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,975	Sixth, tensions over Taiwan are the root cause of other regional tensions. A grand bargain would eliminate the most likely scenarios for major war.	Glaser 15	Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)	China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the U S If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the U S could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The U S is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the U S Consequently, the U S should consider ending this commitment Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would reduce the probability of war between the U S and China over Taiwan. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the U S ’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations terminating this commitment could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the U S and China. Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the SLOCs in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The U S has devised AirSea Battle to counter China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the U S into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition	If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the U S could find itself in a new cold war Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would reduce the probability of war between the U S and China over Taiwan support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions terminating this commitment could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the SLOCs in the South and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The U S has devised AirSea Battle to counter Ending the U.S. commitment would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the U S into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate competition	Reevaluating The U.S. Commitment To Taiwan China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the United States. If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the United States could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The United States is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the United States. Consequently, the United States should consider ending this commitment. Doing so would have both benefits and costs. Benefits. Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would have three main benefits. First, it would reduce the probability of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the United States’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations. Third, terminating this commitment could also greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China. Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The United States has devised a concept, widely known as AirSea Battle, to counter China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the United States into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition.	2,164	<h4><u>Sixth</u>, tensions over Taiwan are the <u>root cause</u> of other regional tensions. A grand bargain would eliminate the <u>most likely scenarios</u> for major war. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)</p><p>Reevaluating The U.S. Commitment To Taiwan</p><p><u>China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could find itself</mark> engaged <mark>in <strong>a new cold war</strong></mark>. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>Consequently, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should consider ending this commitment</u>. Doing so would have both benefits and costs.</p><p>Benefits. <u><mark>Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would</u></mark> have three main benefits. First, it would <u><mark>reduce the probability of war between the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China over Taiwan</mark>. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u>’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means</u>. Second, <u>U.S. <mark>support for Taiwan may be <strong>the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions</strong> about U.S. motives and intentions</mark> in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations</u>. Third, <u><mark>terminating this commitment could</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>greatly moderate</strong> the intensifying military competition</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China. <mark>Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the</u></mark> sea lines of communication (<u><mark>SLOCs</u></mark>) <u><mark>in the South</mark> China <mark>and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>has devised</u></mark> a concept, widely known as <u><mark>AirSea Battle</u></mark>, <u><mark>to counter</mark> China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. <mark>Ending the U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan <mark>would <strong>eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>into a large war with China</strong>, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to <strong>significantly moderate</mark> U.S.-China <mark>competition</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	169,835	77	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,976	Law coop effective now – battles large-scale, international organized and cyber crime	null	-Any arguments about stability of the SQ is because of coop	Rise of Bilateral Law Cooperation “goldfish” AND meetings	null	Lewis 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR} ***modified for racist language 1. Rise of Bilateral Law Enforcement Cooperation The early 1990s “goldfish” AND meetings with the fourteenth plenary meeting scheduled for fall 2016 in China.134	789	<h4>Law <u>coop</u> effective now – battles <u>large-scale</u>, <u>international</u> organized and <u>cyber</u> crime </h4><p>-Any arguments about stability of the SQ is because of coop </p><p><strong>Lewis 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR} ***modified for racist language</p><p>1. <u>Rise of Bilateral Law</u> Enforcement <u>Cooperation</p><p></u>The early 1990s <u>“goldfish” </p><p>AND</p><p><strong>meetings</u></strong> with the fourteenth plenary meeting scheduled for fall 2016 in China.134</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,454	3	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,977	Military restructurance already happened—their evidence is only descriptive	Page 4-25	Jeremy Page 4-25	China’s stock market was swooning Xi didn’t address the global angst about the world’s second-largest economy instead about another challenge that consumes his time and political capital the biggest restructuring of the P L A We must emancipate our minds and change with the times Xi had started to implement a plan to transform military focused on defending China from invasion by 2020 one of Mr. Xi’s most ambitious and politically risky undertakings yet	Xi didn’t address the world’s second-largest economy instead about another challenge that consumes his time and political capital the biggest restructuring of the P Li A Xi had started to implement a plan focused on defending China one of Mr. Xi’s most ambitious and politically risky undertakings yet	Jeremy is a reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, covering domestic politics, international relations and security, “President Xi Jinping’s Most Dangerous Venture Yet: Remaking China’s Military”, Wall Street Journal,http://www.wsj.com/articles/president-xi-jinpings-most-dangerous-venture-yet-remaking-chinas-military-1461608795, Accessed 8-13 BEIJING—China’s stock market was swooning. Investors were panicking. Yet when Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke that first Monday in January, he didn’t address the global angst about the world’s second-largest economy. Clad in an olive-green Mao suit, he was talking instead to Chinese troops about another challenge that consumes his time and political capital: the biggest restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army since the 1950s, a plan that unnerves America and its Asian allies and could upset the global balance of power. “We must emancipate our minds and change with the times,” he told troops of the 13th Group Army on Jan. 4. They should not, he said, “wear new shoes to walk the old road.” Four days earlier, Mr. Xi had started to implement a plan to transform the Soviet-modelled military, long focused on defending China from invasion, into a smaller, modern force capable of projecting power far from its shores. The plan, to be implemented by 2020, is one of Mr. Xi’s most ambitious and politically risky undertakings yet. If it succeeds, it could lay the ground for China to conduct combat operations as far afield as the Middle East and Africa. That would mark a milestone in the nation’s emergence from a period of isolationism that began under the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century. It could enable China not just to challenge U.S. military dominance in Asia, but also to intervene militarily elsewhere to protect its shipping lanes, resource supplies and expatriates, as other world powers have. While an expeditionary Chinese military could help in humanitarian and counterterror operations, the concern for the U.S. and its allies is that Beijing might use force in ways that conflict with Western interests.	2,094	<h4>Military restructurance already happened—their evidence is only descriptive</h4><p>Jeremy <u><strong>Page 4-25</p><p></u></strong>Jeremy is a reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, covering domestic politics, international relations and security, “President Xi Jinping’s Most Dangerous Venture Yet: Remaking China’s Military”, Wall Street Journal,http://www.wsj.com/articles/president-xi-jinpings-most-dangerous-venture-yet-remaking-chinas-military-1461608795, Accessed 8-13</p><p>BEIJING—<u><strong>China’s stock market was swooning</u></strong>. Investors were panicking. Yet when Chinese President <u><strong><mark>Xi</u></strong></mark> Jinping spoke that first Monday in January, he <u><strong><mark>didn’t address the</mark> global angst about the <mark>world’s second-largest economy</u></strong></mark>. Clad in an olive-green Mao suit, he was talking <u><strong><mark>instead</u></strong></mark> to Chinese troops <u><strong><mark>about another challenge that consumes his time and political capital</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>the biggest restructuring of the P</u></strong></mark>eople’s <u><strong><mark>L</u></strong>i</mark>beration <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>rmy since the 1950s, a plan that unnerves America and its Asian allies and could upset the global balance of power. “<u><strong>We must emancipate our minds and change with the times</u></strong>,” he told troops of the 13th Group Army on Jan. 4. They should not, he said, “wear new shoes to walk the old road.” Four days earlier, Mr. <u><strong><mark>Xi had started to implement a plan</mark> to transform</u></strong> the Soviet-modelled <u><strong>military</u></strong>, long <u><strong><mark>focused on defending China</mark> from invasion</u></strong>, into a smaller, modern force capable of projecting power far from its shores. The plan, to be implemented <u><strong>by 2020</u></strong>, is <u><strong><mark>one of Mr. Xi’s most ambitious and politically risky undertakings yet</u></strong></mark>. If it succeeds, it could lay the ground for China to conduct combat operations as far afield as the Middle East and Africa. That would mark a milestone in the nation’s emergence from a period of isolationism that began under the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century. It could enable China not just to challenge U.S. military dominance in Asia, but also to intervene militarily elsewhere to protect its shipping lanes, resource supplies and expatriates, as other world powers have. While an expeditionary Chinese military could help in humanitarian and counterterror operations, the concern for the U.S. and its allies is that Beijing might use force in ways that conflict with Western interests.</p>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Xi Bad Ptx	162,845	9	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,978	“Resolved” means debate should be a legislative forum	Army Officer School 04	Army Officer School 04 – (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)	The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor	The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor	The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.	1,217	<h4> “Resolved” means debate should be a legislative forum</h4><p><strong>Army Officer School 04</strong> – (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)</p><p><u><mark>The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows</u></mark>," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. <u><mark>A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor</u></mark>.</p>	1nc	1	null	1,131	1,242	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,979	Finally, U.S.-China war immediately kills millions — and the fallout would destroy the planet.	Wittner 11	Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)	While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon The gathering tension between the U S and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” need this lead to nuclear war? there are signs that it could both the U S and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations But the Kargil War of 1999 between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan should convince us that such wars can occur A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons The second is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies	While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger they will be used The deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up an example gathering tension is clear need this lead to nuclear war? there are signs that it could Some argue nuclear weapons prevent wars the Kargil War should convince us that such wars can occur A nuclear attack would immediately slaughter 10 million Americans leaving many more dying horribly The Chinese death toll would be far higher Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands debris would blot out the sun and bring on nuclear winter destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction To avert the enormous disaster improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should encourage these policies	While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.	5,086	<h4><u>Finally</u>, U.S.-China war <u>immediately kills millions</u> — and the fallout would <u>destroy the planet</u>. </h4><p><strong>Wittner 11</strong> — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)</p><p><u><mark>While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger</mark> that <strong><mark>they will be used</u></strong></mark>. After all, <u>for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing <strong>their deadliest weapons</strong>. <mark>The</mark> current <mark>deterioration of <strong>U.S. relations with China</strong> might end up</mark> providing us with <strong>yet <mark>an</mark>other <mark>example</strong></mark> of this phenomenon</u>.</p><p><u>The <mark>gathering tension</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>is <strong>clear</strong></mark> enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.”</p><p></u>But <u><mark>need this lead to nuclear war?</p><p></u></mark>Not necessarily. And yet, <u><mark>there are signs that <strong>it could</u></strong></mark>. After all, <u>both the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China possess <strong>large numbers</strong> of nuclear weapons</u>. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”</p><p>Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.</p><p><u><mark>Some</mark> pundits <mark>argue</mark> that <mark>nuclear weapons prevent wars</mark> between nuclear-armed nations</u>; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. <u>But <mark>the <strong>Kargil War</strong></mark> of 1999</u>, <u>between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan</u>, <u><mark>should convince us that such wars <strong>can</strong> occur</u></mark>. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.</p><p>At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?</p><p>Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.</p><p>But what would that “victory” entail? <u><mark>A nuclear attack</mark> by China <mark>would <strong>immediately slaughter</strong></mark> at least <mark>10 million Americans</mark> in a great storm of blast and fire, while <mark>leaving many more dying horribly</mark> of sickness and radiation poisoning. <mark>The Chinese death toll</mark> in a nuclear war <mark>would be <strong>far higher</strong></mark>. <mark>Both nations would be reduced to <strong>smoldering, radioactive wastelands</u></strong></mark>. Also, <u>radioactive <mark>debris</mark> sent aloft by the nuclear explosions <mark>would <strong>blot out the sun</strong> and bring on</mark> a “<strong><mark>nuclear winter</strong></mark>” around the globe—<strong><mark>destroying agriculture</strong>, <strong>creating worldwide famine</strong>, and <strong>generating chaos and destruction</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.</p><p><u><mark>To avert the enormous disaster</mark> of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are</u> two <u><strong>obvious actions</strong> that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons</u>, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. <u>The second</u>, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, <u>is to <strong><mark>improve U.S.-China relations</strong>. If the American and Chinese people are interested in <strong>ensuring their survival and that of the world</strong>, they should</mark> be working to <strong><mark>encourage these policies</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)	9,638	1,488	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,980	Uncontrolled organized crime causes extinction via WMD use and institutions collapse	Dobriansky 1	Dobriansky 1 (Paula, Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the State Department, “The Explosive Growth of Globalized Crime,” http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/transnational-crime/gj01.htm)	international crime poses threats on broad, interrelated fronts AND to the stability of democratic institutions and free market economies around the world.	null	For the United States, international crime poses threats on three broad, interrelated fronts AND to the stability of democratic institutions and free market economies around the world.	184	<h4>Uncontrolled <u>organized crime</u> causes extinction via <u>WMD use</u> and <u>institutions collapse</u> </h4><p><strong>Dobriansky 1<u></strong> (Paula, Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the State Department, “The Explosive Growth of Globalized Crime,” http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/transnational-crime/gj01.htm)</p><p></u>For the United States, <u>international crime poses threats on</u> three <u>broad, interrelated fronts</p><p>AND</p><p>to the stability of <strong>democratic institutions</strong> and free market economies <strong>around the world</strong>.</p></u>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,616	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,981	Perm do the counterplan—NIH evidence talks about how innovation is key to sovle the disease—the aff solves this	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Perm do the counterplan—NIH evidence talks about how innovation is key to sovle the disease—the aff solves this</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	1,560,613	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,982	Their affirmative justifies an unlimited and unstable number of affirmatives to prepare against, which is a reason to vote negative—	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Their affirmative justifies an unlimited and unstable number of affirmatives to prepare against, which is a reason to vote negative—</h4>	1nc	1	null	1,560,614	1	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,983	Contention Two: U.S.-China Relations	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>Contention Two: U.S.-China Relations</h4></u>	null	1AC	1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage	1,560,615	1	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,984	Organized crime make cyberattacks inevitable – they’ve got the motivation and capability – intel-gathering key	Whitmore 15	Brian Whitmore 15, MA in Political Science from Villanova University, former lecturer in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina, 10/27/2015, Organized crime is now a major element of Russia statecraft, http://www.businessinsider.com/organized-crime-is-now-a-major-element-of-russia-statecraft-2015-10	rogue cyber AND the Russian security services have been actively recruiting an army of hackers	null	And according to press reports citing Western intelligence officials, the perpetrators weren't rogue cyber AND that the Russian security services have been actively recruiting an army of hackers.	195	<h4>Organized crime make <u>cyberattacks</u> inevitable – they’ve got the motivation and capability – intel-gathering key </h4><p>Brian <strong>Whitmore 15</strong>, MA in Political Science from Villanova University, former lecturer in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina, 10/27/2015, Organized crime is now a major element of Russia statecraft, <u>http://www.businessinsider.com/organized-crime-is-now-a-major-element-of-russia-statecraft-2015-10</p><p></u>And according to press reports citing Western intelligence officials, the perpetrators weren't <u>rogue cyber</p><p>AND</p><p></u>that <u>the Russian security services have been actively recruiting an army of hackers</u>.</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,617	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,985	IPR not enough now- current theft proves and reform is key to the economy, investment, and innovation	Nash-Hoff 16	Michele Nash-Hoff 2-9-16	Hardly a week goes by without a report of Chinese "hacking" or intellectual property theft China violated its cyber agreement after Xi agreed to not conduct cyber theft of intellectual property , the U.S.-China agreement "does not prohibit cyber spying for national security purposes." companies were victims of economic espionage or theft of trade secrets 95% of those cases involved individuals associated with the Chinese Lack of the rule of law is the most difficult challenge American enterprises face in China." China accounts for at least half – and maybe as much as 80% – of U.S. intellectual property theft Hundreds of billions of dollars per year annual losses are likely to be comparable to the current annual level of U.S. exports to Asia—over $300 billion If IP were to receive the same protection overseas that it does here, the American economy would add millions of jobs Better protection of IP would encourage significantly more investment and economic growth he incentive to innovate drives productivity growth and the advancements that improve the quality of life IP theft diminishes that incentive	U.S companies were victims of economic espionage Lack of the rule of law is the most difficult challenge American enterprises face in China China accounts for 80% of U.S. intellectual property theft Hundreds of billions of dollars per year If IP were to receive the same protection overseas that it does here, the American economy would add millions of jobs. Better protection would encourage significantly more investment and economic growth IP theft diminishes that incentive	(President at ElectroFab Sales, Greater San Diego Area Marketing and Advertising, LEAD San Diego Certificate in Leadership, Organizational Leadership, Candidate for 76th A. C., Cambridge Asociates, “What Could be Done about China's Theft of Intellectual Property?”, Industry Week, http://www.industryweek.com/intellectual-property/what-could-be-done-about-chinas-theft-intellectual-property, Accessed 8-21) Hardly a week goes by without a report of Chinese "hacking" or intellectual property theft, so it was no surprise that a published analysis by CrowdStrike, a California-based cyber security company, revealed that China violated its cyber agreement with the United States the very next day after CNBC reported that President Obama and China's President Xi Jinping agreed to not conduct cyber theft of intellectual property on Friday, 25 Sep 2015. President Obama said, "The United States government does not engage in cyber economic espionage for commercial gain, and today I can announce that our two countries have reached a common understanding on a way forward." However, the U.S.-China agreement "does not prohibit cyber spying for national security purposes." The day before the announcement, September 24, 2015, Chet Nagle, a former CIA agent and current vice president of M-CAM, penned an article in the Daily Caller, stating, "At FBI headquarters in July, the head of FBI counterintelligence, Randall Coleman, said there has been a 53% increase in the theft of American trade secrets, thefts that have cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the past year. In an FBI survey of 165 private companies, half of them said they were victims of economic espionage or theft of trade secrets — 95% of those cases involved individuals associated with the Chinese government." He blamed the corruption of Chinese government officials for the problem and stated that "President Xi Jinping has instituted a strict anti-corruption campaign. Regrettably, the campaign has focused on ‘tigers’ — senior government officials — at the expense of eliminating the rampant corruption by the ‘flies’ — officials at the provincial and local level. In any event, putting a dollar value on direct corruption does not address the totality of the costs. Business confidence and foreign direct investment in China are already falling because of the absence of the rule of law." He concluded, "China’s disregard of the rule of law should be the underlying driver for all discussions of commercial topics during the coming visit of China’s president. Lack of the rule of law is the most difficult challenge American enterprises face in China." In researching this topic, I found out that the bipartisan Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property of the U.S. International Trade Commission released a report in May 2013. Dennis C. Blair, former director of National Intelligence and commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, and Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., former ambassador to China, governor of Utah, and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, were the co-chairs of the commission. The day after the release, Forbes published an article about the report, stating that "China accounts for at least half – and maybe as much as 80% – of U.S. intellectual property theft." The article briefly discussed the problem of China's intellectual property theft and included quotes from the co-chairs, but did not go into any detail about the recommendations of the commission. The article did provide the link to the 100-page report, which I have since read. In view of the continuing problem, it is time to reconsider the key findings of the report, titled, "The Impact of International IP Theft on the American Economy": ”Hundreds of billions of dollars per year. The annual losses are likely to be comparable to the current annual level of U.S. exports to Asia—over $300 billion...” Millions of jobs. If IP were to receive the same protection overseas that it does here, the American economy would add millions of jobs. A drag on U.S. GDP growth. Better protection of IP would encourage significantly more R&D investment and economic growth. Innovation. The incentive to innovate drives productivity growth and the advancements that improve the quality of life. The threat of IP theft diminishes that incentive. The report stated, “A core component of China’s successful growth strategy is acquiring science and technology. It does this in part by legal means—imports, foreign domestic investment, licensing, and joint ventures—but also by means that are illegal. National industrial policy goals in China encourage IP theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese in business and government entities are engaged in this practice.”	4,719	<h4>IPR not enough now- current theft proves and reform is key to the economy, investment, and innovation</h4><p>Michele <u><strong>Nash-Hoff</u></strong> 2-9-<u><strong>16</p><p></u></strong>(President at ElectroFab Sales, Greater San Diego Area Marketing and Advertising, LEAD San Diego Certificate in Leadership, Organizational Leadership, Candidate for 76th A. C., Cambridge Asociates, “What Could be Done about China's Theft of Intellectual Property?”, Industry Week, http://www.industryweek.com/intellectual-property/what-could-be-done-about-chinas-theft-intellectual-property, Accessed 8-21)</p><p><u><strong>Hardly a week goes by without a report of Chinese "hacking" or intellectual property theft</u></strong>, so it was no surprise that a published analysis by CrowdStrike, a California-based cyber security company, revealed that <u><strong>China violated its cyber agreement</u></strong> with the United States the very next day <u><strong>after</u></strong> CNBC reported that President Obama and China's President <u><strong>Xi</u></strong> Jinping <u><strong>agreed to not conduct cyber theft of intellectual property</u></strong> on Friday, 25 Sep 2015. President Obama said, "The United States government does not engage in cyber economic espionage for commercial gain, and today I can announce that our two countries have reached a common understanding on a way forward." However<u><strong>, the <mark>U.S</mark>.-China agreement "does not prohibit cyber spying for national security purposes."</u></strong> The day before the announcement, September 24, 2015, Chet Nagle, a former CIA agent and current vice president of M-CAM, penned an article in the Daily Caller, stating, "At FBI headquarters in July, the head of FBI counterintelligence, Randall Coleman, said there has been a 53% increase in the theft of American trade secrets, thefts that have cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the past year. In an FBI survey of 165 private <u><strong><mark>companies</u></strong></mark>, half of them said they <u><strong><mark>were victims of economic espionage</mark> or theft of trade secrets</u></strong> — <u><strong>95% of those cases involved individuals associated with the Chinese</u></strong> government." He blamed the corruption of Chinese government officials for the problem and stated that "President Xi Jinping has instituted a strict anti-corruption campaign. Regrettably, the campaign has focused on ‘tigers’ — senior government officials — at the expense of eliminating the rampant corruption by the ‘flies’ — officials at the provincial and local level. In any event, putting a dollar value on direct corruption does not address the totality of the costs. Business confidence and foreign direct investment in China are already falling because of the absence of the rule of law." He concluded, "China’s disregard of the rule of law should be the underlying driver for all discussions of commercial topics during the coming visit of China’s president. <u><strong><mark>Lack of the rule of law is the most difficult challenge American enterprises face in China</mark>."</u></strong> In researching this topic, I found out that the bipartisan Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property of the U.S. International Trade Commission released a report in May 2013. Dennis C. Blair, former director of National Intelligence and commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, and Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., former ambassador to China, governor of Utah, and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, were the co-chairs of the commission. The day after the release, Forbes published an article about the report, stating that "<u><strong><mark>China accounts for</mark> at least half – and maybe as much as <mark>80%</mark> – <mark>of U.S. intellectual property theft</u></strong></mark>." The article briefly discussed the problem of China's intellectual property theft and included quotes from the co-chairs, but did not go into any detail about the recommendations of the commission. The article did provide the link to the 100-page report, which I have since read. In view of the continuing problem, it is time to reconsider the key findings of the report, titled, "The Impact of International IP Theft on the American Economy": ”<u><strong><mark>Hundreds of billions of dollars per year</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong>annual losses are likely to be comparable to the current annual level of U.S. exports to Asia—over $300 billion</u></strong>...” Millions of jobs. <u><strong><mark>If IP were to receive the same protection overseas that it does here, the American economy would add millions of jobs</u></strong>.</mark> A drag on U.S. GDP growth. <u><strong><mark>Better protection</mark> of IP <mark>would encourage significantly more</u></strong></mark> R&D <u><strong><mark>investment and economic growth</u></strong></mark>. Innovation. T<u><strong>he incentive to innovate drives productivity growth and the advancements that improve the quality of life</u></strong>. The threat of <u><strong><mark>IP theft diminishes that incentive</u></strong></mark>. The report stated, “A core component of China’s successful growth strategy is acquiring science and technology. It does this in part by legal means—imports, foreign domestic investment, licensing, and joint ventures—but also by means that are illegal. National industrial policy goals in China encourage IP theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese in business and government entities are engaged in this practice.”</p>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	100,001	5	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,986	A. Substantive Side Bias—failing to defend a clear actor and mechanism produces a substantive side bias because they have the ability to recontextualize link arguments and shift focus to different proscriptive claims—there are four impacts to side bias:	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>A. <u>Substantive Side Bias</u>—failing to defend a clear actor and mechanism produces a substantive side bias because they have the ability to recontextualize link arguments and shift focus to different proscriptive claims—there are four impacts to side bias:</h4>	1nc	1	null	1,560,618	1	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,987	Nuclear war – biggest impact	Futter 16	Andrew Futter 16, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of Leicester, 5/1/2016, War Games redux? Cyberthreats, US–Russian strategic stability, and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control , European Security, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09662839.2015.1112276	null	null	The cyberthreat to US and Russian nuclear forces and stability is not homogenous, but AND seconds to fire rockets out of their silos as far away as Siberia.	156	<h4>Nuclear war – biggest impact</h4><p>Andrew <strong>Futter 16</strong>, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of Leicester, 5/1/2016, War Games redux? Cyberthreats, US–Russian strategic stability, and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control , European Security, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09662839.2015.1112276</p><p>The cyberthreat to US and Russian nuclear forces and stability is not homogenous, but </p><p>AND</p><p>seconds to fire rockets out of their silos as far away as Siberia.</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	Coop	1,560,619	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,988	First, U.S.-China relations have reached a dangerous tipping point — overcoming mutual hostility is vital.	