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The allure of dealing such a knock-out blow will be difficult for the Israeli leadership to resist, given the right-wing composition of this particular ruling coalition.
But it would unleash powerful forces that would likely prove impossible to control and would certainly engulf the entire region.
Perhaps most concerningly, an Israeli government with unprecedented far-right and nationalist factions will be uncontainable in its response.
As Steven Cook writes for the Council on Foreign Relations, “Under these circumstances, no foreign government, including the United States, will have any leverage on Israel to respond with restraint.” Terrorism’s power to upend peace processes, trigger dangerous escalations, and set countries on the path to far more destructive, lethal, and consequential wars has so often been dismissed.
But it was an assassin’s bullet in Sarajevo that resulted in World War I and produced 40 million casualties, and it was the 3,000 persons killed on Sept.
11 that launched the U.S.-led global war on terror in which an estimated 3.6 to 3.8 million have since perished.
Saturday’s attacks will profoundly change the Middle East, as the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon did before them.
Preventing the profound repercussions of Sarajevo in 1914 and the response to 9/11 that launched a two-decade-long struggle that many would argue did not end with the United States leaving Afghanistan two years ago, should be of paramount importance in ending this war and containing its spread before the entire region erupts in violence.
A task, sadly, far easier said than done.
Implications Worldwide Moreover, the conflict will also have ramifications far beyond the Middle East.
Already, reports have emerged of non-Israeli citizens — including U.S. citizens — being killed or captured by the dozens.
Pressure is sure to increase on the world’s governments to respond, perhaps with force, particularly if foreign nationals are among the hostages held in Gaza.
What happened on Saturday in Israel should additionally be ringing alarm bells in Washington, D.C., about America’s own enemies who opportunistically will seek to exploit the country’s political paralysis, divisiveness, and distraction with multiple international security challenges alongside the ongoing possibility of domestic political violence as the country approaches among the most contentious presidential races in its history.
But the implications go even further.
At a time when a war for the future of democracy rages in Eastern Europe, perhaps only an existential threat to Israel could draw American attention away from the Ukrainian cause, possibly smoothing a path toward a Russian triumph in Europe.
Refugee flows from several countries and regions would further destabilize surrounding states as well as the European continent, encouraging the same backlashes seen after the Arab Spring.
And, Jewish communities in Europe, the United States, and beyond will also pay a dear price — doubtless finding themselves in the crosshairs of anti-Semitic terrorists driven by the same hatred that drove the Hamas militants across the Gazan border.
The big question at the moment is whether the fighting will remain confined to Gaza and restricted to Israel and Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, the terrorists directly responsible for Saturday’s attacks.
Hizballah, we can be certain, will be monitoring these developments and perhaps looking for an opportunity to expand the war by striking Israel from the north thus locking the Jewish state into a multi-front struggle, should Palestinians on the West Bank rise up as well.
In 2006, Hizballah was initially castigated throughout the region for its recklessness but eventually was lauded for its success in withstanding the inevitable Israeli onslaught and ultimately further isolating Israel among the world’s nations.
In other words, if anything approaching the worst-case scenario — a full-scale, full-theater, total war in the Middle East, involving Israel defending itself against Iran and its proxies — comes to fruition, the security and stability of the world will be affected in ways that would eclipse the impact of the 9/11 attacks 22 years ago.
Bruce Hoffman is senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council of Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University.
He is the author of Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–1947.
Jacob Ware is a research fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and DeSales University.
Together, they are the authors of the forthcoming God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America.
Image: Wikimedia Commons Signing up for this newsletter means you agree to our data policyThis unflinching series documents the 9/11 terrorist attacks, from Al Qaeda's roots in the 1980s to America's response, both at home and abroad.
Interviews and chilling archival recordings chronicle the chaos that unfolded during the 9/11 attacks, whose origins can be traced to the 1980s.
Survivors recount the horrors they endured on 9/11.
Immediately after the attacks, George W.
Bush begins charting America's aggressive military response.
