clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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OSINT continually points to cyber warfare being capable of crippling a state
s electric power
transmission, transportation systems, and communications systems (Phone Phreaking 2008;
Weber 2008; Trahan 2008; McMillan 2007; Tkacik 2007; Reid 2007; Robson 2004;
Miklaszewski 1999). If the Russian government was behind the cyber attacks on Estonia, it
did not use such a dramatic assault. The Russians may simply have been testing their cyber
warfare capabilities, saving their most devastating capability for when it is needed most, as it
may only work once. Such an attack would cripple the flow of goods, effectively starving the
population and shutting down business. Evidence that such a possibility exists can be seen
across the globe. In 1997, a teenager shut down air and ground communication at a US
airport in Massachusetts, and in 2000, the Russian government announced that hackers had
succeeded in taking control of the world
s largest natural gas pipeline network, Gazprom, by
using a type of Trojan. In 2000, Vitek Boden took control of a sewage pumping station in
Australia. He remotely triggered the release of a million litres of sewage into public
waterways (Barker 2002). Computers and manuals seized in Al Qaeda training camps
contained large amounts of SCADA information related to dams and critical infrastructure.
In 2003, the Slammer Worm took a US nuclear power plant
s safety monitoring system
offline, and the Blaster Worm was connected with a massive blackout in the Eastern US
(Maynor and Graham 2006).
The United States is particularly vulnerable as much of the communication, manufacturing,
water, transportation, and energy infrastructure is owned by the private sector, as opposed to
China and Russia where infrastructure is predominantly in the hands of the government
(Greenemeier 2007). The relative ease with which the Titan Rain attacks were conducted
make private sector computer networks look like an easy target (Almeida 2006). The
government and defence installations are heavily funded for security, whereas the private
sector is not. Initially the US power grid control systems were on closed networks (not
connected to the internet). However, over time companies began deciding it was too costly to
maintain separate networks. The internet became essential for operations, meaning they
would need two separate systems for operation, one connected and one not. Through the
decision-making process companies decided it was cheaper to have only the one that was
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
connected, but focus on keeping it secure. Over time security became lax, and no network
that is connected can be entirely secure. Many of these systems do not support
authentication, encryption, or basic validation protocols; of those that do support them, most
run with security features disabled (Maynor and Graham 2006). In addition to the internet,
SCADA systems may be compromised through outdated modems used for maintenance
purposes, wireless access points, or roaming notebooks. Further, power companies may buy
and trade power amongst themselves, so loopholes designed to check available capacity have
provided another entry point (Winkler 2007). The vulnerability of the private sector
computer network, due to a lack of understanding or a lack of incentive, provides China (or
other cyber-capable groups) with the opportunity to cripple US infrastructure.
Point of Sale
Using a modern fuel service station as a parallel for a cyber attack on commercial
infrastructure, one can see the debilitating effects of a cyber attack. Magnetic stripe cards
have replaced tangible notes as the primary method of payment. By overwhelming a bank
through something as simple as a DDoS attack, an adversary could knock the point of sale
banking system offline. Few service stations are equipped to handle this for duration longer
than one day, and the Estonian attacks demonstrated a month-long capability. Lines in the
store would grow as the speed of transactions dramatically slowed. Nearby ATMs would be
taxed as people begin withdrawing more notes. As the ATM runs out of its supply of money,
an internal alert is sent to notify the ATM provider to send an armoured car to restock the
machine. This would require additional workflow, disrupting a fine tuned system of
allocated staff hours and drivers. The long lines at the register would disrupt the productivity
and efficiency of working customers who are unaccustomed to the long wait, and it would
radiate frustration and anger throughout the community.
As the service line grows and employees struggle to keep up, the amount of store theft (fuel
and merchandise) increases. More hours would be allocated to review surveillance footage,
and the local police would be inundated with cases of theft. Panic may ensue, as seen with
small disruptions at service stations, comparable to the temporary collapse of Optus
telecommunications or the temporary collapse of Westpac banking (Streem 2008). A
sustained disruption could lead to mob mentality. The fragility of social order was
demonstrated in 2008 when fuel price increases led to widespread violent protests across the
globe, including Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Portugal, South
Korea, Spain, Thailand, and the UK (Arrests Following Jakarta Fuel Price Increases 2008;
Banerjee and Zappei 2008; Cowell 2008; Fuel Demo Adds To Road Taxes Row 2008;
Indonesia: Growing Fuel Price Protests Meet Repression 2008; Thai Truckers Join Global
Fuel Price Protest 2008).
Alternatively, the registers themselves are operated by using the internet and could be
targeted. China could bypass banking systems, energy providers, transportation systems, or
communications systems and go after the less guarded, and less funded, point-of-sale
software. Few service stations remain in the western world that use unconnected registers, as
it would be difficult to remain competitive. Similarly, there are few competitors in the
service station industry due to strong competition. This means there are only a small group
of service station vendors within a large city, and all of the computers within those companies
are running off of the same network. The six largest non-state owned energy companies,
known as super majors, are: Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron Corporation,
ConocoPhillips, and Total SA. These six companies control the vast majority of service
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
stations (SBDCNET 2001). This is sometimes obscured by the use of alternative store
names, despite being contracted to a supermajor, or the continued use of an old company
name despite having been bought out by a supermajor. This illustrates a lack of diversity in
the retail industry. By attacking only a few targets, an entire city
s service stations could be
knocked offline. There are a limited number of independent operators within a typical city;
however their numbers are too few to facilitate the influx of customers from the larger
competitors.
Without the online register, PLUs (price look-up codes) cannot scan and prices would have to
be manually added. Any extended duration of this process could shutdown a store, and
depending on the system, fuel may not be able to be dispensed without the computer. Service
stations are not known for their sophistication in computer defence as they routinely tighten
budgets to their limits and they have not seen a need to harden this infrastructure. As
community hostility rises, employees may resign due to stress. It would be difficult training
new employees during this time with extended lines and the employees themselves suffering
an inability to access fuel. New staff would also cause lost time and money for training. All

