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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#1_12937247
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1792, the revolutionary French Government clashed with the monarchies of Spain and Great Britain. French policymakers needed the United States to help defend France's colonies in the Caribbean - either as a neutral supplier or as a military ally, and so they dispatched Edmond Charles Gen�t, an experienced diplomat, as minister to the United States. The French assigned Gen�t several additional duties: to obtain advance payments on debts that the U.S. owed to France, to negotiate a commercial treaty between the United States and France, and to implement portions of the 1778 Franco-American treaty which allowed attacks on British merchant shipping using ships based in American ports. Gen�t's attempt to carry out his instructions would bring him into direct conflict with the U.S. Government. The French Revolution had already reinforced political differences within President George Washington's Cabinet. The Democratic-Republicans, led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, sympathized with the French revolutionaries. The Federalists, led by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, believed that ties with Great Britain were more important. President Washington attempted to steer a neutral course between these two opposing views. He believed that joining Great Britain or France in war could subject the comparatively weak United States to invasion by foreign armies and have disastrous economic consequences.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#2_12939051
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The French Revolution had already reinforced political differences within President George Washington's Cabinet. The Democratic-Republicans, led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, sympathized with the French revolutionaries. The Federalists, led by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, believed that ties with Great Britain were more important. President Washington attempted to steer a neutral course between these two opposing views. He believed that joining Great Britain or France in war could subject the comparatively weak United States to invasion by foreign armies and have disastrous economic consequences. President Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality on April 22, 1793. Gen�t arrived in Charleston, South Carolina on April 8, 1793�calling himself "Citizen Gen�t" to emphasize his pro-revolutionary stance. Gen�t immediately began to issue privateering commissions upon his arrival in Charleston, with the consent of South Carolina governor William Moultrie. These commissions authorized the bearers, regardless of their country of origin, to seize British merchant ships and their cargo for personal profit, with the approval and protection of the French Government. When Gen�t arrived in the U.S. capital of Philadelphia in May to present his credentials, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson informed him that the United States Cabinet considered the outfitting of French privateers in American ports to be a violation of the U.S. policy of neutrality.
| 1,538 | 3,028 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#3_12940886
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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President Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality on April 22, 1793. Gen�t arrived in Charleston, South Carolina on April 8, 1793�calling himself "Citizen Gen�t" to emphasize his pro-revolutionary stance. Gen�t immediately began to issue privateering commissions upon his arrival in Charleston, with the consent of South Carolina governor William Moultrie. These commissions authorized the bearers, regardless of their country of origin, to seize British merchant ships and their cargo for personal profit, with the approval and protection of the French Government. When Gen�t arrived in the U.S. capital of Philadelphia in May to present his credentials, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson informed him that the United States Cabinet considered the outfitting of French privateers in American ports to be a violation of the U.S. policy of neutrality. Gen�t's mission ran into further difficulties when the U.S. Government expressed no interest in a new commercial treaty, as it already enjoyed favorable trading privileges in French ports. The U.S. Cabinet also refused to make advance payments on U.S. debts to the French government. Gen�t ignored American warnings and allowed the outfitting of another French privateer, the Little Democrat. Defying numerous warnings from U.S. officials to detain the ship in port, Gen�t continued to ready the ship to sail. Gen�t also threatened to take his case to the American people, bypassing official government opposition.
| 2,169 | 3,643 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#4_12942726
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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Gen�t's mission ran into further difficulties when the U.S. Government expressed no interest in a new commercial treaty, as it already enjoyed favorable trading privileges in French ports. The U.S. Cabinet also refused to make advance payments on U.S. debts to the French government. Gen�t ignored American warnings and allowed the outfitting of another French privateer, the Little Democrat. Defying numerous warnings from U.S. officials to detain the ship in port, Gen�t continued to ready the ship to sail. Gen�t also threatened to take his case to the American people, bypassing official government opposition. Gen�t failed to realize that Washington and his neutrality policy were politically popular, and that his pro-British enemies would depict such an attempt as foreign meddling in American domestic affairs. Washington's Cabinet met to consider a response to Gen�t's defiant actions. All members agreed to request Gen�t's recall, but were divided as to how to go about doing so. Before the Cabinet reached a decision, Gen�t allowed the Little Democrat to sail and begin attacking British shipping. This direct violation of neutrality forced the U.S. Government to take more prompt action and request that the French government recall Gen�t.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#5_12944341
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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Gen�t failed to realize that Washington and his neutrality policy were politically popular, and that his pro-British enemies would depict such an attempt as foreign meddling in American domestic affairs. Washington's Cabinet met to consider a response to Gen�t's defiant actions. All members agreed to request Gen�t's recall, but were divided as to how to go about doing so. Before the Cabinet reached a decision, Gen�t allowed the Little Democrat to sail and begin attacking British shipping. This direct violation of neutrality forced the U.S. Government to take more prompt action and request that the French government recall Gen�t. However, Secretary of State Jefferson stopped short of expelling Genet from the United States, as Hamilton had wished. By the time Jefferson's request for recall reached France, power had shifted from the more moderate Girondins, who had originally sent Gen�t on his mission, to the radical Jacobins. French policy began to emphasize friendlier relations with neutral countries who could provide crucially needed food supplies. French officials were already dissatisfied with Gen�t's failure to fulfill his diplomatic mission, and the Jacobins suspected him of continued loyalty to the Girondins. The French government recalled Gen�t, and demanded that the U.S. hand him over to the commissioners sent to replace him.
| 3,644 | 4,998 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#6_12946054
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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However, Secretary of State Jefferson stopped short of expelling Genet from the United States, as Hamilton had wished. By the time Jefferson's request for recall reached France, power had shifted from the more moderate Girondins, who had originally sent Gen�t on his mission, to the radical Jacobins. French policy began to emphasize friendlier relations with neutral countries who could provide crucially needed food supplies. French officials were already dissatisfied with Gen�t's failure to fulfill his diplomatic mission, and the Jacobins suspected him of continued loyalty to the Girondins. The French government recalled Gen�t, and demanded that the U.S. hand him over to the commissioners sent to replace him. President Washington and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, aware that Gen�t's return to France would almost certainly result in his execution, allowed Gen�t to remain in the United States. U.S. and French diplomatic goals favored friendly neutrality, and the Gen�t affair came to an end. Gen�t himself continued to reside in the United States until his death in 1834. The Gen�t affair forced the United States to formulate a consistent policy on the issue of neutrality. Washington's Cabinet signed a set of rules regarding policies of neutrality on August 3, 1793, and these rules were formalized when Congress passed a neutrality bill on June 4, 1794.
| 4,281 | 5,652 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8403753#7_12947784
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/88110.htm
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
The Citizen Genêt Affair, 1793-1794
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President Washington and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, aware that Gen�t's return to France would almost certainly result in his execution, allowed Gen�t to remain in the United States. U.S. and French diplomatic goals favored friendly neutrality, and the Gen�t affair came to an end. Gen�t himself continued to reside in the United States until his death in 1834. The Gen�t affair forced the United States to formulate a consistent policy on the issue of neutrality. Washington's Cabinet signed a set of rules regarding policies of neutrality on August 3, 1793, and these rules were formalized when Congress passed a neutrality bill on June 4, 1794. This legislation formed the basis for neutrality policy throughout the nineteenth century.
| 4,999 | 5,743 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8409954#0_12948872
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/90612.htm
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Spanish and U.S. negotiators concluded the Treaty of San Lorenzo, also known as Pinckney's Treaty, on October 27, 1795. The treaty was an important diplomatic success for the United States. It resolved territorial disputes between the two countries and granted American ships the right to free navigation of the Mississippi River as well as duty-free transport through the port of New Orleans, then under Spanish control. Prior to the treaty, the western and southern borders of the United States had been a source of tension between Spain and the United States. The U.S. border extended to the Mississippi River, but its southern stretch remained in Spanish territory, and Spanish officials, reluctant to encourage U.S. trade and settlement in a strategic frontier area, kept the Mississippi River closed to American shipping. Moreover, both Spain and the United States claimed portions of the present-day states of Alabama and Mississippi, and earlier negotiations to resolve the territorial disputes had broken off inconclusively. The Spanish government maintained several forts in the disputed territories, and could also count on indigenous resistance to U.S. attempts to survey or encroach upon Native American lands. U.S. citizens from the southern states and frontier areas found Spanish policies restrictive, and wanted the U.S. Government to renegotiate its positions. Prior to 1789, Spanish policy had focused on keeping American trade and settlement in frontier areas to a minimum, and so neither Spanish colonial officials nor policymakers in Madrid were interested in granting the concessions that U.S. negotiators had attempted to obtain earlier. However, Spanish interests changed during the wars of the French Revolution.
| 0 | 1,859 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8409954#1_12951093
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/90612.htm
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Moreover, both Spain and the United States claimed portions of the present-day states of Alabama and Mississippi, and earlier negotiations to resolve the territorial disputes had broken off inconclusively. The Spanish government maintained several forts in the disputed territories, and could also count on indigenous resistance to U.S. attempts to survey or encroach upon Native American lands. U.S. citizens from the southern states and frontier areas found Spanish policies restrictive, and wanted the U.S. Government to renegotiate its positions. Prior to 1789, Spanish policy had focused on keeping American trade and settlement in frontier areas to a minimum, and so neither Spanish colonial officials nor policymakers in Madrid were interested in granting the concessions that U.S. negotiators had attempted to obtain earlier. However, Spanish interests changed during the wars of the French Revolution. Spain joined the other European monarchies in war against France in 1793, but by 1794 Spanish forces experienced defeats in the Caribbean and Europe. Spanish King Charles IV, uninterested in managing political affairs, had earlier handed political and diplomatic responsibilities to his prime minister, Manuel de Godoy. Godoy sought to extract Spain from its alliance with its traditional enemy Great Britain, and to restore peace with France. Godoy's policy was not without risks, as antagonizing the British would put Spanish colonies in the Americas at risk. While Spanish diplomats sought to shift Spanish alliances, U.S. diplomat John Jay arrived in London to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain.
| 949 | 2,563 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8409954#2_12953040
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/90612.htm
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Spain joined the other European monarchies in war against France in 1793, but by 1794 Spanish forces experienced defeats in the Caribbean and Europe. Spanish King Charles IV, uninterested in managing political affairs, had earlier handed political and diplomatic responsibilities to his prime minister, Manuel de Godoy. Godoy sought to extract Spain from its alliance with its traditional enemy Great Britain, and to restore peace with France. Godoy's policy was not without risks, as antagonizing the British would put Spanish colonies in the Americas at risk. While Spanish diplomats sought to shift Spanish alliances, U.S. diplomat John Jay arrived in London to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain. Spanish officials feared that Jay's negotiations would result in an Anglo-American alliance and an invasion of Spanish possessions in North America. Sensing the need for rapprochement, Godoy sent a request to the U.S. Government for a representative empowered to negotiate a new treaty. President George Washington selected South Carolinian Thomas Pinckney, who had been serving as United States minister to Great Britain. Pinckney arrived in Spain in June of 1795, and negotiations proceeded swiftly. Spain's political and military position had weakened under its defeats and war expenses, while population growth in Kentucky and Tennessee, combined with a shortage of European ships to sustain trade with Louisiana, made Spanish officials amenable to a change in restrictive Spanish trade policies.
| 1,860 | 3,364 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8409954#3_12954878
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/90612.htm
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Spanish officials feared that Jay's negotiations would result in an Anglo-American alliance and an invasion of Spanish possessions in North America. Sensing the need for rapprochement, Godoy sent a request to the U.S. Government for a representative empowered to negotiate a new treaty. President George Washington selected South Carolinian Thomas Pinckney, who had been serving as United States minister to Great Britain. Pinckney arrived in Spain in June of 1795, and negotiations proceeded swiftly. Spain's political and military position had weakened under its defeats and war expenses, while population growth in Kentucky and Tennessee, combined with a shortage of European ships to sustain trade with Louisiana, made Spanish officials amenable to a change in restrictive Spanish trade policies. Godoy offered to accept the 31st parallel as the U.S.-Florida border as well as the right to free navigation of the Mississippi, which Americans west of the Appalachians supported enthusiastically. In return, Godoy requested that the United States commit to an alliance with Spain. Pinckney rejected the alliance, and after further consultation Godoy provided the same offer without the necessity of the alliance. Nevertheless, negotiations came to an impasse as the Spanish continued to insist on their right to require duties for goods passing through Spanish-held New Orleans. Pinckney threatened to leave without signing a treaty unless the Spanish dropped duties on American trade passing through New Orleans.