Lampton 15	Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“China and the United States: A Conversation with David M. Lampton,” The Asia Foundation, July 29th, Available Online at http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/, Accessed 06-29-2016)	I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer to it than I’d like to be For the 40-plus years since Nixon went to China most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs Conversely, most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction in terms of policy towards China Somewhere around 2008 to 2010, each side began to wonder about the direction of the other. With the rise of S C S problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. It seemed that China was successful but at the same time was going the wrong way in terms of foreign and domestic policy most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election is going to give voice to that In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place We’re moving from a relationship that was trying to find partnership to one now of deterrence. And threats are a key part of that. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the S C S China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with the Pivot creates anxiety in Beijing. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”	I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer than I’d like For 40 years most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction around 2008 each side began to wonder about the direction of the other It seemed that China was going the wrong way in foreign and domestic policy In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” We’re moving from a relationship trying to find partnership to one of deterrence threats are a key part of that the Pivot creates anxiety in Beijing The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating	You have publicly warned that the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical “tipping point.” From your perspective as a longtime China watcher, what do you think about the future trajectory of bilateral relations? I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer to it than I’d like to be. For the 40-plus years since Nixon went to China, and certainly since Deng Xiaoping came back to power in 1977, most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs, to be sure. 1989 raised questions. But Deng Xiaoping and George H. W. Bush got ties modestly back on track. China was opening up, investing in the world. Most Americans saw China as moving in the right direction. Conversely, most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction in terms of policy towards China. Somewhere around 2008 to 2010, each side began to wonder about the direction of the other. With the rise of South China Sea problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. It seemed that China was successful but at the same time was going the wrong way in terms of foreign and domestic policy. I think most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election coming up is going to give voice to that. In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place. We’re moving from a relationship that was trying to find partnership to one now of deterrence. And threats are a key part of that. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the South China Sea. China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with the Pivot announcement in 2011, rotating troops – small forces – through Australia, and tightening up our alliance structure with Japan, all that creates anxiety in Beijing. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”	3,356	<h4><u>First</u>, U.S.-China relations have reached a <u>dangerous tipping point</u> — overcoming <u>mutual hostility</u> is vital. </h4><p><strong>Lampton 15</strong> — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“China and the United States: A Conversation with David M. Lampton,” The Asia Foundation, July 29th, Available Online at http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p>You have publicly warned that the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical “tipping point.” From your perspective as a longtime China watcher, what do you think about the future trajectory of bilateral relations?</p><p><u><mark>I said we were <strong>approaching a tipping point</strong>. I <strong>didn’t</strong> say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re <strong>a lot closer</strong></mark> to it <mark>than I’d like</mark> to be</u>.</p><p><u><mark>For</mark> the <mark>40</mark>-plus <mark>years</mark> since Nixon went to China</u>, and certainly since Deng Xiaoping came back to power in 1977, <u><mark>most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction”</mark> in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs</u>, to be sure. 1989 raised questions. But Deng Xiaoping and George H. W. Bush got ties modestly back on track. China was opening up, investing in the world. Most Americans saw China as moving in the right direction. <u>Conversely, <mark>most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction</mark> in terms of policy towards China</u>.</p><p><u>Somewhere <mark>around 2008</mark> to 2010, <mark>each side began to wonder about the direction of the other</mark>. With the rise of S</u>outh <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea <u>problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. <mark>It seemed that China was</mark> successful but at the same time was <mark>going the wrong way in</mark> terms of <mark>foreign and domestic policy</u></mark>. I think <u>most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election</u> coming up <u>is going to give voice to that</u>.</p><p><u><mark>In China, one of <strong>the first questions</strong> they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to <strong>keep China down</strong> or <strong>contain China</strong>?”</mark> One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place</u>.</p><p><u><mark>We’re moving from a relationship</mark> that was <mark>trying to find partnership to one</mark> now <mark>of <strong>deterrence</strong></mark>. And <strong><mark>threats are a key part of that</strong></mark>. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the S</u>outh <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea. <u>China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with <mark>the Pivot</u></mark> announcement in 2011, rotating troops – small forces – through Australia, and tightening up our alliance structure with Japan, all that <u><mark>creates anxiety in Beijing</mark>. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. <mark>The relationship is becoming <strong>fundamentally more competitive</strong></mark>. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. <mark>And the underlying security relationship is <strong>deteriorating</strong></mark>. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”</p></u>	null	1AC	1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage	169,546	8	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,989	Doesn’t solve Chinese economy—that is a huge disad	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Doesn’t solve Chinese economy—that is a huge disad</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	1,560,620	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,990	The First impact is Political Effectiveness—sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are key to political effectiveness	Gutting 13	Gutting 13 (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame)	) our political “debates” seldom deserve the name we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique. partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own. Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges part of our political culture A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake debate should not be merely extemporaneous where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.	our political “debates” seldom deserve the name partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold truths, while their opponents must be fools Is there any way to make debates part of our political culture A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement This will prevent vague statements that don’t address the issues at stake debate should not be merely extemporaneous We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses	(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1) This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.” Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”). There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique. Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own. Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points? A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake. Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.	3,207	<h4>The First impact is <u>Political Effectiveness</u>—sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are key to political effectiveness</h4><p><strong>Gutting 13 </strong>(professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) </p><p>(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1<u>)</p><p></u>This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But <u><mark>our political “debates” seldom deserve the name</u></mark>. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.” Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”). There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here <u>we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.</u> Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, <u><mark>partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, <strong>convincing themselves that they hold</strong></mark> to obvious <strong><mark>truths, while their opponents must be</strong></mark> either knaves or <strong><mark>fools</strong></mark> — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.</u> <u><mark>Is there any way to make</mark> genuine <mark>debates</mark> — sustained back-and-forth exchanges</u>, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — <u><strong><mark>part of our political culture</u></strong></mark>? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points? <u><mark>A first condition is that the debates be focused on <strong>specific points of major disagreement</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?”</u> <u><mark>This will prevent vague statements</mark> of principle <mark>that don’t address the</mark> real <mark>issues at stake</u></mark>. Another issue is the medium of the <u><mark>debate</u></mark>. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They <u><mark>should not</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>be merely extemporaneous</u></mark> events, <u>where too much will depend on quick-thinking</u> <u>and an engaging manner</u>. <u><mark>We want remarks to be <strong>carefully prepared</strong> and open to <strong>considered responses</strong></mark>.</p></u>	1nc	1	null	122,847	48	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,991	Contention Three: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Contention Three: The <u>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</u> </h4>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,621	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,992	Second, the plan is the only way to reverse this trend — resolving Taiwan overcomes every other impediment to strong relations.	Glaser 15	Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)	focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the U S does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.” most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down a prominent Chinese analyst argues The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations a professor at China's N D U holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict	U.S. support for Taiwan is the most important policy-driven source of China's suspicions China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study concludes Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification thereby harming a Chinese core interest most Chinese believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down The position the U.S. takes on Taiwan determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations U.S. policies toward Taiwan are the fundamental cause of anti-American sentiment a posture change will strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people ending the U.S. commitment has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which could increase cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict	More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China's National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. … I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.	2,277	<h4><u>Second</u>, the plan is <u>the only way</u> to reverse this trend — resolving Taiwan overcomes <u>every other impediment</u> to strong relations. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>More important, however, is that <u>focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan</u>. First, <u><mark>U.S. support for Taiwan is</mark> <strong>one of the most important, possibly <mark>the most important</strong></mark>, <mark>policy-driven source</mark>s <mark>of China's suspicions</mark> about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, <mark>China considers U.S. support of Taiwan <strong>a key source of “strategic distrust.”</strong> A recent study</mark> by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations <mark>concludes</mark> that <mark>Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan</mark> “<mark>as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification</mark> from occurring, <mark>thereby harming a</mark> clearly-articulated <strong><mark>Chinese core interest</strong></mark>.”</u> In a similar vein, <u>their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.”</u>68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “<u><mark>most Chinese</mark> see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They <mark>believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going <strong>helps the U.S. tie China down</u></strong></mark>.”69 Similarly, <u>a prominent Chinese analyst argues</u>: “<u><mark>The position the U.S. takes on</mark> the <mark>Taiwan</mark> issue <strong><mark>determines the essence of American strategy toward China</strong>, and thus <strong>determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations</u></strong></mark>.”70 Xu Hui, <u>a professor at China's N</u>ational <u>D</u>efense <u>U</u>niversity, <u>holds that “<mark>U.S. policies toward Taiwan</mark> have been and <mark>are the fundamental cause of</mark> some <mark>anti-American sentiment</mark> among the Chinese public</u>. … I assure you that <u><mark>a posture change</mark> of the U.S. policy on Taiwan <mark>will</mark> remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also <mark>strengthen Sino-American cooperation by <strong>winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people</u></strong></mark>.”71 In short, <u><mark>ending the U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan <mark>has the potential to <strong>dramatically improve U.S.-China relations</strong>, which</mark> in turn <mark>could <strong>increase</mark> the possibility of <mark>cooperation on other issues</strong> and <strong>reduce the probability of competition and conflict</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage	1,651,053	456	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,993	1. Competiveness Advantage – our internal links are predicated on inefficient enforcement of IPR in China – even if the CP leads to greater IPR enforcement in other countries it can’t resolve theft from China – impact is US economic leadership.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>1. Competiveness Advantage – our internal links are predicated on inefficient enforcement of IPR in China – even if the CP leads to greater IPR enforcement in other countries it can’t resolve theft from China – impact is US economic leadership. </h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	1,560,622	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,994	Specifically, a stasis point like the resolution is the only way the negative can retain its ability to effectively prepare for the debate – that’s the key internal link to fairness and education. Turns the case	Goodin	Goodin and Niemeyer ‘3	counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’ , on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders ). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted , we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway	democratic deliberation happen before the formal discussions pre-discursive process likely to prove crucial to the shaping of attitudes initial processes of focusing attention on a topic inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong deliberation In politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducte we think in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing we will have to defend our views where they will be probed intensively In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention democratic deliberation within’	[Robert and Simon – of the Australian National University. “When Does Deliberation Begin?” Political Studies, Vol 51. 2003. Ebsco//GBS-JV] What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.	10,984	<h4><strong>Specifically, a stasis point like the resolution is the only way the negative can retain its ability to effectively prepare for the debate – that’s the key internal link to fairness and education. Turns the case</h4><p>Goodin</strong> and Niemeyer ‘3</p><p><strong>[Robert and Simon – of the Australian National University. “When Does Deliberation Begin?” Political Studies, Vol 51. 2003. Ebsco//GBS-JV]</p><p></strong>What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and <u>counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘<mark>democratic deliberation</mark> within’, is that that <mark>happen</mark>ed in the earlier stages of deliberation – <mark>before the formal discussions</u></mark> (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is <u>that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’</u>. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that<u>, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the <mark>pre-discursive process</mark> are <mark>likely to prove crucial to the shaping</mark> and reshaping <mark>of</mark> people’s <mark>attitudes</mark> in a citizens’ jury-style process. The <mark>initial processes of focusing attention on a topic</mark>, providing information about it and <mark>inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong</mark> impetus to internal-reflective <mark>deliberation</mark>, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue</u>. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (<u>or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders</u> (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58<u><strong>). <mark>In</mark> ordinary mass <mark>politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducte</mark>d</u></strong>. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury<u>, <mark>we think</mark> and listen <mark>in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing</mark> that <mark>we</mark> soon <mark>will have to defend our views</mark> in a discursive setting <mark>where they will be probed intensively</mark>.39 <mark>In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention</u></mark>. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) <u>there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘<strong><mark>democratic deliberation within’</strong></mark>, even before the jury discussion gets underway</u>. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.</p>	1nc	1	null	54,860	423	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,995	China is a signatory but hasn’t ratified – Aff’s diplomatic engagement gets past the status quo chasm	Lewis 16	Lewis 16 {Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR} ***Italics are the author’s own	In addition to CAT, China signed ICCPR in 98	null	In addition to CAT, China signed the ICCPR in 1998.217 It is AND it is worth a try even if the PRC government ultimately rebuffs the efforts	140	<h4>China is a <u>signatory</u> but hasn’t <u>ratified</u> – Aff’s <u>diplomatic engagement</u> gets past the <u>status quo chasm</u> </h4><p><strong>Lewis 16 </strong>{Margaret K., Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program, former Senior Research Fellow at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute (NYU School of Law), Professor of Law (Seton Hall University), J.D. (New York University School of Law), “Human Rights and The U.S.-China Relationship in the Next Administration,” Forthcoming in the George Washington International Law Review, Volume 49, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833537#THUR} ***Italics are the author’s own</p><p><u>In addition to CAT, China signed</u> the <u>ICCPR in </u>19<u>98</u>.217 It is </p><p>AND</p><p>it is worth a try even if the PRC government ultimately rebuffs the efforts</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,623	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,996	Third, crossing the tipping point increases the risk of war and undermines cooperation. Relations aren’t resilient without the plan.	Lampton 15	Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, May 11th, Available Online at http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/, Accessed 06-29-2016)	For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments that we had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After 9/11 China was seen as non-threatening In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which negative narratives have grown Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the U S should not be dirty words Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side	policy continuity has persisted despite periodic crises no challenges ever destroyed overall assessments that we had shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed gains Things have changed dramatically since 2010. The tipping point is near We are witnessing the erosion of critical underlying supports for positive ties a sequence of developments and incidents have provided fertile soil in which negative narratives have grown the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and confusion about where China is headed If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues and, economic welfare will be diminished The words “accommodation” or “compromise” should not be dirty words Balance and stability should be our objective, not primacy	For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But, none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments in both our nations that we each had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains. Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives in either society to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” as one respected Chinese professor put it, and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After the 9/11 attacks on America, China was seen as non-threatening, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.” In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization. We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1] Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans. What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done? Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the United States should not be dirty words. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side.	4,778	<h4><u>Third</u>, crossing the tipping point increases the risk of <u>war</u> and undermines <u>cooperation</u>. Relations <u>aren’t</u> resilient <u>without the plan</u>. </h4><p><strong>Lampton 15</strong> — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, May 11th, Available Online at http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p><u>For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable <mark>policy continuity</u></mark>—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. <u>This continuity <mark>has persisted despite periodic</mark> instabilities, problems, and <mark>crises</mark>. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But</u>, <u><mark>no</mark>ne of these <mark>challenges ever destroyed overall assessments</u></mark> in both our nations <u><mark>that we</u></mark> each <u><mark>had</mark> fundamental, <mark>shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed</mark> possible <mark>gains</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives</u> in either society <u>to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,”</u> as one respected Chinese professor put it, <u>and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After</u> the <u>9/11</u> attacks on America, <u>China was seen as non-threatening</u>, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.”</p><p><u>In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests</u> that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. <u>The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. <strong><mark>Things</mark> unfortunately <mark>have changed dramatically since</mark> about <mark>2010</strong>. The <strong>tipping point</strong> is near</mark>. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization</u>.</p><p><u><mark>We are witnessing the erosion of</mark> some <strong><mark>critical underlying supports</strong> for</mark> predominantly <mark>positive</mark> U.S.-China <mark>ties</mark>. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability</u>.</p><p>Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1]</p><p><u>Since about 2008, there has been <mark>a sequence of</mark> regional and global <mark>developments and incidents</mark> that <mark>have provided fertile soil in which</u></mark> these <u><mark>negative narratives have grown</u></mark> in each of our societies. <u>Among them are: <mark>the <strong>2008 financial crisis</strong>, incidents in <strong>Hong Kong</strong>, developments in <strong>the south and east China seas</strong>, U.S. inability to quickly exit <strong>Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires</strong>, and</mark> the <mark>confusion</mark> in America and elsewhere <mark>about <strong>where China is headed</mark> internally and in terms of its foreign policy</u></strong>. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans.</p><p>What is happening? <u><mark>If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have <strong>progressively less security</strong></mark>, at higher cost; <mark>the probabilities of <strong>intentional</strong>, <strong>accidental</strong>, or <strong>catalytic violent confrontations</strong> will increase; the world will enjoy <strong>less cooperation on transnational issues</strong></mark> requiring joint Sino-American efforts; <mark>and, <strong>economic welfare</strong></mark> in both societies <mark>will be diminished</u></mark>. What can be done?</p><p>Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. <u><mark>The words “accommodation” or “compromise”</mark> in either China or the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><strong><mark>should not be dirty words</u></strong></mark>. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. <u><strong><mark>Balance</strong> and <strong>stability</strong></mark> in Asia <mark>should be our objective, not</mark> the <mark>primacy</mark> of either side</u>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage	169,101	86	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,997	2. Pharma—they do not have any solvency for China—China is key because of dense populations	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>2. Pharma—they do not have any solvency for China—China is key because of dense populations</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	1,560,624	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,998	Two impacts – First is the UN	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>Two</u> impacts – <u>First</u> is the UN</h4>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,625	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,782,999	Finally, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address all global challenges.	Cohen et al. 9	Cohen et al. 9 — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)	Sino-U.S. relations has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other arrangement many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship the most influential in the world the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation	Sino-U.S. relations have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other arrangement the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the financial stability, energy security climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must be a priority Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation	The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation.	963	<h4><u>Finally</u>, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address <u>all global challenges</u>. </h4><p><strong>Cohen et al. 9</strong> — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)</p><p>The evolution of <u><mark>Sino-U.S. relations</u></mark> over the next months, years, and decades <u>has the potential to <mark>have a <strong>greater impact on global security and prosperity</strong> than any other</u></mark> bilateral or multilateral <u><mark>arrangement</u></mark>. In this sense, <u>many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship</u> to be <u>the most influential in the world</u>. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, <u><mark>the <strong>trajectory of U.S.-China relations</strong> will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address <strong>the </mark>toughest global challenges</strong>: <strong>global <mark>financial stability</strong>, <strong>energy security</strong> </mark>and <strong><mark>climate change</strong>, <strong>nonproliferation</strong>, and <strong>terrorism</strong></mark>, among other pressing issues. <mark>Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must</mark> therefore <mark>be a <strong>priority</strong></mark> for Washington and Beijing. <strong><mark>Virtually no major global challenge</strong> can be met without U.S.-China cooperation</u></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage	1,562,854	69	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,000	The second impact is Competitive Equity—predictable affirmatives are crucial to equitable dialogue—that is the basis for respect and controls all other factors of debate	Galloway 07	Galloway 07 – Ryan Galloway is the Professor of Communication at Stanford. (“Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Volume 28)	Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers it denies the personhood of the other participant Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by months of preparation not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to participate Instead of allowing for dialogue the affirmative subverts any role to the negative preventing them from offering “counter-word” and undermining the exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the benefits of topical advocacy	Setting the affirmative sets the negative When competitive equity suffers it denies the personhood of the other participant Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by months of preparation not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend fairness exclude negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the table unable to participate Instead of allowing for dialogue the affirmative subverts any role to the negative undermining the exchange of speech acts	Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.	3,497	<h4>The second impact is <u>Competitive Equity</u>—predictable affirmatives are crucial to equitable dialogue—that is the basis for respect and controls all other factors of debate</h4><p><strong>Galloway 07</strong> – Ryan Galloway is the Professor of Communication at Stanford. (“Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Volume 28)</p><p><u>Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table</u>, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. <u>The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements</u>. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. <u><mark>Setting the affirmative</mark> reciprocally <mark>sets the negative</mark>. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands</u>. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. <u><mark>When</mark> one side takes more than its share, <mark>competitive equity suffers</u></mark>. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, <u><strong><mark>it</u></strong></mark> fundamentally <u><strong><mark>denies the personhood of the other participant</u></strong></mark> (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. <u><strong><mark>Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by</u></strong></mark> literally months upon <u><strong><mark>months of preparation</u></strong></mark>, research, and critical thinking <u><strong><mark>not be silenced</strong>. Affirmative cases that suspend</mark> basic <mark>fairness</mark> norms operate to <mark>exclude</mark> particular <mark>negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the</mark> argumentative <mark>table <strong>unable to</u></strong></mark> meaningfully <u><strong><mark>participate</u></strong></mark> in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. <u><mark>Instead of allowing for</u></mark> the <u><mark>dialogue</u></mark> to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, <u><mark>the affirmative subverts any</u></mark> meaningful <u><mark>role to the negative</u></mark> team, <u>preventing them from offering</u> effective <u>“counter-word” and <mark>undermining the</u></mark> value of a meaningful <u><mark>exchange of speech acts</mark>. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the</u> dialogical <u>benefits of topical advocacy</u>.</p>	1nc	1	null	90,248	398	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,001	Perm do both	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Perm do both</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	1,560,626	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,002	B. Mechanism Education—the affirmative’s failure to identify an agent and mechanism makes cost-benefits analysis impossible, meaning debates take place in an academic vacuum where tradeoffs are irrelevant	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>B. <u>Mechanism Education</u>—the affirmative’s failure to identify an agent and mechanism makes cost-benefits analysis impossible, meaning debates take place in an academic vacuum where tradeoffs are irrelevant</h4>	1nc	1	null	1,560,627	1	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,003	Contention ( ): Solvency	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>Contention ( ): Solvency</h4></u>	null	1AC	1AC — Solvency	1,560,628	1	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,004	Ratification sustains China/UN ties – Resulting collaboration demonstrates Chinese commitment to the international community	Szadziewski 13	Szadziewski 13 {Henryk, senior researcher with the Uyghur Human Rights Project, B.A. in Modern Chinese and Mongolian Studies (The University of Leeds), M.Sc. in Development Management/Economics (The University of Wales), “Time for China to Ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Sharnoff’s Global Views, 10/19, http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/china-civil-rights-204/#THUR}	If H R C is not to become divorced from its mission that it places its faith in people	null	If the Human Rights Council is not to become divorced from its mission as its AND that it places its faith in people rather than the ideology of power.	151	<h4>Ratification sustains <u>China/UN ties</u> – Resulting collaboration demonstrates Chinese commitment to the <u>international community</h4><p></u><strong>Szadziewski 13 </strong>{Henryk, senior researcher with the Uyghur Human Rights Project, B.A. in Modern Chinese and Mongolian Studies (The University of Leeds), M.Sc. in Development Management/Economics (The University of Wales), “Time for China to Ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Sharnoff’s Global Views, 10/19, http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/china-civil-rights-204/#THUR}</p><p><u>If</u> the <u><strong>H</u></strong>uman <u><strong>R</u></strong>ights <u><strong>C</u></strong>ouncil <u>is not to <strong>become divorced</u></strong> <u>from its mission</u> as its </p><p>AND</p><p><u>that it places its faith in</u> <u>people</u> rather than the ideology of power.