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The malware’s second functionality is to gain persistence on an infected machine. After obtaining persistence, the next functionality of Linux Rabbit is to brute force SSH passwords which ultimately allows the malware to install the cryptocurrency miner onto the server. The SSH brute forcing begins by the malware first generating a random IPv4 string and checking its geolocation to see where it is located. If the IP is located within a country that is “blacklisted,” it will stop and move on until it finds an IP that is located in an allowed geolocation, which for this malware are Russia, South Korea, the UK, and the US. Once an allowed IP location is discovered, Linux Rabbit will check to see if an SSH server is listening on Port 22. The malware will open a socket to see if it receives a response, and if it does, it will attempt to obtain the machine’s hostname. If the TLD is not blacklisted, the malware will run through a process of authentication utilizing a list of hard-coded credentials it has | ['T1033'] |
txt,log} and is also a "cryptojacker," which is a tool that uses a victim’s computer to mine cryptocurrency | ['T1056.001', 'T1557'] |
1) Communicate with the C2, try to forward ports with UPnP and determine available ports and report them to the C2. The usual C2 communication protocol used here is HTTP POST RC4-ciphered JSON data. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file. 3) Set up external PROXY-C2 connection that was received with command 37 (update config)/module 274 (proxy) by the stager | ['T1071.001'] |
To start, the implant looks for the AHNLAB V3 Antivirus software's class name "49B46336-BA4D-4905-9824-D282F05F6576". If the software is found, the implant will hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user | ['T1564.003', 'T1562.001'] |
Exfiltrated data is encrypted using an RSA public key, preventing third parties from decrypting it. An example exfiltration request is below | ['T1027'] |
Poseidon utilizes a variety of tools. This tool appears to be designed to operate on high-value corporate systems like Domain Controllers or IIS servers that act as repositories of valuable information, particularly for lateral movement. The Information Gathering Tool (IGT) tool is coded in Delphi and includes powershell and SQL components across a dozen different drops. This tool contains several other executable files made in different programming languages ranging from Visual Basic 6 to C#, each one performing a very clear task devised by the group when trying to obtain more information from an objective | ['T1049'] |
REDBALDKNIGHT’s use of steganography isn’t limited to Daserf. Based on their pdb strings, they’re both components of another REDBALDKNIGHT-related threat, XXMM (TROJ_KVNDM), a downloader Trojan that can also act as a first-stage backdoor with its capability to open a shell. While xxmm2_builder allows REDBALDKNIGHT to customize the settings of XXMM, xxmm2_ steganography is used to hide malicious code within an image file | ['T1001.002'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. After a few minutes, execute the malicious file on the system. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity | ['T1027.001'] |
cmd /c tasklist: Executes this command to collect a list of running processes on victim’s machine and store them in a tmp file | ['T1005', 'T1082'] |
The malware will actually search through the /Users/ folder looking for executable files. When it finds one, it will prepend malicious code to the beginning of the file. This means that when the file is executed, the malicious code is executed first. That code will then copy the legit file content into a new, invisible file and execute that | ['T1036.005', 'T1554'] |
APT19 leveraged Rich Text Format (RTF) and macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) files to deliver their initial exploits | ['T1566.001'] |
Current variants will often drop or retrieve secondary executables to inject into, or they will attempt to inject into known (and vulnerable) binaries already present on targeted hosts | ['T1055'] |
As described in the analysis of the group’s previous macOS backdoor, a clientID is created. This identifier is the MD5 hash of the return value of one of the following commands | ['T1082'] |
The C2 domain used in this shellcode has been categorized as malware in DNS Security, URL Filtering and WildFire, which are security subscriptions for Next-Generation Firewall customers. App-ID, the traffic classification system in Next-Generation Firewalls, is capable of identifying applications irrespective of port, protocol, encryption (SSH or SSL) or any other evasive tactic used by the application. This shellcode attempts to communicate over TCP port 443 with traffic that does not conform to proper SSL or any other known application. As a matter of best practice, we advise customers to block unknown outbound TCP traffic in their security policies | ['T1571'] |
Figure 3: The first step of decryption will perform XOR on one byte using the previous adjacent byte, starting from the last byte and excluding the first byte | ['T1140'] |
Once the malware was persisted and kicked off the launch items, it invokes a function named create_rescue_executable to create yet another copy of itself. This copy will made in the user’s Library directory. Its named starts with a . so that it won’t show up in the UI (i.e. Finder.app), and is then followed via 9 random characters | ['T1564.001'] |