| 2,564 | 4,079 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8409954#4_12956727
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/90612.htm
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Godoy offered to accept the 31st parallel as the U.S.-Florida border as well as the right to free navigation of the Mississippi, which Americans west of the Appalachians supported enthusiastically. In return, Godoy requested that the United States commit to an alliance with Spain. Pinckney rejected the alliance, and after further consultation Godoy provided the same offer without the necessity of the alliance. Nevertheless, negotiations came to an impasse as the Spanish continued to insist on their right to require duties for goods passing through Spanish-held New Orleans. Pinckney threatened to leave without signing a treaty unless the Spanish dropped duties on American trade passing through New Orleans. The next day, Godoy agreed to Pinckney's demands, and the two negotiators signed the treaty on October 27, 1795. The final treaty also voided Spanish guarantees of military support that colonial officials had made to Native Americans in the disputed regions, greatly weakening those communities' ability to resist encroachment upon their lands. The Treaty of San Lorenzo enabled and encouraged American settlers to continue westward expansion, and made frontier areas more attractive and lucrative. Consequently, it was popular with the American public, especially in the West and South. Since Thomas Pinckney was associated with the Federalist Party, the treaty served to bolster the Federalists outside of their New England stronghold and give the party a stronger base in areas where it had traditionally been weak.
| 3,365 | 4,898 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8409954#5_12958594
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/90612.htm
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795
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The next day, Godoy agreed to Pinckney's demands, and the two negotiators signed the treaty on October 27, 1795. The final treaty also voided Spanish guarantees of military support that colonial officials had made to Native Americans in the disputed regions, greatly weakening those communities' ability to resist encroachment upon their lands. The Treaty of San Lorenzo enabled and encouraged American settlers to continue westward expansion, and made frontier areas more attractive and lucrative. Consequently, it was popular with the American public, especially in the West and South. Since Thomas Pinckney was associated with the Federalist Party, the treaty served to bolster the Federalists outside of their New England stronghold and give the party a stronger base in areas where it had traditionally been weak. Diplomatically, the treaty marked a reverse in Spanish policies that attempted to maintain a strong buffer region in North America, while placing the United States in a stronger position in relation to European powers compared to the U.S. concessions made in Jay's Treaty.
| 4,080 | 5,171 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#0_12960019
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
Apartheid, the Afrikaans name given by the white-ruled South Africa's Nationalist Party in 1948 to the country's harsh, institutionalized system of racial segregation, came to an end in the early 1990s in a series of steps that led to the formation of a democratic government in 1994. Years of violent internal protest, weakening white commitment, international economic and cultural sanctions, economic struggles, and the end of the Cold War brought down white minority rule in Pretoria. U.S. policy toward the regime underwent a gradual but complete transformation that played an important conflicting role in Apartheid's initial survival and eventual downfall. Although many of the segregationist policies dated back to the early decades of the twentieth century, it was the election of the Nationalist Party in 1948 that marked the beginning of legalized racism's harshest features called Apartheid. The Cold War then was in its early stages. U.S. President Harry Truman's foremost foreign policy goal was to limit Soviet expansion. Despite supporting a domestic civil rights agenda to further the rights of black people in the United States, the Truman Administration chose not to protest the anti-communist South African government's system of Apartheid in an effort to maintain an ally against the Soviet Union in southern Africa. This set the stage for successive administrations to quietly support the Apartheid regime as a stalwart ally against the spread of communism. Inside South Africa, riots, boycotts, and protests by black South Africans against white rule had occurred since the inception of independent white rule in 1910. Opposition intensified when the Nationalist Party, assuming power in 1948, effectively blocked all legal and non-violent means of political protest by non-whites.
| 0 | 1,875 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#1_12962182
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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U.S. President Harry Truman's foremost foreign policy goal was to limit Soviet expansion. Despite supporting a domestic civil rights agenda to further the rights of black people in the United States, the Truman Administration chose not to protest the anti-communist South African government's system of Apartheid in an effort to maintain an ally against the Soviet Union in southern Africa. This set the stage for successive administrations to quietly support the Apartheid regime as a stalwart ally against the spread of communism. Inside South Africa, riots, boycotts, and protests by black South Africans against white rule had occurred since the inception of independent white rule in 1910. Opposition intensified when the Nationalist Party, assuming power in 1948, effectively blocked all legal and non-violent means of political protest by non-whites. The African National Congress (ANC) and its offshoot, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), both of which envisioned a vastly different form of government based on majority rule, were outlawed in 1960 and many of its leaders imprisoned. The most famous prisoner was a leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, who had become a symbol of the anti-Apartheid struggle. While Mandela and many political prisoners remained incarcerated in South Africa, other anti-Apartheid leaders fled South Africa and set up headquarters in a succession of supportive, independent African countries, including Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, and neighboring Mozambique where they continued the fight to end Apartheid. It was not until the 1980s, however, that this turmoil effectively cost the South African state significant losses in revenue, security, and international reputation. The international community had begun to take notice of the brutality of the Apartheid regime after white South African police opened fire on unarmed black protesters in the town of Sharpeville in 1960, killing 69 people and wounding 186 others.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#2_12964395
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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The African National Congress (ANC) and its offshoot, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), both of which envisioned a vastly different form of government based on majority rule, were outlawed in 1960 and many of its leaders imprisoned. The most famous prisoner was a leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, who had become a symbol of the anti-Apartheid struggle. While Mandela and many political prisoners remained incarcerated in South Africa, other anti-Apartheid leaders fled South Africa and set up headquarters in a succession of supportive, independent African countries, including Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, and neighboring Mozambique where they continued the fight to end Apartheid. It was not until the 1980s, however, that this turmoil effectively cost the South African state significant losses in revenue, security, and international reputation. The international community had begun to take notice of the brutality of the Apartheid regime after white South African police opened fire on unarmed black protesters in the town of Sharpeville in 1960, killing 69 people and wounding 186 others. The United Nations led the call for sanctions against the South African Government. Fearful of losing friends in Africa as de-colonization transformed the continent, powerful members of the Security Council, including Great Britain, France, and the United States, succeeded in watering down the proposals. However, by the late 1970s, grassroots movements in Europe and the United States succeeded in pressuring their governments into imposing economic and cultural sanctions on Pretoria. After the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, many large multinational companies withdrew from South Africa. By the late 1980s, the South African economy was struggling with the effects of the internal and external boycotts as well as the burden of its military commitment in occupying Namibia.
| 1,876 | 3,785 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#3_12966564
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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The United Nations led the call for sanctions against the South African Government. Fearful of losing friends in Africa as de-colonization transformed the continent, powerful members of the Security Council, including Great Britain, France, and the United States, succeeded in watering down the proposals. However, by the late 1970s, grassroots movements in Europe and the United States succeeded in pressuring their governments into imposing economic and cultural sanctions on Pretoria. After the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, many large multinational companies withdrew from South Africa. By the late 1980s, the South African economy was struggling with the effects of the internal and external boycotts as well as the burden of its military commitment in occupying Namibia. Defenders of the Apartheid regime, both inside and outside South Africa, had promoted it as a bulwark against communism. However, the end of the Cold War rendered this argument obsolete. South Africa had illegally occupied neighboring Namibia at the end of World War II, and since the mid-1970s, Pretoria had used it as a base to fight the communist party in Angola. The United States had even supported the South African Defense Force's efforts in Angola. In the 1980s, hard-line anti-communists in Washington continued to promote relations with the Apartheid government despite economic sanctions levied by the U.S. Congress.
| 2,972 | 4,413 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#4_12968265
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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Defenders of the Apartheid regime, both inside and outside South Africa, had promoted it as a bulwark against communism. However, the end of the Cold War rendered this argument obsolete. South Africa had illegally occupied neighboring Namibia at the end of World War II, and since the mid-1970s, Pretoria had used it as a base to fight the communist party in Angola. The United States had even supported the South African Defense Force's efforts in Angola. In the 1980s, hard-line anti-communists in Washington continued to promote relations with the Apartheid government despite economic sanctions levied by the U.S. Congress. However, the relaxation of Cold War tensions led to negotiations to settle the Cold War conflict in Angola. Pretoria's economic struggles gave the Apartheid leaders strong incentive to participate. When South Africa reached a multilateral agreement in 1988 to end its occupation of Namibia in return for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, even the most ardent anti-communists in the United States lost their justification for support of the Apartheid regime. The effects of the internal unrest and international condemnation led to dramatic changes beginning in 1989. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha resigned after it became clear that he had lost the faith of the ruling National Party (NP) for his failure to bring order to the country.
| 3,785 | 5,157 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#5_12969896
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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However, the relaxation of Cold War tensions led to negotiations to settle the Cold War conflict in Angola. Pretoria's economic struggles gave the Apartheid leaders strong incentive to participate. When South Africa reached a multilateral agreement in 1988 to end its occupation of Namibia in return for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, even the most ardent anti-communists in the United States lost their justification for support of the Apartheid regime. The effects of the internal unrest and international condemnation led to dramatic changes beginning in 1989. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha resigned after it became clear that he had lost the faith of the ruling National Party (NP) for his failure to bring order to the country. His successor, F W de Klerk, in a move that surprised observers, announced in his opening address to Parliament in February 1990 that he was lifting the ban on the ANC and other black liberation parties, allowing freedom of the press, and releasing political prisoners. The country waited in anticipation for the release of Nelson Mandela who walked out of prison after 27 years on February 11, 1990. The impact of Mandela's release reverberated throughout South Africa and the world. After speaking to throngs of supporters in Cape Town where he pledged to continue the struggle, but advocated peaceful change, Mandela took his message to the international media. He embarked on a world tour culminating in a visit to the United States where he spoke before a joint session of Congress.
| 4,414 | 5,945 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8415444#6_12971687
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm
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The End of Apartheid
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The End of Apartheid
The End of Apartheid
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His successor, F W de Klerk, in a move that surprised observers, announced in his opening address to Parliament in February 1990 that he was lifting the ban on the ANC and other black liberation parties, allowing freedom of the press, and releasing political prisoners. The country waited in anticipation for the release of Nelson Mandela who walked out of prison after 27 years on February 11, 1990. The impact of Mandela's release reverberated throughout South Africa and the world. After speaking to throngs of supporters in Cape Town where he pledged to continue the struggle, but advocated peaceful change, Mandela took his message to the international media. He embarked on a world tour culminating in a visit to the United States where he spoke before a joint session of Congress. After Prime Minister de Klerk agreed to democratic elections for the country, the United States lifted sanctions and increased foreign aid, and many of the U.S. companies who disinvested in the 1980s returned with new investments and joint ventures. In April 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected as South Africa's first black president.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8421968#0_12973067
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, commonly known as SALT II, began almost immediately after the first round ended in 1972. The negotiations led to a treaty on nuclear arms control that the United States and the Soviet Union signed in 1979. Although it was never ratified by the U.S. Senate, both countries adhered to the terms of the agreement. After the SALT I talks, which resulted in both a treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and an interim agreement limiting nuclear arms delivery systems, both sides agreed that there was an immediate need to transform the interim agreement into a formal treaty, which would further limit the development of new technologies and place lower ceilings on the overall number of missiles deployed. In particular, the development of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which made it possible to attach many warheads to a single missile, had created a situation in which limits placed on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) did not limit the number of nuclear warheads each government could deliver to targets. To address these concerns, two years after the SALT I agreement, U.S. President Gerald Ford and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev held a summit meeting at Vladivostok, during which they agreed on the basic tenets of the next SALT agreement and numerical limits for the number of strategic launch vehicles to be deployed by each country. Although the Vladivostok Accords set a limit of 2,400 total strategic launch vehicles for each country with the stipulation that 1,320 of these could be equipped with MIRVs, ongoing technological developments meant that further negotiations were still required to reach a formal treaty over arms control. During the mid-1970s, the United States was developing new cruise missiles, which were very accurate and would skim over the ground close to the earth, undetected by radar. The Soviet Union was also improving its technology, and building new "Backfire" bombers. When Jimmy Carter assumed the U.S. Presidency in 1977, he proposed a new set of arms limits that required much deeper cuts in total conventional and nuclear capability.
| 0 | 2,402 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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To address these concerns, two years after the SALT I agreement, U.S. President Gerald Ford and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev held a summit meeting at Vladivostok, during which they agreed on the basic tenets of the next SALT agreement and numerical limits for the number of strategic launch vehicles to be deployed by each country. Although the Vladivostok Accords set a limit of 2,400 total strategic launch vehicles for each country with the stipulation that 1,320 of these could be equipped with MIRVs, ongoing technological developments meant that further negotiations were still required to reach a formal treaty over arms control. During the mid-1970s, the United States was developing new cruise missiles, which were very accurate and would skim over the ground close to the earth, undetected by radar. The Soviet Union was also improving its technology, and building new "Backfire" bombers. When Jimmy Carter assumed the U.S. Presidency in 1977, he proposed a new set of arms limits that required much deeper cuts in total conventional and nuclear capability. He also suggested that any new agreement include limits on both U.S. cruise missiles and new Soviet bombers, or neither. Carter presented the new proposal even as he engaged in public criticism of the Soviet record on human rights, however. Both measures angered the Soviet leaders, and they refused to consider the proposal. Negotiations continued, but became subordinated to other issues, such as the completion of the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977 and the recognition of the People's Republic of China in late 1978. Finally, the two sides reached a consensus in 1979 and signed an agreement that was very similar to the terms to the Vladivostok Accords.
