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The PowerShell chain is launched from an obfuscated JScript scriptlet previously downloaded from the command and control (C2) server and launched using cmstp.exe. PowerShell downloader The downloaded PowerShell script code is obfuscated in several layers before the last layer is reached. Beginning of the "download and load" shellcode The shellcode is relatively simple and begins with a XOR loop that deobfuscates the rest of the code | ['T1027'] |
For example, ORat uses a WMI event consumer to maintain its presence on a compromised host. The group also creates and maintains scheduled tasks to achieve this purpose | ['T1546.003'] |
The communication between the cryptojacking bot and its mining server is made by using the Stratum protocol on port 10001 and is controlled by the execution of the spreadXfghij.exe program | ['T1071'] |
Observed Clop samples try to kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions. Clop also leverages Code Signing to evade detection | ['T1489'] |
For instance, the character A would be represented by the two characters 41, which is the hexadecimal representation of that character. The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex("File Uploaded")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex("< File Not Found >")> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class. The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data | ['T1560.003'] |
Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. Throughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim's machine. The malware infrastructure of the analysed samples was hosted by a free web hosting provider: 000webhost. The malware has evolved over time | ['T1059.003'] |
These events will run respectively at 15:30:40 and when the system uptime is between 300 and 400 seconds. The variable $HL39fjh contains the base64-encoded PowerShell command shown in Figure 2. It reads the Windows Registry key where the encrypted payload is stored, and contains the password and the salt needed to decrypt the payload | ['T1012'] |
This transport library does not appear on disk in its PE format. It is maintained as encrypted resource 107 in the orchestrator module, then decrypted and loaded by the orchestrator directly into the memory of the target process. This C2 interaction module is independent, once started, it interacts with the orchestrator using its local named pipe | ['T1027'] |
Finally, OverWatch observed AQUATIC PANDA make multiple attempts at credential harvesting by dumping the memory of the LSASS process3 using living-off-the-land binaries rdrleakdiag.exe and cdump.exe — a renamed copy of createdump.exe. The threat actor used winRAR to compress the memory dump in preparation for exfiltration before attempting to cover their tracks by deleting all executables from the ProgramData and Windows\temp\ directories | ['T1003.001', 'T1560.001'] |
The inclusion of both phone and IMSI numbers show the highly targeted nature of this cyber intrusion. If an SMS message contained either a phone number or an IMSI number that matched the predefined list, it was saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor | ['T1074.001', 'T1119'] |
The program CrashReporter.exe is heavily obfuscated with the ADVObfuscation library, renamed “snowman” (Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]). When run, it checks for the Maintain parameter and collects the victim’s host information (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033]), encrypts the collected information with a hardcoded XOR key before exfiltration, and sends the encrypted information to a C2 website (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041]). The program also creates a scheduled SYSTEM task, named JMTCrashReporter, which runs CrashReporter.exe with the Maintain parameter at any user’s login (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005 | ['T1053.005', 'T1027'] |
The function hashing algorithm is used to map a hash value of a given function name to its corresponding location in memory using a process known as Run-Time Dynamic Linking. Pre-computed hashes are passed to the hashing algorithm alongside the Windows library containing the related function name. Each function name within the library is hashed; when a match is found, its address is saved | ['T1027'] |
As mentioned, the registry key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM) is where the malicious payload is stored. In this case, this is the Pillowmint Trojan. Pillowmint is stored and compressed in the registry key | ['T1027'] |
The ultimate goal of both Type A and B loaders is to de-obfuscate and load a Cobalt Strike Reflective Loader in memory. At the conclusion of the de-obfuscation process, both variants proceed to load the Reflective Loader in memory, which subsequently executes Cobalt Strike Beacon in memory | ['T1027.002', 'T1140', 'T1140'] |
The second module is used by the operators to execute an obfuscated PowerShell script, which contains a Meterpreter downloader widely known as “Tinymet“. This downloader, seen in past FIN7 campaigns, downloads a one-byte XOR-encrypted (eg. with the key equal to 0x50 or 0x51) piece of meterpreter shellcode to execute | ['T1059.001'] |
