clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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vestigate: attacks against activists, dissidents, trade unionists,
likewise elicited significant research interest. Where these two
human rights campaigners, journalists, and members of NGOs
problem domains intersect, however
targeted cyber attacks by
(henceforth
targets
) in the Middle East. The attacks we have
nation-states against individuals
has received virtually no sig-
documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail
nificant, methodical research attention to date. This new prob-
attachments, designed to obtain information from a device. On
lem space poses challenges that are both technically complex
the one hand, we have observed attacks using a wide range of
and of significant real-world importance.
off-the-shelf spyware, as well as publicly available third-party
In this work we undertake to characterize the emergent prob- services, like iplogger.org. On the other hand, some at-
lem space of nation-state Internet attacks against individuals tacks use so-called
lawful intercept
trojans and related equip-
engaged in pro-democracy or opposition movements. While
we lack the data to do so in a fully comprehensive fashion, 1 Dates in the paper are given MM/DD/YY.
USENIX Association
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
511
ment, purportedly sold exclusively to governments by compa- do so in a sufficiently well-grounded, meaningful manner first
nies like Gamma International and Hacking Team. The lat- requires developing an understanding of the targets
knowledge
ter advertises that governments need its technology to
look of security issues, their posture regarding how they currently
through their target
s eyes
rather than rely solely on
passive protect themselves, and the resources (including potentially ed-
monitoring
[1]. Overall, the attacks we document are rarely ucation) that they can draw upon. To this end, we are now con-
technically novel. In fact, we suspect that the majority of at- ducting (with IRB approval) in-depth interviews with potential
tacks could be substantially limited via well-known security targets along with systematic examination of their Internet de-
practices, settings, and software updates. Yet, the attacks are vices in order to develop such an understanding.
noteworthy for their careful social engineering, their links to
governments, and their real-world impact.
We obtained the majority of our artifacts by encouraging in- 2 Related Work
dividuals who might be targeted by governments to provide us
with suspicious files and unsolicited links, especially from un- In the past decades, a rich body of academic work has grown to
familiar senders. While this process has provided a rich set of document and understand government Internet censorship, in-
artifacts to analyze, it does not permit us to claim our dataset is cluding nationwide censorship campaigns like the Great Fire-
representative. wall of China [9, 10, 11]. Research on governmental Internet
Our analysis links these attacks with a common class of ac- surveillance and activities like law-enforcement interception is
tor: an attacker whose behavior, choice of target, or use of in- a comparatively smaller area [12]. Some academic work looks
formation obtained in the attack, aligns with the interests of a at government use of devices to enable censorship, such as key-
government. In some cases, such as Ali
s, the attackers appear word blacklists for Chinese chat clients [13], or the Green Dam
to be governments themselves; in other cases, they appear in- censorware that was to be deployed on all new computers sold
stead to be pro-government actors, ranging from patriotic, not in China [14]. We are aware of only limited previous work
necessarily skilled volunteers to cyber mercenaries. The phe- looking at advanced threat actors targeting activists with hack-
nomenon has been identified before, such as in Libya, when ing, though this work has not always been able to establish ev-
the fall of Gaddafi
s regime revealed direct government ties to idence of government connections [15].
hacking during the 2011 Civil War [2]. Platforms used by potential targets, such as GMail [16],
We make the following contributions: Twitter [17], and Facebook [18] increasingly make transport-
We analyze the technology associated with targeted at- layer encryption the default, obscuring communications from
tacks (e.g., malicious links, spyware), and trace it back most network surveillance. This use of encryption, along with
to its programmers and manufacturers. While the attacks the global nature of many social movements, and the role of
are not novel
and indeed often involve technology used diaspora groups, likely makes hacking increasingly attractive,
by the cybercrime underground
they are significant be- especially to states who are unable to request or compel content
cause they have a real-world impact and visibility, and from these platforms. Indeed, the increasing use of encryption
are connected to governments. In addition, we often find and the global nature of targets have both been cited by pur-
amateurish mistakes in either the attacker
s technology or veyors of
lawful intercept
trojans in their marketing materi-
operations, indicating that energy spent countering these als [1, 19]. In one notable case in 2009, UAE telecom firm Eti-
threats can realize significant benefits. We do not, how- salat distributed a system update to its then 145,000 BlackBerry
ever, conclude that all nation-state attacks or attackers subscribers that contained spyware to read encrypted Black-
are incompetent, and we suspect that some attacks have Berry e-mail from the device. The spyware was discovered
evaded our detection. when the update drastically slowed users
phones [20]. In con-
trast to country-scale distribution, our work looks at this kind of
When possible, we empirically characterize the attacks
pro-government and government-linked surveillance through
and technology we have observed. We map out global
highly targeted attacks.
use of two commercial hacking tools by governments by
searching through Internet scan data using fingerprints for The term APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) refers to a
command-and-control (C&C) servers derived from our sophisticated cyber-attacker who persistently attempts to tar-
spyware analysis. get an individual or group [21]. Work outside the academic
community tracking government cyberattacks typically falls
We develop strong evidence tying attacks to govern- under this umbrella. There has been significant work on
ment sponsors and corporate suppliers, countering de- APT outside the academic community, especially among se-
nials, sometimes energetic and sometimes indirect, of curity professionals, threat intelligence companies, and human
such involvement [3, 4, 5, 6], in contrast to denials [7] rights groups. Much of this work has focused on suspected
or claims of a corporate
oversight
board [8]. Our scan- government-on-government or government-on-corporation cy-
ning suggests use of
lawful intercept
trojans by 11 ad- ber attacks [22, 23]. Meanwhile, a small but growing body

vestigate: attacks against activists, dissidents, trade unionists,

likewise elicited significant research interest. Where these two

human rights campaigners, journalists, and members of NGOs

problem domains intersect, however

targeted cyber attacks by

(henceforth

targets

) in the Middle East. The attacks we have

nation-states against individuals

has received virtually no sig-

documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail

nificant, methodical research attention to date. This new prob-

attachments, designed to obtain information from a device. On

lem space poses challenges that are both technically complex

the one hand, we have observed attacks using a wide range of

and of significant real-world importance.