The OilRig group remains highly active in their attack campaigns while they continue to evolve their toolset. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time | ['T1059.003'] |
Execute Pluginhost.exe, the plugin management component. Save the payloads as Alternate Data Streams and set scheduled tasks to run them | ['T1564.004'] |
Upon execution, GoldMax retrieves a list of the system’s network interfaces; the malware terminates if it is unable to do so or no network interface is configured. It then attempts to determine if any of the network interfaces has the following hardcoded MAC address: c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a | ['T1016'] |
As with much of the malware distributed by TA505, The Trick has appeared in frequent, high-volume campaigns. The campaigns used a mix of attached zipped scripts (WSF, VBS), malicious Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel), HTML attachments, password-protected Microsoft Word documents, links to malicious JavaScript, and other vectors. The last TA505 campaigns featuring The Trick appeared in mid-September 2017 with payloads alternating between Locky and The Trick | ['T1027', 'T1204.001', 'T1204.002'] |
As a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) client application, it initializes COM and connects to the \\root\cimv2 namespace to use the IWbemServices pointer and make WMI requests. The code executes wql queries (“wql” is “sql for wmi”, a subset of sql) to gather victim host details, like the query “SELECT Description, Manufacturer, Name, ProcessorId FROM Win32_Processor”. Here are several queries from the BlackEnergy2 plugin code | ['T1047'] |
Cisco Talos' previous research has mainly linked this group to CrimsonRAT, but new campaigns show they are expanding their Windows malware arsenal with ObliqueRAT. The victim is encouraged to click on an embedded URL hosted on sharingmymedia[.]com, which then downloads ObliqueRAT, the trojan discovered by Talos in 2020 associated with threat activity targeting entities in South Asia. We cannot confirm how the maldocs were delivered to victims, but we suspect they were probably sent as attachments to phishing emails based on previous threat actor behavior and the targeted nature of this particular lure. In such cases, adversaries would deliver phishing maldocs to targets containing a malicious VBA macro that extracted either the CrimsonRAT executable or a ZIP archive embedded in the maldoc. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. After enabling macros, the file executes CrimsonRAT on the endpoint.Figure 4: The "Download Now" button contains a link to a malicious XLS with CrimsonRAT embedded in it. Lures and targeting . Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. In a few of these instances, the malicious executables in the archives contained honeytrap-themed icons to entice the victims into executing them | ['T1204.001'] |
The back door Java file uses a custom class loader that loads encrypted class files (named Opcion[1-14]) as it receives commands from the RAT controller server. The key, specified by the attacker when creating the back door, is used to encrypt the class files using DES as a stream cipher | ['T1027'] |
The results are Gzipped and saved under random file in the temp folder. Following successful collection of information, the data is send back to the C2 and the file is deleted | ['T1074.001', 'T1560.001'] |
Below is an example of anti-analysis technique showing the loader checking if the victim system is a Vmware or VirtualBox VM | ['T1497.001'] |
POWRUNER may also receive batch commands from the C2 server to collect host information from the system. An example batch command is provided in Figure 11 | ['T1069.002', 'T1069.001', 'T1087.002'] |
First, just like the Gh0st in the dshell paper from SANS, the decrypted protocol consists of a 5 byte header (ngLGX), a 4byte packet length field, and finally another 4 byte uncompressed length field. This is where the similarity ends as the Opcode and the data are compressed using ZLib, instead of just the data. Additionally, the entire packet is encrypted with an algorithm making visual analysis of the Wireshark data challenging. However, as the packet header is static, you can use the encrypted header as an identifier, like I did in my script. The encrypted header is: “\xEA\xEE\xCC\xD3\xB8” and is unchanged throughout the malware’s runthrough | ['T1132.001'] |
Attackers like to use spear-fishing email with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway. Decryption password is provided in the mail body and inside the attachment it is a MHTML macro based document with the .doc suffix. Its purpose is to implant Imminent backdoor and gain a foothold into the target network which may make the follow up lateral movement easier to implement | ['T1027'] |
This cabinet file is then extracted to the previously identified file path. Again, a shortcut file is written to the %TEMP% path with a name of ‘~Update.lnk’, which is in turn copied to the identified startup path with a filename of ‘Windows help.lnk’. This shortcut file calls the built-in ‘control.exe’ utility to in turn load the previously dropped malicious CPL file of ‘winhelp.cpl’. Finally, the malware calls the ‘winhelp.cpl’ file in a new process via the following command | ['T1012'] |