TrickBot sends the reconnaissance information from the target machine to a hardcoded C2 server. The C2 server is responsible for handling the stolen data | ['T1041'] |
This can potentially bypass application whitelisting since all processes spawned during the attack are legitimate Microsoft executables | ['T1055.012'] |
Shlayer is perhaps the most talked about macOS malware at the moment and hit the news again recently after being caught sneaking past Apple’s macOS Notarization checks. That version of Shlayer was an interesting diversion: using a Mach-O binary written in C++ to execute a Bash shell script in memory. That might well suggest that Apple’s Notarization checks are static rather than dynamic as the telltale Shlayer code is only evident once the packed binary runs | ['T1059.004'] |
IRON TWILIGHT’s email credential targeting system allows the threat group to target and exploit accounts for webmail services such as Gmail and Hotmail, as well as corporate email platforms that use webmail interfaces. When targeting email services that provide alternate methods to authenticate account access, such as Gmail’s use of OAuth, the threat actors may abuse this feature to maintain a persistent session with the compromised account | ['T1566.002'] |
From these web shells, they launched reconnaissance commands, stole data, and dropped additional tools including portqry.exe, renamed cmd.exe, winrar, and the notorious hTran | ['T1105'] |
kaudited — A file installed as /usr/bin/kaudited. This binary will drop and install several loadable kernel modules (LKMs) on the infected machine. To ensure that the infected machine won’t crash due to the kernel-mode rootkits, it uses different modules for specific kernel versions | ['T1547.006'] |
2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. 3) This file requires the target to attempt to open the .lnk file, which redirects the user to a Windows Scripting Component (.wsc) file, hosted on an adversary-controlled microblogging page. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs. 4) The .lnk file uses an embedded VBScript component to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script from the adversary-controlled web page | ['T1059.005'] |
On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. The primary difference was that this sample was encrypted and password protected, requiring the victim to enter in a password which was likely provided by the adversary to view the document. Typically, password protected documents is commonly used by adversaries as an evasion tactic to bypass automated analysis mechanisms due to the password requirement for successful execution. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time | ['T1204.002'] |
In the list of dropped files, VMwareCplLauncher.exe is a legitimate, signed VMware executable that serves to ultimately deliver the BADNEWS payload. The vmtools.dll file is a modified DLL that both ensures persistence and loads MSBuild.exe, which is the BADNEWS malware renamed to spoof a legitimate Microsoft Visual Studio tool. After the files are dropped, the VMwareCplLauncher.exe executable is run, which in turn loads the vmtools.dll DLL file. This DLL file creates a scheduled task named BaiduUpdateTask1, which attempts to run the malicious, spoofed MSBuild.exe every subsequent minute. The technique of having a signed, legitimate, executable load a malicious library is commonly referred to as side-loading, and has been witnessed in a number of campaigns and malware families in the past. The flow of execution from the time the victim opens the malicious Microsoft Word document, to the execution of BADNEWS, may be seen below | ['T1053.005', 'T1574.002'] |
NavRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) designed to upload, download and execute files. This screenshot shows the logs messages during the process injection with the API usage. NavRAT starts by copying itself (~emp.exe) to the %ProgramData%\Ahnlab\GoogleUpdate.exe path. NavRAT then creates a registry key in order to execute this file copy at the next reboot of the system, an initial method of persistence. The log files mentioned previously are stored in the same directory as NavRAT on the victim machine, again making it easy for us to find and analyse the additional log files. NavRAT has support for process injection. By using this method, it will copy itself into a running Internet Explorer process in order to avoid detection by running as an independent process | ['T1055'] |
File hunting plugin: The most frequently used plugin, similar to one used in 2014. Often used to collect Office files from temporary internet history. Detailed survey plugin: Used to gather domain membership, processes/loaded modules, hardware enumeration, installed products, logical and mapped drive information. Evolution of earlier plugin used in 2014. Browser plugin: Used to steal browser history, stored passwords and sessions. Works with Internet Explorer, Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Torch, and Yandex. File listing plugin: Works on local or remote drives and can map additional paths when given credentials | ['T1555.003'] |
X-Session: 0"). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords | ['T1105'] |
