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The purpose of this malware is to allow the actors to download and execute an executable file, as well as download and run batch files to run commands on the end system | ['T1059.003'] |
Unwraps a DLL into memory and calls its one-and-only import using Reflective DLL injection. DLL information | ['T1082'] |
The image displayed to the user after mounting the DMG appears to be the “Install” file. In actuality, it is just a system link that points to the 1302.app application bundle, or the malicious application itself. By double-clicking the “Install” image in Figure C, the system actually executes the 1302.app, where 1302.app/Contents/MacOS/1302 is just a bash script | ['T1553.001'] |
netbook or inexpensive laptop - Raspberry Pi computer - Bash Bunny, a special tool for carrying out USB attacks | ['T1200'] |
The malware has the ability to regularly take screenshots; what’s more, it takes screenshots when certain “interesting” applications are run, for instance, IM’s. Screenshots are stored in compressed format and are regularly sent to the C&C server – just like the audio recordings | ['T1113'] |
To capture login credentials from all the previously listed websites, Javali monitors processes to find open browsers or custom banking applications. The most common web browsers thus monitored are Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge | ['T1057', 'T1555.003'] |
The information collected is performed using WMI queries: Additionally the malware lists the running process via the Microsoft Windows API. The malware uses obfuscation in order to hide strings such as URL or User-Agent, the algorithm is based on bitwise (SUB 0x0F XOR 0x21), here is the decoded data | ['T1057'] |
This recent campaign used malicious documents to install malware on the targeted system using a template injection attack. This technique allows a weaponized document to download an external Word template containing macros that will be executed. This is a known trick used to bypass static malicious document analysis, as well as detection, as the macros are embedded in the downloaded template | ['T1059.005'] |
The SUPERNOVA webshell is an anonymous code C# webshell written in .NET C# that is specifically written for usage on SolarWinds Orion servers | ['T1071.001'] |
1) The script uses the function fromCharCode() that returns a string created from a sequence of UTF-16 code units. By using this function, it avoids explicitly writing commands it wants to execute and it hides the actual code it is initiating. In particular, the script uses this function to hide information related to process names. To the best of our knowledge, this method was not used in early versions of the spam campaign. 2) The script uses the function radador(), which returns a randomized integer. In contrast to the first method of obfuscation, this has been used effectively since early versions of the Astaroth Trojan campaign | ['T1140'] |
The group has made significant improvements to their arsenal recently and has both developed new tools and modified existing ones. The key observations covered below are based on CrowdStrike® Intelligence analysis of BazarLoader, Conti and Ryuk operations | ['T1486'] |
After the last screenshot was created, it uploads all files from the "store" folder to the C2 server "win-restore[.]ru". Then, it deletes all the files present in the folder and starts a new screenshot creation cycle. It should be noted that there is no check of what files are uploaded. The files are uploaded via POST HTTP method to the script "vvd.php". For this, the following HTTP request is used which contains also data from the victim as well the JPEG files | ['T1074.001'] |
The ransomware terminates some processes and services, some examples of which are related to backup software and data related applications. It is likely that it does this as an attempt to debilitate any efforts the victim may take in performing backup and recovery operations after the ransomware attack | ['T1489'] |
The script hides under multiple layers of encryption, obfuscation, and encoding techniques. For this sample, we were able to reveal three layers of code. The top-most layer executes a base64-encoded command | ['T1027'] |
CrowdStrike also identified a connection between StellarParticle-related campaigns and the abuse of Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners’ O365 tenants. This threat actor abused access to accounts in the Cloud Solution Partner’s environment with legitimate delegated administrative privileges to then gain access to several customers’ O365 environments | ['T1199'] |
Malware used by the threat group can be configured to bypass network-based detection; however, the threat actors rarely modify host-based configuration settings when deploying payloads. The threat actors demonstrated the ability to adapt when reentering a network after an eviction, overcoming technical barriers constructed by network defenders | ['T1056.001'] |