| 1,333 | 3,057 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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He also suggested that any new agreement include limits on both U.S. cruise missiles and new Soviet bombers, or neither. Carter presented the new proposal even as he engaged in public criticism of the Soviet record on human rights, however. Both measures angered the Soviet leaders, and they refused to consider the proposal. Negotiations continued, but became subordinated to other issues, such as the completion of the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977 and the recognition of the People's Republic of China in late 1978. Finally, the two sides reached a consensus in 1979 and signed an agreement that was very similar to the terms to the Vladivostok Accords. The agreement included a treaty and a protocol. The treaty set limits on the number of strategic launch vehicles each country could deploy, but then also set quotas for the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs that could carry MIRVs as well as further restrictions on the number of warheads that any one ICBM could carry. The two sides also agreed to limits on the number of launchers and bombers each country could maintain to deliver the missiles. The protocol banned either country from developing or deploying mobile ICBMs or cruise missiles with ranges longer than 375 miles. In addition to this treaty and protocol, SALT II also created a statement of principles to guide the next round of negotiations.
| 2,403 | 3,794 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8421968#3_12979822
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The agreement included a treaty and a protocol. The treaty set limits on the number of strategic launch vehicles each country could deploy, but then also set quotas for the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs that could carry MIRVs as well as further restrictions on the number of warheads that any one ICBM could carry. The two sides also agreed to limits on the number of launchers and bombers each country could maintain to deliver the missiles. The protocol banned either country from developing or deploying mobile ICBMs or cruise missiles with ranges longer than 375 miles. In addition to this treaty and protocol, SALT II also created a statement of principles to guide the next round of negotiations. In the end, limits on cruise missiles were included in the treaty, but the Soviet "Backfire" bomber was not. Informally, however, Brezhnev informed Carter that the Soviet Union would produce no more than 30 of the planes per year. The completed SALT II agreements faced steep opposition during the ensuing U.S. Senate battle over ratification. Opinions on the treaty and protocol varied widely. Some Senators supported the treaty and its ratification on the grounds that it was important to the process of arms control, and that approving each step would make it possible to make further gains in the future.
| 3,057 | 4,403 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8421968#4_12981571
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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In the end, limits on cruise missiles were included in the treaty, but the Soviet "Backfire" bomber was not. Informally, however, Brezhnev informed Carter that the Soviet Union would produce no more than 30 of the planes per year. The completed SALT II agreements faced steep opposition during the ensuing U.S. Senate battle over ratification. Opinions on the treaty and protocol varied widely. Some Senators supported the treaty and its ratification on the grounds that it was important to the process of arms control, and that approving each step would make it possible to make further gains in the future. Of those opposed to the treaty, some believed the treaty did not go far enough in setting limits and therefore did not represent a meaningful attempt at stopping the arms race, whereas others suggested that the terms of the treaty placed too many limits on the United States and could damage U.S. interests and security. Just when it seemed that the forces in favor of ratification would win out, however, Senator Frank Church announced the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, and demanded that the treaty not be considered until they were withdrawn. In fact, the troops had remained in Cuba as part of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, so this concern should not have caused such a delay in the passage of the agreement. That delay proved critical, however, as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, leading Carter to pull the treaty from consideration in protest against the action. Although the SALT II treaty was never ratified, both sides considered the limits it set important enough to their own security and the balance of power that they adhered to the terms anyway.
| 3,795 | 5,569 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979
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Of those opposed to the treaty, some believed the treaty did not go far enough in setting limits and therefore did not represent a meaningful attempt at stopping the arms race, whereas others suggested that the terms of the treaty placed too many limits on the United States and could damage U.S. interests and security. Just when it seemed that the forces in favor of ratification would win out, however, Senator Frank Church announced the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, and demanded that the treaty not be considered until they were withdrawn. In fact, the troops had remained in Cuba as part of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, so this concern should not have caused such a delay in the passage of the agreement. That delay proved critical, however, as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, leading Carter to pull the treaty from consideration in protest against the action. Although the SALT II treaty was never ratified, both sides considered the limits it set important enough to their own security and the balance of power that they adhered to the terms anyway. Even the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in the United States and a series of leadership changes in the Soviet Union did not derail the two nations from observing the terms of the agreement. The two rounds of SALT negotiations were followed by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START, which began in the late 1980s.
| 4,404 | 5,898 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8428257#0_12985645
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/104253.htm
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
On March 23, 1983 in a televised address to the nation, U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced his intention to embark upon groundbreaking research into a national defense system that could make nuclear weapons obsolete. The research took a number of forms which collectively were called the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. The heart of the SDI program was a plan to develop a space-based missile defense program that could protect the country from a large-scale nuclear attack. The proposal involved many layers of technology that would enable the United States to identify and destroy automatically a large number of incoming ballistic missiles as they were launched, as they flew, and as they approached their targets. The idea was dependent on futuristic technology, including space-based laser systems that had not yet been developed, although the idea had been portrayed as real in science fiction. As a result, critics of the proposal nicknamed SDI "Star Wars" after the movie of the same name. There were several reasons why the Reagan Administration was interested in pursuing the technology in the early 1980s. One was to silence domestic critics concerned about the level of defense spending. Reagan described the SDI system as a way to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack; once the system was developed, its existence would benefit everyone.
| 0 | 1,473 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/104253.htm
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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As a result, critics of the proposal nicknamed SDI "Star Wars" after the movie of the same name. There were several reasons why the Reagan Administration was interested in pursuing the technology in the early 1980s. One was to silence domestic critics concerned about the level of defense spending. Reagan described the SDI system as a way to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack; once the system was developed, its existence would benefit everyone. In this way, it could also be portrayed as a peace initiative that warranted the sacrifice of funds from other programs. Privately, Reagan was quite adamant that the goal of U.S. defense research should be to eliminate the need for nuclear weapons, which he thought were fundamentally immoral. In terms of the Cold War conflict with the Soviets, a successful defense system would destroy the Soviet ability to make a first strike, which in turn would undermine the USSR's ability to pose a threat to the United States at all. So success in this area, supporters of SDI argued, could potentially also bring an end to the Cold War. Criticism of the SDI initiative was widespread, however, and it took several forms beyond general skepticism about the feasibility of the technology.
| 1,022 | 2,253 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/104253.htm
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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In this way, it could also be portrayed as a peace initiative that warranted the sacrifice of funds from other programs. Privately, Reagan was quite adamant that the goal of U.S. defense research should be to eliminate the need for nuclear weapons, which he thought were fundamentally immoral. In terms of the Cold War conflict with the Soviets, a successful defense system would destroy the Soviet ability to make a first strike, which in turn would undermine the USSR's ability to pose a threat to the United States at all. So success in this area, supporters of SDI argued, could potentially also bring an end to the Cold War. Criticism of the SDI initiative was widespread, however, and it took several forms beyond general skepticism about the feasibility of the technology. First, research and development for such a complicated project inevitably came with a very high price tag. Many critics of SDI wondered why the Reagan Administration was willing to spend so much money on a defense system that might never work, and expressed alarm that the funding for SDI came at the cost of social programs like education and health care. Moreover, there was no way to test such a system without exposing the world to a very dangerous attack. Second, the very idea of guarding against nuclear attack struck at the heart of the theory of deterrence. If one nuclear power no longer had to fear nuclear attack, then there would be no fear of retaliation to stop it from making the first strike against another.
| 1,474 | 2,979 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/104253.htm
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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First, research and development for such a complicated project inevitably came with a very high price tag. Many critics of SDI wondered why the Reagan Administration was willing to spend so much money on a defense system that might never work, and expressed alarm that the funding for SDI came at the cost of social programs like education and health care. Moreover, there was no way to test such a system without exposing the world to a very dangerous attack. Second, the very idea of guarding against nuclear attack struck at the heart of the theory of deterrence. If one nuclear power no longer had to fear nuclear attack, then there would be no fear of retaliation to stop it from making the first strike against another. In fact, if the Soviet Union thought that the United States was on the verge of deploying a comprehensive defense system, some argued, it might feel forced to attack before the United States could complete the system; this possibility meant that developing the system could actually contribute to U.S. insecurity, not the other way around. Third, critics both in the United States and around the world called the SDI initiative a clear violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. That treaty had committed the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from developing missile defense systems in order to prevent a new and costly arms race. The Strategic Defense Initiative appeared to be a missile defense system by another name.
| 2,254 | 3,721 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/104253.htm
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983
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In fact, if the Soviet Union thought that the United States was on the verge of deploying a comprehensive defense system, some argued, it might feel forced to attack before the United States could complete the system; this possibility meant that developing the system could actually contribute to U.S. insecurity, not the other way around. Third, critics both in the United States and around the world called the SDI initiative a clear violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. That treaty had committed the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from developing missile defense systems in order to prevent a new and costly arms race. The Strategic Defense Initiative appeared to be a missile defense system by another name. The Soviet Union expressed its concerns about SDI almost as soon as it learned of it, and the prospect of the United States developing the defense system thus became a hindrance in the pursuit of future arms negotiations between the two powers. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev linked his demands that the United States drop SDI to the negotiations for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). Over the course of the 1980s, Reagan's refusal to give up SDI became the sticking point that prevented the two countries from reaching a deal on other arms control measures, and it was only when the two sides agreed to delink defense and intermediate-range forces discussions that they managed to sign the INF Treaty. START was completed after Reagan left office, and government commitment to the SDI project waned.
| 2,980 | 4,596 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17672.htm
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
On the night of November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall—the most potent symbol of the cold-war division of Europe—came down. Earlier that day, the Communist authorities of the German Democratic Republic had announced the removal of travel restrictions to democratic West Berlin. Thousands of East Germans streamed into the West, and in the course of the night, celebrants on both sides of the wall began to tear it down. The collapse of the Berlin Wall was the culminating point of the revolutionary changes sweeping East Central Europe in 1989. Throughout the Soviet bloc, reformers assumed power and ended over 40 years of dictatorial Communist rule. The reform movement that ended communism in East Central Europe began in Poland. Solidarity, an anti-Communist trade union and social movement, had forced Poland’s Communist government to recognize it in 1980 through a wave of strikes that gained international attention. In 1981, Poland’s Communist authorities, under pressure from Moscow, declared martial law, arrested Solidarity’s leaders, and banned the democratic trade union. The ban did not bring an end to Solidarity. The movement simply went underground, and the rebellious Poles organized their own civil society, separate from the Communist government and its edicts.
| 0 | 1,389 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17672.htm
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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The reform movement that ended communism in East Central Europe began in Poland. Solidarity, an anti-Communist trade union and social movement, had forced Poland’s Communist government to recognize it in 1980 through a wave of strikes that gained international attention. In 1981, Poland’s Communist authorities, under pressure from Moscow, declared martial law, arrested Solidarity’s leaders, and banned the democratic trade union. The ban did not bring an end to Solidarity. The movement simply went underground, and the rebellious Poles organized their own civil society, separate from the Communist government and its edicts. In 1985, the assumption of power in the Soviet Union by a reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev, paved the way for political and economic reforms in East Central Europe. Gorbachev abandoned the “Brezhnev Doctrine” — the Soviet Union’s policy of intervening with military force, if necessary, to preserve Communist rule in the region. Instead, he encouraged the local Communist leaders to seek new ways of gaining popular support for their rule. In Hungary, the Communist government initiated reforms in 1989 that led to the sanctioning of a multiparty system and competitive elections. In Poland, the Communists entered into round-table talks with a reinvigorated Solidarity.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17672.htm
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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In 1985, the assumption of power in the Soviet Union by a reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev, paved the way for political and economic reforms in East Central Europe. Gorbachev abandoned the “Brezhnev Doctrine” — the Soviet Union’s policy of intervening with military force, if necessary, to preserve Communist rule in the region. Instead, he encouraged the local Communist leaders to seek new ways of gaining popular support for their rule. In Hungary, the Communist government initiated reforms in 1989 that led to the sanctioning of a multiparty system and competitive elections. In Poland, the Communists entered into round-table talks with a reinvigorated Solidarity. As a result, Poland held its first competitive elections since before World War II, and in 1989, Solidarity formed the first non-Communist government within the Soviet bloc since 1948. Inspired by their neighbors’ reforms, East Germans took to the streets in the summer and fall of 1989 to call for reforms, including freedom to visit West Berlin and West Germany. Moscow’s refusal to use military force to buoy the regime of East German leader Erich Honecker led to his replacement and the initiation of political reforms, leading up to the fateful decision to open the border crossings on the night of November 9, 1989. In the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Czechs and Slovaks took to the streets to demand political reforms in Czechoslovakia. Leading the demonstrations in Prague was dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, co-founder of the reform group Charter 77.
