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msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#2_12563966
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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In collaboration with host nation TB programs, the U.S. works to improve the quality of basic TB programs or DOTS (Directly Observed Therapy, Short Course) services; upgrade laboratory infrastructure; build a foundation to introduce new diagnostic technologies; and work with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners to conduct drug resistance surveys and surveillance. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead USG agency in international TB control programs, with PEPFAR taking the lead role in TB/HIV co-infection, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC) providing critical technical support to global and country level initiatives. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is engaged in basic and bioclinical international TB research. From 2000 to 2007, the U.S. provided nearly $600 million for TB programs worldwide. The U.S. also supports TB control worldwide through funding provided to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund), to which the U.S. is the largest single donor. The U.S. also supports the fight against malaria through the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), a five-year program run by USAID to reach those in 15 of the hardest-hit countries in Africa with the goal of reducing malaria-related deaths by 50 percent. In its second year, PMI reached 25 million people with treatment and prevention services and is working to reach the goal of reducing malaria-related deaths by 50 percent in 15 focus countries in Africa.
| 1,809 | 3,376 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#3_12565898
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is engaged in basic and bioclinical international TB research. From 2000 to 2007, the U.S. provided nearly $600 million for TB programs worldwide. The U.S. also supports TB control worldwide through funding provided to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund), to which the U.S. is the largest single donor. The U.S. also supports the fight against malaria through the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), a five-year program run by USAID to reach those in 15 of the hardest-hit countries in Africa with the goal of reducing malaria-related deaths by 50 percent. In its second year, PMI reached 25 million people with treatment and prevention services and is working to reach the goal of reducing malaria-related deaths by 50 percent in 15 focus countries in Africa. Prevention of infectious disease benefits people and contributes to health security. In 1988, for example, polio was endemic in more than 125 countries and paralyzed 350,000 children each year. Since then, the world has made remarkable progress toward polio eradication and only four countries remain endemic for polio transmission. The U.S. has contributed to this accomplishment by providing nearly thirty percent of global contributions to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative and funding 500 million doses of oral polio vaccine for distribution in endemic countries. Along with some of the more commonly known infectious diseases, Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), are truly devastating to many developing countries.
| 2,550 | 4,102 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#4_12567815
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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Prevention of infectious disease benefits people and contributes to health security. In 1988, for example, polio was endemic in more than 125 countries and paralyzed 350,000 children each year. Since then, the world has made remarkable progress toward polio eradication and only four countries remain endemic for polio transmission. The U.S. has contributed to this accomplishment by providing nearly thirty percent of global contributions to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative and funding 500 million doses of oral polio vaccine for distribution in endemic countries. Along with some of the more commonly known infectious diseases, Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), are truly devastating to many developing countries. These largely preventable diseases continue to pose a major threat to health and economic growth in many developing countries. In 2008, the United States launched a new initiative, challenging the world to reduce, control, and eliminate the threat of neglected tropical diseases. The U.S. committed $350 million over five years to treat over 3 million people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America suffering from NTDs. The initiative targets seven major NTDs including: lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis);
| 3,376 | 4,606 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#5_12569404
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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These largely preventable diseases continue to pose a major threat to health and economic growth in many developing countries. In 2008, the United States launched a new initiative, challenging the world to reduce, control, and eliminate the threat of neglected tropical diseases. The U.S. committed $350 million over five years to treat over 3 million people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America suffering from NTDs. The initiative targets seven major NTDs including: lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis); schistosomiasis (snail fever); trachoma (eye infection); onchocerciasis (river blindness); and three soil-transmitted helminthes (STHs – hookworm, roundworm, whipworm). Another example of the potentially devastating effects of infectious disease can be found in the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which cost Asian economies between $11 and $18 billion, resulting in a GDP loss of between 0.5% and 2%.
| 4,103 | 5,035 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#6_12570701
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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schistosomiasis (snail fever); trachoma (eye infection); onchocerciasis (river blindness); and three soil-transmitted helminthes (STHs – hookworm, roundworm, whipworm). Another example of the potentially devastating effects of infectious disease can be found in the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which cost Asian economies between $11 and $18 billion, resulting in a GDP loss of between 0.5% and 2%. The emergence or re-emergence of other infectious diseases such as pandemic influenza could possibly exact a higher toll, both human and economic. Other infectious diseases requiring national and international attention include dengue fever, measles, yellow fever, and Ebola virus. Strong health systems within countries, including effective surveillance systems and adequate human resources, are fundamental to curb the spread of infectious disease and to provide early warning of new disease outbreaks. Chronic Disease
Chronic diseases are now the major cause of death and disability worldwide. By 2020, chronic diseases are expected to account for 7 of every 10 deaths in the world, as they already do in the U.S. These projections suggest that chronic diseases – and the death, illness, and disability they cause – will soon dominate health care costs and are causing public health officials, governments and multinational institutions to rethink how we approach this growing global challenge.
| 4,607 | 6,033 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#7_12572503
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
|
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
|
The emergence or re-emergence of other infectious diseases such as pandemic influenza could possibly exact a higher toll, both human and economic. Other infectious diseases requiring national and international attention include dengue fever, measles, yellow fever, and Ebola virus. Strong health systems within countries, including effective surveillance systems and adequate human resources, are fundamental to curb the spread of infectious disease and to provide early warning of new disease outbreaks. Chronic Disease
Chronic diseases are now the major cause of death and disability worldwide. By 2020, chronic diseases are expected to account for 7 of every 10 deaths in the world, as they already do in the U.S. These projections suggest that chronic diseases – and the death, illness, and disability they cause – will soon dominate health care costs and are causing public health officials, governments and multinational institutions to rethink how we approach this growing global challenge. According to statistics from the World Health Organization, of the 58 million people that died worldwide in 2005, 35 million deaths were attributed to chronic disease. That puts the death toll for chronic disease, 60% of all deaths that year, at double the number of deaths from infectious diseases (including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria), maternal and perinatal conditions, and nutritional deficiencies combined. The principal known causes of premature death from chronic disease are tobacco use, poor diet, physical inactivity, obesity and alcohol consumption. Although chronic diseases make up a greater proportion of deaths and illnesses in developed countries, overall the greatest numbers of chronic disease deaths and illnesses occur in the developing world. Almost half of the disease burden in low and middle-income countries is now from non-communicable diseases.
| 5,036 | 6,915 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#8_12574753
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
|
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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According to statistics from the World Health Organization, of the 58 million people that died worldwide in 2005, 35 million deaths were attributed to chronic disease. That puts the death toll for chronic disease, 60% of all deaths that year, at double the number of deaths from infectious diseases (including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria), maternal and perinatal conditions, and nutritional deficiencies combined. The principal known causes of premature death from chronic disease are tobacco use, poor diet, physical inactivity, obesity and alcohol consumption. Although chronic diseases make up a greater proportion of deaths and illnesses in developed countries, overall the greatest numbers of chronic disease deaths and illnesses occur in the developing world. Almost half of the disease burden in low and middle-income countries is now from non-communicable diseases. Apart from the tremendous adverse effects on the quality of life of individuals involved, these conditions place enormous strains on family and community budgets. The overall economy suffers from both the labor units lost due to death and illness as well as the high direct medical costs. This phenomenon, during which health infrastructures already weakened by continuing battles with infectious disease are increasingly being taxed by rapidly growing chronic diseases, is often referred to as the double disease burden. Greater advocacy is required to raise global awareness of this growing threat and to help dispel some of the myths surrounding chronic diseases, including the myth that chronic disease cannot be prevented and the myth that these diseases only burden high income countries. Related Links
--05/01/07 Can Polio Be Eradicated? ;
| 6,033 | 7,762 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#9_12576842
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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Apart from the tremendous adverse effects on the quality of life of individuals involved, these conditions place enormous strains on family and community budgets. The overall economy suffers from both the labor units lost due to death and illness as well as the high direct medical costs. This phenomenon, during which health infrastructures already weakened by continuing battles with infectious disease are increasingly being taxed by rapidly growing chronic diseases, is often referred to as the double disease burden. Greater advocacy is required to raise global awareness of this growing threat and to help dispel some of the myths surrounding chronic diseases, including the myth that chronic disease cannot be prevented and the myth that these diseases only burden high income countries. Related Links
--05/01/07 Can Polio Be Eradicated? ; Kent Hill, Assistant Administrator for Global Health U.S. Agency for International Development; Remarks to he Center for Strategic and International Studies; Washington, DC
--05/01/07 Finishing the Global Fight Against Polio ; Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs; Remarks to Center for Strategic and International Studies;
| 6,916 | 8,128 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8135098#10_12578416
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/id/index.htm
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
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Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease & Non-Infectious Disease
Infectious Disease
Chronic Disease
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Kent Hill, Assistant Administrator for Global Health U.S. Agency for International Development; Remarks to he Center for Strategic and International Studies; Washington, DC
--05/01/07 Finishing the Global Fight Against Polio ; Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs; Remarks to Center for Strategic and International Studies; Washington, DC
--02/28/07 Eradication vs. Control: Comparing the Burden of Polio if Milestones Are Not Achieved ; Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs; Remarks to the WHO Urgent Stakeholder Consultation on Global Polio Eradication; Washington, DC
| 7,763 | 8,417 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#0_12579433
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
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Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
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Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
Following World War II there was an upsurge in research activity in Antarctica culminating in the cooperative scientific program in Antarctica undertaken as part of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957-58. Twelve states with scientific research and other interests in Antarctica participated in the IGY program: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. These countries devised informal arrangements to avoid disruptions resulting from differing territorial claims -- positions that worked well and formed the basis of a U.S. initiative to provide a more formal basis for long-term cooperation in Antarctica. This initiative resulted in conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, signed by these same 12 states in 1959. The Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1961, applies to the area south of 60°south latitude including all ice shelves. The Treaty guarantees freedom of scientific research in Antarctica, placing on a permanent basis the system of peaceful international cooperation that evolved during the IGY. It calls for plans for scientific investigations to be shared in advance and the results of scientific investigations to be shared and made freely available. The Treaty establishes Antarctica as a zone of peace, reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. It bans all military activities, including the testing of weapons, and prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste.
| 0 | 1,593 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#1_12581597
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
The Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1961, applies to the area south of 60°south latitude including all ice shelves. The Treaty guarantees freedom of scientific research in Antarctica, placing on a permanent basis the system of peaceful international cooperation that evolved during the IGY. It calls for plans for scientific investigations to be shared in advance and the results of scientific investigations to be shared and made freely available. The Treaty establishes Antarctica as a zone of peace, reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. It bans all military activities, including the testing of weapons, and prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste. In addition, it provides an absolute right of on-site inspection of all stations and installations in Antarctica to promote the objectives of the Treaty and ensure compliance with its provisions. To achieve these purposes, the Antarctic Treaty had to deal with the basic legal and political differences over territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. It provides that no acts or activities carried out while the Treaty is in force will constitute a basis for a claim. Seven countries have made claims to parts of Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and UK). The claims of Argentina, Chile and the UK all overlap in the Antarctic Peninsula.
| 893 | 2,262 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#2_12583507
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
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Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
In addition, it provides an absolute right of on-site inspection of all stations and installations in Antarctica to promote the objectives of the Treaty and ensure compliance with its provisions. To achieve these purposes, the Antarctic Treaty had to deal with the basic legal and political differences over territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. It provides that no acts or activities carried out while the Treaty is in force will constitute a basis for a claim. Seven countries have made claims to parts of Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and UK). The claims of Argentina, Chile and the UK all overlap in the Antarctic Peninsula. One sector of Antarctica, comprising about 15% of the land area, is unclaimed. Other states active in Antarctica neither assert nor recognize such claims, though both the United States and the Russian Federation, as successor to the Soviet Union, have maintained the basis to a claim. The Treaty also preserves the previously established U.S. basis of a claim. The Antarctic Treaty did not deal with all possible activities in Antarctica. Its substantive provisions, including the juridical accommodation, apply to activities relating to scientific research and the reservation of Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes.
