Datasets:
shivendrra
/
consolidated-datasets

Dataset card Data Studio Files Community
1
text
stringlengths
0
82.7M
After the attack on October 12, the Yemenis provided the FBI and the CIA with information on the Bin Laden operative known as �Khallad.� According to this information, Khallad had been described as the purported mastermind of the Cole attack.
U.S. intelligence agencies had already connected Khallad to the East African embassy bombings.
The Yemenis also identified �Khallad� as Tawfiq Muhammad Salih Bin Rashid al Atash.
On November 22, 2000, the Yeminis provided the FBI with a photograph of Khallad (�the Yemeni-provided photograph�).
Around this same time, the Yemenis provided the FBI with several photographs of other Cole suspects.
The New York FBI agents investigating the Cole bombing wanted to determine whether the Khallad identified by the Yemenis was the same Khallad who had been previously described by the source.
At the same time, a CIA internal cable to was sent to several CIA offices suggesting that the photographs of the Cole suspects that the FBI had obtained from the Yemenis, including the Khallad photograph, be shown to the source.
Because the FBI did not have the technological capability to easily transmit the Khallad photograph from Yemen to the ALAT who was handling the source and who we call Max, the photograph was forwarded through CIA channels to the nearby CIA office in order to show the photograph to the source.140 CIA documents show that on December 16, 2000, the CIA officer conducted a debriefing of the source.
Max was present for the debriefing.141 During the debriefing, the CIA case officer showed the source many photos of Cole bombing suspects and other suspected Arab terrorists, including the Yemeni-provided photograph of Khallad.
The source immediately identified the individual in the Yemeni-provided photograph as the same Khallad he had previously described as a trusted senior Bin Laden operative with potential connections to the East African embassy bombings.
The CIA officer prepared a cable documenting the debriefing, which was addressed to several CIA offices.
The CIA officer wrote in the cable that the source was shown the many photographs and �quickly� identified Khallad in the Yemeni-provided photograph.
Notably, the CIA cable stated that the CIA officer had the source repeat the identification specifically for the benefit of Max.
In addition, the cable stated that before the debriefing ended, the CIA officer again showed the photographs to the source and asked the source to verify the Khallad identification.
Max acknowledged to the OIG that he was contemporaneously aware of the identification of Khallad in the Yemeni-provided photograph by the source on December 16.
Max stated that he recalled specific circumstances of the debriefing and recounted them to us.
Max told us that he recalled the source immediately identifying Khallad in the photograph.
CIA suspects that Khallad may be Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur surveillance photographs Around this same time, CIA personnel were beginning to connect Khallad with Mihdhar [INFORMATION REDACTED].
In a December 2000 cable, CIA personnel overseas asked for copies of the January 2000 Kuala Lumpur surveillance photographs of Mihdhar.
The cable noted that further connections had been made between Mihdhar and Al Qaeda.
As a result of these further connections, the CIA believed there might be a connection between Mihdhar and the Cole perpetrators.
The CIA office reported in the December 2000 cable that the it had learned that Fahd al Quso, who was in Yemeni custody for his participation in the Cole attack, had received $7,000 from someone named Ibrahim, which Quso had taken to Bangkok, Thailand, on January 6, 2000, to deliver to �Khallad,� a friend of Ibrahim�s.
It was noted in the cable that because Mihdhar had departed Kuala Lumpur around that same time to travel to Bangkok, the CIA suspected that the �Khallad� mentioned by Quso could actually be Khalid al Mihdhar or one of his associates.142 It was noted further that this information had �added significance� because Khallad had been identified as a �key operative likely serving as an intermediary between Usama Bin Laden and the [Cole] perpetrators.� In another December 2000, cable the CTC concurred with the overseas CIA office�s theory and forwarded a Kuala Lumpur surveillance photo of Mihdhar to the CIA case officer to show to the source.
According to the cable, the purpose was �to confirm/rule out this particular Khalid [Mihdhar] as a match for [Khallad].�143 The next day, the CIA officer received permission to show the Kuala Lumpur surveillance photographs to the source.
Max told the OIG, however, that he was not aware of the CIA cables or the theory that Khallad was actually Mihdhar.
We found no other evidence that Max knew about the information that Mihdhar was at the Malaysia meetings, or the CIA�s theory that Khallad was actually Mihdhar.144 Source identifies Khallad from Kuala Lumpur photograph The CIA case officer debriefed the source again in early January 2001.
At some point, the CIA case officer showed the source photographs, including two of the surveillance photographs taken during the January 2000 Malaysia meetings.
One of the photographs from the Malaysia meetings, which we call �Photo No. 1� included an unknown subject.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] According to a January 2001, cable written by the CIA case officer, the source was asked if he was sure, and he replied that he was �ninety percent� certain.145 The second photograph from the Malaysia meetings, which we call �Photo No. 2,� contained a picture of the person the CIA knew to be Mihdhar.
