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In addition, he noted that in January 2000 when Mihdhar was traveling to Malaysia, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Therefore, he recommended that the Cole and [INFORMATION REDACTED]be re-examined for potential connections to the current threat information involving [INFORMATION REDACTED].
He wrote, �I know your resources are strained, but if we can prevent something in SE Asia, this would seem to be a productive place to start.� He ended the e-mail by stating that �all the indicators are of a massively bad infrastructure being readily completed with just one purpose in mind.� On July 13, John wrote another e-mail to CTC managers stating that he had discovered the CIA cable relating to the source�s identification of [INFORMATION REDACTED].
John began the e-mail by announcing �OK.
This is important.� He then described Khallad as a �major league killer who orchestrated the Cole attack and possibly the Africa bombings.� The e-mail recommended revisiting the [INFORMATION REDACTED], especially in relation to any potential information on [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Significantly, John ended the e-mail asking, �can this [information] be sent via CIR to [the FBI]?� Despite John�s recommendation that this information be forwarded to the FBI in a CIR, we found no evidence indicating that the CIA provided this information to the FBI until August 30, 2001, which, as we describe below, was after the FBI learned about Mihdhar�s presence in the United States.
In a response e-mail dated July 13, 2001, a CTC Bin Laden Unit supervisor stated that Mary had been assigned to handle the request for additional information on the Malaysia meetings.
In addition, the e-mail stated that another FBI detailee to the CTC, Dwight, who was out of the office at the time, would be assigned to assist Mary upon his return.
Later in July, Mary drafted a cable to another CIA office requesting follow-up information about the Malaysia meetings.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] A week later, the CTC supervisor forwarded the cable to John for his review prior to release, and the cable was sent to the office to which it was addressed three days after that.
On the same day she drafted the cable referencing the source�s identification of Khallad, Mary located one of the CIA cables referencing Mihdhar�s possession of a U.S. visa.
On the same date, Mary also reviewed the CIA cable that stated this visa information had been passed to the FBI in January 2000.169 In early August, Mary and Donna continued to discuss the [INFORMATION REDACTED].
In an e-mail on August 7 from Donna to Mary, Donna requested a copy of the flight manifest for Mihdhar�s January 2000 trip to Malaysia in order to determine whether [INFORMATION REDACTED] had traveled with Mihdhar.
She also asked, �if we could get the pictures cleared to show [INFORMATION REDACTED].�170 She continued, �the reasoning behind this would be that first, we do not have a concensous [sic] that the individual with Midhar [sic] is in fact [INFORMATION REDACTED] .
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[second] to determine if [INFORMATION REDACTED] can identify Midher by an other [sic] name.� Donna then discussed her continuing efforts to track telephone number information developed in the investigation.
At the close of the e-mail, Donna wrote, �I plan to write something up, but perhaps we should schedule another sit down to compare notes on both sides.
Let me know.� In a response e-mail on the same date, Mary wrote, �okay, all sounds good.� Mary also wrote that she thought Donna had Mihdhar�s flight manifest because John had mentioned it, but Mary indicated she would find the manifest.
She wrote, �I think we will be able to clear the pictures, they are for passage to Quso, right?� Mary also asked whether the FBI would be able to meet with Quso again.
Mary ended the e-mail, �I think a sit down again would be great� and mentioned the potential logistics of arranging the meeting.
In another e-mail exchange on August 7, Donna thanked Mary and advised her that the FBI would again have access to Quso.
Donna continued by stating that the [INFORMATION REDACTED] also would be passed to a foreign government because Quso was currently in its custody.
She stated that John could call if he had any questions.
Donna tentatively scheduled a meeting with Mary at FBI Headquarters on August 15, 2001.
However, it appears that the meeting did not take place.171 Discovery of Mihdhar�s entry into the United States On August 21, Mary located the CIA cables referencing Hazmi�s travel to the United States on January 15, 2000.172 Mary checked with a U.S. Customs Service representative to the CTC about Hazmi�s and Mihdhar�s travel.
She discovered that Mihdhar had entered the United States on July 4, 2001, and had not departed.
In addition, she confirmed that Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000.
Mary immediately relayed to Donna in a voicemail message on August 21 that Mary had something important to discuss with her.
Donna was on annual leave on August 21.
Mary told the OIG she did not have an opportunity to focus on the Malaysia meetings until August, but upon discovering on August 21 that Hazmi had traveled to the United States �it [the importance of the information] all clicks for me.� On August 22, Mary met with Donna at FBI Headquarters and informed her of Mihdhar�s July 4 entry and Hazmi�s travel to the United States in March 2000.173 Donna verified in INS indices Mihdhar�s recent entry.
She also learned that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had entered the United States on January 15, 2000, and that they were allegedly destined for the Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles, California.
The INS records showed Mihdhar had departed the United States from Los Angeles on June 10, 2000, on Lufthansa Airlines.
No departure record could be located for Hazmi.
An INS representative advised Donna that departure information often was not captured in INS indices.
Therefore, she incorrectly surmised Hazmi had also departed on June 10, 2000.175 Further INS indices checks confirmed Mihdhar had re-entered the U.S. on July 4, 2001, at the JFK Airport in New York, allegedly destined for the �Marriott hotel� in New York City.