| 1,594 | 2,889 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#3_12585340
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
One sector of Antarctica, comprising about 15% of the land area, is unclaimed. Other states active in Antarctica neither assert nor recognize such claims, though both the United States and the Russian Federation, as successor to the Soviet Union, have maintained the basis to a claim. The Treaty also preserves the previously established U.S. basis of a claim. The Antarctic Treaty did not deal with all possible activities in Antarctica. Its substantive provisions, including the juridical accommodation, apply to activities relating to scientific research and the reservation of Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes. They do not, for example, extend to resource activities. At the same time, the Treaty provides a mechanism for dealing with new activities and new circumstances. This mechanism, which is contained in Article IX of the Treaty, provides for meetings of the 12 original contracting Parties, first within two months of entry into force of the Treaty and at suitable intervals thereafter, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica and recommending to their governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty. The Treaty also provides that these Consultative Meetings, as they are now called, are open not only to full participation by representatives of the 12 original contracting Parties but also to representatives of any acceding Party during such time as that party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by the conduct of substantial scientific research there. There are now 27 Parties (Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties or ATCPs) with full rights of participation in these meetings:
| 2,263 | 3,987 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#4_12587602
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
They do not, for example, extend to resource activities. At the same time, the Treaty provides a mechanism for dealing with new activities and new circumstances. This mechanism, which is contained in Article IX of the Treaty, provides for meetings of the 12 original contracting Parties, first within two months of entry into force of the Treaty and at suitable intervals thereafter, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica and recommending to their governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty. The Treaty also provides that these Consultative Meetings, as they are now called, are open not only to full participation by representatives of the 12 original contracting Parties but also to representatives of any acceding Party during such time as that party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by the conduct of substantial scientific research there. There are now 27 Parties (Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties or ATCPs) with full rights of participation in these meetings: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. In addition, representatives of all other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty also participate in Consultative Meetings. There are 18 such non-Consultative Parties (NCPs): Austria, , Canada, Colombia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Papua-New Guinea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. There have been 24 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) since the Antarctic Treaty entered into force.
| 2,890 | 4,798 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#5_12590048
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
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Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. In addition, representatives of all other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty also participate in Consultative Meetings. There are 18 such non-Consultative Parties (NCPs): Austria, , Canada, Colombia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Papua-New Guinea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. There have been 24 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) since the Antarctic Treaty entered into force. As a result of these ATCMs, approximately 200 agreed recommendations have been adopted by the Consultative Parties. The agreed recommendations adopted at the ATCMs incorporate a wide range of measures to give effect and elaborate the principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty. A significant proportion of these recommendations deals with protection of the Antarctic environment. Equally important from the environmental perspective, the ATCMs have provided the mechanism for the ATCPs to delineate and respond to the challenge of possible resource activities in Antarctica. Recommendations adopted at ATCMs have included initiatives that have led to the conclusion of separate agreements that in whole or in part seek to address resource issues.
| 3,988 | 5,550 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#6_12592148
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
As a result of these ATCMs, approximately 200 agreed recommendations have been adopted by the Consultative Parties. The agreed recommendations adopted at the ATCMs incorporate a wide range of measures to give effect and elaborate the principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty. A significant proportion of these recommendations deals with protection of the Antarctic environment. Equally important from the environmental perspective, the ATCMs have provided the mechanism for the ATCPs to delineate and respond to the challenge of possible resource activities in Antarctica. Recommendations adopted at ATCMs have included initiatives that have led to the conclusion of separate agreements that in whole or in part seek to address resource issues. Three of these are in force: the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (concluded in 1972, entered into force in 1978); the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (concluded in 1980, entered into force in 1982); and
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (concluded in 1991, entered into force in 1998). The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
This Convention establishes limitations upon, and provides a mechanism to deal with, commercial sealing in Antarctica.
| 4,799 | 6,103 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#7_12593992
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
Three of these are in force: the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (concluded in 1972, entered into force in 1978); the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (concluded in 1980, entered into force in 1982); and
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (concluded in 1991, entered into force in 1998). The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
This Convention establishes limitations upon, and provides a mechanism to deal with, commercial sealing in Antarctica. It was negotiated primarily as a precautionary measure in light of concern over the possible re-initiation of pelagic commercial sealing in Antarctica. Interest in such sealing has not materialized, as was confirmed at the meeting of Parties to CCAS in September 1988. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
This Convention resulted from an initiative taken at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting IX in London in 1977. The Convention represents a precedent-setting effort to develop and apply an ecosystem approach to management of resources in the waters surrounding Antarctica. Its objective is to ensure that any harvesting of Antarctic marine living resources is consistent not only with the health of target populations but also with that of dependent and related species and with maintenance of ecological relationships.
| 5,551 | 6,974 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#8_12595956
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
It was negotiated primarily as a precautionary measure in light of concern over the possible re-initiation of pelagic commercial sealing in Antarctica. Interest in such sealing has not materialized, as was confirmed at the meeting of Parties to CCAS in September 1988. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
This Convention resulted from an initiative taken at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting IX in London in 1977. The Convention represents a precedent-setting effort to develop and apply an ecosystem approach to management of resources in the waters surrounding Antarctica. Its objective is to ensure that any harvesting of Antarctic marine living resources is consistent not only with the health of target populations but also with that of dependent and related species and with maintenance of ecological relationships. Consistent with its conservation objectives, the Convention applies to a geographic area defined to approximate the full extent of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. This area, defined by specific coordinates, extends to those waters found south of the Antarctic Convergence, or polar front, which is the transition zone between Antarctic waters to the south and warmer sub-Antarctic waters to the north. It should be noted that the Convention area is considerably larger than that covered by the Antarctic Treaty (which applies to the area south of 60 ° south latitude). The Convention establishes the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, headquartered in Hobart, Tasmania; the Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, charged with providing objective scientific assessments and recommendations to the Commission;
| 6,104 | 7,858 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#9_12598254
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
|
Consistent with its conservation objectives, the Convention applies to a geographic area defined to approximate the full extent of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. This area, defined by specific coordinates, extends to those waters found south of the Antarctic Convergence, or polar front, which is the transition zone between Antarctic waters to the south and warmer sub-Antarctic waters to the north. It should be noted that the Convention area is considerably larger than that covered by the Antarctic Treaty (which applies to the area south of 60 ° south latitude). The Convention establishes the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, headquartered in Hobart, Tasmania; the Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, charged with providing objective scientific assessments and recommendations to the Commission; and a Secretariat to serve both the Commission and Scientific Committee. The Convention provides that the Commission will operate on the basis of a consensus -- or no-objection – procedure, which has been characteristic of the Antarctic Treaty system. There are currently 24 Commission members and 7 additional parties to the Convention. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Convention was concluded at Wellington, New Zealand in 1988, after six years of negotiation. There are no known mineral resources in Antarctica, but Parties decided to establish a regime to govern the activities surrounding exploration and possible exploitation before any discoveries took place.
| 6,974 | 8,580 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8143917#10_12600408
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/9570.htm
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Antarctic Treaty
|
Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
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and a Secretariat to serve both the Commission and Scientific Committee. The Convention provides that the Commission will operate on the basis of a consensus -- or no-objection – procedure, which has been characteristic of the Antarctic Treaty system. There are currently 24 Commission members and 7 additional parties to the Convention. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Convention was concluded at Wellington, New Zealand in 1988, after six years of negotiation. There are no known mineral resources in Antarctica, but Parties decided to establish a regime to govern the activities surrounding exploration and possible exploitation before any discoveries took place. With the adoption of the Protocol in 1991, all activities relating to Antarctic mineral resources were prohibited, except for scientific research. No countries have ratified the Convention. The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
The Protocol was concluded in Madrid on October 4, 1991 and entered into force, together with Annexes I-IV, on January 14, 1998. It has been accepted by all 27 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and two other countries. It builds upon the Antarctic Treaty to extend and improve the Treaty's effectiveness as a mechanism for ensuring the protection of the Antarctic environment.
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Antarctic Treaty
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Antarctic Treaty
Antarctic Treaty
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
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With the adoption of the Protocol in 1991, all activities relating to Antarctic mineral resources were prohibited, except for scientific research. No countries have ratified the Convention. The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
The Protocol was concluded in Madrid on October 4, 1991 and entered into force, together with Annexes I-IV, on January 14, 1998. It has been accepted by all 27 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and two other countries. It builds upon the Antarctic Treaty to extend and improve the Treaty's effectiveness as a mechanism for ensuring the protection of the Antarctic environment. It designates Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science, and sets forth basic principles and detailed, mandatory rules applicable to human activities in Antarctica, including obligations to accord priority to scientific research. The Protocol prohibits all activities relating to Antarctic mineral resources, except for scientific research, and provides that this prohibition cannot be amended by less than unanimous agreement for at least 50 years following entry into force of the Protocol. The Protocol requires Parties to protect Antarctic fauna and flora and imposes strict limitations on disposal of wastes in Antarctica and discharge of pollutants into Antarctic waters. It also requires application of environmental impact assessment procedures to activit
| 8,581 | 10,000 |
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs
Remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy's 2006 Democracy Award Ceremony
Washington, DC
June 27, 2006
As Delivered
Good evening. Carl, Congressman Payne, Congressman Meeks, Congressman Clyburn, ambassadors, honorees, and distinguished guests. Thank you Vin for your gracious introduction. I’m delighted to be part of this ceremony honoring four extraordinary individuals with the Endowment’s 2006 Democracy Awards. These awards recognize the courageous and creative works of these remarkable activists who have advanced the cause of human rights and democracy in their respective countries. In his National Security Strategy, President Bush, expressed our conviction that “promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability, reducing regional conflicts, countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and extending peace and prosperity.” For the United States, the promotion of human rights and democracy is central to our foreign policy, as is our methodology of transformational diplomacy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has defined ‘transformational diplomacy’ as working with partners “to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people” and helping others “better their own lives, build their own nations, and transform their futures.” The ‘partners’ to whom Secretary Rice referred are other donor states and international organizations that share our values and goals. They are also the governments of those states that are seeking to strengthen their democracy and to secure the human rights of their citizens.
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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In his National Security Strategy, President Bush, expressed our conviction that “promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability, reducing regional conflicts, countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and extending peace and prosperity.” For the United States, the promotion of human rights and democracy is central to our foreign policy, as is our methodology of transformational diplomacy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has defined ‘transformational diplomacy’ as working with partners “to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people” and helping others “better their own lives, build their own nations, and transform their futures.” The ‘partners’ to whom Secretary Rice referred are other donor states and international organizations that share our values and goals. They are also the governments of those states that are seeking to strengthen their democracy and to secure the human rights of their citizens. But our most important partners in this work are the dedicated and capable non-governmental organizations around the world who have worked with all parts of civil society. It is they who promote and protect the rights and liberties that mark the boundary between freedom and oppression. They are the advocacy groups, religious organizations, human rights defenders, civil libertarians, professional associations, environmentalists, and worker organizations. In the nations of sub-Saharan Africa such as those our honorees call home, the job of promoting democracy and human rights from within a given society is always difficult and sometimes dangerous. In Africa, the status quo and tradition can be fierce opponents of progress.
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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But our most important partners in this work are the dedicated and capable non-governmental organizations around the world who have worked with all parts of civil society. It is they who promote and protect the rights and liberties that mark the boundary between freedom and oppression. They are the advocacy groups, religious organizations, human rights defenders, civil libertarians, professional associations, environmentalists, and worker organizations. In the nations of sub-Saharan Africa such as those our honorees call home, the job of promoting democracy and human rights from within a given society is always difficult and sometimes dangerous. In Africa, the status quo and tradition can be fierce opponents of progress. But an illustrious African American activist, the abolitionist Frederick Douglass, spoke a central truth that confronts anyone who sets out to change her or his society. Speaking in 1857 of the efforts to end chattel slavery in the United States, Douglass said, “If there is no struggle, there is no progress . . . This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.”
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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But an illustrious African American activist, the abolitionist Frederick Douglass, spoke a central truth that confronts anyone who sets out to change her or his society. Speaking in 1857 of the efforts to end chattel slavery in the United States, Douglass said, “If there is no struggle, there is no progress . . . This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.” Significantly, next year the Community of Democracies (CD), a coalition of over 120 democratic nations, chaired by Mali, will come together to share best practices and support civil society as the engine of democratic change. Mali’s theme for the 2007 Community of Democracies’ ministerial in Bamako is democracy and development. Both are inseparably linked. Democracy can yield a range of tangible benefits to the people of Africa by encouraging stability and good governance which are essential for poverty eradication and economic prosperity. Tonight, we stand in great admiration and respect for the courage and leadership manifested by each of the individuals being recognized and their organizations, for not only what they have achieved on behalf of the advancement of freedom in their own societies but the exemplary behavior that I know will be emulated by countless others struggling for fundamental human rights in Africa and across the globe.