Persistence with BITS UBoatRAT achieves persistence by using Microsoft Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service(BITS). BITS is a service for transferring files between machines. Though the most famous application using the service is Windows Update, other applications or users can take advantage of the component. The tool provides the option, /SetNotifyCmdLine which executes a program when the job finishes transferring data or is in error. UBoatRAT takes advantage of the option to ensure it stays running on a system, even after a reboot. After completing the copying the local file, BITS executes the UBoatRAT file configured with /SetNotifyCmdLine at the third line | ['T1197'] |
It moves the property list (plist) file com.dorusio.pkg.wallet.plist from the Installer package to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder (Scheduled Task/Job: Launchd [T1053.004]). Because the LaunchDaemon will not run automatically after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script launches Dorusio_upgrade and runs it in the background (Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon [T1543.004 | ['T1543.004'] |
The group extensively uses long-running strategic web compromises[2] (SWCs), and relies on whitelists to deliver payloads to select victims. In comparison to other threat groups, TG-3390 is notable for its tendency to compromise Microsoft Exchange servers using a custom backdoor and credential logger | ['T1189'] |
Both variants of the BitPaymer malware feature multiple techniques to hinder analysis. The malware developers have employed a combination of encrypted strings, string hashes and dynamic API resolution to ensure that no strings exist in the binary | ['T1106'] |
Ramsay implements a decentralized way of storing these artifacts among the victim’s file system by using inline hooks applied on two Windows API functions, WriteFile and CloseHandle | ['T1106'] |
The VBScript also uploads the output of the provided batch scripts to the command and control (C2) server, which provides threat actors a functional remote shell to the system | ['T1119'] |
The malware collects loads of sensitive data, which are then temporarily stored in files and deleted after they have been successfully uploaded to the C&C servers. Even the deleted files can, however, be recovered by an experienced system administrator, which could help further investigation of the attack – after the victim becomes aware of it. This is possible due to the fact that some data still reside on a disk even after a file is deleted. To prevent this, the malware has the ability to safe-delete all the files, which means it first overwrites the data in a file with zeroes or random bytes, and only then is the file deleted | ['T1070.004'] |
It uses virtualization software – QEMU on macOS and VirtualBox on Windows – to mine cryptocurrency on a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, making it cross platform. The admins of the site also frequently update the applications with newer versions, making it difficult to track the very first version of the miner. 2) Shell scripts used to launch the QEMU images. qemuservice shell script . After the dependencies are copied over, all miner-related daemons are launched and then the actual software is installed: - qemuservice won’t launch the image if the Activity Monitor process is running. In fact, if it is running, it will unload the plist that it was launched by. Before installation, version 1 of the miner is removed along with executing the command: rm -rf /usr/local/* . As seen in the listing in Script 2, it only does so when it detects a running qemu-system-x86_64 process. Launching the Linux image . All versions use multiple shell scripts to launch the images. Version 1 executes the following binaries (copies of qemu-system-x86_64) to launch the QEMU images: qemu-system-x86_64, system-monitor, tools-service. All versions use the following switches: - -M accel=hvf to use the Hypervisor framework as an accelerator. There are, however, some hints that can help you to identify when an application contains unwanted code: - A trust popup from an unexpected, “additional” installer (in this case the Oracle network adapter). - High CPU consumption by a process you did not install (QEMU or VirtualBox in this case). - A new service added to the startup services list (Windows) or a new Launch Daemon (macOS). - Network connections to curious domain names (such as system-update[.]info or system-check[.]services here). Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) . Hashes . macOS “cracked” applications (versions 1-3) . Windows “cracked” applications (version 4) . Linux images . Filenames . macOS . Windows . Hostnames . Download hosts (via HTTP on port 80) . Update hosts (via SCP) . Mining hosts . MITRE ATT&CK techniques . 20 Jun 2019 - 11:00AM . Sign up to receive an email update whenever a new article is published in our Ukraine Crisis – Digital Security Resource Center . Newsletter . Similar Articles . ESET Research . Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia . Virus Bulletin: Old malware never dies – it just gets more targeted . Anatomy of native IIS malware . Some URL shortener services distribute Android malware, including banking or SMS trojans . Discussion | ['T1569.001'] |
Kimsuky is a highly motivated threat actor targeting a number of entities in South Korea. This group has been relentlessly creating new infection chains to deliver different types of malware to their victims. This campaign relies on the abuse of Blogspot to host attacker-operated blogs serving malicious VB based scripts to their targets. We've found preliminary malicious components from initial access beacons to file exfiltrators being deployed to victims. In many cases, the content of these preliminary components was combined to serve special scripts to victims.The final implants utilized by the actors in this campaign are derivatives of the Gold Dragon/Brave Prince malware families. Such targeted attacks can result in the leak of restricted research, unauthorized access for espionage and even destructive attacks against target organizations | ['T1608.001'] |
