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sādhyārthaviṣayajñānavyatirekiṇo rājīvakesarādayaḥ / | [hence these must be regarded as ‘with Cause’] this being a Reason based on the nature of things. End of Chapter (4) dealing with the Doctrine of the ‘Thing by Itself’. |
niyatajanmata iti / | As their production is restricted; |
niyatapadārthasannidhāne satīti śeṣaḥ / | i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there. |
prayogaḥ ye niyatapadārthasannidhāne sati niyatajanmānas te sahetukaḥ / yathā bhavatsādhanasannidhānabhāvisādhyarthaviṣayaṃ jñānam tathā ca rājīvādayo bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The argument may be formulated as follows: Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded as with Cause, as for instance, your own cognition of the Probandum (desired to be proved) which appears only when the Probans (Reason) is there; |
iti svābhāvikavādaparīkṣā // | [hence these must be regarded as ‘with Cause’] this being a Reason based on the nature of things. |
KAPITEL Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā | End of Chapter (4) dealing with the Doctrine of the ‘Thing by Itself’. |
nāśotpādetyādi śabdabrāhmavādino bruvate | The upholders of ‘Word-Sound’ as ‘Brahman’ assert their view in the following words: |
nāśotpādāsamālīḍhaṃ brahma śabdamayaṃ param / | “Free from such distinctions as ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’, unborn, imperishable, such is the Brahman consisting of ‘Word-Sound’; |
yat tasya pariṇāmo 'yaṃ bhāvagrāmaḥ pratīyate // | and from this Brahman there evolve the whole lot of Things, such as Colour and the like; this fact is clearly recognised. |
anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatatvaṃ yadakṣaram / | This has been thus declared ‘Without beginning and end, Brahman, of the essence of SOUND, in the form of Letter-Sounds, evolves in the form of Things; |
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ // | whence proceeds the entire world-process The term ‘ādi’, ‘beginning’, here stands for production; |
tatra ādiḥ utpādaḥ; nidhanam nāśaḥ; tadabhāvād anādinidhanam / | ‘nidhana’, ‘end’, stands for destruction; that which is free from these two is ‘without beginning and end’; |
akṣaram iti / | ‘in the form of the Letter-Sounds’; |
akārādyakṣarasya nimittatvāt / | as it is the Letters ‘a’ and the rest which are the means (of the expressing of Word-Sound); |
etenābhidhānarūpeṇa vivarto darśitaḥ / arthabhāvenetyādinā punar abhidheyavivartaḥ / | this indicates the evolution in the form of the ‘word’, the ‘name’; the evolution in the form of the ‘thing denoted’ is indicated by the phrase ‘in the form of things’; |
prakriyeti bhedāḥ / | the term ‘process’ stands for the diverse things; |
brahmeti nāmasaṃkīrtanam / | the term ‘Brahman’ mentions the name.” |
asyaiva ślokasyārthaṃ nirdiśati nāśotpādāsamālīḍham iti / | What has been asserted in the verse just quoted is reiterated in the following Text: [see verse 128 above] |
nāśotpādagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam / | ‘Destruction’ and ‘Origination’ have been mentioned only by way of illustration; |
idamapyatra boddhavyam pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitam iti / tathā hi anādinidhanatvaṃ pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitatvam api tatra nirdiṣṭam / | what should be understood to be meant is that it is entirely free from all such distinctions as priority and posteriority of Place; this includes freedom from distinctions of ‘priority’ and ‘posteriority’ of Time also. |
śabdamayam iti / | ‘Of the essence of Word-Sound’; |
śabdasvabhāvāt ata eva śabdas tattvam asya śabdatattvaṃ taducyate / | of the nature of Word-Sound; it is this fact of Word-Sound forming its essence that makes it spoken of as ‘of the essence of Word-Sound’; |
[p.68] śabdo 'syāviparītaṃ rūpam ity arthaḥ / | what is meant is that Word-Sound is its inseparable form. |
param iti / praṇavātmakam / | ‘Highest’, in the form of the syllable ‘om’; |
praṇavo hi kila sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ sarveṣāṃ cārthānāṃ prakṛtiḥ sa ca vedaḥ / | this syllable ‘om’ is the essence of all words and names and also of all things; and it constitutes the Veda. |
ayaṃ tu varṇapadakrameṇāvasthito vedas tadadhigamopāyas tasya praticchabdakanyāyenāvasthitaḥ / | This Word-Sound existing in the form of Letters and Words constitutes the Veda; which is the means of comprehending the syllable, of which it stands as the replica. |
taṃ tu paramaṃ brahmaṇamabhyudayaniḥśreyasaphaladharmānugṛhītāntaḥ{karanaṃ}paśyantīti / | Tins Highest Brahman is perceived only by such persons as have their minds thoroughly imbued with Merit conducive to the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good. |
