clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
Operation_GreedyWonk.pdf.txtUT
Operation_Poisoned_Handover.pdf.txtUT
Operation_SnowMan.pdf.txtUT
J.VZm
Pitty_Tiger_Final_Report.pdf.txtUT
Regis_The_Intercept.pdf.txtUT
JZ3
TA14-353A_wiper.pdf.txtUT
Targeting_Syrian_ISIS_Critics.pdf.txtUT
The_Epic_Turla_Operation.pdf.txtUT
The_Monju_Incident.pdf.txtUT
The_Uroburos_case.pdf.txtUT
ThreatConnect_Operation_Arachnophobia_Report.pdf.txtUT
apt28.pdf.txtUT
bcs_wp_InceptionReport_EN_v12914.pdf.txtUT
darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf.txtUT
darkhotelappendixindicators_kl.pdf.txtUT
fireeye-operation-saffron-rose.pdf.txtUT
fireeye-sidewinder-targeted-attack.pdf.txtUT
operation-poisoned-helmand.pdf.txtUT
putter-panda.pdf.txtUT
regin-analysis.pdf.txtUT
sec14-paper-marczak.pdf.txtUT
snake_whitepaper.pdf.txtUT
targeted_attacks_against_the_energy_sector.pdf.txtUT
When Governments Hack Opponents:
A Look at Actors and Technology
William R. Marczak, University of California, Berkeley, and The Citizen Lab;
John Scott-Railton, University of California, Los Angeles, and The Citizen Lab;
Morgan Marquis-Boire, The Citizen Lab; Vern Paxson, University of California, Berkeley,
and International Computer Science Institute
ERROR: type should be string, got " https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/marczak"
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
23rd USENIX Security Symposium.
August 20
22, 2014
San Diego, CA
ISBN 978-1-931971-15-7
Open access to the Proceedings of
the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium
is sponsored by USENIX
When Governments Hack Opponents: A Look at Actors and Technology
William R. Marczak John Scott-Railton Morgan Marquis-Boire
UC Berkeley, Citizen Lab UCLA, Citizen Lab Citizen Lab
Vern Paxson
UC Berkeley, ICSI
Abstract we provide extensive detail from both technical and operational
perspectives as seen in three countries. We view such character-
Repressive nation-states have long monitored telecommunica- izations as the fundamental first step necessary for the rigorous,
tions to keep tabs on political dissent. The Internet and online scientific pursuit of a new problem space.
social networks, however, pose novel technical challenges to For our study we draw upon several years of research we
this practice, even as they open up new domains for surveil- have conducted into cases from Bahrain, Syria and the United
lance. We analyze an extensive collection of suspicious files Arab Emirates. We frame the nature of these attacks, and the
and links targeting activists, opposition members, and non- technology and infrastructure used to conduct them, in the con-
governmental organizations in the Middle East over the past text of their impacts on real people. We hope in the process to
several years. We find that these artifacts reflect efforts to at- inspire additional research efforts addressing the difficult prob-
tack targets
devices for the purposes of eavesdropping, stealing lem of how to adequately protect individuals with very limited
information, and/or unmasking anonymous users. We describe resources facing powerful adversaries.
attack campaigns we have observed in Bahrain, Syria, and the As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider the follow-
United Arab Emirates, investigating attackers, tools, and tech- ing anecdote, pieced together from public reports and court
niques. In addition to off-the-shelf remote access trojans and documents.
the use of third-party IP-tracking services, we identify commer- At dawn on 3/12/13,1 police raided the house of 17-year-
cial spyware marketed exclusively to governments, including old Ali Al-Shofa, confiscated his laptop and phone, and took
Gamma
s FinSpy and Hacking Team
s Remote Control Sys- him into custody. He was charged with referring to Bahrain
tem (RCS). We describe their use in Bahrain and the UAE, and King as a
dictator
( ) and
fallen one
( ) on a
map out the potential broader scope of this activity by conduct-
pseudonymous Twitter account, @alkawarahnews. Accord-
ing global scans of the corresponding command-and-control
ing to court documents, Bahrain
s Cyber Crime Unit had linked
(C&C) servers. Finally, we frame the real-world consequences
an IP address registered in his father
s name to the account on
of these campaigns via strong circumstantial evidence linking
12/9/12. Operators of @alkawarahnews later forwarded a
hacking to arrests, interrogations, and imprisonment.
suspicious private message to one of the authors. The message
was received on 12/8/12 on a Facebook account linked to the
Twitter handle, and contained a link to a protest video, purport-
1 Introduction edly sent by an anti-government individual. The link redirected
through iplogger.org, a service that records the IP address
Computer security research devotes extensive efforts to pro-
of anyone who clicks. Analytics for the link indicate that it had
tecting individuals against indiscriminate, large-scale attacks
been clicked once from inside Bahrain. On 6/25/13, Ali was
such as those used by cybercriminals. Recently, the prob-
sentenced to one year in prison.
lem of protecting institutions against targeted attacks conducted
Ali
s case is an example of the larger phenomenon we in-
by nation-states (so-called
Advanced Persistent Threats
) has