By the terms of his entry, Mihdhar was authorized to remain in the United States until October 3, 2001.
The INS had no record indicating Mihdhar had departed the United States as of August 22, 2001.
Mary and Donna met with John on August 22 in his office at FBI Headquarters to discuss their discovery that Mihdhar recently had entered the United States and there was no record of his departure.
All of them said they could not recall the specifics of the conversation, but all agreed that they realized it was important to initiate an investigation to determine whether Mihdhar was still in the United States and locate him if he was.
On August 22, 2001, Donna sent an e-mail to the New York FBI Special Agent who we call �Glenn.� He was one of the agents assigned to the Cole investigation.
In the e-mail, Donna advised Glenn that she had obtained Mihdhar�s flight manifest.
Donna also wrote, �the reason they [the intelligence community] were looking at Midhar [sic] is relatively general � basically they were looking at all individuals using the name Khalid because of some threat information.� Significantly, the e-mail also advised that the CIA had additional surveillance photographs beyond those she had taken to New York, and the source had identified one of the individuals in these additional photographs as Khallad.
Donna said that she was �requesting the details on that [Khallad�s identification].� Donna also stated in her e-mail that the clearance to show the [INFORMATION REDACTED] should not be a problem.176 This e-mail was the first reference we identified that the FBI had been informed of additional [INFORMATION REDACTED].
After her meeting with Donna on August 22, 2001, Mary asked another CTC officer to draft a CIR to the State Department, INS, U.S. Customs Service, and FBI requesting the placement of Mihdhar and his travel companions, Hazmi and Salah Saeed Muhammed bin Yousaf, on U.S. watchlists.177 The CIR briefly outlined Mihdhar�s attendance at the Malaysia meetings and his subsequent travel to the U.S. in January 2000 and July 2001.
On August 24, the State Department placed Mihdhar and his travel companions on its terrorism watchlist.
This is the first record of the placement of Mihdhar or Hazmi on any U.S. watchlist.
On August 23, 2001, Donna contacted the State Department and requested a copy of Mihdhar�s most recent visa application from the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
The FBI�s intelligence investigation on Mihdhar Steps to open the investigation On August 23, Donna contacted her supervisor, an SSA who we call �Rob,� regarding the information about Mihdhar�s travel to the United States.
As discussed in Chapter Three, Rob was the acting Unit Chief of the UBLU at the time.178 After reviewing the information, Rob concurred with Donna that the appropriate course of action would be to open an intelligence investigation in New York, Mihdhar�s last known destination in the United States, to locate Mihdhar.
To expedite the investigative process and provide a �heads up [alert]� to the New York Field Office that the information was coming, on August 23 Donna telephoned an agent on the Bin Laden squad in the New York Field Office who we call �Chad.� To comply with the wall, the New York Field Office had designated agents as either �criminal� or �intelligence,� and Chad was an intelligence agent.
Donna discussed with Chad Mihdhar�s most recent entry into the United States and FBI Headquarters� request for the New York office to open a full field intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar.
Donna told the OIG that she did not normally telephonically contact the field on these types of issues, but there was some urgency to her request because the FBI did not want to lose the opportunity to locate Mihdhar before he left the United States.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Chad told the OIG that although he routinely worked with Donna, this was the first time that Donna had relayed a need for urgency in an intelligence investigation.
Chad told us, however, that he questioned both the urgency and the need for a separate intelligence investigation.
Chad explained that the attempt to locate Mihdhar seemed to relate to the criminal investigation of the Cole attack, and efforts to locate an individual normally would be handled through a sub-file to the main investigation and not as a separate full field investigation.
Nevertheless, he told Donna that New York would open an intelligence investigation.
On August 23, Donna sent an e-mail to John concerning her telephone conversation with Chad.
She advised in the e-mail that �[Chad] will open an intel[ligence] case.� [INFORMATION REDACTED] She wrote, �I am still looking at intel, but I think we have more of a definitive connection to the Cole here than we thought.� She ended by stating that she was working on the EC requesting a full field investigation, but doubted that it would be completed that day.
On August 27, Donna requested permission through the NSA representative to the FBI to pass to the FBI agents working on the Cole investigation the information [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Donna told the OIG that she thought that the NSA information on Mihdhar could be useful to the Cole criminal investigators, even if the Mihdhar search remained an intelligence investigation.
On the morning of August 28, Donna sent Chad a draft copy of an EC requesting the intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar.
In the cover e-mail, Donna stated, �here is a draft� and that the EC had not been uploaded due to some tear line information that was not yet approved for passage.
179 She concluded, �I do want to get this going as soon as possible.� The EC, entitled �Khalid M.
Al-Mihdhar� with various aliases, stated in the synopsis, �Request to open an intelligence investigation.� The EC outlined Mihdhar�s travel to the United States in July 2001, his previous travel to the United States with Hazmi in January 2000, the background on and his attendance at the Malaysia meetings, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
As to the identification of Khallad in the [INFORMATION REDACTED] by the source, Donna told the OIG that she did not include this information because it had not yet been officially passed to the FBI, although she had requested the passage from a CTC Representative to the FBI.180 While Donna had relayed urgency to opening the investigation in her telephone conversation with Chad and in her cover e-mail, she designated the EC precedence as �routine,� the lowest precedence level.181 She explained this by saying this case was �no bigger� than any other intelligence case.
