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iti śabdhabrahmaparīksā // | End of the Chapter on the Doctrine of ‘Sound-Brahman’. |
tatraiva dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam | With the following Text, the Author applies the previously-detailed objections to this doctrine also: [see verse 152 above] |
na śabdajanyaṃ tatkāryaṃ sattāto hetuvittivat / | The objection may be stated thus: ‘The World cannot be the effect of Sound, because it exists, like the cognition of the Cause; |
ato nābhimato hetur asādhyatvātparātmavat // ityādi // | hence what is meant to be the Cause cannot be the Cause, because it cannot be so proved, like the other Self’, and so on. |
iti śabdabrahmaparīkṣā // | End of the Chapter on the Doctrine of ‘Sound-Brahman’. |
anye tvīśasadharmāṇaṃ puruṣaṃ lokakāraṇam / kalpayanti durākhyātasiddhāntānugabuddhayaḥ // | Others, however, postulate the ‘puruṣa’ (spirit), similar in character to ‘god’ as the cause of the world, their mind being swayed by an ill-conceived doctrine. |
samastavastupralaye 'pyaluptajñānaśaktimān / | thus ‘spirit’ has his powers such as do not cease even in regard to the dissolution of all things; |
ūrṇānābha ivāṃśūnāṃ sa hetuḥ kila janminām // | he is the cause of all born things, just as the spider is of the cobwebs. |
ta evamāhuḥ puruṣa ekaikaḥ sakalalokasthitisargapralayahetuḥ prayalepyaluptajñānātiśayaśaktir iti / tathā coktam | These people state their doctrine as follows: “The Puruṣa, Spirit, alone is the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the whole world; |
ūrṇanābha ivāṃśūnāṃ candrakānta ivāmbhasām / prarohāṇām iva plakṣaḥ sa hetuḥ sarvajanminām // | This has been thus declared ‘As the Spider is the cause of the cobwebs, the Lunar Gem of water, and the Banyan Tree of its offshoots, so is the Spirit the Cause of all born things’; |
tathā"puruṣa evaitat sarvaṃ yadbhūtaṃ yac ca bhāvyam" iti / | and again ‘The Spirit alone is all this, the past, and also the future’,” |
īśadharmāṇām īśvaratulyadharmāṇām dvayor api viśvasargasthitipralayanimittatvāt / | i.e. He has qualities equal to those of God; inasmuch as both are the ‘efficient cause’ of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe; |
etāvāṃstu viśeṣaḥ īśvaravyatiriktamanyadapyātmādikaṃ samavāyyādikāraṇamīśvarakāraṇakair iṣyate / puruṣavādibhis tu puruṣa eva kāraṇam viśvasargasthitipralayanimittabhāvas tu dvayor api samānaḥ / | the only difference between these two (Spirit and God) is that those who regard God as the Cause of the World postulate other things also like the Soul and such things, as the ‘constituent’ and other kinds of Cause (God being only the ‘efficient’ cause), while those who regard ‘Spirit’ as the Cause of the world, posit the Spirit alone as the sole cause (efficient as well as constituent); but the character of being the efficient cause of creation, sustenance and dissolution is common to both doctrines. |
dūrākhyātasiddhāntānugabuddhaya iti / durākhyātasiddhāntānugā buddhir yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ / | They have their mind swayed by an ill-conceived doctrine; i.e. their mind is under the influence of a doctrine which is wrongly conceived. |
ūrṇanābho markaṭakaḥ //153- | The term ‘Ūrṇanābha’ stands for the Spider. |
asyāpītyādinā dūṣaṇam ārabhate īśvaravad iti / | thus ‘spirit’ has his powers such as do not cease even in regard to the dissolution of all things; |
asyāpīśvaravatsarvaṃ vacanīyaṃ niṣedhanam / | and again ‘The Spirit alone is all this, the past, and also the future’,” Similar in character to God; |
kimarthaṃ ca karotyeva vyāpāramimamīdṛśam // | inasmuch as both are the ‘efficient cause’ of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe; |
ṣaṣṭhyantād vatiḥ / | The term ‘Ūrṇanābha’ stands for the Spider. |
atrāpyevaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam | With the following Text, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against this doctrine: [see verse 155 above] |
puruṣo janmināṃ hetur notpattivikalatvataḥ / gaganāmbhojavatsargamanyathā yugapad bhavet // | ‘Īśvaravat’ is to be construed as ‘Īśvarasya iva’, ‘as in the case of God’, This refutation is to be stated thus ‘The Spirit cannot be the Cause of born things, because He is Himself devoid of birth, like the sky-lotus; |