| 1,389 | 2,930 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17672.htm
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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As a result, Poland held its first competitive elections since before World War II, and in 1989, Solidarity formed the first non-Communist government within the Soviet bloc since 1948. Inspired by their neighbors’ reforms, East Germans took to the streets in the summer and fall of 1989 to call for reforms, including freedom to visit West Berlin and West Germany. Moscow’s refusal to use military force to buoy the regime of East German leader Erich Honecker led to his replacement and the initiation of political reforms, leading up to the fateful decision to open the border crossings on the night of November 9, 1989. In the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Czechs and Slovaks took to the streets to demand political reforms in Czechoslovakia. Leading the demonstrations in Prague was dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, co-founder of the reform group Charter 77. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia quietly and peacefully transferred rule to Havel and the Czechoslovak reformers in what was later dubbed the “Velvet Revolution.” In Romania, the Communist regime of hardliner Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown by popular protest and force of arms in December 1989. Soon, the Communist parties of Bulgaria and Albania also ceded power. The revolutions of 1989 marked the death knell of communism in Europe. As a result, not only was Germany reunified in 1990, but soon, revolution spread to the Soviet Union itself.
| 2,056 | 3,482 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17672.htm
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989
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The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia quietly and peacefully transferred rule to Havel and the Czechoslovak reformers in what was later dubbed the “Velvet Revolution.” In Romania, the Communist regime of hardliner Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown by popular protest and force of arms in December 1989. Soon, the Communist parties of Bulgaria and Albania also ceded power. The revolutions of 1989 marked the death knell of communism in Europe. As a result, not only was Germany reunified in 1990, but soon, revolution spread to the Soviet Union itself. After surviving a hard line coup attempt in 1991, Gorbachev was forced to cede power in Russia to Boris Yeltsin, who oversaw the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The collapse of communism in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union marked the end of the cold war. The U.S. long-term policy of containing Soviet expansion while encouraging democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe through scientific and cultural exchanges, information policy (e.g., Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty), and the United States’ own example, provided invaluable support to the peoples of East Central Europe in their struggle for freedom.
| 2,931 | 4,109 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8437643#0_13003159
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/82205.htm
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson went before a joint session of Congress to request a declaration of war against Germany. Wilson cited Germany's violation of its pledge to suspend unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and its attempts to entice Mexico into an alliance against the United States, as his reasons for declaring war. On April 4, 1917, the U.S. Senate voted in support of the measure to declare war on Germany. The House concurred two days later. The United States later declared war on Austria-Hungary on December 7, 1917. Germany's resumption of submarine attacks on passenger and merchant ships in 1917 was the primary motivation behind Wilson's decision to lead the United States into World War I. Following the sinking of an unarmed French boat, the Sussex, in the English Channel in March 1916, Wilson had threatened to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, unless the German Government refrained from attacking all passenger ships, and allowed the crews of enemy merchant vessels to escape from their ships prior to any attack. On May 4, 1916, the German Government had accepted these terms and conditions in what came to be known as the " Sussex pledge." By January 1917, however, the situation in Germany had changed. During a wartime conference that month, representatives from the German navy convinced the military leadership and Kaiser Wilhelm II that a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare could help defeat Great Britain within five months. German policymakers argued that they could violate the "Sussex pledge," because the United States could no longer be considered a neutral party after supplying munitions and financial assistance to the Allies.
| 0 | 1,841 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8437643#1_13005343
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/82205.htm
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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Germany's resumption of submarine attacks on passenger and merchant ships in 1917 was the primary motivation behind Wilson's decision to lead the United States into World War I. Following the sinking of an unarmed French boat, the Sussex, in the English Channel in March 1916, Wilson had threatened to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, unless the German Government refrained from attacking all passenger ships, and allowed the crews of enemy merchant vessels to escape from their ships prior to any attack. On May 4, 1916, the German Government had accepted these terms and conditions in what came to be known as the " Sussex pledge." By January 1917, however, the situation in Germany had changed. During a wartime conference that month, representatives from the German navy convinced the military leadership and Kaiser Wilhelm II that a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare could help defeat Great Britain within five months. German policymakers argued that they could violate the "Sussex pledge," because the United States could no longer be considered a neutral party after supplying munitions and financial assistance to the Allies. Germany also believed that the United States had jeopardized its neutrality by acquiescing to the Allied blockade of Germany. Germany's Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, protested this decision, as he believed that resuming submarine warfare would draw the United States into the war on behalf of the Allies. This, he argued, would lead to the defeat of Germany. Despite these warnings, the German Government decided to resume unrestricted submarine attacks on all Allied and neutral shipping within prescribed war zones, reckoning that German submarines would end the war long before the first American troopship arrived in Europe. Accordingly, on January 31, 1917, the German Ambassador to the United States, Count Johann von Bernstorff, presented U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing with a note declaring Germany's intention to restart unrestricted submarine warfare the following day.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/82205.htm
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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Germany also believed that the United States had jeopardized its neutrality by acquiescing to the Allied blockade of Germany. Germany's Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, protested this decision, as he believed that resuming submarine warfare would draw the United States into the war on behalf of the Allies. This, he argued, would lead to the defeat of Germany. Despite these warnings, the German Government decided to resume unrestricted submarine attacks on all Allied and neutral shipping within prescribed war zones, reckoning that German submarines would end the war long before the first American troopship arrived in Europe. Accordingly, on January 31, 1917, the German Ambassador to the United States, Count Johann von Bernstorff, presented U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing with a note declaring Germany's intention to restart unrestricted submarine warfare the following day. Stunned by the news, President Wilson went before Congress on February 3 to announce that he had severed diplomatic relations with Germany. However, he refrained from asking for a declaration of war because he doubted that the American public would support him unless there was ample proof that Germany intended to attack U.S. ships with no warning. Wilson left open the possibility of negotiating with Germany if its submarines refrained from attacking American shipping. Nevertheless, throughout February and March 1917, German submarines targeted and sunk several American ships, and many American passengers and seamen died. On February 26, Wilson asked Congress for authority to arm American merchant ships with U.S. naval personnel and equipment.
| 1,842 | 3,495 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8437643#3_13009674
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/82205.htm
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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Stunned by the news, President Wilson went before Congress on February 3 to announce that he had severed diplomatic relations with Germany. However, he refrained from asking for a declaration of war because he doubted that the American public would support him unless there was ample proof that Germany intended to attack U.S. ships with no warning. Wilson left open the possibility of negotiating with Germany if its submarines refrained from attacking American shipping. Nevertheless, throughout February and March 1917, German submarines targeted and sunk several American ships, and many American passengers and seamen died. On February 26, Wilson asked Congress for authority to arm American merchant ships with U.S. naval personnel and equipment. While the measure would probably have passed in a vote, several anti-war Senators led a successful filibuster that consumed the remainder of the Congressional session. Despite the rebuff from Congress, Wilson decided to arm American merchant ships by executive order, claiming that an old anti-piracy law gave him the authority to do so. While Wilson weighed his options regarding the submarine issue, he also had to address the question of Germany's attempts to cement a secret alliance with Mexico. On January 19, 1917, British naval intelligence intercepted and decrypted a telegram sent by German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman to the German Ambassador in Mexico City. The "Zimmerman Telegram" promised the Mexican Government that Germany would help Mexico recover the territory it had ceded to the United States following the Mexican-American War.
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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While the measure would probably have passed in a vote, several anti-war Senators led a successful filibuster that consumed the remainder of the Congressional session. Despite the rebuff from Congress, Wilson decided to arm American merchant ships by executive order, claiming that an old anti-piracy law gave him the authority to do so. While Wilson weighed his options regarding the submarine issue, he also had to address the question of Germany's attempts to cement a secret alliance with Mexico. On January 19, 1917, British naval intelligence intercepted and decrypted a telegram sent by German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman to the German Ambassador in Mexico City. The "Zimmerman Telegram" promised the Mexican Government that Germany would help Mexico recover the territory it had ceded to the United States following the Mexican-American War. In return for this assistance, the Germans asked for Mexican support in the war. The British had initially not shared the news of the Zimmerman Telegram with U.S. officials, because they did not want the Germans to discover that British code breakers had cracked the German code. However, following Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, the British decided to use the note to help sway American official and public opinion to join the war. The British finally forwarded the intercept to Wilson on February 24. The American press carried the story the following week.
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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In return for this assistance, the Germans asked for Mexican support in the war. The British had initially not shared the news of the Zimmerman Telegram with U.S. officials, because they did not want the Germans to discover that British code breakers had cracked the German code. However, following Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, the British decided to use the note to help sway American official and public opinion to join the war. The British finally forwarded the intercept to Wilson on February 24. The American press carried the story the following week. Despite the shocking news of the Zimmerman Telegram, Wilson still hesitated to ask for a declaration of war. He waited until March 20 before convening a Cabinet meeting to broach the matter--almost a month after he had first seen the telegram. The precise reasons for Wilson's decision to choose war in 1917 remain the subject of debate among historians, especially in light of his efforts to avoid war in 1915 after the sinking of the British passenger liners Lusitania and Arabic, which had led to the deaths of 131 Americans. However, by 1917, the continued submarine attacks on American merchant and passenger ships, and the "Zimmerman Telegram's" implied threat of a German attack on the United States, had served to sway American public opinion in support of a declaration of war. Furthermore, international law stipulated that the placing of U.S. naval personnel on civilian ships to protect them from German submarines already constituted an act of war against Germany.
| 4,352 | 5,926 |
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
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American Entry into World War I, 1917
American Entry into World War I, 1917
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Despite the shocking news of the Zimmerman Telegram, Wilson still hesitated to ask for a declaration of war. He waited until March 20 before convening a Cabinet meeting to broach the matter--almost a month after he had first seen the telegram. The precise reasons for Wilson's decision to choose war in 1917 remain the subject of debate among historians, especially in light of his efforts to avoid war in 1915 after the sinking of the British passenger liners Lusitania and Arabic, which had led to the deaths of 131 Americans. However, by 1917, the continued submarine attacks on American merchant and passenger ships, and the "Zimmerman Telegram's" implied threat of a German attack on the United States, had served to sway American public opinion in support of a declaration of war. Furthermore, international law stipulated that the placing of U.S. naval personnel on civilian ships to protect them from German submarines already constituted an act of war against Germany. Finally, the Germans, by their actions, had demonstrated that they had no interest in seeking an end to the conflict. These reasons all contributed to President Wilson's decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. They also encouraged Congress to grant Wilson's request and formally declare war on Germany.
| 4,948 | 6,256 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8444206#0_13016867
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/89875.htm
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
In 1919, the Big Four met in Paris to negotiate the Treaty: Lloyd George of Britain, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the U.S.
The Paris Peace Conference was an international meeting convened in January 1919 at Versailles just outside Paris. The purpose of the meeting was to establish the terms of the peace after World War. Though nearly thirty nations participated, the representatives of Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy became known as the "Big Four." The "Big Four" would dominate the proceedings that led to the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles, a treaty that articulated the compromises reached at the conference. The Treaty of Versailles included a plan to form a League of Nations that would serve as an international forum and an international collective security arrangement. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was a strong advocate of the League as he believed it would prevent future wars. Negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference were not always easy. Great Britain, France, and Italy fought together during the First World War as Allied Powers. The United States, entered the war in April 1917 as an Associated Power, and while it fought on the side of the Allies, it was not bound to honor pre-existing agreements between the Allied powers.
| 0 | 1,476 |
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Treaty of Versailles included a plan to form a League of Nations that would serve as an international forum and an international collective security arrangement. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was a strong advocate of the League as he believed it would prevent future wars. Negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference were not always easy. Great Britain, France, and Italy fought together during the First World War as Allied Powers. The United States, entered the war in April 1917 as an Associated Power, and while it fought on the side of the Allies, it was not bound to honor pre-existing agreements between the Allied powers. These agreements tended to focus on postwar redistribution of territories. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson strongly opposed many of these arrangements, including Italian demands on the Adriatic. This often led to significant disagreements among the "Big Four." Treaty negotiations were also weakened by the absence of other important nations. Russia had fought as one of the Allies until December 1917, when its new Bolshevik Government withdrew from the war.