In one of these campaigns, Waterbug used a USB stealer that scans removable storage devices to identify and collect files of interest. It then packages stolen files into a password-protected RAR archive. The malware then uses WebDAV to upload the RAR archive to a Box account | ['T1560.001', 'T1567.002'] |
TA505 sent several similar campaigns in mid-October with VBScript compressed in 7-Zip files that also downloaded either Locky or The Trick. By late October, the actor switched to Microsoft Word attachments that abused Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to download either Locky or Locky and The Trick in several more geo-targeted campaigns. This was the first time that we observed TA505 abusing DDE, a legitimate feature in Microsoft Office that became a regular part of multiple threat actors’ toolkits in Q4 2017. Recipients of these emails, which also used simple lures with attached fake invoices, needed to open the Microsoft Word attachments and click through a security dialog (Figure 3) to download the malware | ['T1204.001'] |
WannaCry then proceeds to encrypt files on the system, searching for the following file extensions, which are hard-coded in the binary | ['T1083'] |
The document is disguised from the Colombian National Civil Registry and uses Spanish to prompt the victim to enable the macro code in order to execute the subsequent payload | ['T1204.002'] |
In addition to these malware families, GALLIUM has been observed employing SoftEther VPN software to facilitate access and maintain persistence to a target network. By installing SoftEther on internal systems, GALLIUM is able to connect through that system as though they are on the internal network of the target. SoftEther provides GALLIUM with another means of persistence and flexibility with the added benefit that its traffic may appear to be benign on the target network | ['T1133'] |
The most notable change to this variant of Zebrocy, other than the programming language used, is the way the tool gathers the system information and running processes. Instead of using systeminfo and tasklist commands, the C# variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather this information | ['T1057'] |
Next, the script executes a command to delete the targeted PC’s volume shadow copies, so victims cannot restore older unencrypted versions of their files | ['T1490'] |
No exploits were used, so the victim would have to manually execute the malware dropper, which pretends to be an Adobe Flash installer. However, our analysis confirmed that Bad Rabbit uses the EternalRomance exploit as an infection vector to spread within corporate networks. The same exploit was used in the ExPetr | ['T1210'] |
We identified that even though the downloaded installation executable was signed using a valid digital signature issued to Piriform, CCleaner was not the only application that came with the download. During the installation of CCleaner 5.33, the 32-bit CCleaner binary that was included also contained a malicious payload that featured a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) as well as hardcoded Command and Control (C2) functionality. We confirmed that this malicious version of CCleaner was being hosted directly on CCleaner's download server as recently as September 11, 2017. In reviewing the Version History page on the CCleaner download site, it appears that the affected version (5.33) was released on August 15, 2017. On September 12, 2017 version 5.34 was released. The version containing the malicious payload (5.33) was being distributed between these dates. This version was signed using a valid certificate that was issued to Piriform Ltd by Symantec and is valid through 10/10/2018. Piriform was the company that Avast recently acquired and was the original company who developed the CCleaner software application. This second sample was also signed using a valid digital certificate, however the signing timestamp was approximately 15 minutes after the initial sample was signed. It is also important to note that while previous versions of the CCleaner installer are currently still available on the download server, the version containing the malicious payloads has been removed and is no longer available | ['T1195.002'] |
Another new feature in the latest UPPERCUT sample is that the malware sends an error code in the Cookie header if it fails to receive the HTTP response from the command and control (C2) server. The error code is the value returned by the GetLastError function and sent in the next beacon. This was likely included to help the attackers understand the problem if the backdoor is unable to receive a response (Figure 9). This Cookie header is a unique indicator that can be used for network-based detection | ['T1071.001'] |