After this registry change, ShowCompColor and ShowInfoTip keys are also modified to disable the display of compressed and encrypted NTFS files in color. This setting allows you to see compressed files in a blue color | ['T1112'] |
Determine whether the victim’s host machine is running Windows with an x86 or x64 architecture. Parse the contents of a corresponding textbox within the document and convert it to a command line argument specific to the Windows architecture on the victim’s machine | ['T1082'] |
It was used to overwrite data by the BE2 actor, destroying data stored on hard drives by overwriting file contents. While its use may be intended to cover their tracks, it is heavy handed to use this type of tool to cover one’s tracks in a network. Most likely it is a tool of sabotage, much like the Destover wiper seen on Sony Pictures Entertainment’s networks. Instead of re-using the commercial EldoS RawDisk drivers in their malware, the BE2 developers wrote their own low-level disk and file destruction routines | ['T1485'] |
After successfully exporting mail they wished to steal, the attacker would remove the evidence of the export request using Remove-MailboxExportRequest | ['T1070'] |
Once executed, NavRAT will immediately leverage cmd.exe to perform a systeminfo and a tasklist check on the system it is running on while writing the output to a TMP file, once again attempting to hide within an AhnLab folder. Interestingly, the attacker has used the >> method to append to the file so there can be multiple outputs written to their single TMP file | ['T1074.001'] |
However, what happened was that the actor resized the Certificate Table in the digitally signed ‘vac.dll’ and inserted their own data in the Certificate Table so it doesn’t affect the digital signature | ['T1553.002'] |
Tomiris is a backdoor written in Go whose role is to continuously query its C2 server for executables to download and execute on the victim system. Before performing any operations, it sleeps for at least nine minutes in a possible attempt to defeat sandbox-based analysis systems | ['T1497.003'] |
The observed JSS Loader infection led to the download and execution of a setup VBScript from https[:]//petshopbook[.]com. This script installs a custom Sekur PS stager to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsDefender\ClearTemp.ps1 and establishes persistence for this stager with a second VBS that is launched by a scheduled task | ['T1053.005'] |
We found four different trojaned binaries in use since July 2019. The 5kplayer, driver pack and Firefox trojanized software use a service to achieve persistence. The VPNpro trojanized application uses an AutoRun registry key, as mentioned in the publication released before July 2019. After that, it will check if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping the malware | ['T1562.001'] |
Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. Figure 2 shows the attackers' use of HTTrack, a free website copier program, to duplicate a legitimate website to use for their own malicious purposes. These examples highlight Transparent Tribe's heavy reliance on social engineering as a core TTP and the group's efforts to make their operations appear as legitimate as possible.Figure 2: Fake website cloned using HTTrack on May 29, 2020. Lures and targeting . Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. Figure 6: Transparent Tribe's spear-phishing email targeting defense personnel. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. Transparent Tribe also delivers malicious archives containing CrimsonRAT executables using various themes, including honeytraps. Conclusion . Transparent Tribe relies heavily on the use of maldocs to spread their Windows implants. Transparent Tribe uses generically themed content-hosting domains as well as malicious domains masquerading as legitimate defense-related websites | ['T1189'] |
An interesting fact is that the ransomware enumerates all running processes and compares the hashed name of each process with embedded hash values | ['T1057'] |
Once the macro collected all the information, it sends the data to the C2 server over an HTTP POST request | ['T1071.001'] |
The threat actor gave considerable effort to obfuscating the code of this new Anchor_DNS variant using stack strings, string encryption, and by implementing a packer. The following example shows considerable changes in the code of the WinMain() function between an older variant of Anchor_DNS and the new variant | ['T1027'] |
The main function within the ISMInjector assembly uses the Joiner module to construct the final payload and the Inner module to inject the final payload into a process. Figure 4 shows the ISMInjector’s main function that uses the two modules to carry out its injection process before exiting | ['T1055.012'] |