% QUOTE Tattvasaṃgraha v.87 ityādi / | otherwise all things would come into existence simultaneously’, [This is exactly the same argument that has been put forward against ‘God’, under Text 87, above]. |
yadi ceśvarasiddhaye yathā paraiḥ sādhanānyuktāni / tathaiva puruṣasiddhaye puruṣavadbhir upādīyante / tadā tadvadevāsiddhatādidoṣo vācyaḥ / | If the upholders of the Spirit put forward the same arguments that have been put forward by others in proof of ‘God’, then the same fallacies of being ‘unproven’ and the rest that have been shown in the latter should be applied to the former also. |
anyad api dūṣaṇaprakāram āha kimarthaṃ cetyādi / | The Text mentions another line of objection also For what purpose, etc. |
prekṣāpūrvakāripravṛtteḥ prayojanavattayā vyāptatvādayaḥ kimartham ayaṃ puruṣo jagadracanāvyāpāramīdṛśaṃ karotīti vaktavyam // | The activity of all intelligent beings is found to be prompted by some purpose; hence it has to be explained for what purpose the Spirit performs such an act as that of creating the world. |
yadyanyena prayuktatvān na syād asya svatantratā / | If he does it because he is prompted by another being, then he can not be self-sufficient (independent). |
athānukampayā kuryād ekāntasukhitaṃ jagat // | if he does it through compassion, then he should make the world absolutely happy. |
ādhidāridryaśokādivividhāyāsapīḍitam / janaṃ tu sṛjatas tasya kānukampā pratīyate // | when he is found to have created people beset with misery, poverty, sorrow and other troubles, where can his compassion be perceived? (156-157) |
yadyanyeneśvarādinā prayukto 'nicchannapi karoti tadāsya yatsvātantryam abhyupagataṃ taddhīyeta / | If the Spirit does all this, even though himself unwilling to do so, because he is prompted by another Being in the shape of God and the like, then the ‘self-sufficiency’ that has been postulated for him disappears. |
atha kṛpayā parānugrahārthaṃ karoti tadā nārakādiduḥkhitamatvanirmāṇaṃ nakuryād ekāntasukhitam eva kuryāt //156- | If it were through compassion that he did it, for the purpose of helping others, then he would not make it full of such dire miseries as those of Hell, etc., he would make it entirely happy. |
sṛṣṭeḥ prāganukampānām asattve nopapadyate / anukampāpi yadyotāddhātāyaṃ parikalpyate // [p.77] kiṃ ca sṛṣṭeḥ sargātprāganukampyasattvābhāvāt / | Further, inasmuch as, prior to creation, the objects of compassion would not be there, there could not be even that compassion through the presence op which the ordainer is assumed. Further, prior to creation, there is no entity towards whom he would he compassionate; |
yasyā anukampāyā vaśādayaṃ dhātā sraṣṭā kalpyeta // | and through the presence of this ‘compassion’, the Ordainer Creator is assumed. |
na cāyaṃ pralayaṃ kuryāt sadābhyudayayoginām / | Nor should he ever bring about the dissolution op those beings who would be always prosperous. |
tadadṛṣṭavyapekṣāyāṃ svātantryamavahīyate // | if in so doing, he be regarded as dependent upon the ‘unseen force’ (op destiny), then his ‘self-sufficiency’ ceases. |
yadi cāyam anukampayā kurute tadā yadeva manuṣyāḥ sadābhyudayayoginas teṣāṃ kimiti pralayaṃ karoti / ye duḥkhitasantataya āpāyikāḥ sattvās teṣām eva kāmaṃ karotu pralayam iti bhāvaḥ / | If he created people through compassion, and they were always happy, then why should he bring about their dissolution? The sense is that if he has to bring about Dissolution, he should bring about the Dissolution of only such Beings as are miserable and imbecile. |
athāpi syāt teṣām anukampyānāṃ yadadṛṣṭaṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇaṃ tadapekṣya sukhaduḥkhasamanvitaṃ lokaṃ karoti / | It might be urged that “He makes people happy or unhappy in accordance with their Destiny, in the shape of Merit and Demerit That cannot be right; |
evaṃ hi svātantryamabhyupagataṃ hīyate / | as in that case his ‘self-sufficiency’ which has been postulated, would cease. |
na cāpi samarthyasya kācidapekṣā / | One who is himself endowed with power does not depend upon anything else; |
asāmarthye vāpekṣyādeva lokasyotpattes tatkāraṇatvam asya hīyate // | if one is wanting in power, then the creation of the world itself might be attributed to That on which he is dependent; and in that case He would cease to be the ‘Cause’. |
pīḍāhetumadṛṣṭaṃ ca kimarthaṃ sa vyapekṣate / upekṣaiva punas tatra dayāyoge 'sya yujyate // | Then again, why should he make himself dependent upon that destiny, which is conducive to suffering and pain? in fact, pull of mercy as he is, the right course for him would be to ignore that destiny. |