A Golden Ticket (GT) can be created to impersonate any user (real or imagined) in the domain as a member of any group in the domain (providing a virtually unlimited amount of rights) to any and every resource in the domain. Since the Golden Ticket is an authentication ticket (TGT described below), its scope is the entire domain (and the AD forest by leveraging SID History) since the TGT is used to get service tickets (TGS) used to access resources. The Golden Ticket (TGT) contains user group membership information (PAC) and is signed and encrypted using the domain’s Kerberos service account (KRBTGT) which can only be opened and read by the KRBTGT account | ['T1134.005'] |
The presence of this credential stealer may partially answer how Kobalos propagates. Anyone using the SSH client of a compromised machine will have their credentials captured. Those credentials can then be used by the attackers to install Kobalos on the newly discovered server later | ['T1056'] |
Extracting and dropping an OpenSSH binary from its PE resources - Extracting, dropping, and configuring the RDP Wrapper Library software from its PE resources - Creating a new user “supportaccount” with a password of “Ghar4f5” - Adding this user to the “Remote Desktop Users” and “Administrators” groups | ['T1136.001'] |
Poseidon utilizes a variety of tools. This tool appears to be designed to operate on high-value corporate systems like Domain Controllers or IIS servers that act as repositories of valuable information, particularly for lateral movement. This tool contains several other executable files made in different programming languages ranging from Visual Basic 6 to C#, each one performing a very clear task devised by the group when trying to obtain more information from an objective | ['T1003'] |
1) Creating malicious Word documents by injecting a remote template URL 2) Hosting a C2 server to gather credentials entered into authentication dialog boxes displayed when attempting to obtain the remote template | ['T1221'] |
As the final reconnaissance step, if the system is domain-joined, BoomBox executes an LDAP query to gather data such as distinguished name, SAM account name, email, and display name of all domain users via the filter (&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person | ['T1087.003', 'T1087.002'] |
As has been previously reported, there are two variants of the trojan TinkaOTP. The version that has received the most attention contains the malware payload in the application bundle’s Resources folder. The dot prefix is added in order to make it invisible in the Finder. This payload is then executed via a user LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.aex-loop.agent.plist | ['T1564.001'] |
First, the malware goes over the files and directories from the paths_to_wipe config, fills them with zero-bytes instead of their real content, and then deletes them | ['T1485'] |
The most notable change to this variant of Zebrocy, other than the programming language used, is the way the tool gathers the system information and running processes. Instead of using systeminfo and tasklist commands, the C# variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather this information. The tool runs the following list of WMI queries | ['T1047'] |
To ensure that the compromised system is unable to restore from backup, REvil deletes shadow copies and disables recovery mode by executing the following command via ShellExecute | ['T1490'] |
Operational since April 2019, the group obtained the GandCrab source code from GOLD GARDEN, the operators of GandCrab that voluntarily withdrew their ransomware from underground markets in May 2019. CTU researchers assess with high confidence that GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a former GandCrab affiliate and continues to work with other former GandCrab affiliates. In December 2019, GOLD SOUTHFIELD began operating a name-and-shame style website that uses stolen data from intrusions to generate additional leverage against victims; a tactic known as double extortion. Despite GOLD SOUTHFIELD's infrastructure being taken down by law enforcement in October 2021, the REvil leak site re-emerged in April 2022 with several new victims added. GOLD SOUTHFIELD also began recruiting exclusively via their leak site using the peer-to-peer secure messaging software Tox Chat. GOLD SOUTHFIELD's affiliates distribute ransomware through a variety of means including exploit kits, scan-and-exploit attacks, publicly-accessible RDP, remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers, and backdoored software installers. As of May 2022, the group continues to operate REvil as a name-and-shame scheme and uses a leak site to post victim information and recruit affiliates | ['T1195.002'] |