The source could not identify the person in the photograph.146 [INFORMATION REDACTED] First, the source previously provided information that Khallad was a Bin Laden operative who was connected to the Cole attack and the East African embassy bombings.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Thus, the source�s identification of Khallad at the Malaysia meetings raised the question whether Mihdhar and Hazmi also were linked to the Cole attack.
We tried to determine if the FBI�s ALAT learned of the source�s identification of Khallad in the photograph.
Max told the OIG that he did not specifically recall the early January 2001 debriefing of the source.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] The CIA case officer told the OIG that he had no independent recollection of any particular meeting with the source, including the meeting in early January 2001.
Documentation regarding the source�s identification of Khallad in the early January 2001 debriefing (1) CIA cables To examine whether the FBI learned of the source�s identification of [INFORMATION REDACTED], we reviewed the CIA documentation concerning the meeting with the source in early January 2001.
In an internal cable written the day after the debriefing, the CIA case officer reported that the source had identified [INFORMATION REDACTED] with a �ninety percent� certainty.
However, unlike in the December 2000 CIA cable, which stated that the CIA officer had the source repeat the identification of Khallad in the Yemeni-provided photograph to Max, the January 2001 cable did not suggest the identification was repeated for Max or was brought to the attention of Max.
The January 2001 cable did not provide any other details about the debriefing, such as where the meeting took place, when exactly during the debriefing the photographs were shown to the source, who was present when the photographs were shown to the source, or what other topics were discussed with the source.
We also reviewed a detailed January 2001 CIA TD to the Intelligence Community regarding the early January 2001 debriefing.
The TD reported specifics about what the source discussed and that he had provided a stack of documents to his CIA and FBI handlers.
The TD made no mention of any photographs being shown to the source [INFORMATION REDACTED].147 A few days later, the CIA case officer wrote another cable describing the logistics of the early January 2001 meeting with the source.
In addition, the cable summarized what was discussed during the meeting.
This cable also did not mention the photographs being shown to or discussed with the source, but the CIA case officer told the OIG that these kinds of cables were not always comprehensive with respect to the information obtained from the source.
(2) FBI documents We also reviewed FBI documents from this period relating to the source.
On January 9, 2001, a New York FBI agent who was the FBI�s lead case agent on the Cole investigation sent Max an e-mail stating that he and his co-case agent wanted to meet with the source to talk about some of the Cole suspects, including Khallad.
The New York agent wrote that he was �specially [sic] interested in all [the source] knows about Khallad and his associates.� The agent noted that the source previously had given the agents important information regarding Khallad and the Cole attack.
In a January 10 e-mail response, Max referred to the December 16 meeting with the source in which the source had been shown many photographs and had immediately identified the Yemeni-provided photograph as Khallad.
Max also mentioned the early January 2001 meeting, summarizing specific information provided by the source in the debriefing.
Max wrote that, due to the lack of technological capabilities in the Legat Office, he promised to make the CIA TD numbers relating to the source available to the case agent within a few days so the agent could read them before his trip to interview the source.
However, Max made no mention of any identification of photographs by the source in the early January 2001 debriefing.
Around the same time as this e-mail exchange, Max was criticized by the head of the FBI�s UBL Unit at Headquarters for insufficient reporting regarding the source�s information.
The UBL Unit chief wanted to know from Max what information the source was providing.
She also was concerned because Max was not producing any reports regarding the source.
In response, on January 16, 2001, Max wrote a 34-page EC summarizing the source�s debriefings and other information obtained from the source since mid-2000, most of which was based on the information that had been disseminated in the TDs by the CIA.
Max explained in the EC that he merely was repeating what the CIA had previously reported in TDs, which had already been forwarded to FBI Headquarters.
He noted the agreement with the CIA that there would not be duplicative reporting on the source�s information.
He explained the CIA was doing the primary reporting on the source debriefings Max noted that the interview was conducted in the foreign language, and he would read the CIA�s report of the interview (the TD) once it was completed.
Max then listed all of the CIA�s TDs that summarized what the source had said.
On page 29 of this January 16 EC, Max summarized the CIA�s reporting of what had occurred at the December 16, 2000, meeting with the source.
The EC stated the source was handed a stack of many photographs and immediately identified the top photograph as a photograph of Khallad, the person the source had previously implicated in the attack on the Cole.
The EC stated, �At that time it was the clear impression of [the Legat] and [the CIA officer] that both FBIHQ CTD and NYO were receiving all of the reporting above from CIA liaison in the U.S., as soon as it was being filed.� In the next paragraph of the EC, Max summarized what the CIA had reported in the TD about the early January 2001 debriefing of the source.
This summary is contained on pages 29 through 33 of the EC.
Max reported at length about the source�s information, and the EC provided a lengthy description of the documents provided by the source.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Max discussed with the CIA case officer the complaint from FBI Headquarters about Max�s reporting on the source.
As a result, the CIA case officer provided Max with a report of the next debriefing of the source in late January 2001.
The day after this debriefing, Max prepared a lengthy EC summarizing this debriefing.
