clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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ballistic weapons research, aircraft and ship design, military payroll, personnel records,
procurement, modelling of battlefield environments, and computer security research
(Lewis
1994). The US places classified military information on the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNet) and secret information on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS). While these networks are not connected to the internet,
examining NIPRNet may give insight into the contents through cross talk, or it may provide a
means of escalating privileges, providing information on how to access SIPRNet and JWICS
either directly or indirectly via an asset.
Taiwan
China can use the internet to manipulate the Taiwanese populace, either to set up for an
attack, or to undermine Taiwan independence peacefully and avoid conflict altogether. This
may include PSYOPS/propaganda, recruitment and identification of sympathizers, or
cataloguing of cyber and defence weaknesses. For example, an internet rumour in 1999 that
a Chinese Su-27 had shot down a Taiwan aircraft caused the Taipei stock market to drop
more than two percent in less than four hours. An earthquake in 1999 and a typhoon in 2001
revealed weaknesses in Taiwan
s telecommunications, electric power, and transportation
infrastructure; weaknesses which could be targeted in physical sabotage. Further, a landslide
revealed that the loss of a single power grid tower is capable of knocking out 90 percent of
the power grid in the central mountainous region. Building information, including the
location of the President
s office, and daily activities, are openly available on the internet.
This is even more significant given the lack of security present during the 2004 assassination
attempt on President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu (China
s Proliferation
Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Taiwan
Assassin 2004).
In the event of a Taiwan conflict, China could use cyber attacks to delay US involvement
long enough for Taiwan to capitulate. For example, China could go after the US logistical
apparatus, using information gained via NIPRNet, in order to delay the force deployment
phase. This would include the organization of forces, food supplies, uniforms, and/or
communication which are often organised through networks that are connected to the
internet. Cyber attack could also delay re-supply to the region by misdirecting stores, fuel,
and munitions, corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission
capability. If the Chinese lack the capability to find exploits in NIPRNet, they could simply
conduct DDoS attacks to bring it down long enough for a Taiwanese surrender. While
delaying the US, China could use traditional military forces in concert with cyber warfare
against Taiwan. The cyber warfare component could include online PSYOPS, media
warfare, special forces aided by cyber reconnaissance information, and cyber attacks against
Taiwan
s point of sale and banking infrastructure.
6. Conclusion
This research has shown that China seeks to leapfrog in military competitiveness by utilizing
cyber warfare. Chinese military doctrine places an emphasis on asymmetric attack. Cyber
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
warfare epitomizes this a low cost means of levelling the playing field. Cyber attack strikes
at a superior adversary
s weakness
in the case of the US, a heavy reliance on hi-tech
computerized weaponry and a civilian population reliant on an unsecured computer
infrastructure. Cyber reconnaissance follows China
s tradition of technology transfer and
reverse engineering for domestic production as a means of leapfrogging.
Cyber
reconnaissance gives the added benefit of providing deniability, low cost, a lack of legal
framework against it, and the removal of geographical distance. Foreign allegations, such as
the Titan Rain incursions, suggest China is making rapid progress in cyber reconnaissance
and attack capabilities. The PRC openly states in its National Defense White Paper that it is
seeking informationization and modernization of the PLA. This follows the US, China
perceived greatest threat, in its pursuit of NCW, IO, and FCS. Cataloguing adversary
weaknesses not only provides an asymmetric advantage in the event of a conflict, it also acts
as a deterrent while China catches up in traditional military might. By utilizing cyber
reconnaissance, China can accelerate its advancement in hi-tech weaponry. Unrestricted
warfare has shown a blurring of the lines between military and non-military spheres. China
can tap into the power of its online population for military purposes, such as seen in the
Estonian, Georgian and Chanology case studies. Following the US example of IO, China can
leverage the internet as a means of boosting soft power. Using cyber reconnaissance, the
Chinese can gain market dominance in the fields of ICT. This will provide increased cyber
security, by removing foreign influence, and it will provide improved cyber offence, such as
pre-installed exploits or ownership of internet infrastructure. Market dominance also relates
to financial gain, which China has stated is intrinsically related to military capabilities and
strategic interests.
References
Adams, Eric. 2004. Rods From God. Retrieved on March 10, 2008, from http://www.pop
sci.com/scitech/article/2004-06/rods-god.
Alberts, David S. 2002. Information Age Transformation. Retrieved on February 22, 2008,
from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_IAT.pdf.
Alberts, David S., Garstka, John J., Stein, Frederick P. 2000. Network Centric Warfare.
Retrieved on February 2, 2008, from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf.
Allen, Kenneth. 2005. Reforms in the PLA Air Force. Retrieved on February 12, 2008, from
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3390&
article_id=2369972.
Allen, Kenneth W., Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack. 1995. China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century.
Retrieved 1 February 2008, from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR580.pdf.
Almeida, Marcelo. 2006. Cyberwar: The Beginning. Retrieved on March 3, 2008, from
http://www.zone-h.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13932&
Itemid=30&msgid=710.
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People
s Republic of China 2008. 2008.
Retrieved on March 15, 2008, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
2008/2008-prc-military-power.htm.
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People
s Republic of China 2007. 2007.
Retrieved on February 18, 2008, from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523China-Military-Power-final.pdf.
A Cyber-Riot. 2007. Retrieved on February 2, 2008, from http://www.economist.com/
world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9163598.
Amnesty International. 2004. People

ballistic weapons research, aircraft and ship design, military payroll, personnel records,

procurement, modelling of battlefield environments, and computer security research

(Lewis

1994). The US places classified military information on the Secret Internet Protocol Router

Network (SIPRNet) and secret information on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communications System (JWICS). While these networks are not connected to the internet,

examining NIPRNet may give insight into the contents through cross talk, or it may provide a

means of escalating privileges, providing information on how to access SIPRNet and JWICS

either directly or indirectly via an asset.

