clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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sections of Georgian cyberspace. The attack marks a new phase in the
history of warfare, being the first case in which a land invasion was coordinated with an orchestrated online cyber-offensive. This offers
crucial lessons for strategists and planners whilst providing vital
information about how the Russian Federation is developing its
offensive capacities on the internet.
The campaign has been reported in the media, with wide coverage
suggesting the campaign was a spontaneous outburst of popular
feeling in Russia lead by independent hackers. However, as this report
suggests, the offensive was too large, coordinated, and sophisticated
to be the work of independent hackers; the evidence leads by-andlarge to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Whilst only a criminal investigation can directly prove the involvement
of the Kremlin, both experts and commentators have accused
Moscow of sponsoring the attacks as their magnitude requires the
involvement of the kind of resources only a state-sponsor can provide.
2. BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE
Cyberattacks are becoming an increasingly established and virulent
form of warfare in the early Twenty-First Century. High technology and
online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers,
including private individuals and terrorist organizations, and can
potentially destabilize a country
s whole economy and crucial security
infrastructure. Cyberwarfare has found its primary state-sponsor in the
Russian Federation, which is widely suspected of having played a
leading role in the first large scale cyberattack on a NATO member
state last year.
In the spring of 2007 government computers in Estonia came under
sustained attack from cyberterrorists following the decision taken by
Estonian officials to move a statue placed commemorating a Red
Army soldier that died fighting the Nazis, to the military cemetery in the
capital Tallinn. The event roused emotions and led to large scale
protests by the Russian minority. It was then that the Estonian
Government
s online networks came under massive assault using
Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) assaults on its infrastructure. The
attacks, which flooded computers and servers, blocking legitimate
users were described as
crippling
by experts, owing to Estonia
s high
dependence on information technology. Commentators have pointed
out that the assault had very serious consequences for Estonia`s banks
and airports. Consequences similar in effect to a full scale missile strike.
This provided vital lessons for Estonia and NATO and has led to the
development of a cutting edge cyberwarfare institute in Tallinn.
3. RUSSIA
S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE
In August 2008, cyberwar associated with the Russian Federation struck
once more, this time against Georgia. The DDoS attacks began in the
weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russian invasion and
continued after the Kremlin announced that it had ceased hostilities on
12 August. Georgian claims have been confirmed by Tom Burling, an
executive of Tulip Systems, a U.S. Internet firm, which took over hosting
of the web sites for Georgia's government agencies during the conflict.
In a recent interview Burling said its experts had worked frantically to
curtail the damage from the hackers, remarking that "They have been
attacking Georgia from a cyber standpoint since July." Some of the
Western sources confirm this claim.
On 20 July the Shadowserver Foundation published news about the
serious attack against the website of the President of Georgia:
over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia
(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a
multi-pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
Computerworld, 21 July:
The Web site for the president of Georgia was
knocked offline by a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack over
the weekend, yet another in a series of cyberattacks against countries
experiencing political friction with Russia.
New York Times, 12 August:
Weeks before bombs started falling on
Georgia, a security researcher in suburban Massachusetts was watching an
attack against the country in cyberspace.
The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by a cyber attack on
Georgia
s Internet facilities. A large number of Georgia
s Internet
servers were seized and placed under external control from late
Thursday, 7 August, whereas Russia
s invasion of Georgia officially
commenced on Friday, 8 August. Also, much of Georgia
s traffic and
access was taken under unauthorized external control at the same
time that this first large scale attack occurred.
The defacement of President Mikheil Saakashvili web site
president.gov.ge with the screen-shot provided below which operated
as a moving slideshow was part of the initial phase of the attack. What
followed were large numbers of DDoS against the site designed to
prevent the Georgian government from getting its message across to
the general population and international media during this critical
time.
Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber
threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence
gathering, malware and E-crime incident response. As an expert in the
field, he views the defacement attacks as clearly being Kremlin linked
and not undertaken by independent or un-coordinated attackers.
What am I trying to imply? It smells like a three letter intelligence
agency
s propaganda arm has managed to somehow supply
the creative for the defacement of Georgia President
s official
web site, thereby forgetting a simple rule of engagement in such

sections of Georgian cyberspace. The attack marks a new phase in the

history of warfare, being the first case in which a land invasion was coordinated with an orchestrated online cyber-offensive. This offers

crucial lessons for strategists and planners whilst providing vital

information about how the Russian Federation is developing its

offensive capacities on the internet.