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
The Role of Civil Society in the Growth of Democracy in Africa
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Significantly, next year the Community of Democracies (CD), a coalition of over 120 democratic nations, chaired by Mali, will come together to share best practices and support civil society as the engine of democratic change. Mali’s theme for the 2007 Community of Democracies’ ministerial in Bamako is democracy and development. Both are inseparably linked. Democracy can yield a range of tangible benefits to the people of Africa by encouraging stability and good governance which are essential for poverty eradication and economic prosperity. Tonight, we stand in great admiration and respect for the courage and leadership manifested by each of the individuals being recognized and their organizations, for not only what they have achieved on behalf of the advancement of freedom in their own societies but the exemplary behavior that I know will be emulated by countless others struggling for fundamental human rights in Africa and across the globe. We salute you. Since its founding in 1982, the National Endowment for Democracy has provided financial support and capacity-building assistance to thousands of NGOs that, in turn, have nurtured the aspirations and given voice to the grievances of millions of people in Africa and around the world. This partnership -- United States Government, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the collective civil society organizations throughout Africa -- will endure as long as we Americans remember the abolitionists, suffragists, civil rights workers, labor organizers and religious non-conformists who brought us to this place and time, and as long there are men and women like those we honor tonight who are willing to dedicate their lives to the struggle for liberty and democracy. Thank you.
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Fact Sheet
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
Washington, DC
October 28, 2008
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
The U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) sponsored a symposium of experienced victim service providers to discuss how best to protect and assist victims of human trafficking after they are identified and rescued. This group of experts represented ten organizations recognized for quality victim care. The product of this collaboration will be the report, Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking, to be posted on the G/TIP website later this year. A summary of the report’s findings is outlined below. Shelter Safety Measures
Safety is the first priority of aftercare programs. Safety involves physical security measures and a thorough understanding of—and commitment to—safety measures from all shelter staff and clients. Centro Integral de Atencion a las Mujeres, CIAM CANCUN A.C. (CIAM CANCUN) provides safe shelter to female victims of trafficking in Mexico. The shelter’s safety measures include: 24 hour-a-day staff; HiFi technology;
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Safety involves physical security measures and a thorough understanding of—and commitment to—safety measures from all shelter staff and clients. Centro Integral de Atencion a las Mujeres, CIAM CANCUN A.C. (CIAM CANCUN) provides safe shelter to female victims of trafficking in Mexico. The shelter’s safety measures include: 24 hour-a-day staff; HiFi technology; bulletproof windows; entrance safety measures; and a professionally trained team of female security guards. Visitors are not allowed at the shelter; victims are accompanied by a security team in a safe vehicle to meet with guests at a visiting home.
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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bulletproof windows; entrance safety measures; and a professionally trained team of female security guards. Visitors are not allowed at the shelter; victims are accompanied by a security team in a safe vehicle to meet with guests at a visiting home. CIAM CANCUN produced an orientation videotape, which introduces victims to all aspects of the shelter and highlights the importance of maintaining shelter security. It is shown to all new clients prior to entering the shelter. Safety Protocols
The Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking (CAST) provides physically and psychologically safe housing to trafficking victims in the United States. The shelter also serves as a drop-in center, where all CAST clients can receive legal assistance, attend life skills workshops, and participate in therapeutic activities. CAST emphasizes personal safety and shelter security with all clients and staff members.
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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CIAM CANCUN produced an orientation videotape, which introduces victims to all aspects of the shelter and highlights the importance of maintaining shelter security. It is shown to all new clients prior to entering the shelter. Safety Protocols
The Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking (CAST) provides physically and psychologically safe housing to trafficking victims in the United States. The shelter also serves as a drop-in center, where all CAST clients can receive legal assistance, attend life skills workshops, and participate in therapeutic activities. CAST emphasizes personal safety and shelter security with all clients and staff members. The CAST Social Services Manual: A Guidebook to Serving Survivors of Human Trafficking in Los Angeles provides comprehensive guidelines on all areas of victim assistance, and includes forms for safety screening, a safety protocol, and a no-harm contract for clients. Program Policies and Procedures
Victim, staff, and community safety are at the core of all elements of aftercare services. To mitigate potential safety risks, staff members must have a clear understanding of the program’s rules, roles and regulations before providing services to victims of human trafficking. Comprehensive policies and procedures for secure facilities that assist female victims of human trafficking are included in Guidelines for the Operation of Care Facilities for Victims of Trafficking and Violence Against Women and Girls.
| 1,557 | 3,026 |
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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The CAST Social Services Manual: A Guidebook to Serving Survivors of Human Trafficking in Los Angeles provides comprehensive guidelines on all areas of victim assistance, and includes forms for safety screening, a safety protocol, and a no-harm contract for clients. Program Policies and Procedures
Victim, staff, and community safety are at the core of all elements of aftercare services. To mitigate potential safety risks, staff members must have a clear understanding of the program’s rules, roles and regulations before providing services to victims of human trafficking. Comprehensive policies and procedures for secure facilities that assist female victims of human trafficking are included in Guidelines for the Operation of Care Facilities for Victims of Trafficking and Violence Against Women and Girls. Developed by Planete Enfants, this manual is intended to build capacity in shelter facilities through the establishment of policies, guidelines, training, personnel and material requirements. Legal and Victim Services Case Planning
A case plan is an informed strategy that directs a victim’s course of assistance and is an integral component used to evaluate a victim’s progress. The International Justice Mission (IJM) assists victims of slavery and sex trafficking in Asia, Africa, Latin America and South America, working within each
country’s legal system to facilitate victim rescue, prosecute perpetrators, and provide aftercare services to victims. IJM’s work with victims requires thorough, accurate documentation. Each victim has two case plans:
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developed by Planete Enfants, this manual is intended to build capacity in shelter facilities through the establishment of policies, guidelines, training, personnel and material requirements. Legal and Victim Services Case Planning
A case plan is an informed strategy that directs a victim’s course of assistance and is an integral component used to evaluate a victim’s progress. The International Justice Mission (IJM) assists victims of slavery and sex trafficking in Asia, Africa, Latin America and South America, working within each
country’s legal system to facilitate victim rescue, prosecute perpetrators, and provide aftercare services to victims. IJM’s work with victims requires thorough, accurate documentation. Each victim has two case plans: a legal case plan and a victim services case plan. IJM has found that obtaining a victim’s legal documentation is a critical component of each victim’s case plan. Often, traffickers take victims’ legal documents to make them more defenseless and afraid of justice officials. Restoring those legal documents is an important step in victim safety, rehabilitation, and future reintegration. Psychological First Aid
Victims of human trafficking undergo profound, and often prolonged, traumatic events at the hands of others.
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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a legal case plan and a victim services case plan. IJM has found that obtaining a victim’s legal documentation is a critical component of each victim’s case plan. Often, traffickers take victims’ legal documents to make them more defenseless and afraid of justice officials. Restoring those legal documents is an important step in victim safety, rehabilitation, and future reintegration. Psychological First Aid
Victims of human trafficking undergo profound, and often prolonged, traumatic events at the hands of others. They often experience overwhelming psychological effects as a direct consequence of trafficking incidents. Psychological first aid (PFA), also referred to as “crisis intervention,” is the process of helping people who have experienced a sudden, disturbing or shocking event cope with emotional distress. PFA can be administered by trained professionals or laypersons. Trauma-informed Treatment for Young Victims
Trafficking may not be the first time that a victim has experienced violence or exploitation. Girls Educational & Mentoring Services (GEMS) provides aftercare services to young women (ages 12-21) who have been internally trafficked or sexually exploited in the United States.
| 3,782 | 4,990 |
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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They often experience overwhelming psychological effects as a direct consequence of trafficking incidents. Psychological first aid (PFA), also referred to as “crisis intervention,” is the process of helping people who have experienced a sudden, disturbing or shocking event cope with emotional distress. PFA can be administered by trained professionals or laypersons. Trauma-informed Treatment for Young Victims
Trafficking may not be the first time that a victim has experienced violence or exploitation. Girls Educational & Mentoring Services (GEMS) provides aftercare services to young women (ages 12-21) who have been internally trafficked or sexually exploited in the United States. When GEMS first began providing services, it became apparent that the victims had been sexually or physically abused prior to becoming victims of trafficking or sexual exploitation. The prior victimization made the young women more susceptible to recruitment into the sex industry; victims often left home to escape abuse only to undergo worse abuse on the streets. GEMS’ services help victims think critically about the local, national, and international social forces (such as poverty, race, gender, class, prior victimization) that create a “perfect storm” of risk factors for trafficking. Victims’ practical and physical needs are met first, which builds a foundation of trust so victims can then successfully receive holistic, strengths-based and trauma-informed treatment.
| 4,303 | 5,769 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8161277#8_12627908
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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When GEMS first began providing services, it became apparent that the victims had been sexually or physically abused prior to becoming victims of trafficking or sexual exploitation. The prior victimization made the young women more susceptible to recruitment into the sex industry; victims often left home to escape abuse only to undergo worse abuse on the streets. GEMS’ services help victims think critically about the local, national, and international social forces (such as poverty, race, gender, class, prior victimization) that create a “perfect storm” of risk factors for trafficking. Victims’ practical and physical needs are met first, which builds a foundation of trust so victims can then successfully receive holistic, strengths-based and trauma-informed treatment. GEMS partners with allied professionals in the community to provide comprehensive services that address victims’ needs—including those that stem from prior victimization. Comprehensive Medical Care
Some trafficking victims develop medical issues as a direct result of trafficking. Victims of labor trafficking may develop chronic physical illnesses and disabilities. Victims of sex trafficking have a greatly increased risk of contracting infections and diseases. Depending on the type and severity of the medical issue, a victim may not be able to address psychological issues until his/her medical needs have been addressed.
| 4,991 | 6,396 |
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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GEMS partners with allied professionals in the community to provide comprehensive services that address victims’ needs—including those that stem from prior victimization. Comprehensive Medical Care
Some trafficking victims develop medical issues as a direct result of trafficking. Victims of labor trafficking may develop chronic physical illnesses and disabilities. Victims of sex trafficking have a greatly increased risk of contracting infections and diseases. Depending on the type and severity of the medical issue, a victim may not be able to address psychological issues until his/her medical needs have been addressed. The Indian-based NGO, Prajwala, performs rescue, rehabilitation, reintegration, and community-based prevention programs for adult and child victims of sex trafficking in India. Trained caretakers offer appropriate care and support for victims with HIV/AIDS, including providing antiretroviral drugs, treating opportunistic infections and providing psychosocial support. HIV-positive victims are also fed a special diet to meet their nutritional needs. Mentoring
Mentoring (also referred to as “peer support” or a “buddy system”) within the context of case planning can act as a transformational relationship, in which positive role models create a compassionate catalyst for change. When those positive role models are victims of trafficking who are successfully rebuilding their lives, the catalyst for change can extend beyond other victims to the entire community or nation.
| 5,770 | 7,274 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8161277#10_12631742
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/08/111378.htm
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
|
The Indian-based NGO, Prajwala, performs rescue, rehabilitation, reintegration, and community-based prevention programs for adult and child victims of sex trafficking in India. Trained caretakers offer appropriate care and support for victims with HIV/AIDS, including providing antiretroviral drugs, treating opportunistic infections and providing psychosocial support. HIV-positive victims are also fed a special diet to meet their nutritional needs. Mentoring
Mentoring (also referred to as “peer support” or a “buddy system”) within the context of case planning can act as a transformational relationship, in which positive role models create a compassionate catalyst for change. When those positive role models are victims of trafficking who are successfully rebuilding their lives, the catalyst for change can extend beyond other victims to the entire community or nation. World Vision is an international humanitarian organization dedicated to helping children, families and communities reach their full potential by tackling poverty and injustice, including labor and sex trafficking and sexual exploitation. World Vision works collaboratively with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in Laos on the Voices of Victims Network, which trains former victims of trafficking to mentor potential migrants on safe migration. The network extends from village committees to schools to migration hubs in Laos and Thailand. The project also trains and mentors Lao government workers at local, provincial and national levels to support anti-trafficking measures. “Soft Skills” Training
For victims to successfully reintegrate into any community, they must possess basic life and work skills that will increase their ability to thrive independently, which in turn decreases their risk of re-trafficking.