Forensic examination of a computer infected with a banking trojan Oleg Skulkin Senior Digital Forensics Analyst at Group-IB Where did it all start. Since then, phishing emails distributing the trojan have been sent to potential victims with admirable persistence. In this article, I am going to show how to perform forensic analysis of an image of a computer infected with the RTM banking trojan. Let's try to find registry files, such as SOFTWARE, for example. Let's recall Jesse Kornblum's paradox: "Malware can hide, but it must run". A good start will be to look for potential persistence mechanisms that can be used by the malware to restart after reboot. Let's start with simple things: we will take the NTUSER.DAT registry file with the latest modification date from the user directory (C:\Users\%username%\), and extract data from it using RegRipper. Let's start with low-hanging fruits, the so-called run keys: The partition was last modified on November 7th, and we see that when a user logs in, the apg.exe file is executed from a very suspicious location. Let's see what else we can find in the b7mg81 directory: TeamViewer. Let's take a closer look at apg.exe and use PPEE: This looks like TeamViewer and is signed as TeamViewer, so does this mean it indeed is TeamViewer. Another interesting file is TeamViewer.ini: Here is anti-forensics: according to the configuration file, our "TeamViewer" did not keep any logs, and was apparently used as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Well, not bad | ['T1547.001'] |
The attackers manually send a command to the JS or C# component to drop and execute a batch file from one of their servers. That batch file writes a malicious INF file and supplies it as a parameter to the Microsoft utility cmstp.exe, which executes a remote scriptlet specified in the INF file. The remote scriptlet contains obfuscated JS code that drops an OCX file and executes it via regsvr32.exe | ['T1218.010'] |
Almost exclusively, Unit 42 has seen the use of weaponized documents that require user execution. Only once in the last six months have we seen use of exploits to circumvent the need for the user to execute any part of the installation chain | ['T1203'] |
The attacker created password-protected archives on the victims' OWA server so that they could be exfiltrated via a simple HTTP request | ['T1048.002'] |
This extreme level of variance was also applied to non-executable entities, such as WMI persistence filter name, WMI filter query, passwords used for 7-zip archives, and names of output log files. Camouflage and blending into the environment. ADFIND legit tool) were always renamed and placed in folders that mimicked existing programs and files already present on a machine. This blending was not just used for files, but for other elements. For example, WMI persistence filters were created with names and queries matching other scripts present in affected organizations. The firewall rules were also methodically removed after the network reconnaissance was completed. Lateral movement activities were never executed without preparation. To increase the likelihood that their activities remain undetected, the attackers first enumerated remote processes and services running on the target host and decided to move laterally only after disabling certain security services | ['T1036.005'] |
Finally, REvil ransomware marks its binary code for deletion during the next reboot and terminates execution | ['T1070.004'] |
For example, we recently disclosed the activities of one of those teams (dubbed Tsar team) surrounding the use of mobile malware. This team has previously launched campaigns targeting the United States and European intelligence communities, militaries, defense contractors, news organizations, NGOs and multilateral organizations. It has also targeted jihadists and rebels in Chechnya | ['T1027'] |
ESET has recently discovered that the BlackEnergy trojan was recently used as a backdoor to deliver a destructive KillDisk component in attacks against Ukrainian news media companies and against the electrical power industry. In this blog, we provide details on the BlackEnergy samples ESET has detected in 2015, as well as the KillDisk components used in the attacks. Furthermore, we examine a previously unknown SSH backdoor that was also used as another channel of accessing the infected systems, in addition to BlackEnergy | ['T1133'] |
Given this extended period, it is logical to assume that some credentials obtained by the threat actor would be rotated during normal business operations. To combat this, the threat actor periodically “refreshed” their credential set by performing credential theft activities in an already compromised environment. At one victim, CrowdStrike identified multiple instances of domain credential theft months apart, each time with a different credential theft technique | ['T1589.001'] |
Case in point: Last week, we came across a worm (detected by Trend Micro as Worm.Win32.BLADABINDI.AA) that propagates through removable drives and installs a fileless version of the BLADABINDI backdoor | ['T1120'] |
The TrickBot modules used for discovery include networkdll and psfin. TrickBot downloads modules for collecting local system information and scouting the network, primarily part of the networkdll module. This module has a battery of command line, WMI and LDAP queries to gather information, and then exfiltrate the data to GRIM SPIDER for review. The psfin module has a similar purpose but specifically searches for financial and point-of-sales indicators | ['T1047', 'T1074', 'T1018'] |
