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See also
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Aircraft cabin
Airline seat
Economy class
Hypermobility (travel)
First class
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IATA class codes
Premium economy
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References
External links
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Qantas History including business class history
Business Class Community with pictures
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https://www.executivetraveller.com/did-qantas-invent-business-class
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Airline tickets
Passenger rail transport
Travel classes
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9851_0
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This article is about the history of the United States Federal Reserve System from its creation to
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the present.
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Central banking prior to the Federal Reserve
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The Federal Reserve System is the third central banking system in United States history. The First
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Bank of the United States (1791–1811) and the Second Bank of the United States (1817–1836) each had
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a 20-year charter. Both banks issued currency, made commercial loans, accepted deposits, purchased
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securities, maintained multiple branches and acted as fiscal agents for the U.S. Treasury. The
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U.S. Federal Government was required to purchase 20% of the bank capital stock shares and to
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appoint 20% of the board members (directors) of each of those first two banks "of the United
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States." Therefore, each bank's majority control was placed squarely in the hands of wealthy
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investors who purchased the remaining 80% of the stock. These banks were opposed by state-chartered
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banks, who saw them as very large competitors, and by many who insisted that they were in reality
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banking cartels compelling the common man to maintain and support them. President Andrew Jackson
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vetoed legislation to renew the Second Bank of the United States, starting a period of free
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banking. Jackson staked the legislative success of his second presidential term on the issue of
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central banking. "Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the
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public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to
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bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank must come directly or indirectly out of the
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earnings of the American people," Jackson said in 1832. Jackson's second term in office ended in
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March 1837 without the Second Bank of the United States's charter being renewed.
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In 1863, as a means to help finance the Civil War, a system of national banks was instituted by the
|
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National Currency Act. The banks each had the power to issue standardized national bank notes based
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on United States bonds held by the bank. The Act was totally revised in 1864 and later named as the
|
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National-Bank Act, or National Banking Act, as it is popularly known. The administration of the new
|
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national banking system was vested in the newly created Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
|
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and its chief administrator, the Comptroller of the Currency. The Office, which still exists today,
|
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examines and supervises all banks chartered nationally and is a part of the U.S. Treasury
|
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Department.
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The Federal Reserve Act, 1913
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National bank currency was considered inelastic because it was based on the fluctuating value of
|
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U.S. Treasury bonds. If Treasury bond prices declined, a national bank had to reduce the amount of
|
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currency it had in circulation by either refusing to make new loans or by calling in loans it had
|
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made already. The related liquidity problem was largely caused by an immobile, pyramidal reserve
|
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system, in which nationally chartered rural/agriculture-based banks were required to set aside
|
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their reserves in federal reserve city banks, which in turn were required to have reserves in
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central city banks. During the planting seasons, rural banks would exploit their reserves to
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finance full plantings, and during the harvest seasons they would use profits from loan interest
|
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payments to restore and grow their reserves. A national bank whose reserves were being drained
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would replace its reserves by selling stocks and bonds, by borrowing from a clearing house or by
|
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calling in loans. As there was little in the way of deposit insurance, if a bank was rumored to be
|
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having liquidity problems then this might cause many people to remove their funds from the bank.
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Because of the crescendo effect of banks which lent more than their assets could cover, during the
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last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the United States economy
|
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went through a series of financial panics.
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The National Monetary Commission, 1907-1913
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Prior to a particularly severe panic in 1907, there was a motivation for renewed demands for
|
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banking and currency reform. The following year, Congress enacted the Aldrich–Vreeland Act which
|
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provided for an emergency currency and established the National Monetary Commission to study
|
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banking and currency reform.
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The chief of the bipartisan National Monetary Commission was financial expert and Senate Republican
|
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leader Nelson Aldrich. Aldrich set up two commissions – one to study the American monetary system
|
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in depth and the other, headed by Aldrich, to study the European central-banking systems and report
|
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on them.
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Aldrich went to Europe opposed to centralized banking but, after viewing Germany's banking system,
|
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he came away believing that a centralized bank was better than the government-issued bond system
|
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that he had previously supported. Centralized banking was met with much opposition from
|
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politicians, who were suspicious of a central bank and who charged that Aldrich was biased due to
|
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his close ties to wealthy bankers such as J.P. Morgan and his daughter's marriage to John D.
|
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Rockefeller, Jr.
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In 1910, Aldrich and executives representing the banks of J.P. Morgan, Rockefeller, and Kuhn, Loeb
|
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& Co., secluded themselves for ten days at Jekyll Island, Georgia. The executives included Frank A.
|
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Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New York, associated with the Rockefellers; Henry
|
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Davison, senior partner of J.P. Morgan Company; Charles D. Norton, president of the First National
|
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Bank of New York; and Col. Edward M. House, who would later become President Woodrow Wilson's
|
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closest adviser and founder of the Council on Foreign Relations. There, Paul Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb,
|
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& Co. directed the proceedings and wrote the primary features of what would be called the Aldrich
|
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Plan. Warburg would later write that "The matter of a uniform discount rate (interest rate) was
|
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discussed and settled at Jekyll Island." Vanderlip wrote in his 1935 autobiography From Farmboy to
|
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Financier:
|
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Despite my views about the value to society of greater publicity for the affairs of corporations,
|
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there was an occasion, near the close of 1910, when I was as secretive, indeed, as furtive as any
|
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conspirator. None of us who participated felt that we were conspirators; on the contrary we felt we
|
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were engaged in a patriotic work. We were trying to plan a mechanism that would correct the
|
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weaknesses of our banking system as revealed under the strains and pressures of the panic of 1907.
|
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I do not feel it is any exaggeration to speak of our secret expedition to Jekyl Island as the
|
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occasion of the actual conception of what eventually became the Federal Reserve System. ...
|
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Discovery, we knew, simply must not happen, or else all our time and effort would be wasted. If it
|
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were to be exposed publicly that our particular group had gotten together and written a banking
|
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bill, that bill would have no chance whatever of passage by Congress. Yet, who was there in
|
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Congress who might have drafted a sound piece of legislation dealing with the purely banking
|
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problem with which we were concerned?
|
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Despite meeting in secret, from both the public and the government, the importance of the Jekyll
|
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Island meeting was revealed three years after the Federal Reserve Act was passed, when journalist
|
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Bertie Charles Forbes in 1916 wrote an article about the "hunting trip".
|
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The 1911–12 Republican plan was proposed by Aldrich to solve the banking dilemma, a goal which was
|
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supported by the American Bankers' Association. The plan provided for one great central bank, the
|
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National Reserve Association, with a capital of at least $100 million and with 15 branches in
|
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various sections. The branches were to be controlled by the member banks on a basis of their
|
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capitalization. The National Reserve Association would issue currency, based on gold and commercial
|
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paper, that would be the liability of the bank and not of the government. The Association would
|
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also carry a portion of member banks' reserves, determine discount reserves, buy and sell on the
|
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open market, and hold the deposits of the federal government. The branches and businessmen of each
|
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of the 15 districts would elect thirty out of the 39 members of the board of directors of the
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