If the user opens the file and the exploitation is successful, a backdoor Trojan is installed on the system that gives the attacker access and a decoy document is displayed to the victim. The main module is also responsible for communicating with its C2 servers and handling commands issued by the C2 server. Figure 8: FakeM Architecture . All FakeM variants initiate communications with its C2 server and check the C2’s response for a command. After sending the acknowledgement packet, the Trojan will gather local system information and include it in a beacon to the C2 server. The Trojan uses AES to encrypt the communication channel its C2 server, which will provide one of three commands to carry out activities on the compromised system, as seen in Table 4. Unit 42 tracks this mobile Trojan as MobileOrder, as the authors specifically refer to commands within the app as orders. MobileOrder acts on instructions provided by its C2 server, which it communicates with over TCP port 3728. The C2 server will respond to requests from MobileOrder with commands that the Trojan refers to as “orders”. MobileOrder contains a command handler with functionality that provides a fairly robust set of commands, as seen in Table 6. Table 6: MobileOrder command handler . Infrastructure Overlap and Related Tools . There is some infrastructure overlap in the C2 servers used by almost all of the FakeM variants, as well other Trojans such as MobileOrder, Psylo, and CallMe. Actors will run HTRAN on a server and configure their malware to interact with that server; however, the actor will configure HTRAN to forward traffic to another server where the actual C2 server exists | ['T1083'] |
So far, our telemetry hasn’t provided any concrete evidence that shows us how the Remexi malware spread. However, we think it’s worth mentioning that for one victim we found a correlation between the execution of Remexi´s main module and the execution of an AutoIt script compiled as PE, which we believe may have dropped the malware. This dropper used an FTP with hardcoded credentials to receive its payload | ['T1059.005'] |
Second technique: FIN6 also leveraged the creation of Windows services (named with a random 16-character string such as IXiCDtPbtGWnrAGQ) to execute encoded PowerShell commands. The randomly named service is a by-product of using Metasploit, which creates the 16-character service by default. The encoded command contained a Metasploit reverse HTTP shellcode payload stored in a byte-array like the first technique. This C2 URL contained shellcode that would make an HTTPS request for an additional download | ['T1059.001'] |
PowerShell Cobalt Strike Beacon - New payload + new C2 domain - PowerShell Obfuscator - All the new PowerShell payloads are obfuscated using a publicly available script adapted from a Daniel Bohannon’s GitHub project. Using this tool, the attackers could overcome a password reset. Customized Windows Credentials Dumper - A PowerShell password dumper that is based on a known password dumping tool, using PowerShell bypass and reflective loading. The attackers specifically used it to obtain Outlook passwords. Customized Outlook Credentials Dumper - Inspired by known Outlook credentials dumpers | ['T1552.002'] |
During the first C&C call, the backdoor sends a pack with the victim’s system information. All further information sent to the C&C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible. The commands from the C&C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware | ['T1012', 'T1560'] |
Each payload comes compiled with a standard list of commonly used Monero-mining domains alongside a Monero wallet address. So far, we’ve identified two wallet addresses used by Blue Mockingbird that are in active circulation. Due to the private nature of Monero, we cannot see the balance of these wallets to estimate their success. We’ve seen mining payloads compiled as early as December 2019 and as recently as late April 2020. In each compilation, one of the two wallets has been embedded into the binary. The wallet addresses could be extracted from the binaries easily in earlier versions using a simple strings command. In newer versions, the string is obfuscated | ['T1027'] |
Certutil is a living-off the land command line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure certificate services. Threat actors usually utilize certutil to download remote files from a given URL. It also incorporates a built-in function to decode base64-encoded files | ['T1140'] |
In the first campaign, the email (Figure 1) purported to be from FinCERT [8] with the subject “Памятка по информационной безопасности” (Information Security Notice) and contained a Microsoft Word attachment named “сводка1705.doc” (report1705) (Figure 3). - Another email (Figure 2) purported to be from Security Support for PCI-DSS [3] at a major credit card company with the subject line “Безопасность” (security) and a Microsoft Word attachment (Figure 4) “Требования безопасности.doc” (Safety requirements | ['T1566.001'] |