After all this, if the malware successfully discovers a viable target and is able to gain access through SSH credential brute forcing, the malware will be able to begin installation of the cryptocurrency miner. Linux Rabbit attempts to install both “CNRig” and “CoinHive” Monero miners onto the machine, but only one will actually successfully install depending on what type of architecture the machine is. If the machine is a x86-bit, it will install CNRig Monero miner and if the machine is an ARM/MISP, it will install CoinHive. If the infected machine is a web server, the malware will inject CoinHive script tags into every HTML file, so that even visitors of the site/server are also infected with the cryptocurrency miner. Linux Rabbit is able to connect to GitHub and receive updates from the threat actors. It also has a killswitch built-in. It is able to detect other miners already on a target machine and delete them from the machine during the installation of its own miner | ['T1110.003'] |
Next, a Cobalt Strike binary was dropped on the endpoint as a .dll file and executed by rundll32.exe. With that, the intrusion began spreading laterally via Cobalt Strike. The operators used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) in their lateral movement attempt. WMI spawned cmd.exe, which subsequently spawned PowerShell with an encoded command line. This encoded PowerShell creates another Cobalt Strike Beacon. We’ve found that looking for encoded PowerShell is a great way to catch this specific evil and a lot of other evil, too. In this incident, we saw a command line that began with | ['T1059.001'] |
Multiple SUNBURST samples have been recovered, delivering different payloads. In at least one instance the attackers deployed a previously unseen memory-only dropper we’ve dubbed TEARDROP to deploy Cobalt Strike BEACON | ['T1105'] |
The GetWebpImage() method is in charge of masquerading the output of the C2 commands as a legitimate WebP file (by adding appropriate RIFF/WebP file header magic/fields) and encoding the resulting WebP file | ['T1036'] |
How about DPAPI with keys tied per user & system. Volume serial ID keying. See the APT41 talk #FireEyeSummit7:19 PM · Oct 30, 2019·Twitter for Android12 Retweets1 Quote Tweet35 LikesNick Carr@ItsReallyNick | ['T1480.001'] |
The PowerShell script employs several layers of obfuscation to hide its actual functionality. In addition to obfuscation techniques, it also has the ability to detect security tools on the analysis machine, and can also shut down the system if it detects the presence of such tools | ['T1027'] |
When run, the first thing the script does is to retrieve a GUID associated to a LAN connection present on the machine by leveraging the interface offered by the WMI Class Root\Microsoft\Homenet\HNet_Connection. If a LAN connection is not available, the script defaults to a hardcoded GUID. This GUID is later communicated to the C2. It’s possible that the threat actor used this GUID to verify that the threat is running in a desirable environment, i.e. a real machine with LAN connections available | ['T1049'] |
In one instance, the threat actor gained remote access to a high-value system in a compromised network, ran quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on the device, immediately ran a command to compile a RAR archive that specified file types the threat actor did not want, and used a password to encrypt the archive | ['T1119', 'T1005'] |
The actors have regularly leveraged Cobalt Strike BEACON and Metasploit Meterpreter to move laterally within victim environments. The actors commonly moved laterally within victim environments using compromised accounts—both those belonging to regular users and accounts with administrative privileges. In addition to the use of common post-exploitation frameworks, lateral movement has also been achieved using WMIC commands and the Windows RDP and SMB protocols. The actors used the Windows net use command to connect to Windows admin shares to move laterally | ['T1078.002'] |
Whitefly usually attempts to remain within a targeted organization for long periods of time—often months—in order to steal large volumes of information. It keeps the compromise alive by deploying a number of tools that facilitate communication between the attackers and infected computers | ['T1059'] |
The binary will be saved in the %APPDATA% folder and, for persistence, it creates a scheduled task that will execute every hour | ['T1053.005'] |
By gaining access to the configuration panel the attackers configured the Apache web server and started using the router as a proxy server between the organization’s corporate and restricted segments | ['T1090.001'] |
USB Worm -> this is the USBWorm component developed for stealing files from removable drives, spread across systems by infecting removable media, and download and execute the “Thin Client” component from a remote Crimson server | ['T1091'] |