Learning the hijackers benefitted from gaps in US intelligence, the White House justifies a secret surveillance program and "enhanced interrogation." With no cohesive strategy, the war in Afghanistan squanders early successes and backfires, fueling disillusionment, corruption and a Taliban resurgence.
After two decades, the US aims to end its longest-ever war, but its withdrawal threatens to plunge Afghanistan back into repressive, bloody violence.
Questions?
Call 000-800-919-1694 Netflix IndiaA Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks Special Report November 2004 (Released Publicly June 2005) Office of the Inspector General REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED I.
Introduction In this chapter, we examine the FBI�s handling of intelligence information concerning two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
Mihdhar, Hazmi, and three other terrorists hijacked and crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon.
The FBI has asserted that it learned in late August 2001 that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda operatives and that they had traveled to the United States in January 2000.
In August 2001, the FBI also discovered that Mihdhar had entered the United States on July 4, 2001, purportedly for a month-long stay.
In late August, the FBI initiated an investigation to determine whether Mihdhar was still in the country and to find him.
The FBI was still searching for him at the time of the September 11 attacks.
We examined the information that the Intelligence Community and the FBI had about Mihdhar and Hazmi prior to September 11.
We found no evidence indicating the FBI or any other member of the Intelligence Community had specific intelligence regarding the September 11 plot.
However, beginning in late 1999 and continuing through September 11, 2001, we found five junctures at which the FBI either learned of intelligence information about Mihdhar and Hazmi, could have learned of additional intelligence information about them, or could have developed additional information about their location and terrorist connections.
These five junctures were: [INFORMATION REDACTED] The CIA also discovered in March 2000 that Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles in January 2000.
In late January 2000, Mihdhar and Hazmi both traveled to Los Angeles and then moved to San Diego, where they associated with a former subject of an FBI investigation and also lived with a long-time FBI asset.92 In late December 2000 and early January 2001, a reliable joint FBI/CIA source provided information related to the FBI�s ongoing investigation of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.93 [INFORMATION REDACTED] In the summer of 2001, the CIA and the FBI had various interactions regarding the FBI�s investigation of the Cole attack.
These interactions touched on the participants in the January 2000 Malaysia meetings and information developed by the CIA about the Malaysia meetings.
In August 2001, the FBI learned that Mihdhar had entered the United States on July 4 and began searching for him in early September 2001.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] The FBI did not locate him before the September 11 attacks.
Yet, despite these ongoing discussions and opportunities for the FBI to learn about and focus on Mihdhar and Hazmi, including their presence in the United States, the FBI was not made aware of and did not connect important details about them until late August 2001, a short time before they participated in the terrorist attacks.
Even in August, the FBI�s search for Mihdhar and Hazmi was not given any urgency or priority, and was not close to locating them by the time of the attacks.
In this chapter, we describe each of these five opportunities in detail.
We set forth the available intelligence information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar that existed at the time, whether the information was made available to the FBI, and what additional information about Hazmi and Mihdhar the FBI could have developed.
In the analysis section of this chapter, we evaluate the problems that impeded the FBI�s handling of the intelligence information about Hazmi and Mihdhar before September 11.
II.
Background OIG investigation To investigate the issues involving Hazmi and Mihdhar, the OIG asked for and reviewed all documents the FBI had regarding them before September 11.
The FBI search for these documents included searches of its Automated Case Support system (ACS), Integrated Intelligence Information Application (IIIA) system,94 and CTLink.95 In addition, searches were conducted on archived FBI e-mail messages and the FBI Director�s briefing documents.
These searches were initially conducted in response to a request by the Congressional Joint Intelligence Committee�s Inquiry Staff, which was conducting its own inquiry into this subject.
The OIG also obtained direct access to ACS so that we could conduct our own searches for relevant documents.
In addition, we reviewed hard copy case and informant files to search for documents relevant to Mihdhar and Hazmi.
In addition to reviewing these documents, we conducted more than 70 interviews related to the Mihdhar and Hazmi matter.
These included interviews of FBI IOSs, special agents, attorneys, and supervisors who had access to some of the relevant information or participated in meetings or operations related to these hijackers.