OSINT continually points to cyber warfare being capable of crippling a state

s electric power

transmission, transportation systems, and communications systems (Phone Phreaking 2008;

Weber 2008; Trahan 2008; McMillan 2007; Tkacik 2007; Reid 2007; Robson 2004;

Miklaszewski 1999). If the Russian government was behind the cyber attacks on Estonia, it

did not use such a dramatic assault. The Russians may simply have been testing their cyber

warfare capabilities, saving their most devastating capability for when it is needed most, as it

may only work once. Such an attack would cripple the flow of goods, effectively starving the

population and shutting down business. Evidence that such a possibility exists can be seen

across the globe. In 1997, a teenager shut down air and ground communication at a US

airport in Massachusetts, and in 2000, the Russian government announced that hackers had

succeeded in taking control of the world

s largest natural gas pipeline network, Gazprom, by

using a type of Trojan. In 2000, Vitek Boden took control of a sewage pumping station in

Australia. He remotely triggered the release of a million litres of sewage into public

waterways (Barker 2002). Computers and manuals seized in Al Qaeda training camps

contained large amounts of SCADA information related to dams and critical infrastructure.

In 2003, the Slammer Worm took a US nuclear power plant

s safety monitoring system

offline, and the Blaster Worm was connected with a massive blackout in the Eastern US

(Maynor and Graham 2006).

The United States is particularly vulnerable as much of the communication, manufacturing,

water, transportation, and energy infrastructure is owned by the private sector, as opposed to

China and Russia where infrastructure is predominantly in the hands of the government

(Greenemeier 2007). The relative ease with which the Titan Rain attacks were conducted

make private sector computer networks look like an easy target (Almeida 2006). The

government and defence installations are heavily funded for security, whereas the private

sector is not. Initially the US power grid control systems were on closed networks (not

connected to the internet). However, over time companies began deciding it was too costly to

maintain separate networks. The internet became essential for operations, meaning they

would need two separate systems for operation, one connected and one not. Through the

decision-making process companies decided it was cheaper to have only the one that was