| 6,397 | 8,199 |
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
|
World Vision is an international humanitarian organization dedicated to helping children, families and communities reach their full potential by tackling poverty and injustice, including labor and sex trafficking and sexual exploitation. World Vision works collaboratively with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in Laos on the Voices of Victims Network, which trains former victims of trafficking to mentor potential migrants on safe migration. The network extends from village committees to schools to migration hubs in Laos and Thailand. The project also trains and mentors Lao government workers at local, provincial and national levels to support anti-trafficking measures. “Soft Skills” Training
For victims to successfully reintegrate into any community, they must possess basic life and work skills that will increase their ability to thrive independently, which in turn decreases their risk of re-trafficking. Hagar International (Hagar) provides physical, psychological, and social support in secure residential facilities to women and children who have been trafficked in Cambodia. Hagar’s Career Pathways Program offers “soft skills” training for the first three months, where victims receive guidance on successfully entering a work environment (including self motivation, work ethics, developing competency, interview preparation, career counseling, and literacy training). During this time, victims also visit local businesses so they can choose a vocation. Victims then go through the Career Pathways Program’s “hard skills training,” six-month courses during which victims choose to specialize in hair and beauty, sewing or cooking. Apprenticeship opportunities are facilitated for students completing the course so they can receive further “on the job” training to increase their skill levels and confidence.
| 7,275 | 9,107 |
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Hagar International (Hagar) provides physical, psychological, and social support in secure residential facilities to women and children who have been trafficked in Cambodia. Hagar’s Career Pathways Program offers “soft skills” training for the first three months, where victims receive guidance on successfully entering a work environment (including self motivation, work ethics, developing competency, interview preparation, career counseling, and literacy training). During this time, victims also visit local businesses so they can choose a vocation. Victims then go through the Career Pathways Program’s “hard skills training,” six-month courses during which victims choose to specialize in hair and beauty, sewing or cooking. Apprenticeship opportunities are facilitated for students completing the course so they can receive further “on the job” training to increase their skill levels and confidence. Micro-Credit Loans
One of the largest risk factors of human trafficking is poverty. Traffickers often conscript victims by promising to provide honest work and a decent living. Often, victims reintegrate into a community where the same poverty factors that led to trafficking still exist. Micro-credit programs extend small loans or other financial services (such as savings accounts, training, networking, and peer support) from cooperative groups, not moneylenders. Loans are made to help impoverished people get training or start self-employment projects that generate income, enabling them to care for themselves and their families.
| 8,200 | 9,744 |
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Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
Developing a Consensus on Aftercare Services for Victims of Human Trafficking
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Micro-Credit Loans
One of the largest risk factors of human trafficking is poverty. Traffickers often conscript victims by promising to provide honest work and a decent living. Often, victims reintegrate into a community where the same poverty factors that led to trafficking still exist. Micro-credit programs extend small loans or other financial services (such as savings accounts, training, networking, and peer support) from cooperative groups, not moneylenders. Loans are made to help impoverished people get training or start self-employment projects that generate income, enabling them to care for themselves and their families. Free the Slaves (FTS) is an international organization that partners with local aftercare service providers to meet the needs of victims of labor and sex trafficking. FTS’s comprehensive document Rebuilding Lives: An Introduction to Promising Practices in
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/other/48236.htm
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What Do the Tiers of the Trafficking in Persons Report Mean?
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What Do the Tiers of the Trafficking in Persons Report Mean?
What Do the Tiers of the Trafficking in Persons Report Mean?
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What Do the Tiers of the Trafficking in Persons Report Mean? What Do the Tiers of the Trafficking in Persons Report Mean? Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
Washington, DC
June 3, 2005
Tier 1
Countries that fully comply with the The Trafficking in Persons Act’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Tier 2
Countries that do not fully comply with the minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance. Tier 2 Watch List
Countries on Tier 2 requiring special scrutiny because of a high or significantly increasing number of victims; failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons; or an assessment as Tier 2 based on commitments to take action over the next year. Tier 3
Countries that neither satisfy the minimum standards nor demonstrate a significant effort to come into compliance. Countries in this tier are subject to potential non-humanitarian and non-trade sanctions.
| 0 | 1,011 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8179004#0_12641041
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/46345.htm
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
Historical Background
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
Wartime relations between the United States and the Soviet Union can be considered one of the highpoints in the longstanding interaction between these two great powers. Although not without tensions--such as differing ideological and strategic goals, and lingering suspicions--the collaborative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union nonetheless was maintained. Moreover, it was instrumental in defeating Nazi Germany in 1945. The United States greeted the democratic Russian Revolution of February 1917 with great enthusiasm, which cooled considerably with the advent of the Bolsheviks in October 1917. The United States, along with many other countries, refused to recognize the new regime, arguing that it was not a democratically elected or representative government. The policy of non-recognition ended in November 1933, when the United States, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the last major power to do so. Despite outwardly cordial relations between the two countries, American misgivings regarding Soviet international behavior grew in the late 1930s. The August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, which paved the way for Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September, followed by the Soviet invasion of Poland’s eastern provinces of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, caused alarm in Washington. The Soviet attack on Finland in November 1939, followed by Stalin’s absorption of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, further exacerbated relations. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, led to changes in American attitudes.
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The policy of non-recognition ended in November 1933, when the United States, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the last major power to do so. Despite outwardly cordial relations between the two countries, American misgivings regarding Soviet international behavior grew in the late 1930s. The August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, which paved the way for Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September, followed by the Soviet invasion of Poland’s eastern provinces of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, caused alarm in Washington. The Soviet attack on Finland in November 1939, followed by Stalin’s absorption of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, further exacerbated relations. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, led to changes in American attitudes. The United States began to see the Soviet Union as an embattled country being overrun by fascist forces, and this attitude was further reinforced in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Under the Lend-Lease Act, the United States sent enormous quantities of war materiel to the Soviet Union, which was critical in helping the Soviets withstand the Nazi onslaught. By the end of 1942, the Nazi advance into the Soviet Union had stalled; it was finally reversed at the epic battle of Stalingrad in 1943. Soviet forces then began a massive counteroffensive, which eventually expelled the Nazis from Soviet territory and beyond.
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States began to see the Soviet Union as an embattled country being overrun by fascist forces, and this attitude was further reinforced in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Under the Lend-Lease Act, the United States sent enormous quantities of war materiel to the Soviet Union, which was critical in helping the Soviets withstand the Nazi onslaught. By the end of 1942, the Nazi advance into the Soviet Union had stalled; it was finally reversed at the epic battle of Stalingrad in 1943. Soviet forces then began a massive counteroffensive, which eventually expelled the Nazis from Soviet territory and beyond. This Soviet effort was aided by the cross-channel Allied landings at Normandy in June 1944. These coordinated military actions came about as the result of intensive and prolonged diplomatic negotiations between the Allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, who became known as the “Big Three.” These wartime conferences, which also sought to address issues related to the postwar world, included the November 1943 Tehran Conference. At Tehran, Stalin secured confirmation from Roosevelt and Churchill of the launching of the cross-channel invasion. In turn, Stalin promised his allies that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan.
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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This Soviet effort was aided by the cross-channel Allied landings at Normandy in June 1944. These coordinated military actions came about as the result of intensive and prolonged diplomatic negotiations between the Allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, who became known as the “Big Three.” These wartime conferences, which also sought to address issues related to the postwar world, included the November 1943 Tehran Conference. At Tehran, Stalin secured confirmation from Roosevelt and Churchill of the launching of the cross-channel invasion. In turn, Stalin promised his allies that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan. In February 1945, the "Big Three" met at Yalta in the Crimea. The Yalta Conference was the most important--and by far the most controversial--of the wartime meetings. Recognizing the strong position that the Soviet Army held on the ground, Churchill--and an ailing Roosevelt--agreed to a number of things with Stalin. At Yalta, they granted territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and outlined punitive measures against Germany, including Allied occupation and the principle of reparations. Stalin guaranteed that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within 6 months after the end of hostilities in Europe.
| 2,545 | 3,823 |
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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In February 1945, the "Big Three" met at Yalta in the Crimea. The Yalta Conference was the most important--and by far the most controversial--of the wartime meetings. Recognizing the strong position that the Soviet Army held on the ground, Churchill--and an ailing Roosevelt--agreed to a number of things with Stalin. At Yalta, they granted territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and outlined punitive measures against Germany, including Allied occupation and the principle of reparations. Stalin guaranteed that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within 6 months after the end of hostilities in Europe. While the diplomats and politicians engaged in trying to shape the postwar world, Soviet forces from the east and Allied forces from the west continued to advance on Germany. After a fierce and costly battle, Berlin fell to Soviet forces on May 8, 1945, after Allied and Soviet troops had met on the Elbe River to shake hands and congratulate each other on a hard won impending victory. Although the war in Europe was over, it would take several more months of hard fighting and substantial losses for Allied forces to defeat the Japanese in September 1945, including the first use of the atomic bomb. In accordance with the Yalta agreements, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in early August 1945, just prior to Japan’s surrender in September. The alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II developed out of necessity, and out of a shared realization that each country needed the other to defeat one of the most dangerous and destructive forces of the twentieth century.
| 3,205 | 4,833 |
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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While the diplomats and politicians engaged in trying to shape the postwar world, Soviet forces from the east and Allied forces from the west continued to advance on Germany. After a fierce and costly battle, Berlin fell to Soviet forces on May 8, 1945, after Allied and Soviet troops had met on the Elbe River to shake hands and congratulate each other on a hard won impending victory. Although the war in Europe was over, it would take several more months of hard fighting and substantial losses for Allied forces to defeat the Japanese in September 1945, including the first use of the atomic bomb. In accordance with the Yalta agreements, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in early August 1945, just prior to Japan’s surrender in September. The alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II developed out of necessity, and out of a shared realization that each country needed the other to defeat one of the most dangerous and destructive forces of the twentieth century. Ideological differences were subordinated, albeit temporarily, to the common goal of defeating fascism. As a result of this cooperation, the groundwork for a new international system was laid, out of which came the United Nations organization. The Soviets had suffered tremendous human and material losses during the war. Approximately 20 million people were killed, thousands of villages, towns, and cities were destroyed, and the Soviet Union’s economic infrastructure was devastated. Despite the subsequent postwar controversies and the beginning of the Cold War, nothing can diminish the importance of the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II
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Ideological differences were subordinated, albeit temporarily, to the common goal of defeating fascism. As a result of this cooperation, the groundwork for a new international system was laid, out of which came the United Nations organization. The Soviets had suffered tremendous human and material losses during the war. Approximately 20 million people were killed, thousands of villages, towns, and cities were destroyed, and the Soviet Union’s economic infrastructure was devastated. Despite the subsequent postwar controversies and the beginning of the Cold War, nothing can diminish the importance of the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State
May 2005
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
Historical Background
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The impetus to establish the United Nations stemmed in large part from the inability of its predecessor, the League of Nations, to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. Despite Germany’s occupation of a number of European states, and the League’s failure to stop other serious international transgressions in the 1930s, such as Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, many international leaders remained committed to the League’s ideals. Once World War II began, President Franklin D. Roosevelt determined that U.S. leadership was essential for the creation of another international organization aimed at preserving peace, and his administration engaged in international diplomacy in pursuit of that goal. He also worked to build domestic support for the concept of the United Nations. After Roosevelt’s death, President Harry S Truman also assumed the important task of maintaining support for the United Nations and worked through complicated international problems, particularly with the Soviet Union, to make the founding of the new organization possible. After nearly four years of planning, the international community finally established the United Nations in the spring of 1945. Origins of the United Nations
The concept of creating a global organization of member states dedicated to preserving international peace through collective security increased in popularity during World War I. The bloodshed of the “Great War” persuaded President Woodrow Wilson, and a number of other American and international leaders, to seek the creation of an international forum in which conflicts could be resolved peacefully. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I, which Wilson negotiated on behalf of the United States, contained a framework for a League of Nations, intended to maintain peace and stability. However, despite Wilson’s efforts to gain the domestic support of political leaders and the American public, he was unable to convince the United States Senate to approve U.S. membership in the League. This was due to strong isolationist sentiment and partisan conflicts, stemming in part from his failure to include any prominent Republicans in the peace negotiations.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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After nearly four years of planning, the international community finally established the United Nations in the spring of 1945. Origins of the United Nations