We also interviewed FBI employees detailed to the CIA and FBI agents who participated in debriefings of intelligence sources who had relevant information.
Because much of the information discussed in this chapter of the report involves the FBI�s interactions with the CIA, we also obtained information directly from the CIA.
The DOJ OIG does not have oversight authority over CIA operations or personnel, and we therefore did not make assessments of the performance of CIA personnel.
That issue is the responsibility of the CIA OIG, which is conducting its own inquiry in response to the JICI report.
We had to rely on the cooperation of the CIA in providing access to CIA witnesses and documents that were relevant to the OIG�s oversight of the FBI.
We interviewed CIA staff operations officers, analysts, and supervisors, as well as CIA employees detailed to the FBI, including a CIA employee detailed to the FBI�s New York Field Office�s Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Initially, the CIA made available to the OIG for review various documents that the CIA�s �Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Review Group�96 had identified as being related to our inquiry.
The Review Group had gathered these and other documents during its review of the September 11 attacks and during additional searches conducted at the request of the JICI staff.
We did not have independent access to CIA databases, and therefore we could not independently verify that all relevant documents had been provided to us.
However, we had several lengthy sessions with members of the Review Group at which they identified the documents they used to support their conclusions regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar.
The CIA permitted us to review but not have a copy of these documents.
In addition, a member of the CIA General Counsel�s staff conducted additional searches for documents relevant to particular disputed issues.
As a result of that review, copies of additional relevant documents were also made available for our review.
In response to the JICI report issued in December 2002, the CIA OIG initiated a review in February 2003 of the CIA actions related to the September 11 attacks.
In July 2003 the CIA OIG review team informed us it had several more documents that were relevant to our review.
These documents were made available to us to review, and redacted copies of the documents were provided to us in November 2003.
The CIA OIG review team also provided additional relevant documents and information to us that it found during the course of its review.
In February 2004, however, while we were reviewing a list of CIA documents that had been accessed by FBI employees assigned to the CIA, we noticed the title of a document that appeared to be relevant to this review and had not been previously disclosed to us.
The CIA OIG had not previously obtained this document in connection with its review.
We obtained this document, known as a Central Intelligence Report (CIR).
This CIR was a draft document addressed to the FBI containing information about Mihdhar�s travel and possession of a U.S. visa.
As a result of the discovery of this new document, a critical document that we later determined had not been sent to the FBI before the September 11 attacks (see Section III, A, 4 below), we had to re-interview several FBI and CIA employees and obtain additional documents from the CIA.
The belated discovery of this CIA document delayed the completion of our review.
Background on the CIA In this section of the chapter, we describe background information relevant to the interactions between the CIA and the FBI and the ways in which they exchanged intelligence.
We begin with a discussion of the CIA�s authority and mission, organization, forms of communications, and ways in which the CIA passed intelligence to the FBI.
We also discuss the role of the FBI�s employees who were �detailed� to work at the CIA.
CIA authority and mission As discussed in Chapter Two, the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA and established it as the nation�s lead foreign intelligence agency of the United States.
The CIA engages primarily in the clandestine collection of �foreign intelligence� information � information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign governments or organizations, including information about their international terrorist activities.
The CIA is charged with evaluating and disseminating the intelligence information it collects.
The CIA reports directly to the President through the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is the head of both the CIA and the Intelligence Community.
The DCI is the primary advisor to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence matters.
George Tenet was named to that position in 1997.
Organization of the CIA The work of the CIA is conducted primarily through three �directorates�: the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Each is led by a Deputy Director.
Below we briefly describe the relevant structure and positions within each directorate.
Directorate of Operations The Directorate of Operations is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence.
This takes place in field offices known as �stations.�97 Smaller cities may have �bases,� which are sub-offices of the stations.
�Operations officers,� also known as �case officers,� are responsible for collecting intelligence through contacts with human sources and through the use of technology.
Collection management officers, also known as �reports officers,� are responsible for taking raw intelligence reported by the operations officers and removing from it the information that reveals the source, method of collection, or other sensitive information.