Operation_GreedyWonk.pdf.txtUT

Operation_Poisoned_Handover.pdf.txtUT

Operation_SnowMan.pdf.txtUT

J.VZm

Pitty_Tiger_Final_Report.pdf.txtUT

Regis_The_Intercept.pdf.txtUT

JZ3

TA14-353A_wiper.pdf.txtUT

Targeting_Syrian_ISIS_Critics.pdf.txtUT

The_Epic_Turla_Operation.pdf.txtUT

The_Monju_Incident.pdf.txtUT

The_Uroburos_case.pdf.txtUT

ThreatConnect_Operation_Arachnophobia_Report.pdf.txtUT

apt28.pdf.txtUT

bcs_wp_InceptionReport_EN_v12914.pdf.txtUT

darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf.txtUT

darkhotelappendixindicators_kl.pdf.txtUT

fireeye-operation-saffron-rose.pdf.txtUT

fireeye-sidewinder-targeted-attack.pdf.txtUT

operation-poisoned-helmand.pdf.txtUT

putter-panda.pdf.txtUT

regin-analysis.pdf.txtUT

sec14-paper-marczak.pdf.txtUT

snake_whitepaper.pdf.txtUT

targeted_attacks_against_the_energy_sector.pdf.txtUT

When Governments Hack Opponents:

A Look at Actors and Technology

William R. Marczak, University of California, Berkeley, and The Citizen Lab;

John Scott-Railton, University of California, Los Angeles, and The Citizen Lab;

Morgan Marquis-Boire, The Citizen Lab; Vern Paxson, University of California, Berkeley,

and International Computer Science Institute

ERROR: type should be string, got " https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/marczak"

This paper is included in the Proceedings of the

23rd USENIX Security Symposium.

August 20

22, 2014

San Diego, CA

ISBN 978-1-931971-15-7

Open access to the Proceedings of

the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium

is sponsored by USENIX

When Governments Hack Opponents: A Look at Actors and Technology

William R. Marczak John Scott-Railton Morgan Marquis-Boire

UC Berkeley, Citizen Lab UCLA, Citizen Lab Citizen Lab

Vern Paxson

UC Berkeley, ICSI

Abstract we provide extensive detail from both technical and operational

perspectives as seen in three countries. We view such character-

Repressive nation-states have long monitored telecommunica- izations as the fundamental first step necessary for the rigorous,

tions to keep tabs on political dissent. The Internet and online scientific pursuit of a new problem space.

social networks, however, pose novel technical challenges to For our study we draw upon several years of research we

this practice, even as they open up new domains for surveil- have conducted into cases from Bahrain, Syria and the United

lance. We analyze an extensive collection of suspicious files Arab Emirates. We frame the nature of these attacks, and the

and links targeting activists, opposition members, and non- technology and infrastructure used to conduct them, in the con-

governmental organizations in the Middle East over the past text of their impacts on real people. We hope in the process to

several years. We find that these artifacts reflect efforts to at- inspire additional research efforts addressing the difficult prob-

tack targets

devices for the purposes of eavesdropping, stealing lem of how to adequately protect individuals with very limited

information, and/or unmasking anonymous users. We describe resources facing powerful adversaries.

attack campaigns we have observed in Bahrain, Syria, and the As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider the follow-

United Arab Emirates, investigating attackers, tools, and tech- ing anecdote, pieced together from public reports and court

niques. In addition to off-the-shelf remote access trojans and documents.

the use of third-party IP-tracking services, we identify commer- At dawn on 3/12/13,1 police raided the house of 17-year-

cial spyware marketed exclusively to governments, including old Ali Al-Shofa, confiscated his laptop and phone, and took

Gamma

s FinSpy and Hacking Team

s Remote Control Sys- him into custody. He was charged with referring to Bahrain

tem (RCS). We describe their use in Bahrain and the UAE, and King as a

dictator

( ) and

fallen one

( ) on a

map out the potential broader scope of this activity by conduct-

pseudonymous Twitter account, @alkawarahnews. Accord-

ing global scans of the corresponding command-and-control

ing to court documents, Bahrain

s Cyber Crime Unit had linked

(C&C) servers. Finally, we frame the real-world consequences

an IP address registered in his father

s name to the account on

of these campaigns via strong circumstantial evidence linking

12/9/12. Operators of @alkawarahnews later forwarded a

hacking to arrests, interrogations, and imprisonment.

suspicious private message to one of the authors. The message

was received on 12/8/12 on a Facebook account linked to the

Twitter handle, and contained a link to a protest video, purport-

1 Introduction edly sent by an anti-government individual. The link redirected

through iplogger.org, a service that records the IP address

Computer security research devotes extensive efforts to pro-

of anyone who clicks. Analytics for the link indicate that it had

tecting individuals against indiscriminate, large-scale attacks

been clicked once from inside Bahrain. On 6/25/13, Ali was

such as those used by cybercriminals. Recently, the prob-

sentenced to one year in prison.

lem of protecting institutions against targeted attacks conducted

Ali

s case is an example of the larger phenomenon we in-

by nation-states (so-called

Advanced Persistent Threats

) has