</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,630	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,005	Links to the net benefit—dedev	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Links to the net benefit—dedev</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	CP	1,560,629	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,006	The first impact to mechanism education is Revolutionary Success—creating change, no matter the forum or end-goal, requires constant strategic discussion and planning—the impact to this portable skill is world peace, income equality, environmental sustainability, in addition to the goals of every social movement	Dixon 14	Dixon 14 (activist, writer, anarchist and educator who received a PhD from the History of Consciousness program at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He has been involved in transformative social movements for more than two decades.)	Strategy is a consistent challenge we can't simply do the same things with no clear plans for how these activities will help us build movements pick up momentum, and move toward winning Revolutionary change requires conscious strategies and a movement culture that supports strategic discussion and planning. Many in the anti-authoritarian current yearn for this we have tremendous difficulty sustaining dialogue and developing strategy focus on principles over plans slips into a kind of magical thinking we have the right ideas everything else will follow	Strategy is a consistent challenge we can't do the same things with no clear plans for how activities will help build movements Revolutionary change requires conscious strategies and strategic discussion and planning. Many in the anti-authoritarian current yearn for this focus on principles over plans slips into a magical thinking	(Chris, Another Politics Talking across Today's Transformative Movements, pg. 111) Strategy is a consistent challenge in the anti-authoritarian current. As activists and organizers, we often talk abstractly about how crucial strategy is, but much of the time we recognize its importance mainJy through its absence in our activities. If we're serious about social transformation and honest with ourselves, we eventually begin to realize that we can't simply do the same things week after week, month after month, with no clear plans for how these activities will help us build movements, achieve interim gains, pick up momentum, and move toward winning the world we want. Revolutionary change needs more than good intentions, commitment, and effort; it also requires conscious strategies and a movement culture that supports strategic discussion and planning. Many in the anti-authoritarian current yearn for this. As Toronto-based youth organ.izer Pauline Hwang put it, "To have some level of dialogue at which these questions are being raised-the questions of long-term direc- tion, the questions of how does our work fit into building the society we want to have after the so-called revolution-having that kind of dialogue is important to rne." This yearning is something I've encountered again and again in conversations and workshops with activists across the continent. So why do we have such tremendous difficulty sustaining this kind of dialogue and developing strategy? In my view, there are three major obstacles that trip us up again and again. The first of these obstacles is a tendency to focus on principles over plans. This focus, which comes out of some sectors of North American anarchism in particular, is based on a legitimate concern that radicals may sacrifice our core values and beliefs in order to win.' But focusing exclusively on princi- ples slips into a kind of magical thinking: if we have the right ideas and values, so this goes, everything else will more or less follow. Brooke Lehman, an experienced activist and educator who was involved with Occupy Wall Street, characterized this tendency as "Well, I'm gonna do what I believe in and what feels right to me and just be a piece of this larger whole."	2,234	<h4>The first impact to mechanism education is <u>Revolutionary Success</u>—creating change, no matter the forum or end-goal, requires constant strategic discussion and planning—the impact to this portable skill is world peace, income equality, environmental sustainability, in addition to the goals of every social movement</h4><p><strong>Dixon 14</strong> (activist, writer, anarchist and educator who received a PhD from the History of Consciousness program at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He has been involved in transformative social movements for more than two decades.)</p><p>(Chris, Another Politics Talking across Today's Transformative Movements, pg. 111)</p><p><u><mark>Strategy is a consistent challenge</u></mark> in the anti-authoritarian current. As activists and organizers, we often talk abstractly about how crucial strategy is, but much of the time we recognize its importance mainJy through its absence in our activities. If we're serious about social transformation and honest with ourselves, we eventually begin to realize that <u><mark>we can't</mark> simply <mark>do the same things</u></mark> week after week, month after month,<u> <mark>with no clear plans for how</mark> these <mark>activities will help</mark> us <mark>build movements</u></mark>, achieve interim gains, <u>pick up momentum, and move toward winning</u> the world we want. <u><strong><mark>Revolutionary change</u></strong></mark> needs more than good intentions, commitment, and effort; it also <u><strong><mark>requires conscious strategies and</strong></mark> a movement culture that supports <strong><mark>strategic discussion and planning</strong>. Many in the anti-authoritarian current yearn for this</u></mark>. As Toronto-based youth organ.izer Pauline Hwang put it, "To have some level of dialogue at which these questions are being raised-the questions of long-term direc- tion, the questions of how does our work fit into building the society we want to have after the so-called revolution-having that kind of dialogue is important to rne." This yearning is something I've encountered again and again in conversations and workshops with activists across the continent. So why do <u>we have</u> such <u>tremendous difficulty sustaining</u> this kind of <u>dialogue and developing strategy</u>? In my view, there are three major obstacles that trip us up again and again. The first of these obstacles is a tendency to <u><mark>focus on principles over plans</u></mark>. This focus, which comes out of some sectors of North American anarchism in particular, is based on a legitimate concern that radicals may sacrifice our core values and beliefs in order to win.' But focusing exclusively on princi- ples <u><mark>slips into a</mark> kind of <mark>magical thinking</u></mark>: if <u>we have the right ideas</u> and values, so this goes, <u>everything else will </u>more or less <u>follow</u>. Brooke Lehman, an experienced activist and educator who was involved with Occupy Wall Street, characterized this tendency as "Well, I'm gonna do what I believe in and what feels right to me and just be a piece of this larger whole."</p>	1nc	1	null	1,470,454	9	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,007	Those relations prevent international instability and territorial disputes – Vital to overall UN	Niu 11 {Niu Zhongjun, Associate Professor of the Department of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs Administration (China Foreign Affairs University), “Multilateralism and China–UN Relations,” Asia Paper – Institute for Security and Development Policy, March, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2011_niu_multilateralism-and-china-un-relations.pdf#THUR}	Niu 11 {Niu Zhongjun, Associate Professor of the Department of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs Administration (China Foreign Affairs University), “Multilateralism and China–UN Relations,” Asia Paper – Institute for Security and Development Policy, March, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2011_niu_multilateralism-and-china-un-relations.pdf#THUR}	Concluding Remarks that “the UN needs China, and China needs the UN.”	null	Concluding Remarks Due to the outbreak of the Cold War, the long exclusion AND that “the UN needs China, and China needs the UN.”59	131	<h4>Those relations prevent international <u>instability</u> and <u>territorial disputes</u> – Vital to overall <strong>UN </h4><p>Niu 11 <u>{Niu Zhongjun, Associate Professor of the Department of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs Administration (China Foreign Affairs University), “Multilateralism and China–UN Relations,” Asia Paper – Institute for Security and Development Policy, March, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2011_niu_multilateralism-and-china-un-relations.pdf#THUR}</p><p>Concluding Remarks</p><p></u></strong>Due to the outbreak of the Cold War, the long exclusion </p><p>AND</p><p><u>that</u> <u><strong>“the UN needs China, and China needs the UN.”</u></strong>59</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,632	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,008	Framework – the judge should evaluate the costs and benefits of negotiating a bilateral agreement with China versus the status quo or a competitive policy option – only evaluate arguments based on the plan text – aff ground - any other standard moots predictability because we only have comparative solvency evidence about the plan text, logic – framing and acting are not opportunity costs – any link that doesn’t prove the need for IPR is a reason to vote for the permutation – our method inculcates comparatively better advocacy skills by raising the standard for K links instead of just sweeping claims about the world.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Framework – the judge should evaluate the costs and benefits of negotiating a bilateral agreement with China versus the status quo or a competitive policy option – only evaluate arguments based on the plan text – <u>aff ground</u> - any other standard moots predictability because we only have comparative solvency evidence about the plan text, <u>logic</u> – framing and acting are not opportunity costs – any link that doesn’t prove the need for IPR is a reason to vote for the permutation – our method inculcates <u>comparatively better</u> advocacy skills by raising the standard for K links instead of just sweeping claims about the world. </h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	1,560,631	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,009	First, the plan removes the biggest potential flashpoint for U.S.-Sino nuclear conflict. This creates sustainable peace and strong U.S.-Sino relations — containment strategies are counterproductive.	Glaser 11	Glaser 11 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)	The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the U S ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the U S and China have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the U S will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the U S would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the U S found itself following events rather than leading them Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations Given such risks, the U S should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the U S and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics argue Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension	Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the U S and China have such different attitudes regarding the status quo, the issue poses special dangers placing it in a different category A crisis could easily escalate to nuclear war because each step might seem rational improvements in China's military may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements might be interpreted as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations Given such risks, the U S should back away from its commitment This would remove the most contentious flash point and smooth the way for better relations Critics argue Beijing would not be satisfied critics are wrong because accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension	Accommodation On Taiwan? The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China — whatever they might formally agree to — have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations. Given such risks, the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.	3,767	<h4><u>First</u>, the plan removes the <u>biggest potential flashpoint</u> for U.S.-Sino nuclear conflict. This creates <u>sustainable peace</u> and <u>strong U.S.-Sino relations</u> — containment strategies are <u>counterproductive</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 11</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)</p><p>Accommodation On Taiwan?</p><p><u>The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy</u> that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly <u>regarding Taiwan</u>. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, <u>China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a <strong>key political goal</strong> for Beijing. China has made clear that it will <strong>use force</strong> if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates' <u>ability to intervene. <mark>Because China places <strong>such high value on Taiwan</strong> and because the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China</u></mark> — whatever they might formally agree to — <u><mark>have such different attitudes regarding</mark> the legitimacy of <mark>the status quo, the issue poses special dangers</mark> and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, <mark>placing it in <strong>a different category</strong></mark> than Japan or South Korea</u>.</p><p><u><mark>A crisis</mark> over Taiwan <mark>could</mark> <strong>fairly <mark>easily escalate to nuclear war</strong></mark>, <mark>because each step</mark> along the way <mark>might</mark> well <strong><mark>seem rational</strong></mark> to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against <strong>any</strong> sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>found itself following events rather than leading them</u>.</p><p><u>Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing <mark>improvements in China's military</mark> capabilities <mark>may make Beijing <strong>more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis</strong></mark>. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. <mark>China's nuclear modernization might <strong>remove that check on Chinese action</strong>, leading Beijing to behave <strong>more boldly</strong></mark> in future crises than it has in past ones. <mark>A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan</u></mark>, meanwhile, <u><mark>could fuel a <strong>conventional and nuclear arms race</strong>. Enhancements</mark> to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses <mark>might be interpreted</mark> by China <mark>as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and <strong>a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Given such risks, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should</mark> consider <strong><mark>back</mark>ing <mark>away from its commitment</mark> to Taiwan</strong>. <mark>This would remove <strong>the most</mark> obvious and <mark>contentious flash point</strong></mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>and <strong>smooth the way for better relations</strong></mark> between them in the decades to come. <mark>Critics</u></mark> of such a move <u><mark>argue</u></mark> that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: <u><mark>Beijing would not be satisfied</mark> by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. <strong>The <mark>critics are wrong</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><mark>because</mark> territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, <mark>accommodation can be <strong>an effective policy tool.</strong> When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead</mark> not to further demands but rather <mark>to <strong>satisfaction with the new status quo</strong> and <strong>a reduction of tension</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Solvency	2,444	459	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,010	Second, a quid-pro-quo grand bargain is key — it maintains U.S. resolve.	Glaser 15	Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)	Insisting on Chinese concessions would demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the U S would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the U S into dangerous crises with China	Insisting on Chinese concessions would demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the U S would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that could draw the U S into dangerous crises	Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.	1,238	<h4><u>Second</u>, a <u>quid-pro-quo</u> grand bargain is key — it <u>maintains U.S. resolve</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Insisting on Chinese concessions</strong> would</u></mark> also <u><mark>demonstrate <strong>U.S. resolve</strong> to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan <strong>contingent on Chinese concessions</strong>, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>would make clear that it is <strong>willing to run the risk</strong> of protecting Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, <strong>if</strong> China were uncompromising</u></mark>. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, <u>China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests</u> (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), <u>would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, <strong><mark>compared to unilateral concessions</strong>, insisting on a package deal that included</mark> Chinese <mark>concessions would <strong>demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve</strong></mark>. In addition, <mark>resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that</mark>, via alliance commitments, <mark>could draw the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>into <strong>dangerous crises</strong></mark> with China</u>.</p>	null	1AC	1AC — Solvency	69,187	345	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,011	Litany of possible nuke wars – all cause extinction – New US nuclear posture means crisis instability	Fields 16 }	Fields 16 {Jason, Managing Editor at Reuters, former National Editor at Digital First Media, B.A. in Philosophy/Mathematics (St. John's College – Maryland), “Podcast: Why Nuclear War Looks Inevitable,” 9/21, War College Podcast, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-war-podcast-idUSKCN11K23T#THUR}	Several developments move hands of the nuclear doom clock closer Soviet Union had a death wish	null	Several developments have the potential to move the hands of the nuclear doom clock closer AND Soviet Union had a death wish, and those were clearly the stakes.	160	<h4>Litany of possible <u>nuke wars</u> – all cause <u>extinction</u> – New <u>US nuclear posture</u> means crisis instability </h4><p><strong>Fields 16 </strong>{Jason, Managing Editor at Reuters, former National Editor at Digital First Media, B.A. in Philosophy/Mathematics (St. John's College – Maryland), “Podcast: Why Nuclear War Looks Inevitable,” 9/21, War College Podcast, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-war-podcast-idUSKCN11K23T#THUR<u><strong>}</p><p></strong>Several developments</u> have the potential to <u>move</u> the <u>hands of the nuclear doom clock</u> <u><strong>closer </p><p></u></strong>AND</p><p><u>Soviet Union had a death wish</u>, and those were clearly the stakes. </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,633	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,012	No link our growth and pharma advantage does not justify militarism which is what their links are predicated off of	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>No link our growth and pharma advantage does not justify militarism which is what their links are predicated off of</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	1,560,634	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,013	The second impact is that it Turns the Affirmative—debates over mechanisms for change are crucial to reduce material violence on a large scale	Capulong 9	Capulong 9 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana)	activism requires the constant reassessment of resistance That task requires specific activist goals Instances of failure need to be part of that analysis, because they teach us much about why otherwise promising activist efforts do not become sustained mass movements We will not build a mass movement though sheer perseverance political consciousness and action requires a constant organizational and political calibration and modulation often missing from theoretical scholarship any effort at fundamental social transformation is doomed without effective political leadership fundamental social transformation will only come about if there are political organizations clear enough, motivated enough, experienced enough, large enough, embedded enough and agile enough to respond to the twists and turns endemic in any struggle for power The problem is not our analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strategic, and political character of our subject successful social transformations occur when there is political organization This is a complex evaluation, one requiring the formulation, development and constant assessment and reassessment of an overarching political perspective only organized masses of people can alter exploitative and oppressive institutions and bring about lasting fundamental social change, then, we need to be clear about which tactics can bring about such a sustained Without concrete and comprehensive diagnoses of ultimate political goals, social and economic contexts, and organizing priorities, progressive legal practice will fail	activism requires the constant reassessment of resistance requires specific activist goals failure need to be part of that analysis We will not build a mass movement though perseverance requires a constant organizational and political calibration social transformation is doomed without effective political leadership The problem is not analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strategic, and political character of our subject only organized masses can alter exploitative and oppressive institutions and bring about fundamental social change we need to be clear about which tactics	(Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009) Motivating client activism under dynamic social conditions requires the development and constant assessment and reassessment of a political perspective that measures that resistance and its possibilities. That task in turn requires the development of specific activist goals within the context of such analyses, and perhaps broader, national and international strategy--what some call the political "next step." This is particularly true today, when the economic crisis plaguing capitalism, the "war on terror" and climate change undeniably have world-wide dimensions. Instances of failure, too, need to be part of that analysis, because they teach us much about why otherwise promising activist efforts do not become sustained mass movements of the sort to which we all aspire. Thus, the theoretical need is two-fold: to construct a broader organizing perspective from a political standpoint, and to consider activism writ large. Without reading the pulse of prevailing social conditions, it is easy to miscalculate what that next step ought to be. We will not build a mass movement though sheer perseverance--a linear, idealist conception of change at odds with dynamic social conditions. By the same token, we may underestimate the potential of such mass activism if we focus simply on the local dimensions of our work. The dialectic between a dynamic social context and political consciousness and action requires a constant organizational and political calibration and modulation often missing from theoretical scholarship. Without such a working perspective, we are apt to be either ultra-left or overly conservative. As Jim Pope put it recently in the context of new forms of labor organizing: "If we limit our vision of the future to include only approaches that work within the prevailing legal regime and balance of forces, then we are likely to be irrelevant when and if the opportunity for a paradigm shift arises." n449 The cyclical nature of labor organizing, he argues, mirrors politics generally: American political life as a whole has likewise alternated between periods characterized by public action, idealism, and reform on the [189] one hand, and periods of private interest, materialism, and retrenchment on the other. A prolonged private period spawns orgies of corruption and extremes of wealth and poverty that, sooner or later, ignite passionate movements for reform. n450 C. 'Activism': Towards a Broader, Deeper, Systematic Framework In progressive lawyering theory, grassroots activism is frequently equated with "community organizing" and "movement" or "mobilization" politics. n451 Indeed, these methods have come to predominate activist lawyering in much the same way as "public interest law" has come for many to encompass all forms of progressive practice. "Activism" is, of course, broader still. Even on its own terms, the history of community organizing and social movements in the United States includes two vitally important traditions frequently given short shrift in this realm: industrial union organizing and alternative political party-building. n452 In this section, my aim is not to catalogue the myriad ways in which lawyers and clients can and do become active (methodically or institutionally)--which, given human creativity and progress, in any event may be impossible to do--but rather to problematize three assumptions: first, the tendency to define grassroots activity narrowly; second, the notion that certain groups--for example "the poor" or the "subordinated"--are the definitive agents of social change; and finally, the conviction that mass mobilization or movement-building, by itself, is key to social transformation. 1. Grassroots Activism There are countless ways in which people become socially or politically active. Yet even the more expansive and sophisticated considerations of activism in progressive lawyering theory tend to unnecessarily circumscribe activism. For example, Cummings and Eagly argue that we need to "unpack" the term "organizing." n453 Contrasting two strategies of the welfare rights movement in the 1960s, these authors distinguish between "mobilization as short-term community action and organizing as an effort to build long-term institutional power." n454 In the same breath, however, they define organizing "as shorthand for a range of community-based practices," n455 even though at least some activism, for example union organizing or, say, [190] fasting, might not be best characterized as "community-based." What is required is a larger framework that takes into account the sum total of activist initiatives. Lucie White argues that we need to "map out the internal microdynamics of progressive grassroots initiatives ... observe the multiple impacts of different kinds of initiatives on wide spheres of social and political life ... and devise typologies, or models, or theories that map out a range of opportunities for collaboration." n456 This map would be inadequate--and therefore inaccurate--if we include certain activist initiatives and not others. But that is precisely what the progressive lawyering literature has done by failing to regularly consider, for example, union organizing or alternative political party-building. 2. Agents of Social Change: Identity, Class and Political Ideology As with our definition of activism, here, too, the problem is a lack of clarity, breadth or scope, which leads to misorientation. Have we defined, with theoretical precision, the social-change agents to whom we are orienting--e.g., the "people," the "poor," the "subordinated," "low-income communities" or "communities of color?" And if so, are these groupings, so defined, the primary agents of social change? By attempting to harmonize three interrelated (yet divergent) approaches to client activism--organizing on the bases of geography and identity, class and the workplace, and political ideology--modern community organizing simultaneously blurs and balkanizes the social-change agents to whom we need to orient. What, after all, is "community?" In geographic terms, local efforts alone cannot address social problems with global dimensions. n457 As Pope observed of workers' centers: "the tension between the local and particularistic focus of community unionism and the global scope of trendsetting corporations like Wal-Mart makes it highly unlikely that community unionism will displace industrial unionism as 'the' next paradigm of worker organization." n458 On the other hand, members of cross-class, identity-based "communities" may not necessarily share the same interests. In the "Asian American community," Ancheta explains: using the word "community" in its singular form is often a misnomer, because Asian Pacific Americans comprise many communities, each with its own history, culture and language: Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, Lao-Mien, [191] Hmong, Indian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Samoan, Tongan, Guamanian, Native Hawaiian, and more. The legal problems facing individuals from different communities defy simple categorization. The problems of a fourth-generation Japanese American victim of job discrimination, a monolingual refugee from Laos seeking shelter from domestic violence, an elderly immigrant from the Philippines trying to keep a job, and a newcomer from Western Samoa trying to reunite with relatives living abroad all present unique challenges. Add in factors such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and disability, and the problems become even more complex. n45 Angela Harris echoes this observation by pointing out how some feminist legal theory assumes "a unitary, 'essential' women's experience [that] can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." n460 The same might be said of the "people," which, like the "working class," may be too broad. Other categorizations--such as "low-income workers," "immigrants", and the "poor", for example--may be too narrow to have the social weight to fundamentally transform society. In practice, progressive lawyers orient to the politically advanced among these various "communities." In so doing, then, we need to acknowledge that we are organizing on the basis of political ideology, and not simply geography, identity or class. Building the strongest possible mass movement, therefore, requires an orientation not only towards certain "subordinated" communities, but to the politically advanced generally. Otherwise, we may be undermining activism writ large. This is not to denigrate autonomous community efforts. As I have mentioned, subordinated communities of course have the right to self-determination, i.e. to organize separately. But the point is not simply to organize groups of people who experience a particular oppression, but rather to identify those who have the social power to transform society. Arguing that these agents are the collective, multi-racial working class, Smith explains: The Marxist definition of the working class has little in common with those of sociologists. Neither income level nor self-definition are [sic] what determine social class. Although income levels obviously bear some relationship to class, some workers earn the same or higher salaries than some people who fall into the category of middle class. And many people who consider themselves "middle [192] class" are in fact workers. Nor is class defined by categories such as white and blue collar. For Marx the working class is defined by its relationship to the means of production. Broadly speaking, those who do not control the means of production and are forced to sell their labor power to capitalists are workers. n461 The practical consequence of this very well may be that we redefine who we represent as clients and consider activism or potential activism outside subordinated communities, for example union activity and alternative political-party building, as part of our work. 3. From Movementism to Political Organization Dogged as our work is in the activist realm, any effort at fundamental social transformation is doomed without effective political leadership. Such leadership, in turn, requires work not often associated with "activism," such as, for example, theoretical study. n462 "Movementism," n463 by which I mean the conviction that building a mass movement is the answer to oppression and exploitation, has its limitations. Even though activism itself is perhaps the best school for political education, we have an enormous amount to learn from our predecessors. In the final analysis, fundamental social transformation will only come about if there are political organizations clear enough, motivated enough, experienced enough, large enough, embedded enough and agile enough to respond to the twists and turns endemic in any struggle for power. "The problem," as Bellow astutely observed, "is not our analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strategic, and political character of our subject." n464 Such opportunities typically occur when there is a confluence of three factors: a social crisis; a socio-economic elite that finds itself divided over how to overcome it; and a powerful mass movement from below. As I understand the nature of social change, successful social transformations occur when there is a fourth element: political organization. Conclusion Client activism is not a monolithic, mechanical object. Most of the time, it is neither the gathering mass movement many of us wish for, nor the inert, atomized few in need of external, professional motivation. Rather, activism is a phenomenon in constant ebb and flow, a [193] mercurial, fluid complex shaped by an unremitting diversity of factors. The key through the maze of lawyering advice and precaution is therefore to take a hard, sober look at the overarching state of activism. Are our clients in fact active or are they not? How many are and who are they? What is the nature of this period? Economically? Politically? Culturally? What are the defining issues? What political and organizing trends can be discerned? With which organizations are our clients active, if any? What demands are they articulating, and how are they articulating them? This is a complex evaluation, one requiring the formulation, development and constant assessment and reassessment of an overarching political perspective. My aim in this Article is to begin to theorize the various approaches to this evaluation. In essence, I am arguing for the elaboration of a systematic macropolitical analysis in progressive lawyering theory. Here, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive set of political considerations, but rather to develop a framework for, and to investigate the limitations of, present considerations in three areas: strategic aims; prevailing social conditions; and methods of activism. Consciously or not, admittedly or not, informed and systematic or not, progressive lawyers undertake their work with certain assumptions, perspectives and biases. Progressive lawyering theory would be a much more effective and concrete guide to action--to defining the lawyer's role in fostering activism--if it would elaborate on these considerations and transform implicit and perhaps delimited assumptions and approaches into explicit and hopefully broader choices. Over the past four decades, there has been remarkable continuity and consistency in progressive lawyers' use of litigation, legislation, direct services, education and organizing to stimulate and support client activism. The theoretical "breaks" to which Buchanan has referred n465 have not been so much about the practice of lawyering itself, but rather about unarticulated shifts in ultimate goals, societal analyses, and activist priorities, each necessitated by changes in the social, economic, and political context. That simply is another way of stating the obvious: that progressive lawyers change their practices to adapt to changing circumstances. The recurrent problem in progressive lawyering theory is that many commentators have tended to generalize these practice changes to apply across social circumstances. In so doing, they displace and often replace more fundamental differences over strategic goals, interpretation of social contexts, and organizing priorities with debates over the mechanics of lawyering practice. The argument is turned on its head: we often assume or tend to [194] assume agreement over the meanings and underlying conceptual frameworks relating to "fundamental social change," current political analysis, and "community organizing," and debate lawyering strategy and tactics; but instead we should be elaborating and clarifying these threshold political considerations as a prerequisite to using what we ultimately agree to be a broad and flexible set of lawyering tools. In effect, the various approaches to lawyering have become the currency by which scholars have debated politics and activism. The irony is that our disagreements are less about lawyering approaches per se, I believe, than they are about our ultimate political objectives, our analyses of contemporary opportunities, and our views of the optimal paths from the latter to the former. The myriad lawyering descriptions and prescriptions progressive lawyering theory offers are of limited use unless they are anchored in these primary considerations. How do we decide if we should subscribe to "rebellious" and not traditional "public interest" lawyering, for example, or "collaborative" over "critical" lawyering, if we do not interrogate these questions and instead rush too quickly into practical questions? The differences among these approaches matter precisely because they have different political goals, are based on different political analyses, and employ different political activist strategies. Activist lawyers already engage in these analyses--necessarily so. To foster client activism, they must read prevailing social conditions and strategize with their clients about the political next step, often with an eye toward a long-term goal. But I don't think we necessarily engage in these analyses as consciously, or with as full a picture of the history and dynamics involved or options available, as we could. Often this is because there simply isn't time to engage these questions. Or perhaps not wanting to dominate our clients, we squelch our own political analysis and agenda to allow for organic, indigenous leadership from below. But if we are truly collaborative--and when we feel strongly enough about certain political issues--we engage on issues and argue them out. In either event, we undertake an unsystematic engagement of these fundamental issues at our peril. If we adhere to the belief that only organized, politicized masses of people can alter or replace exploitative and oppressive institutions and bring about lasting fundamental social change, then, as progressive lawyers, we need to be clear about which legal tactics can bring about such a sustained effort in each historical moment. Without concrete and comprehensive diagnoses of ultimate political goals, social and economic contexts, and organizing priorities, progressive legal practice will fail to live up to its potential.	