She also told us, however, that there was a time consideration because Mihdhar could be leaving the United States at any time and that is why she had personally contacted Chad.
The FBI opens the intelligence investigation On August 28, Chad forwarded Donna�s draft EC to his immediate supervisor, a Supervisory Special Agent who we call �Jason.� Jason became a supervisor on the JTTF in the New York Field Office in 1996.
He had been on the New York JTTF since 1985.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on August 28, Jason forwarded the EC to various agents on the Bin Laden squad, including the Cole criminal case agent who we call �Scott.� In the cover e-mail, Jason directed the Relief Supervisor, who we call �Jay,� to open an intelligence investigation and assign it to a Special Agent who we call �Richard.� Jason also directed another agent to check on an investigative lead related to Mihdhar while the agent was in Malaysia.182 Scott received the EC on August 28.
Scott, who had been at the June 11 meeting and had discussions with Donna about the [INFORMATION REDACTED], contacted Donna to discuss the appropriateness of opening an intelligence investigation as opposed to a criminal investigation.
Donna told the OIG that when she realized that the EC had been disseminated to Scott, she asked Scott to delete it because it contained NSA information and therefore required approval for review by criminal agents.
Scott told the OIG that he deleted the EC as she requested.
Shortly thereafter, Scott, Donna, and Rob engaged in a conference call to discuss whether the case should be opened as a criminal instead of an intelligence investigation.
Scott told the OIG that he argued that the investigation should be opened as a criminal investigation due to the nexus to the Cole investigation and the greater investigative resources that could be brought to bear in a criminal investigation.
Scott explained that more agents could be assigned to a criminal investigation due to the squad designations.
He also asserted that criminal investigation tools, such as grand jury subpoenas, were far quicker and easier to obtain than the tools available in an intelligence investigation, such as a national security letter.
Donna told the OIG that the information on Mihdhar was received through intelligence channels and, because of restrictions on using intelligence information, could not be provided directly to the criminal agents working the Cole investigation.
The only information that could be provided directly to them was the limited INS information.
She stated that without the intelligence information on Mihdhar, there would have been no potential nexus to the Cole investigation and no basis for a criminal investigation.
Rob told the OIG he had concurred with Donna�s assessment that the matter should be an intelligence investigation.
He added that there was also a process through which the information could potentially be shared with the criminal agents in the future.183 Scott was not satisfied with that response, and he asked for a legal opinion from the FBI�s National Security Law Unit (NSLU) whether the investigation should be opened as a criminal matter relating to the Cole criminal investigation.
Additionally, Scott wanted a legal opinion on whether a criminal agent could accompany an intelligence agent to interview Mihdhar if he was located.
According to Donna, she subsequently contacted the NSLU attorney who we call �Susan� on August 28, and she and Rob discussed the issue with Susan.
It is unclear how she presented the matter to Susan because there were no documents about the conversation and she and Susan had little or no recollection of the specific conversation.
Donna told the OIG that she provided the EC to Susan.
According to Donna, Susan agreed with her that the matter should be opened as an intelligence investigation.
Donna said Susan also advised that a criminal agent should not be present for an interview of Mihdhar if he was located.
During an OIG interview, Susan said she could not specifically recall this matter or the advice she gave.
Rob told the OIG that he did not recall the specifics of this consultation, but he stated that the NSLU opinion was supportive of FBI Headquarters� determination that the case should be opened as an intelligence investigation.
At approximately 7:30 a.m. on August 29, Donna sent an e-mail to Jason, which stated: I think I might have caused some unnecessary confusion.
I sent the EC on Al-Midhar [sic] to [Chad] via email marking it as DRAFT so he could read it before he went on vacation.
There is material in the EC�which is not cleared for criminal investigators.
[Scott] called and [Rob] and I spoke with him and tried to explain why this case had to stay on the intel.
side of the house�In order to be confident�for this case to be a 199, and to answer some questions that [Scott] had, [Rob] and I spoke with the NSLU yesterday afternoon184 �The opinion is as follows: Al-Mihdar [sic] can be opened directly as a FFI [Full Field Investigation]�The EC is still not cleared for criminal investigators�Per NSLU, if Al-Mihdar [sic] is located the interview must be conducted by an intel agent.
A criminal agent CAN NOT be present at the interview.
This case, in its entirety, is based on intel.
If�information is developed indicating the existence of a substantial federal crime, that information will be passed over the wall according to the proper procedures and turned over for follow-up criminal investigation.185 Approximately 15 minutes after sending the e-mail to Jason, Donna sent an e-mail to Scott with the same language advising that the NSLU agreed the investigation should be an intelligence investigation and a criminal agent could not attend the interview if Mihdhar was located.
That same morning, Scott responded in an e-mail to Donna stating: �where is the wall defined?
Isn�t it dealing with FISA information?