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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These agreements tended to focus on postwar redistribution of territories. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson strongly opposed many of these arrangements, including Italian demands on the Adriatic. This often led to significant disagreements among the "Big Four." Treaty negotiations were also weakened by the absence of other important nations. Russia had fought as one of the Allies until December 1917, when its new Bolshevik Government withdrew from the war. The Allied Powers refused to recognize the new Bolshevik Government and thus did not invite its representatives to the Peace Conference. The Allies were angered by the Bolshevik decision to repudiate Russia's outstanding financial debts to the Allies and to publish the texts of secret agreements between the Allies concerning the postwar period. The Allies also excluded the defeated Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria). According to French and British wishes, Germany was subjected to strict punitive measures under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The new German government was required to surrender approximately 10 percent of its prewar territory in Europe and all of its overseas possessions.
| 1,477 | 2,667 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/89875.htm
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Allied Powers refused to recognize the new Bolshevik Government and thus did not invite its representatives to the Peace Conference. The Allies were angered by the Bolshevik decision to repudiate Russia's outstanding financial debts to the Allies and to publish the texts of secret agreements between the Allies concerning the postwar period. The Allies also excluded the defeated Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria). According to French and British wishes, Germany was subjected to strict punitive measures under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The new German government was required to surrender approximately 10 percent of its prewar territory in Europe and all of its overseas possessions. The harbor city of Danzig (now Gdansk) and the coal-rich Saarland were placed under the administration of the League of Nations, and France was allowed to exploit the economic resources of the Saarland until 1935. The German Army and Navy were limited in size. Kaiser Wilhelm II and a number of other high-ranking German officials were to be tried as war criminals. Under the terms of Article 231 of the treaty, the Germans accepted responsibility for the war and, as such, were liable to pay financial reparations to the Allies, though the actual amount would be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission that would present its findings in 1921 (the amount they determined was 132 billion gold Reichmarks, or $32 billion, which came on top of an initial $5 billion payment demanded by the treaty). Germans would grow to resent these harsh conditions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.
| 1,935 | 3,554 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/89875.htm
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The harbor city of Danzig (now Gdansk) and the coal-rich Saarland were placed under the administration of the League of Nations, and France was allowed to exploit the economic resources of the Saarland until 1935. The German Army and Navy were limited in size. Kaiser Wilhelm II and a number of other high-ranking German officials were to be tried as war criminals. Under the terms of Article 231 of the treaty, the Germans accepted responsibility for the war and, as such, were liable to pay financial reparations to the Allies, though the actual amount would be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission that would present its findings in 1921 (the amount they determined was 132 billion gold Reichmarks, or $32 billion, which came on top of an initial $5 billion payment demanded by the treaty). Germans would grow to resent these harsh conditions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. While the Treaty of Versailles did not present a peace agreement that satisfied all parties concerned, by the time President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States in July 1919, American public opinion was overwhelming in favor of ratifying the treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that 32 state legislatures passed resolutions in favor of the treaty, there was intense opposition to it within the U.S. Senate. Senate opposition to the Treaty of Versailles cited Article 10 of the treaty, which dealt with collective security and the League of Nations. This article, opponents argued, ceded the war powers of the U.S. Government to the League's Council. The opposition came from two groups:
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/89875.htm
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
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While the Treaty of Versailles did not present a peace agreement that satisfied all parties concerned, by the time President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States in July 1919, American public opinion was overwhelming in favor of ratifying the treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that 32 state legislatures passed resolutions in favor of the treaty, there was intense opposition to it within the U.S. Senate. Senate opposition to the Treaty of Versailles cited Article 10 of the treaty, which dealt with collective security and the League of Nations. This article, opponents argued, ceded the war powers of the U.S. Government to the League's Council. The opposition came from two groups: the "Irreconcilables," who refused to join the League of Nations under any circumstances, and "Reservationists," led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Henry Cabot Lodge, who were willing to ratify the treaty with amendments. While Lodge was defeated in his attempt to pass amendments to the Treaty in September, he did manage to attach 14 "reservations" to it in November. In a final vote on March 19, 1920, the Treaty of Versailles fell short of ratification by seven votes. Consequently, the U.S. Government signed the Treaty of Berlin on August 25, 1921. This was a separate peace treaty with Germany that stipulated that the United States would enjoy all "rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages" conferred to it by the Treaty of Versailles, but left out any mention of the League of Nations, which the United States never joined.
| 3,554 | 5,174 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8449744#0_13027733
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/104429.htm
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference, 1943
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference was a meeting between U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in Tehran, Iran, between November 28 and December 1, 1943. During the Conference, the three leaders coordinated their military strategy against Germany and Japan and made a number of important decisions concerning the post World War II era. The most notable achievements of the Conference focused on the next phases of the war against the Axis powers in Europe and Asia. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin engaged in discussions concerning the terms under which the British and Americans finally committed to launching Operation Overlord, an invasion of northern France, to be executed by May of 1944. The Soviets, who had long been pushing the Allies to open a second front, agreed to launch another major offensive on the Eastern Front that would divert German troops away from the Allied campaign in northern France. Stalin also agreed in principle that the Soviet Union would declare war against Japan following an Allied victory over Germany. In exchange for a Soviet declaration of war against Japan, Roosevelt conceded to Stalin's demands for the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin, and access to the ice-free ports of Darien (Dalian) and Port Arthur (L�shun Port) located on the Liaodong Peninsula in northern China. The exact details concerning this deal were not finalized, however, until the Yalta Conference of 1945. At Tehran, the three Allied leaders also discussed important issues concerning the fate of Eastern Europe and Germany in the postwar period. Stalin pressed for a revision of Poland's eastern border with the Soviet Union to match the line set by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1920.
| 0 | 1,878 |
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference, 1943
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Stalin also agreed in principle that the Soviet Union would declare war against Japan following an Allied victory over Germany. In exchange for a Soviet declaration of war against Japan, Roosevelt conceded to Stalin's demands for the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin, and access to the ice-free ports of Darien (Dalian) and Port Arthur (L�shun Port) located on the Liaodong Peninsula in northern China. The exact details concerning this deal were not finalized, however, until the Yalta Conference of 1945. At Tehran, the three Allied leaders also discussed important issues concerning the fate of Eastern Europe and Germany in the postwar period. Stalin pressed for a revision of Poland's eastern border with the Soviet Union to match the line set by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1920. In order to compensate Poland for the resulting loss of territory, the three leaders agreed to move the German-Polish border to the Oder and Neisse rivers. This decision was not formally ratified, however, until the Potsdam Conference of 1945. During these negotiations Roosevelt also secured from Stalin his assurance that the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would be reincorporated into the Soviet Union only after the citizens of each republic voted on the question in a referendum. Stalin stressed, however, that that the matter would have to be resolved "in accordance with the Soviet constitution," and that he would not consent to any international control over the elections. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin also broached the question of the possible postwar partition of Germany into Allied zones of occupation and agreed to have the European Advisory Commission "carefully study the question of dismemberment" before any final decision was taken.
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference, 1943
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In order to compensate Poland for the resulting loss of territory, the three leaders agreed to move the German-Polish border to the Oder and Neisse rivers. This decision was not formally ratified, however, until the Potsdam Conference of 1945. During these negotiations Roosevelt also secured from Stalin his assurance that the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would be reincorporated into the Soviet Union only after the citizens of each republic voted on the question in a referendum. Stalin stressed, however, that that the matter would have to be resolved "in accordance with the Soviet constitution," and that he would not consent to any international control over the elections. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin also broached the question of the possible postwar partition of Germany into Allied zones of occupation and agreed to have the European Advisory Commission "carefully study the question of dismemberment" before any final decision was taken. Broader international cooperation also became a central theme of the negotiations at Tehran. Roosevelt and Stalin privately discussed the composition of the United Nations. During the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers in October and November of 1943, the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union had signed a four-power declaration whose fourth point called for the creation of a "general international organization" designed to promote "international peace and security." At Tehran, Roosevelt outlined for Stalin his vision of the proposed organization in which the future United Nations would be dominated by "four policemen" (the United States, Britain, China, and Soviet Union) who "would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires action." Finally, the three leaders issued a "Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran."
| 1,879 | 3,760 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/104429.htm
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference, 1943
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Broader international cooperation also became a central theme of the negotiations at Tehran. Roosevelt and Stalin privately discussed the composition of the United Nations. During the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers in October and November of 1943, the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union had signed a four-power declaration whose fourth point called for the creation of a "general international organization" designed to promote "international peace and security." At Tehran, Roosevelt outlined for Stalin his vision of the proposed organization in which the future United Nations would be dominated by "four policemen" (the United States, Britain, China, and Soviet Union) who "would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires action." Finally, the three leaders issued a "Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran." Within it, they thanked the Iranian Government for its assistance in the war against Germany and promised to provide it with economic assistance both during and after the war. Most importantly, the U.S., British, and Soviet Governments stated that they all shared a "desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran." Roosevelt secured many of his objectives during the Conference. The Soviet Union had committed to joining the war against Japan and expressed support for Roosevelt's plans for the United Nations. Most importantly, Roosevelt believed that he had won Stalin's confidence by proving that the United States was willing to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union and, most importantly, by guaranteeing the opening of the second front in France by the spring of 1944.
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
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The Tehran Conference, 1943
The Tehran Conference, 1943
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Within it, they thanked the Iranian Government for its assistance in the war against Germany and promised to provide it with economic assistance both during and after the war. Most importantly, the U.S., British, and Soviet Governments stated that they all shared a "desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran." Roosevelt secured many of his objectives during the Conference. The Soviet Union had committed to joining the war against Japan and expressed support for Roosevelt's plans for the United Nations. Most importantly, Roosevelt believed that he had won Stalin's confidence by proving that the United States was willing to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union and, most importantly, by guaranteeing the opening of the second front in France by the spring of 1944. However, Stalin also gained tentative concessions on Eastern Europe that would be confirmed during the later wartime conferences.
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
Although relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had been strained in the years before World War II, the U.S.-Soviet alliance of 1941-1945 was marked by a great degree of cooperation and was essential to securing the defeat of Nazi Germany. Without the remarkable efforts of the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front, the United States and Great Britain would have been hard pressed to score a decisive military victory over Nazi Germany. As late as 1939, it seemed highly improbable that the United States and the Soviet Union would forge an alliance. U.S.-Soviet relations had soured significantly following Stalin's decision to sign a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August of 1939. The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September and the "Winter War" against Finland in December led President Franklin Roosevelt to condemn the Soviet Union publicly as a "dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world," and to impose a "moral embargo" on the export of certain products to the Soviets. Nevertheless, in spite of intense pressure to sever relations with the Soviet Union, Roosevelt never lost sight of the fact that Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, posed the greatest threat to world peace. In order to defeat that threat, Roosevelt confided that he "would hold hands with the devil" if necessary. Following the Nazi defeat of France in June of 1940, Roosevelt grew wary of the increasing aggression of the Germans and made some diplomatic moves to improve relations with the Soviets. Beginning in July of 1940, a series of negotiations took place in Washington between Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky. Welles refused to accede to Soviet demands that the United States recognize the changed borders of the Soviet Union after the Soviet seizure of territory in Finland, Poland, and Romania and the reincorporation of the Baltic Republics in August 1940, but the U.S. Government did lift the embargo in January 1941.
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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Nevertheless, in spite of intense pressure to sever relations with the Soviet Union, Roosevelt never lost sight of the fact that Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, posed the greatest threat to world peace. In order to defeat that threat, Roosevelt confided that he "would hold hands with the devil" if necessary. Following the Nazi defeat of France in June of 1940, Roosevelt grew wary of the increasing aggression of the Germans and made some diplomatic moves to improve relations with the Soviets. Beginning in July of 1940, a series of negotiations took place in Washington between Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky. Welles refused to accede to Soviet demands that the United States recognize the changed borders of the Soviet Union after the Soviet seizure of territory in Finland, Poland, and Romania and the reincorporation of the Baltic Republics in August 1940, but the U.S. Government did lift the embargo in January 1941. Furthermore, in March of 1941, Welles warned Oumansky of a future Nazi attack against the Soviet Union. Finally, during the Congressional debate concerning the passage of the Lend-Lease bill in early 1941, Roosevelt blocked attempts to exclude the Soviet Union from receiving U.S. assistance. The most important factor in swaying the Soviets eventually to enter into an alliance with the United States was the Nazi decision to launch its invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. President Roosevelt responded by dispatching his trusted aide Harry Lloyd Hopkins to Moscow in order to assess the Soviet military situation. Although the War Department had warned the President that the Soviets would not last more than six weeks, after two one-on-one meetings with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, Hopkins urged Roosevelt to assist the Soviets.
