clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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ditional countries considered governed by
authoritarian of this research deals with attacks carried out by governments
regimes.
We believe that activists and journalists in such against opposition and activist groups operating within, as well
countries may experience harassment or consequences to as outside their borders. One of the most notable cases is
life or liberty from government surveillance. GhostNet, a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the
Finally, we do not explore potential defenses appropriate for Tibetan independence movement [24, 25]. Other work avoids
protecting the target population in this work. We believe that to drawing conclusions about the attackers [26].
2
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
USENIX Association
Country Date Range Range of Targets Number and Type of Samples Distinct Malware C&C
Bahrain 4/9/12

12 activists, dissidents, trade unionists, 8 FinSpy samples, 7 IP spy links received via private 4 distinct IP addresses
7/31/13 human rights campaigners, and journalists message, > 200 IP spy links observed publicly
Syria 2011 to present 10
20 individuals with technical back- 40
50: predominantly BlackShades, DarkComet, 160 distinct IP addresses
grounds who receive suspect files from their Xtreme RAT, njRAT, ShadowTech RAT.
contacts
UAE 7/23/12
7 activists, human rights campaigners, and 31 distinct malware samples spanning 7 types; 5 dis- 12 distinct IP addresses
7/31/13 journalists tinct exploits
Table 1: Range of data for the study.
Country Possible Impacts Probable Impacts
Bahrain 1. 3 individuals arrested, sen- 1. Activist serving 1 yr in
tenced to 1
12 mo in prison prison
2. Union leader questioned by 2. Police raid on house
police; fired
Syria 1. Sensitive opposition com- 1. Opposition members dis-
munications exposed to gov- credited by publishing embar-
ernment rassing materials
2. Exfiltrated material used to 2. Exfiltrated materials used
identify and detain activists during interrogation by secu-
rity services
UAE Contacts targeted via mal- Password stolen, e-mail
ware downloaded
Table 2: Negative outcomes plausibly or quite likely aris-
ing from attacks analyzed. Figure 1: E-mail containing FinSpy.
4.1 Bahrain
3 Data Overview and Implications
We have analyzed two attack campaigns in the context of
Our study is based on extensive analysis of malicious files and Bahrain, where the government has been pursuing a crackdown
suspect communications relevant to the activities of targeted against an Arab-Spring inspired uprising since 2/14/2011.
groups in Bahrain, Syria, and the UAE, as documented in Ta- The first involved malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a
ble 1. A number of the attacks had significant real-world impli-
lawful intercept
trojan sold exclusively to governments. The
cations, per Table 2. In many cases, we keep our descriptions second involved specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails de-
somewhat imprecise to avoid potential leakage of target identi- signed to reveal the IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous
ties. accounts. Some individuals who apparently clicked on these
We began our work when contacted by individuals con- links were later arrested, including Ali (cf.
1), whose click
cerned that a government might have targeted them for cyber- appears to have been used against him in court. While both
attacks. As we became more acquainted with the targeted com- campaigns point back to the government, we have not as yet
munities, in some cases we contacted targeted groups directly; identified overlap between the campaigns; targets of FinSpy
in others, we reached out to individuals with connections to tar- appeared to reside mainly outside Bahrain, whereas the IP spy
geted groups, who allowed us to examine their communications links targeted those mainly inside the country. We examine
with the groups. For Bahrain and Syria, the work encompassed each campaign in turn.
10,000s of e-mails and instant messages. For the UAE, the vol-
ume is several thousand communications.
FinSpy Campaign. Beginning in April 2012, the authors
received 5 suspicious e-mails from US and UK-based activists
4 Case Studies: Three Countries and journalists working on Bahrain. We found that some
of the attachments contained a PE (.exe) file designed to
This following sections outline recent targeted hacking cam- appear as an image. Their filenames contained a Uni-
paigns in Bahrain, Syria and the UAE. These cases have a com- code right-to-left override (RLO) character, causing Windows
mon theme: attacks against targets
computers and devices with to render a filename such as gpj.1bajaR.exe instead as
malicious files and links. In some cases the attackers employed exe.Rajab1.jpg.
expensive and
government exclusive
malware, while in other The other .rar files contained a Word document with an
cases, attackers used cheap and readily available RATs. Across embedded ASCII-encoded PE file containing a custom macro
these cases we find that clever social engineering often plays set to automatically run upon document startup. Under default
a central role, which is strong evidence of a well-informed ad- security settings, Office disables all unsigned macros, so that
versary. We also, however, frequently find technical and op- a user who opens the document will only see an informational
erational errors by the attackers that enable us to link attacks message that the macro has been disabled. Thus, this attack was
to governments. In general, the attacks we find are not well- apparently designed with the belief or hope that targets would
detected by anti-virus programs. have reduced security settings.
3
USENIX Association
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
513
Identification as FinSpy: By running the sample using ated with another government [4]. However, a proxy would
Windows Virtual PC, we found the following string in mem- show gaps in a global IPID as it forwarded traffic; our frequent
ory: y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\. observation of strictly consecutive IPIDs thus contradicts this
This string suggests FinSpy, a product of Gamma Inter- statement.
national [27]. The executables used virtualized obfusca- Exploitation of captured data: Since we suspected the spy-
tion [28], which appeared to be custom-designed. We de- ware operator would likely seek to exploit captured credentials,
vised a fingerprint for the obfuscater and located a structurally particularly those associated with Bahraini activist organiza-
similar executable by searching a large malware database. tions, we worked with Bahrain Watch, an activist organization
This executable contained a similar string, except it identi- inside Bahrain. Bahrain Watch established a fake login page
fied itself as FinSpy v3.00, and attempted to connect to on their website and provided us with a username and pass-
tiger.gamma-international.de, a domain registered word. From a clean VM, we logged in using these credentials,
to Gamma International GmbH. saving the password in Mozilla Firefox. We then infected the
Analysis of capabilities: We found that the spyware has VM with FinSpy and allowed it to connect to the Bahrain C&C
a modular design, and can download additional modules from server. Bahrain Watch

