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Although it was unclear exactly how long the meeting lasted, the witnesses said it lasted between two and four hours.
In interviews with the OIG, the attendees said they did not recall the specifics of what was discussed at the meeting.
The only contemporaneous notes from the meeting that we were able to obtain were Donna�s.
Her notes indicate that the latest developments in the Cole investigation were discussed.
The second page of the notes is labeled �to do� and referenced several items.
Randall said he recalled that at the beginning of the meeting, Scott gave an update of the results and status of the investigation.
Mary said she recalled that the attendees �brainstormed� various issues, but she did not recall any significant ideas being developed during the meeting.
Peter said he recalled that the New York agents �railed� about the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and the lack of cooperation they believed they were receiving from the Yemeni government.
At some point during the meeting, AUSA Kelley discussed the feasibility of prosecution in the Cole case.
Toward the end of the meeting, Donna produced the three Kuala Lumpur surveillance photographs and asked the agents if they recognized Quso in any of the photographs.
Donna said she told the agents that the photographs had been taken in Malaysia around the Millennium.
Donna said she provided Khalid al Mihdhar�s name to at least some of the agents present.
[INFORMATION REDACTED]161 The witnesses� accounts of what happened next differ.
Scott told the OIG that after reviewing the Kuala Lumpur photographs, the FBI agents began to ask questions, such as whether there were additional photographs or information concerning the background on the photographs, including questions about Mihdhar, who was in the photographs.
According to Scott, he pressed Donna and Peter for details of the Malaysia meetings.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Scott contended that Donna �refused� to provide any further information about the photographs or the Malaysia meetings due to �the wall.� Scott told the OIG that he previously had numerous conversations about the wall with Donna, which had been an issue between them.
He stated that during this June 11 meeting, he disputed that the wall was applicable to the information at hand because the photographs had not been obtained as the result of a FISA Court order, and he continued to press Donna for more information.
Scott said the meeting degenerated into an argument about the wall.
In his initial OIG interview, Scott described the meeting as very contentious and combative.162 In a second OIG interview, although Scott did not characterize the meeting as having the same level of combativeness, he contended that he pressed Donna for more information but none was forthcoming.
Scott stated he had heated telephone conversations and e mail exchanges with Donna over this issue after the June 11 meeting.
Donna, Mary, and Peter described the showing of the Kuala Lumpur photographs as a sidebar to the main meeting and generally inconsequential.
All three asserted that neither the display of the surveillance photographs nor the meeting overall was contentious.
Although Donna agreed that the FBI agents asked further questions regarding the origin of the photographs and asked for additional information regarding the Malaysia meetings, she contended that she responded simply by saying she did not know anything further.
She told the OIG that these questions made sense to her when they were asked, but she did not know the answers.
She stated that someone asked what kind of passport Mihdhar was traveling on, and Peter responded that it was a Saudi passport.163 According to Donna, she had not known this information prior to Peter stating it.
Donna told us that this was the only information volunteered by Peter, and she believed he would have provided additional information if he knew it.
Peter told the OIG that he was not asked any questions at the June 11 meeting, he had no formal role, and he did not brief anyone on anything at the June 11 meeting.
Peter explained that it is not within his purview or authority as an analyst to share CIA information.
He said he did not recall the meeting becoming heated or contentious.
He said he did not recall any time during the meeting where Donna said, �I can�t answer that question� or directly refused to answer a question.164 Mary stated that she had not been �up to speed� on the case at this time, so she was not in a position to provide information at the meeting.
She stated that she and Peter were not asked any questions during the meeting.
She said that she did not recall any serious disagreements arising during the meeting.
According to Donna, she remained in New York after the meeting, without Peter and Mary, and she continued the discussions with the New York agents regarding the photographs after the meeting.
She said that these subsequent conversations became fairly �heated,� as the agents pressed her with questions such as whether there were additional photographs and any documentation about the photographs.165 Donna told the OIG she had provided to the agents all the information she had received from the CIA regarding the photographs.
She told us that all she knew was that these three photographs were taken in Malaysia around the Millennium, and one of the persons in the photographs was someone named Khalid al Mihdhar.
Donna stated she advised the agents of this and told them that efforts would be made to obtain the requested information.
She said she was not aware that there would have been additional information to provide.
She added that she recalled having the impression that the agents did not believe her when she said that she did not have the information about the photographs that the agents were requesting.