Web inject – the configuration file for the hooking module Once communication with the C2 is established, one of the additional modules that is downloaded is the web-inject module. It intercepts the victim’s traffic by injecting the module into the browser’s process and hooking the network API. The hooking module gets the execution flow from intercepted APIs, and as soon as the victim accesses certain web pages related to banking and finance, additional JavaScript is injected into the source page | ['T1185', 'T1059.007'] |
My blog post, “Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes”, describes the technical details of how WindShift (ab)used custom URL schemes to infect macOS systems | ['T1189'] |
Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. Talos could not pinpoint the initial attack vector, however, the use of trojanized installation files to well-known applications is consistent with the previously documented campaigns. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. The dropped files are now stored in a folder located in C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\ always following the same pattern similar to the following: 4CA-B25C11-A27BC. If it is executed with the "help" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp. Mysterious Wintask.xml . Our initial analysis in a sandbox showed that the C2 contact module attempts to execute this file, searching for it in the same path as the document search module, which we further corroborated with manual analysis. Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network | ['T1204.002'] |
One, called "frown.py," is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143. With a successful connection, it will send the word "almond" The server should reply either with "who" or "ice. The RAT will answer the "who" command with a string that contains the username, computer name and the previously generated UUID. The "ice" command simply makes the RAT finish the connection procedure. This is responsible for the interpretation and execution of the C2 commands. The available commands are | ['T1033'] |
APT15 then used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to Microsoft’s Psexec) in order to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries | ['T1569.002'] |
At the end of August 2018, the Sednit group launched a spearphishing email campaign where it distributed shortened URLs that delivered the first stage of Zebrocy components. In the past, Sednit used a similar technique for credential phishing. However, it is unusual for the group to use this technique to deliver one of its malware components directly. Previously, it had used exploits to deliver and execute the first stage malware, while in this campaign the group relied entirely on social engineering to lure victims into running the first part of the chain. The screenshot in Figure 1 shows Bitly statistics for the shortened URL used in this campaign | ['T1218.011'] |
After the exploit succeeds, this Fallout Exploit Kit downloads a “.tmp” file to the %Temp% directory and calls CreateProcess to execute it. Further analysis revealed that the “.tmp” file was the latest variant of Azorult malware. It was the first time we’ve seen the new variant of Azorult malware used as primary payload for Fallout Exploit Kit | ['T1105'] |
In at least one engagement, we observed Blue Mockingbird seemingly experimenting with different tools to create SOCKS proxies (T1090: Proxy) for pivoting. These tools included a fast reverse proxy (frp), Secure Socket Funneling (SSF), and Venom. In one instance, the adversary also tinkered with PowerShell reverse TCP shells and a reverse shell in DLL form (T1059.001: PowerShell | ['T1059.001'] |
When initially executed, the malware will check its current working directory. Should it not match the expected path, Cardinal will enter its installation routine. Cardinal RAT will copy itself to a randomly named executable in the specified directory. It will then compile and execute embedded source code that contains watchdog functionality. Specifically, this newly spawned executable will ensure that the following registry key is set | ['T1027.004', 'T1012', 'T1083'] |
A custom executable that only contains the Metasploit shellcode. It is saved to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msupdateconf.exe, granting the executable persistence. Another custom executable used to execute PowerShell scripts. The Mosquito JScript backdoor that uses Google Apps Script as its C&C server. Privilege escalation using the Metasploit module ext_server_priv.x86.dll [8 | ['T1547.001'] |
It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. That malicious dll then loads encrypted shellcode from the binary, which is decrypted and runs the final BUGJUICE payload. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. Persistence is maintained through a Run registry key. The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past | ['T1574.001'] |
The ransomware also stops security software-related processes to evade detection and termination of its malicious activities | ['T1518.001', 'T1562.001'] |
Later, the attackers are observed executing an HTA file hosted on a remote server by abusing mshta.exe via depended.exe. The Mshta utility can execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files and can be abused to bypass application control solutions. Since mshta.exe executes outside of Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings | ['T1218.005'] |
APT40 uses a variety of malware and tools to establish a foothold, many of which are either publicly available or used by other threat groups. In some cases, the group has used executables with code signing certificates to avoid detection | ['T1553.002'] |