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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Furthermore, in March of 1941, Welles warned Oumansky of a future Nazi attack against the Soviet Union. Finally, during the Congressional debate concerning the passage of the Lend-Lease bill in early 1941, Roosevelt blocked attempts to exclude the Soviet Union from receiving U.S. assistance. The most important factor in swaying the Soviets eventually to enter into an alliance with the United States was the Nazi decision to launch its invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. President Roosevelt responded by dispatching his trusted aide Harry Lloyd Hopkins to Moscow in order to assess the Soviet military situation. Although the War Department had warned the President that the Soviets would not last more than six weeks, after two one-on-one meetings with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, Hopkins urged Roosevelt to assist the Soviets. By the end of October, the first Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union was on its way. The United States entered the war as a belligerent in late 1941 and thus began coordinating directly with the Soviets, and the British, as allies. Several issues arose during the war that threatened the alliance. These included the Soviet refusal to aide the Polish Home Army during the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944, and the decision of British and U.S. officials to exclude the Soviets from secret negotiations with German officers in March of 1945 in an effort to secure the surrender of German troops in Italy. The most important disagreement, however, was over the opening of a second front in the West.
| 2,108 | 3,641 |
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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By the end of October, the first Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union was on its way. The United States entered the war as a belligerent in late 1941 and thus began coordinating directly with the Soviets, and the British, as allies. Several issues arose during the war that threatened the alliance. These included the Soviet refusal to aide the Polish Home Army during the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944, and the decision of British and U.S. officials to exclude the Soviets from secret negotiations with German officers in March of 1945 in an effort to secure the surrender of German troops in Italy. The most important disagreement, however, was over the opening of a second front in the West. Stalin's troops struggled to hold the Eastern front against the Nazi forces, and the Soviets began pleading for a British invasion of France immediately after the Nazi invasion in 1941. In 1942, Roosevelt unwisely promised the Soviets that the Allies would open the second front that autumn. Although Stalin only grumbled when the invasion was postponed until 1943, he exploded the following year when the invasion was postponed again until May of 1944. In retaliation, Stalin recalled his ambassadors from London and Washington and fears soon arose that the Soviets might seek a separate peace with Germany. In spite of these differences, the defeat of Nazi Germany was a joint endeavor that could not have been accomplished without close cooperation and shared sacrifices.
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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Stalin's troops struggled to hold the Eastern front against the Nazi forces, and the Soviets began pleading for a British invasion of France immediately after the Nazi invasion in 1941. In 1942, Roosevelt unwisely promised the Soviets that the Allies would open the second front that autumn. Although Stalin only grumbled when the invasion was postponed until 1943, he exploded the following year when the invasion was postponed again until May of 1944. In retaliation, Stalin recalled his ambassadors from London and Washington and fears soon arose that the Soviets might seek a separate peace with Germany. In spite of these differences, the defeat of Nazi Germany was a joint endeavor that could not have been accomplished without close cooperation and shared sacrifices. Militarily, the Soviets fought valiantly and suffered staggering casualties on the Eastern Front. When Great Britain and the United States finally invaded northern France in 1944, the Allies were finally able to drain Nazi Germany of its strength on two fronts. Finally, two devastating atomic bomb attacks against Japan by the United States, coupled with the Soviets' decision to break their neutrality pact with Japan by invading Manchuria, finally led to the end of the war in the Pacific. Furthermore, during the wartime conferences at Tehran and Yalta, Roosevelt secured political concessions from Stalin and Soviet participation in the United Nations. While President Roosevelt harbored no illusions about Soviet designs in Eastern Europe, it was his great hope that if the United States made a sincere effort to satisfy legitimate Soviet security requirements in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, and to integrate the U.S.S.R. into the United Nations, the Soviet regime would become an international team player and moderate its authoritarian regime.
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945
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Militarily, the Soviets fought valiantly and suffered staggering casualties on the Eastern Front. When Great Britain and the United States finally invaded northern France in 1944, the Allies were finally able to drain Nazi Germany of its strength on two fronts. Finally, two devastating atomic bomb attacks against Japan by the United States, coupled with the Soviets' decision to break their neutrality pact with Japan by invading Manchuria, finally led to the end of the war in the Pacific. Furthermore, during the wartime conferences at Tehran and Yalta, Roosevelt secured political concessions from Stalin and Soviet participation in the United Nations. While President Roosevelt harbored no illusions about Soviet designs in Eastern Europe, it was his great hope that if the United States made a sincere effort to satisfy legitimate Soviet security requirements in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, and to integrate the U.S.S.R. into the United Nations, the Soviet regime would become an international team player and moderate its authoritarian regime. Unfortunately, soon after the war, the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union began to unravel as the two nations faced complex postwar decisions.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/17604.htm
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
On January 1, 1942, representatives of 26 nations at war with the Axis powers met in Washington to sign the Declaration of the United Nations endorsing the Atlantic Charter, pledging to use their full resources against the Axis and agreeing not to make a separate peace. At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden agreed to draft a declaration that included a call for "a general international organization, based on the principle sovereign equality of all nations." An agreed declaration was issued after a Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in October 1943. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in Tehran, Iran, in November 1943, he proposed an international organization comprising an assembly of all member states and a 10-member executive committee to discuss social and economic issues. The United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China would enforce peace as "the four policemen." Meanwhile Allied representatives founded a set of task-oriented organizations: the Food and Agricultural Organization (May 1943), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (November 1943), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (April 1944), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (July 1944), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (November 1944). U.S., British, Soviet, and Chinese representatives met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington in August and September 1944 to draft the charter of a postwar international organization based on the principle of collective security. They recommended a General Assembly of all member states and a Security Council consisting of the Big Four plus six members chosen by the Assembly. Voting procedures and the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council were finalized at the Yalta Conference in 1945 when Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that the veto would not prevent discussions by the Security Council.
| 0 | 2,148 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/17604.htm
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
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Meanwhile Allied representatives founded a set of task-oriented organizations: the Food and Agricultural Organization (May 1943), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (November 1943), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (April 1944), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (July 1944), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (November 1944). U.S., British, Soviet, and Chinese representatives met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington in August and September 1944 to draft the charter of a postwar international organization based on the principle of collective security. They recommended a General Assembly of all member states and a Security Council consisting of the Big Four plus six members chosen by the Assembly. Voting procedures and the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council were finalized at the Yalta Conference in 1945 when Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that the veto would not prevent discussions by the Security Council. Roosevelt agreed to General Assembly membership for Ukraine and Byelorussia while reserving the right, which was never exercised, to seek two more votes for the United States. Representatives of 50 nations met in San Francisco April-June 1945 to complete the Charter of the United Nations. In addition to the General Assembly of all member states and a Security Council of 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent members, the Charter provided for an 18-member Economic and Social Council, an International Court of Justice, a Trusteeship Council to oversee certain colonial territories, and a Secretariat under a Secretary General. The Roosevelt administration strove to avoid Woodrow Wilson's mistakes in selling the League of Nations to the Senate. It sought bipartisan support and in September 1943 the Republican Party endorsed U.S. participation in a postwar international organization, after which both houses of Congress overwhelmingly endorsed participation.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/17604.htm
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
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The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
The Formation of the United Nations, 1945
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Roosevelt agreed to General Assembly membership for Ukraine and Byelorussia while reserving the right, which was never exercised, to seek two more votes for the United States. Representatives of 50 nations met in San Francisco April-June 1945 to complete the Charter of the United Nations. In addition to the General Assembly of all member states and a Security Council of 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent members, the Charter provided for an 18-member Economic and Social Council, an International Court of Justice, a Trusteeship Council to oversee certain colonial territories, and a Secretariat under a Secretary General. The Roosevelt administration strove to avoid Woodrow Wilson's mistakes in selling the League of Nations to the Senate. It sought bipartisan support and in September 1943 the Republican Party endorsed U.S. participation in a postwar international organization, after which both houses of Congress overwhelmingly endorsed participation. Roosevelt also sought to convince the public that an international organization was the best means to prevent future wars. The Senate approved the UN Charter on July 28, 1945, by a vote of 89 to 2. The United Nations came into existence on October 24, 1945, after 29 nations had ratified the Charter.
| 2,149 | 3,408 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/86552.htm
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
In 1943, Congress passed a measure to repeal the discriminatory exclusion laws against Chinese immigrants and to establish an immigration quota for China of around 105 visas per year. As such, the Chinese were both the first to be excluded in the beginning of the era of immigration restriction and the first Asians to gain entry to the United States in the era of liberalization. The repeal of this act was a decision almost wholly grounded in the exigencies of World War II, as Japanese propaganda made repeated reference to Chinese exclusion from the United States in order to weaken the ties between the United States and its ally, the Republic of China. The fact that in addition to general measures preventing Asian immigration, the Chinese were subject to their own, unique prohibition had long been a source of contention in Sino‑American relations. There was little opposition to the repeal, because the United States already had in place a number of measures to ensure that, even without the Chinese Exclusion Laws explicitly forbidding Chinese immigration, Chinese still could not enter. The Immigration Act of 1924 stated that aliens ineligible for U.S. citizenship were not permitted to enter the United States, and this included the Chinese. More controversial than repeal was the proposal to go one step further and place the Chinese on a quota basis for future entry to the United States. By finally applying the formulas created in the 1924 Immigration Act, the total annual quota for Chinese immigrants to the United States (calculated as a percentage of the total population of people of Chinese origin living in the United States in 1920) would be around 105. In light of the overall immigration to the United States, at first glance the new quota seemed insignificant. Yet, those concerned about an onslaught of Chinese (or Asian) immigration and its potential impact on American society and racial composition believed that even this small quota represented an opening wedge through which potentially thousands of Chinese could enter the United States.
| 0 | 2,187 |
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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The Immigration Act of 1924 stated that aliens ineligible for U.S. citizenship were not permitted to enter the United States, and this included the Chinese. More controversial than repeal was the proposal to go one step further and place the Chinese on a quota basis for future entry to the United States. By finally applying the formulas created in the 1924 Immigration Act, the total annual quota for Chinese immigrants to the United States (calculated as a percentage of the total population of people of Chinese origin living in the United States in 1920) would be around 105. In light of the overall immigration to the United States, at first glance the new quota seemed insignificant. Yet, those concerned about an onslaught of Chinese (or Asian) immigration and its potential impact on American society and racial composition believed that even this small quota represented an opening wedge through which potentially thousands of Chinese could enter the United States. Because migration within the Western Hemisphere was not regulated by the quota system, it seemed possible that Chinese residents in Central and South America would re-migrate to the United States. Moreover, if the Chinese of Hong Kong were to apply under the vast, largely unused British quota, thousands could enter each year on top of the number of available Chinese visas. Fears about the economic, social, and racial effect of a "floodtide" of Chinese immigrants led to a compromise bill�fears that mirrored the xenophobic arguments that had led to Chinese Exclusion in the first place, some sixty years previously. Under this bill, there would be a quota on Chinese immigration, but, unlike European quotas based on country of citizenship, the Chinese quota would be based on ethnicity. Chinese immigrating to the United States from anywhere in the world would be counted against the Chinese quota, even if they had never been to China or had never held Chinese nationality.
| 1,212 | 3,167 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/86552.htm
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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Because migration within the Western Hemisphere was not regulated by the quota system, it seemed possible that Chinese residents in Central and South America would re-migrate to the United States. Moreover, if the Chinese of Hong Kong were to apply under the vast, largely unused British quota, thousands could enter each year on top of the number of available Chinese visas. Fears about the economic, social, and racial effect of a "floodtide" of Chinese immigrants led to a compromise bill�fears that mirrored the xenophobic arguments that had led to Chinese Exclusion in the first place, some sixty years previously. Under this bill, there would be a quota on Chinese immigration, but, unlike European quotas based on country of citizenship, the Chinese quota would be based on ethnicity. Chinese immigrating to the United States from anywhere in the world would be counted against the Chinese quota, even if they had never been to China or had never held Chinese nationality. Creating this special, ethnic quota for the Chinese was a way for the United States to combat Japanese propaganda by proclaiming that Chinese were welcome, but at the same time, to ensure that only a limited number of Chinese actually entered the country. President Franklin D. Roosevelt threw the weight of his office behind the compromise measure, connecting the importance of the measure to American wartime goals. In a letter to Congress, Roosevelt wrote that passing the bill was vital to correcting the "historic mistake" of Chinese exclusion, and he emphasized that the legislation was "important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace." The repeal of Chinese exclusion paved the way for measures in 1946 to admit Filipino and Asian-Indian immigrants. The exclusion of both of these groups had long damaged U.S. relations with the Philippines and India.
| 2,188 | 4,056 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/86552.htm
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
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Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943
|
Creating this special, ethnic quota for the Chinese was a way for the United States to combat Japanese propaganda by proclaiming that Chinese were welcome, but at the same time, to ensure that only a limited number of Chinese actually entered the country. President Franklin D. Roosevelt threw the weight of his office behind the compromise measure, connecting the importance of the measure to American wartime goals. In a letter to Congress, Roosevelt wrote that passing the bill was vital to correcting the "historic mistake" of Chinese exclusion, and he emphasized that the legislation was "important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace." The repeal of Chinese exclusion paved the way for measures in 1946 to admit Filipino and Asian-Indian immigrants. The exclusion of both of these groups had long damaged U.S. relations with the Philippines and India. Eventually, Asian exclusion ended with the 1952 Immigration Act, although that Act followed the pattern of the Chinese quota and assigned racial, not national, quotas to all Asian immigrants. This system did not end until Congress did away with the National Origins quota system altogether in the Immigration Act of 1965.
| 3,168 | 4,378 |
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/93275.htm
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Big Three�Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Harry Truman�met in Potsdam, Germany, from July 17 to August 2, 1945, to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. After the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Stalin, Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to meet following the surrender of Germany to determine the postwar borders in Europe. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, and the Allied leaders agreed to meet over the summer at Potsdam to continue the discussions that had begun at Yalta. Although the Allies remained committed to fighting a joint war in the Pacific, the lack of a common enemy in Europe led to difficulties reaching consensus concerning postwar reconstruction on the European continent. The major issue at Potsdam was the question of how to handle Germany. At Yalta, the Soviets had pressed for heavy postwar reparations from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. While Roosevelt had acceded to such demands, Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, were determined to mitigate the treatment of Germany by allowing the occupying nations to exact reparations only from their own zone of occupation. Truman and Byrnes encouraged this position because they wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation created by the the Treaty of Versailles, which had exacted high reparations payments from Germany following World War One. Many experts agreed that the harsh reparations imposed by the Versailles Treaty had handicapped the German economy and fueled the rise of the Nazis. Despite numerous disagreements, the Allied leaders did manage to conclude some agreements at Potsdam.