17,402	<h4>The second impact is that it <u>Turns the Affirmative</u>—debates over mechanisms for change are crucial to reduce material violence on a large scale</h4><p><strong>Capulong 9</strong> (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana)</p><p>(Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009)</p><p>Motivating client <u><mark>activism</mark> </u>under dynamic social conditions<u> <mark>requires the</mark> </u>development and<u> <mark>constant</mark> </u>assessment and<u> <mark>reassessment</u> <u>of</u></mark> a political perspective that measures that <u><mark>resistance</u></mark> and its possibilities. <u>That task</u> in turn <u><mark>requires</u></mark> the development of <u><strong><mark>specific activist goals</u></strong></mark> within the context of such analyses, and perhaps broader, national and international strategy--what some call the political "next step." This is particularly true today, when the economic crisis plaguing capitalism, the "war on terror" and climate change undeniably have world-wide dimensions. <u>Instances of <mark>failure</u></mark>, too, <u><mark>need to be part of that analysis</mark>, because they teach us much about why otherwise promising activist efforts do not become sustained mass movements</u> of the sort to which we all aspire. Thus, the theoretical need is two-fold: to construct a broader organizing perspective from a political standpoint, and to consider activism writ large. Without reading the pulse of prevailing social conditions, it is easy to miscalculate what that next step ought to be. <u><mark>We will not build a mass movement though</mark> sheer <mark>perseverance</u></mark>--a linear, idealist conception of change at odds with dynamic social conditions. By the same token, we may underestimate the potential of such mass activism if we focus simply on the local dimensions of our work. The dialectic between a dynamic social context and<u> political consciousness and action <mark>requires a <strong>constant organizational and political calibration</strong></mark> and modulation often missing from theoretical scholarship</u>. Without such a working perspective, we are apt to be either ultra-left or overly conservative. As Jim Pope put it recently in the context of new forms of labor organizing: "If we limit our vision of the future to include only approaches that work within the prevailing legal regime and balance of forces, then we are likely to be irrelevant when and if the opportunity for a paradigm shift arises." n449 The cyclical nature of labor organizing, he argues, mirrors politics generally: American political life as a whole has likewise alternated between periods characterized by public action, idealism, and reform on the [189] one hand, and periods of private interest, materialism, and retrenchment on the other. A prolonged private period spawns orgies of corruption and extremes of wealth and poverty that, sooner or later, ignite passionate movements for reform. n450 C. 'Activism': Towards a Broader, Deeper, Systematic Framework In progressive lawyering theory, grassroots activism is frequently equated with "community organizing" and "movement" or "mobilization" politics. n451 Indeed, these methods have come to predominate activist lawyering in much the same way as "public interest law" has come for many to encompass all forms of progressive practice. "Activism" is, of course, broader still. Even on its own terms, the history of community organizing and social movements in the United States includes two vitally important traditions frequently given short shrift in this realm: industrial union organizing and alternative political party-building. n452 In this section, my aim is not to catalogue the myriad ways in which lawyers and clients can and do become active (methodically or institutionally)--which, given human creativity and progress, in any event may be impossible to do--but rather to problematize three assumptions: first, the tendency to define grassroots activity narrowly; second, the notion that certain groups--for example "the poor" or the "subordinated"--are the definitive agents of social change; and finally, the conviction that mass mobilization or movement-building, by itself, is key to social transformation. 1. Grassroots Activism There are countless ways in which people become socially or politically active. Yet even the more expansive and sophisticated considerations of activism in progressive lawyering theory tend to unnecessarily circumscribe activism. For example, Cummings and Eagly argue that we need to "unpack" the term "organizing." n453 Contrasting two strategies of the welfare rights movement in the 1960s, these authors distinguish between "mobilization as short-term community action and organizing as an effort to build long-term institutional power." n454 In the same breath, however, they define organizing "as shorthand for a range of community-based practices," n455 even though at least some activism, for example union organizing or, say, [190] fasting, might not be best characterized as "community-based." What is required is a larger framework that takes into account the sum total of activist initiatives. Lucie White argues that we need to "map out the internal microdynamics of progressive grassroots initiatives ... observe the multiple impacts of different kinds of initiatives on wide spheres of social and political life ... and devise typologies, or models, or theories that map out a range of opportunities for collaboration." n456 This map would be inadequate--and therefore inaccurate--if we include certain activist initiatives and not others. But that is precisely what the progressive lawyering literature has done by failing to regularly consider, for example, union organizing or alternative political party-building. 2. Agents of Social Change: Identity, Class and Political Ideology As with our definition of activism, here, too, the problem is a lack of clarity, breadth or scope, which leads to misorientation. Have we defined, with theoretical precision, the social-change agents to whom we are orienting--e.g., the "people," the "poor," the "subordinated," "low-income communities" or "communities of color?" And if so, are these groupings, so defined, the primary agents of social change? By attempting to harmonize three interrelated (yet divergent) approaches to client activism--organizing on the bases of geography and identity, class and the workplace, and political ideology--modern community organizing simultaneously blurs and balkanizes the social-change agents to whom we need to orient. What, after all, is "community?" In geographic terms, local efforts alone cannot address social problems with global dimensions. n457 As Pope observed of workers' centers: "the tension between the local and particularistic focus of community unionism and the global scope of trendsetting corporations like Wal-Mart makes it highly unlikely that community unionism will displace industrial unionism as 'the' next paradigm of worker organization." n458 On the other hand, members of cross-class, identity-based "communities" may not necessarily share the same interests. In the "Asian American community," Ancheta explains: using the word "community" in its singular form is often a misnomer, because Asian Pacific Americans comprise many communities, each with its own history, culture and language: Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, Lao-Mien, [191] Hmong, Indian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Samoan, Tongan, Guamanian, Native Hawaiian, and more. The legal problems facing individuals from different communities defy simple categorization. The problems of a fourth-generation Japanese American victim of job discrimination, a monolingual refugee from Laos seeking shelter from domestic violence, an elderly immigrant from the Philippines trying to keep a job, and a newcomer from Western Samoa trying to reunite with relatives living abroad all present unique challenges. Add in factors such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and disability, and the problems become even more complex. n45 Angela Harris echoes this observation by pointing out how some feminist legal theory assumes "a unitary, 'essential' women's experience [that] can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." n460 The same might be said of the "people," which, like the "working class," may be too broad. Other categorizations--such as "low-income workers," "immigrants", and the "poor", for example--may be too narrow to have the social weight to fundamentally transform society. In practice, progressive lawyers orient to the politically advanced among these various "communities." In so doing, then, we need to acknowledge that we are organizing on the basis of political ideology, and not simply geography, identity or class. Building the strongest possible mass movement, therefore, requires an orientation not only towards certain "subordinated" communities, but to the politically advanced generally. Otherwise, we may be undermining activism writ large. This is not to denigrate autonomous community efforts. As I have mentioned, subordinated communities of course have the right to self-determination, i.e. to organize separately. But the point is not simply to organize groups of people who experience a particular oppression, but rather to identify those who have the social power to transform society. Arguing that these agents are the collective, multi-racial working class, Smith explains: The Marxist definition of the working class has little in common with those of sociologists. Neither income level nor self-definition are [sic] what determine social class. Although income levels obviously bear some relationship to class, some workers earn the same or higher salaries than some people who fall into the category of middle class. And many people who consider themselves "middle [192] class" are in fact workers. Nor is class defined by categories such as white and blue collar. For Marx the working class is defined by its relationship to the means of production. Broadly speaking, those who do not control the means of production and are forced to sell their labor power to capitalists are workers. n461 The practical consequence of this very well may be that we redefine who we represent as clients and consider activism or potential activism outside subordinated communities, for example union activity and alternative political-party building, as part of our work. 3. From Movementism to Political Organization Dogged as our work is in the activist realm, <u>any effort at fundamental <strong><mark>social transformation is doomed without effective political leadership</u></strong></mark>. Such leadership, in turn, requires work not often associated with "activism," such as, for example, theoretical study. n462 "Movementism," n463 by which I mean the conviction that building a mass movement is the answer to oppression and exploitation, has its limitations. Even though activism itself is perhaps the best school for political education, we have an enormous amount to learn from our predecessors. In the final analysis, <u>fundamental social transformation will only come about if there are political organizations clear enough, motivated enough, experienced enough, large enough, embedded enough and agile enough to respond to the twists and turns endemic in any struggle for power</u>. "<u><mark>The problem</u></mark>," as Bellow astutely observed, "<u><mark>is not</mark> our <mark>analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strategic, and political character of our subject</u></mark>." n464 Such opportunities typically occur when there is a confluence of three factors: a social crisis; a socio-economic elite that finds itself divided over how to overcome it; and a powerful mass movement from below. As I understand the nature of social change, <u>successful social transformations occur when there is</u> a fourth element: <u>political organization</u>. Conclusion Client activism is not a monolithic, mechanical object. Most of the time, it is neither the gathering mass movement many of us wish for, nor the inert, atomized few in need of external, professional motivation. Rather, activism is a phenomenon in constant ebb and flow, a [193] mercurial, fluid complex shaped by an unremitting diversity of factors. The key through the maze of lawyering advice and precaution is therefore to take a hard, sober look at the overarching state of activism. Are our clients in fact active or are they not? How many are and who are they? What is the nature of this period? Economically? Politically? Culturally? What are the defining issues? What political and organizing trends can be discerned? With which organizations are our clients active, if any? What demands are they articulating, and how are they articulating them? <u>This is a complex evaluation, one requiring the formulation, development and constant assessment and reassessment of an overarching political perspective</u>. My aim in this Article is to begin to theorize the various approaches to this evaluation. In essence, I am arguing for the elaboration of a systematic macropolitical analysis in progressive lawyering theory. Here, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive set of political considerations, but rather to develop a framework for, and to investigate the limitations of, present considerations in three areas: strategic aims; prevailing social conditions; and methods of activism. Consciously or not, admittedly or not, informed and systematic or not, progressive lawyers undertake their work with certain assumptions, perspectives and biases. Progressive lawyering theory would be a much more effective and concrete guide to action--to defining the lawyer's role in fostering activism--if it would elaborate on these considerations and transform implicit and perhaps delimited assumptions and approaches into explicit and hopefully broader choices. Over the past four decades, there has been remarkable continuity and consistency in progressive lawyers' use of litigation, legislation, direct services, education and organizing to stimulate and support client activism. The theoretical "breaks" to which Buchanan has referred n465 have not been so much about the practice of lawyering itself, but rather about unarticulated shifts in ultimate goals, societal analyses, and activist priorities, each necessitated by changes in the social, economic, and political context. That simply is another way of stating the obvious: that progressive lawyers change their practices to adapt to changing circumstances. The recurrent problem in progressive lawyering theory is that many commentators have tended to generalize these practice changes to apply across social circumstances. In so doing, they displace and often replace more fundamental differences over strategic goals, interpretation of social contexts, and organizing priorities with debates over the mechanics of lawyering practice. The argument is turned on its head: we often assume or tend to [194] assume agreement over the meanings and underlying conceptual frameworks relating to "fundamental social change," current political analysis, and "community organizing," and debate lawyering strategy and tactics; but instead we should be elaborating and clarifying these threshold political considerations as a prerequisite to using what we ultimately agree to be a broad and flexible set of lawyering tools. In effect, the various approaches to lawyering have become the currency by which scholars have debated politics and activism. The irony is that our disagreements are less about lawyering approaches per se, I believe, than they are about our ultimate political objectives, our analyses of contemporary opportunities, and our views of the optimal paths from the latter to the former. The myriad lawyering descriptions and prescriptions progressive lawyering theory offers are of limited use unless they are anchored in these primary considerations. How do we decide if we should subscribe to "rebellious" and not traditional "public interest" lawyering, for example, or "collaborative" over "critical" lawyering, if we do not interrogate these questions and instead rush too quickly into practical questions? The differences among these approaches matter precisely because they have different political goals, are based on different political analyses, and employ different political activist strategies. Activist lawyers already engage in these analyses--necessarily so. To foster client activism, they must read prevailing social conditions and strategize with their clients about the political next step, often with an eye toward a long-term goal. But I don't think we necessarily engage in these analyses as consciously, or with as full a picture of the history and dynamics involved or options available, as we could. Often this is because there simply isn't time to engage these questions. Or perhaps not wanting to dominate our clients, we squelch our own political analysis and agenda to allow for organic, indigenous leadership from below. But if we are truly collaborative--and when we feel strongly enough about certain political issues--we engage on issues and argue them out. In either event, we undertake an unsystematic engagement of these fundamental issues at our peril. If we adhere to the belief that<u> <strong><mark>only organized</u></strong></mark>, politicized<u> <strong><mark>masses</strong></mark> of people <strong><mark>can alter</strong></mark> </u>or replace<u> <strong><mark>exploitative and oppressive institutions</strong> and bring about</mark> lasting <mark>fundamental social change</mark>, then, </u>as progressive lawyers, <u><mark>we need to be clear about which</u></mark> legal<u> <mark>tactics</mark> can bring about such a sustained </u>effort in each historical moment. <u>Without concrete and comprehensive diagnoses of ultimate political goals, social and economic contexts, and organizing priorities, progressive legal practice will fail </u>to live up to its potential.</p>	1nc	1	null	1,357,308	42	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,014	C. Switch side debate – It solves all of their offense and is the only model of debate that allows us to question traditional dogmas like racism – the alternative is authoritarianism	Hanghoj 8 }	Hanghoj 8 {Thorkild, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Herm}	Authoritative discourse refers to those forms of language use which present themselves as unchallengeable orthodoxy by formulating positions that are not open to debate demands our unconditional allegiance” (Bakhtin, 1981: 343). According to Eugene Matusov, classroom examples of authoritative discourse also include “intolerance, speaking for others, an unwillingness to listen to and genuinely question others, the failure to test one’s own ideas internally persuasive discourse cannot be reduced to the mere “appropriation” of the ideas and words of others, as it requires the ability to be involved in and embody how “diverse voices collide with each other in a dialogue that tests these ideas”	Authoritative discourse refers to forms of language which present themselves as unchallengeable orthodoxy political dogma demands unconditional allegiance examples of authoritative discourse include “intolerance, speaking for others unwillingness to listen failure to test one’s ideas Internally persuasive discourse refers to language use directed towards mutual communication internally persuasive discourse requires the ability to be involved and embody how “diverse voices collide in a dialogue that tests these ideas”	One of the key elements of dialogical pedagogy, and consequently a dialogical game pedagogy, is based upon the Bakhtinian notion of “authority”. In his writings, Bakhtin often distinguishes between “authoritative discourse” and “internally persuasive discourse” (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984a). Authoritative discourse refers to those forms of language use which present themselves as unchallengeable orthodoxy by formulating positions that are not open to debate. Bakhtinexemplifies this with political dogma that “demands our unconditional allegiance” (Bakhtin, 1981: 343). According to Eugene Matusov, classroom examples of authoritative discourse also include “intolerance, speaking for others, an unwillingness to listen to and genuinely question others, the failure to test one’s own ideas and assumptions, and the desire to impose one’s own views on others” (Matusov, 2007: 231). Internally persuasive discourse, in contrast, refers to language use directed towards mutual communication and the mutual construction of knowledge: “In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and halfsomeone-else's” (Bakhtin, 1981: 345). In this way, internally persuasive discourse marks a creative border zone based on the impossibility of any word ever being final, and for this reason it is “able to reveal ever newer ways to mean” (Bakhtin, 1981: 346). But internally persuasive discourse cannot be reduced to the mere “appropriation” of the ideas and words of others, as it requires the ability to be involved in and embody how “diverse voices collide with each other in a dialogue that tests these ideas” (Matusov, 2007: 230). Thus, internally persuasive discourse always requires some form of dialogical and critical exposure that can be supported by the interplay of different voices in a classroom setting.	1,841	<h4>C. <u>Switch side debate</u> – It solves all of their offense and is the only model of debate that allows us to question traditional dogmas like racism – the alternative is authoritarianism </h4><p><strong>Hanghoj 8</strong> {Thorkild, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Herm<u><strong>}</p><p></u></strong>One of the key elements of dialogical pedagogy, and consequently a dialogical game pedagogy, is based upon the Bakhtinian notion of “authority”. In his writings, Bakhtin often distinguishes between “authoritative discourse” and “internally persuasive discourse” (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984a). <u><mark>Authoritative discourse refers to</mark> those <mark>forms of language</mark> use <mark>which present themselves as unchallengeable orthodoxy</mark> by formulating positions that are not open to debate</u>. Bakhtinexemplifies this with <mark>political dogma</mark> that “<u><mark>demands</mark> our <mark>unconditional</mark> <mark>allegiance</mark>” (Bakhtin, 1981: 343). According to Eugene Matusov, classroom <mark>examples of authoritative discourse</mark> also <mark>include “intolerance, speaking for others</mark>, an <mark>unwillingness to listen</mark> to and genuinely question others, the <mark>failure to test one’s</mark> own <mark>ideas</u></mark> and assumptions, and the desire to impose one’s own views on others” (Matusov, 2007: 231). <mark>Internally persuasive discourse</mark>, in contrast, <mark>refers to language use directed towards mutual communication</mark> and the mutual construction of knowledge: “In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and halfsomeone-else's” (Bakhtin, 1981: 345). In this way, internally persuasive discourse marks a creative border zone based on the impossibility of any word ever being final, and for this reason it is “able to reveal ever newer ways to mean” (Bakhtin, 1981: 346). But <u><mark>internally</mark> <mark>persuasive discourse</mark> cannot be reduced to the mere “appropriation” of the ideas and words of others, as it <mark>requires the ability to be involved</mark> in <mark>and embody how “diverse voices collide</mark> with each other <mark>in a dialogue that tests these ideas”</u></mark> (Matusov, 2007: 230). Thus, internally persuasive discourse always requires some form of dialogical and critical exposure that can be supported by the interplay of different voices in a classroom setting. </p>	1nc	1	null	1,651,047	13	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,015	China’s leaders will say “Yes” — it’s a good deal and it’s good politics.	Glaser 16	Glaser 16 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)	The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the U S as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and a large reduction in the security threat posed by the U S The grand bargain could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might	the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the S and E C S far out of proportion China’s leaders might be able to deflate these nationalist claims Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the U S as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its control and a large reduction in the security threat posed by the U S The grand bargain could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might	The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless, the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the United States as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and, closely related, a large reduction in the security threat posed by the United States. The grand bargain, therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.	1,732	<h4>China’s leaders will say “<u>Yes</u>” — it’s <u>a good deal</u> and it’s <u>good politics</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 16</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p><u>The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty</u>. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises.</p><p>Nevertheless, <u><mark>the grand bargain would provide China with a <strong>major achievement</strong> at arguably <strong>little cost</strong>. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the S</mark>outh China <mark>and E</mark>ast <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>eas <strong><mark>far out of proportion</strong></mark> to their material value. If <mark>China’s leaders</mark> decide to prioritize other goals, they <mark>might be able to <strong>deflate these nationalist claims</strong></mark>, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, <mark>Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide <strong>large benefits to China</strong>, including elimination of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its</mark> full sovereign <mark>control and</u></mark>, closely related, <u><strong><mark>a large reduction in the security threat</strong> posed by the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u><mark>The grand bargain</u></mark>, therefore, <u><mark>could be <strong>appealing to a Chinese leadership</strong> that faces <strong>daunting domestic challenges</strong> and <strong>intensifying regional opposition</strong> to its assertive policies and growing military might</u></mark>. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.</p>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “China Says No”	176,679	166	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,016	Even if relations can’t prevent all war, overall UN effectiveness is a firebreak on escalation – Independently, resolves famine and disease	Goldberg 13	Goldberg 13 [Mark Leon, quoting former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, previously served as a professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, chairman of the Atlantic Council, and co-chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board January 7, 2013. Why Chuck Hagel Supports the United Nations, http://www.undispatch.com/why-chuck-hagel-supports-the-united-nations/]	out of control,	null	The former Nebraska Senator has some fairly nuanced and developed views about the proper role AND out of control, with no structure, no order, no boundaries.”	158	<h4><u>Even if</u> relations can’t prevent all war, overall <u>UN effectiveness</u> is a firebreak on <u>escalation</u> – Independently, resolves <u>famine</u> and <u>disease</h4><p></u><strong>Goldberg 13</strong> [Mark Leon, quoting former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, previously served as a professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, chairman of the Atlantic Council, and co-chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board January 7, 2013. Why Chuck Hagel Supports the United Nations, http://www.undispatch.com/why-chuck-hagel-supports-the-united-nations/]</p><p>The former Nebraska Senator has some fairly nuanced and developed views about the proper role </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>out of control</strong>,</u> with no structure, no order, no boundaries.” </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,636	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,017	Prefer proximate over root cause—if we win any extinction claims—you evaluate those first because of timeframe	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Prefer proximate over root cause—if we win any extinction claims—you evaluate those first because of timeframe</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	1,560,635	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,018	D. The State—we do not need to win that the state is good, but that the value of the state is something that should be debated—general indictments of the state can be made on the negative, while still preserving limited and effective debate and research	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>D. <u>The State</u>—we do not need to win that the state is good, but that the value of the state is something that should be debated—general indictments of the state can be made on the negative, while still preserving limited and effective debate and research</h4>	1nc	1	null	1,560,638	1	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,019	Recent positive trends haven’t resolved the fundamental issue — Taiwan conflict remains likely.	Kastner 16	Kastner 16 — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)	Broadly speaking, this analysis of recent trends in cross-strait relations offers some reason for optimism. To be clear, the relationship between China and Taiwan remains on a fundamental level untransformed, and it continues to be defined by a sovereignty dispute that is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, future cross-strait relations will almost certainly be characterized by periodic tensions, particularly after the DPP returns to power in Taiwan That the relationship has become more stable does not mean that military conflict in the Taiwan Strait has become unthinkable. The shifting balance of military power has the potential to create renewed instability if it begins to dominate other, more stabilizing, trends such as deepening cross-strait economic integration. As Chinese military capabilities continue to improve, future PRC leaders may become less willing to continue to accept the status quo in cross-strait relations. Analysts should not assume that future Taiwanese leaders will readily accommodate new power realities. To the contrary, a number of factors—relating to both Taiwan’s domestic politics and structural commitment problems—will make it difficult for Taiwan to yield significant ground on sovereignty issues in the years ahead. A shifting balance of power has the potential to give rise to renewed instability in the Taiwan Strait if it dominates other trends	the relationship remains untransformed future relations will almost certainly be characterized by periodic tensions That the relationship has become more stable does not mean military conflict has become unthinkable. The shifting balance has the potential to create renewed instability As Chinese military capabilities improve, future PRC leaders may become less willing to continue to accept the status quo a number of factors will make it difficult for Taiwan to yield significant ground A shifting balance of power has the potential to give rise to renewed instability	Conclusion Broadly speaking, this analysis of recent trends in cross-strait relations offers some reason for optimism. To be clear, the relationship between China and Taiwan remains on a fundamental level untransformed, and it continues to be defined by a sovereignty dispute that is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, future cross-strait relations will almost certainly be characterized by periodic tensions, particularly after the DPP returns to power in Taiwan. Key trends in the relationship, however—including a shifting balance of military power, deepening economic integration and cooperation, and changing views in Taiwan on identity and sovereignty issues—combine to make less likely the cross-strait conflict scenarios that most worried analysts in the past. That the relationship has become more stable does not mean, however, that military conflict in the Taiwan Strait has become unthinkable. The shifting balance of military power has the potential to create renewed instability if it begins to dominate other, more stabilizing, trends such as deepening cross-strait economic integration. As Chinese military capabilities continue to improve, future PRC leaders may become less willing to continue to accept the status quo in cross-strait relations. Analysts should not assume, however, that future Taiwanese leaders will readily accommodate new power realities. To the contrary, a number of factors—relating to both Taiwan’s domestic politics and structural commitment problems—will make it difficult for Taiwan to yield significant ground on sovereignty issues in the years ahead. A shifting balance of power, then, has the potential to give rise to renewed instability in the Taiwan Strait if it dominates other trends.	