ditional countries considered governed by

authoritarian of this research deals with attacks carried out by governments

regimes.

We believe that activists and journalists in such against opposition and activist groups operating within, as well

countries may experience harassment or consequences to as outside their borders. One of the most notable cases is

life or liberty from government surveillance. GhostNet, a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the

Finally, we do not explore potential defenses appropriate for Tibetan independence movement [24, 25]. Other work avoids

protecting the target population in this work. We believe that to drawing conclusions about the attackers [26].

2

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

USENIX Association

Country Date Range Range of Targets Number and Type of Samples Distinct Malware C&C

Bahrain 4/9/12

12 activists, dissidents, trade unionists, 8 FinSpy samples, 7 IP spy links received via private 4 distinct IP addresses

7/31/13 human rights campaigners, and journalists message, > 200 IP spy links observed publicly

Syria 2011 to present 10

20 individuals with technical back- 40

50: predominantly BlackShades, DarkComet, 160 distinct IP addresses

grounds who receive suspect files from their Xtreme RAT, njRAT, ShadowTech RAT.

contacts

UAE 7/23/12

7 activists, human rights campaigners, and 31 distinct malware samples spanning 7 types; 5 dis- 12 distinct IP addresses

7/31/13 journalists tinct exploits

Table 1: Range of data for the study.

Country Possible Impacts Probable Impacts

Bahrain 1. 3 individuals arrested, sen- 1. Activist serving 1 yr in

tenced to 1

12 mo in prison prison

2. Union leader questioned by 2. Police raid on house

police; fired

Syria 1. Sensitive opposition com- 1. Opposition members dis-

munications exposed to gov- credited by publishing embar-

ernment rassing materials

2. Exfiltrated material used to 2. Exfiltrated materials used

identify and detain activists during interrogation by secu-

rity services

UAE Contacts targeted via mal- Password stolen, e-mail

ware downloaded

Table 2: Negative outcomes plausibly or quite likely aris-

ing from attacks analyzed. Figure 1: E-mail containing FinSpy.