The campaign has been reported in the media, with wide coverage

suggesting the campaign was a spontaneous outburst of popular

feeling in Russia lead by independent hackers. However, as this report

suggests, the offensive was too large, coordinated, and sophisticated

to be the work of independent hackers; the evidence leads by-andlarge to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Whilst only a criminal investigation can directly prove the involvement

of the Kremlin, both experts and commentators have accused

Moscow of sponsoring the attacks as their magnitude requires the

involvement of the kind of resources only a state-sponsor can provide.

2. BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE

Cyberattacks are becoming an increasingly established and virulent

form of warfare in the early Twenty-First Century. High technology and

online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers,

including private individuals and terrorist organizations, and can

potentially destabilize a country

s whole economy and crucial security

infrastructure. Cyberwarfare has found its primary state-sponsor in the

Russian Federation, which is widely suspected of having played a

leading role in the first large scale cyberattack on a NATO member

state last year.

In the spring of 2007 government computers in Estonia came under

sustained attack from cyberterrorists following the decision taken by

Estonian officials to move a statue placed commemorating a Red

Army soldier that died fighting the Nazis, to the military cemetery in the

capital Tallinn. The event roused emotions and led to large scale

protests by the Russian minority. It was then that the Estonian

Government

s online networks came under massive assault using

Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) assaults on its infrastructure. The

attacks, which flooded computers and servers, blocking legitimate

users were described as

crippling

by experts, owing to Estonia

s high

dependence on information technology. Commentators have pointed

out that the assault had very serious consequences for Estonia`s banks

and airports. Consequences similar in effect to a full scale missile strike.

This provided vital lessons for Estonia and NATO and has led to the

development of a cutting edge cyberwarfare institute in Tallinn.

3. RUSSIA

S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE

In August 2008, cyberwar associated with the Russian Federation struck

once more, this time against Georgia. The DDoS attacks began in the

weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russian invasion and

continued after the Kremlin announced that it had ceased hostilities on

12 August. Georgian claims have been confirmed by Tom Burling, an

executive of Tulip Systems, a U.S. Internet firm, which took over hosting

of the web sites for Georgia's government agencies during the conflict.

In a recent interview Burling said its experts had worked frantically to

curtail the damage from the hackers, remarking that "They have been

attacking Georgia from a cyber standpoint since July." Some of the

Western sources confirm this claim.

On 20 July the Shadowserver Foundation published news about the

serious attack against the website of the President of Georgia:

over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia

(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a

multi-pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.

Computerworld, 21 July:

The Web site for the president of Georgia was

knocked offline by a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack over

the weekend, yet another in a series of cyberattacks against countries

experiencing political friction with Russia.

New York Times, 12 August:

Weeks before bombs started falling on

Georgia, a security researcher in suburban Massachusetts was watching an

attack against the country in cyberspace.

The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by a cyber attack on

Georgia

s Internet facilities. A large number of Georgia

s Internet

servers were seized and placed under external control from late

Thursday, 7 August, whereas Russia

s invasion of Georgia officially

commenced on Friday, 8 August. Also, much of Georgia

s traffic and

access was taken under unauthorized external control at the same

time that this first large scale attack occurred.

The defacement of President Mikheil Saakashvili web site

president.gov.ge with the screen-shot provided below which operated

as a moving slideshow was part of the initial phase of the attack. What

followed were large numbers of DDoS against the site designed to

prevent the Georgian government from getting its message across to

the general population and international media during this critical

time.

Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber

threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence

gathering, malware and E-crime incident response. As an expert in the

field, he views the defacement attacks as clearly being Kremlin linked

and not undertaken by independent or un-coordinated attackers.

What am I trying to imply? It smells like a three letter intelligence

agency

s propaganda arm has managed to somehow supply

the creative for the defacement of Georgia President

s official

web site, thereby forgetting a simple rule of engagement in such