bhavatu nāma tasyādṛṣṭāpekṣā / | It may be granted that he is dependent upon the ‘Unseen Force’ (of Destiny). |
tathāpi yadadṛṣṭaṃ dharamādharmātmakaṃ pīḍāhetus tadapekṣā kṛpālor naḥ yuktā kintvavadhīraṇam eva tatra tasya kṛpāparatantratayā yuktaṃ kartum / | Even so, it is not right for the merciful Being to make himself dependent upon such Destiny in the form of Merit and Demerit, as leads to pain and suffering; on the contrary, he should totally disregard such Destiny, if he is influenced (in his activity) by Mercy and Compassion. |
na hi kṛpālavaḥ paraduḥkhahetumevānvicchanti teṣāṃ paraduḥkhaviyogecchayaiva pravṛtteḥ // | merciful persons do not seek for such causes as bring about suffering; because the sole motive behind their actions consists in the desire to remove the sufferings of others. |
krīḍārthā tasya vṛttiścet krīḍāyāṃ na prabhur bhavet / vicitrakrīḍanopāyavyapekṣātaḥ śiśur yathā // | If the functioning of the spirit be said to be for purposes of ‘amusement’, then he would not be his own master regarding that amusement, as he would be dependent upon the various implements of that amusement, just like a child. |
atha nānukampayā karoti / kiṃ tarhikrīḍārtham / etad apyasamyak / | If it be held that “He creates the world, not through Compassion, but for purposes of ‘Amusement’”, that also cannot be right. |
evaṃ krīḍotpāde svātantryam asya na syāt sargasthitipralayātmakasya vicitrakrīḍanopāyasyāpekṣaṇāt // | As, in that case, in the matter of bringing about this ‘Amusement’, he would not be ‘self-sufficient’, being dependent upon such diverse implements of Amusement as creation, sustenance and dissolution (of the world). |
tat sarvaṃ yugapat kuryād yadi tatkṛtiśaktimān // | If he had the power to create them, he would have created, at one and the same time, all the implements conducive to the pleasure to be accomplished by the ‘amusement’. |
krameṇāpi na śaktaḥ syān no cedādau sa śaktimān / | if he did not have that power in the beginning, then he could not have it for creating them consecutively either. |
nāvibhaktasya yujyete śaktyaśaktī hi vastunaḥ // | because for an indivisible thing, it is not possible to have power and also to be without power. |
kiṃ ca ye te vicitrāḥ krīḍanopāyāḥ tatkāraṇe yadi śaktirasyāsti tadā yugapadeva kuryāt / | Further, those various implements of Amusement that are there, if he has the power to create them, then he should create them all at the same time; |
athādau tasya na śaktis tadā krameṇāpi na kuryāt / | if he does not have that power in the beginning, then he could not create them subsequently, one by one either; |
aśaktāvasthāyā aviśiṣṭatvāt / | as the ‘powerless condition’ would be there still; |
na hyekasyaikatra vastuni śaktatvamaśaktatvaṃ ca paramparaviruddhaṃ dharmadvayaṃyuktam / | it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the power and not to have the power to do a certain act at one and the same time, the two, power and absence of power, being mutually exclusive. |
[p.78] kimarthaṃ ca vyāpāramīdṛśamārabhata ityādi sarvo vikalpa īśvare 'pi sādhāraṇaḥ / | The arguments that have been urged before against the doctrine of God, e.g. why does He undertake such an operation as creation and so forth, are applicable to this doctrine also. |
tena yadāha praśastamatiḥ parānugrahārtham īśvaraḥ pravartate / | This also disposes of the following arguments set forth by Praśastamati: “God undertakes activity for the purpose of helping others. |
yathā kṛtārthaḥ kaścinmunirātmahitāhitaprāptiparihārārthāsambhave 'pi parahitārthamupadeśaṃ karoti / tatheśvaropyātmīyāmaiśvaryavibhūtiṃ vikhyāpya prāṇino 'grahīṣyan pravartata iti / | Just as a certain sage, who has had all his own purposes accomplished and hence for whom there is nothing to be done for either acquiring what is desirable or avoiding what is not desirable, undertakes the work of teaching for the benefit of others, similarly God also, having made known the majesty of His own power, proceeds to act for the purpose of helping living beings. |
