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The malware from various locations caused the virus to be delivered |
from |
single |
site, |
address: |
79.135.167.49). |
The name of the malware is "name.avi.exe", and as of September 2008, |
only FOUR out of 36 anti-virus products could detect it. The Russian |
Business Network (RBN) had created a highly virulent strain designed to |
act as a propaganda weapon against Georgia. |
7. RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK |
The individual, with direct responsibility for carrying out the cyber "first |
strike" on Georgia, is a RBN operative named Alexandr A. Boykov of |
Saint Petersburg, Russia. Also involved in the attack was a programmer |
and spammer from Saint Petersburg named Andrey Smirnov. These |
men are leaders of RBN sections and are not "script-kiddies" or |
"hacktivists," as some have maintained of the cyber attacks on Georgia |
but senior operatives in positions of responsibility with vast |
background knowledge. |
Intelligence can suggest further information about these individual |
cyber-terrorists. According to Spamhaus SBL64881, Mr. Boykov operates |
a hosting service in Class C Network 79.135.167.0/24. It should be noted |
that the pre-invasion attacks emanated from 79.135.167.22, clearly |
showing professional planning and not merely |
hacktivism. |
Due to the |
degree of professionalism and the required massive costs to run such |
operations, a state-sponsor is suspected. Further information gathered |
also links the RBN to known disruptive websites. |
The IP addresses of the range, 79.135.160.0/19 are assigned to |
Sistemnet Telecom to provide services to companies who are |
classified as engaging in illicit activities such as credit card fraud, |
malware and so on. |
79.135.160.0/19 Sistemnet Telecom and AS9121 TTNet (Turkey) are |
associated with AbdAllah_Internet which is linked with cybercrime |
hosting such as thecanadianmeds.com. These are known Russian |
Business Network routes. |
8. THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK |
The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there |
have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is |
meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are |
indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to |
regular civilians. |
On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against |
the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the |
Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. |
The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second, |
and up to 200 |
250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached |
graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were |
higher. |
The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge |
website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly |
generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload |
the web server in a way where every single request would need |
significant |
time. |
The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian |
websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to |
load |
servers |
these |
requests. |
As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down |
after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack |
may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the |
Russian cyber attacks. |
CONCLUSION |
The information presented in here catalogues and explains the historic |
first major use of cyberattacks as a weapon of war during the Russian |
aggression against Georgia. Considering that this is the second Russiansponsored cyber-attack in just over a year, as well as the alarming fact |
that the US Embassy in Tbilisi was listed for assault by cyberterrorists, |
NATO member states as well as NATO aspirant countries need to be on |
full alert for future Russian aggression against critical online |
infrastructure. |
APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia |
Contents |
SHADOWSERVER............................................................................................................. 11 |
COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 13 |
COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 14 |
SOFT SECURITY ................................................................................................................ 15 |
THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 15 |
NEW YORK TIMES ........................................................................................................... 17 |
AFP....................................................................................................................................... 19 |
INTERNATIONAL DATA GROUP................................................................................ 20 |
THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 22 |
WASHINGTON POST ...................................................................................................... 23 |
NEWSWEEK....................................................................................................................... 26 |
AFP....................................................................................................................................... 28 |
WASHINGTON POST (blog)............................................................................................29 |
SHADOWSERVER |
20 July 2008; Updated on 10 August 2008 |
The Website for the President of Georgia Under Attack - Politically Motivated? |
For over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia |
(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a multi- |
pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The site began coming |
under attack very early Saturday morning (Georgian time). Shadowserver has |
observed at least one web-based command and control (C&C) server taking |
aim at the website hitting it with a variety of simultaneous attacks. The C&C |
server has instructed its bots to attack the website with TCP, ICMP, and HTTP |
Subsets and Splits