GetST.py: Given a password, hash, aesKey or TGT in ccache, this script will request a Service Ticket and save it as ccache. If the account has constrained delegation (with protocol transition) privileges you will be able to use the -impersonate switch to request the ticket on behalf another user. GetPac.py: This script will get the PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) structure of the specified target user just having a normal authenticated user credentials. It does so by using a mix of [MS-SFU]’s S4USelf + User to User Kerberos Authentication. GetUserSPNs.py: This example will try to find and fetch Service Principal Names that are associated with normal user accounts. Output is compatible with JtR and HashCat. GetNPUsers.py: This example will attempt to list and get TGTs for those users that have the property ‘Do not require Kerberos preauthentication’ set (UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH). Output is compatible with JtR. ticketConverter.py: This script will convert kirbi files, commonly used by mimikatz, into ccache files used by Impacket, and vice versa. raiseChild.py: This script implements a child-domain to forest privilege escalation by (ab)using the concept of Golden Tickets and ExtraSids | ['T1558.003'] |
Creates events "__klg__" and "__klgkillsoft__" to act as mutexes and facilitate self-removal. Installs itself to %APPDATA%\Intel Corporation\IAStorIcon.exe. Creates an entry in the user's Startup folder for persistence. Uses the SetWindowsHookExW API function to capture keystrokes system-wide. Formats and writes the keylogger output to %APPDATA%\Update\Tmp\k%d.txt, where %d is the current system tick count | ['T1547.001'] |
The dropper has its encrypted payload embedded as an overlay of a PE file as extra data that will never be used in normal execution steps. Its decryption routine, part of an executable physical patch, begins somewhere between the start() and WinMain() functions. A fun fact is that the malware authors embedded their malicious code into a binary that was a harmless executable | ['T1140'] |
Another component used by this group is a variant of TerraTV. It runs a legitimate TeamViewer application but hides its user interface elements, so that the operators of the malware can connect to the compromised computer undetected | ['T1219'] |
It creates a socket, requests the address of the hardcoded C2 server "win-restore.ru" via gethostbyname() and connects to it. Thereafter, it also collects the volume serial number of C:\ drive, the computer name and the hardware profile GUID. With this information, it creates the following string used by a subsequent send() function call | ['T1082'] |
This is the final payload that has been deployed as a service using svchost.exe. This Rat is heavily obfuscated and is using multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has a custom section named “qwdfr0” which performs all the de-obfuscation process. This payload register itself as a service using its export function ServiceMain | ['T1543.003'] |
In previous attacks, we were able to determine the impacted organization based on the domain names and credentials used by the Disttrack tool to spread to other systems on the network. However, that functionality was missing from this sample. Unlike past Shamoon attacks, this particular Disttrack wiper would not overwrite files with an image. Instead it would overwrite the MBR, partitions, and files on the system with randomly generated data | ['T1485'] |
Since 2014, Inception has widened its use of cloud service providers for C&C purposes. Whereas previously it relied on one service provider (CloudMe.com), more recently it has employed a least five cloud service providers | ['T1102'] |
The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. The OilRig group sent two emails to two different email addresses at the same organization within a six minutes time span. The recipient email addresses suggest they may be the addresses used for specific regional branches of the targeted organization. However, based upon the captured session data, it is highly likely the source email address was spoofed. The email contained an attachment named Seminar-Invitation.doc, which is a malicious Microsoft Word document we track as ThreeDollars. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time | ['T1566.001'] |
Once initiated the agent proceeds to enumerate the infected machine using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to obtain the following information | ['T1047'] |
After trying to determine whether ports are open and the machine could act as a C2 tier 2 proxy, the proxy module also starts a multithreaded SOCKS5 proxy server. The SOCKS5 protocol is encapsulated into the QakBot proxy protocol composed of: QakBot proxy command (1 byte), version (1 byte), session id (4 bytes), total packet length (dword), data (total packet length-10). Incoming and outgoing packets are stored in the buffers and may be received/transmitted one by one or in multiple packets in a single TCP data segment (streamed | ['T1572'] |