The concept of creating a global organization of member states dedicated to preserving international peace through collective security increased in popularity during World War I. The bloodshed of the “Great War” persuaded President Woodrow Wilson, and a number of other American and international leaders, to seek the creation of an international forum in which conflicts could be resolved peacefully. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I, which Wilson negotiated on behalf of the United States, contained a framework for a League of Nations, intended to maintain peace and stability. However, despite Wilson’s efforts to gain the domestic support of political leaders and the American public, he was unable to convince the United States Senate to approve U.S. membership in the League. This was due to strong isolationist sentiment and partisan conflicts, stemming in part from his failure to include any prominent Republicans in the peace negotiations. The League’s opponents criticized it as a threat to American sovereignty and security, and objected most stridently to Article Ten of the League Charter, which committed member states to protect the territorial integrity of all other member states against external aggression. Many American lawmakers argued that Article Ten might obligate the United States to take part in wars in defense of dubious, often contested, colonial boundaries. After considering membership in the League with reservations, the Senate ultimately prevented the United States from joining the League. The absence of the United States weakened the League, which was also hindered in its efforts to resolve disputes by the widespread economic crises of the 1930s, its inability to compel states to abide by its decisions, and its requirement that many decisions--including those involving a response to aggression--be decided unanimously. The fact that member states involved in a dispute were granted a seat on the League’s Council, thereby allowing them to prevent unanimous action, meant that the League eventually resorted to expelling aggressor states such as Japan and Italy, with little effect.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The League’s opponents criticized it as a threat to American sovereignty and security, and objected most stridently to Article Ten of the League Charter, which committed member states to protect the territorial integrity of all other member states against external aggression. Many American lawmakers argued that Article Ten might obligate the United States to take part in wars in defense of dubious, often contested, colonial boundaries. After considering membership in the League with reservations, the Senate ultimately prevented the United States from joining the League. The absence of the United States weakened the League, which was also hindered in its efforts to resolve disputes by the widespread economic crises of the 1930s, its inability to compel states to abide by its decisions, and its requirement that many decisions--including those involving a response to aggression--be decided unanimously. The fact that member states involved in a dispute were granted a seat on the League’s Council, thereby allowing them to prevent unanimous action, meant that the League eventually resorted to expelling aggressor states such as Japan and Italy, with little effect. Proposing the United Nations Concept
President Roosevelt recognized the inherent weaknesses of the League of Nations, but faced with the reality of another world war, also saw the value of planning for the creation of an international organization to maintain peace in the post-World War II era. He felt that this time, the United States needed to play a leading role both in the creation of the organization, and in the organization itself. Moreover, in contrast to the League, the new organization needed the power to enforce key decisions. The first wartime meeting between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt, the Atlantic Conference held off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941, took place before the United States had formally entered the war as a combatant. Despite its official position of neutrality, the United States joined Britain in issuing a joint declaration that became known as the Atlantic Charter.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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Proposing the United Nations Concept
President Roosevelt recognized the inherent weaknesses of the League of Nations, but faced with the reality of another world war, also saw the value of planning for the creation of an international organization to maintain peace in the post-World War II era. He felt that this time, the United States needed to play a leading role both in the creation of the organization, and in the organization itself. Moreover, in contrast to the League, the new organization needed the power to enforce key decisions. The first wartime meeting between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt, the Atlantic Conference held off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941, took place before the United States had formally entered the war as a combatant. Despite its official position of neutrality, the United States joined Britain in issuing a joint declaration that became known as the Atlantic Charter. This pronouncement outlined a vision for a postwar order supported, in part, by an effective international organization that would replace the struggling League of Nations. During this meeting, Roosevelt privately suggested to Churchill the name of the future organization: the United Nations. The governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China formalized the Atlantic Charter proposals in January 1942, shortly after the United States entered the war. In the Declaration of the United Nations, these major Allied nations, along with 22 other states, agreed to work together against the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy), and committed in principle to the establishment of the United Nations after the war.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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This pronouncement outlined a vision for a postwar order supported, in part, by an effective international organization that would replace the struggling League of Nations. During this meeting, Roosevelt privately suggested to Churchill the name of the future organization: the United Nations. The governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China formalized the Atlantic Charter proposals in January 1942, shortly after the United States entered the war. In the Declaration of the United Nations, these major Allied nations, along with 22 other states, agreed to work together against the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy), and committed in principle to the establishment of the United Nations after the war. Learning from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to gain Congressional support for the League of Nations, the Roosevelt Administration aimed to include a wide range of administration and elected officials in its effort to establish the proposed United Nations. The State Department played a significant role in this process, and created a Special Subcommittee on International Organization in the Advisory Committee on Postwar Planning to advise Congress. The subcommittee reviewed past efforts at international cooperation, and by March 1943 had drafted a formal proposal to establish a new, more effective international organization. Secretary of State Cordell Hull took the proposal to members of Congress in an effort to build bipartisan support for the proposed postwar organization. Consultations between Congress and the Department of State continued into the summer of 1943, and by August, produced a draft United Nations Charter.
| 4,584 | 6,260 |
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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Learning from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to gain Congressional support for the League of Nations, the Roosevelt Administration aimed to include a wide range of administration and elected officials in its effort to establish the proposed United Nations. The State Department played a significant role in this process, and created a Special Subcommittee on International Organization in the Advisory Committee on Postwar Planning to advise Congress. The subcommittee reviewed past efforts at international cooperation, and by March 1943 had drafted a formal proposal to establish a new, more effective international organization. Secretary of State Cordell Hull took the proposal to members of Congress in an effort to build bipartisan support for the proposed postwar organization. Consultations between Congress and the Department of State continued into the summer of 1943, and by August, produced a draft United Nations Charter. Congress repeatedly passed resolutions declaring its support for the establishment of an international organization--and for United States membership in that organization. The major Allied Powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China--reiterated their commitment to forming an international organization in the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, and more concrete international planning for the structure of the new organization commenced. Representatives from these four countries met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC, from August 21 through October 7, 1944, and the four Allied powers issued a statement of Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, largely based on the draft charter formulated by the State Department’s Subcommittee on International Organization, in consultation with the U.S. Congress. The Department of State undertook a public relations campaign to build support for the United Nations. As part of that effort, the Department printed over 200,000 copies of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and an informative, eight-page guide to the draft United Nations Charter.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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Congress repeatedly passed resolutions declaring its support for the establishment of an international organization--and for United States membership in that organization. The major Allied Powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China--reiterated their commitment to forming an international organization in the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, and more concrete international planning for the structure of the new organization commenced. Representatives from these four countries met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC, from August 21 through October 7, 1944, and the four Allied powers issued a statement of Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, largely based on the draft charter formulated by the State Department’s Subcommittee on International Organization, in consultation with the U.S. Congress. The Department of State undertook a public relations campaign to build support for the United Nations. As part of that effort, the Department printed over 200,000 copies of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and an informative, eight-page guide to the draft United Nations Charter. The Department worked in concert with interested groups to inform the public about the United Nations and even dispatched officials around the country to answer questions on the proposed organization. By the end of the effort, the Department of State had coordinated almost 500 such meetings. Creation of the United Nations
The basic framework for the proposed United Nations rested on President Roosevelt’s vision that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China would provide leadership in the postwar international system. It was these four states, with the addition of France, that would assume permanent seats in the otherwise rotating membership of the United Nations Security Council. At the Anglo-American Malta Conference in early 1945, the two sides proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council would have a veto.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The Department worked in concert with interested groups to inform the public about the United Nations and even dispatched officials around the country to answer questions on the proposed organization. By the end of the effort, the Department of State had coordinated almost 500 such meetings. Creation of the United Nations
The basic framework for the proposed United Nations rested on President Roosevelt’s vision that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China would provide leadership in the postwar international system. It was these four states, with the addition of France, that would assume permanent seats in the otherwise rotating membership of the United Nations Security Council. At the Anglo-American Malta Conference in early 1945, the two sides proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council would have a veto. Immediately thereafter, at the Yalta Conference, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom agreed on veto power for the permanent members of the Security Council. This crucial decision essentially required unanimity between the five permanent members on the pressing international decisions related to international security and use of force that would be brought before the Security Council. Churchill and Roosevelt also made an important concession to Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s request that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic be seated in the United Nations General Assembly, thus increasing the Soviet Union’s seats in that body to three. Stalin had originally requested seats for all sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics, but at Yalta this request was turned down, and the compromise was to allow Ukraine and Byelorussia into the United Nations. The United States originally had countered Stalin’s proposal with the request to allow all fifty American states into the United Nations, a suggestion that encouraged Stalin to agree to the compromise.
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945
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Immediately thereafter, at the Yalta Conference, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom agreed on veto power for the permanent members of the Security Council. This crucial decision essentially required unanimity between the five permanent members on the pressing international decisions related to international security and use of force that would be brought before the Security Council. Churchill and Roosevelt also made an important concession to Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s request that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic be seated in the United Nations General Assembly, thus increasing the Soviet Union’s seats in that body to three. Stalin had originally requested seats for all sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics, but at Yalta this request was turned down, and the compromise was to allow Ukraine and Byelorussia into the United Nations. The United States originally had countered Stalin’s proposal with the request to allow all fifty American states into the United Nations, a suggestion that encouraged Stalin to agree to the compromise. At Yalta, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom also drafted invitations to a conference beginning in April 1945 in San Francisco that would formally establish the United Nations. After Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, days before the scheduled San Francisco Conference, Vice President Harry S Truman took the oath of office and immediately announced that the Conference should go forward as planned. Moved by Roosevelt’s death, Stalin, who had initially planned to send Ambassador Andrei Gromyko as the Soviet representative to the San Francisco conference, announced that he
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
Historical Background
Office of the Historian
Washington, DC
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
1780-1820
1780-1783: First Representative of the United States to Russia
The new Government of the United States of America appointed Francis Dana as Minister to St. Petersburg. John Quincy Adams served as translator for this Dana Mission to Russia. Although Dana arrived in August 1781, he left Russia in August 1783 without ever receiving formal recognition from the Russians. Diplomatic ties to Britain prevented the Russian Government from accepting Dana's credentials. Nevertheless, while in Russia, Dana worked as a private citizen to build support for the American cause, and to dispel Russian fears that the new United States would become a trading rival. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris that formally ended the Revolutionary War, Robert Livingston, Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the Continental Congress, recalled Dana and focused on formalizing diplomatic relations with other European powers. 1790:
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Although Dana arrived in August 1781, he left Russia in August 1783 without ever receiving formal recognition from the Russians. Diplomatic ties to Britain prevented the Russian Government from accepting Dana's credentials. Nevertheless, while in Russia, Dana worked as a private citizen to build support for the American cause, and to dispel Russian fears that the new United States would become a trading rival. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris that formally ended the Revolutionary War, Robert Livingston, Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the Continental Congress, recalled Dana and focused on formalizing diplomatic relations with other European powers. 1790: Establishment of Russian Outposts in Russian America
In the late 1700s, the Russians became increasingly interested in the Pacific Northwest of the American continent for fur trapping and trading. Aleksandr Baranov, sponsored by the fur trading business, traveled to the North Pacific in 1790 and established various Russian outposts in the area--including Sitka, which later became New Archangel, the main administrative center of Russian America. 1799: Creation of Russian America Company
Tsar Paul chartered the Russian America Company in 1799 to develop trade opportunities in the North Pacific. Although competition between the United States and the Russians in the Pacific remained peaceful, American traders also showed some interest in this area as part of their nascent Pacific and Asian trade.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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Establishment of Russian Outposts in Russian America