Taiwan

China can use the internet to manipulate the Taiwanese populace, either to set up for an

attack, or to undermine Taiwan independence peacefully and avoid conflict altogether. This

may include PSYOPS/propaganda, recruitment and identification of sympathizers, or

cataloguing of cyber and defence weaknesses. For example, an internet rumour in 1999 that

a Chinese Su-27 had shot down a Taiwan aircraft caused the Taipei stock market to drop

more than two percent in less than four hours. An earthquake in 1999 and a typhoon in 2001

revealed weaknesses in Taiwan

s telecommunications, electric power, and transportation

infrastructure; weaknesses which could be targeted in physical sabotage. Further, a landslide

revealed that the loss of a single power grid tower is capable of knocking out 90 percent of

the power grid in the central mountainous region. Building information, including the

location of the President

s office, and daily activities, are openly available on the internet.

This is even more significant given the lack of security present during the 2004 assassination

attempt on President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu (China

s Proliferation

Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Taiwan

Assassin 2004).

In the event of a Taiwan conflict, China could use cyber attacks to delay US involvement

long enough for Taiwan to capitulate. For example, China could go after the US logistical

apparatus, using information gained via NIPRNet, in order to delay the force deployment

phase. This would include the organization of forces, food supplies, uniforms, and/or

communication which are often organised through networks that are connected to the

internet. Cyber attack could also delay re-supply to the region by misdirecting stores, fuel,

and munitions, corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission

capability. If the Chinese lack the capability to find exploits in NIPRNet, they could simply

conduct DDoS attacks to bring it down long enough for a Taiwanese surrender. While

delaying the US, China could use traditional military forces in concert with cyber warfare

against Taiwan. The cyber warfare component could include online PSYOPS, media

warfare, special forces aided by cyber reconnaissance information, and cyber attacks against

Taiwan

s point of sale and banking infrastructure.

6. Conclusion

This research has shown that China seeks to leapfrog in military competitiveness by utilizing

cyber warfare. Chinese military doctrine places an emphasis on asymmetric attack. Cyber

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

warfare epitomizes this a low cost means of levelling the playing field. Cyber attack strikes

at a superior adversary

s weakness

in the case of the US, a heavy reliance on hi-tech

computerized weaponry and a civilian population reliant on an unsecured computer

infrastructure. Cyber reconnaissance follows China

s tradition of technology transfer and

reverse engineering for domestic production as a means of leapfrogging.

Cyber

reconnaissance gives the added benefit of providing deniability, low cost, a lack of legal

framework against it, and the removal of geographical distance. Foreign allegations, such as

the Titan Rain incursions, suggest China is making rapid progress in cyber reconnaissance

and attack capabilities. The PRC openly states in its National Defense White Paper that it is

seeking informationization and modernization of the PLA. This follows the US, China

perceived greatest threat, in its pursuit of NCW, IO, and FCS. Cataloguing adversary

weaknesses not only provides an asymmetric advantage in the event of a conflict, it also acts

as a deterrent while China catches up in traditional military might. By utilizing cyber

reconnaissance, China can accelerate its advancement in hi-tech weaponry. Unrestricted

warfare has shown a blurring of the lines between military and non-military spheres. China

can tap into the power of its online population for military purposes, such as seen in the

Estonian, Georgian and Chanology case studies. Following the US example of IO, China can

leverage the internet as a means of boosting soft power. Using cyber reconnaissance, the

Chinese can gain market dominance in the fields of ICT. This will provide increased cyber

security, by removing foreign influence, and it will provide improved cyber offence, such as

pre-installed exploits or ownership of internet infrastructure. Market dominance also relates

to financial gain, which China has stated is intrinsically related to military capabilities and

strategic interests.

References

Adams, Eric. 2004. Rods From God. Retrieved on March 10, 2008, from http://www.pop

sci.com/scitech/article/2004-06/rods-god.

Alberts, David S. 2002. Information Age Transformation. Retrieved on February 22, 2008,

from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_IAT.pdf.

Alberts, David S., Garstka, John J., Stein, Frederick P. 2000. Network Centric Warfare.

Retrieved on February 2, 2008, from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf.

Allen, Kenneth. 2005. Reforms in the PLA Air Force. Retrieved on February 12, 2008, from

http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3390&

article_id=2369972.

Allen, Kenneth W., Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack. 1995. China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century.

Retrieved 1 February 2008, from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR580.pdf.

Almeida, Marcelo. 2006. Cyberwar: The Beginning. Retrieved on March 3, 2008, from

http://www.zone-h.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13932&

Itemid=30&msgid=710.

Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People

s Republic of China 2008. 2008.

Retrieved on March 15, 2008, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/

2008/2008-prc-military-power.htm.

Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People

s Republic of China 2007. 2007.

Retrieved on February 18, 2008, from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523China-Military-Power-final.pdf.

A Cyber-Riot. 2007. Retrieved on February 2, 2008, from http://www.economist.com/

world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9163598.

Amnesty International. 2004. People