The core component will check whether it is located in the %temp%\[appname] directory, otherwise it copies itself to %temp%\[appname]\[appname] and set the file attribute to hidden | ['T1083'] |
First, the malware checks for the existence of a Mutex value, “EKANS”, on the victim. If present, the ransomware will stop with a message “already encrypted. Otherwise, the Mutex value is set and encryption moves forward using standard encryption library functions. Primary functionality on victim systems is achieved via Windows Management Interface (WMI) calls, which begins executing encryption operations and removes Volume Shadow Copy backups on the victim | ['T1486'] |
Function and variable names are obfuscated. Strings are encrypted. Contain an encrypted .NET injector and one or more encrypted PE payloads. Take one argument that is the decryption key for the embedded .NET injector and PE payload(s). - Embedded .NET injector and payload(s) are encoded with Base64 and encrypted with Rijndael | ['T1027'] |
All of the attacks involved spear-phishing emails to deliver malicious documents that required the recipient to carry out some action. The payload in a majority of these attacks was a backdoor called Spark, which is a backdoor that allows the threat actors to open applications and run command line commands on the compromised system | ['T1204.001', 'T1204.002'] |
We can also see files created in a TEMP folder that are serving as a small database, where Dyreza stores information, before they are sent to the C&C | ['T1074.001'] |
Forensic analysis indicates that many of these tools were executed during the timeframe in which the actor was accessing the system. Of note, the threat actors installed Python 2.7 on a compromised host of one staging victim, and a Python script was seen at C:\Users\<Redacted Username>\Desktop\OWAExchange | ['T1059.006'] |
To ensure that the compromised system is unable to restore from backup, REvil deletes shadow copies and disables recovery mode by executing the following command via ShellExecute. The length and uniqueness of this command allow for the development of high-fidelity detection controls | ['T1059.003'] |
an “object_id” that is a unique uuid used to identify the victim, when the value is not set in the file, it is generated randomly by the malware - a list of processes into which code is injected (iproc) - the frequency and time for task execution / backup logs / connection to the C&C ([TIME]) - the IP addresses of other computers on the network ([CW_LOCAL]) - the C&C server addresses ([CW_INET]) - the named pipes used to communicate with the injected library and with the other computers ([TRANSPORT | ['T1016'] |
Throughout our investigation, many of the analyzed ZeroT RAR SFX samples (e.g. 67693ddb6236d3ef790059409ae240212c47acfd8c1c76d65c3ef19096fdf43b) contained a file named Go.exe which performs Windows UAC bypass. This executable contains a PDB path indicating its purpose of bypassing UAC (Fig | ['T1548.002'] |
The ‘microsoft-cache’ domain was used by the malware variant that communicated over HTTP. We found four unique samples communicating with this domain, which resolved to the same Hong Kong-based IP address used by the first two domains | ['T1016'] |
When the Trojan runs as an executable within the "DsvHelper" folder, the Trojan will create a shortcut (.lnk file) and save the shortcut to the 'DsvHelper' folder. The embedded payload written to process memory exists in the "R" resource and called function in the new payload is named "RPe.Test.Work". The function will take another executable embedded in the initial Trojan as a resource named "M", which it attempts to inject into the following process to execute: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe While it's configured to inject into cvtres.exe, the Trojan is also capable of injecting its code into the following process as well: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe | ['T1055.012'] |
These encrypted blobs are dropped to C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\3f34a.tmp one after the other. Once they are dropped, the dropper also decrypts them and writes them to a newly created folder and creates persistence | ['T1140'] |
It iterates over all possible Office <version> values for both Word and Excel <product> values. It then scans for documents with valid Word or Excel file extensions on all drives connected to the system. The malware moves each located document into the AppData folder, inserts malicious Word or Excel macros into it using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object, and then moves the document back into its original folder. In the samples we analyzed, the injected macros were simple downloaders | ['T1080'] |