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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At Yalta, the Soviets had pressed for heavy postwar reparations from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. While Roosevelt had acceded to such demands, Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, were determined to mitigate the treatment of Germany by allowing the occupying nations to exact reparations only from their own zone of occupation. Truman and Byrnes encouraged this position because they wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation created by the the Treaty of Versailles, which had exacted high reparations payments from Germany following World War One. Many experts agreed that the harsh reparations imposed by the Versailles Treaty had handicapped the German economy and fueled the rise of the Nazis. Despite numerous disagreements, the Allied leaders did manage to conclude some agreements at Potsdam. For example, the negotiators confirmed the status of a demilitarized and disarmed Germany under four zones of Allied occupation. According to the Protocol of the Conference, there was to be "a complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany"; all aspects of German industry that could be utilized for military purposes were to be dismantled; all German military and paramilitary forces were to be eliminated; and the production of all military hardware in Germany was forbidden.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/93275.htm
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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For example, the negotiators confirmed the status of a demilitarized and disarmed Germany under four zones of Allied occupation. According to the Protocol of the Conference, there was to be "a complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany"; all aspects of German industry that could be utilized for military purposes were to be dismantled; all German military and paramilitary forces were to be eliminated; and the production of all military hardware in Germany was forbidden. Furthermore, Germany society was to be remade along democratic lines by repeal of all discriminatory laws from the Nazi era and by the arrest and trial of those Germans deemed to be "war criminals." The German educational and judicial systems were to be purged of any authoritarian influences, and democratic political parties would be encouraged to participate in the administration of Germany at the local and state level. The reconstitution of a national German Government was, however, postponed indefinitely, and the Allied Control Commission (which was comprised of four occupying powers, the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) would run the country during the interregnum. One of the most controversial matters addressed at the Potsdam Conference dealt with the revision of the German-Soviet-Polish borders and the expulsion of several million Germans from the disputed territories. In exchange for the territory it lost to the Soviet Union following the readjustment of the Soviet-Polish border, Poland received a large swath of German territory and began to deport the German residents of the territories in question, as did other nations that were host to large German minority populations.
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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Furthermore, Germany society was to be remade along democratic lines by repeal of all discriminatory laws from the Nazi era and by the arrest and trial of those Germans deemed to be "war criminals." The German educational and judicial systems were to be purged of any authoritarian influences, and democratic political parties would be encouraged to participate in the administration of Germany at the local and state level. The reconstitution of a national German Government was, however, postponed indefinitely, and the Allied Control Commission (which was comprised of four occupying powers, the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) would run the country during the interregnum. One of the most controversial matters addressed at the Potsdam Conference dealt with the revision of the German-Soviet-Polish borders and the expulsion of several million Germans from the disputed territories. In exchange for the territory it lost to the Soviet Union following the readjustment of the Soviet-Polish border, Poland received a large swath of German territory and began to deport the German residents of the territories in question, as did other nations that were host to large German minority populations. The negotiators at Potsdam were well-aware of the situation, and even though the British and Americans feared that a mass exodus of Germans into the western occupation zones would destabilize them, they took no action other than to declare that "any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner" and to request that the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians temporarily suspend additional deportations. In addition to settling matters related to Germany and Poland, the Potsdam negotiators approved the formation of a Council of Foreign Ministers that would act on behalf of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China to draft peace treaties with Germany's former allies. Conference participants also agreed to revise the 1936 Montreux Convention, which gave Turkey sole control over the Turkish Straits. Furthermore, the United States, Great Britain, and China released the "Potsdam Declaration," which threatened Japan with "prompt and utter destruction" if it did not immediately surrender (the Soviet Union did not sign the declaration because it had yet to declare war on Japan). The Potsdam Conference is perhaps best known for President Truman's July 24, 1945 conversation with Stalin, during which time the President informed the Soviet leader that the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945.
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The Potsdam Conference, 1945
The Potsdam Conference, 1945
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The negotiators at Potsdam were well-aware of the situation, and even though the British and Americans feared that a mass exodus of Germans into the western occupation zones would destabilize them, they took no action other than to declare that "any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner" and to request that the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians temporarily suspend additional deportations. In addition to settling matters related to Germany and Poland, the Potsdam negotiators approved the formation of a Council of Foreign Ministers that would act on behalf of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China to draft peace treaties with Germany's former allies. Conference participants also agreed to revise the 1936 Montreux Convention, which gave Turkey sole control over the Turkish Straits. Furthermore, the United States, Great Britain, and China released the "Potsdam Declaration," which threatened Japan with "prompt and utter destruction" if it did not immediately surrender (the Soviet Union did not sign the declaration because it had yet to declare war on Japan). The Potsdam Conference is perhaps best known for President Truman's July 24, 1945 conversation with Stalin, during which time the President informed the Soviet leader that the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945. Historians have often interpreted Truman's somewhat firm stance during negotiations to the U.S. negotiating team's belief that U.S. nuclear capability would enhance its bargaining power. Stalin, however, was already well-informed about the U.S. nuclear program thanks to the Soviet intelligence network, so he also held firm in his positions. This situation made negotiations challenging. The leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, who, despite their differences, had remained allies throughout the war, never met again collectively to discuss cooperation in postwar reconstruction.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/8839.htm
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Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Remarks to Executivesu0012 Club of Chicago Leadership Symposium
Chicago, IL
March 14, 2002
Distinguished guests: We're here to talk about the impact of global terrorism, and how it has affected the way we will protect our businesses in the future. On the morning of September 11, the world changed. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the United States launched a global campaign not only against the perpetrators of those attacks but also against terrorism itself, wherever it exists. There can be no excuse, no justification, and no rationalization for these acts of mass murder of innocent people. As President Bush told the UN General Assembly: The time for sympathy is passed; time for action has arrived. This war will be a long struggle with many dimensions. Today I would like to spend some time discussing the impact of terrorism on the business world, in particular, on financing, kidnapping, and oil pipelines, what the U.S. Government is doing about that impact, and how you can help in the fight against terrorism.
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Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
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As President Bush told the UN General Assembly: The time for sympathy is passed; time for action has arrived. This war will be a long struggle with many dimensions. Today I would like to spend some time discussing the impact of terrorism on the business world, in particular, on financing, kidnapping, and oil pipelines, what the U.S. Government is doing about that impact, and how you can help in the fight against terrorism. The Costs of Terrorism
Terrorism raises the risk and cost of doing business, whether that business is diplomacy, manufacturing, or sales. Examples: The AP reported in October that nearly 200,000 people were laid off after 9/11, including close to 40,000 in the aerospace industry
An airline industry spokesman estimated in October that the world’s airlines may have lost as much as $15 billion due to passenger and freight cut backs
New York City’s comptroller estimated the attacks will cost the city’s economy $1.7 billion in lost sales and $1.75 billion in lost rent by the end of FY 2003
The world’s insurance industry took an estimated $50 billion hit. The cost to insurers will be passed on to all of us, but primarily to businesses. These costs are huge and affect every aspect of the business world.
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Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
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The Costs of Terrorism
Terrorism raises the risk and cost of doing business, whether that business is diplomacy, manufacturing, or sales. Examples: The AP reported in October that nearly 200,000 people were laid off after 9/11, including close to 40,000 in the aerospace industry
An airline industry spokesman estimated in October that the world’s airlines may have lost as much as $15 billion due to passenger and freight cut backs
New York City’s comptroller estimated the attacks will cost the city’s economy $1.7 billion in lost sales and $1.75 billion in lost rent by the end of FY 2003
The world’s insurance industry took an estimated $50 billion hit. The cost to insurers will be passed on to all of us, but primarily to businesses. These costs are huge and affect every aspect of the business world. We must take up the challenge – together – to defeat global terrorism. Forging the Tools to Fight Terror
President Bush told Congress: " Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Most have already chosen, and they have chosen to stand with us against terrorism.
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Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
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We must take up the challenge – together – to defeat global terrorism. Forging the Tools to Fight Terror
President Bush told Congress: " Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Most have already chosen, and they have chosen to stand with us against terrorism. On the global scale, many nations have made pledges and contributions on all fronts. We are receiving diplomatic, political, financial, police, intelligence, and military support. It is this concerted international action that will ultimately bring success to our campaign. Terrorist Funding
Funding is a critical element in large-scale terrorist operations and in the recruiting of supporters. It is the oxygen of terrorism.
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Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
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On the global scale, many nations have made pledges and contributions on all fronts. We are receiving diplomatic, political, financial, police, intelligence, and military support. It is this concerted international action that will ultimately bring success to our campaign. Terrorist Funding
Funding is a critical element in large-scale terrorist operations and in the recruiting of supporters. It is the oxygen of terrorism. We – you and I – need to work together to choke it off. We – together with our coalition partners - are working diligently to choke off terrorist funds: The first shot in the war against "terrorism with a global reach" was fired on Sept. 24 when the President signed Executive Order 13224. This E.O. freezes the assets of known terrorists and their supporters, and blocks U.S. transactions with them. The order covers 189 terrorists, including all 22 of the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists, as well as terrorist organizations, and terrorist financiers associated with them.
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/8839.htm
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Impact of Global Terrorism
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Impact of Global Terrorism
Impact of Global Terrorism
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We – you and I – need to work together to choke it off. We – together with our coalition partners - are working diligently to choke off terrorist funds: The first shot in the war against "terrorism with a global reach" was fired on Sept. 24 when the President signed Executive Order 13224. This E.O. freezes the assets of known terrorists and their supporters, and blocks U.S. transactions with them. The order covers 189 terrorists, including all 22 of the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists, as well as terrorist organizations, and terrorist financiers associated with them. A previous E.O., in effect since 1995 and renewed each year since, includes al-Qaida as well as such groups as Hizballah and Hamas that represent a terrorist threat to the Middle East peace negotiations. You can find a current list of all named groups on the Department’s web site, WWW.State. Gov. UNSCR 1373, unanimously adopted in September, extends the campaign to freeze terrorist assets to the international community. The resolution obliges all states to deny financing, support, and safe harbor for terrorists.
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A previous E.O., in effect since 1995 and renewed each year since, includes al-Qaida as well as such groups as Hizballah and Hamas that represent a terrorist threat to the Middle East peace negotiations. You can find a current list of all named groups on the Department’s web site, WWW.State. Gov. UNSCR 1373, unanimously adopted in September, extends the campaign to freeze terrorist assets to the international community. The resolution obliges all states to deny financing, support, and safe harbor for terrorists. It is binding on all member states under international law, and provides for a follow-up mechanism to monitor compliance
This effort has already yielded results, but more should be done. 150 nations--more than half the world --have acted to choke off the oxygen of money for terrorists. The United States has frozen some $34 million
Millions of additional dollars are being frozen around the world -- over $70 million. This effort is a continuing process, in which many other nations have joined. For example, just this week the Saudi Government joined the U.S. in blocking assets of two organizations (Bosnia-Herzegovina branches of Al-Haramain) engaged in supporting terrorist activities.
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It is binding on all member states under international law, and provides for a follow-up mechanism to monitor compliance
This effort has already yielded results, but more should be done. 150 nations--more than half the world --have acted to choke off the oxygen of money for terrorists. The United States has frozen some $34 million
Millions of additional dollars are being frozen around the world -- over $70 million. This effort is a continuing process, in which many other nations have joined. For example, just this week the Saudi Government joined the U.S. in blocking assets of two organizations (Bosnia-Herzegovina branches of Al-Haramain) engaged in supporting terrorist activities. The Taking of U.S. Hostages – What the U.S. will and won’t do. The business community has every reason to be concerned about their employees in overseas locations. US policy on what to do when an American is abducted was recently reviewed, but the basics are still the same: The United States will make every appropriate effort to gain the safe release of an American who is taken hostage. We will treat every abduction of a U.S. citizen, official or unofficial, with the same priority.