As discussed earlier, however, Donna had additional NSA information about Mihdhar that she had discovered through her CTLink query.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Donna told us that she could not provide this information directly to the agents working the Cole criminal investigation due to the caveat, which prevented all NSA counterterrorism-related intelligence information from being provided to FBI criminal agents without approval from the NSA.166 Donna told us that the New York FBI primarily worked criminal terrorism investigations and the sharing of intelligence information with the criminal agents was often an issue.
She said that some of the New York agents had become �overly sensitive� about a perceived lack of information sharing.
Donna emphasized that any information could be shared but often a process had to be followed before certain intelligence information could be shared with agents working criminal investigations.
She added that it was not her job to keep information from the agents but instead to ensure they had the tools necessary to do their job.
According to Donna, the only issue regarding the [INFORMATION REDACTED] photographs would have been obtaining permission from the CIA to allow individuals outside of the FBI to see the photographs in furtherance of the Cole investigation, such as in interviews conducted in Yemen.167 Donna said at some point while she was in New York, she and the agents discussed providing the photographs to the agents working in Yemen in order to get a positive identification of Quso in the photographs and to conduct further investigation.168 She stated that she told the agents that she would attempt to obtain the requisite permission to provide the photographs to the agents working the Cole investigation in Yemen.
Although she had no explicit discussion with John regarding the use of the photographs, Donna stated she understood that the photographs were �not formally passed� to the FBI when John gave them to her, but only provided for limited use in the meeting.
Therefore, Donna said she did not believe that she could leave the photographs with the New York agents until the requisite permission to show the photographs outside of the FBI had been obtained.
However, John told the OIG that that since the photographs had been given to Donna, an FBI employee, they could be further distributed within the FBI.
John agreed that the photographs could not be used by the FBI in any manner where they would be disclosed to a foreign government.
For example, he said that without approval from the CIA, the FBI agents could not keep the photographs and show them to Quso, who was in Yemeni custody, because Yemeni officials also would see the photographs.
Follow-up after the June 11 meeting We looked for evidence as to whether Donna or the New York agents conducted any follow-up efforts about the [INFORMATION REDACTED] photographs or obtaining permission from the NSA to pass the intelligence information to the New York agents.
Donna said that she �probably� had follow-up conversations with John, Peter, and Mary about the photographs, but she did not specifically recall the conversations or obtaining additional information.
Mary told the OIG that she recalled conversations with Donna about obtaining permission for the FBI to use the photographs of the Malaysia meetings in their investigation.
Donna stated she was not contacted by Scott after the meeting, although she was working with another agent on the squad, who we call �Glenn,� in connection with tracking telephone toll records.
Those records related to the Cole participants, the travel of Quso to Bangkok, and Quso�s potential travel to [INFORMATION REDACTED].
According to Scott, over the course of the summer, he had several more conversations with FBI Headquarters asking about any additional information on the [INFORMATION REDACTED], but he was not provided any additional information.
He stated that he did not seek assistance from any supervisor in obtaining additional information.
He told us that he and the rest of the New York Field Office had been fighting a battle with FBI Headquarters over information sharing for months, and he was �dumbfounded� that he could not obtain the information about the [INFORMATION REDACTED].
He stated that in hindsight he probably should have sought the intervention of a supervisor.
Documentary evidence shows that, as a result of the June 11 meeting, Donna and the New York agents discussed the [INFORMATION REDACTED] in several follow-up conversations.
In an e-mail dated August 22 from Donna to Glenn, she wrote that there were additional photographs of the Malaysia meetings and that the reason that Mihdhar was of interest at the time was because of some threat information that led to the CIA looking at all persons named �Khalid.� In addition, she wrote that she had received assurances that the FBI would be able to use the [INFORMATION REDACTED] outside the FBI.
We discuss this e-mail in further detail in the next section.
Documents also show that on August 27 Donna requested permission from the NSA to provide the intelligence information about Mihdhar to the New York Cole criminal agents.
However, this request came after the FBI had discovered on August 22 that Mihdhar might be in the United States and had opened an investigation to determine whether he was in the country.
We discuss the events that led to that investigation and the investigative efforts of the FBI in the next section of the report.
OIG conclusions on May and June discussions While there were several interactions between FBI and CIA personnel in May and June 2001 that could have resulted in the FBI learning more about the [INFORMATION REDACTED] and Mihdhar, the FBI personnel did not become aware of significant intelligence information about Mihdhar and [INFORMATION REDACTED].
The fact that Mihdhar had possessed a United States visa was not disclosed at this time by the CIA to Donna or the FBI.
The fact that Hazmi had been at the Malaysia meeting and then traveled to Los Angeles also was not disclosed by the CIA.