PwDumpVariant: This tool imports lsremora.dll (often downloaded by the attacker as part of the toolset) and uses the GetHash export of this DLL. On execution, the tool injects itself into lsass.exe and is triggered with the argument “dig | ['T1003.001'] |
The developer rewrote a large part of the code however the workflow is the same as previously and some features are copy/paste. The biggest change is the network communication with the C2 server. The malware does not use a raw socket anymore but all the communications are performed with WinInet. The malware performs connection to the C2 server by using InternetOpenA() with an hardcoded User-Agent: "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322". Note the missing parenthesis at the end of the User-Agent. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011. The code is not exactly the same but the workflow and some constants are similar | ['T1573.001'] |
Cardinal RAT is deployed using an interesting technique of compiling and executing a downloader via a malicious macro embedded within a Microsoft Excel file. The Excel files themselves contain lures that have financial themes. This threat has had a low volume of samples in the past two years, with 11 instances of Carp Downloader and 27 instances of Cardinal RAT observed | ['T1204.002'] |
The first thread is responsible for taking a screenshot of the desktop of the victim machine. This screenshot data is both compressed and encrypted using a single-byte xor key of 0x5F. This data is written to one of the following files | ['T1113'] |
Once the "instal.xml" file began execution, it would deobfuscate the base64-encoded commands. This revealed a stager, or a small script designed to obtain an additional payload. One notable difference is that this particular stager included functionality that allowed the stager to communicate with the command and control (C2) via an encrypted RC4 byte stream. A copy of the deobfuscated stager can be seen in the image below | ['T1140'] |
The group used Ruler to configure a specially crafted Outlook Home Page URL to exploit the security bypass vulnerability CVE-2017-11774, which was fixed shortly after it was discovered. Successful exploitation automatically triggered remote code execution of a script when an Outlook client synced with a mailbox and rendered the profile Home Page URL. These scripts, usually VBScript followed by PowerShell, in turn initiated the delivery of various payloads | ['T1203'] |
If this is successful, the malware creates a :0 alternate data stream in the executable and copies the executable’s own contents to the stream. This can be used to restore the executable later. Then the malware replaces the contents of the executable with a copy of itself and launches the service. The file modified time of the executable is also artificially changed to 00:00:00 UTC. The purpose of this time change is so the file can be identified and restored by the decryption tool | ['T1070.006'] |
DNS Monitoring Bypass The malware modifies the system DNS resolvers and uses Google’s public DNS servers to avoid being detected by DNS monitoring tools | ['T1562.001'] |
Since the discovery of the {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll backdoor and its public analysis by multiple researchers, we observed some changes in the malware’s configuration data. First, the authors started removing the names from the helper DLLs (DNSprov.dll and the two versions of HttpProv.dll). Then the operators stopped packaging the third DLL (second version of HttpProv.dll), choosing to embed just one | ['T1082'] |
1) Using the compromised SolarWinds DLL to activate a backdoor that enables attackers to remotely control and operate on a device 2) Using the backdoor access to steal credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally to gain the ability to create valid SAML tokens using any of two methods: Stealing the SAML signing certificate (Path 1) Adding to or modifying existing federation trust (Path 2) 3) Stealing the SAML signing certificate (Path 1) 4) Adding to or modifying existing federation trust (Path 2) 5) Using attacker-created SAML tokens to access cloud resources and perform actions leading to the exfiltration of emails and persistence in the cloud | ['T1047'] |
The scripts themselves could be easily extracted and decompiled out of the binaries using uncompyle. The decompiled scripts employed some visual obfuscation techniques by naming variables as combinations of the characters ‘o’, ‘O’, and ‘0’ to hinder analysis. In-depth analysis of the scripts showed the group employed AES in CBC mode using a predefined static key to encrypt files before uploading them to the C2 server | ['T1027'] |