The core Karagany implant does not delete any of the plugins it downloads, although some of the plugins are designed to self-delete. This oversight facilitates high-fidelity forensic analysis of the majority of plugin activity carried out over the duration of the intrusion and allows a detailed timeline of threat actor activity to be compiled. The malware also creates a directory that is used for storing both plugin output data and to stage data for exfiltration. The ascending numerical value of these directories likely indicates malware versioning | ['T1074.001'] |
The second portion of EnvyScout is a modified version of the open-source tool FileSaver, which is intended to assist in the writing of files to disk via JavaScript. This methodology may circumvent static analysis of known malicious file types by obscuring them within dynamically altered content upon execution | ['T1059.007'] |
It can terminate IDA debugger, x32dbg, OllyDbg and more processes to avoid dynamic analysis, close databases, office programs and security tools | ['T1562.001'] |
OwaAuth is a web shell that is installed as an ISAPI filter on Exchange servers and shares characteristics with the ChinaChopper web shell. In addition to acting as a web shell, the malware captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to disk. The OwaAuth web shell enables a threat actor to upload and download files, launch processes, and execute SQL queries | ['T1056.001', 'T1505.003'] |
Linux/Ebury is noteworthy for multiple reasons. Although this is something common under the Windows operating system, it is the first time we’ve seen a malicious library being used on POSIX systems. Linux/Ebury also uses innovative tricks to hook functions, discover the address space of the ELF executable that loaded the library and apply patches to its code at runtime. We believe that before using the external library to hook into OpenSSH processes, the author of Linux/Ebury used a patch to modify the source code of OpenSSH, thereby adding “new functionalities” to the software. The first variants found were modified binaries left on the disk. We have also seen usage of the rpm commands to remove signature from the original OpenSSH packages (openssh-server, openssh-clients) and modify the RPM database to update the file hashes with those of the malicious files. This will make the output of rpm --verify openssh-servers report the files as unmodified. However, the output from rpm -qi openssh-servers will clearly show the package is missing its signatures | ['T1553.002'] |
The macOS version of the malicious application is a DMG Installer that has a disk image format that Apple commonly uses to distribute software over the internet. The installer looks legitimate and has a valid digital signature from Sectigo (Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates [T1588.004]). It has very similar functionality to the Windows version | ['T1553.002'] |
Ryuk does not encrypt files from within its own process memory space, but injects into a remote process. Before injecting into a remote process, Ryuk attempts to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege. It takes no action if the adjustment of the token privileges fails. Before injecting into a remote process, Ryuk also calls CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to enumerate all running processes. If a process is found that is not named csrss.exe, explorer.exe, lsaas.exe, or is running under NT AUTHORITY system account, Ryuk will inject itself into this single process. Ryuk uses a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread to inject itself into the remote process | ['T1134'] |
Each user on a Mac can have a LaunchAgents folder in their own Library folder to specify code that should be run every time that user logs in. We can confirm this is the case with Green Lambert by running the implant, then checking the user’s LaunchAgents folder | ['T1543.001'] |
In this latest discovery by McAfee ATR, despite a short pause in similar operations, the Lazarus group targets crypto currency and financial organizations. Furthermore, we have observed an increased usage of limited data gathering modules to quickly identify targets for further attacks. This campaign is tailored to identifying those who are running Bitcoin related software through specific system scans | ['T1057'] |
The malware also contains an embedded .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks on Windows systems | ['T1053.005', 'T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
This variation of the Zebrocy downloader begins by gathering the serial number for the storage volume with the label "C:\" and the computer name. The main function gets pertinent strings to communicate with its C2 by calling a sub-function with a specific number that the sub-function uses as a case within a switch statement to decrypt the desired string. The main function then calls the subfunction with the argument 3 to get the POST data parameter (“porg”) along with the volume serial number and computer name and will send this data to the C2 via the HTTP POST request. The Trojan will convert these hexadecimal bytes to their binary values and write them to a file and will run the file using the "open" function using the ShellExecuteW API function. Also, the author capitalized the “E” in the “dde” command to evade case sensitive signatures. Lastly, the author bolded the “dd” characters within the “dde” command, which breaks the string up within the XML of the DOCX file (word/document.xml) to make signature development difficult, as seen here | ['T1082'] |
