clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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delivery trucks create online invoices sent and received by the service station. Assuming
they are able to maintain the fuel for their trucks, they would be forced to adapt to old
methods of interaction and record keeping. A store
s stock might also suffer shortages from
hoarding of products due to panic in the community.
These systems could be attacked solely online, or operatives could be placed into the store to
learn the system
s weaknesses and install malware directly. Operations could be expanded
beyond a service station to attack grocery and a wide range of retail outlets. Rather than
going after the transport of goods, it may be easier to disrupt them online at their point of
sale. The effects would radiate outward, knocking down additional infrastructure unable to
handle the increased stress. A service station is only one example of weak commercial
infrastructure that relies on computers to operate. If China could gain market dominance in
the point of sale software industry, or in the registers used for sales, it would gain an even
greater access to disruption. This disruption could be used as a deterrent, as blackmail, or as
a force multiplier in traditional warfare.
Market Dominance
China may seek to establish market dominance in the production of ICT software and
hardware as a means of increasing its cyber warfare capability. On an infrastructure level,
China could seek to control ownership of submarine cable infrastructure allowing it further
access to cyber reconnaissance or the option of shutting down portions of internet
connectivity during times of war (Whitney 2008; Of Cables and Conspiracies 2008). Further,
if China could unseat Microsoft as the industry standard in software, it could install
backdoors, latent viruses, or remotely triggered ex-filtration devices. This type of tactic was
examined in section 3, above (Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack), with Sony BMG
s use of
rootkits. China used legal and financial prowess to convince Microsoft to teach its software
engineers how to insert their own software into Window
s applications. As a part of the
Chinese argument for doing so, was an insistence that Microsoft Windows was a secret tool
of the US government. By providing China with
skeleton keys
to the Windows Operating
System, inadvertently China was given advanced knowledge on how to infiltrate foreign
computers and craft advanced exploits (Marsal 2008; Tkacik 2007).
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
US concerns over Chinese market dominance have begun to surface. In 2006, the State
Department banned the purchase of computers from the Lenovo Group, the Chinese firm that
acquired the IBM personal computing division, following penetrations using a zero-day flaw
in Microsoft software. China is also growing in the field of microchips, something other
states need for defence related electronics. Not only could China embed exploits, but also
dominance in this field gives it access to critical individuals and information through
partnership, such as a chance to liaise with industry insiders, come close to sensitive
information and hardware, and conduct social engineering or HUMINT. In 2003, the Huawei
Shenzhen Technology Company was charged with stealing secrets and wholesale pirating of
Cisco software, a US company. In 2007, Huawei then attempted to buy 3Com, a US
company which supplies the US government with security software, routers, and servers.
India turned down a $60 million Huawei investment deal in 2005 after concerns over cyber
reconnaissance, noting that Huawei is the same company that conducts sweeping and
debugging of the Chinese embassy. India
s Defence Ministry stated
the choice was between
cheap Chinese equipment and national security
(Tkacik 2007).
China consistently reverse engineers ICT hardware and software in an attempt to maintain a
stronghold on its own markets. This can be seen with the reverse engineering of Skype
Protocol and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and
knock offs
of the iPhone (VoIP
WkiBlog 2006). The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project, which has the potential to
rapidly spread internet connectivity to China
s remaining population, uses an open source
operating system and software, helping to free China from US owned Microsoft. Yet China
has denounced the sale of OLPC, promoting instead various domestic versions that were
reversed engineered from the OLPC model.
Further, the Chinese have secured
manufacturing rights to produce OLPC within China even though they do not intend to
promote OLPC sales domestically (O
Brien 2008). China also has a history of reverse
engineering websites that become popular and profitable in the Western world; examples
include clones of YouTube, Google, MySpace, Facebook, Wikipedia, and eBay being
YoQoo, Baidu, Baidu Space, Xiaonei/Zhanzuo, Baidu Baike/Hoodong, and Taobao
respectively (Marshall 2008; Wei 2008; Burns 2006).
Peacetime Operations
During peacetime, China is likely to rely on cyber reconnaissance to gather information and
catalogue exploits/weaknesses in the US military and infrastructure. Automobile companies,
food services, oil companies, financial institutions, and telecommunications all play a vital
role in supporting military operations, as well as housing technological advances, expertise,
and inside information which could prove useful for leapfrogging (Winkler 2005).
Technology transfer allows China to skip years of costly research and development, and it
removes the competitive edge of foreign militaries and companies (Tkacik 2007). In
unrestricted fashion, China may also seek advantage during peacetime to battle military
export restrictions of the EU, purchase vital capital in the US financial system, and help
shape the international legal structure being developed for cyber warfare. Cyber
reconnaissance against US military logistics networks could reveal force deployment
information, such as the names of ships deployed, readiness status of various units, timing
and destination of deployments, and rendezvous schedules. It could also reveal the details of
weaponry sold to Taiwan.
China has repeatedly shown interest in the US Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNet) (China
s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008). NIPRNet is used to exchange unclassified but
sensitive information between internal users. The network is connected to the broader
internet to improve collaboration between scientists and officers located in different
organizations and in remote locations. This means it can provide intruders with data such as

delivery trucks create online invoices sent and received by the service station. Assuming

they are able to maintain the fuel for their trucks, they would be forced to adapt to old

methods of interaction and record keeping. A store

s stock might also suffer shortages from

hoarding of products due to panic in the community.