One of the documents spreads what analysts are calling SQLRat, previously unseen malware that drops files and executes SQL scripts on the host system. The use of SQL scripts is ingenious in that they don’t leave artifacts behind the way traditional malware does. Once they are deleted by the attackers’ code, there is nothing left to be forensically recovered. This technique has not been observed in previous campaigns associated with FIN7 | ['T1070.004'] |
The ‘vsnet’ plugin was intended to spread and launch a payload (BlackEnergy2 dropper itself at the moment) in the local network by using PsExec, as well as gaining primary information on the user’s computer and network. It was a ddos tool compiled to run on ARM systems | ['T1021.002'] |
Using Frame1_Layout for macro execution and using lesser known API calls for shellcode execution is known to be used by Lazarus. We also were able to find infrastructure overlap between this campaign and past campaigns of Lazarus (Figure 19 | ['T1106'] |
Skidmap also sets up a way to gain backdoor access to the machine. It does this by having the binary add the public key of its handlers to the authorized_keys file, which contains keys needed for authentication | ['T1098.004'] |
Kwampirs uses a fairly aggressive means to propagate itself once inside a victim's network by copying itself over network shares | ['T1021.002'] |
When we deploy any web browser, it directly injects the code into its process and deploys illegitimate connections.It is the way to keep in touch with the C&C, monitor user’s activity and steal credentials | ['T1055'] |
In order to exfiltrate data from a network segment not connected to the Internet, the threat actor deployed a modified version of hTran. This ‘connection bouncer’ tool lets the threat actor redirect ports and connections between different networks and obfuscate C2 server traffic. There have been numerous reports of hTran being used by different Chinese threat actors, including: APT3, APT27 and DragonOK | ['T1090.002'] |
Each web shell instance is configured to contain SP, Key, and Log variables. When the malicious ISAPI filter captures a username matching this variable, it knows to handle the incoming HTTP request as a command to the web shell. The DES key to encrypt the credentials in the configuration observed by CTU researchers is 12345678, and the log file is c:\log.txt. The decrypted contents of the log file adhere to the format in Figure 22 | ['T1560.003'] |
The original sample involved in the forbes.com breach used HTTP, which is consistent with the original variant discussed in this blog post. It should be noted that while the newest variant that uses direct network communication over port 22 no longer uses HTTP, references to the HTTP strings are still found within the sample itself. This is most likely due to code re-used by the attackers | ['T1071.001'] |
Some of BRONZE PRESIDENT's malware has persistence capabilities. For example, ORat uses a WMI event consumer to maintain its presence on a compromised host. The group also creates and maintains scheduled tasks to achieve this purpose. Figure 8 shows a Sysdriver scheduled task that periodically executes a Cobalt Strike payload | ['T1053.005'] |
Compromise website of strategic importance (e.g. websites visitors have a higher likelihood to be targets of interest) - Add one or more webshell backdoors to victim websites to maintain persistence - Webshell used to add JavaScript developed by OceanLotus into the website - The malicious JavaScript makes calls over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to typically load one of two different OceanLotus frameworks - OceanLotus JavaScript frameworks designed to track, profile, and target the compromised website's visitors - Website visitors of interest are flagged for targeting and receive special JavaScript aimed at compromising the user's system or e-mail accounts | ['T1105'] |
Once decrypted, the backdoor takes a fingerprint of the system. It sends home various data, such as the computer and user names and the operating system version, before waiting for commands to carry out its main mission | ['T1082'] |
Make a unique filename. This useful utility is widely used by malware to make random, unique file and directory names for payloads. Despite the name, mktemp does not have to be used only in the /tmp directory | ['T1564', 'T1564'] |
We discovered that TeamTNT gained initial access with the Hildegard malware by executing commands on kubelets that allow anonymous access. This was achieved by accessing the kubelet’s run command API and executing commands on running containers | ['T1133', 'T1609', 'T1609'] |
The Leeson, Neoichor, and NumbIdea malware families typically use the Internet Explorer (IE) COM interface to connect and receive commands from hardcoded C2 servers. Due to their reliance on IE, these malware families intentionally configure the browser settings by modifying the following registry entries | ['T1112', 'T1071.001'] |
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