The malware also loads shellcode in an additional resource, MD5: a4808a329b071a1a37b8d03b1305b0cb, which contains the METALJACK payload. The shellcode performs a system survey to collect the victim's computer name and username and then appends those values to a URL string using libjs.inquirerjs[.]com. It then attempts to call out to the URL | ['T1082'] |
The spreading technique observed by Anomali researchers is the same one used in previous campaigns. The malware in both previous and ongoing campaign assumes that it has root level access on the machine. Below are code snippets from the current campaign and the campaign reported by Unit 42, where the threat actor uses ssh keys and known hosts if they are available to infect other machines | ['T1552.004'] |
Next, HyperStack uses a custom handshake that is similar to handshakes used for Carbon named-pipe communications. To detect incoming connections from the controller, the HyperStack implant uses the Windows API call ‘ConnectNamedPipe’. When HyperStack receives an incoming connection, it starts a new thread and continues with the custom handshake. If it matches, the HyperStack implant returns the value CACA05ACCE55F11E to the controller | ['T1106'] |
The document may also display the fake message “This document is protected” to entice users to enable content and execute malicious code. The .docx file contained embedded x86 and x64 versions of the payload DLL so that the appropriate version was dropped depending on the target operating system | ['T1204.002'] |
The strings pertaining to the ransomware are encrypted and stored in the .bss section of the binary file. This includes the ransom note along with other important information necessary for the ransomware’s tasks. The strings are decrypted using a key that combined the size and raw address of the .bss section, as well as the ransomware’s compilation timestamp | ['T1027'] |
GALLIUM predominantly uses widely available tools. In certain instances, GALLIUM has modified these tools to add additional functionality. However, it’s likely these modifications have been made to subvert antimalware solutions since much of the malware and tooling employed by GALLIUM is historic and is widely detected by security products. For example, QuarkBandit is a modified version of the widely used Gh0st RAT, an openly available remote access tool (RAT). Similarly, GALLIUM has made use of a modified version of the widely available Poison Ivy RAT. These RATs and the China Chopper web shell form the basis of GALLIUM’s toolkit for maintaining access to a victim network | ['T1588.002'] |
For Linux Rabbit to establish a connection with the C2 server, it utilizes Tor hidden services to act as contact points to access a Tor gateway. The malware will randomly select one of the hidden services and then a Tor gateway to follow in order to establish an active C2 URL. The payload for the malware is then sent from the C2 server as an encoded URL parameter | ['T1132'] |
ntlmrelayx.py: This script performs NTLM Relay Attacks, setting an SMB, HTTP, WCF and RAW Server and relaying credentials to many different protocols (SMB, HTTP, MSSQL, LDAP, IMAP, POP3, etc. The script can be used with predefined attacks that can be triggered when a connection is relayed (e.g. In this mode, for every connection relayed, it will be available to be used later on multiple times through a SOCKS proxy. karmaSMB.py: A SMB Server that answers specific file contents regardless of the SMB share and pathname specified. smbserver.py: A Python implementation of an SMB server | ['T1557.001'] |
Moreover, USBWorm uses an icon that mimics a Windows directory, tricking the user into executing the malware when trying to access a directory | ['T1036.005'] |
A string, that contains a PDB-path to debug symbols, suggests one such tool was named CredRaptor by the attackers. This tool collects saved passwords from various browsers such as Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Opera | ['T1555.003'] |
In the case of a Linux/Ebury backdoor connection, the <version> contains a hexadecimal string of twenty-two (22) characters or more. It embeds an eleven (11) character password that is first encrypted with the client IP address and then encoded as a hexadecimal string; optionally a four (4) byte command may be encrypted and encoded as well after the password | ['T1573.001'] |
Cisco Talos assesses with moderate confidence that a campaign we recently discovered called "BlackWater" is associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. The findings outlined in this blog should help threat hunting teams identify MuddyWater's latest TTPs. In this latest activity, the threat actor first added an obfuscated Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) script to establish persistence as a registry key. Next, the script triggered a PowerShell stager, likely in an attempt to masquerade as a red-teaming tool rather than an advanced actor. The stager would then communicate with one actor-controlled server to obtain a component of the FruityC2 agent script, an open-source framework on GitHub, to further enumerate the host machine. This could allow the threat actor to monitor web logs and determine whether someone uninvolved in the campaign made a request to their server in an attempt to investigate the activity. Once the enumeration commands would run, the agent would communicate with a different C2 and send back the data in the URL field | ['T1104'] |