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

connected, but focus on keeping it secure. Over time security became lax, and no network

that is connected can be entirely secure. Many of these systems do not support

authentication, encryption, or basic validation protocols; of those that do support them, most

run with security features disabled (Maynor and Graham 2006). In addition to the internet,

SCADA systems may be compromised through outdated modems used for maintenance

purposes, wireless access points, or roaming notebooks. Further, power companies may buy

and trade power amongst themselves, so loopholes designed to check available capacity have

provided another entry point (Winkler 2007). The vulnerability of the private sector

computer network, due to a lack of understanding or a lack of incentive, provides China (or

other cyber-capable groups) with the opportunity to cripple US infrastructure.

Point of Sale

Using a modern fuel service station as a parallel for a cyber attack on commercial

infrastructure, one can see the debilitating effects of a cyber attack. Magnetic stripe cards

have replaced tangible notes as the primary method of payment. By overwhelming a bank

through something as simple as a DDoS attack, an adversary could knock the point of sale

banking system offline. Few service stations are equipped to handle this for duration longer

than one day, and the Estonian attacks demonstrated a month-long capability. Lines in the

store would grow as the speed of transactions dramatically slowed. Nearby ATMs would be

taxed as people begin withdrawing more notes. As the ATM runs out of its supply of money,

an internal alert is sent to notify the ATM provider to send an armoured car to restock the

machine. This would require additional workflow, disrupting a fine tuned system of

allocated staff hours and drivers. The long lines at the register would disrupt the productivity

and efficiency of working customers who are unaccustomed to the long wait, and it would

radiate frustration and anger throughout the community.

As the service line grows and employees struggle to keep up, the amount of store theft (fuel

and merchandise) increases. More hours would be allocated to review surveillance footage,

and the local police would be inundated with cases of theft. Panic may ensue, as seen with

small disruptions at service stations, comparable to the temporary collapse of Optus

telecommunications or the temporary collapse of Westpac banking (Streem 2008). A

sustained disruption could lead to mob mentality. The fragility of social order was

demonstrated in 2008 when fuel price increases led to widespread violent protests across the

globe, including Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Portugal, South

Korea, Spain, Thailand, and the UK (Arrests Following Jakarta Fuel Price Increases 2008;

Banerjee and Zappei 2008; Cowell 2008; Fuel Demo Adds To Road Taxes Row 2008;

Indonesia: Growing Fuel Price Protests Meet Repression 2008; Thai Truckers Join Global

Fuel Price Protest 2008).

Alternatively, the registers themselves are operated by using the internet and could be

targeted. China could bypass banking systems, energy providers, transportation systems, or

communications systems and go after the less guarded, and less funded, point-of-sale

software. Few service stations remain in the western world that use unconnected registers, as

it would be difficult to remain competitive. Similarly, there are few competitors in the

service station industry due to strong competition. This means there are only a small group

of service station vendors within a large city, and all of the computers within those companies

are running off of the same network. The six largest non-state owned energy companies,

known as super majors, are: Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron Corporation,

ConocoPhillips, and Total SA. These six companies control the vast majority of service

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

stations (SBDCNET 2001). This is sometimes obscured by the use of alternative store

names, despite being contracted to a supermajor, or the continued use of an old company

name despite having been bought out by a supermajor. This illustrates a lack of diversity in

the retail industry. By attacking only a few targets, an entire city

s service stations could be

knocked offline. There are a limited number of independent operators within a typical city;

however their numbers are too few to facilitate the influx of customers from the larger

competitors.

Without the online register, PLUs (price look-up codes) cannot scan and prices would have to

be manually added. Any extended duration of this process could shutdown a store, and

depending on the system, fuel may not be able to be dispensed without the computer. Service

stations are not known for their sophistication in computer defence as they routinely tighten

budgets to their limits and they have not seen a need to harden this infrastructure. As

community hostility rises, employees may resign due to stress. It would be difficult training

new employees during this time with extended lines and the employees themselves suffering

an inability to access fuel. New staff would also cause lost time and money for training. All