Temporary audio and video files are stored within the audio and video sub-folders respectively. After a call is finished, this data is compressed and encrypted using the same techniques previously witnessed. These files are stored in randomly named .dat files within the Skype folder | ['T1123', 'T1125'] |
During the investigation we discovered that the Responder tool was executed from one of the victim machines that had received the spear-phishing document. One day after the initial infection, the malware operator placed the tool onto this host and executed it using the following command | ['T1204.002'] |
The attackers used the famous Mimikatz credential dumping tool as their main tool to obtain credentials including user passwords, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets. Mimikatz is a very popular tool and is detected by most antivirus vendors and other security products. Therefore, the attackers used over 10 different customized Mimikatz payloads, which were obfuscated and packed in a way that allowed them to evade antivirus detection | ['T1588.002'] |
Editor’s note: Following publication of this blog, it came to our attention that AhnLab encountered what appears to be an earlier version of SDBbot, described in their recent Q3 ASEC Report as a “malicious SDB file. AhnLab describes delivery of the malware in South Korean campaigns as a secondary payload to the FlawedAmmyy RAT. TA505 has been active in South Korea in 2019 and frequently distributes the FlawedAmmyy RAT, but we cannot verify the connection at this time | ['T1204.002'] |
This DLL is used for decrypting and executing another JavaScript backdoor such as Orz. The DLL is registered by the installer using regsvr32. If the string “DR” is passed as an argument, or if the DLL is running in the active session with a username that is not “system”, the final JavaScript backdoor is decoded using a custom base64 alphabet. This backdoor has to be present in the same directory as the dll, with a “.tmp” file extension. The backdoor script is then executed using the IActiveScript and IActiveScriptParse32 COM interfaces | ['T1140'] |
The ‘vac.dll’ DLL file is signed with a valid, legitimate digital signature, although the file has been tampered with. At first glance, the fact that its digital signature is valid would suggest the file has not been manipulated after being digitally signed | ['T1553.002'] |
Ultimately, the XLS writes two files to disk, one of which -- the BAT -- immediately modifies some system settings and creates two scheduled tasks. However, this behaviour may not be enough to determine the components as malicious. Only after 20 minutes will the task scheduler execute the VBS downloader component and launch the BackConfig loader EXE, by which time analysis systems may have stopped monitoring | ['T1053.005'] |
CTU researchers have observed BRONZE PRESIDENT targeting multiple NGOs. The threat actors steal data from compromised systems over a long period of time, which likely indicates a long-term objective of monitoring the target's network. BRONZE PRESIDENT uses custom batch scripts to collect either specific file types (including files with .pptx, .xlsx, .pdf extensions) or all files within a specific location. CTU researchers also observed evidence that the threat actors collect credentials from high-privilege network accounts and reputationally sensitive accounts, such as social media and webmail accounts | ['T1119'] |
The malware calls User32.dll's GetKeyboardLayoutList function, inspects the keyboard identifier, and returns true if the result ends in a value between \x18 thru \x44 inclusive. This result means the compromised host is whitelisted based on the host's configured keyboard layout. The malware inspects only the lower byte of the full keyboard identifier, so all systems using the keyboard locales listed in Table 4 are immune to REvil. Despite the large number of potential matches, CTU researchers suspect that the malware author intended to identify Russian keyboards based on several other links to the Russia-based GandCrab ransomware | ['T1082'] |
The malware checks the language of the machine with function “GetUserDefaultUILanguage” and saves the value in the stack; it is not checked automatically after the call, but it is important later | ['T1614.001'] |
Next, it checks the running processes against a list of hard-coded process names; if any are found, the machine is forcefully rebooted. The names are linked to various tools used by malware researchers | ['T1057', 'T1518.001'] |
In the obfuscated and packed version of the loader, an uncommon API call is used to facilitate code injection. As seen in the image below, the loader uses VirtualAllocExNuma to allocate new memory and store the returned base address. The beginning of an obfuscated shellcode is copied to this address after being decrypted using an RC4 algorithm.In addition to the shellcode an additional PE can be seen in memory | ['T1106'] |
The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what | ['T1053.005'] |
After executing the sample, we noticed the sample copied itself to a hidden folder and launched from the hidden folder. This is a good first step to hide itself from casual observation on disk | ['T1564.001'] |
Qakbot has anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine checks. It will not continue to execute if any of the following exists in the system | ['T1497.001'] |