atha vā śaktisvābhāvyāt yathā kālasya vasantādīnāṃ paryāyeṇābhivyaktau sthāvarajaṅgamavikārotpattiḥ svabhāvataḥ / tatheśvarasyāpyavirbhāvānugrahasaṃhāraśaktīnāṃ paryāyeṇābhivyaktau prāṇinām utpattisthitipralayahetukatvam iti / | Or, just as, on account of the natural potency of Time, the Spring and other seasons come about by turns, upon which animate and inanimate products com© about by their own inherent nature, similarly in the case of God also, the faculties of creating, maintaining and dissolving become manifested by turns, and through these, He becomes the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of all living beings.” |
tadapyanenaiva prativihitam / | This argument becomes set aside by what has been said above. |
tathā hi parānugrahārthaṃ pravartata ityatredam eva pratividhānam / anugrahaḥ paraḥ kuryād ekāntasukhitaṃ jagadityādi / śaktisvābhāvyād ity atrāpīdam eva dūṣaṇam / | For instance, the assertion that “Spirit acts for the purpose of helping others” is to be met by this reasoning: If it were kindness towards others, then He should have created the world absolutely happy, etc. etc. As regards the statement that “it is due to the nature of his powers”; |
sargasthityupasaṃhārānyugapad vyaktaśaktikaḥ / | the objection against this is as follows: If he had his powers fully manifested, he would bring about creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world simultaneously; |
na vyaktarīśo 'yaṃ krameṇāpy upapadyata / | if he has not his powers manifested, then the creation and the rest could not be brought about even consecutively; |
vyaktaśaktirato 'nyāścodbhāvo hyekaḥ kathaṃ bhavet // iti / | if then, the Being with manifested power were someone else, then how could there be a single Being in the shape of Spirit? |
kālasyāpoi vasantādyabhivyaktau paryāyeṇa pravṛttāvayam eva doṣaḥ / śītoṣṇānvayabhedabhājas tu bhāvā eva hi pratikṣaṇavināśinaḥ kāla ityetat paścāt pratipādayiṣyate //162- | The assertion regarding Time being the cause operating towards the consecutive appearance of Spring and other seasons is also open to the same objection. Time, in fact, is nothing more than Things of the world themselves as beset with such diversities as those of heat and cold; |
atha svabhāvato vṛttirityādinodyotakaramatamāśaṅkate / atha svabhāvato vṛttiḥ sargādāvasya varṇyate / pāvakādeḥ prakṛtyaiva yathā dāhādikarmaṇi // | as we are going to explain later on. If it be held that “the functioning at the beginning of creation is due to his nature, just like the functioning of fire and such things towards burning and such effects, which is due to their very nature”; |
yadyevam akhilā bhāvā bhaveyur yugapattataḥ / | then, under the circumstances, all things should come into existence simultaneously; |
tadutpādanasāmarthyayogikāraṇasannidheḥ // | because of the presence of the cause fully competent to produce them. |
sa hyāha nahi bhagavataḥ krīḍārthā pravṛttiḥ / | Uddyotakam argues as follows: “The action of God cannot be for purposes of amusement; |
api tu yathā pṛthivyādīnāṃ mahābhūtānāṃ svabhāva eva sa tādṛśo yatsvakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ tatheśvarasyāpīti / | on the other hand, just as in the case of Earth and other Rudimentary Elements, their very nature is such that they operate towards the bringing about of their products, so also in the case of God”. |
tadetad ayuktam / | This is not right; |
evaṃ hi sarvabhāvānāṃ tadvyāpāramātrabhāvināṃ samarthāvikalakāraṇasannidhānādyugapadevotpādaḥ syāt / | as the appearance of all things being entirely dependent upon the action of that Being, when the Cause in its fully efficient and perfect form would he present, all things would be produced simultaneously. |
na cāpi buddhimattvaṃ viśeṣakaṃ yuktam iti pūrvamevāsmābhiḥ pratipāditam //164- | It will not be right to introduce the qualification of “intelligence” (in the Cause), as we have already explained (under the section on God). |
svahetubalasambhūtā niyatā eva śaktayaḥ / asarvakālabhāvinyo jvalanādiṣu vastuṣu // | In the case of such things as fire and the like, their powers are dependent upon the efficiency of their own causes, and hence restricted in their operations, and consequently not effective at all times. |
anyathā yaugapadyena sarvaṃ kāryaṃ samudbhavet / teṣām api na cedeṣa niyamo 'bhyupagamyate // | if it were not so, all effects would come into existence simultaneously, if in their case also there were no such restriction. Question “If this is so, then how is it that the effects of Fire and other things do not come about simultaneously?” |
teṣām iti / | ‘Teṣām’ of Fire and such things. |