Most of CARBANAK’s strings are encrypted in order to make analysis more difficult. We have observed that the key and the cipher texts for all the encrypted strings are changed for each sample that we have encountered, even amongst samples with the same compile time. The RC2 key used for the HTTP protocol has also been observed to change among samples with the same compile time. These observations paired with the use of campaign codes that must be configured denote the likely existence of a build tool | ['T1573.001'] |
The wrapper JAR file drops a secondary JAR file and copies it to a %Temp% location. The payload JAR file can be extracted using AES decryption. The first 16 bytes in the file “k” seen in Figure 4 contains the key and the file “e” is the encrypted Java payload | ['T1027'] |
29],[30(link is external)] - During the STOLEN PENCIL operation in May 2018, Kimsuky used the GREASE malware. 32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly | ['T1112'] |
Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Gather the list of all files names listed in the Recent Items folder i.e. Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent". - Gather all names of files listed in the Desktop folder of the current user. Gather names of all files and programs listed in the Taskbar i.e. Get Microsoft Version Number from the registry, specifically from reg key/value: HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Excel.Application\CurVer||Default. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1 | ['T1112'] |
The anti-detection launcher and decompressor make extensive use of Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as LZNT1 compression | ['T1140'] |
Based on the use of the relatively unique PLAINTEE malware, the malware’s use of the same file paths on in each cluster, and the similar targeting, we have grouped these attacks together under the RANCOR campaign moniker. Interestingly, the delivery document borrowed a technique which was publicized in late 2017 as being used by the Sofacy threat actors, embedding the main malicious code in a EXIF metadata property of the document. By doing so, the main content of the macro itself (Figure 2) can be kept relatively simple, and the malicious’ codes small footprint can help enable evasion of automated detection mechanisms based on macro content | ['T1204.002'] |
The QUADAGENT backdoors dropped onto the hosts were nearly identical to each other, with the only differences being the command and control server (C2) and randomized obfuscation. We were also able to locate a third delivery package of the QUADAGENT backdoor as reported by ClearSky Cyber Security. In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails | ['T1059.003'] |
In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. The wave against the government entity (June 26) also involved a simple PE file attachment (SHA256: d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520) using the filename tafahom.exe. This PE was slightly different from the other attack, being compiled using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of being generated via a bat2exe tool and containing a decoy dialog box as shown in Figure 1 | ['T1059.003'] |
1) The printer vulnerability MS10-061 exploited by Stuxnet – using a special MOF file, executed on the attacked system using WMI | ['T1136.001'] |
Endpoint Protection . Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries . The Patchwork attack group has been targeting more than just government-associated organizations. Symantec Security Response has been actively monitoring Patchwork, also known as Dropping Elephant, which uses Chinese-themed content as bait to compromise its targets’ networks. A customized website with content related to the Chinese military . The malicious sites link to files hosted on different domains, which appear to be solely used for malicious purposes. The PowerPoint files appear to exploit the Microsoft Windows OLE Package Manager Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2014-4114), which was used in the Sandworm attacks against American and European targets in October 2014. The rich text files typically attempt to exploit the Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2015-1641), which was patched in April 2015. Users should manually remove any potential dropped files which would typically be named “sysvolinfo.exe”. Malicious Word .doc file Besides the .pps file, the threat actor uses rich text files to deliver the malware. While other researchers have reported that these files exploit CVE-2012-0158, Symantec has also observed CVE-2015-1641 being exploited to drop Backdoor.Steladok. As two file types are used to deliver two different payloads, there are likely multiple individuals or groups contributing to the malware development efforts. Mitigation Users should adhere to the following advice to prevent Patchwork’s attacks from succeeding: - Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive, especially if they contain links or attachments. Spear-phishing emails are frequently used by cyberespionage attackers as a means of luring victims into opening malicious files | ['T1566.002'] |