off-the-shelf spyware, as well as publicly available third-party

In this work we undertake to characterize the emergent prob- services, like iplogger.org. On the other hand, some at-

lem space of nation-state Internet attacks against individuals tacks use so-called

lawful intercept

trojans and related equip-

engaged in pro-democracy or opposition movements. While

we lack the data to do so in a fully comprehensive fashion, 1 Dates in the paper are given MM/DD/YY.

USENIX Association

23rd USENIX Security Symposium

511

ment, purportedly sold exclusively to governments by compa- do so in a sufficiently well-grounded, meaningful manner first

nies like Gamma International and Hacking Team. The lat- requires developing an understanding of the targets

knowledge

ter advertises that governments need its technology to

look of security issues, their posture regarding how they currently

through their target

s eyes

rather than rely solely on

passive protect themselves, and the resources (including potentially ed-

monitoring

[1]. Overall, the attacks we document are rarely ucation) that they can draw upon. To this end, we are now con-

technically novel. In fact, we suspect that the majority of at- ducting (with IRB approval) in-depth interviews with potential

tacks could be substantially limited via well-known security targets along with systematic examination of their Internet de-

practices, settings, and software updates. Yet, the attacks are vices in order to develop such an understanding.

noteworthy for their careful social engineering, their links to

governments, and their real-world impact.

We obtained the majority of our artifacts by encouraging in- 2 Related Work

dividuals who might be targeted by governments to provide us

with suspicious files and unsolicited links, especially from un- In the past decades, a rich body of academic work has grown to

familiar senders. While this process has provided a rich set of document and understand government Internet censorship, in-

artifacts to analyze, it does not permit us to claim our dataset is cluding nationwide censorship campaigns like the Great Fire-

representative. wall of China [9, 10, 11]. Research on governmental Internet

Our analysis links these attacks with a common class of ac- surveillance and activities like law-enforcement interception is

tor: an attacker whose behavior, choice of target, or use of in- a comparatively smaller area [12]. Some academic work looks

formation obtained in the attack, aligns with the interests of a at government use of devices to enable censorship, such as key-

government. In some cases, such as Ali

s, the attackers appear word blacklists for Chinese chat clients [13], or the Green Dam

to be governments themselves; in other cases, they appear in- censorware that was to be deployed on all new computers sold

stead to be pro-government actors, ranging from patriotic, not in China [14]. We are aware of only limited previous work

necessarily skilled volunteers to cyber mercenaries. The phe- looking at advanced threat actors targeting activists with hack-

nomenon has been identified before, such as in Libya, when ing, though this work has not always been able to establish ev-

the fall of Gaddafi

s regime revealed direct government ties to idence of government connections [15].

hacking during the 2011 Civil War [2]. Platforms used by potential targets, such as GMail [16],

We make the following contributions: Twitter [17], and Facebook [18] increasingly make transport-

We analyze the technology associated with targeted at- layer encryption the default, obscuring communications from

tacks (e.g., malicious links, spyware), and trace it back most network surveillance. This use of encryption, along with

to its programmers and manufacturers. While the attacks the global nature of many social movements, and the role of

are not novel

and indeed often involve technology used diaspora groups, likely makes hacking increasingly attractive,

by the cybercrime underground

they are significant be- especially to states who are unable to request or compel content

cause they have a real-world impact and visibility, and from these platforms. Indeed, the increasing use of encryption

are connected to governments. In addition, we often find and the global nature of targets have both been cited by pur-

amateurish mistakes in either the attacker

s technology or veyors of

lawful intercept

trojans in their marketing materi-

operations, indicating that energy spent countering these als [1, 19]. In one notable case in 2009, UAE telecom firm Eti-

threats can realize significant benefits. We do not, how- salat distributed a system update to its then 145,000 BlackBerry

ever, conclude that all nation-state attacks or attackers subscribers that contained spyware to read encrypted Black-

are incompetent, and we suspect that some attacks have Berry e-mail from the device. The spyware was discovered

evaded our detection. when the update drastically slowed users

phones [20]. In con-

trast to country-scale distribution, our work looks at this kind of

When possible, we empirically characterize the attacks

pro-government and government-linked surveillance through

and technology we have observed. We map out global

highly targeted attacks.

use of two commercial hacking tools by governments by

searching through Internet scan data using fingerprints for The term APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) refers to a

command-and-control (C&C) servers derived from our sophisticated cyber-attacker who persistently attempts to tar-

spyware analysis. get an individual or group [21]. Work outside the academic

community tracking government cyberattacks typically falls

We develop strong evidence tying attacks to govern- under this umbrella. There has been significant work on

ment sponsors and corporate suppliers, countering de- APT outside the academic community, especially among se-

nials, sometimes energetic and sometimes indirect, of curity professionals, threat intelligence companies, and human

such involvement [3, 4, 5, 6], in contrast to denials [7] rights groups. Much of this work has focused on suspected

or claims of a corporate

oversight

board [8]. Our scan- government-on-government or government-on-corporation cy-

ning suggests use of

lawful intercept

trojans by 11 ad- ber attacks [22, 23]. Meanwhile, a small but growing body