pāvakādīnām / na kevalamīśvarasyetyapiśabdaḥ / eṣa niyama iti / svahetubalasambhavakṛtaḥ //166- | The particle ‘api’, ‘also’, implies that what is urged is applicable not to the case of ‘God’ only, ‘If there were no such restriction’, that is, the restriction due to the efficiency of their own causes. |
prakṛtyaivāṃśuhetutvamūrṇanābhe 'pi neṣyate / | In the case of the spider also, the causal capacity to produce the cobwebs is not admitted (by us) to be due to its very nature; |
prāṇibhakṣaṇalāmpaṭyāllālājālaṃ karoti yat // | what produces them is the saliva emitted by the spider’s eager desire to devour insects. |
ūrṇanābho 'pi na svabhāvataḥ pravartate / | The Spider also does not act by its very nature; |
kiṃ tarhi prāṇibhakṣaṇalāmpaṭyātkādācitkāt pratiniyatahetusambhūtādityabhiprāyaḥ / | what happens is that it acts from its eager desire to devour insects, which appears only occasionally, through special causes. |
na hyasau nityaikarūpaḥ tasyāpi svahetubalabhāvitvena kādācitkī śaktiḥ // | The Spider thus is not always of one and the same character; its efficiency also is only occasional and due to the force of its own causes. |
athāpi syāt / | The following might be urged; |
nāsamīkṣya yataḥ kāryaṃ śanako 'pi pravartate // | “The Spirit may not act through Compassion, or through Amusement; but somehow it acts unintentionally (automatically)”. |
evaṃ hi kaivartādeḥ prākṛtapuruṣādapyatyantānabhijñatayā kathamasau prekṣāvatām avadheyavacanaḥ syāt / | The answer to this is given in the following Text: [see verse 169 above] How could such a Person be listened to by intelligent men, being more ignorant and stupid than even such common people as the fisherman and the like. |
buddhimatteti / prekṣāvattā / | ‘Buddhimattā’ stands for intelligence. |
śanakaḥ kaivartaḥ / | ‘Śanaka’ is the fisherman. |
etenaiva puruṣadūṣaṇena ye vā śauriprabhṛtayaḥ parair jagato dhātāraḥ kalpitās te 'pi nirastā boddhavyā iti darśayati // śauryātmajādaya ityādi / śauryātmajādayo ye 'pi dhātāraḥ parikalpitāḥ / | ‘Śauri’ (Viṣṇu), ‘the Self-Born’ (Brahmā), and others who have been assumed to be the creators (of the world) all become actually rejected by the above reasonings. This objection against the ‘Spirit’ should be taken as rejecting all those ‘creators’ Śauri and the rest, who have been postulated by other people. |
etenaiva prakāreṇa nirastāste 'pi vastutaḥ // | This is what is shown in the following Text: [see verse 170 above] |
tatra śaurir viṣṇuḥ / | ‘Śauri’ is Viṣṇu; |
ātmajo brahmā / | ‘Self-born’ is Brahmā; |
ādiśabdena yo buddhimān kālaḥ parair iṣyate tasya grahaṇam ..... | ‘and others’ is meant to include ‘Intelligent Time’, which also is postulated by some people. [There is a lacuna in the Text here.] |
yathoktam // iti puruṣaparīkṣā // | This is what is shown in the following Text: [see verse 170 above] |
KAPITEL Ótmaparīkṣā | ‘Self-born’ is Brahmā; |
Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā | ‘and others’ is meant to include ‘Intelligent Time’, which also is postulated by some people. |
anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpamicchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā // [p.80] | Others again postulate the ‘self’ (soul) as the substratum of desire and the rest, which, by itself, is not of the nature of consciousness, but is eternal and all-pervasive; |
śubhāśubhānāṃ kartāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca / | it is the doer of good and bad acts and the enjoyer of the fruit of these; |
bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāccetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ // | it is ‘conscious’, not by itself, but through the presence of consciousness; |
jñānayantrādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyate / | the presence of cognition, effort, etc. as also the character of being the ‘doer’ is attributed to it. |
sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā // | its being the ‘enjoyer’ (experiencer) consists in the subsistence in it of the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like; |
buddhibhir vedanābhiś ca janma tasyābhidhīyate // | contact with physical body and with special unprecedented cognitions and feelings is called its ‘birth’; |
prāgāttābhirviyogas tu maraṇaṃ jīvanaṃ punaḥ / | and dissociation from these same as taken up before is called its ‘death’; |
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