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The Taking of U.S. Hostages – What the U.S. will and won’t do. The business community has every reason to be concerned about their employees in overseas locations. US policy on what to do when an American is abducted was recently reviewed, but the basics are still the same: The United States will make every appropriate effort to gain the safe release of an American who is taken hostage. We will treat every abduction of a U.S. citizen, official or unofficial, with the same priority. The U.S. Government may make contact with representatives of the captors, in order to obtain the release of hostages
We will facilitate contacts with local authorities. However, U.S. goals are to pursue hostage takers alone or in cooperation with other governments. Above all, our memory long – we will pursue hostage takers, apprehend them, prosecute them. What the US won’t do is to pay ransom, encourage the payment of ransom, or make political or other concessions to terrorists that would only encourage more kidnapping. Pipeline Security
Another area of major concern to businesses is the safety of oil pipelines.
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The U.S. Government may make contact with representatives of the captors, in order to obtain the release of hostages
We will facilitate contacts with local authorities. However, U.S. goals are to pursue hostage takers alone or in cooperation with other governments. Above all, our memory long – we will pursue hostage takers, apprehend them, prosecute them. What the US won’t do is to pay ransom, encourage the payment of ransom, or make political or other concessions to terrorists that would only encourage more kidnapping. Pipeline Security
Another area of major concern to businesses is the safety of oil pipelines. According to the American Petroleum Institute, U.S. consumers use 20 million barrels of crude oil a day (bpd). Domestic refineries process only 6 million bpd. – Hence, the majority of petroleum is imported. In 2001, Colombia’s Cano-Limon-Convenas pipeline was attacked 170 times and was shut down for six months. Total loss in revenue was $500 million (based on 115,000 bpd).
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According to the American Petroleum Institute, U.S. consumers use 20 million barrels of crude oil a day (bpd). Domestic refineries process only 6 million bpd. – Hence, the majority of petroleum is imported. In 2001, Colombia’s Cano-Limon-Convenas pipeline was attacked 170 times and was shut down for six months. Total loss in revenue was $500 million (based on 115,000 bpd). It has been attacked 13 times so far this year. Protecting the petroleum infrastructure is a big job. We are working with the petroleum industry to help them keep these pipelines safe from attack. For example, we are currently developing a series of pipeline security courses for Colombia that will assist in such areas as the electronic detection of line tampering, and the development of a Rapid Response Force to repair damage after attacks. This program also has important applications to the new pipelines being planned in Central Asia.
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It has been attacked 13 times so far this year. Protecting the petroleum infrastructure is a big job. We are working with the petroleum industry to help them keep these pipelines safe from attack. For example, we are currently developing a series of pipeline security courses for Colombia that will assist in such areas as the electronic detection of line tampering, and the development of a Rapid Response Force to repair damage after attacks. This program also has important applications to the new pipelines being planned in Central Asia. Other Measures
We have a number of other tools on our counterterrorism tool kit that may be of special interest to the business community. For example, the Overseas Security Assistance Council was established in 1985 by the U.S. Department of State to foster the exchange of security related information between the U.S. Government and American private sector operating abroad. Administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, OSAC has developed into an enormously successful joint venture for effective security cooperation. Through OSAC, the American private sector, including colleges and universities, is provided timely information on which to make informed corporate decisions on how best to protect their investment, facilities, personnel and intellectual property abroad. The Bureau of Consular Affairs publishes regular advisories on security conditions in countries around the world.
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Other Measures
We have a number of other tools on our counterterrorism tool kit that may be of special interest to the business community. For example, the Overseas Security Assistance Council was established in 1985 by the U.S. Department of State to foster the exchange of security related information between the U.S. Government and American private sector operating abroad. Administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, OSAC has developed into an enormously successful joint venture for effective security cooperation. Through OSAC, the American private sector, including colleges and universities, is provided timely information on which to make informed corporate decisions on how best to protect their investment, facilities, personnel and intellectual property abroad. The Bureau of Consular Affairs publishes regular advisories on security conditions in countries around the world. These advisories are also available on the Department web site. There are certain restrictions placed by law on trade with the seven formallly designated state sponsors of terrorism – Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Licenses are available for trade with these countries through the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). You should consult the Treasury Department’s web site for more information. Conclusion
As President Bush told the United Nations last fall, every member state has a responsibility to eliminate terrorism.
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These advisories are also available on the Department web site. There are certain restrictions placed by law on trade with the seven formallly designated state sponsors of terrorism – Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Licenses are available for trade with these countries through the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). You should consult the Treasury Department’s web site for more information. Conclusion
As President Bush told the United Nations last fall, every member state has a responsibility to eliminate terrorism. As the business community, you have a vested interest in joining this fight. The international coalition, our bilateral programs, and the assistance we receive from you are just some of the measures we are taking to meet this new challenge. Our response to the horrific events of September 11 are broad-based and will not be completed in a short time. We are committed to a long term strategic campaign, in concert with the nations of the world that abhor terrorism, to root out and bring to justice those that use terrorism. As President Bush has told the world: "
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As the business community, you have a vested interest in joining this fight. The international coalition, our bilateral programs, and the assistance we receive from you are just some of the measures we are taking to meet this new challenge. Our response to the horrific events of September 11 are broad-based and will not be completed in a short time. We are committed to a long term strategic campaign, in concert with the nations of the world that abhor terrorism, to root out and bring to justice those that use terrorism. As President Bush has told the world: " Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." Businesses can help by being alert to your business relationships, by keeping in close contact with the U.S. Embassy in any foreign country in which you operate, so as to reduce to a minimum the risks your employees may face, by contributing to the rewards for justice program, which augments money available to the United States to pay for information that results in the apprehension or conviction in any country of a terrorist. For example, we will pay up to $5 million for such information, or up to $25 million if the information related to Usama Bin Ladin, al-Qaida, or senior Taliban leadership. But more importantly, businesses can help by staying in business. We must be more careful about not opening strange envelopes, watching unattended packages, and keeping our employees safe.
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Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." Businesses can help by being alert to your business relationships, by keeping in close contact with the U.S. Embassy in any foreign country in which you operate, so as to reduce to a minimum the risks your employees may face, by contributing to the rewards for justice program, which augments money available to the United States to pay for information that results in the apprehension or conviction in any country of a terrorist. For example, we will pay up to $5 million for such information, or up to $25 million if the information related to Usama Bin Ladin, al-Qaida, or senior Taliban leadership. But more importantly, businesses can help by staying in business. We must be more careful about not opening strange envelopes, watching unattended packages, and keeping our employees safe. While business works, while you accomplish your mission, you deliver a very important message of confidence in our form of government, in our society, and in our economy. We cannot let the September 11 terrorists hijack our way of life. We are Americans. We must remain engaged. We must say, in the words of Secretary Powell, to the underdeveloped countries of the world, to the nations who count on our business to bring energy and wealth and jobs to their society: "
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While business works, while you accomplish your mission, you deliver a very important message of confidence in our form of government, in our society, and in our economy. We cannot let the September 11 terrorists hijack our way of life. We are Americans. We must remain engaged. We must say, in the words of Secretary Powell, to the underdeveloped countries of the world, to the nations who count on our business to bring energy and wealth and jobs to their society: " Watch us. We're
| 9,516 | 10,000 |
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
PDF version
The White House
September 2006
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Successes
Challenges
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Long-term approach: Advancing effective democracy
Over the short term: Four priorities of action
Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them
Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states
Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder. Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003, recognizes that we are at war and that protecting and defending the Homeland, the American people, and their livelihoods remains our first and most solemn obligation. Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain.
| 0 | 2,075 |
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain. This updated strategy sets the course for winning the War on Terror. It builds directly from the National Security Strategy issued in March 2006 as well as the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and incorporates our increased understanding of the enemy. From the beginning, we understood that the War on Terror involved more than simply finding and bringing to justice those who had planned and executed the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Our strategy involved destroying the larger al-Qaida network and also confronting the radical ideology that inspired others to join or support the terrorist movement. Since 9/11, we have made substantial progress in degrading the al–Qaida network, killing or capturing key lieutenants, eliminating safehavens, and disrupting existing lines of support.
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
This updated strategy sets the course for winning the War on Terror. It builds directly from the National Security Strategy issued in March 2006 as well as the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and incorporates our increased understanding of the enemy. From the beginning, we understood that the War on Terror involved more than simply finding and bringing to justice those who had planned and executed the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Our strategy involved destroying the larger al-Qaida network and also confronting the radical ideology that inspired others to join or support the terrorist movement. Since 9/11, we have made substantial progress in degrading the al–Qaida network, killing or capturing key lieutenants, eliminating safehavens, and disrupting existing lines of support. Through the freedom agenda, we also have promoted the best long-term answer to al–Qaida's agenda: the freedom and dignity that comes when human liberty is protected by effective democratic institutions. In response to our efforts, the terrorists have adjusted, and so we must continue to refine our strategy to meet the evolving threat. Today, we face a global terrorist movement and must confront the radical ideology that justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion. As laid out in this strategy, to win the War on Terror, we will:
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
Through the freedom agenda, we also have promoted the best long-term answer to al–Qaida's agenda: the freedom and dignity that comes when human liberty is protected by effective democratic institutions. In response to our efforts, the terrorists have adjusted, and so we must continue to refine our strategy to meet the evolving threat. Today, we face a global terrorist movement and must confront the radical ideology that justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion. As laid out in this strategy, to win the War on Terror, we will: Advance effective democracies as the long–term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and
Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
Advance effective democracies as the long–term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and
Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success. Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were acts of war against the United States, peaceful people throughout the world, and the very principles of liberty and human dignity. The United States, together with our Coalition partners, has fought back and will win this war. We will hold the perpetrators accountable and work to prevent the recurrence of similar atrocities on any scale – whether at home or abroad. The War on Terror extends beyond the current armed conflict that arose out of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and embraces all facets of continuing U.S. efforts to bring an end to the scourge of terrorism. Ultimately, we will win the long war to defeat the terrorists and their murderous ideology.
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
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Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were acts of war against the United States, peaceful people throughout the world, and the very principles of liberty and human dignity. The United States, together with our Coalition partners, has fought back and will win this war. We will hold the perpetrators accountable and work to prevent the recurrence of similar atrocities on any scale – whether at home or abroad. The War on Terror extends beyond the current armed conflict that arose out of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and embraces all facets of continuing U.S. efforts to bring an end to the scourge of terrorism. Ultimately, we will win the long war to defeat the terrorists and their murderous ideology. Successes
We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary ruled by the repressive Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on Terror. A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the Middle East. We have significantly degraded the al–Qaida network.
| 3,891 | 5,197 |
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
Successes
We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary ruled by the repressive Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on Terror. A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the Middle East. We have significantly degraded the al–Qaida network. Most of those in the al–Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We also have killed other key al–Qaida members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group’s operational commander in Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis. We have led an unprecedented international campaign to combat terrorist financing that has made it harder, costlier, and riskier for al-Qaida and related terrorist groups to raise and move money. There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause. Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.
| 4,649 | 6,057 |
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
Most of those in the al–Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We also have killed other key al–Qaida members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group’s operational commander in Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis. We have led an unprecedented international campaign to combat terrorist financing that has made it harder, costlier, and riskier for al-Qaida and related terrorist groups to raise and move money. There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause. Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity. We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center. Overall, the United States and our partners have disrupted several serious plots since September 11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the United States. Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions. The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties. Yet while America is safer, we are not yet safe.
| 5,198 | 6,960 |
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center. Overall, the United States and our partners have disrupted several serious plots since September 11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the United States. Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions. The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties. Yet while America is safer, we are not yet safe. The enemy remains determined, and we face serious challenges at home and abroad. Challenges
Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure. While the United States Government and its partners have thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to prevent them all. Terrorists have struck in many places throughout the world, from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad.
| 6,057 | 7,452 |
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
|
The enemy remains determined, and we face serious challenges at home and abroad. Challenges
Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure. While the United States Government and its partners have thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to prevent them all. Terrorists have struck in many places throughout the world, from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad. While we have substantially improved our air, land, sea, and border security, our Homeland is not immune from attack. Terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the United States, our allies, partners, and other interests around the world. Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad. The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry. Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.
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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8485400#10_13119858
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
Today’s Terrorist Enemy
Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
Conclusion
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While we have substantially improved our air, land, sea, and border security, our Homeland is not immune from attack. Terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the United States, our allies, partners, and other interests around the world. Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad. The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry. Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact. Today’s Terrorist Enemy
The United States and our partners continue to pursue a significantly degraded but still dangerous al-Qaida network. Yet the enemy we face today in the War on Terror is not the same enemy we faced on September 11. Our effective counterterrorist efforts, in part, have forced the terrorists to evolve and modify their ways of doing business. Our understanding of the enemy has evolved as well. Today, the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.
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