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The reports officers publish intelligence information in a form that can be made available to the Intelligence Community.
The head of a station or base is usually an operations officer and is known as a Chief of Station (COS) or Chief of Base (COB).
Stations and bases are usually grouped by geographic division and report to the chief of the geographic division at CIA Headquarters.
Within the geographic division at CIA Headquarters are �staff operations officers,� or �desk officers,� who provide operational research, advice, and other forms of case management support to the officers in the field.
The CIA�s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), which is based in the Directorate of Operations but which draws on all CIA resources, is charged with preempting and disrupting international terrorism.
The CTC is staffed by managers, analysts, operations officers, desk officers, and reports officers.
The CTC collects and analyzes strategic intelligence on terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism to ascertain the capabilities, sources of support, and likely targets of terrorist elements, and to furnish detailed information on terrorist-related intelligence to the Intelligence Community.
At the time of the events relevant to our review, the CTC operated a unit � that we call the �Bin Laden Unit� � that dealt exclusively with issues related to al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden.
The Bin Laden Unit was later merged into a larger group in the CTC.
Although staffing levels fluctuated, approximately 40-50 people worked within the Bin Laden Unit before September 11, 2001.
The Bin Laden Unit was known as a �virtual station� because it operated from within CIA Headquarters but collected and operated against a subject, much as stations in the field focus on a country.
Directorate of Intelligence The Directorate of Intelligence, the analytical branch of the CIA, is responsible for the production and dissemination of timely, accurate, and objective intelligence analysis on foreign policy issues.
It focuses analysis on key foreign countries, regional conflicts, and issues such as terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
The Directorate of Intelligence is primarily composed of analysts who concentrate on particular areas of expertise.
For example, intelligence analysts are assigned a particular geographic region to monitor the leadership, motivations, plans, and intentions of foreign governments in relation to U.S. national security interests.
Additionally, counterterrorism analysts stationed in the CTC produce a range of long-term intelligence products about terrorist organizations and provide tactical analytic support to intelligence operations.
Directorate of Science and Technology The Directorate of Science and Technology is responsible for creating and applying technology in support of the intelligence collection mission.
It employs a broad range of professionals, including computer programmers, engineers, scientists, and linguists.
The CIA�s collection and internal dissemination of information Official internal communications between entities within the CIA are normally conducted by an electronic communication known as a �cable.� Cables are addressed to the stations, offices, or units within an office from which some action is expected.
Information acceptable for sharing with a foreign government service is put into a section of a cable called a �tear line.� Passing of intelligence information by the CIA to the FBI The CIA shares intelligence with the rest of the Intelligence Community through a communication known as a �TD� (�Telegraphic Dissemination�).
TDs can be sent to other Intelligence Community agencies, including the FBI, and are available to the Intelligence Community through the Intelink system.
Another type of intelligence report used by the CIA when conducting business with other agencies is a CIR, or �Central Intelligence Report.� CIRs are used for disseminating information to a specific agency or group of agencies.
CIRs to the FBI normally concern something occurring in the United States, involving a U.S. person or an ongoing FBI investigation.
In addition to formal methods of communicating by the CIA to the FBI, much information can be shared with the FBI informally.
CIA and FBI employees who have similar positions and expertise develop relationships and communicate informally while working together on related matters, either by secure telephones or in person.
In addition, meetings are sometimes held to discuss a matter or a piece of intelligence that is of value to both agencies.
According to the CIA employees we interviewed, when the CIA passed intelligence information or other kinds of information verbally or by another informal mechanism to the FBI, the information exchange normally would be documented through a TD or a CIR.
However, they said that not every telephone call or conversation was documented.
FBI detailees to the CIA Counterterrorist Center In 1996, the FBI began detailing employees to work in the CIA�s CTC.
During the time period relevant to this chapter of the report, five FBI employees were detailed to the CTC�s Usama Bin Laden Unit in four separate positions.
Two of the positions were filled by personnel from the FBI�s Washington Field Office, and one position each was filled from the FBI�s New York Field Office and FBI Headquarters.98 FBI Headquarters detailees One of the FBI detailees assigned to Bin Laden Unit, who we call �Eric,� held a supervisory position as a deputy chief of the Bin Laden Unit.99 Eric, an FBI Headquarters supervisor in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, was detailed to the CTC as a branch chief for a particular terrorist group in September 1997.
In March 1999, FBI Headquarters transferred him from that part of the CTC to the deputy chief position in the Bin Laden Unit.
According to Eric, he was told by FBI Assistant Director Neil Gallagher that there were a lot of problems between the FBI�s New York Field Office and the Bin Laden Unit and that he needed to mend the relationship.100 Eric stated that although he acted as a liaison between the CIA and the FBI, his primary job was to perform substantive work related to the Bin Laden Unit�s mission.