These systems could be attacked solely online, or operatives could be placed into the store to

learn the system

s weaknesses and install malware directly. Operations could be expanded

beyond a service station to attack grocery and a wide range of retail outlets. Rather than

going after the transport of goods, it may be easier to disrupt them online at their point of

sale. The effects would radiate outward, knocking down additional infrastructure unable to

handle the increased stress. A service station is only one example of weak commercial

infrastructure that relies on computers to operate. If China could gain market dominance in

the point of sale software industry, or in the registers used for sales, it would gain an even

greater access to disruption. This disruption could be used as a deterrent, as blackmail, or as

a force multiplier in traditional warfare.

Market Dominance

China may seek to establish market dominance in the production of ICT software and

hardware as a means of increasing its cyber warfare capability. On an infrastructure level,

China could seek to control ownership of submarine cable infrastructure allowing it further

access to cyber reconnaissance or the option of shutting down portions of internet

connectivity during times of war (Whitney 2008; Of Cables and Conspiracies 2008). Further,

if China could unseat Microsoft as the industry standard in software, it could install

backdoors, latent viruses, or remotely triggered ex-filtration devices. This type of tactic was

examined in section 3, above (Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack), with Sony BMG

s use of

rootkits. China used legal and financial prowess to convince Microsoft to teach its software

engineers how to insert their own software into Window

s applications. As a part of the

Chinese argument for doing so, was an insistence that Microsoft Windows was a secret tool

of the US government. By providing China with

skeleton keys

to the Windows Operating

System, inadvertently China was given advanced knowledge on how to infiltrate foreign

computers and craft advanced exploits (Marsal 2008; Tkacik 2007).

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

US concerns over Chinese market dominance have begun to surface. In 2006, the State

Department banned the purchase of computers from the Lenovo Group, the Chinese firm that

acquired the IBM personal computing division, following penetrations using a zero-day flaw

in Microsoft software. China is also growing in the field of microchips, something other

states need for defence related electronics. Not only could China embed exploits, but also

dominance in this field gives it access to critical individuals and information through

partnership, such as a chance to liaise with industry insiders, come close to sensitive

information and hardware, and conduct social engineering or HUMINT. In 2003, the Huawei

Shenzhen Technology Company was charged with stealing secrets and wholesale pirating of

Cisco software, a US company. In 2007, Huawei then attempted to buy 3Com, a US

company which supplies the US government with security software, routers, and servers.

India turned down a $60 million Huawei investment deal in 2005 after concerns over cyber

reconnaissance, noting that Huawei is the same company that conducts sweeping and

debugging of the Chinese embassy. India

s Defence Ministry stated

the choice was between

cheap Chinese equipment and national security

(Tkacik 2007).

China consistently reverse engineers ICT hardware and software in an attempt to maintain a

stronghold on its own markets. This can be seen with the reverse engineering of Skype

Protocol and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and

knock offs

of the iPhone (VoIP

WkiBlog 2006). The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project, which has the potential to

rapidly spread internet connectivity to China

s remaining population, uses an open source

operating system and software, helping to free China from US owned Microsoft. Yet China

has denounced the sale of OLPC, promoting instead various domestic versions that were

reversed engineered from the OLPC model.

Further, the Chinese have secured

manufacturing rights to produce OLPC within China even though they do not intend to

promote OLPC sales domestically (O

Brien 2008). China also has a history of reverse

engineering websites that become popular and profitable in the Western world; examples

include clones of YouTube, Google, MySpace, Facebook, Wikipedia, and eBay being

YoQoo, Baidu, Baidu Space, Xiaonei/Zhanzuo, Baidu Baike/Hoodong, and Taobao

respectively (Marshall 2008; Wei 2008; Burns 2006).

Peacetime Operations

During peacetime, China is likely to rely on cyber reconnaissance to gather information and

catalogue exploits/weaknesses in the US military and infrastructure. Automobile companies,

food services, oil companies, financial institutions, and telecommunications all play a vital

role in supporting military operations, as well as housing technological advances, expertise,

and inside information which could prove useful for leapfrogging (Winkler 2005).

Technology transfer allows China to skip years of costly research and development, and it

removes the competitive edge of foreign militaries and companies (Tkacik 2007). In

unrestricted fashion, China may also seek advantage during peacetime to battle military

export restrictions of the EU, purchase vital capital in the US financial system, and help

shape the international legal structure being developed for cyber warfare. Cyber

reconnaissance against US military logistics networks could reveal force deployment

information, such as the names of ships deployed, readiness status of various units, timing

and destination of deployments, and rendezvous schedules. It could also reveal the details of

weaponry sold to Taiwan.

China has repeatedly shown interest in the US Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol

Router Network (NIPRNet) (China

s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008). NIPRNet is used to exchange unclassified but

sensitive information between internal users. The network is connected to the broader

internet to improve collaboration between scientists and officers located in different

organizations and in remote locations. This means it can provide intruders with data such as