In the late 1700s, the Russians became increasingly interested in the Pacific Northwest of the American continent for fur trapping and trading. Aleksandr Baranov, sponsored by the fur trading business, traveled to the North Pacific in 1790 and established various Russian outposts in the area--including Sitka, which later became New Archangel, the main administrative center of Russian America. 1799: Creation of Russian America Company
Tsar Paul chartered the Russian America Company in 1799 to develop trade opportunities in the North Pacific. Although competition between the United States and the Russians in the Pacific remained peaceful, American traders also showed some interest in this area as part of their nascent Pacific and Asian trade. 1803: Acceptance of First U.S. Consul in Russia
In the interest of concluding commercial agreements with Russia, President Thomas Jefferson appointed Consul Levett Harris as the first official U.S. representative to Russia in 1803. Harris received a formal commission as Consul for St. Petersburg in early 1803 and arrived in St. Petersburg in October of that same year. Russia accepted Harris but did not reciprocate by sending a representative to the United States. August-December 1807:
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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1803: Acceptance of First U.S. Consul in Russia
In the interest of concluding commercial agreements with Russia, President Thomas Jefferson appointed Consul Levett Harris as the first official U.S. representative to Russia in 1803. Harris received a formal commission as Consul for St. Petersburg in early 1803 and arrived in St. Petersburg in October of that same year. Russia accepted Harris but did not reciprocate by sending a representative to the United States. August-December 1807: Establishing Formal U.S.-Russian Diplomatic Relations
In August 1807, American Minister in London, James Monroe, discussed with Russia's Special Envoy at London, Maksim Alopeus, the possibility of establishing official diplomatic ties between the two nations. In December 1807, Russian Special Envoy Alopeus informed American Minister-Designate at London, William Pinkney, that Russian Tsar Alexander I had agreed to send a Minister to the United States, once the United States agreed to reciprocate by sending a representative of similar rank. 1808-1809: Appointing the Diplomats
On August 30, 1808, Tsar Alexander issued credentials for Andrei Dashkov to be Charg� d'Affaires and Consul General to Philadelphia. On September 8, 1808, Secretary of State James Madison informed William Short that President Thomas Jefferson had selected Short to serve as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Tsar of Russia.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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Establishing Formal U.S.-Russian Diplomatic Relations
In August 1807, American Minister in London, James Monroe, discussed with Russia's Special Envoy at London, Maksim Alopeus, the possibility of establishing official diplomatic ties between the two nations. In December 1807, Russian Special Envoy Alopeus informed American Minister-Designate at London, William Pinkney, that Russian Tsar Alexander I had agreed to send a Minister to the United States, once the United States agreed to reciprocate by sending a representative of similar rank. 1808-1809: Appointing the Diplomats
On August 30, 1808, Tsar Alexander issued credentials for Andrei Dashkov to be Charg� d'Affaires and Consul General to Philadelphia. On September 8, 1808, Secretary of State James Madison informed William Short that President Thomas Jefferson had selected Short to serve as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Tsar of Russia. While this compelled the Russians to elevate the rank of the envoy they sent to the United States, President Jefferson had difficulties in getting his nomination approved by the Senate. In March 1809, the Senate rejected Short's nomination, and shortly thereafter rejected the new President James Madison's nomination of John Quincy Adams. Regardless, the Russian Government informed Washington that it would appoint Minister-Designate Fedor Pahlen to Washington. Finally, on June 27, 1809, the Senate approved Adams, after Madison resubmitted his nomination. July 1809:
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While this compelled the Russians to elevate the rank of the envoy they sent to the United States, President Jefferson had difficulties in getting his nomination approved by the Senate. In March 1809, the Senate rejected Short's nomination, and shortly thereafter rejected the new President James Madison's nomination of John Quincy Adams. Regardless, the Russian Government informed Washington that it would appoint Minister-Designate Fedor Pahlen to Washington. Finally, on June 27, 1809, the Senate approved Adams, after Madison resubmitted his nomination. July 1809: First Russian Representative to the United States
Charg� d'Affaires Andrei Dashkov formally presented his credentials to President Madison. He was the first official Russian representative to the United States. November 1809: First U.S. Minister to Russia
John Quincy Adams formally presented his credentials to Tsar Alexander in St. Petersburg, and became the first U.S. Minister to Russia on November 5, 1809. June 1810:
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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First Russian Representative to the United States
Charg� d'Affaires Andrei Dashkov formally presented his credentials to President Madison. He was the first official Russian representative to the United States. November 1809: First U.S. Minister to Russia
John Quincy Adams formally presented his credentials to Tsar Alexander in St. Petersburg, and became the first U.S. Minister to Russia on November 5, 1809. June 1810: First Russian Minister to the United States
The first Russian Minister to the United States, Fedor Pahlen, presented his credentials to President Madison on June 26, 1810. Dashkov replaced him in 1811. 1812: Establishment of Russian Colony at Fort Ross
As instructed by the major stockholders of the Russian America Company and by Aleksandr Baranov, Ivan Kuskov established a southern base in 1812 at Fort Ross near Bodega Bay in California, which was at that time a Spanish territory. 1812-1814:
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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First Russian Minister to the United States
The first Russian Minister to the United States, Fedor Pahlen, presented his credentials to President Madison on June 26, 1810. Dashkov replaced him in 1811. 1812: Establishment of Russian Colony at Fort Ross
As instructed by the major stockholders of the Russian America Company and by Aleksandr Baranov, Ivan Kuskov established a southern base in 1812 at Fort Ross near Bodega Bay in California, which was at that time a Spanish territory. 1812-1814: Russian Mediation Efforts in War of 1812
In September 1812, the Russian Minister of Foreign Relations, Nikolai Rumiantsev, approached Adams in St. Petersburg with the suggestion that the Russians make an effort to mediate in the increasingly tense conflict between Great Britain and the United States. Russian officials hoped to maintain the American commerce, upon which the Russians had come to depend, and to ensure that more British forces would be freed to combat Napoleon's French troops, which were encroaching on Russian territory. Russia presented documents of its mediation offer to Secretary of State James Monroe on February 27, 1813. Monroe accepted the offer on March 11, and sent a team of negotiators led by Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and former Senator James Bayard to St. Petersburg shortly thereafter. Unfortunately for the American delegation, the British refused the third-party mediation, despite continued insistence from the Russians that they sit down with the Americans.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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Russian Mediation Efforts in War of 1812
In September 1812, the Russian Minister of Foreign Relations, Nikolai Rumiantsev, approached Adams in St. Petersburg with the suggestion that the Russians make an effort to mediate in the increasingly tense conflict between Great Britain and the United States. Russian officials hoped to maintain the American commerce, upon which the Russians had come to depend, and to ensure that more British forces would be freed to combat Napoleon's French troops, which were encroaching on Russian territory. Russia presented documents of its mediation offer to Secretary of State James Monroe on February 27, 1813. Monroe accepted the offer on March 11, and sent a team of negotiators led by Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and former Senator James Bayard to St. Petersburg shortly thereafter. Unfortunately for the American delegation, the British refused the third-party mediation, despite continued insistence from the Russians that they sit down with the Americans. Frustrated after months of waiting, the Gallatin-Bayard delegation left St. Petersburg in January 1814. In 1815 the Americans met with the British in Belgium, and concluded the Treaty of Ghent without Russian assistance. 1820-1860
1820-1821: Arbitration of the Treaty of Ghent
When in 1820-1821 the United States and Britain began to disagree over certain provisions of the Treaty of Ghent related to compensation for slaves seized from U.S. territory during the war, the United States suggested that Russia act as a third-party mediator in arbitration. The Russians agreed and settled the disagreement in favor of the Americans.
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Frustrated after months of waiting, the Gallatin-Bayard delegation left St. Petersburg in January 1814. In 1815 the Americans met with the British in Belgium, and concluded the Treaty of Ghent without Russian assistance. 1820-1860
1820-1821: Arbitration of the Treaty of Ghent
When in 1820-1821 the United States and Britain began to disagree over certain provisions of the Treaty of Ghent related to compensation for slaves seized from U.S. territory during the war, the United States suggested that Russia act as a third-party mediator in arbitration. The Russians agreed and settled the disagreement in favor of the Americans. September 1821: Ukaz of 1821
Tsar Alexander issued an ukaz (edict) on September 16, 1821, regarding Russian claims in America. Alexander declared the northwest territory north of 51� latitude under the jurisdiction of the Russian American Company. This line was far south of the main Russian settlement at New Archangel, yet north of the colony at Fort Ross. Alexander also banned foreign ships from coming closer than 115 miles off the coasts of Russian America.
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September 1821: Ukaz of 1821
Tsar Alexander issued an ukaz (edict) on September 16, 1821, regarding Russian claims in America. Alexander declared the northwest territory north of 51� latitude under the jurisdiction of the Russian American Company. This line was far south of the main Russian settlement at New Archangel, yet north of the colony at Fort Ross. Alexander also banned foreign ships from coming closer than 115 miles off the coasts of Russian America. On September 25, Alexander went a step further when he issued a new charter for the Russian American Company that claimed its monopoly on fur hunting, fishing, and trading in this area. A number of American trading companies protested this action. December 1823: The Monroe Doctrine
In his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe outlined the set of principles that would later become known as the Monroe Doctrine. These tenets essentially demanded that Europeans stay out of Western Hemisphere affairs, and refrain from further colonization on the American continents.
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On September 25, Alexander went a step further when he issued a new charter for the Russian American Company that claimed its monopoly on fur hunting, fishing, and trading in this area. A number of American trading companies protested this action. December 1823: The Monroe Doctrine
In his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe outlined the set of principles that would later become known as the Monroe Doctrine. These tenets essentially demanded that Europeans stay out of Western Hemisphere affairs, and refrain from further colonization on the American continents. April 1824: The Convention of 1824
After some hard bargaining urged by American statesmen and trading companies, in April 1824, the Russians finally agreed to abandon the requirements of the ukaz of 1821 and reopened its Pacific ports to U.S. ships. The Convention also set the boundary for Russia's Northwest claims at 54� 40' north latitude. In concluding this agreement, the United States essentially recognized Russian claims north of this line. Once this Convention was ratified in 1825, it became the first treaty concluded between Russia and the United States.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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April 1824: The Convention of 1824
After some hard bargaining urged by American statesmen and trading companies, in April 1824, the Russians finally agreed to abandon the requirements of the ukaz of 1821 and reopened its Pacific ports to U.S. ships. The Convention also set the boundary for Russia's Northwest claims at 54� 40' north latitude. In concluding this agreement, the United States essentially recognized Russian claims north of this line. Once this Convention was ratified in 1825, it became the first treaty concluded between Russia and the United States. December 1832: Russian-American Commercial Treaty of 1832
The Russian-American Commercial Treaty of 1832 made no major changes to the status quo, but formalized practices already followed in the growing trade between the two countries. The treaty provided general bilateral trading rights and most-favored-nation treatment. December 1841: Sale of Fort Ross
The Russians arranged to sell its southernmost Pacific outpost to local American rancher John Sutter for $30,000 in December 1841.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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December 1832: Russian-American Commercial Treaty of 1832
The Russian-American Commercial Treaty of 1832 made no major changes to the status quo, but formalized practices already followed in the growing trade between the two countries. The treaty provided general bilateral trading rights and most-favored-nation treatment. December 1841: Sale of Fort Ross
The Russians arranged to sell its southernmost Pacific outpost to local American rancher John Sutter for $30,000 in December 1841. The sale did not go through immediately, due to demands from the Mexican Government, which officially controlled the California territory for a time, and then the Mexican-American War. However, payment was finally settled in time for the California gold rush, during which prospectors discovered a good deal of the precious metal on territory formerly controlled by the Russians. February 1842: American Engineer as Consultant for Russian Railroad
Tsar Nicholas appointed George Washington Whistler as consulting engineer for the Moscow‑St. Petersburg railroad project in February 1842.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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The sale did not go through immediately, due to demands from the Mexican Government, which officially controlled the California territory for a time, and then the Mexican-American War. However, payment was finally settled in time for the California gold rush, during which prospectors discovered a good deal of the precious metal on territory formerly controlled by the Russians. February 1842: American Engineer as Consultant for Russian Railroad
Tsar Nicholas appointed George Washington Whistler as consulting engineer for the Moscow‑St. Petersburg railroad project in February 1842. Whistler ultimately oversaw most of the construction until his death 7 years later, and brought many American managers to Russia to oversee various aspects of the project. This marked the beginning of long-term American involvement with Russian railroad building. 1853: Organization of American Russian Commercial Company
In the early 1850s, San Francisco entrepreneurs became interested in a commodity readily available in the Russian territory of Alaska-ice. The American Russian Commercial Company, organized in 1853, established large ice houses in Sitka, and eventually dominated American trade with the Russian territories to the north.
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United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War Two
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Whistler ultimately oversaw most of the construction until his death 7 years later, and brought many American managers to Russia to oversee various aspects of the project. This marked the beginning of long-term American involvement with Russian railroad building. 1853: Organization of American Russian Commercial Company
In the early 1850s, San Francisco entrepreneurs became interested in a commodity readily available in the Russian territory of Alaska-ice. The American Russian Commercial Company, organized in 1853, established large ice houses in Sitka, and eventually dominated American trade with the Russian territories to the north. Mid-1850s: Russia, the United States, and the Crimean War
As the European powers vied for control over the declining Ottoman Empire, Ame
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
Chronology
Office of the Historian
Washington, DC
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
1945-1949
1945-1946: Creation of Eastern European People's Republics
Between November 1945 and December 1946, a number of the coalition governments established in the Eastern European countries occupied by Soviet troops during the war transformed into Communist "People's Republics" with strong ties to the Soviet Union. These included Yugoslavia (November 1945); Albania (January 1946); and Bulgaria (December 1946). The United States and Britain considered this an abrogation of agreements made at the Yalta Conference. February 1946: George Kennan's Long Telegram and the Policy of Containment
On February 22, 1946, George F. Kennan, the Charg� d'Affaires at the Moscow Embassy, sent a long telegram to the Department of State detailing his concerns about Soviet expansionism.