1,775	<h4>Recent positive trends haven’t resolved the fundamental issue — Taiwan conflict <u>remains likely</u>. </h4><p><strong>Kastner 16</strong> — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p>Conclusion</p><p><u>Broadly speaking, this analysis of recent trends in cross-strait relations offers some reason for optimism. To be clear, <mark>the relationship</mark> between China and Taiwan <mark>remains</mark> on a fundamental level <mark>untransformed</mark>, and it continues to be defined by a sovereignty dispute that is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, <mark>future</mark> cross-strait <mark>relations will almost certainly be characterized by <strong>periodic tensions</strong></mark>, particularly after the DPP returns to power in Taiwan</u>. Key trends in the relationship, however—including a shifting balance of military power, deepening economic integration and cooperation, and changing views in Taiwan on identity and sovereignty issues—combine to make less likely the cross-strait conflict scenarios that most worried analysts in the past.</p><p><u><mark>That the relationship has become more stable <strong>does not mean</u></strong></mark>, however, <u>that <mark>military conflict</mark> in the Taiwan Strait <mark>has become unthinkable. The shifting balance</mark> of military power <mark>has the potential to create <strong>renewed instability</strong></mark> if it begins to dominate other, more stabilizing, trends such as deepening cross-strait economic integration. <mark>As Chinese military capabilities</mark> continue to <mark>improve, future PRC leaders may become <strong>less willing to continue to accept the status quo</strong></mark> in cross-strait relations. Analysts should <strong>not</strong> assume</u>, however, <u>that future Taiwanese leaders will readily accommodate new power realities. To the contrary, <mark>a number of factors</mark>—relating to both Taiwan’s domestic politics and structural commitment problems—<mark>will make it difficult for Taiwan to yield significant ground</mark> on sovereignty issues in the years ahead. <mark>A shifting balance of power</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>has the potential to give rise to <strong>renewed instability</strong></mark> in the Taiwan Strait if it dominates other trends</u>.</p>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “China Won’t Risk War Over Taiwan”	170,521	9	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,020	Famine kills billions – shortages coming because of water shortages and climate change	Brown 5	Brown 5 (Lester, President – Earth Policy Institute, People and the Planet, “Falling Water Tables 'Could Hit Food Supply'”, 2-7, http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=2424)	for much of AND	null	Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security, but for much of AND For them, it is the next meal that is the overriding concern."	148	<h4>Famine kills <u>billions</u> – shortages coming because of water shortages and climate change </h4><p><strong>Brown 5</strong> (Lester, President – Earth Policy Institute, People and the Planet, “Falling Water Tables 'Could Hit Food Supply'”, 2-7, http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=2424<u>)</p><p></u>Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security, but <u>for much of </p><p>AND</p><p></u>For them, it is the next meal that is the overriding concern." </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	480,351	4	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,021	Perm enact IPR enforcement in China and engage in an epistemological self reflection this is their alt card don’t let any contrived competition arguments in the block	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Perm enact IPR enforcement in China and engage in an epistemological self reflection this is their alt card don’t let any contrived competition arguments in the block</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	1,560,640	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,022	First, engaging with the law is inevitable and can be effective	Capulong 9	Capulong 9 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana)	Nevertheless, in contrast to the a-legal approach First, activists often do not have a choice but to work within the legal system, as when they are arrested or otherwise prevented from engaging in activism by state authorities Second, campaigns for legal reform can win substantial gains and are frequently the only vehicles through which more far-reaching change takes shape struggles beget more radical possibilities third, law is constitutive of the social order law and lawyering are "a complex, contradictory, and open-textured setting that provides opportunities to challenge the status quo	activists often do not have a choice but to work within the legal system campaigns for legal reform can win substantial gains and are the only vehicles through which far-reaching change takes shape; struggles beget more radical possibilities law is constitutive of the social order law provides opportunities to challenge the status quo	(Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009) Nevertheless, in contrast to what Steve Bachmann has called the [116] "a-legal" or "crude Marxist" approach, n19 progressive activists recognize that the legal arena remains a forum for social struggle. n20 This is so for three reasons: First, activists often do not have a choice but to work within the legal system, as when they are arrested or otherwise prevented from engaging in activism by state authorities. Second, because law is relatively autonomous from economic and political interests, n21 campaigns for legal reform can win substantial gains and are frequently the only vehicles through which more far-reaching change takes shape; struggles for reform, in other words, beget more radical possibilities and aspirations. n22 And third, law is constitutive of the social order. Law--or, more accurately, the concept of it--is not (again as some crude analysts would argue) simply a tool of one ruling class or other, but rather an essential component of a just society. n23 Commentators observe that lawyers who base their practice on these three premises are "hungry for theory," n24 for theory checks the "occupational hazards [of] reformism or cynicism." n25 The theoretical project is thus a dialectic: while law reform alone cannot "disturb the basic political and economic organization of modern American society," n26 [117] law and lawyering are "a complex, contradictory, and open-textured setting that provides opportunities to challenge the status quo."	1,598	<h4>First, engaging with the law is inevitable and can be effective </h4><p><strong>Capulong 9</strong> (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana)</p><p>(Eduardo R.C., CLIENT ACTIVISM IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORY<strong>, CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 109, Fall, 2009)</p><p><u></strong>Nevertheless, in contrast to</u> what Steve Bachmann has called <u>the </u>[116] "<u>a-legal</u>" or "crude Marxist" <u>approach</u>, n19 progressive activists recognize that the legal arena remains a forum for social struggle. n20 This is so for three reasons: <u>First, <mark>activists often <strong>do not have a choice</strong> but to work within the legal system</mark>, as when they are arrested or otherwise prevented from engaging in activism by state authorities</u>. <u>Second,</u> because law is relatively autonomous from economic and political interests, n21 <u><mark>campaigns for legal reform can win <strong>substantial gains</strong> and are</mark> frequently <mark>the <strong>only vehicles</strong> through which</mark> more <mark>far-reaching change takes shape</u>; <u>struggles</u></mark> for reform, in other words, <u><mark>beget more radical possibilities</u></mark> and aspirations. n22 And <u>third, <mark>law is constitutive of the social order</u></mark>. Law--or, more accurately, the concept of it--is not (again as some crude analysts would argue) simply a tool of one ruling class or other, but rather an essential component of a just society. n23 Commentators observe that lawyers who base their practice on these three premises are "hungry for theory," n24 for theory checks the "occupational hazards [of] reformism or cynicism." n25 The theoretical project is thus a dialectic: while law reform alone cannot "disturb the basic political and economic organization of modern American society," n26 [117] <u><strong><mark>law</strong></mark> and lawyering are "a complex, contradictory, and open-textured setting that <strong><mark>provides opportunities to challenge the status quo</u></mark>."</p></strong>	1nc	1	null	191,415	50	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,023	China will never give up unification with Taiwan — nationalism and public pressure.	Mearsheimer 14	Mearsheimer 14 — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, 2014 (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, March/April, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)	The nationalism story is straightforward and uncontroversial. China is deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. For China’s elites, as well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory that has been part of China since ancient times, but was taken away by the hated Japanese in 1895—when China was weak and vulnerable. It must once again become an integral part of China The unification of China and Taiwan is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. There is simply no compromising on this issue the legitimacy of the Chinese regime is bound up with making sure Taiwan does not become a sovereign state and that it eventually becomes an integral part of China Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later and that hopefully it can be done peacefully. At the same time, they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other recourse	China is deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. For elites, as well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory taken by the hated Japanese unification is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. There is simply no compromising on this issue legitimacy of the regime is bound up with making sure Taiwan becomes part of China Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other recourse	The nationalism story is straightforward and uncontroversial. China is deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. For China’s elites, as well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory that has been part of China since ancient times, but was taken away by the hated Japanese in 1895—when China was weak and vulnerable. It must once again become an integral part of China. As Hu Jintao said in 2007 at the Seventeenth Party Congress: “The two sides of the Straits are bound to be reunified in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The unification of China and Taiwan is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. There is simply no compromising on this issue. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Chinese regime is bound up with making sure Taiwan does not become a sovereign state and that it eventually becomes an integral part of China. Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later and that hopefully it can be done peacefully. At the same time, they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other recourse.	1,149	<h4>China will <u>never</u> give up unification with Taiwan — nationalism and public pressure. </h4><p><strong>Mearsheimer 14</strong> — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, 2014 (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, March/April, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p><u>The nationalism story is straightforward and uncontroversial. <mark>China is <strong>deeply committed</strong> to making Taiwan part of China. For</mark> China’s <mark>elites, as well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory</mark> that has been part of China since ancient times, but was <mark>taken</mark> away <mark>by the hated Japanese</mark> in 1895—when China was weak and vulnerable. It must once again become an integral part of China</u>. As Hu Jintao said in 2007 at the Seventeenth Party Congress: “The two sides of the Straits are bound to be reunified in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”</p><p><u>The <mark>unification</mark> of China and Taiwan <mark>is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. <strong>There is simply no compromising on this issue</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u>the <mark>legitimacy of the</mark> Chinese <mark>regime is bound up with making sure Taiwan</mark> does not become a sovereign state and that it eventually <mark>becomes</mark> an integral <mark>part of China</u></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold <strong>sooner rather than later</strong></mark> and that hopefully it can be done peacefully. At the same time, <mark>they have made it clear that <strong>force is an option if they have no other recourse</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “China Won’t Risk War Over Taiwan”	77,965	15	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,024	Disease causes extinction	CGHR 16	CGHR 16 [Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future; National Academy of Medicine, Secretariat, “The Neglected Dimension of Global Security: A Framework to Counter Infectious Disease Crises,” Online, PDF available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21891/the-neglected-dimension-of-global-security-a-framework-to-counter] GANGEEZY	global community has massively underestimated risks that pandemics present to human life and AND	null	The global community has massively underestimated the risks that pandemics present to human life and AND crisis dwarfs our Commission’s proposed spending on pandemic risk (BIS, 2015).	183	<h4>Disease causes extinction </h4><p><strong>CGHR 16</strong> [Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future; National Academy of Medicine, Secretariat, “The Neglected Dimension of Global Security: A Framework to Counter Infectious Disease Crises,” Online, PDF available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21891/the-neglected-dimension-of-global-security-a-framework-to-counter<u>] GANGEEZY</p><p></u>The <u>global community has <strong>massively underestimated</u></strong> the <u>risks that pandemics present to human life and </p><p>AND</p><p></u>crisis dwarfs our Commission’s proposed spending on pandemic risk (BIS, 2015). </p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,641	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,025	If you think our reps are bad reject them, there is no disad to enacting IPR	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>If you think our reps are bad reject them, there is no disad to enacting IPR</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	1,560,642	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,026	Xi has consolidated power in the squo which guarantees inevitable success of reforms in the next few months, but treading lightly is key	(2/24, Latest shuffle in Beijing puts more economic power into hands of Xi	Cheng (2/24, Evelyn, staff writer at CNBC.com covering daily U.S. market moves and broader market trends across both the United States and China, “Latest shuffle in Beijing puts more economic power into hands of Xi Jinping”, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/latest-shuffle-in-beijing-puts-more-economic-power-into-hands-of-xi-jinping.html, SCOTT)	economy top of the list as the leadership shuffle in China begins, ahead of a potential power grab by Chinese President Xi Jinping this fall seem to suggest he's pretty confident" in bringing in more loyalists at the 19th Communist Party congress this fall. economics are very, very important to Xi given the economic pressures that are building in China in areas like debt and China's broader political stability Xi is expected to consolidate his power by appointing allies at the congress and possibly even signal he will stay on for an unprecedented third term the central bank looks set to combine with other financial institutions such as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission would be a reflection of Xi's ability to consolidate power increase effectiveness in economic policy. progress has stalled on ambitious market-oriented reform plans announced in 2013. Xi has been confronted with a lot of resistance to these reforms at the 19th party congress is to get enough allies that these reforms can be put through	null	Finance and the economy are top of the list as the leadership shuffle in China begins, ahead of a potential power grab by Chinese President Xi Jinping this fall. With three promotions announced Friday, Xi has more allies in higher positions, said Michael Hirson, Asia director at Eurasia Group. "The fact that he's willing to make them now ... would seem to suggest he's pretty confident" in bringing in more loyalists at the 19th Communist Party congress this fall. "It is certainly safe to say that economics are very, very important to Xi just given the economic pressures that are building in China in areas like debt and China's broader political stability," Hirson said. Xi is expected to consolidate his power by appointing allies at the congress and possibly even signal he will stay on for an unprecedented third term. However, analysts say the leadership changes are due more to the opportunity offered by officials' retirement. Chinese state media announced Friday that Guo Shuqing will succeed Shang Fulin as head the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Shang is 65 years old, the general retirement age for officials. Guo turns 61 this year and was governor of the northeastern Shandong province. Before that, he headed the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and is seen as a reformer with a chance of becoming the head of the People's Bank of China. "The campaign for the PBOC governor is more important," said Scott Kennedy, deputy director, Freeman Chair in China Studies, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kennedy said among Chinese proposals on the future of the PBOC, the central bank looks set to combine with other financial institutions such as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. "It would be a reflection of Xi's ability to consolidate power," he said, and potentially increase effectiveness in economic policy. Both the PBOC and CSRC did not return CNBC's emailed requests for comment. Also on Friday, Beijing mouthpiece Xinhua said on its official microblog that He Lifeng will head the National Development and Reform Commission. Zhong Shan will lead the Ministry of Commerce, Reuters reported Friday. Both Zhong and He previously held subordinate roles in the same agencies. He Lifeng is "very close to Xi," Eurasia Group's Hirson said. The NDRC "is a very important agency for both Xi's domestic agenda and foreign policy," he said, while Zhong has experience in anti-dumping issues that are "going to be a particularly key area of contention between China and the Trump administration." These personnel changes — rumored for days but only confirmed Friday — precede an expected switch-up in five of seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest circle of leadership. Xi and Premier Li Keqiang are the only two members that should remain after the fall party congress. China's president has enacted a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that many say has dampened economic growth and taken down his political enemies. Meanwhile, progress has stalled on ambitious market-oriented reform plans announced in 2013. "Xi Jinping has been confronted with a lot of resistance to these reforms," said Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. "What he wants to do at the 19th party congress is to get enough allies that these reforms can be put through."	3,362	<h4>Xi has consolidated power in the squo which guarantees <u>inevitable</u><strong> success of reforms in the next few months, but treading lightly is key</h4><p></strong>Cheng <strong>(2/24,</strong> Evelyn, staff writer at CNBC.com covering daily U.S. market moves and broader market trends across both the United States and China, “<u><strong>Latest shuffle in Beijing puts more economic power into hands of Xi </u></strong>Jinping”, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/latest-shuffle-in-beijing-puts-more-economic-power-into-hands-of-xi-jinping.html, SCOTT)</p><p>Finance and the <u><strong>economy</u></strong> are <u>top of the list as the leadership shuffle in China begins, <strong>ahead of a potential power grab</strong> by Chinese President <strong>Xi</strong> Jinping this fall</u>. With three promotions announced Friday, Xi has more allies in higher positions, said Michael Hirson, Asia director at Eurasia Group. "The fact that he's willing to make them now ... would <u>seem to suggest <strong>he's pretty confident</strong>" in bringing in more loyalists at the 19th Communist Party congress this fall. </u>"It is certainly safe to say that <u>economics are very, very important to Xi</u> just <u>given the economic pressures that are building in China in areas like debt and China's broader political stability</u>," Hirson said. <u><strong>Xi is expected to consolidate his power</u></strong> <u>by appointing allies at the congress and possibly even signal he will stay on for an unprecedented third term</u>. However, analysts say the leadership changes are due more to the opportunity offered by officials' retirement. Chinese state media announced Friday that Guo Shuqing will succeed Shang Fulin as head the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Shang is 65 years old, the general retirement age for officials. Guo turns 61 this year and was governor of the northeastern Shandong province. Before that, he headed the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and is seen as a reformer with a chance of becoming the head of the People's Bank of China. "The campaign for the PBOC governor is more important," said Scott Kennedy, deputy director, Freeman Chair in China Studies, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kennedy said among Chinese proposals on the future of the PBOC, <u>the central bank looks set to combine with other financial institutions such as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission</u>. "It <u><strong>would be a reflection of Xi's ability to consolidate power</u></strong>," he said, and potentially <u><strong>increase effectiveness in economic policy. </u></strong>Both the PBOC and CSRC did not return CNBC's emailed requests for comment. Also on Friday, Beijing mouthpiece Xinhua said on its official microblog that He Lifeng will head the National Development and Reform Commission. Zhong Shan will lead the Ministry of Commerce, Reuters reported Friday. Both Zhong and He previously held subordinate roles in the same agencies. He Lifeng is "very close to Xi," Eurasia Group's Hirson said. The NDRC "is a very important agency for both Xi's domestic agenda and foreign policy," he said, while Zhong has experience in anti-dumping issues that are "going to be a particularly key area of contention between China and the Trump administration." These personnel changes — rumored for days but only confirmed Friday — precede an expected switch-up in five of seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest circle of leadership. Xi and Premier Li Keqiang are the only two members that should remain after the fall party congress. China's president has enacted a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that many say has dampened economic growth and taken down his political enemies. Meanwhile, <u>progress has stalled on ambitious market-oriented reform plans announced in 2013. </u>"<u>Xi</u> Jinping <u>has been <strong>confronted with a lot of resistance</strong> to these reforms</u>," said Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. "What he wants to do <u>at the 19th party congress is to get <strong>enough allies that these reforms can be put through</u>."</p></strong>	1NC v GBN KR	1	null	1,560,644	2	125,898	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	657,902	N	Kanellis	4	Glenbrook North KR	Zuckerman	1AC - Taiwan 1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	null	55,805	ArSk	Glenbrook South ArSk	null	Al.....	Ar.....	Ke.....	Sk.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,027	Second scenario – Uyghurs	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><u>Second</u> scenario – Uyghurs </h4>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,643	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,028	Failure to resolve the sovereignty issue makes Taiwan a constant conflict threat.	Kastner 16	Kastner 16 — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)	The relationship across the Taiwan Strait has stabilized greatly in recent years, but it remains untransformed on a more fundamental level. The underlying issue in dispute, Taiwan’s sovereign status, remains unresolved. China’s military modernization—and the resulting shift in the cross-strait balance of power—have the potential to introduce dangerous new dynamics that could give rise to future conflict. Instability, though, is not inevitable Still, Officials should not be lulled by the recent détente; long-term stability will require continued careful management of the Taiwan issue in all three capitals	The relationship has stabilized but remains untransformed on a fundamental level. The underlying issue remains unresolved. China’s military modernization—and the shift in the balance of power—have the potential to introduce dangerous new dynamics that could give rise to future conflict Officials should not be lulled by the recent détente; long-term stability will require continued careful management	The relationship across the Taiwan Strait has stabilized greatly in recent years, but it remains untransformed on a more fundamental level. The underlying issue in dispute, Taiwan’s sovereign status, remains unresolved. China’s military modernization—and the resulting shift in the cross-strait balance of power—have the potential to introduce dangerous new dynamics that could give rise to future conflict. Instability, though, is not inevitable. This article has provided a number of reasons to be optimistic about the future of cross-strait relations. Still, Officials in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei should not be lulled by the recent détente; long-term stability will require continued careful management of the Taiwan issue in all three capitals. [End Page 92]	769	<h4>Failure to resolve the sovereignty issue makes Taiwan a <u>constant</u> conflict threat. </h4><p><strong>Kastner 16</strong> — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p><u><mark>The relationship</mark> across the Taiwan Strait <mark>has stabilized</mark> greatly in recent years, <mark>but</mark> it <mark>remains <strong>untransformed on a</mark> more <mark>fundamental level</strong>. The underlying issue</mark> in dispute, Taiwan’s sovereign status, <mark>remains <strong>unresolved</strong>. China’s military modernization—and the</mark> resulting <mark>shift in the</mark> cross-strait <mark>balance of power—have the potential to introduce <strong>dangerous new dynamics</strong> that could give rise to <strong>future conflict</strong></mark>. Instability, though, is not inevitable</u>. This article has provided a number of reasons to be optimistic about the future of cross-strait relations. <u>Still, <mark>Officials</u></mark> in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei <u><strong><mark>should not be lulled by the recent détente</strong>; long-term stability will require continued careful management</mark> of the Taiwan issue in all three capitals</u>. [End Page 92]</p>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “China Won’t Risk War Over Taiwan”	170,527	3	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,029	Engaging the law is better than the alternative – non-state activism is coopted and fails to compare to alternative mechanisms for change	Lobel 7	Lobel 7 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego)	, arguments about legal cooptation developed in response to a perceived gap between the ideal toward which a reform group struggled and its actual accomplishments opting out of traditional legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem the idea of opting out of the legal arena becomes self-defeating as it discounts the ongoing importance of law and the possibilities of legal reform in seemingly unregulated spheres sphere distinctions further fails to recognize a reality of blurring of boundaries between private and public spheres law operates in the background of seemingly unregulated relationships the extralegal view of decentralized activism and the division of society into different spheres in fact have worked to subvert rather than support the progressive agenda since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic idealism, they fail to develop tools for evaluating their success If the critique has involved the argument that legal reform is never radically transformative we must ask: what are the criteria for assessing the achievements of the suggested alternatives? we must question whether the new extralegal politics that are proposed are capable of producing a constructive theory and meaningful channels for reform, rather than passive status quo politics an axiomatic rejection of law presents the very risks they seek to avoid The myth of the law" is replaced by a myth of exit," romanticizing a distinct sphere that can better solve social conflict it is the act of engagement, not law, that holds the risks of cooptation It is not the particularities of the structural limitations of the judiciary that threaten to limit the progressive vision of social movements it is the essential difficulties of implementing theory into practice Life is simply messier than abstract ideals in the absence of a more programmatic and concrete vision of what alternative models of social reform activism need to achieve the conclusions and rhetoric of the contemporary critical legal consciousness are appropriated by advocates representing a wide range of political commitments	opting out of legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem opting out becomes self-defeating as it discounts the importance of law and the possibilities of legal reform the extralegal view of decentralized activism have worked to subvert rather than support the progressive agenda since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic idealism, they fail to develop tools for evaluating success what are the criteria for assessing the achievements of alternatives? an axiomatic rejection of law presents the risks they seek to avoid it is the essential difficulties of implementing theory into practice. Life is messier than abstract ideals	(Orly, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, February, 2007, LN) In the following sections, I argue that the extralegal model has suffered from the same drawbacks associated with legal cooptation. I show that as an effort to avoid the risk of legal cooptation, the current wave of suggested alternatives has effects that ironically mirror those of cooptation itself. Three central types of difficulties exist with contemporary extralegal scholarship. First, in the contexts of the labor and civil rights movements, arguments about legal cooptation often developed in response to a perceived gap between the conceptual ideal toward which a social reform group struggled and its actual accomplishments. But, ironically, the contemporary message of opting out of traditional legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem. As the rise of informalization (moving to nonlegal strategies), civil society (moving to extralegal spheres), and pluralism (the proliferation of norm-generating actors) has been effected and appropriated by supporters from a wide range of political commitments, these concepts have had unintended implications that conflict with the very social reform ideals from which they stem. Second, the idea of opting out of the legal arena becomes self-defeating as it discounts the ongoing importance of law and the possibilities of legal reform in seemingly unregulated spheres. A model encompassing exit and rigid sphere distinctions further fails to recognize a reality of increasing interpenetration and the blurring of boundaries between private and public spheres, profit and nonprofit sectors, and formal and informal institutions. It therefore loses the critical insight that law operates in the background of seemingly unregulated relationships. Again paradoxically, the extralegal view of decentralized activism and the division of society into different spheres in fact have worked to subvert rather than support the progressive agenda. Finally, since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic idealism, they fail to develop tools for evaluating their success. If the critique of legal cooptation has involved the argument that legal reform, even when viewed as a victory, is never radically transformative, we must ask: what are the criteria for assessing the achievements of the suggested alternatives? As I illustrate in the following sections, much of the current scholarship obscures the lines between the descriptive and the prescriptive in its formulation of social activism. If current suggestions present themselves as alternatives to formal legal struggles, we must question whether the new extralegal politics that are proposed and celebrated are capable of producing a constructive theory and meaningful channels for reform, rather than passive status quo politics. A. Practical Failures: When Extralegal Alternatives Are Vehicles for Conservative Agendas We don't want the 1950s back. What we want is to edit them. We want to keep the safe streets, the friendly grocers, and the milk and cookies, while blotting out the political bosses, the tyrannical headmasters, the inflexible rules, and the lectures on 100 percent Americanism and the sinfulness of dissent. n163 A basic structure of cooptation arguments as developed in relation to the labor and civil rights movements has been to show how, in the move from theory to practice, the ideal that was promoted by a social group takes on unintended content, and the group thus fails to realize the original vision. This risk is particularly high when ideals are framed in broad terms that are open to multiple interpretations. Moreover, the pitfalls of the potential risks presented under the umbrella of cooptation are in fact accentuated in current proposals. Paradoxically, as the extralegal movement is framed by way of opposition to formal legal reform paths, without sufficiently defining its goals, it runs the very risks it sought to avoid by working outside the legal system. Extralegal paths are depicted mostly in negative terms and as resorting to new alternative forms of action rather than established models. Accordingly, because the ideas of social organizing, civil society, and legal pluralism are framed in open-ended contrarian terms, they do not translate into specific visions of social justice reform. The idea of civil society, which has been embraced by people from a broad array of often conflicting ideological commitments, is particularly demonstrative. Critics argue that "some ideas fail because they never make the light of day. The idea of civil society ... failed because it [972] became too popular." n164 Such a broadly conceived ideal as civil society sows the seeds of its own destruction. In former eras, the claims about the legal cooptation of the transformative visions of workplace justice and racial equality suggested that through legal strategies the visions became stripped of their initial depth and fragmented and framed in ways that were narrow and often merely symbolic. This observation seems accurate in the contemporary political arena; the idea of civil society revivalism evoked by progressive activists has been reduced to symbolic acts with very little substance. On the left, progressive advocates envision decentralized activism in a third, nongovernmental sphere as a way of reviving democratic participation and rebuilding the state from the bottom up. By contrast, the idea of civil society has been embraced by conservative politicians as a means for replacing government-funded programs and steering away from state intervention. As a result, recent political uses of civil society have subverted the ideals of progressive social reform and replaced them with conservative agendas that reject egalitarian views of social provision. In particular, recent calls to strengthen civil society have been advanced by politicians interested in dismantling the modern welfare system. Conservative civil society revivalism often equates the idea of self-help through extralegal means with traditional family structures, and blames the breakdown of those structures (for example, the rise of the single parent family) for the increase in reliance and dependency on government aid. n165 This recent depiction of the third sphere of civic life works against legal reform precisely because state intervention may support newer, nontraditional social structures. For conservative thinkers, legal reform also risks increasing dependency on social services by groups who have traditionally been marginalized, including disproportionate reliance on public funds by people of color and single mothers. Indeed, the end of welfare as we knew it, n166 as well as the [973] transformation of work as we knew it, n167 is closely related to the quest of thinkers from all sides of the political spectrum for a third space that could replace the traditional functions of work and welfare. Strikingly, a range of liberal and conservative visions have thus converged into the same agenda, such as the recent welfare-to-work reforms, which rely on myriad non-governmental institutions and activities to support them. n168 When analyzed from the perspective of the unbundled cooptation critique, it becomes evident that there are multiple limits to the contemporary extralegal current. First, there have been significant problems with resources and zero-sum energies in the recent campaigns promoting community development and welfare. For example, the initial vision of welfare-to-work supported by liberal reformers was a multifaceted, dynamic system that would reshape the roles and responsibilities of the welfare bureaucracy. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 n169 (PRWORA), supported by President Clinton, was designed to convert various welfare programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children, into a single block grant program. The aim was to transform passive cash assistance into a more active welfare system, in which individuals would be better assisted, by both the government and the community, to return to the labor force and find opportunities to support themselves. Yet from the broad vision to actual implementation, the program quickly became limited in focus and in resources. Indeed, PRWORA placed new limits on welfare provision by eliminating eligibility categories and by placing rigid time limits on the provision of benefits. n170 Moreover, the need to frame questions relating to work, welfare, and poverty in institutional arrangements and professional jargon and to comply with various funding block grants has made some issues, such as the statistical reduction of welfare recipients, more salient, whereas other issues, such as the quality of jobs offered, have been largely eliminated from policymakers' consideration. Despite aspects of the reform that were hailed as empowering for those groups they were designed to help, such as individual private training vouchers, serious questions have been raised about the adequacy of the particular [974] policy design because resources and institutional support have been found lacking. n171 The reforms require individual choices and rely on the ability of private recipients to mine through a vast range of information. As in the areas of child care, health care, and educational vouchers, critics worry that the most disadvantaged workers in the new market will not be able to take advantage of the reforms. n172 Under such conditions, the goal of eliminating poverty may be eroded and replaced by other goals, such as reducing public expenses. Thus, recalling the earlier cooptation critique, once reforms are envisioned, even when they need not be framed in legalistic terms, they in some ways become reduced to a handful of issues, while fragmenting, neglecting, and ultimately neutralizing other possibilities. At this point, the paradox of extralegal activism unfolds. While public interest thinkers increasingly embrace an axiomatic rejection of law as the primary form of progress, their preferred form of activism presents the very risks they seek to avoid. The rejected "myth of the law" is replaced by a "myth of activism" or a "myth of exit," romanticizing a distinct sphere that can better solve social conflict. Yet these myths, like other myths, come complete with their own perpetual perils. The myth of exit exemplifies the myriad concerns of cooptation. For feminist agendas, for example, the separation of the world into distinct spheres of action has been a continuous impediment to meaningful reform. Efforts to create better possibilities for women to balance work and family responsibilities, including relaxing home work rules and supporting stay-at-home parents through federal child care legislation, have been couched in terms of support for individual choice and private decisionmaking. n173 Indeed, recent initiatives in federal child care legislation to support stay-at-home parents have been clouded by preconceptions of the separation of spheres and the need to make one-or-the-other life choices. Most importantly, the emergence of a sphere-oriented discourse abandons a critical perspective that distinguishes between valuing traditional gender-based characteristics and celebrating feminine difference in a universalist and essentialist manner. n174 [975] Not surprisingly then, some feminist writers have responded to civil society revivalism with great skepticism, arguing that efforts to align feminine values and agendas with classic republican theory of civil society activism should be understood, at least in part, as a way of legitimizing historical social structures that subordinated women. The feminist lesson on the law/exit pendulum reveals a broader pattern. In a classic example of cooptation, activists should be concerned about the infusion (or indeed confusion) of nonlegal strategies with conservative privatization agendas. Indeed, in significant social policy contexts, legal scholarship oriented toward the exploration of extralegal paths reinforces the exact narrative that it originally resisted - that the state cannot and should not be accountable for sustaining and improving the lifeworld of individuals in the twenty-first-century economy and that we must seek alternative ways to bring about social reform. Whether using the terminology of a path-dependent process, an inevitable downward spiral, a transnational prisoner's dilemma, or a global race to the bottom, current analyses often suggest a lack of control over the forces of new economic realities. Rather than countering the story of lack of control, pointing to the ongoing role of government and showing the contradictions between that which is being kept regulated and that which is privatized, alternative extralegal scholarship accepts these developments as natural and inevitable. Similar to the arguments developed in relation to the labor movement - in which focusing on a limited right to collective bargaining demobilized workers and stripped them of their voice, participation, and decisionmaking power - contemporary extralegal agendas are limited to very narrow and patterned sets of reforms. A striking example has been the focus on welfare reform as the single frontier of economic redistribution without a connection being made between these reforms and social services in which the middle class has a strong interest, such as Social Security and Medicare. Similarly, on the legal pluralism frontier, when activists call for more corporate social responsibility, the initial expressions are those of broad demands for sustainable development and overall industry obligations for the social and environmental consequences of their activities. n176 The discourse, however, quickly becomes coopted by a shift to a narrow focus on charitable donations and corporate philanthropy or [976] private reporting absent an institutionalized compliance structure. n177 Moreover, because of institutional limitations and crowding out effects possible in any type of reform agenda, the focus shifts to the benefits of corporate social responsibility to businesses, as marketing, recruit-ment, public relations, and "greenwashing" strategies. n178 Critics therefore become deeply cynical about the industry's real commitments to ethical conduct. A similar process can be described with regard to the literature on globalization. Globalization scholarship often attempts to produce a unifying narrative and an image of unitary struggle when in fact such unity does not exist. Embodied in the aforementioned irony of a "global anti-globalization" movement, social reform activism that resides under the umbrella of global movements is greatly diverse, some of it highly conservative. An "anti-globalization" movement can be a defensive nationalist movement infused with xenophobia and protective ideologies. n179 In fact, during central instances of collective action, such as those in Seattle, Quebec, Puerto Alegre, and Genoa, competing and conflicting claims were frequently encompassed in the same protest. n180 Nevertheless, there is a tendency to celebrate and idealize these protests as united and world-altering. Similarly, at the local level, grassroots politics often lack a clear agenda and are particularly ripe for cooptation resulting in far lesser achievements than what may have been expected by the groups involved. In a critical introduction to the law and organizing model, Professor Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly describe the ways in which new community-based approaches to progressive lawyering privilege grassroots activism over legal reform efforts and the facilitation of community mobilization over conventional lawyering. n181 After carefully unpacking the ways in which community lawyers embrace [977] law and organizing, Professor Cummings and Eagly rightfully warn against "exaggerating the ineffectiveness of traditional legal interventions" and "closing off potential avenues for redress." n182 Significantly, the strategies embraced by new public interest lawyers have not been shown to produce effective change in communities, and certainly there has been no assurance that these strategies fare comparatively better than legal reform. Moreover, what are meant to be progressive projects of community action and community economic development frequently can have a hidden effect of excluding worse-off groups, such as migrant workers, because of the geographical scope and zoning restrictions of the project. n183 In the same way that the labor and corporate social responsibility movements have failed because of their embrace of a legal framework, the community economic development movement - so diverse in its ideological appeal yet so prominent since the early 1990s as a major approach to poverty relief - may bring about its own destruction by fracture and diffusion. n184 In all of these cases, it is the act of engagement, not law, that holds the risks of cooptation and the politics of compromise. It is not the particularities of lawyers as a professional group that create dependency. Rather, it is the dynamics between skilled, networked, and resourced components and those who need them that may submerge goals and create reliance. It is not the particularities of the structural limitations of the judiciary that threaten to limit the progressive vision of social movements. Rather, it is the essential difficulties of implementing theory into practice. Life is simply messier than abstract ideals. Cooptation analysis exposes the broad, general risk of assuming ownership over a rhetorical and conceptual framework of a movement for change. Subsequently, when, in practice, other factions in the political debate embrace the language and frame their projects in similar terms, groups experience a sense of loss of control or possession of "their" vision. In sum, in the contemporary context, in the absence of a more programmatic and concrete vision of what alternative models of social reform activism need to achieve, the conclusions and rhetoric of the contemporary critical legal consciousness are appropriated by advocates representing a wide range of political commitments. Understood [*978] from this perspective, cooptation is not the result of the turn to a particular reform strategy. Rather, cooptation occurs when imagined ideals are left unchecked and seemingly progressive rhetoric is reproduced by a conservative agenda. Dominant interpretations such as privatization and market competitiveness come out ahead, whereas other values, such as group empowerment and redistributive justice, receive only symbolic recognition, and in turn serve to facilitate and stabilize the process. n185	18,831	<h4>Engaging the law is better than the alternative – non-state activism is coopted and fails to compare to alternative mechanisms for change</h4><p><strong>Lobel 7</strong> (Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego)</p><p>(Orly, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, February, 2007, LN)</p><p>In the following sections, I argue that the extralegal model has suffered from the same drawbacks associated with legal cooptation. I show that as an effort to avoid the risk of legal cooptation, the current wave of suggested alternatives has effects that ironically mirror those of cooptation itself. Three central types of difficulties exist with contemporary extralegal scholarship. First, in the contexts of the labor and civil rights movements<u>, arguments about legal cooptation</u> often <u>developed in response to a perceived gap between the</u> conceptual <u>ideal toward which a</u> social <u>reform group struggled and its actual accomplishments</u>. But, ironically, the contemporary message of <u><strong><mark>opting out of</strong></mark> traditional <strong><mark>legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem</u></strong></mark>. As the rise of informalization (moving to nonlegal strategies), civil society (moving to extralegal spheres), and pluralism (the proliferation of norm-generating actors) has been effected and appropriated by supporters from a wide range of political commitments, these concepts have had unintended implications that conflict with the very social reform ideals from which they stem. Second, <u>the idea of <mark>opting out</mark> of the legal arena <mark>becomes self-defeating as it discounts the</mark> ongoing <mark>importance of law and the possibilities of legal reform</mark> in seemingly unregulated spheres</u>. A model encompassing exit and rigid <u>sphere distinctions further fails to recognize a reality of </u>increasing interpenetration and the <u>blurring of boundaries between private and public spheres</u>, profit and nonprofit sectors, and formal and informal institutions. It therefore loses the critical insight that <u>law operates in the background of seemingly unregulated relationships</u>. Again paradoxically, <u><mark>the extralegal view of decentralized activism</mark> and the division of society into different spheres in fact <mark>have worked to <strong>subvert rather than support</strong> the progressive agenda</u></mark>. Finally, <u><mark>since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic idealism, they <strong>fail to develop tools for evaluating</strong></mark> their <strong><mark>success</u></strong></mark>. <u>If the critique</u> of legal cooptation <u>has involved the argument that legal reform</u>, even when viewed as a victory, <u>is never radically transformative</u>, <u>we must ask: <mark>what are the criteria for assessing the achievements of</mark> the suggested <mark>alternatives?</u></mark> As I illustrate in the following sections, much of the current scholarship obscures the lines between the descriptive and the prescriptive in its formulation of social activism. If current suggestions present themselves as alternatives to formal legal struggles, <u>we must question whether the new extralegal politics that are proposed</u> and celebrated <u>are capable of producing a constructive theory and meaningful channels for reform, rather than passive status quo politics</u>. A. Practical Failures: When Extralegal Alternatives Are Vehicles for Conservative Agendas We don't want the 1950s back. What we want is to edit them. We want to keep the safe streets, the friendly grocers, and the milk and cookies, while blotting out the political bosses, the tyrannical headmasters, the inflexible rules, and the lectures on 100 percent Americanism and the sinfulness of dissent. n163 A basic structure of cooptation arguments as developed in relation to the labor and civil rights movements has been to show how, in the move from theory to practice, the ideal that was promoted by a social group takes on unintended content, and the group thus fails to realize the original vision. This risk is particularly high when ideals are framed in broad terms that are open to multiple interpretations. Moreover, the pitfalls of the potential risks presented under the umbrella of cooptation are in fact accentuated in current proposals. Paradoxically, as the extralegal movement is framed by way of opposition to formal legal reform paths, without sufficiently defining its goals, it runs the very risks it sought to avoid by working outside the legal system. Extralegal paths are depicted mostly in negative terms and as resorting to new alternative forms of action rather than established models. Accordingly, because the ideas of social organizing, civil society, and legal pluralism are framed in open-ended contrarian terms, they do not translate into specific visions of social justice reform. The idea of civil society, which has been embraced by people from a broad array of often conflicting ideological commitments, is particularly demonstrative. Critics argue that "some ideas fail because they never make the light of day. The idea of civil society ... failed because it [972] became too popular." n164 Such a broadly conceived ideal as civil society sows the seeds of its own destruction. In former eras, the claims about the legal cooptation of the transformative visions of workplace justice and racial equality suggested that through legal strategies the visions became stripped of their initial depth and fragmented and framed in ways that were narrow and often merely symbolic. This observation seems accurate in the contemporary political arena; the idea of civil society revivalism evoked by progressive activists has been reduced to symbolic acts with very little substance. On the left, progressive advocates envision decentralized activism in a third, nongovernmental sphere as a way of reviving democratic participation and rebuilding the state from the bottom up. By contrast, the idea of civil society has been embraced by conservative politicians as a means for replacing government-funded programs and steering away from state intervention. As a result, recent political uses of civil society have subverted the ideals of progressive social reform and replaced them with conservative agendas that reject egalitarian views of social provision. In particular, recent calls to strengthen civil society have been advanced by politicians interested in dismantling the modern welfare system. Conservative civil society revivalism often equates the idea of self-help through extralegal means with traditional family structures, and blames the breakdown of those structures (for example, the rise of the single parent family) for the increase in reliance and dependency on government aid. n165 This recent depiction of the third sphere of civic life works against legal reform precisely because state intervention may support newer, nontraditional social structures. For conservative thinkers, legal reform also risks increasing dependency on social services by groups who have traditionally been marginalized, including disproportionate reliance on public funds by people of color and single mothers. Indeed, the end of welfare as we knew it, n166 as well as the [973] transformation of work as we knew it, n167 is closely related to the quest of thinkers from all sides of the political spectrum for a third space that could replace the traditional functions of work and welfare. Strikingly, a range of liberal and conservative visions have thus converged into the same agenda, such as the recent welfare-to-work reforms, which rely on myriad non-governmental institutions and activities to support them. n168 When analyzed from the perspective of the unbundled cooptation critique, it becomes evident that there are multiple limits to the contemporary extralegal current. First, there have been significant problems with resources and zero-sum energies in the recent campaigns promoting community development and welfare. For example, the initial vision of welfare-to-work supported by liberal reformers was a multifaceted, dynamic system that would reshape the roles and responsibilities of the welfare bureaucracy. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 n169 (PRWORA), supported by President Clinton, was designed to convert various welfare programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children, into a single block grant program. The aim was to transform passive cash assistance into a more active welfare system, in which individuals would be better assisted, by both the government and the community, to return to the labor force and find opportunities to support themselves. Yet from the broad vision to actual implementation, the program quickly became limited in focus and in resources. Indeed, PRWORA placed new limits on welfare provision by eliminating eligibility categories and by placing rigid time limits on the provision of benefits. n170 Moreover, the need to frame questions relating to work, welfare, and poverty in institutional arrangements and professional jargon and to comply with various funding block grants has made some issues, such as the statistical reduction of welfare recipients, more salient, whereas other issues, such as the quality of jobs offered, have been largely eliminated from policymakers' consideration. Despite aspects of the reform that were hailed as empowering for those groups they were designed to help, such as individual private training vouchers, serious questions have been raised about the adequacy of the particular [974] policy design because resources and institutional support have been found lacking. n171 The reforms require individual choices and rely on the ability of private recipients to mine through a vast range of information. As in the areas of child care, health care, and educational vouchers, critics worry that the most disadvantaged workers in the new market will not be able to take advantage of the reforms. n172 Under such conditions, the goal of eliminating poverty may be eroded and replaced by other goals, such as reducing public expenses. Thus, recalling the earlier cooptation critique, once reforms are envisioned, even when they need not be framed in legalistic terms, they in some ways become reduced to a handful of issues, while fragmenting, neglecting, and ultimately neutralizing other possibilities. At this point, the paradox of extralegal activism unfolds. While public interest thinkers increasingly embrace<u> <mark>an axiomatic rejection of law</u></mark> as the primary form of progress, their preferred form of activism <u><mark>presents the</mark> very <mark>risks they seek to avoid</u></mark>. <u>The</u> rejected "<u>myth of the law" is replaced by a</u> "myth of activism" or a "<u>myth of exit," romanticizing a distinct sphere that can better solve social conflict</u>. Yet these myths, like other myths, come complete with their own perpetual perils. The myth of exit exemplifies the myriad concerns of cooptation. For feminist agendas, for example, the separation of the world into distinct spheres of action has been a continuous impediment to meaningful reform. Efforts to create better possibilities for women to balance work and family responsibilities, including relaxing home work rules and supporting stay-at-home parents through federal child care legislation, have been couched in terms of support for individual choice and private decisionmaking. n173 Indeed, recent initiatives in federal child care legislation to support stay-at-home parents have been clouded by preconceptions of the separation of spheres and the need to make one-or-the-other life choices. Most importantly, the emergence of a sphere-oriented discourse abandons a critical perspective that distinguishes between valuing traditional gender-based characteristics and celebrating feminine difference in a universalist and essentialist manner. n174 [975] Not surprisingly then, some feminist writers have responded to civil society revivalism with great skepticism, arguing that efforts to align feminine values and agendas with classic republican theory of civil society activism should be understood, at least in part, as a way of legitimizing historical social structures that subordinated women. The feminist lesson on the law/exit pendulum reveals a broader pattern. In a classic example of cooptation, activists should be concerned about the infusion (or indeed confusion) of nonlegal strategies with conservative privatization agendas. Indeed, in significant social policy contexts, legal scholarship oriented toward the exploration of extralegal paths reinforces the exact narrative that it originally resisted - that the state cannot and should not be accountable for sustaining and improving the lifeworld of individuals in the twenty-first-century economy and that we must seek alternative ways to bring about social reform. Whether using the terminology of a path-dependent process, an inevitable downward spiral, a transnational prisoner's dilemma, or a global race to the bottom, current analyses often suggest a lack of control over the forces of new economic realities. Rather than countering the story of lack of control, pointing to the ongoing role of government and showing the contradictions between that which is being kept regulated and that which is privatized, alternative extralegal scholarship accepts these developments as natural and inevitable. Similar to the arguments developed in relation to the labor movement - in which focusing on a limited right to collective bargaining demobilized workers and stripped them of their voice, participation, and decisionmaking power - contemporary extralegal agendas are limited to very narrow and patterned sets of reforms. A striking example has been the focus on welfare reform as the single frontier of economic redistribution without a connection being made between these reforms and social services in which the middle class has a strong interest, such as Social Security and Medicare. Similarly, on the legal pluralism frontier, when activists call for more corporate social responsibility, the initial expressions are those of broad demands for sustainable development and overall industry obligations for the social and environmental consequences of their activities. n176 The discourse, however, quickly becomes coopted by a shift to a narrow focus on charitable donations and corporate philanthropy or [976] private reporting absent an institutionalized compliance structure. n177 Moreover, because of institutional limitations and crowding out effects possible in any type of reform agenda, the focus shifts to the benefits of corporate social responsibility to businesses, as marketing, recruit-ment, public relations, and "greenwashing" strategies. n178 Critics therefore become deeply cynical about the industry's real commitments to ethical conduct. A similar process can be described with regard to the literature on globalization. Globalization scholarship often attempts to produce a unifying narrative and an image of unitary struggle when in fact such unity does not exist. Embodied in the aforementioned irony of a "global anti-globalization" movement, social reform activism that resides under the umbrella of global movements is greatly diverse, some of it highly conservative. An "anti-globalization" movement can be a defensive nationalist movement infused with xenophobia and protective ideologies. n179 In fact, during central instances of collective action, such as those in Seattle, Quebec, Puerto Alegre, and Genoa, competing and conflicting claims were frequently encompassed in the same protest. n180 Nevertheless, there is a tendency to celebrate and idealize these protests as united and world-altering. Similarly, at the local level, grassroots politics often lack a clear agenda and are particularly ripe for cooptation resulting in far lesser achievements than what may have been expected by the groups involved. In a critical introduction to the law and organizing model, Professor Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly describe the ways in which new community-based approaches to progressive lawyering privilege grassroots activism over legal reform efforts and the facilitation of community mobilization over conventional lawyering. n181 After carefully unpacking the ways in which community lawyers embrace [977] law and organizing, Professor Cummings and Eagly rightfully warn against "exaggerating the ineffectiveness of traditional legal interventions" and "closing off potential avenues for redress." n182 Significantly, the strategies embraced by new public interest lawyers have not been shown to produce effective change in communities, and certainly there has been no assurance that these strategies fare comparatively better than legal reform. Moreover, what are meant to be progressive projects of community action and community economic development frequently can have a hidden effect of excluding worse-off groups, such as migrant workers, because of the geographical scope and zoning restrictions of the project. n183 In the same way that the labor and corporate social responsibility movements have failed because of their embrace of a legal framework, the community economic development movement - so diverse in its ideological appeal yet so prominent since the early 1990s as a major approach to poverty relief - may bring about its own destruction by fracture and diffusion. n184 In all of these cases, <u>it is the act of engagement, not law, that holds the risks of cooptation</u> and the politics of compromise. It is not the particularities of lawyers as a professional group that create dependency. Rather, it is the dynamics between skilled, networked, and resourced components and those who need them that may submerge goals and create reliance. <u>It is not the particularities of the structural limitations of the judiciary that threaten to limit the progressive vision of social movements</u>. Rather, <u><strong><mark>it is the essential difficulties of implementing theory into practice</u></strong>. <u>Life is</mark> simply <mark>messier than abstract ideals</u></mark>. Cooptation analysis exposes the broad, general risk of assuming ownership over a rhetorical and conceptual framework of a movement for change. Subsequently, when, in practice, other factions in the political debate embrace the language and frame their projects in similar terms, groups experience a sense of loss of control or possession of "their" vision. In sum, in the contemporary context, <u>in the absence of a more programmatic and concrete vision of what alternative models of social reform activism need to achieve</u>, <u>the conclusions and rhetoric of the contemporary critical legal consciousness are appropriated by advocates representing a wide range of political commitments</u>. Understood [*978] from this perspective, cooptation is not the result of the turn to a particular reform strategy. Rather, cooptation occurs when imagined ideals are left unchecked and seemingly progressive rhetoric is reproduced by a conservative agenda. Dominant interpretations such as privatization and market competitiveness come out ahead, whereas other values, such as group empowerment and redistributive justice, receive only symbolic recognition, and in turn serve to facilitate and stabilize the process. n185</p>	1nc	1	null	81,318	245	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,030	One instance of securitization isn’t bad.	Ghughunishvili, CEU IR masters, 2010	Ghughunishvili, CEU IR masters, 2010	As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches	The causality between the speech act and securitizing actor has been criticized process of threat construction can be clearer a single speech does not create discourse but it is created through a long process a single speech will not securitize an issue	(Irina, “Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies”, online pdf) As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.	2,245	<h4><strong>One instance of securitization isn’t bad. </h4><p>Ghughunishvili, CEU IR masters, 2010</p><p></strong>(Irina, “Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies”, online pdf)</p><p><u>As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act</u>, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. <u><mark>The causality</mark> or a one-way relationship <mark>between the speech act</mark>, the audience <mark>and securitizing actor</mark>, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, <mark>has been criticized</u></mark> by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. <u>To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them</u>. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. <u>The <mark>process of threat construction</mark>, according to him, <mark>can be clearer</mark> if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered</u>. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where <u><mark>a single speech does not create</mark> the <mark>discourse</mark>, <mark>but it is created through a long process</mark>, where context is vital</u>. 28 He indicates: <u>In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it</u>. <u>In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization</u>. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as <u>it is more likely that <mark>a single speech will not</mark> be able to <mark>securitize an issue</mark>, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches</u>. </p>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	12,120	225	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,031	The plan is a huge loss for xi---their ev doesn’t assume reciprocal reductions	Mass 16 Warren, “The Reaction in Taipei and Beijing to Trump’s Openness to Taiwan,” 12/15/16, http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/24848-the-reaction-in-taipei-and-beijing-to-trump-s-openness-to-taiwan	Mass 16 Warren, “The Reaction in Taipei and Beijing to Trump’s Openness to Taiwan,” 12/15/16, http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/24848-the-reaction-in-taipei-and-beijing-to-trump-s-openness-to-taiwan	Trump indicated during his interview with Fox News Sunday that he regards the “one China” policy as a potential bargaining chip in striking a trade deal with China International political analysts have attempted to predict how Trump’s statement regarding his lack of commitment to the “one China” policy might impact the PRC’s foreign policy. Xi has taken a strong position against independence for Taiwan and concessions he might make in that area would not only cause him to lose face, but also erode his standing within China’s Communist Party and among the Chinese public. analysts said it would be politically difficult for Xi to offer concessions on trade or security issues after Trump’s statements questioning the “one China” policy since Beijing has long maintained that that policy is nonnegotiable To concede that point now would be regarded both in China and abroad as an indication that China has backed down a sign of weakness it would be unwilling to present to the world.	