Unlike recent variants of Mirai and Gafgyt that target vulnerable Linux systems via randomly generated IP addresses, Xbash also scans and trawls through domain names. Hadoop’s unauthenticated command execution flaw discovered in October 2016, as well as the Redis arbitrary and remote command execution vulnerability disclosed in October 2015, have yet to be assigned CVE numbers. Based on the active C&C traffic, it scans and probes for open TCP or UDP ports such as HTTP, VNC, MySQL/MariaDB, Telnet, FTP, MongoDB, RDP, ElasticSearch, Oracle Database, CouchDB, Rlogin and PostgreSQL. While the malware uses a weak username and password dictionary to brute force itself into the service, it is also able to update its set from the C&C server, delete all the databases, and display the ransom message | ['T1110.001'] |
BITSAdmin tool - Win32 apps BITSAdmin is a command-line tool that you can use to create download or upload jobs and monitor their progress. Using BITS - Win32 apps Using BITS - bitsadmin examples Examples showing how to use the bitsadmin tool to perform the most common tasks. Background Intelligent Transfer Service - Win32 apps Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) transfers files (downloads or uploads) between a client and server and provides progress information related to the transfers. cleanmgr Configure the Disk Cleanup tool (Cleanmgr.exe) to automatically clean up certain files. bitsadmin Reference article for the bitsadmin command, which is a command-line tool used to create, download, or upload jobs and monitor their progress | ['T1570'] |
Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. In the first scenario, Talos discovered a document named "MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx", that appeared to display the national flag of Jordan. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine | ['T1053.005'] |
After this it will destroy all shadow volumes of the victim machine and disable the protection of the recovery boot with this command | ['T1490'] |
The command in Figure 8 downloads and launches code within an SCT file. The SCT file in the payload (MD5: 1554d6fe12830ae57284b389a1132d65) contained the code shown in Figure 9 | ['T1059'] |
Steals Google Chrome and Apple Safari browser cookies from the victim’s machine - Steals saved usernames and passwords in Chrome - Steals saved credit card credentials in Chrome - Steals iPhone’s text messages if backed up to Mac - Steals cryptocurrency wallet data and keys - Keeps full control of the victim using the EmPyre backdoor - Mines cryptocurrency on the victim’s machine | ['T1555.003'] |
Look for traffic to any of the related malicious domains identified in Appendix A. Use the signatures provided by FireEye to identify related activity. Make sure all credentials in an organization, including service accounts, are reset following a breach and that default passwords or those similar to previous passwords are not used. If you run an on-premise Exchange environment, consider adding alerting mechanisms to any EDR solutions for processes using the Exchange Management Shell PowerShell cmdlets listed in Appendix B. This may or may not be a valid detection approach depending on how frequently this is used within your organization. More generally, if the Exchange Management Shell is rarely used in a legitimate Administrative context, it may be worth investigating any historical use of this shell | ['T1482'] |
Config.json" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as [email protected]. Lowerv2.sh" and "rootv2.sh" are similar shell scripts that attempt to download and execute the mining malware components "bashf" and "bashg," hosted on 118[.]24[.]150[.]172. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called "XbashY" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. R88.sh" is a shell script that installs a cron job and attempts to download "lowerv2.sh" or "rootv2.sh. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. Advertising for the miner promotes it as offering startup registry key persistence, mining only while idle, and the ability to inject the miner into "Windows processes to bypass firewalls. The sample grabs the config file "xmr.txt," which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. Intriguingly, this file appears to share some similarities with Cobalt Strike, the popular penetration testing software, which would allow the attacker to have greater control over the infected system. Both Iron and Rocke's malware behave similarly, and reach out to similar infrastructure | ['T1059.004'] |
It uses the Windows service “winmgmts:\\.\root\SecurityCenter2 ” to check all AntiVirus products installed on the operating system. As shown below in the figure, it is done by creating the object the service “ winmgmts:\\.\root\SecurityCenter2 ” and executes the query “ Select * From AntiVirusProduct ” by using the same object that is created of a mentioned service | ['T1518.001'] |
Flagpro v2.0 has another new function. If a dialog title is “Internet Explorer [7-11]” (the number after “Internet Explorer” depends on what version the user users) when Flagpro accesses to an external site, Flagpro sends WM_CLOSE message to close the dialog | ['T1070'] |
The file destruction algorithm is composed of two stages: a first stage to overwrite files and another to destroy the physical disk layout and the partition tables along with it. For the file destruction, it takes ownership of the files by modifying their ACL entries after it has obtained the 'SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'. A file found will then simply be overwritten with zeros. This is done for the next 23 drives alphabetically (through "Z:\"). On the second stage, the wiper attempts to set the drive layout of all the physical drives on the system numbered 9 to 0. This will wipe out all extended information about the physical drive's partitions including MBR, GPT and partition entries. Destroying the start of the files and the partitions tables is a common technique seen on other wipers, and its highly effective in preventing the file recovery | ['T1561.002'] |