Eric left the Bin Laden Unit in January 2000 and was replaced in July 2000 by an FBI employee who we call �Craig.�101 By this time, the Bin Laden Unit had been placed into a newly formed group, which was a much larger organization than the Bin Laden Unit.
Craig was designated as a deputy chief in the new, larger group.
He described his primary job as being a �referent� for law enforcement issues.
He explained this role as involving coordination between the FBI and CIA when they wanted to conduct joint interviews or when the CIA requested assistance with a law enforcement matter.
Eric and Craig had access via computers on their desks to the CIA�s internal cables.
Eric said that while he was at the CIA, he attempted to read all incoming Bin Laden Unit cables.
However, he said that the amount of cable traffic was overwhelming and was too much for one individual to read consistently.
In contrast, Craig told the OIG that he did not believe his job was to read all the cable traffic and that he did not even attempt to do so.
Washington Field Office detailees Another FBI employee detailed to the Bin Laden Unit, an Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) who we call �Mary,� was assigned to CIA Headquarters from the FBI�s Washington Field Office in April 1998.
Although she was assigned to work on issues of mutual interest to the FBI and the CIA, such as the East African embassy bombings,102 she also was assigned to work on unilateral CTC matters.
She said that as a desk officer, she read and responded to cable traffic that was pertinent to the matters she was assigned.
She nominally reported to a supervisor in the FBI�s Washington Field Office, but her work was assigned by her CTC supervisors at the Bin Laden Unit.103 The Washington Field Office also detailed to the CTC a special agent, who we call �Dwight.� His performance evaluations were done by the Washington Field Office, but his assignments came from CTC managers.
He focused on the financial aspects of terrorism and obtained information through the CTC to help identify and investigate persons who were responsible for funding terrorism.
He had access to CIA cables and reviewed them for potential leads or other information related to terrorist financing.
New York Field Office detailee An FBI New York Field Office agent from its Bin Laden squad, who we call �Malcolm,� was also detailed to the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit in early 1999 at the request of John O�Neill, the New York Field Office Special Agent in Charge for Counterterrorism at the time.
Malcolm replaced another New York Field Office Bin Laden squad agent who had left the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit in August 1998.
Malcolm told the OIG that he was not given instructions as to his specific duties at the CIA.
He said he understood his job there was to be the �eyes and ears� of the New York Field Office and �to monitor� New York Field Office cases.
He said his role was to �facilitate inquiries of mutual interest� and to act as a liaison for FBI offices around the country by following up on tracing requests and reporting on their status.
He stated that he also spent a significant amount of time coordinating with the CTC in preparation for and during the trials that arose out of the FBI�s investigations into the East African Embassy bombings.
He told the OIG that he did not review all cables; he reviewed only the cables that he thought were interesting, generally based solely on his review of the cable subject line.
He said he reported to an SSA in the New York Field Office, not to anyone at the CIA.
III.
Factual chronology regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar In this section of the report, we discuss in detail the five junctures before September 11, 2001, during which the FBI had an opportunity to obtain or develop information about Mihdhar and Hazmi but did not.
We describe in chronological order the sequence of events regarding these five opportunities, including the information that the FBI obtained or could have obtained about Hazmi and Mihdhar.
Many of the witnesses told the OIG they did not have specific recollection of the events and conversations related to the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter.
In addition, we found few notes and documents relating to these events and conversations.
The following is our best reconstruction of the events based on the participants� recollections and the existing documentary evidence.
We show a timeline of the Hazmi and Mihdhar events described in this chapter on the next two pages of the report.
Identification in January 2000 of Hazmi and Mihdhar as al Qaeda operatives This section describes the initial development and dissemination of intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] The intelligence led to a surveillance operation in Malaysia in which it was discovered that Mihdhar had a valid multiple-entry U.S. visa and photographs of Mihdhar meeting with other al Qaeda operatives were taken.
There were several ways the FBI could have acquired this information from the CIA � through a CIR from the CIA to the FBI, informally through conversations between a CIA employee and FBI Headquarters employees, and through the FBI employees detailed to the CIA reviewing the CIA cable traffic.
We reviewed whether this information was in fact passed to the FBI by the CIA, and based on the evidence, concluded that while the CIA passed some of the information about Mihdhar to the FBI, it did not contemporaneously pass the information about Mihdhar�s U.S. visa to the FBI.
We concluded it was not disclosed by the CIA until late August 2001, shortly before the September 11 terrorist attacks.