null	The Times noted that Trump’s recent statements indicating that he is willing to reconsider the decades-long American policy that favors China at the expense of Taiwan has encouraged Lin and many others on Taiwan who share his mindset. However, notes the report, Lin and others on Taiwan are concerned about what Trump’s China policy will be and what role Taiwan will play in the dealmaker’s negotiations with communist China. Trump indicated during his interview with Fox News Sunday that he regards the “one China” policy as a potential bargaining chip in striking a trade deal with China, saying: “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” “Many people in Taiwan worry that once Trump takes office, he’ll make a U-turn,” Lin said. “We are suspicious of his motivations.” The Times reported that Lin said Trump had opened a potential path for Taiwan to gain the international recognition that he and others have been fighting to achieve for a long time. However, Lin also indicated that he regards Trump as perhaps an unreliable ally. “We are not naïve,” Lin said. “We don’t believe that the election of a new U.S. president will necessarily bring about huge changes. But if there’s an opportunity, we will definitely not give it up.” The Times report also quoted a statement from Huang Kuo-chang, chairman of the New Power Party, a young political party that emerged from the Sunflower Student Movement in 2015, who hoped to build bridges with the United States. “We need to talk to the American people so they can have a deeper understanding of Taiwan. We want to tell them that we are their true ally and that we share many common values,” said Huang. Hsu Tse-mei, a retired bank manager in Taipei, expressed concern about how the ascendancy of Trump to the American presidency will impact the future of his country. “He’s an uncontrollable force,” he was quoted as saying by the Times. “We’re caught between two powerful countries, China and the United States, and we’re at the mercy of Trump.” International political analysts have also attempted to predict how Trump’s statement regarding his lack of commitment to the “one China” policy might impact the PRC’s foreign policy. PRC President Xi Jinping has taken a strong position against independence for Taiwan and concessions he might make in that area would not only cause him to lose face, but also erode his standing within China’s Communist Party and among the Chinese public. The Times cited analysts who said it would be politically difficult for Xi to offer concessions on trade or security issues after Trump’s statements questioning the “one China” policy, since Beijing has long maintained that that policy is nonnegotiable. To concede that point now would be regarded both in China and abroad as an indication that China has backed down — a sign of weakness it would be unwilling to present to the world.	2,974	<h4><strong>The plan is a huge loss for xi---their ev doesn’t assume reciprocal reductions</h4><p>Mass 16 <u>Warren, “The Reaction in Taipei and Beijing to Trump’s Openness to Taiwan,” 12/15/16, http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/24848-the-reaction-in-taipei-and-beijing-to-trump-s-openness-to-taiwan</p><p></u></strong>The Times noted that Trump’s recent statements indicating that he is willing to reconsider the decades-long American policy that favors China at the expense of Taiwan has encouraged Lin and many others on Taiwan who share his mindset. However, notes the report, Lin and others on Taiwan are concerned about what Trump’s China policy will be and what role Taiwan will play in the dealmaker’s negotiations with communist China. <u>Trump indicated during his interview with Fox News Sunday that he regards the “one China” policy as a potential bargaining chip in striking a trade deal with China</u>, saying: “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” “Many people in Taiwan worry that once Trump takes office, he’ll make a U-turn,” Lin said. “We are suspicious of his motivations.” The Times reported that Lin said Trump had opened a potential path for Taiwan to gain the international recognition that he and others have been fighting to achieve for a long time. However, Lin also indicated that he regards Trump as perhaps an unreliable ally. “We are not naïve,” Lin said. “We don’t believe that the election of a new U.S. president will necessarily bring about huge changes. But if there’s an opportunity, we will definitely not give it up.” The Times report also quoted a statement from Huang Kuo-chang, chairman of the New Power Party, a young political party that emerged from the Sunflower Student Movement in 2015, who hoped to build bridges with the United States. “We need to talk to the American people so they can have a deeper understanding of Taiwan. We want to tell them that we are their true ally and that we share many common values,” said Huang. Hsu Tse-mei, a retired bank manager in Taipei, expressed concern about how the ascendancy of Trump to the American presidency will impact the future of his country. “He’s an uncontrollable force,” he was quoted as saying by the Times. “We’re caught between two powerful countries, China and the United States, and we’re at the mercy of Trump.” <u>International political analysts have</u> also <u>attempted to predict how Trump’s statement regarding his lack of commitment to the “one China” policy might impact the PRC’s foreign policy.</u> PRC President <u>Xi</u> Jinping <u>has taken a strong position against independence for Taiwan</u> <u><strong>and concessions he might make in that area would not only cause him to lose face, but also erode his standing within China’s Communist Party and among the Chinese public.</u></strong> The Times cited <u><strong>analysts</u></strong> who <u><strong>said it would be politically difficult for Xi to offer concessions on trade or security issues after Trump’s statements questioning the “one China” policy</u></strong>, <u><strong>since Beijing has long maintained that that policy is nonnegotiable</u></strong>. <u>To concede that point now would be regarded both in China and abroad as an indication that China has backed down </u>— <u><strong>a sign of weakness it would be unwilling to present to the world.</p></u></strong>	1NC v GBN KR	1	null	1,559,470	3	125,898	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	657,902	N	Kanellis	4	Glenbrook North KR	Zuckerman	1AC - Taiwan 1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	null	55,805	ArSk	Glenbrook South ArSk	null	Al.....	Ar.....	Ke.....	Sk.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,032	Our first link is Agency—transforming the world via language and creativity equates autonomy with the Cartesian subject and represents animals as impotent objects	Bell and Russell 2K	Bell and Russell 2K – Anne C. Bell was a graduate student in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University and Constance L. Russell was a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. (“Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn”, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)	Freire defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence Freire represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous biological existence Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world The human/animal opposition is taken for granted And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature metaphors in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric thinking. These include an understanding of individuals as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression How is freedom predicated on the exploitation of the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, self, and community It has also been used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks, queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is, animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized This “organic apartheid” is bolstered by the belief that language elevates mere biological existence to meaningful, social existence language becomes a medium through which we set ourselves apart and above. This view of language is deeply embedded in critical pedagogy So too is the human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that language enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the world around us,” and that “subjectivity is constructed by and in language” then their transformative projects are encoded to exclude the nonhuman. if subjectivity and meaning are securely lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything more than material objects in nature is nil	Freire defines human according to hierarchical dichotomy establishes human superiority. Humans are able to infuse the world with their creative presence Freire represents animals in terms of their lack of traits. Humans are cast as agents whose essence is to transform the world This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and limits possibilities of confronting inequities metaphors reinforce anthropocentric thinking. These include an understanding of individuals as “potentially free from oppression It has been used to justify exploitation of groups deemed to be closer to nature – language becomes a medium through which we set ourselves above. This is deeply embedded in critical pedagogy if subjectivity and meaning are lodged in humanity, the possibility of encountering anything more is nil	Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a, pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view was beginning to take shape. To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, self, and community, and thus bring into focus the underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’ interdependence with the more-than-human world. This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed to be free agents separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). It has also been used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks, queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is, animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989, p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988). This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through which we set ourselves apart and above. This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that “it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman. Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden (1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything more than material objects in nature is nil” (p. 108). What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994) uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural, somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).	7,725	<h4><strong>Our first link is Agency—transforming the world via language and creativity equates autonomy with the Cartesian subject and represents animals as impotent objects</h4><p>Bell and Russell 2K</strong> – Anne C. Bell was a graduate student in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University and Constance L. Russell was a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. (“Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn”, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)</p><p>Take, for example, <u><mark>Freire</u></mark>’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He <u><mark>defines</mark> the boundaries of <mark>human </mark>membership <mark>according to </mark>a sharp, <mark>hierarchical dichotomy </mark>that <mark>establishes human superiority. Humans</mark> alone</u>, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone <u><mark>are able to <strong>infuse the world with their creative presence</u></strong></mark>, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). <u><mark>Freire</u></mark> (1990, pp. 87–91) <u><mark>represents</mark> other <mark>animals in terms of their <strong>lack of </mark>such <mark>traits</strong>. </mark>They are doomed to passively accept the given</u>, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. <u>Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound</u>.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, <u>we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous</u>, species-determined <u>biological existence</u>. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. <u><mark>Humans are</mark> thus <mark>cast as</mark> active <mark>agents whose</mark> very <mark>essence is to <strong>transform the world</u></strong></mark> – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. <u>The human/animal opposition</u> upon which it rests <u>is taken for granted</u>, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. <u>And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity</u> and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). <u><mark>This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and</u></mark> like other discourses of normalcy, it <u><mark>limits possibilities of</mark> taking up and <mark>confronting inequities</u></mark> (see Britzman, 1995). <u>The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned</u>. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, <u>there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature</u>, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root <u><mark>metaphors</u></mark> or “analogs” <u>in critical pedagogy that <mark>reinforce</mark> the problem of <mark>anthropocentric thinking. These include</u></mark> the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and <u><mark>an understanding of individuals as “potentially free</mark>, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for creating themselves when freed <mark>from</mark> societal forms of <mark>oppression</u></mark>” (1993a, pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view was beginning to take shape. To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? <u>How is</u> educating for <u>freedom predicated on the exploitation of the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, self, and community</u>, and thus bring into focus the underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’ interdependence with the more-than-human world. This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed to be free agents separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). <u><mark>It has</mark> also <mark>been used to justify </mark>the <mark>exploitation of </mark>human <mark>groups</mark> (e.g., women, Blacks, queers, indigenous peoples) <mark>deemed to be closer to nature – </mark>that is, animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized</u> (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989, p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988). <u>This “organic apartheid”</u> (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) <u>is bolstered by the belief that language</u> is an exclusively human property that <u>elevates mere biological existence to meaningful, social existence</u>. Understood in this way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs of communication all around us, <u><mark>language becomes a medium through which we set ourselves</mark> apart and <mark>above. This</mark> view of language <mark>is deeply embedded in</u></mark> the conceptual framework of <u><mark>critical pedagogy</u></mark>, including poststructuralist approaches. <u>So too is the human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that</u> “it is <u>language</u> that <u>enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the world around us,”</u> that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) <u>and that “subjectivity is constructed by and in language”</u> (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), <u>then their transformative projects are encoded </u>so as <u>to exclude</u> any consideration of <u>the nonhuman. </u>Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden (1992) puts it, “<u><strong><mark>if subjectivity</u></strong></mark>, willing, valuation, <u><strong><mark>and meaning are</strong></mark> securely <strong><mark>lodged in</strong></mark> the domain of <strong><mark>humanity</strong>, the possibility of encountering anything more</mark> than material objects in nature <mark>is nil</u></mark>” (p. 108). What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994) uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural, somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).</p>	1nc	2	null	224,293	89	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,033	Tensions will inevitably rise.	Kazianis 15	Kazianis 15 — Harry J. Kazianis, Editor of RealClearDefense—a member of the RealClearPolitics family of websites, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute, former Executive Editor of The National Interest and former Editor of The Diplomat, holds an ALM in International Relations from Harvard University, 2015 (“5 Ways the U.S. and China Could Stumble Into War,” The National Interest, February 15th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)	While tensions between the PRC and the ROC have certainly dropped considerably since the election of Ma there is no guarantee that Beijing may begin to exert pressure seeking the return of its so-called “renegade province.” Xi alluded to such a possibility, stating the issue of political disagreements that exist between the two sides must reach a final resolution, step by step, and these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation the dynamics of PRC-ROC tensions have not changed Despite atmospheric improvements in cross-strait ties...the fundamental nature of the dispute has not changed. Beijing still refuses to renounce the use of force as a means of reunification, and China’s steady, methodical build up of missile and air assets aimed at Taiwan serves as a constant and sobering reminder At the same time, a series of polls indicate that a vast majority of the Taiwanese population continues to reject unification. While both sides’ official positions remain unaltered, the cross-strait military balance has moved decisively in China’s favor Two decades of annual double-digit growth in Chinese military expenditures have resulted in Beijing acquiring a wide margin of conventional superiority over Taiwan, leading to growing concerns that it may no longer be able to withstand a large-scale PRC assault against its territory and raising the specter of a forcible annexation before U.S. forces could intervene There is also the very real possibility that a change of leadership in Taiwan could ratchet up tensions—especially if they were to cool efforts to further tie Taiwan to the Chinese mainland. One could easily see Beijing begin to raise the stakes with Taipei—pushing for the resolution of what it has stated many times as one of its most important “core interests.” such a trend that could quickly create a crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations. If China were to forcibly attempt to reunite with Taiwan using kinetic force or an outright invasion, it seems some form of a U.S.-China conflict would be all but guaranteed	While tensions have dropped there is no guarantee Beijing may exert pressure Xi alluded to such a possibility the fundamental nature of the dispute has not changed. Beijing refuses to renounce force and China’s steady build up of missile and air assets serves as a constant reminder polls indicate a vast majority of Taiwanese reject unification the military balance has moved decisively in China’s favor Taiwan may no longer be able to withstand a large-scale PRC assault change of leadership in Taiwan could ratchet up tensions One could see Beijing raise the stakes such a trend could quickly create a crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations. If China were to forcibly attempt to reunite using kinetic force or an invasion, U.S.-China conflict would be all but guaranteed	5. Finally...Don’t Forget Taiwan While tensions between the PRC and the ROC have certainly dropped considerably since the election of President Ma in 2008, there is no guarantee that Beijing may begin to exert pressure seeking the return of its so-called “renegade province.” In fact, Chinese president Xi Jinping alluded to such a possibility, stating, “the issue of political disagreements that exist between the two sides must reach a final resolution, step by step, and these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” So how does Taiwan play into the possibility of a U.S.-China war? Simple. As a recent report from the always-smart D.C.-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis (CSBA) explains, the dynamics of PRC-ROC tensions have not changed: Despite atmospheric improvements in cross-strait ties...the fundamental nature of the dispute has not changed. Beijing still refuses to renounce the use of force as a means of reunification, and China’s steady, methodical build up of missile and air assets aimed at Taiwan serves as a constant and sobering reminder...At the same time, a series of polls indicate that a vast majority of the Taiwanese population continues to reject unification. While both sides’ official positions remain unaltered, the cross-strait military balance has moved decisively in China’s favor....Two decades of annual double-digit growth in Chinese military expenditures have resulted in Beijing acquiring a wide margin of conventional superiority over Taiwan, leading to growing concerns that it may no longer be able to withstand a large-scale PRC assault against its territory and raising the specter of a forcible annexation before U.S. forces could intervene. There is also the very real possibility that a change of leadership in Taiwan, especially if a candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were to win the 2016 election, could ratchet up tensions—especially if they were to cool efforts to further tie Taiwan to the Chinese mainland. One could easily see Beijing begin to raise the stakes with Taipei—pushing for the resolution of what it has stated many times as one of its most important “core interests.” Clearly, Washington would be concerned over such a trend that could quickly create a crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations. If China were to forcibly attempt to reunite with Taiwan using kinetic force or an outright invasion, it seems some form of a U.S.-China conflict would be all but guaranteed.	2,481	<h4>Tensions will inevitably rise. </h4><p><strong>Kazianis 15</strong> — Harry J. Kazianis, Editor of RealClearDefense—a member of the RealClearPolitics family of websites, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute, former Executive Editor of The National Interest and former Editor of The Diplomat, holds an ALM in International Relations from Harvard University, 2015 (“5 Ways the U.S. and China Could Stumble Into War,” The National Interest, February 15th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p>5. Finally...Don’t Forget Taiwan</p><p><u><mark>While tensions</mark> between the PRC and the ROC <mark>have</mark> certainly <mark>dropped</mark> considerably since the election of</u> President <u>Ma</u> in 2008, <u><mark>there is no guarantee</mark> that <mark>Beijing may</mark> begin to <mark>exert pressure</mark> seeking the return of its so-called “renegade province.”</u> In fact, Chinese president <u><mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping <u><mark>alluded to such a possibility</mark>, stating</u>, “<u>the issue of political disagreements that exist between the two sides must reach a final resolution, step by step, and these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation</u>.”</p><p>So how does Taiwan play into the possibility of a U.S.-China war? Simple. As a recent report from the always-smart D.C.-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis (CSBA) explains, <u>the dynamics of PRC-ROC tensions have not changed</u>:</p><p><u>Despite atmospheric improvements in cross-strait ties...<mark>the <strong>fundamental</strong> <strong>nature of the dispute</strong> has not changed. Beijing</mark> still <mark>refuses to renounce</mark> the use of <mark>force</mark> as a means of reunification, <mark>and China’s steady</mark>, methodical <mark>build up of missile and air assets</mark> aimed at Taiwan <mark>serves as a constant</mark> and sobering <mark>reminder</u></mark>...<u>At the same time, a series of <mark>polls indicate</mark> that <mark>a vast majority of</mark> the <mark>Taiwanese</mark> population continues to <mark>reject unification</mark>. While both sides’ official positions remain unaltered, <mark>the</mark> cross-strait <mark>military balance has moved decisively in China’s favor</u></mark>....<u>Two decades of annual double-digit growth in Chinese military expenditures have resulted in Beijing acquiring a wide margin of conventional superiority over <mark>Taiwan</mark>, leading to growing concerns that it <mark>may no longer be able to withstand a large-scale PRC assault</mark> against its territory and raising the specter of a forcible annexation before U.S. forces could intervene</u>.</p><p><u>There is also the very real possibility that a <mark>change of leadership in Taiwan</u></mark>, especially if a candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were to win the 2016 election, <u><mark>could <strong>ratchet up tensions</strong></mark>—especially if they were to cool efforts to further tie Taiwan to the Chinese mainland. <mark>One could</mark> easily <mark>see Beijing</mark> begin to <strong><mark>raise the stakes</strong></mark> with Taipei—pushing for the resolution of what it has stated many times as one of its most important “core interests.”</u> Clearly, Washington would be concerned over <u><mark>such a trend</mark> that <mark>could <strong>quickly create a crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations</strong>. If China were to forcibly attempt to reunite</mark> with Taiwan <mark>using kinetic force or an</mark> outright <mark>invasion,</mark> it seems some form of a <mark>U.S.-China conflict would be <strong>all but guaranteed</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “China Won’t Risk War Over Taiwan”	170,531	15	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,034	If they can kick out of their reps—so can we justifies permutation	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>If they can kick out of their reps—so can we justifies permutation</h4>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	1,560,645	1	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,035	SQ is violent crackdown – Chinese ICCPR ratification ends that	null	-SQ fails: Chinese assurances of peace aren’t credible, reports of HR monitors, CEC/HRW report	} There seems little doubt China will defend its record protecting rights AND order to determine the futures of their communities.	null	-Ratification solves: opens China to “genuine scrutiny” at the UN, is super enforceable, and has article 25, which is necessary for Uyghur inclusion Szadziewski 13 {Henryk, senior researcher with the Uyghur Human Rights Project, B.A. in Modern Chinese and Mongolian Studies (The University of Leeds), M.Sc. in Development Management/Economics (The University of Wales), “Time for China to Ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Sharnoff’s Global Views, 10/19, http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/china-civil-rights-204/#THUR} There seems little doubt that China will defend its record on protecting the human rights AND order to determine the economic, social and cultural futures of their communities.	725	<h4>SQ is violent crackdown – Chinese ICCPR ratification ends that</h4><p>-SQ fails: Chinese assurances of peace aren’t credible, reports of HR monitors, CEC/HRW report</p><p>-Ratification solves: opens China to “genuine scrutiny” at the UN, is super enforceable, and has article 25, which is necessary for Uyghur inclusion</p><p><strong>Szadziewski 13 </strong>{Henryk, senior researcher with the Uyghur Human Rights Project, B.A. in Modern Chinese and Mongolian Studies (The University of Leeds), M.Sc. in Development Management/Economics (The University of Wales), “Time for China to Ratify International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Sharnoff’s Global Views, 10/19, http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/china-civil-rights-204/#THUR<u>}</p><p>There seems little doubt</u> that <u>China will defend its record</u> on <u>protecting</u> the human <u>rights </p><p>AND</p><p>order to determine the</u> economic, social and cultural <u>futures of their communities.</p></u>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,646	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,036	Xi’s reforms key to solve overcapacity and zombie companies---both collapse the economy	New York Times 16 China Should Shut Down Zombie Businesses to Help the Economy	New York Times 16, “China Should Shut Down Zombie Businesses to Help the Economy”, 6/9/16, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/opinion/china-should-shut-down-zombie-businesses-to-help-the-economy.html?_r=0	China knows that it has to shut down steel mills, coal mines and other industrial units that are producing much more of just about everything than the world needs, depressing prices and hurting businesses and workers everywhere. American officials need to keep pressing the issue, not only because China is flooding global markets with steel, aluminum and other goods, but also because China is living a fantasy that can only hurt its own people. China began pumping tens of billions of dollars into its economy and encouraged banks to embark on a lending spree to offset the effect of the financial crisis. The government intervention came at a high cost as businesses, many of them owned by provincial and local governments, borrowed excessively to invest in projects based on unrealistic assumptions about global demand. The result is that China now faces a debt problem and an overcapacity problem The bills for that debt and investment binge are now coming due, including human costs that merit a compassionate response. Reducing industrial production could force five million to 10 million workers from their jobs Banks and other investors may have to write off or restructure tens of billions of dollars in loans and bonds. China needs a stronger social safety net China needs a more effective process for companies to restructure debts, merge with other businesses or liquidate their assets. The current bankruptcy system is so inefficient State-owned banks keep ailing companies, some government owned, alive by rolling over their loans simply because managers do not want to acknowledge losses. There have been signs of progress in recent months. But the defaults have also unnerved investors, because they cannot easily turn to bankruptcy courts to swap their debt for equity or recoup at least some of their money through negotiations with management. Xi Jinping says he intends to push for “supply-side structural reform” that would reduce excess industrial capacity, cut taxes and relax government control over the economy.	null	China knows that it has to shut down steel mills, coal mines and other industrial units that are producing much more of just about everything than the world needs, depressing prices and hurting businesses and workers everywhere. But the government has been reluctant to act for fear of throwing millions out of work and damaging Chinese banks that have lent money to what are essentially zombie businesses kept alive by government policies. That fear helps explain why Chinese officials pushed back when the Obama administration demanded during this week’s U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that Beijing reduce industrial capacity. American officials need to keep pressing the issue, not only because China is flooding global markets with steel, aluminum and other goods, but also because China is living a fantasy that can only hurt its own people. In 2008, China began pumping tens of billions of dollars into its economy and encouraged banks to embark on a lending spree to offset the effect of the financial crisis. As a result, the country continued to grow quickly, even as other countries slid into recession. The government intervention came at a high cost as businesses, many of them owned by provincial and local governments, borrowed excessively to invest in projects based on unrealistic assumptions about global demand. The result is that China now faces a debt problem and an overcapacity problem. Goldman Sachs estimates that the amount of debt in the Chinese economy jumped to 235 percent of gross domestic product in 2015, from 130 percent in 2008. At its current trajectory, Goldman analysts say that number could rise to 344 percent of G.D.P. by 2020. The bills for that debt and investment binge are now coming due, including human costs that merit a compassionate response. Reducing industrial production could force five million to 10 million workers from their jobs, says Scott Kennedy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Banks and other investors may have to write off or restructure tens of billions of dollars in loans and bonds. To help affected workers, China needs a stronger social safety net — retraining people for jobs in the service sector, providing generous pensions to workers close to retirement age and relocating workers in hard-hit areas to cities and towns where jobs are more plentiful. Increased spending on health and education would improve social services and create jobs. Over all, these policies should make it easier for provincial and local governments to shut down unprofitable enterprises. On the financial side, China needs a more effective process for companies to restructure debts, merge with other businesses or liquidate their assets. The current bankruptcy system is so inefficient that many smaller businesses that fail simply disappear without settling their debts. State-owned banks keep ailing companies, some government owned, alive by rolling over their loans simply because managers do not want to acknowledge losses. There have been signs of progress in recent months. Some state-owned businesses have defaulted on bond payments, suggesting that the government will not prop up failing companies in perpetuity, which is encouraging. But the defaults have also unnerved investors, because they cannot easily turn to bankruptcy courts to swap their debt for equity or recoup at least some of their money through negotiations with management. President Xi Jinping says he intends to push for “supply-side structural reform” that would reduce excess industrial capacity, cut taxes and relax government control over the economy. That echoed a promise he made in 2013 to give market forces a “decisive role in the allocation of resources.” So far, he has not supported either slogan with much substance.	3,807	<h4>Xi’s reforms key to solve overcapacity and zombie companies---both <u>collapse</u> the economy</h4><p><strong>New York Times 16</strong>, “<u><strong>China Should Shut Down Zombie Businesses to Help the Economy</u></strong>”, 6/9/16, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/opinion/china-should-shut-down-zombie-businesses-to-help-the-economy.html?_r=0</p><p><u>China knows that it has to shut down steel mills, coal mines and other industrial units that are producing much more of just about everything than the world needs, depressing prices and hurting businesses and workers everywhere. </u>But the government has been reluctant to act for fear of throwing millions out of work and damaging Chinese banks that have lent money to what are essentially zombie businesses kept alive by government policies. That fear helps explain why Chinese officials pushed back when the Obama administration demanded during this week’s U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that Beijing reduce industrial capacity. <u>American officials need to keep pressing the issue, not only because China is flooding global markets with steel, aluminum and other goods, but also because <strong>China is living a fantasy that can only hurt its own people</strong>.</u> In 2008, <u>China began pumping tens of billions of dollars into its economy and encouraged banks to embark on a lending spree to offset the effect of the financial crisis.</u> As a result, the country continued to grow quickly, even as other countries slid into recession. <u>The government intervention came at a high cost as businesses, many of them owned by provincial and local governments, <strong>borrowed excessively</strong> to invest in projects based on unrealistic assumptions about global demand. The result is that China now faces a debt problem and an overcapacity problem</u>. Goldman Sachs estimates that the amount of debt in the Chinese economy jumped to 235 percent of gross domestic product in 2015, from 130 percent in 2008. At its current trajectory, Goldman analysts say that number could rise to 344 percent of G.D.P. by 2020. <u><strong>The bills for that debt and investment binge are now coming</strong> due, including human costs that merit a compassionate response. Reducing industrial production could force five million to 10 million workers from their jobs</u>, says Scott Kennedy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. <u>Banks and other investors may have to write off or restructure tens of billions of dollars in loans and bonds. </u>To help affected workers, <u>China needs a stronger social safety net</u> — retraining people for jobs in the service sector, providing generous pensions to workers close to retirement age and relocating workers in hard-hit areas to cities and towns where jobs are more plentiful. Increased spending on health and education would improve social services and create jobs. Over all, these policies should make it easier for provincial and local governments to shut down unprofitable enterprises. On the financial side, <u><strong>China needs a more effective process for companies to restructure debts, merge with other businesses or liquidate their assets.