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Dwight opened one of the cables, which reported that Mihdhar�s visa application had been verified and that he had listed New York as his intended destination.
Around 9:30 a.m. on the same morning, Dwight began drafting in the CIA�s computer system a CIR addressed to the UBL Unit Chief at FBI Headquarters and an SSA in the UBL Unit at FBI Headquarters who we call �Bob.� Dwight�s CIR also was addressed to the FBI�s New York Field Office.
The CIR first described the NSA information that had been received about Mihdhar, including the planned travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in early January.
The CIR also discussed the potential links between the suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East and the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
The CIR stated that photographs of Mihdhar had been obtained and would be sent to the FBI under separate cover.
The CIR detailed Mihdhar�s passport and visa information, including that Mihdhar had listed on his visa application his intended destination as New York and that he planned to stay three months.
Dwight also wrote that the CTC was requesting �feedback� on �any intelligence uncovered in FBI�s investigation� resulting from the information in the CIR.
Michelle, the Bin Laden Unit desk officer who originally had taken notice of the information about Mihdhar and his connections to Al Qaeda, accessed Dwight�s draft CIR less than an hour after Dwight drafted it at approximately 9:30 a.m. Around 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Michelle added a note to the CIR in the CIA�s computer system: �pls hold off on CIR for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit].� CIA records show that the same morning, the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit, who we will call �John,� also had read the cable indicating that Mihdhar�s visa was valid and that New York had been listed as his intended destination.
Around 6:30 p.m. on the same day, John again accessed this cable and then another cable, the same two CIA cables about Hazmi and Mihdhar in the CIA�s computer system that Dwight had used in drafting the CIR.
CIA records do not indicate that John accessed Dwight�s draft CIR.109 CIA records show that the CIA employee detailed to FBI Headquarters who we call James and who discussed the Mihdhar information with two FBI Headquarters employees, also accessed the draft CIR on the day it was drafted.
In addition, two other FBI detailees accessed the draft CIR: Eric, the other Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit, accessed it two hours after Dwight began writing it, and Malcolm, the New York Field Office�s detailee to the Bin Laden Unit, accessed it two days later.
CIA records show that as of eight days later the CIR had not been disseminated to the FBI.
In an e-mail to John in mid-January, Dwight had attached the draft CIR and wrote, �Is this a no go or should I remake it in some way.� The CIA was unable to locate any response to this e-mail.
By mid-February, the CIR had not been sent to the FBI and was still in draft form in the CIA�s computer system.
CIA records show that Dwight e-mailed a CIA contractor who handled computer matters and asked him to delete several draft cables in the computer system unrelated to this matter, but to save the draft CIR concerning Mihdhar.
The contractor accessed the draft cable in the system the next day.
When we interviewed all of the individuals involved with the CIR, they asserted that they recalled nothing about it.
Dwight told the OIG that he did not recall being aware of the information about Mihdhar, did not recall drafting the CIR, did not recall whether he drafted the CIR on his own initiative or at the direction of his supervisor, and did not recall any discussions about the reasons for delaying completion and dissemination of the CIR.
Malcolm said he did not recall reviewing any of the cable traffic or any information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar.
Eric told the OIG that he did not recall the CIR.
The CIA employees also stated that they did not recall the CIR.
Although James, the CIA employee detailed to FBI Headquarters, declined to be interviewed by us, he told the CIA OIG that he did not recall the CIR.
John (the Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit) and Michelle, the desk officer who was following this issue, also stated that they did not recall the CIR, any discussions about putting it on hold, or why it was not sent.
Mihdhar in Dubai On the same day that Dwight was drafting the CIR, the CIA reported in an internal cable additional information about Mihdhar.
The cable stated that it appeared that, despite his multiple entry visa, Mihdhar had not yet traveled to the United States.
The cable then stated that it was up to the CTC as to whether anyone should inquire with the INS to verify whether Mihdhar had traveled to the United States.110 The cable also reported additional information about Mihdhar while he was in Dubai.
CIA records reveal that this cable also was read by FBI detailee Dwight.
However, Dwight did not include in the draft CIR the additional information about the lack of any indication that Mihdhar had traveled to United States or the additional information about Mihdhar in Dubai.111 CIA cable stating that Mihdhar�s visa and passport information had been passed to FBI Also on the same day that Dwight was preparing the CIR, Michelle, the Bin Laden Unit desk officer who was following the issue of Mihdhar, prepared a lengthy cable to several stations summarizing the information that had been collected at that point on Mihdhar and three other individuals who also were possibly traveling to Malaysia.
The cable began, �After following the various reports, some much more credible than others, regarding a possible [Bin Laden]-associated threat against U.S. interests in East Asia, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
This cable then summarized the CIA�s information that indicated several individuals were planning to travel to Malaysia.