He noted in the EC that the report was based on the CIA�s report of an interview conducted by a CIA officer and, although Max was present for the debriefing, he only became aware of what was said after the CIA officer provided the report.148 New York FBI agents� interview of source on February 1, 2001 Around the same time, Max was preparing for the arrival of the Cole case agent from the FBI�s New York Field Office.
The Cole case agent was traveling to interview the source about Khallad, along with another FBI agent who spoke one of the languages of the source and was going to assist in the preparation of the FD-302 for the criminal investigation.
Max had received a January 17 e-mail from one of the Cole agents stating that the information being provided by the source was very important to the FBI�s criminal investigation of the Cole attack and discussing the arrangements for the upcoming interview of the source by the Cole agents.
The New York Cole agents also asked Max to prepare an FD-302 documenting Max�s personal knowledge of the source�s identification of Khallad from the Yemeni-provided photograph on December 16.
On January 24, 2001, Max sent an EC to the New York Field Office and FBI Headquarters with an attached FD-302 regarding the source�s December 16, 2000, identification of Khallad.
On February 1, 2001, the New York Cole case agent and another agent who spoke one of the source�s languages interviewed the source overseas.149 The CIA case officer who had shown the Kuala Lumpur photographs to the source in early January was also present at the interview.
During the interview, they showed the source the Yemeni-provided photograph of Khallad, which previously had been shown to the source by the CIA officer on December 16, 2000.
The source again identified Khallad in the photograph.
As discussed above, the agents had received information indicating that Quso, who was in custody for his participation in the Cole attack, had traveled to Bangkok and met Khallad in January 2000.
The New York agents were investigating the circumstances of that trip.
The agents knew that Quso previously had claimed that he had intended to meet Khallad in Malaysia.
The agents were concerned about Quso�s veracity and [INFORMATION REDACTED].
[INFORMATION REDACTED] OIG conclusions regarding whether the FBI was aware of the source�s identification of Khallad in the Kuala Lumpur photograph [INFORMATION REDACTED] Neither Max nor the CIA case officer specifically recalled the early January debriefing, but the documentary evidence supports this conclusion.
In numerous CIA and FBI documents discussing the source and the early January debriefing, other important information from the source is described, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Given the importance of that identification and the other details reported in the documents, we believe such information would have been included had the FBI been made aware of the identification.
For example, as described above, in the CIA case officer�s cable reporting the December 16 debriefing of the source during which the source had identified Khallad in the Yemeni photograph, the CIA officer specifically noted that ALAT heard the identification and that the identification was repeated for the benefit of him.
Max said he recalled this debriefing and the identification of Khallad being brought to his attention by the CIA case officer.
By contrast, in his cable reporting the early January source debriefing, the CIA case officer did not state that he brought to the attention of Max the identification of [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Likewise in his cable describing the logistics of the debriefing, the CIA case officer provided a description of what was discussed with the source and stated that Max was present for a significant portion of the meeting with the source, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
The documents prepared at the time by Max about the early January debriefing also suggest that Max was not aware of the identification of Khallad in the Kuala Lumpur photographs.
For example, in response to the Cole case agent�s January 9 e-mail specifically requesting �all [the source] knows about Khallad,� Max did not include any information about the Khallad identification from the Kuala Lumpur photographs.
This was shortly after the early January debriefing, and the case agent had specifically indicated his interest in any information about Khallad.
Max�s January 16 EC to FBI Headquarters in which he described at length what the source had reported in the early January meeting also did not mention the identification of Khallad or that any [INFORMATION REDACTED] were shown to the source.
In addition, Max prepared an FD-302 to document the source�s identification of Khallad from the Yemeni photograph to provide documentation for the criminal investigation.
We believe that if Max had known of the source�s identification of [INFORMATION REDACTED], he likely would have prepared a similar FD-302 of that identification as well.
We also found that the New York Field Office agents who interviewed the source overseas in February 2001 were not made aware of the early January identification of Khallad.
The agents insisted that they were completely [INFORMATION REDACTED] other than the Yemeni-provided photograph.
In addition, we found no documentary evidence that the New York FBI agents were even aware [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Because the agents were keenly interested in Khallad and had asked the source to confirm his identification of Khallad from the Yemeni photograph, we believe the agents would have noted, remembered, and acted upon any information regarding another Khallad identification.
We also believe that had the FBI known about the identification of [INFORMATION REDACTED], which could have increased the FBI�s chances of locating them before the September 11 attacks.
Due to the OIG�s lack of complete access to CIA employees and documents, we were unable to fully examine why the CIA did not inform Max or the New York agents that the source had identified [INFORMATION REDACTED].
We believe the FBI should have been made aware that the joint FBI/CIA source had provided such significant information about the person purported to be the mastermind behind the Cole attack.
This failure demonstrated significant problems in communication between the FBI and the CIA.
However, the FBI employees� inaccurate belief that CIA reporting in TDs was comprehensive contributed to the FBI�s failure to obtain this critical piece of information.