The configuration, along with downloaded plugins and all harvested data are stored in a custom database format inside a single file under the %TEMP% directory. The file name is hardcoded and obfuscated with XOR. The storage file is encrypted with AES-256 using a hardcoded key and is decrypted each time the malware needs to read or write it and re-encrypted after new data is added | ['T1070.004'] |
After exfiltrating the files, the threat actor used web shell access on the staging server to delete the staged RAR archives and detach their network shares, likely to avoid detection | ['T1070.005'] |
Targets common cloud applications such as web servers for initial access, using known vulnerabilities (“1-days”) – presumably those with a working exploit in the wild. Uses Windows container escape techniques to escape the container and gain code execution on the underlying node. Connects to its C2 server using the IRC protocol over the Tor network | ['T1190'] |
Intelligence gathering and stealing information has generally been the motivation behind Cicada’s attacks in the past, and that would appear to be the case in this attack campaign too. We observed the attackers archiving some folders of interest in these attacks, including in one organization folders relating to human resources (HR), audit and expense data, and meeting memos | ['T1083'] |
The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. They gained access to victims via trojanized updates to SolarWind’s Orion IT monitoring and management software | ['T1195.002'] |
The macros are also responsible for achieving reboot persistence for the ObliqueRAT payloads. This is done by creating a shortcut (.url file extension) in the infected user's Startup directory. Malicious shortcut in the infected user's startup directory to execute ObliqueRAT on startup | ['T1547.001'] |
Shamoon creates the new malicious service MaintenaceSrv. It creates the service with the option Autostart (StartType: 2) and runs the service with its own process (ServiceType: 0x10 | ['T1036.004'] |
It will then resolve the current process’s PID and path to be used as script arguments, and proceeds to execute the script by running: /bin/sh -c ./update.sh <process_id> <process_path | ['T1083'] |
Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. The "Blackwater.bas" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. The screenshot below shows the first few lines of the PowerShell trojan. Notably, a number of the PowerShell commands used to enumerate the host appear to be derived from a GitHub projected called FruityC2. rCecms=BlackWater". Notably, the trojanized document's macro was also called "BlackWater," and the value "BlackWater" was hard coded into the PowerShell script. Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and then query the following information | ['T1027'] |
The ‘jli.dll’ file acts as the first layer of the Ecipekac loader. This DLL file has a number of export functions; however, all of them refer to a similar function that carries the main loading feature | ['T1574.002'] |
Siloscape searches for kubectl.exe by name and the config file using a regular expression. The search function takes an extra argument: a pointer to a vector that holds folder names to exclude from the search | ['T1083'] |
We believe the malware authors chose to send packets that look like legitimate DNS requests over UDP port 53 to avoid being blocked by firewalls. It is very common to whitelist DNS requests in firewall configurations because blocking them could disrupt name resolution | ['T1071.004'] |
At this point in the execution cycle, the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into one or more application domains where the legitimate AD FS code is running. This means the backdoor code runs alongside the AD FS code with the same access and permissions as the AD FS application. Such access allows the FoggyWeb backdoor to directly interact with the AD FS codebase (that is, not an external disk-resident tool) and selectively invoke native AD FS methods needed to facilitate its malicious operations | ['T1036.005'] |
Filter the target machines: setup.bat first checks if the hostname of the machine is one of the following: PIS-APP, PIS-MOB, WSUSPROXY or PIS-DB. If so, it stops the execution and deletes the folder containing the malicious script from this machine. The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. Extract and run additional tools: update.bat, which was extracted and started by setup.bat, uses the password hackemall to extract the next stages: cache.bat, msrun.bat and bcd.bat. Corrupt the boot: bcd.bat is used in order to harm the boot process. It moves wiper-related files to “C:\temp” and creates a scheduled task named mstask to execute the wiper only once at 23:55:00 | ['T1490'] |
Should a removable drive be discovered, the plugin will seek any files residing on this device based on the plugin’s configured list. In this particular instance, the malware will seek out the following file types | ['T1119'] |
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