In the paragraph describing Mihdhar, Michelle stated that Mihdhar�s travel documents, including a multiple entry U.S. visa, had been copied and passed �to the FBI for further investigation.� This cable �the fifth CIA cable to discuss Mihdhar�s U.S. visa � did not state by whom or to whom Mihdhar�s travel documents were passed.
It also did not indicate how they had been passed, or provide any other reference to the passage of the documents.
Because this cable was an internal, operational cable, it was not forwarded to or copied to the FBI.
This cable was disseminated to various CIA stations approximately three hours after Michelle had noted in the cable system that Dwight was directed to hold off on sending his draft CIR to the FBI �for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit].� When we interviewed Michelle, she stated that she had no recollection of who told her that Mihdhar�s travel documents had been passed to the FBI or how they had been passed.
She said she would not have been the person responsible for passing the documents.
According to Michelle, the language in the cable stating �[the documents] had been passed� suggested to her that someone else told her that they had already been passed, but she did not know who it was.
The CIA Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit also said he had no recollection of this cable, and he did not know whether the information had been passed to the FBI.
Neither we nor the CIA OIG was able to locate any other witness who said they remembered anything about Mihdhar�s travel documents being passed to the FBI, or any other documents that corroborated the statement that the documents were in fact passed to the FBI.
The Malaysia meetings and surveillance of Mihdhar After he arrived in Malaysia, Mihdhar was followed and photographed in various locations meeting with several different people.
These events are referred to as �the Malaysia meetings.� CIA employees wrote several cables contemporaneously about the Malaysia meetings, which we discuss below.
First cable regarding Mihdhar in Malaysia The CIA prepared an internal cable stating that Mihdhar had arrived in Kuala Lumpur on the evening of January 5.
The cable also described his activities with other Arabs who were unidentified at the time.
This cable, which we refer to as the �first Malaysia meetings cable,� did not contain any information regarding passports or visas.
First cable regarding Mihdhar in Malaysia It appears that this first Malaysia meetings cable was provided to the FBI.
Sometime before the daily FBI executive briefing that took place on January 6 at 7:30 a.m., the January 5 threat update information concerning Mihdhar was edited in the FBI�s SIOC.
This January 5 threat update reflected an almost verbatim recitation of portions of the CIA�s first Malaysia meetings cable, including the same spelling mistake in reference to a particular place in Malaysia, which indicates that the CIA provided a copy of the first Malaysia meetings cable to the FBI.
However, we were not able to determine who in the FBI received this information from the CIA or who edited the January 5 threat update.
No one we interviewed at the FBI said they recalled handling information related to Mihdhar or the January 5 threat update.
The threat update contained no reference to Mihdhar�s passport information or his U.S. multiple-entry visitor�s visa.
The January 5 threat update also was made part of the January 6 7:30 a.m. executive briefing document.
This briefing did not contain any additional information about Mihdhar.
The January 5 threat update was the only official document from this period located by the FBI that referenced the Malaysia meetings that were discussed in the first CIA Malaysia meetings cable.
Discussion between CIA and FBI employees about Malaysia meetings As noted above, computer records show that James, the CTC employee detailed to the FBI�s SIOC, read the cables and the draft CIR indicating that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa.
Contemporaneous e-mails show that James discussed the Malaysia meetings with two FBI Headquarters employees in the SIOC in the early morning hours of January 6.
Below we detail the cables and the evidence about the discussions that took place between the CIA and FBI personnel in the SIOC about the Malaysia meetings.
Contemporaneous e-mail messages among CIA employees show that during the night of January 5 James briefed the FBI SSA who we call Bob about Mihdhar�s travel.
At the time, Bob was an SSA in the UBL Unit in FBI Headquarters, which was operating out of the SIOC during this period.
James wrote an e-mail to several CIA employees in which he stated that he was detailing �exactly what [he] briefed [the FBI] on� in the event the FBI later complained that they were not provided with all of the information about Mihdhar.112 This e-mail did not discuss Mihdhar�s passport or U.S. visa.
As previously mentioned, James told the CIA OIG that he had no recollection of these events.
He declined to be interviewed by us.
Bob told the OIG that he had no independent recollection of any briefing from a CIA employee regarding the Malaysia meetings.
However, he was able to locate a scant contemporaneous note that confirmed he had been briefed regarding Mihdhar and his trip to Malaysia.
This note contained no details as to the content of the briefing and no reference to Mihdhar�s U.S. visa.
Bob told the OIG that he does not believe that he had been told in this conversation about Mihdhar�s U.S. visa.
Bob stated to us that the presence of a U.S. visa in Mihdhar�s passport would have been extremely important and would have triggered a more significant response than his minimal notes.
Bob also told the OIG that he did not know why James chose to brief him about Mihdhar.
