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concentrate on protecting vital sites by coordinating government and |
public efforts. They were also able to create diversions which caused |
hackers to attack sites which were already disabled or not very important. |
(Collier, 2007) |
The cyber attack on Estonia demonstrated the importance of legal |
obligations for the U.S. in rendering support to its allies during a cyber |
attack (Gee, 2008). The cyber attack also showed the vulnerability of an IT |
system, raising the question, if it could happen to Estonia could another |
trans-national cyber attack of this magnitude happen in the U.S. (Griggs, |
2008)? The convention on cybercrime, which the U.S. is a party to, |
outlines principles for providing mutual assistance regarding cybercrime |
(Council of Europe, 2001). The convention does not mention cyber |
attacks or cyber war but treats such activities as crimes (Korns & |
Kastenberg, 2008/2009). Because only 23 countries have agreed to this |
treaty, its force in the international community is limited (Gee, 2008). |
Several members of NATO are participating in the Cyber Defence Centre |
of Excellence that was established in Estonia, but the U.S. only agreed to |
the creation of the cyber defence centre as an observer. The cyber defence |
centre is working on issues of cyber security that affect NATO along with |
the U.S (The Associated Press, 2008). What will the U.S. |
s response be if a |
cyber attack destroys infrastructure and kills citizens in an allied country, |
and then that ally declares war because of the attack? The plausibility of |
such an attack was demonstrated in 2007 when scientists from the Idaho |
Baltic Security & Defence Review |
Volume 11, 2009 |
National Laboratory demonstrated how a cyber attack could cause a power |
plant to overload its system, begin to smoke, and then break down which |
caused physical damage to equipment. Currently, both international law |
and NATO |
s framework lack coherent responses that are legal in the event |
of such an attack. The cyber attackers could limit options for the U.S. |
under such a scenario by routing their cyber attack through countries |
which do not have laws or agreements to cooperate with the U.S. The |
cyber attacker could remain completely anonymous if the country where |
the attack was routed through refused to hand over information identifying |
the cyber attackers. (Gee, 2008) |
Cyber attacks on the U.S. government IT infrastructure are not new. In |
March 1998 a cyber attack was launched against computer systems of the |
U.S. government, private universities and research labs computer systems |
that lasted for over three years. Government investigators named the |
attacks |
Moonlight Maze. |
The cyber attacks targeted gaining access to |
sensitive but unclassified information (Abreu, 2001). John Adams, a |
National Security Agency (NSA) consultant says that government |
investigators have identified seven internet addresses involved in the cyber |
attacks that originated in Russia. Dion Stempfley, a former Pentagon |
computer analyst, believes that the U.S. prove that the Russian Federation |
government is sponsoring the attacks but there is evidence that they are |
allowing or otherwise permitting the cyber attacks. The cyber attacks |
which resulted in the theft of technical defence information were serious |
enough that the U.S. State Department issued a formal complaint to the |
Russian Federation. (Loeb, 2001) |
In Global Trends 2025, a study conducted by the National Intelligence |
Council, states over the next two decades non-military aspects of warfare, |
including cyber, will be prominent (National Intelligence Council, 2008). |
According to Secure Works, a cyber security company, in 2008 over 20 |
million attacks originated from computers within the United States (Secure |
Works Press Release, 2008). In 2008 the U.S. Department of Homeland |
Security created the National Cybersecurity Centre to counter these threats |
(Griggs, 2008). The threats to the U.S. infrastructure and technology are |
moving at a much faster pace than the creation of government structures |
to counter the threat. |
Even a casual observer can see that there is a cyber threat to the U.S., but |
how is that connected to any Russian involvement in cyber attacks? There |
Volume 11, 2009 |
Baltic Security & Defence Review |
are three recent examples of how cyber attacks, that may have allegedly |
originated in Russia, that demonstrate danger for U.S. and Russian |
relations. These examples show how attacks against an IT structure were |
used as cyber pressure to influence nations or organizations. |
The first example is when Radio Free Europe |
s internet sites in April 2008 |
in Eastern Europe were shut down because of a denial of service attack. |
The attack lasted two days and coincided with the planned coverage of the |
anniversary of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The attacks effectively shut |
down the websites which stopped the flow of information from Radio |
Free Europe, a U.S. sponsored program (America.gov, 2008). |
Another example is the malware (malware is a term used to identify illegal |
computer access including computer viruses) attack on U.S. Department of |
Defence computer systems in November 2008. According to WMD |
Insights 6 the computer attacks are thought to have originated from Russia. |
The attacks seemed to target military computer systems and affected the |
U.S. central command along with computers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The |
attacks led to a ban on the use of external computer flash drives on |
military computers throughout the world. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009) |
The latest example of an attack that may have originated in Russia is the |
January 2009 denial of service attack that was directed at the government |
websites of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. One theory on why the attack was |
started was because of Kyrgyzstan |
s support of the U.S. in its war on terror |
in Afghanistan. This shows the significance of a cyber attack not directed |
against the U.S. but against one of its allies. (Rhoads, 2009) |
One senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in |
Washington, D.C. believes there is no adversary that can defeat the U.S. in |
cyber space. A spokesman for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security |
commented that the U.S. government is able to protect itself from cyber |
attacks, but the U.S. IT system is not completely impenetrable. The |
director of a non-profit research institute, the United States Cyber |
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