</u></strong> <u>The current bankruptcy system is so inefficient</u> that many smaller businesses that fail simply disappear without settling their debts. <u>State-owned banks keep ailing companies, some government owned, alive by rolling over their loans simply because managers do not want to acknowledge losses.</u> <u>There have been signs of progress in recent months.</u> Some state-owned businesses have defaulted on bond payments, suggesting that the government will not prop up failing companies in perpetuity, which is encouraging. <u><strong>But the defaults have also unnerved investors</strong>, because they cannot easily turn to bankruptcy courts to swap their debt for equity or recoup at least some of their money through negotiations with management.</u> President <u><strong>Xi Jinping says he intends to push for “supply-side structural reform” that would reduce excess industrial capacity, cut taxes and relax government control over the economy.</u></strong> That echoed a promise he made in 2013 to give market forces a “decisive role in the allocation of resources.” So far, he has not supported either slogan with much substance.</p>	1NC v GBN KR	1	null	1,560,647	1	125,898	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	657,902	N	Kanellis	4	Glenbrook North KR	Zuckerman	1AC - Taiwan 1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	null	55,805	ArSk	Glenbrook South ArSk	null	Al.....	Ar.....	Ke.....	Sk.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,037	Prefer our evidence — neg authors underestimate the risk.	Littlefield and Lowther 15	Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)	While the scenario is not inevitable, the fact tha[t] many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the U S nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the U S Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the U S may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe	While the scenario is not inevitable, the fact tha[t] many see it as implausible is an example of mirror-imaging China is not the U S nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the U S Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the U S may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe	While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact tha[t] many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the United States may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe.	545	<h4><u>Prefer our evidence</u> — neg authors <u>underestimate the risk</u>. </h4><p><strong>Littlefield and Lowther 15</strong> — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p><u><mark>While the scenario</u></mark> described <u><mark>is</u></mark> certainly <u><mark>not inevitable, the fact tha[t] many</mark> American readers will <mark>see it as implausible</mark> if not impossible <mark>is an example of</mark> the <strong><mark>mirror-imaging</strong></mark> that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. <mark>China is <strong>not</strong> the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u><strong><mark>Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur</strong>, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>may be <strong>unprepared</strong> for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe</u></mark>.</p>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “No Nuclear Escalation”	92,424	11	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,038	Anthropocentrism is the root cause of hierarchy and violence	Best 07	Best 07 – Steven Best is an American animal rights advocate, author, and associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. (Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf)	human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history the human domination of animals laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained control over animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways To conquer animals humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans slaves were managed like livestock when Europeans began the colonization of Africa the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves horrors inflicted on black slaves were perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them western aggressors engaged in wordplay vilifying their victims with terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” subjugated peoples once characterized as animals could be hunted down like animals Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non or subhuman	animals shaping forces of psychology the domination of animals laid groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and violence human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation emerged with agricultural nomadic bands to settled practices, humans began to exploit animals To conquer animals humans developed technologies, such as pens chains, and branding irons the metaphors and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied to human slaves first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them subjugated peoples once characterized as animals could be hunted down like animals western norms of rationality were defined as humanity by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity	While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism – a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use – collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy. "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras. It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination, such as patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non or subhuman. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism – namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.	10,857	<h4>Anthropocentrism is the root cause of hierarchy and violence</h4><p><strong>Best 07</strong> – Steven Best is an American animal rights advocate, author, and associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. (Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf)</p><p>While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the <u>human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy</u>, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that <u><mark>animals </mark>have been key driving and <mark>shaping forces of</mark> human thought, <mark>psychology</mark>, moral and social life, and history</u> overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that <u><mark>the</mark> human <mark>domination of animals</u></mark>, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and <u><strong><mark>laid </mark>the <mark>groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and</strong></mark> other systems of <strong><mark>violence</u></strong></mark> and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that <u><mark>human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation</u></mark>, and thus humanism – a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use – collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy. "<u>As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other</u>" –Pythagoras. It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination, such as patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “<u>the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other</u>, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” <u>Hierarchy <mark>emerged with</mark> the rise of <mark>agricultural </mark>society</u> some ten thousand years ago. <u>In the shift from <mark>nomadic</mark> hunting and gathering <mark>bands to settled</mark> agricultural <mark>practices, humans began</u></mark> to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began <u><mark>to exploit animals</mark> for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained</u> increasing <u>control over</u> the lives and labor power of <u>animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways</u>, such as castrating males to make them more docile. <u><mark>To conquer</u></mark>, enslave, and claim <u><mark>animals</u></mark> as their own property, <u><mark>humans developed</mark> numerous <mark>technologies, such as pens</mark>, cages, collars, ropes, <mark>chains, and branding irons</mark>. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans</u>. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, <u>slaves were managed like livestock</u>, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, <u>when Europeans began the colonization of Africa</u> and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, <u><mark>the metaphors</mark>, models, <mark>and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied</mark> with equal cruelty and force <mark>to human slaves</u></mark>. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these <u>horrors</u> and countless others <u>inflicted on black slaves were</u> developed and <u>perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation</u>. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: <u><mark>first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them</u></mark>.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, <u>western aggressors engaged in wordplay</u> before swordplay, <u>vilifying their victims</u> – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – <u>with</u> opprobrious <u>terms such as “rats,” “pigs,”</u> “swine,” “monkeys,” <u>“beasts,” and “filthy animals.”</u> Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, <u><mark>subjugated peoples</u></mark> were treated accordingly; <u><mark>once characterized as animals</u></mark>, they <u><mark>could be hunted down like animals</u></mark>. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. <u>Once <mark>western norms of rationality were defined as</mark> the essence of <mark>humanity</mark> and social normality, <mark>by first <strong>using non-human animals as the measure of alterity</strong></mark>, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non or subhuman</u>. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism – namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.</p>	1nc	2	null	224,300	67	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,039	Rampant rights abuse risk cultural extermination and retaliatory, escalatory violence	Grieboski 14	Grieboski 14 {Joe, Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies (Georgetown), honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters (Marywood University), “Tension, Repression, and Discrimination: China’s Uyghurs Under Threat,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9/24, http://journal.georgetown.edu/tension-repression-and-discrimination-chinas-uyghurs-under-threat/#THUR}	Despite official stance of PRC repression with violent attacks, further jeopardizing Uyghur’s relations with CCP	null	Despite the official stance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which nominally AND repression with violent attacks, further jeopardizing the Uyghur’s relations with CCP authority.	185	<h4>Rampant <u>rights abuse</u> risk <u>cultural extermination</u> and <u>retaliatory, escalatory violence</h4><p></u><strong>Grieboski 14</strong> {Joe, Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies (Georgetown), honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters (Marywood University), “Tension, Repression, and Discrimination: China’s Uyghurs Under Threat,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9/24, http://journal.georgetown.edu/tension-repression-and-discrimination-chinas-uyghurs-under-threat/#THUR}</p><p><u>Despite</u> the <u>official stance of</u> the People’s Republic of China (<u>PRC</u>), which nominally </p><p>AND</p><p><u><strong>repression with violent attacks,</u></strong> <u>further jeopardizing</u> the <u>Uyghur’s relations with CCP</u> authority.</p>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,648	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,040	Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff	Knudsen 1	Knudsen 1– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)	In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat political life is often marked by misperceptions but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena now. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. he phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states ( not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.	emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat it discounts an independent existence for a threat misperceptions do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time threats refer to 'real' phenomena What has 'threats' important is the implication that urgent action may be required instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena by reconceptualizing them we should pay attention to them, because situations with credible urgency will keep coming back	Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.	3,278	<h4>Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff</h4><p><strong>Knudsen 1<u></strong>– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)</p><p></u>Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups.<u> In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears</u>, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, <u>this <mark>emphasis on the subjective is a <strong>misleading conception of threat</strong></mark>, in that <mark>it discounts an independent existence for</mark> what- ever is perceived as <mark>a threat</u></mark>. Granted, <u>political life is often marked by <mark>misperceptions</u></mark>, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, <u>but such phenomena <strong><mark>do not occur simultaneously</strong> to large numbers of politicians, and <strong>hardly most of the time</strong></mark>. During the Cold War, <mark>threats </mark>- in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they <strong><mark>refer to 'real' phenomena</strong> </mark>now.</u> The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. <u>The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites.</u> In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, t<u>he phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation.</u> Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns.<u> <mark>What has </mark>long made <mark>'threats' </mark>and ’threat perceptions’ <mark>important </mark>phenomena in the study of IR <mark>is the implication that <strong>urgent action may be required</strong></mark>. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.</u>” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater.<u> When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that <mark>instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena </mark>’out there’ <mark>by reconceptualizing them</mark>, as Waever does, <mark>we should</mark> continue <mark>pay</mark>ing <mark>attention to them, because <strong>situations with </mark>a <mark>credible </mark>claim to <mark>urgency will keep coming back</strong> </mark>and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (</u>such as civil wars, for instance), <u><strong>not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.</p></u></strong>	Aff v Marist AE Round 3 Johns Creek Open Source	2AC	Security K	15,774	136	125,826	./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	655,667	A	Johns Creek Gladiator Debates	3	Marist AE	judge	1AC-- IPR Growth Pharma 1NC-- T must be qpq Xi Bad ptx NIH and tax rate cp security k 2NR-- T must be qpq	hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Aff-Johns%20Creek%20Gladiator%20Debates-Round3.docx	null	55,551	AdMu	Chattahoochee AdMu	null	Za.....	Ad.....	Pr.....	Mu.....	20,067	Chattahoochee	Chattahoochee	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,041	Nuclear war	Rachman, 6/1/2016	Rachman, 6/1/2016 Gideon, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula	the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purposen. In harder economic times, the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government.	null	The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - could well undermine the party's legitimacy. When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's foreign policy has become more nationalistic and more willing to risk confrontation with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purposen. In harder economic times, the CCP may need new sources of legitimacy, and confrontation with Japan and the US at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government.	3,113	<h4>Nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Rachman, 6/1/2016<u></strong> Gideon, Financial Times and The Strait times Correspondent, “Xi Jinping's risky change of China's winning formula” http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xi-jinpings-risky-change-of-chinas-winning-formula</p><p></u>The three big policy shifts have different origins. In economics, the old model of growth based on exports, high rates of investment and low wages could not go on forever. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, combined with rising costs in China and slower growth in the West, made change inevitable. But the shift to a new model is perilous. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China launched an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment that could yet culminate in a financial crisis. Even if that unpleasant fate is avoided, China still has to get used to lower rates of growth. The party leadership used to encourage the idea that China had to grow at 8 per cent a year to maintain social and political stability. But now growth of 6 per cent to 7 per cent would be regarded as a good result. A healthy economy is crucial to internal stability. The CCP still resolutely rejects any move towards democratic elections as unsuitable for China. Instead, <u>the country's leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a "performance legitimacy</u>", which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election. <u>But a faltering economy - or, worse, a financial crisis - <strong>could well undermine the party's legitimacy.</strong> </u>When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has sought a middle path between dictatorship and democracy. The idea was to embrace a collective style of government, with smooth transitions of leadership managed by the party itself. Mr Hu Jintao, Mr Xi's colourless predecessor, epitomised this system. He never encouraged a cult of personality, served two terms in office, and then left power. Mr Xi has broken with this model. He is now widely said to be the most powerful leader of China since Mao. A sycophantic official media is encouraged, literally, to sing his praises. (The most noted ditty is called "Uncle Xi Loves Mama Peng", a saccharine reference to the President's wife Peng Liyuan.) At the same time, Mr <u>Xi has launched a crackdown on corruption that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of convictions, terrifying much of China's business and political elite. The result is fevered speculation in Beijing</u> - including rumours of purges, attempted coups and assassination attempts. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office - a development that would overturn the model of collective leadership. <u>At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country's <strong>foreign policy has become more nationalistic</strong> and more willing to <strong>risk confrontation</strong> with the West and with China's Asian neighbours. Beijing's increasingly tough assertion of its territorial and maritime claims, epitomised by its "island-building" in the South China Sea, has led to stand-offs with the US and Japanese navies. These near-clashes may serve a political purposen. In harder economic times, the CCP <strong>may need new sources of legitimacy</strong>, and <strong>confrontation with Japan and the US</strong> at sea is liable to stir patriotic support for the government.</p></u>	1NC v GBN KR	1	null	81,678	54	125,898	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	657,902	N	Kanellis	4	Glenbrook North KR	Zuckerman	1AC - Taiwan 1NC - Xi Good NSG CP Japan DA One China CP	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/ArSk/Glenbrook%20South-Aralis-Skoulikaris-Neg-Kanellis-Round4.docx	null	55,805	ArSk	Glenbrook South ArSk	null	Al.....	Ar.....	Ke.....	Sk.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,042	Our alternative is to reject systems of anthropocentrism—our performance presences traumatic knowledge and creates affective emotional responses to the suffering of animals	Adams 11	Adams 11 – Carol Adams is a feminist and animal rights advocate. She has a Masters of Divinity from Yale. (“Forward to Speaking Up for Animals: An Anthology of Women's Voices”, pg. xi-xiii)	We didn't know it was that bad, and then suddenly we do. When there is a moment of awareness, a shirting of the universe follows. Suddenly, the division of human and nonhuman is rendered illogical, unethical, and truly evil the line between being a perpetrator and a bystander is especially murk. Institutional oppression needs it that way Behind every meal from animals is an absence: the death or exploitation of the animal whose place this food takes. The structure of the absent referent both insures and insulates violence They don't have to personally hold the knife, operate the stun gun, or lock the pig into her farrowing crate. But they make sure that this happens. The absent referent creates entitlement to benefit from the abuse of others without having knowledge about the abuse In a culture that moves away from the literal experiences of animals, one aspect of activism is trying to re-present and represent who has disappeared There are no bystanders: you are either restoring the absent referent or accepting and benefiting from the structure of the absent referent by eating nonhumans, using them for knowledge when you have restored the absent referent, you can imagine them dreaming, you can experience their songs, you can create a sanctuary The work of restoring the absent referent isn't intellectual work; it is activist work It exposes us to traumatic knowledge It is painful knowledge—knowledge about everyday practices and everyday sufferings. Traumatic knowledge makes us feel the suffering of animals acutely. It feels relentless Traumatic knowledge causes dissonance/disturbance/disjunction It affects us personal, interpersonally and strategically	We didn't know it was that bad, and then suddenly we do. When there is a moment of awareness the division of human and nonhuman is rendered truly evil Behind every meal is an absence: the death of the animal whose place this food takes They don't have to hold the knife But they make sure this happens one aspect of activism is trying to represent who has disappeared There are no bystanders: you are either restoring the referent or benefiting from the absent referent The work of restoring the referent isn't intellectual work; it is activist work It exposes us to traumatic knowledge It is painful knowledge Traumatic knowledge makes us feel the suffering of animals It feels relentless It affects us	We didn't know it was that bad, and then suddenly we do. When there is a moment of awareness, a shirting of the universe follows. Suddenly, the division of human and nonhuman is rendered illogical, unethical, and truly evil. After that moment of awareness, the question becomes what do we do with the incredible power of the consiousness that animals, together with us, share the possibility of 'great joy and great suffering in their lives? What do we do with the moment of connection that affirms, "I am in relationship with nonhuman beings a well as human beings”? When it comes to nonhumans, the line between being a perpetrator and a bystander is especially murk. Institutional oppression needs it that way. 'In The Sexual Politics of Meat, I introduced the idea that nonhuman animals arc the absent referent. In the production of flesh, dairy and eggs, the animal disappear as individuals and become commodified. Behind every meal from animals is an absence: the death or exploitation of the animal whose place this food takes. The structure of the absent referent both insures and insulates violence. Someone who eats pieces of a dead animal or dairy or eggs not only benefits from this structure of the absent referent, they insure that it continues. They are not just bystanders. They are perpetrators. They don't have to personally hold the knife, operate the stun gun, or lock the pig into her farrowing crate. But they make sure that this happens. The absent referent creates entitlement to benefit from the abuse of others without having knowledge about the abuse. Through the structure of the absent referent, the abuse disappears and the consumed object is experienced without a past, without a biography, without individuality, without a history. In a culture that moves away from the literal experiences of animals, one aspect of activism is trying to re-present and represent who has disappeared. A papier-rnache life-sized sow taken to malls to educate people about what pigs are experiencing. Writing about and drawing what happens in slaughterhouses. There are no bystanders: you are either restoring the absent referent or accepting and benefiting from the structure of the absent referent by eating nonhumans, using them for sport or entertainment, or "knowledge." It is so true: for every drop of milk there is blood. As these contributors show, when you have restored the absent referent, you can imagine them dreaming, you can experience their songs, you can create a sanctuary so that a child can experience giving a belly rub to a pig. The work of restoring the absent referent isn't intellectual work; it is activist work. And as activist work it is fraught with emotion. It exposes us to traumatic knowledge. Traumatic knowledge is the knowledge that a person has about the fate of the other animals. It is painful knowledge—knowledge about everyday practices and everyday sufferings. Traumatic knowledge makes us feel the suffering of animals acutely. It feels relentless. It does not provide relief bur intensifies our emotional connections to animals. Traumatic knowledge causes dissonance/disturbance/disjunction. It is a major challenge to any individual who experiences it and to any movement composed of individuals who bear its truths. It affects us personal, interpersonally and strategically.	3,332	<h4>Our alternative is to reject systems of anthropocentrism—our performance presences traumatic knowledge and creates affective emotional responses to the suffering of animals</h4><p><strong>Adams 11</strong> – Carol Adams is a feminist and animal rights advocate. She has a Masters of Divinity from Yale. (“Forward to Speaking Up for Animals: An Anthology of Women's Voices”, pg. xi-xiii)</p><p><u><mark>We didn't know it was that bad, and then suddenly we do. When there is a moment of awareness</mark>, a shirting of the universe follows. Suddenly, <strong><mark>the division of human and nonhuman is rendered</strong></mark> illogical, unethical, and <strong><mark>truly evil</u></strong></mark>. After that moment of awareness, the question becomes what do we do with the incredible power of the consiousness that animals, together with us, share the possibility of 'great joy and great suffering in their lives? What do we do with the moment of connection that affirms, "I am in relationship with nonhuman beings a well as human beings”? When it comes to nonhumans, <u>the line between being a perpetrator and a bystander is especially murk. Institutional oppression needs it that way</u>. 'In The Sexual Politics of Meat, I introduced the idea that nonhuman animals arc the absent referent. In the production of flesh, dairy and eggs, the animal disappear as individuals and become commodified. <u><mark>Behind every meal</mark> from animals <mark>is an absence: the death</mark> or exploitation <mark>of the animal whose place this food takes</mark>. The structure of the absent referent both insures and insulates violence</u>. Someone who eats pieces of a dead animal or dairy or eggs not only benefits from this structure of the absent referent, they insure that it continues. They are not just bystanders. They are perpetrators. <u><mark>They don't have to</mark> personally <mark>hold the knife</mark>, operate the stun gun, or lock the pig into her farrowing crate. <mark>But they make sure</mark> that <mark>this happens</mark>. The absent referent creates entitlement to benefit from the abuse of others without having knowledge about the abuse</u>. Through the structure of the absent referent, the abuse disappears and the consumed object is experienced without a past, without a biography, without individuality, without a history. <u>In a culture that moves away from the literal experiences of animals, <mark>one aspect of activism is trying to</mark> re-present and <mark>represent who has disappeared</u></mark>. A papier-rnache life-sized sow taken to malls to educate people about what pigs are experiencing. Writing about and drawing what happens in slaughterhouses. <u><mark>There are no bystanders: you are either restoring the</mark> absent <mark>referent or</mark> accepting and <mark>benefiting from</mark> the structure of <mark>the absent referent</mark> by eating nonhumans, using them for</u> sport or entertainment, or "<u>knowledge</u>." It is so true: for every drop of milk there is blood. As these contributors show, <u>when you have restored the absent referent, you can imagine them dreaming, you can experience their songs, you can create a sanctuary</u> so that a child can experience giving a belly rub to a pig. <u><mark>The work of restoring the</mark> absent <mark>referent isn't intellectual work; it is activist work</u></mark>. And as activist work it is fraught with emotion. <u><mark>It exposes us to traumatic knowledge</u></mark>. Traumatic knowledge is the knowledge that a person has about the fate of the other animals. <u><strong><mark>It is painful knowledge</strong></mark>—knowledge about everyday practices and everyday sufferings. <mark>Traumatic knowledge <strong>makes us feel the suffering of animals</strong></mark> acutely. <mark>It feels relentless</u></mark>. It does not provide relief bur intensifies our emotional connections to animals. <u>Traumatic knowledge causes dissonance/disturbance/disjunction</u>. It is a major challenge to any individual who experiences it and to any movement composed of individuals who bear its truths. <u><strong><mark>It affects us</strong></mark> personal, interpersonally and strategically</u>.</p>	1nc	2	null	648,285	6	125,888	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	657,845	N	Michigan	1	Lane Tech HC	Shreee	K aff went for FW we also read anthro!	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Michigan-Round1.docx	null	55,804	GoSc	Glenbrook South GoSc	null	Dy.....	Go.....	Mi.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,043	China won’t back down — nuclear escalation is likely.	White 15	White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?,” The National Interest, May 5th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)	China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict. US leaders must therefore ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? Is Taiwan's status quo worth a global economic collapse? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China?	America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory China's capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those had been degraded by a sustained strike campaign against Chinese bases China would respond with attacks on US and allied bases The US has no means to cap the resulting escalation spiral The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would be considered It is a big mistake to keep assuming that China would back off before a crisis became a conflict What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China?	China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered. These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict. US leaders must therefore ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? Is Taiwan's status quo worth a global economic collapse? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China?	1,700	<h4>China <u>won’t</u> back down — nuclear escalation is likely. </h4><p><strong>White 15</strong> — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?,” The National Interest, May 5th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808?page=show, Accessed 06-28-2016)</p><p><u>China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, <mark>America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory</mark> in a war over Taiwan. <mark>China's</mark> anti-access/area-denial <mark>capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those</mark> capabilities <mark>had</mark> first <mark>been degraded by a sustained</mark> and wide-ranging <mark>strike campaign against Chinese bases</mark> and forces</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China would</mark> very likely <mark>respond</mark> to such a campaign <mark>with attacks on US and allied bases</mark> throughout Asia. <mark>The US has no</mark> evident <mark>means to cap the resulting escalation spiral</mark>, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. <mark>The possibility of <strong>nuclear attacks on US cities</strong> would</mark> have to <mark>be considered</u></mark>.</p><p><u>These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. <mark>It is</mark> therefore <strong><mark>a big mistake</strong> to keep assuming</mark>, as many people seem to do, <mark>that China would</mark> be sure to <mark>back off before a crisis</mark> over Taiwan <mark>became a conflict</mark>.</p><p>US leaders must therefore ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? <mark>What could happen if Washington didn't blink first?</mark> Is Taiwan's status quo worth a global economic collapse? <mark>It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China?</p></u></mark>	null	Case Backlines	They Say: “No Nuclear Escalation”	84,007	57	125,884	./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	657,305	A	Damus	1	Santa Margeurita CW	Kezios	AFF - Taiwan Grand Bargain	hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/GaGr/Georgetown%20Day-Garcia-Grossfield-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx	null	55,757	GaGr	Georgetown Day GaGr	null	Ma.....	Ga.....	Ca.....	Gr.....	20,114	GeorgetownDay	Georgetown Day	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2
3,783,044	Cultural extermination facilitates extinction – independently, it’s a d-rule	UNESCO 1	UNESCO 1 (“The Earth’s Linguistic, Cultural, and Biologic Diversity” UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=18391&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html)	world’s languages represent human creativity. They contain and express estimates that half of the world’s languages are in varying degrees of endangerment.	null	The world’s languages represent an extraordinary wealth of human creativity. They contain and express AND estimates that half of the world’s languages are in varying degrees of endangerment.	190	<h4><u>Cultural extermination</u> facilitates <u>extinction</u> – independently, it’s a <u>d-rule</h4><p></u><strong>UNESCO 1</strong> (“The Earth’s Linguistic, Cultural, and Biologic Diversity” UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=18391&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html)</p><p>The <u>world’s languages represent</u> an extraordinary wealth of <u>human creativity. They contain and express</u> </p><p>AND</p><p><u>estimates that half of the world’s languages are in varying degrees of endangerment.</p></u>	null	Organized Crime Aff	ICCPR	1,560,650	1	125,889	./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	657,725	A	MBA	5	Isidore Newman AI	Toby Whisenhunt	1AC New Organized Crime Aff 2NR Neolib K	hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/BaSc/Glenbrook%20South-Baime-Schuler-Aff-MBA-Round5.docx	null	55,800	BaSc	Glenbrook South BaSc	null	Jo.....	Ba.....	Br.....	Sc.....	20,117	GlenbrookSouth	Glenbrook South	null	null	1,015	hspolicy16	HS Policy 2016-17	2,016	cx	hs	2

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