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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Albania (January 1946); and Bulgaria (December 1946). The United States and Britain considered this an abrogation of agreements made at the Yalta Conference. February 1946: George Kennan's Long Telegram and the Policy of Containment
On February 22, 1946, George F. Kennan, the Charg� d'Affaires at the Moscow Embassy, sent a long telegram to the Department of State detailing his concerns about Soviet expansionism. Kennan argued that the United States would never be able to cooperate successfully with the Soviets, because they saw the West as an enemy and would engage in a protracted battle to limit Western power and increase Soviet domination. Kennan argued that the United States should lead the West in "containing" the Soviets by exerting counterforce at various geographical and political points of conflict. Kennan published a public version of this argument in the July 1947 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs. Kennan's articulations of the policy of containment had a major influence on American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. March 1946:
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Kennan argued that the United States would never be able to cooperate successfully with the Soviets, because they saw the West as an enemy and would engage in a protracted battle to limit Western power and increase Soviet domination. Kennan argued that the United States should lead the West in "containing" the Soviets by exerting counterforce at various geographical and political points of conflict. Kennan published a public version of this argument in the July 1947 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs. Kennan's articulations of the policy of containment had a major influence on American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. March 1946: Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech
During a speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, visiting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed that Europe was divided by an "Iron Curtain" as the nations of Eastern Europe fell increasingly under Soviet control. Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia all fell under Communist control by early 1948. Spring 1946: Soviet Troops in Iran
Responding to Iranian requests to the United Nations, on March 5, 1946, the United States sent a note to Moscow protesting the retention of Soviet troops in Iran, where Stalin wanted to establish Soviet influence. On April 3, the Soviet Union announced that its troops would leave by May 6.
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech
During a speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, visiting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed that Europe was divided by an "Iron Curtain" as the nations of Eastern Europe fell increasingly under Soviet control. Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia all fell under Communist control by early 1948. Spring 1946: Soviet Troops in Iran
Responding to Iranian requests to the United Nations, on March 5, 1946, the United States sent a note to Moscow protesting the retention of Soviet troops in Iran, where Stalin wanted to establish Soviet influence. On April 3, the Soviet Union announced that its troops would leave by May 6. March 1947: Truman Doctrine
The Soviets aimed also to establish influence over Turkey and Greece in an effort to seek access to the Mediterranean. President Truman delivered a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, asking for $400 million to provide assistance for Greece and Turkey in the hopes of bolstering pro-Western governments there. In this speech, he enunciated the Truman Doctrine that would serve to justify the U.S. Cold War policy of containment. This doctrine described the U.S. policy of supporting free peoples who resisted subjugation from armed minorities or outside pressures.
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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March 1947: Truman Doctrine
The Soviets aimed also to establish influence over Turkey and Greece in an effort to seek access to the Mediterranean. President Truman delivered a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, asking for $400 million to provide assistance for Greece and Turkey in the hopes of bolstering pro-Western governments there. In this speech, he enunciated the Truman Doctrine that would serve to justify the U.S. Cold War policy of containment. This doctrine described the U.S. policy of supporting free peoples who resisted subjugation from armed minorities or outside pressures. June 1947: U.S. Efforts to Control Atomic Energy
In June 1947, the United States submitted proposals, know as the Baruch Plan, for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Development Authority to control all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. The United States offered to destroy its atomic weapons after international control and inspection became effective. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal. June 5, 1947:
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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June 1947: U.S. Efforts to Control Atomic Energy
In June 1947, the United States submitted proposals, know as the Baruch Plan, for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Development Authority to control all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. The United States offered to destroy its atomic weapons after international control and inspection became effective. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal. June 5, 1947: Marshall's Offer of Economic Assistance
In a speech given at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall offered U.S. assistance for the postwar economic rehabilitation of all European nations, including those that had adopted Communist governments. The Soviet Union denounced the Marshall Plan, saying it would infringe upon European sovereignty. Western European nations accepted Marshall's offer, while the Eastern European states followed Moscow's lead. 1948-1949: Berlin Airlift
In the summer of 1948, the Soviet Union cut off access to the Western sectors of Berlin, situated in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany.
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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Marshall's Offer of Economic Assistance
In a speech given at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall offered U.S. assistance for the postwar economic rehabilitation of all European nations, including those that had adopted Communist governments. The Soviet Union denounced the Marshall Plan, saying it would infringe upon European sovereignty. Western European nations accepted Marshall's offer, while the Eastern European states followed Moscow's lead. 1948-1949: Berlin Airlift
In the summer of 1948, the Soviet Union cut off access to the Western sectors of Berlin, situated in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. The Western powers organized a massive airlift to supply West Berlin, and organized a counter-blockade of the Soviet zone. On May 12, 1949, the Soviets lifted their blockade. April 1949: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
On April 14, 1949, twelve Western nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty providing for mutual support in the event of a military attack on any of the parties to the treaty and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The original members of NATO were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
The Western powers organized a massive airlift to supply West Berlin, and organized a counter-blockade of the Soviet zone. On May 12, 1949, the Soviets lifted their blockade. April 1949: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
On April 14, 1949, twelve Western nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty providing for mutual support in the event of a military attack on any of the parties to the treaty and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The original members of NATO were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. September-October 1949: Creation of the two Germanys
Recognizing that the Soviets would not honor agreements to reunite the German zones of occupation, the Western powers moved in the fall of 1949 to establish the Federal Republic of Germany out of the Western zones of occupation. The Soviets countered by supporting the creation of the German Democratic Republic in their zone. Berlin remained divided. September 1949:
| 4,004 | 5,057 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#8_12714741
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
September-October 1949: Creation of the two Germanys
Recognizing that the Soviets would not honor agreements to reunite the German zones of occupation, the Western powers moved in the fall of 1949 to establish the Federal Republic of Germany out of the Western zones of occupation. The Soviets countered by supporting the creation of the German Democratic Republic in their zone. Berlin remained divided. September 1949: Soviet Atomic Bomb
On September 22, 1949, President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb. 1950-1959
February 1950: Sino-Soviet Treaty
Despite U.S. efforts, mainland China became a Communist People's Republic. The Soviets and the Chinese signed a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship on February 14, 1950. April 1950:
| 4,636 | 5,408 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#9_12715862
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
Soviet Atomic Bomb
On September 22, 1949, President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb. 1950-1959
February 1950: Sino-Soviet Treaty
Despite U.S. efforts, mainland China became a Communist People's Republic. The Soviets and the Chinese signed a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship on February 14, 1950. April 1950: NSC-68
In April 1950, Truman signed National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) outlining U.S. justifications for a rapid and massive U.S. military build-up. NSC-68 cited Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, Soviet expansionist tendencies, and the need for the West to contain the Soviet Union as the justifications for the United States to pursue a significant buildup of its conventional military and nuclear resources. 1950-1953: Korean War
Following World War II, the United States administered the southern occupation zone in Korea, while the Soviets administered the northern zone. Plans to unify the two zones never materialized.
| 5,058 | 6,057 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#10_12717212
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
NSC-68
In April 1950, Truman signed National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) outlining U.S. justifications for a rapid and massive U.S. military build-up. NSC-68 cited Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, Soviet expansionist tendencies, and the need for the West to contain the Soviet Union as the justifications for the United States to pursue a significant buildup of its conventional military and nuclear resources. 1950-1953: Korean War
Following World War II, the United States administered the southern occupation zone in Korea, while the Soviets administered the northern zone. Plans to unify the two zones never materialized. On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. U.S.-led United Nations forces responded, and battled the North Korean and Communist Chinese armies. The Soviet Union supplied North Korea and China. On July 27, 1953, the warring parties concluded an armistice that restored the 38th parallel, but failed to unite North and South Korea. November 1952:
| 5,409 | 6,441 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#11_12718593
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. U.S.-led United Nations forces responded, and battled the North Korean and Communist Chinese armies. The Soviet Union supplied North Korea and China. On July 27, 1953, the warring parties concluded an armistice that restored the 38th parallel, but failed to unite North and South Korea. November 1952: U.S. Hydrogen Bomb
On November 1, 1952, the United States announced it had successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb. March 1953: Stalin's Death
The Soviet Union's hard-line leader, Joseph Stalin, died on March 5, 1953, and the Soviet Union entered a period of collective leadership under which a handful of leaders from within the Presidium of the Communist Party shared leadership responsibilities. First Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, ultimately consolidated power and became the de facto leader of the Soviet Union. August 1953:
| 6,058 | 6,993 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#12_12719877
|
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
U.S. Hydrogen Bomb
On November 1, 1952, the United States announced it had successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb. March 1953: Stalin's Death
The Soviet Union's hard-line leader, Joseph Stalin, died on March 5, 1953, and the Soviet Union entered a period of collective leadership under which a handful of leaders from within the Presidium of the Communist Party shared leadership responsibilities. First Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, ultimately consolidated power and became the de facto leader of the Soviet Union. August 1953: Soviet Hydrogen Bomb
On August 8, 1953, the Soviet Union announced it had hydrogen bomb capabilities. August 1954: Atomic Energy Act
President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Atomic Energy Act in August 1954 to authorize the international exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and endorsed the development of commercial nuclear power. May 1955: Creation of the Warsaw Pact
In response to NATO actions in the West, including the rearming of West Germany and the expansion of the treaty organization, on May 1, 1955, the Soviet Union concluded a military defensive alliance known as the Warsaw Pact with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
| 6,442 | 7,699 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#13_12721486
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
Soviet Hydrogen Bomb
On August 8, 1953, the Soviet Union announced it had hydrogen bomb capabilities. August 1954: Atomic Energy Act
President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Atomic Energy Act in August 1954 to authorize the international exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and endorsed the development of commercial nuclear power. May 1955: Creation of the Warsaw Pact
In response to NATO actions in the West, including the rearming of West Germany and the expansion of the treaty organization, on May 1, 1955, the Soviet Union concluded a military defensive alliance known as the Warsaw Pact with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. May 1955: Austrian State Treaty
The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France signed the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955. This officially ended the four-power occupation of Austria and enabled the Austrians, who had pledged to remain neutral, to receive diplomatic recognition as an independent nation. July 1955: Big Four Geneva Summit
Eisenhower met with Soviet Premier Nicolai Bulganin, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and French Premier Edgar Faure at a summit in Geneva in July 1955.
| 6,994 | 8,221 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#14_12723065
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
May 1955: Austrian State Treaty
The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France signed the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955. This officially ended the four-power occupation of Austria and enabled the Austrians, who had pledged to remain neutral, to receive diplomatic recognition as an independent nation. July 1955: Big Four Geneva Summit
Eisenhower met with Soviet Premier Nicolai Bulganin, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and French Premier Edgar Faure at a summit in Geneva in July 1955. Eisenhower offered an "Open Skies" proposal, calling for a U.S.-Soviet exchange of military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection of one another's military installations. The participants also discussed disarmament, German reunification through free elections, European security, and the need for East-West cultural and scientific exchange. February 1956: Twentieth Congress of Soviet Communist Party
At the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev publicly denounced aspects of Stalin's regime, including Stalin's harsh political purges and his "cult of personality." Khrushchev also reversed Stalinist policy by urging "the peaceful coexistence between states with differing political and social systems."