BEACON payloads have commonly been executed after moving laterally to new hosts within the victim network. The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. In at least once case, attackers have maintained access to a victim environment using stolen credentials to access corporate VPN infrastructure configured to require only single-factor authentication | ['T1133'] |
This second request (Encoded Get System Information Request) is encoded using the same method as the custom TCP protocol used for communication with command-and-control servers, which uses a four-byte XOR encoding. Before acting on the request, Winnti will validate the third DWORD contains the magic value 0xABC18CBA before executing tasking | ['T1573.001', 'T1205'] |
an executable (also compressed, i.e. zip, rar or cab archive), sometimes pretending to be a different file format, like Dyreza - a document (commonly PDF or some MS Office format ) – like this Dridex downloader | ['T1204.002'] |
After “GetExtendedTcpTable” is executed and the process returns back to the second part of the code, it iteratively checks every record in the returned Tcp table. If any record contains the PID Waterbear wants to hide, it will remove the corresponding record, modify the record number inside the table, and continue to check the succeeding records | ['T1562.006'] |
The function will then download an encrypted file containing the final payload used in the campaign. The file is encrypted with a custom XOR-based algorithm, with the key 0x0AE2. In the latest versions, the authors moved from encryption to using a base64-encoded ZIP file | ['T1027'] |
When the persistence operation finishes, the loader deletes itself by writing a batch file in the Windows temporary folder with the file name prefix ‘tmp’ followed by random digits. The batch file content | ['T1070.004'] |
We also observed a third approach used by a malicious document file to deliver Hancitor. Although the threat actor and command and control servers are similar to the second Hancitor delivery approach, this one uses an alternate tactic to reach its goal of data theft | ['T1027'] |
As we mentioned, the Bad Rabbit ransomware encrypts a victim’s files and disk. Files are encrypted with the following algorithms | ['T1486'] |
If opened, the dropper runs a loader known as Trojan.Vcrodat on the computer. Whitefly has consistently used a technique known as search order hijacking to run Vcrodat. If no path is provided, Windows searches for the DLL in specific locations on the computer in a pre-defined order. Attackers can therefore give a malicious DLL the same name as a legitimate DLL but place it ahead of the legitimate version in the search order so that it will be loaded when Windows searches for it. Whitefly frequently delivers Vcrodat as a malicious DLL that has the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors. The group leverages search order hijacking to assure that its malicious DLLs will be executed. Targeting security applications could allow the attackers to gain higher privileges for the malware, since the vendor’s component may be run with elevated privileges | ['T1574.001'] |
This turned out to be the best solution, as the Cobalt group set up a controlled botnet in the bank's network which was very difficult to track and even harder to stop. In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Initially the Cobalt group focused on jackpotting ATMs: they launched a program that sent commands directly to the dispenser to issue cash. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. 6 Example of a message sent by attackers from a domain whose name is similar to the name of a real domain . As soon as the attachment is launched and the malicious code is executed, the Cobalt Strike payload is loaded in the memory. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. The goal is to set the startup path to the executable file or program code, launching it with the powershell.exe shell command to access the Internet resource specified in the code in order to download and install Cobalt Strike module. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed | ['T1059.003'] |
2) The directory “out” is created in the user’s %AppData% folder. 5) The screenshot is then copied over to the newly created “out” directory of the system where the batch script was executed. 6) In one instance, DHS observed an “out.zip” file created | ['T1074.001'] |
Similar to many other ransomware operators, CARBON SPIDER not only encrypted victim files using Darkside, but also exfiltrated data for publication on a dedicated leak site (DLS) hosted on Tor. Further, CARBON SPIDER frequently conducted hypervisor jackpotting by encrypting ESXi servers using a version of Darkside specifically designed for ESXi | ['T1486'] |
MESSAGETAP is a 64-bit ELF data miner initially loaded by an installation script. Once installed, the malware checks for the existence of two files: keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt and attempts to read the configuration files every 30 seconds | ['T1070.004'] |
OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents | ['T1027.002'] |
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