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a conflict - risk forwarding the responsibility of the attack to each
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and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked
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Georgian sites using publicly obtainable DDoS attack tools in a
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coordinated fashion.
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An example of Russian efforts to shut the mouse of Georgian media is
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the story of the Georgian news agency GHN. The first attack against
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the agency
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s website occurred in August 2008. Another wave of cyber
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attacks started on 8 September. As a result, the GHN news agency
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website had been paralyzed for 2 weeks. Another Georgian media
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website that came under consistent cyber attacks after the end of the
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armed conflict is www.apsny.ge
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website of the Georgia-Online news
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agency. It is interesting to note that Russian efforts to prevent Georgian
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Internet media resources from disseminating information continued
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even after the war.
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4. CYBER BLOCKADE
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The Russian assault on Georgian cyberspace was intensely coordinated and directed out of St. Petersburg, inside the territory of the
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Russian Federation. The primary orchestrator was the Russian Business
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Network (RBN) which conducted the cyber-blockade so that all
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Georgian Internet traffic was going through Russia, denying Georgia its
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internet independence. Computers in Georgia showed that an assault
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was clearly taking place, which is presented here as evidence of
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Russian sponsored cyber-terrorism:
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Two trace routes for the web site mfa.gov.ge, that of the Georgian
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were showing:
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(a) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
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(b) From Ukraine - Ge = available & slow; not accessible, cached
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(forged page) now only via redirect through Bryansk.ru
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Other Georgia government websites such as mod.gov.ge, the
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website of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the web site
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president.gov.ge, the web site of the Georgian Presidency showed
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(c) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
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(d) From Ukraine - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
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By examining Internet routes before and after the beginning of the war,
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it is clear that they were altered either legally or illegally, blocking
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traffic in and out of Georgia. Some of those routers are known to be
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under control of the Russian Business Network (RBN). This can be
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demonstrated via a comparison of route configuration before and
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after the war.
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5. SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS
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Here we can provide clear evidence of co-ordination and a full list of
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targets the cyber-terrorists had selected taken from the Russian hosted
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web site stopgeorgia.ru (which also appears as stopgeorgia.info a
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redirected page). This site provided the necessary attack tools for the
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cyber assault against Georgia for hackers. As we can see the screenshot shows that mostly .ge web sites are listed for priority attacks.
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However - also targeted for assault is the US embassy in Tbilisi. This web
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site, as seen before, is an open site to attract future FSB cyber warriors.
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The following evidence below shows how these sites can be traced
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back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in ST. Petersburg and other
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cybercriminal locations.
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The information site Stopgeorgia.ru which provided information and
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tools for independent hackers to attack Georgian sites was hosted
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by AS36351 Softlayer of Plano Texas. This is a well known location
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that is associated with Atrivo and Intercage malware hosting
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connectivity, which is highly disruptive to online service.
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The information site Stopgeorgia.info was hosted by AS28753
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NETDIRECT in Frankfurt, Germany as well as in AS12578 APOLLO
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LATTELEKOM APOLLO in Latvia.
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The link back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) was provided by
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the clues left in the registration, which reads as:
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Sponsoring
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Registrar:
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EstDomains,
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Inc.
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Registrant: Domain Manager, Protect Details, Inc, Street1: 29
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Kompozitorov St., Saint Petersburg, RU, Phone:+7.8129342271
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In summary, 36 important web sites were identified as targets for
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hackers, including the US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi, Georgian
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Parliament, Georgian Supreme Court, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various
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news agencies and other media resources, the Central Election
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Commission, and many others.
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Due to efforts of many IT specialists in Internet hosting routing
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companies, normal traffic was mostly resumed after the initial strikes.
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Most critical websites were hosted outside of Georgia.
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6. PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR
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To help to make a final judgment regarding the cyberwar against
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Georgia these two declarations from Russian officials can help us to
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evaluate how Moscow thinks in regard to online warfare. The Russian
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State Duma deputy and member of the Security Committee Deputy
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Nikolai Kuryanovich stated in 2006 within a formal Russian
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parliamentary letter of appreciation to hackers who had taken down
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several Israeli web sites:
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"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the
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open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with
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the aid of information soldiers, that is hackers. This means that a
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small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of
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the current armed forces."
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Should we interpret this declaration as a statement of intent, or merely
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a prediction? A few days ago, the Editor of the Russian Online journal
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cybersecurity.ru, made a similar statement that provides insight into the
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Russian war aims:
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Cyber-attacks are part of the information war, making your enemy
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shut up is a potent weapon of modern warfare.
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Clear examples that such thinking is being applied as guiding principles
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of Russian strategy as part of the intense information-war taking place
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can be drawn from the second wave of attacks that showed up from
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Russian Business Network (RBN) server range. This time the weapon was
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a new campaign purporting to come from the BBC that mocked
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Georgia's President and spread as a new virus.
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