| 7,699 | 8,995 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#15_12724716
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
Eisenhower offered an "Open Skies" proposal, calling for a U.S.-Soviet exchange of military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection of one another's military installations. The participants also discussed disarmament, German reunification through free elections, European security, and the need for East-West cultural and scientific exchange. February 1956: Twentieth Congress of Soviet Communist Party
At the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev publicly denounced aspects of Stalin's regime, including Stalin's harsh political purges and his "cult of personality." Khrushchev also reversed Stalinist policy by urging "the peaceful coexistence between states with differing political and social systems." This marked the beginning of a brief loosening of the most stringent forms of censorship in the Soviet Union. June 1956: Polish Uprising
Riots against the Communist regime in Poland broke out at Poznan in June 1956, after workers demonstrated for better social and economic conditions. The revolt led the Polish Communist leadership to allow some reforms. Autumn 1956:
| 8,222 | 9,364 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#16_12726213
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
This marked the beginning of a brief loosening of the most stringent forms of censorship in the Soviet Union. June 1956: Polish Uprising
Riots against the Communist regime in Poland broke out at Poznan in June 1956, after workers demonstrated for better social and economic conditions. The revolt led the Polish Communist leadership to allow some reforms. Autumn 1956: Suez Crisis
After the United States reneged on a deal to finance the building of the Aswan Dam, Egypt seized and nationalized the Suez Canal, through which the West received its oil supplies. This led to Israeli, British, and French military action against an Egyptian military supplied by the Soviets in the fall of 1956. While Western Europe focused on the Middle East, the Soviets moved to squash anti-communist rebellions in Poland and Hungary. Eisenhower, fearing that the Soviets would provide large-scale assistance to Egypt, convinced Britain, France, and Israel to retreat. October-November 1956:
| 8,996 | 9,970 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8248489#17_12727536
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm
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United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
|
Suez Crisis
After the United States reneged on a deal to finance the building of the Aswan Dam, Egypt seized and nationalized the Suez Canal, through which the West received its oil supplies. This led to Israeli, British, and French military action against an Egyptian military supplied by the Soviets in the fall of 1956. While Western Europe focused on the Middle East, the Soviets moved to squash anti-communist rebellions in Poland and Hungary. Eisenhower, fearing that the Soviets would provide large-scale assistance to Egypt, convinced Britain, France, and Israel to retreat. October-November 1956: Hungarian Uprising
Anti-Sovie
| 9,365 | 10,000 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8296928#0_12728521
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/14313.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
The Treaty of Paris was signed by U.S. and British Representatives on September 3, 1783, ending the War of the American Revolution. Based on a1782 preliminary treaty, the agreement recognized U.S. independence and granted the U.S. significant western territory. The 1783 Treaty was one of a series of treaties signed at Paris in 1783 that also established peace between Great Britain and the allied nations of France, Spain, and the Netherlands. The 1781 U.S. victory at the Battle of Yorktown made peace talks where British negotiators were willing to consider U.S. independence a possibility. Eighteenth-century British parliamentary governments tended to be unstable and depended on both a majority in the House of Commons and the good favor of the King. Thus, when news of Yorktown reached London, the parliamentary opposition succeeded in overthrowing the embattled government led by Frederick North, Lord North. However, the new government, led by Charles Watson-Wentworth, Marquess of Rockingham, was not much more stable than the previous one. The strong personalities of its ministers led to internal conflicts between them and King George III. Rockingham died in July of 1782, and he was succeeded by William Petty Fitzmaurice, Earl of Shelburne. Lord Shelburne’s government wanted to seek peace, but hoped to avoid recognizing U.S. independence.
| 0 | 1,429 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8296928#1_12730245
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/14313.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
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Thus, when news of Yorktown reached London, the parliamentary opposition succeeded in overthrowing the embattled government led by Frederick North, Lord North. However, the new government, led by Charles Watson-Wentworth, Marquess of Rockingham, was not much more stable than the previous one. The strong personalities of its ministers led to internal conflicts between them and King George III. Rockingham died in July of 1782, and he was succeeded by William Petty Fitzmaurice, Earl of Shelburne. Lord Shelburne’s government wanted to seek peace, but hoped to avoid recognizing U.S. independence. However, the war had been expensive, and Britain faced a formidable alliance, fighting the combined forces of France, Spain, and the Netherlands, in addition to the rebellious colonists. Shelburne and other British diplomats had pursued a strategy of trying to drive the alliance apart by entering negotiations for a separate peace with France’s allies. Although such efforts failed with the Netherlands, U.S. negotiators were receptive to the idea of separate negotiations, because they saw in such negotiations the clearest path to ensuring recognition of U.S. independence in a final peace settlement. The French Foreign Minister, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, approved of separate negotiations, though not of a separate peace. In the meantime, Anglo-American negotiations had been stalled, owing to internal conflicts in the British government and British refusal to recognize U.S. independence as part of the peace settlement.
| 831 | 2,368 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8296928#2_12732053
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/14313.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
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However, the war had been expensive, and Britain faced a formidable alliance, fighting the combined forces of France, Spain, and the Netherlands, in addition to the rebellious colonists. Shelburne and other British diplomats had pursued a strategy of trying to drive the alliance apart by entering negotiations for a separate peace with France’s allies. Although such efforts failed with the Netherlands, U.S. negotiators were receptive to the idea of separate negotiations, because they saw in such negotiations the clearest path to ensuring recognition of U.S. independence in a final peace settlement. The French Foreign Minister, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, approved of separate negotiations, though not of a separate peace. In the meantime, Anglo-American negotiations had been stalled, owing to internal conflicts in the British government and British refusal to recognize U.S. independence as part of the peace settlement. In July of 1782, Lord Shelburne gave in on the issue of independence, hoping that a generous peace settlement with the United States would bring peace with France, the Netherlands, and Spain. However, John Jay objected to British refusal to acknowledge the United States as already independent during peace negotiations, so the negotiations halted until the fall. Anglo-American negotiations entered their final stage in October and November of 1782. The United States succeeded in obtaining Newfoundland fishing rights, a western border that extended to the Mississippi with rights of navigation (which the Spanish government would later prevent) and, most importantly, British acknowledgement of U.S. independence along with the peaceful withdrawal of British forces. In return for these concessions, the agreement contained provisions requiring the U.S. to honor private debts and ensure an end to the seizure of Loyalist property.
| 1,430 | 3,303 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8296928#3_12734193
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/14313.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
In July of 1782, Lord Shelburne gave in on the issue of independence, hoping that a generous peace settlement with the United States would bring peace with France, the Netherlands, and Spain. However, John Jay objected to British refusal to acknowledge the United States as already independent during peace negotiations, so the negotiations halted until the fall. Anglo-American negotiations entered their final stage in October and November of 1782. The United States succeeded in obtaining Newfoundland fishing rights, a western border that extended to the Mississippi with rights of navigation (which the Spanish government would later prevent) and, most importantly, British acknowledgement of U.S. independence along with the peaceful withdrawal of British forces. In return for these concessions, the agreement contained provisions requiring the U.S. to honor private debts and ensure an end to the seizure of Loyalist property. U.S. negotiators John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and Henry Laurens signed a preliminary agreement with British representative Richard Oswald on November 30, 1782. The agreement would remain informal until the conclusion of a peace agreement between Britain and France. Franklin disclosed the Anglo-American agreement to Vergennes, who had objections to the manner in which it was obtained, but was willing to accept the agreement as a part of broader peace negotiations, and agreed to supply the United States with another loan that Franklin had requested. When Spanish forces failed to capture Gibraltar, Vergennes was able to persuade the Spanish government to agree to peace as well. Negotiators abandoned an earlier complicated plan to redistribute each others’ unconquered colonies to one which largely preserved existing Spanish and French territorial gains.
| 2,369 | 4,176 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8296928#4_12736267
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/14313.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
U.S. negotiators John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and Henry Laurens signed a preliminary agreement with British representative Richard Oswald on November 30, 1782. The agreement would remain informal until the conclusion of a peace agreement between Britain and France. Franklin disclosed the Anglo-American agreement to Vergennes, who had objections to the manner in which it was obtained, but was willing to accept the agreement as a part of broader peace negotiations, and agreed to supply the United States with another loan that Franklin had requested. When Spanish forces failed to capture Gibraltar, Vergennes was able to persuade the Spanish government to agree to peace as well. Negotiators abandoned an earlier complicated plan to redistribute each others’ unconquered colonies to one which largely preserved existing Spanish and French territorial gains. In North America, Spain received Florida, which it had lost in the Seven Years’ War. Spanish, French, British, and American representatives signed a provisional peace treaty on January 20, 1783, proclaiming an end to hostilities. The formal agreement was signed at Paris on September 3, 1783. The U.S. Confederation Congress ratified the treaty on January 14. Although the treaty secured U.S. independence, it left several border regions undefined or in dispute, and certain provisions also remained unenforced.
| 3,304 | 4,688 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8296928#5_12737923
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/14313.htm
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Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
Treaty of Paris, 1783
Treaty of Paris, 1783
|
In North America, Spain received Florida, which it had lost in the Seven Years’ War. Spanish, French, British, and American representatives signed a provisional peace treaty on January 20, 1783, proclaiming an end to hostilities. The formal agreement was signed at Paris on September 3, 1783. The U.S. Confederation Congress ratified the treaty on January 14. Although the treaty secured U.S. independence, it left several border regions undefined or in dispute, and certain provisions also remained unenforced. These issues would be resolved over the years, though not always without controversy, by a series of U.S. agreements with Spain and Britain, including the Jay’s Treaty, the Treaty of San Lorenzo, the Convention of 1818, and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. Despite the unresolved border issues, the U.S. benefited most among the treaty’s signatories, firmly securing recognition of its independence from European powers. Although Britain lost its American colonies, British global power continued to increase, driven by the economic growth of the early industrial revolution. For France, victory came at an enormous financial cost, and attempts to resolve the financial crisis would ultimately trigger the French Revolution.
| 4,177 | 5,418 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8302625#0_12739441
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/91857.htm
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
|
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
By issuing the Declaration of Independence, adopted by the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776, the 13 American colonies severed their political connections to Great Britain. The Declaration summarized the colonists' motivations for seeking their independence. By declaring themselves an independent nation, the American colonists were able to conclude an official alliance with the government of France and obtain French assistance in the war against Great Britain. Throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, the North American colonists found themselves increasingly at odds with British imperial policies regarding taxation and frontier policy. When repeated protests failed to influence British policies, and instead resulted in the closing of the port of Boston and the declaration of martial law in Massachusetts, the colonial governments sent delegates to a Continental Congress to coordinate a colonial boycott of British goods. When fighting broke out between American colonists and British forces in Massachusetts, Continental Congress worked with local groups, originally intended to enforce the boycott, to coordinate resistance against the British. British officials throughout the colonies increasingly found their authority challenged by informal local governments, although loyalist sentiment remained strong in some areas. Despite these changes, colonial leaders hoped to reconcile with the British Government, and all but the most radical members of Congress were unwilling to declare independence. However, in late 1775, Benjamin Franklin, then a member of the Secret Committee of Correspondence, hinted to French agents and other European sympathizers that the colonies were increasingly leaning towards seeking independence. While perhaps true, Franklin also hoped to convince the French to supply the colonists with aid.
| 0 | 1,943 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8302625#1_12741722
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/91857.htm
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
|
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
|
When fighting broke out between American colonists and British forces in Massachusetts, Continental Congress worked with local groups, originally intended to enforce the boycott, to coordinate resistance against the British. British officials throughout the colonies increasingly found their authority challenged by informal local governments, although loyalist sentiment remained strong in some areas. Despite these changes, colonial leaders hoped to reconcile with the British Government, and all but the most radical members of Congress were unwilling to declare independence. However, in late 1775, Benjamin Franklin, then a member of the Secret Committee of Correspondence, hinted to French agents and other European sympathizers that the colonies were increasingly leaning towards seeking independence. While perhaps true, Franklin also hoped to convince the French to supply the colonists with aid. Independence would be necessary, however, before French officials would consider the possibility of an alliance. Throughout the winter of 1775-1776, the members of Continental Congress increasingly viewed reconciliation with Britain as unlikely, and independence the only course of action available to them. When on December 22, 1775, the British Parliament prohibited trade with the colonies, Congress responded in April of 1776 by opening colonial ports�this was a major step towards severing ties with Britain. The colonists were aided by the January publication of Thomas Paine's pamphlet Common Sense, which advocated the colonies' independence and was widely distributed throughout the colonies. By February of 1776, colonial leaders were discussing the possibility of forming foreign alliances and began to draft the Model Treaty that would serve as a basis for the 1778 alliance with France.
| 1,038 | 2,843 |
msmarco_v2.1_doc_00_8302625#2_12743842
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http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/91857.htm
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The Declaration of Independence, 1776
|
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
The Declaration of Independence, 1776
|
Independence would be necessary, however, before French officials would consider the possibility of an alliance. Throughout the winter of 1775-1776, the members of Continental Congress increasingly viewed reconciliation with Britain as unlikely, and independence the only course of action available to them. When on December 22, 1775, the British Parliament prohibited trade with the colonies, Congress responded in April of 1776 by opening colonial ports�this was a major step towards severing ties with Britain. The colonists were aided by the January publication of Thomas Paine's pamphlet Common Sense, which advocated the colonies' independence and was widely distributed throughout the colonies. By February of 1776, colonial leaders were discussing the possibility of forming foreign alliances and began to draft the Model Treaty that would serve as a basis for the 1778 alliance with France. Leaders for the cause of independence wanted to make certain that they had sufficient congressional support before they would bring the issue to the vote. On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee introduced a motion in Congress to declare independence. Other members of Congress were amenable but thought some colonies not quite ready. However, Congress did form a committee to draft a declaration of independence and assigned this duty to Thomas Jefferson. Benjamin Franklin and John Adams reviewed Jefferson's draft.
| 1,944 | 3,356 |
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