Bob said that he was not a designated point of contact for the CIA while the SIOC was activated, although he also said that he did not know whether there was a designated point of contact in the SIOC.
Bob said that he knew James because James had previously been detailed from the CTC to FBI Headquarters and had worked in ITOS with Bob.
Second cable regarding Mihdhar and the Malaysia meetings The day after the CIA employee discussed the Malaysia meetings with the two FBI SIOC employees, the CIA sent another internal cable providing new information about the activities of Mihdhar.
This cable, �the second Malaysia meetings cable,� provided information about Mihdhar�s activities once he left the Kuala Lumpur airport and his meetings with various individuals.
Discussion between CTC officer and FBI employee about Malaysia meetings Shortly after 7:30 a.m. on January 6, James briefed another FBI SSA � who we call �Ted� � who was detailed to the SIOC from an FBI field office, about information contained in the second Malaysia meetings cable.
Ted told the OIG he was working in the SIOC as an �assistant� to the day shift commander and the UBL Unit Chief, but that he had no specific duties.
Because Bob had left FBI Headquarters on a trip to New York by this time, James briefed Ted to ensure that someone at FBI Headquarters had the latest information on Mihdhar.
In the same e-mail in which he had detailed what he told Bob, James provided specifics of what he told Ted.
The e-mail also stated that the CIA would �continue to run this down and keep the FBI in the loop.� The e-mail did not contain any reference to Mihdhar�s passport or U.S. visa.
Based on this briefing by James, Ted prepared an update for the January 6 afternoon FBI executive briefing.
Ted e-mailed the update to the ITOS Assistant Section Chief at 8:40 a.m. This update reflected the details of the information Ted had received from James.
It did not contain any reference to Mihdhar�s passport or U.S. visa.
Like Bob, Ted told the OIG that he had no recollection of being briefed regarding the Malaysia meetings.
Although he said he did not recall these events, Ted asserted he did not believe that he had received Mihdhar�s passport or U.S. visa information because if he had he would have unquestionably recognized their significance and documented such information in the update for the executive briefing.
Ted told the OIG that he did not know why James briefed him about the Mihdhar information.
Like Bob, Ted stated he was not a designated point of contact for the CIA while the SIOC was activated.
Ted also knew James because of James� previous detail to ITOS in FBI Headquarters when Ted served as an SSA in the RFU.
Cables updating the Malaysia meetings information, including Mihdhar�s travel to Bangkok On January 8, the CIA reported in another internal cable that a new individual had joined Mihdhar and the others, and that additional surveillance photographs were taken.
The cable did not state how many photographs were taken or what would be done with the photos.
In another cable sent five hours later, the CIA reported in an internal cable that Mihdhar and two of the unidentified men � one of whom turned out to be Hazmi � departed Malaysia from Kuala Lumpur airport en route to Bangkok, Thailand.
Cables regarding Hazmi�s travel to the United States On January 9, the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit prepared a cable asking that Mihdhar and his associates be identified while in Thailand.
CIA records show that on January 13, the CIA was attempting to locate Mihdhar and his traveling companions.
In addition, Mihdhar had been watchlisted at the airport in the event that he attempted to leave Thailand.
Several weeks later, CIA officers in Kuala Lumpur followed up with their Bangkok counterparts for additional information about Mihdhar and his traveling companions.
Approximately two weeks later, Bangkok reported that there was a delay in responding due to difficulties in obtaining the requested information.
In early March 2000, officials in Bangkok reported internally that it had identified one of Mihdhar�s traveling companions as Nawaf al-Hazmi.
The cable reported that Hazmi had traveled to Bangkok on January 8 and had subsequently traveled on a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles, California on January 15.
The cable also stated that Mihdhar had arrived in Bangkok on January 8 but that it was unknown if and when he had departed.113 In addition, the cable identified the third traveler as Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf.114 CIA records show that none of the FBI detailees accessed this early March cable.
The OIG found no documents or witnesses indicating that the information that Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, was shared with the FBI at this time.
Rather, as we discuss below, this fact was not shared with the FBI until August 2001.
We found no indication that CTC personnel took any action with regard to the important information that Hazmi had traveled to the United States.
For example, he was not placed on any U.S. watchlists.
The day after Bangkok reported about Hazmi�s travel to Los Angeles, one office that received the Bangkok cable sent a cable to the CTC stating the Bangkok cable regarding Hazmi�s travel had been read �with interest.� Yet, despite this effort to flag the significance of this information, the cable was not shared with the FBI and did not result in any specific action by the CIA.
As we discuss below, it was not until August 2001 that FBI Headquarters personnel learned that on January 15, 2000, both Mihdhar and Hazmi had left Thailand and traveled to Los Angeles, California, where they were both admitted into the United States on non-immigrant visas and authorized to remain until July 14, 2000.