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The malware from various locations caused the virus to be delivered
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from
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single
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site,
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address:
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79.135.167.49).
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The name of the malware is "name.avi.exe", and as of September 2008,
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only FOUR out of 36 anti-virus products could detect it. The Russian
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Business Network (RBN) had created a highly virulent strain designed to
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act as a propaganda weapon against Georgia.
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7. RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK
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The individual, with direct responsibility for carrying out the cyber "first
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strike" on Georgia, is a RBN operative named Alexandr A. Boykov of
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Saint Petersburg, Russia. Also involved in the attack was a programmer
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and spammer from Saint Petersburg named Andrey Smirnov. These
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men are leaders of RBN sections and are not "script-kiddies" or
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"hacktivists," as some have maintained of the cyber attacks on Georgia
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but senior operatives in positions of responsibility with vast
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background knowledge.
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Intelligence can suggest further information about these individual
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cyber-terrorists. According to Spamhaus SBL64881, Mr. Boykov operates
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a hosting service in Class C Network 79.135.167.0/24. It should be noted
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that the pre-invasion attacks emanated from 79.135.167.22, clearly
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showing professional planning and not merely
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hacktivism.
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Due to the
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degree of professionalism and the required massive costs to run such
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operations, a state-sponsor is suspected. Further information gathered
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also links the RBN to known disruptive websites.
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The IP addresses of the range, 79.135.160.0/19 are assigned to
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Sistemnet Telecom to provide services to companies who are
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classified as engaging in illicit activities such as credit card fraud,
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malware and so on.
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79.135.160.0/19 Sistemnet Telecom and AS9121 TTNet (Turkey) are
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associated with AbdAllah_Internet which is linked with cybercrime
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hosting such as thecanadianmeds.com. These are known Russian
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Business Network routes.
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8. THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK
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The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there
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have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is
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meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are
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indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to
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regular civilians.
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On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against
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the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the
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Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second,
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and up to 200
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250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached
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graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were
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higher.
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The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge
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website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly
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generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload
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the web server in a way where every single request would need
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significant
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time.
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The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian
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websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to
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load
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servers
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these
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requests.
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As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down
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after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack
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may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the
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Russian cyber attacks.
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CONCLUSION
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The information presented in here catalogues and explains the historic
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first major use of cyberattacks as a weapon of war during the Russian
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aggression against Georgia. Considering that this is the second Russiansponsored cyber-attack in just over a year, as well as the alarming fact
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that the US Embassy in Tbilisi was listed for assault by cyberterrorists,
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NATO member states as well as NATO aspirant countries need to be on
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full alert for future Russian aggression against critical online
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infrastructure.
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APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia
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Contents
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SHADOWSERVER............................................................................................................. 11
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COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 13
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COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 14
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SOFT SECURITY ................................................................................................................ 15
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THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 15
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NEW YORK TIMES ........................................................................................................... 17
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AFP....................................................................................................................................... 19
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INTERNATIONAL DATA GROUP................................................................................ 20
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THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 22
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WASHINGTON POST ...................................................................................................... 23
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NEWSWEEK....................................................................................................................... 26
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AFP....................................................................................................................................... 28
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WASHINGTON POST (blog)............................................................................................29
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SHADOWSERVER
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20 July 2008; Updated on 10 August 2008
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The Website for the President of Georgia Under Attack - Politically Motivated?
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For over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia
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(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a multi-
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pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The site began coming
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under attack very early Saturday morning (Georgian time). Shadowserver has
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observed at least one web-based command and control (C&C) server taking
|
aim at the website hitting it with a variety of simultaneous attacks. The C&C
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server has instructed its bots to attack the website with TCP, ICMP, and HTTP
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