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technical sophistication by some of the members," Rios said. "It also indicates |
that all the information from the attacked systems was most likely already |
compromised and pilfered before the injection point was posted." |
While Grey Goose members could find no direct link between Russian |
government officials and the StopGeorgia.ru forum administrators, they claim |
it is unreasonable to conclude that no such connection exists. |
"The historical record shows clear support by members of the Russian |
government and implied consent in its refusal to intervene or stop the hacker |
attacks," the report states, naming at least three Russian politicians and |
military officials who have previously endorsed coordinated cyber attacks |
against other nations as a show of nationalistic pride. |
Oleg Gordievsky, a former colonel in the Russian KGB who defected to the |
British intelligence wing MI6 in 1985, spoke in 1998 at an international |
conference on crime and discussed how Russian hackers convicted of cyber |
crime are sometimes offered an alternative to prison -- working for the FSB" |
(the federal security service of the Russian Federation and a successor to the |
KGB). |
According to a cyber warfare analysis by researchers at Dartmouth College, |
Moscow has a track record of offensive hacking into Chechen Web sites. The |
researchers provide this account of incidents in 2002, when Russian hackers |
used cyber warfare in to supplement the ongoing military conflict with |
Chechnya. |
"In 2002, Chechen rebels claimed that two of their Web sites, kavkaz.org and |
chechenpress.com, crashed under hack attacks by the Russian FSB security |
service. The website crashes were reportedly timed to occur concurrently or |
shortly after Russian Special Forces troops stormed the Moscow Theater in |
which the rebels had taken hostages. "On October 26 ... our Web Site |
kavkaz.org was attacked by a group of hackers," said a spokesman for the |
Chechen rebel site run by Movladi Udugov. Following the attack on the site, |
which is based in the United States, Udugov said that he was "amazed Russia's |
special services can operate so freely on U.S. territory." The attacks on one |
site, chechenpress.com, fell under the category of brute-force denial of |
service (DoS) attacks, while on the other site, kavkaz.org, the attacks |
appeared much more sophisticated. |
According to Chechen sources, the Web site was hijacked by hackers from |
the FSB. The FSB hackers reportedly accomplished this by changing the |
domain registration of the site and then eliminating the data for the site from |
the hosting server. Upon learning of these attacks, the rebels moved the |
information on the sites to kavkazcenter.com. However, that site was |
attacked just a week later, also apparently the work of FSB hackers. |
In July, Russian hackers were blamed for a similar assault on Lithuanian |
government Web sites. In Security Fix's account of that attack, I posted a |
copy of a congratulatory letter sent to nationalist Russian hackers by Nikolai |
Kuryanovich, a former member of the Russian Duma. The missive is dated |
March 2006, and addresses the hacker group Slavic Union after the group |
had just completed a series of successful attacks against Israeli Web sites. |
"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the open field of |
battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with the aid of information |
soldiers, that is hackers," Kuryanovich wrote. "This means that a small force of |
hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of the current armed |
forces." |
The Grey Goose report concludes that the journeyman-apprentice |
relationship observed in the StopGeorgia forum will continue to be the |
training model used by nationalistic Russian hackers, and that those hackers |
are actively engaged in finding more efficient ways to disable networks. |
In the meantime, Carr said, the Russian government will continue to deny any |
involvement in any nation-level cyber attacks. |
"The Russian government has adopted this hands-off and satisfying position of |
deniability while enjoying the rewards achieved by the Russian hacker |
community," Carr said. |
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 |
Copyright |
2008 Jason Fritz |
HOW CHINA WILL USE CYBER WARFARE |
TO LEAPFROG IN MILITARY COMPETITIVENESS |
byJason Fritz BS (St. Cloud), MIR (Bond) |
Introduction |
The People |
s Republic of China (PRC) may be a global power economically but its military lacks force projection |
beyond the Asia Pacific region. Its traditional military hardware is one to three generations behind the US and |
Russia. In light of these deficiencies it is probable that cyber warfare will provide China with an asymmetric |
advantage to deter aggression from stronger military powers as they catch up in traditional military capabilities. |
Cyber warfare would also allow China to leapfrog by means of technology transfer and exploiting adversary |
weaknesses. This investigation will address three primaryquestions: What is China |
s current militarycapability? |
How would cyber warfare allow China to seriously advance its strategic abilities? And what is the evidence that |
China is headed in a cyber warfare direction? |
1. Traditional Military Power of the PLA |
In order to see how the Chinese military will |
leapfrog |
in military competitiveness, it is |
necessary to establish its current capabilities. The Chinese People |
s Liberation Army (PLA) |
is composed of five main service branches, the PLA Ground Force, PLA Navy, PLA Air |
Force, Second Artillery Corps, and the PLA Reserved Force. China has one of the world |
largest military forces, with 2.3 million active members, a reserve force of 800,000, and a |
paramilitary force of 3.9 million, for a grand total of approximately 7 million members. The |
PLA has tried to transform itself from a land based power, to a smaller, mobile, high tech |
power that is capable of reaching beyond its borders (Annual Report to Congress 2007; |
China's National Defense in 2006). |
During the 1980 |
s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping pushed for quality over quantity, and the |
military was reduced by one million members. In 1993, President Jiang Zemin officially |
announced a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) a part of the national military strategy for |
modernization. RMA is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to |
technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military |
and others. RMA is tied to modern information, communications, space technology, and |
total systems integration. Careful observation of US involvement in the Kosovo, |
Afghanistan, and Iraqi wars, furthered China |
s interest in network-centric warfare and |
Subsets and Splits