In addition, the fact that the source had identified Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole bombing, from the [INFORMATION REDACTED] was not disclosed during these interactions.
Although Donna knew about the [INFORMATION REDACTED], we do not believe that she was informed that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa or that [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Donna�s contemporaneous notes on the back of the [INFORMATION REDACTED] reflect the limited information that she had obtained about the photographs and the Malaysia meetings.
The notes do not mention anything about Mihdhar�s possession of a U.S. visa.
In addition, Donna stated that she was aware of the significance of Khallad to the Cole investigation, but the notes on the photographs also do not mention Khallad.
Moreover, John, who provided the photographs to Donna, told the OIG he did not recall discussing the [INFORMATION REDACTED] with her, and he did not believe that he would have discussed with Donna that [INFORMATION REDACTED], because at the time he was not sure that this was true and he thought the information was �speculative.� Although an e mail message indicated that Peter was planning to discuss the Khallad identification with Donna in a meeting on May 29, we were unable to determine that this meeting actually occurred.
It was impossible for us to determine exactly what happened at the June 11 meeting with respect to the [INFORMATION REDACTED] because the witnesses cannot recall the specifics of the discussions and there is little documentary evidence.
It is clear, however, that the information regarding Mihdhar�s U.S. visa and the fact that [INFORMATION REDACTED] was not discussed at the June 11 meeting.
Donna told the agents about the photographs and provided them limited information that she had obtained from the CIA about the photographs.
Most of the questioning about the photographs took place after the meeting, when Peter and Mary had left.
We believe those interactions after the meeting became very contentious, with the New York FBI wanting more information.
Donna did not provide the New York agents with the NSA intelligence information about the Mihdhar�s [INFORMATION REDACTED], which she obtained through her research.
She said she did not because of the restrictions placed on sharing such NSA information.
As we discuss further in the next section, Donna subsequently contacted the NSA in reference to having the NSA information passed to the agents, but this did not occur until much later, on August 27, 2001.
We found little attempt by either the FBI agents or Donna after June 11 to follow up on the information about the photographs that was discussed at the meeting.
There is little evidence of follow-up until some time in August 2001, when, as we discuss in the next section, the FBI learned that Mihdhar had recently entered the United States, and the FBI opened an investigation to locate him.
The interaction between the CIA and the FBI in May and June 2001 was another failed opportunity for the FBI to obtain the critical information about Mihdhar and Khallad.
The failure of the FBI to learn about Mihdhar, [INFORMATION REDACTED], and his travel to the United States at that time demonstrated significant problems in the flow of information between the CIA and the FBI.
We discuss these deficiencies in the analysis section of this chapter.
The FBI�s efforts to locate Mihdhar in August and September 2001 The fifth and final opportunity for the FBI to locate Mihdhar and Hazmi occurred in late August 2001, when it was informed that Mihdhar and Hazmi had traveled to the United States.
The FBI learned in August 2001 that Mihdhar had entered the United States in July 2001 and that Mihdhar and Hazmi had previously traveled together to the United States in January 2000.
On August 29, the FBI began an investigation to locate Mihdhar, but it did not assign great urgency or priority to the investigation.
The New York FBI criminal agents who wanted to participate in the investigation were specifically prohibited from doing so because of concerns about the wall and the procedures to keep criminal and intelligence investigations separate.
The FBI did not locate Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks.
We review the facts surrounding the FBI�s discovery of this information about Mihdhar and Hazmi and what the FBI did with this information in August.
We also examine the FBI�s unsuccessful efforts to locate Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks.
Continuing review of the Malaysia meetings in July and August 2001 As discussed above, John, the CIA Bin Laden Unit Deputy Chief, was detailed to the FBI�s ITOS in May 2001.
Shortly before assuming his duties at the FBI, John had asked CTC management to assign a CTC desk officer with �getting up to speed� on the Malaysia meetings and determining any potential [INFORMATION REDACTED].
This assignment was given to Mary.
She told the OIG that �getting up to speed� meant she would have to research and read the pertinent cable traffic as her schedule permitted.
She emphasized that her priority assignment during this period was the credible threats of an imminent attack on U.S. personnel in Yemen, and she said that she worked the Malaysia meetings connections to the Cole attack whenever she had an opportunity.
In early July 2001, based on recent intelligence information, the CIA had concerns about the possibility of a terrorist attack in Southeast Asia.
On July 5, 2001, John sent an e-mail to managers at the CTC�s Bin Laden Unit noting �how bad things look in Malaysia.� He wrote that there was a potential connection between the recent threat information and information developed about the [INFORMATION REDACTED].