4.1 Bahrain

3 Data Overview and Implications

We have analyzed two attack campaigns in the context of

Our study is based on extensive analysis of malicious files and Bahrain, where the government has been pursuing a crackdown

suspect communications relevant to the activities of targeted against an Arab-Spring inspired uprising since 2/14/2011.

groups in Bahrain, Syria, and the UAE, as documented in Ta- The first involved malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a

ble 1. A number of the attacks had significant real-world impli-

lawful intercept

trojan sold exclusively to governments. The

cations, per Table 2. In many cases, we keep our descriptions second involved specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails de-

somewhat imprecise to avoid potential leakage of target identi- signed to reveal the IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous

ties. accounts. Some individuals who apparently clicked on these

We began our work when contacted by individuals con- links were later arrested, including Ali (cf.

1), whose click

cerned that a government might have targeted them for cyber- appears to have been used against him in court. While both

attacks. As we became more acquainted with the targeted com- campaigns point back to the government, we have not as yet

munities, in some cases we contacted targeted groups directly; identified overlap between the campaigns; targets of FinSpy

in others, we reached out to individuals with connections to tar- appeared to reside mainly outside Bahrain, whereas the IP spy

geted groups, who allowed us to examine their communications links targeted those mainly inside the country. We examine

with the groups. For Bahrain and Syria, the work encompassed each campaign in turn.

10,000s of e-mails and instant messages. For the UAE, the vol-

ume is several thousand communications.

FinSpy Campaign. Beginning in April 2012, the authors

received 5 suspicious e-mails from US and UK-based activists

4 Case Studies: Three Countries and journalists working on Bahrain. We found that some

of the attachments contained a PE (.exe) file designed to

This following sections outline recent targeted hacking cam- appear as an image. Their filenames contained a Uni-

paigns in Bahrain, Syria and the UAE. These cases have a com- code right-to-left override (RLO) character, causing Windows

mon theme: attacks against targets

computers and devices with to render a filename such as gpj.1bajaR.exe instead as

malicious files and links. In some cases the attackers employed exe.Rajab1.jpg.

expensive and

government exclusive

malware, while in other The other .rar files contained a Word document with an

cases, attackers used cheap and readily available RATs. Across embedded ASCII-encoded PE file containing a custom macro

these cases we find that clever social engineering often plays set to automatically run upon document startup. Under default

a central role, which is strong evidence of a well-informed ad- security settings, Office disables all unsigned macros, so that

versary. We also, however, frequently find technical and op- a user who opens the document will only see an informational

erational errors by the attackers that enable us to link attacks message that the macro has been disabled. Thus, this attack was

to governments. In general, the attacks we find are not well- apparently designed with the belief or hope that targets would

detected by anti-virus programs. have reduced security settings.

3

USENIX Association

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

513

Identification as FinSpy: By running the sample using ated with another government [4]. However, a proxy would

Windows Virtual PC, we found the following string in mem- show gaps in a global IPID as it forwarded traffic; our frequent

ory: y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\. observation of strictly consecutive IPIDs thus contradicts this

This string suggests FinSpy, a product of Gamma Inter- statement.

national [27]. The executables used virtualized obfusca- Exploitation of captured data: Since we suspected the spy-

tion [28], which appeared to be custom-designed. We de- ware operator would likely seek to exploit captured credentials,

vised a fingerprint for the obfuscater and located a structurally particularly those associated with Bahraini activist organiza-

similar executable by searching a large malware database. tions, we worked with Bahrain Watch, an activist organization

This executable contained a similar string, except it identi- inside Bahrain. Bahrain Watch established a fake login page

fied itself as FinSpy v3.00, and attempted to connect to on their website and provided us with a username and pass-

tiger.gamma-international.de, a domain registered word. From a clean VM, we logged in using these credentials,

to Gamma International GmbH. saving the password in Mozilla Firefox. We then infected the

Analysis of capabilities: We found that the spyware has VM with FinSpy and allowed it to connect to the Bahrain C&C

a modular design, and can download additional modules from server. Bahrain Watch