We also reviewed whether FBI detailees to the CIA contemporaneously acquired this information and what action, if any, they took with respect to this information.
Hazmi and Mihdhar Timeline - Part I [Image Not Available Electronically] Hazmi and Mihdhar Timeline - Part II [Image Not Available Electronically] In addition, the CIA learned in March 2000 that Hazmi had boarded a United Airlines flight in Bangkok, Thailand, bound for Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 2000.104 We also reviewed whether the FBI was informed of this information, and concluded that it did not learn about this information until August 2001.
Background In late 1999, the Intelligence Community developed significant intelligence information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar.
At this time, the Intelligence Community was on high alert because of concerns involving possible terrorist activity planned in conjunction with the coming of the new Millennium.
In addition to concerns about attacks at New Year�s Eve celebrations, the Intelligence Community was concerned that a terrorist attack was planned for January 3, 2000, which in the Islamic calendar is considered a �night of destiny.�105 There were additional concerns about potential terrorist attacks coinciding with the end of Ramadan, around January 6, 2000.106 Several of these planned attacks were uncovered in December 1999.
For example, on December 1, 1999, in Jordan, a plot to disrupt New Year activities with explosives designed to kill thousands of revelers, including U.S. citizens, was uncovered and thwarted with the arrest of 16 people.
On December 14, 1999, Ahmad Ressam was stopped at the United States/Canadian border in Washington state as he attempted to enter the United States in a vehicle loaded with explosives.
It was determined later that he had intended to detonate the explosives at the Los Angeles airport.
To be prepared for possible terrorist activity at the end of 1999, the FBI activated its Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC).
The SIOC is located in a secure area within FBI Headquarters and contains several meeting rooms, conferencing equipment, communications equipment, computers, and other operational equipment.
It allows the FBI to manage major investigations or other significant operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
During the Millennium period, the FBI operated its International Terrorism Operations Section from within the SIOC.
In addition, the FBI detailed field supervisors with counterterrorism experience and other counterterrorism personnel to the SIOC for around-the-clock monitoring and response to possible terrorist activities.
At the CIA, additional personnel were called in to work at the CTC and planned leave was canceled.
In addition, personnel from the CIA and other Intelligence Community agencies were detailed to work in the FBI�s SIOC.
During this period, personnel in the FBI�s SIOC prepared two daily briefings for the FBI Director and his executive staff, one at 7:30 a.m. and the other at 4:30 p.m. The daily briefings contained summaries of significant terrorism investigations and the latest intelligence related to counterterrorism.
Accompanying the briefings were daily threat updates prepared each afternoon for the Director and his executive staff.
The briefings and the threat updates were prepared by various people throughout the course of the day and night in the SIOC.
NSA provides intelligence regarding planned travel by al Qaeda operatives to Malaysia [INFORMATION REDACTED] The communications indicated that several members of an �operational cadre� were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000.
Analysis of the communications revealed that persons named Nawaf, Khalid and Salem were involved.
In early 2000, the NSA analyzed what appeared to be related communications concerning a �Khalid.�107 The NSA�s reporting about these communications was sent, among other places, to FBI Headquarters, the FBI�s Washington and New York Field Offices, and the CIA�s CTC.
At the FBI, this information appeared in the daily threat update to the Director on January 4, 2000.
Mihdhar�s travel and discovery of his U.S. visa A CIA desk officer working in the Bin Laden Unit who we call �Michelle� determined that there were links between these people and Al Qaeda as well as the 1998 East African embassy bombings.
In addition, the CIA identified �Khalid� as Khalid al-Mihdhar.
Mihdhar arrived [INFORMATION REDACTED], on January 5, 2000.
Mihdhar was traveling on a Saudi passport.
This passport contained a valid U.S. visa.
Mihdhar�s passport was photocopied and sent to CIA Headquarters.
Several CIA cables contemporaneously discussed Mihdhar�s travel and the discovery of his U.S. visa in his Saudi passport.
CIA records show that a CIA employee, who we call �James�108 and who was detailed to FBI Headquarters during the Millennium period, accessed one of these cables approximately two hours after it was disseminated in the morning, and he accessed another of the cables about eight hours after it was disseminated on the next morning.
James discussed some information about Mihdhar with two FBI Headquarters employees on the evening of January 5, which we detail in Section 7 below.
CIR is drafted to pass Mihdhar�s visa information to the FBI Dwight, the special agent detailed to the CIA�s Bin Laden Unit from the FBI�s Washington Field Office, also read the cables discussing Mihdhar�s U.S. visa within hours of each cable being disseminated.
CIA records also show that Dwight�s immediate supervisor in the Bin Laden Unit opened one of the cables soon after Dwight.