atra ca pramaṇayanti / | and are hence known to be of the essence of Clay; |
ye yadākārānusyūtās te tan mayā yathā ghaṭaśarāvodañcanādayo mṛdvikārāḥ mṛdākārānugatāḥ padārthā mṛṇamayatvena prasiddhāḥ / | ‘in the form of the Letter-Sounds’; as it is the Letters ‘a’ and the rest which are the means (of the expressing of Word-Sound); this indicates the evolution in the form of the ‘word’, the ‘name’; the evolution in the form of the ‘thing denoted’ is indicated by the phrase ‘in the form of things’; |
śabdākārānusyūtāś ca sarvabhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / yataḥ pratyakṣata eva sarvārthānāṃ śabdākārānugamaḥ siddhaḥ / | ‘Of the essence of Word-Sound’; of the nature of Word-Sound; it is this fact of Word-Sound forming its essence that makes it spoken of as ‘of the essence of Word-Sound’; what is meant is that Word-Sound is its inseparable form. |
tathā hi śabda eva pratyayo 'rtheṣūpajāyamānaḥ śabdollekhānugata evopajāyate / | This Word-Sound existing in the form of Letters and Words constitutes the Veda; which is the means of comprehending the syllable, of which it stands as the replica. |
yathoktam | e.g. the Jar, the Saucer and the Cup are evolutes of Clay, being always associated with the form of Clay; |
na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte / | all Things are found to be associated with some form of Sound in the shape of Names; |
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena vartate // | as it is a clearly perceptible fact that all things are associated with some form of sound (in the shape of Name); |
jñānākāranibandhanā ca vastūnāṃ svabhāvaprajñaptiḥ / | in fact, all cognition is always interfused with words’, The knowledge of the nature of things also is always dependent upon the form of their cognition (which is associated with words). |
ataḥ siddhameṣāṃ śabdākārānusyūtatvaṃ tatsiddhau ca tanmayatvam api siddhameva tanmātrabhāvitvāt tanmayatvasyeti // te vācyā ityādinā pratijñārthaṃ ........ | From this it follows that all things are always associated with Name-Sounds; and tins being established, it follows as a matter of course that they have their essence in these Sounds; as having their essence in Sound means nothing more than being always associated with Name-Sound. |
iti sañcakṣate ye 'pi te vācyāḥ kimidaṃ nijam / śabdarūpaṃ parityajya nīlāditvaṃ prapadyate // na vā tatheti yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ saṃśrīyate tadā / akṣaratvaviyogaḥ syāt paurastyātmavināśataḥ // | Those people who assert the above view should be addressed as follows: [when the blue and other things evolve out of the said sound] does or does not the sound abandon its sound-form and take up the blue and other forms? if it is the first alternative (that it does abandon its own form) that is accepted, then the sound becomes deprived of its imperishability, inasmuch as its previous form has become destroyed. |
athāpyanantaraḥ pakṣas tatra nīlādivedane / aśruter api vispaṣṭaṃ bhavecchabdātmavedanam // | if the second alternative is accepted, then, on the cognition of the blue and other things, even the deaf should have the clear perception of the sound-form. |
atra kadācicchabdapariṇāmarūpatvād vā jagataḥ śabdamayatvaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam kadācicchabdādutpatter vā / yathānnamayāḥ prāṇā iti hetau mayaḍvidhānāt / | Is the World regarded as ‘of the Essence of Sound’, ‘Śabdamaya’ in the sense that sometimes it takes the form of the modification of Sound? Or in the sense that sometimes it is produced from Sound, as in the case of the expression ‘annamayāḥ prāṇāḥ’ (‘Life is of the essence of food’), the affix ‘mayaṭ’ denotes cause (the meaning being that Food is the cause of Life)? |
atra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ pariṇāmasyaivānupapatteḥ / | The first alternative cannot be right; as the said ‘modification’ itself is not possible. |
tathā hi śabdātmakaṃ brahma nīlādirūpatāṃ pratipadyamānaṃ kadācinnijaṃ svābhāvikaṃ śabdarūpaṃ parityajya pratipadyetāparityajya vā / tatra yadi parityajyetyādyaḥ pakṣa āśrīyate tadānādinidhanam ityanena vacanena yadakṣaratvamavināśitvamabhyupagataṃ tasya hāniḥ syāt paurastsyasvabhāvavināśāt / | Because when Brahman who is ‘of the essence of Sound’ takes the form of the Blue and other things, does It or does it not abandon its own pristine Sound-form? If the former alternative be accepted that It does abandon its pristine Sound-form, then there would be an end to the view that it is ‘without beginning and end’, that is, imperishable, indestructible; as there would be a destruction of the pristine form. |
athāparityajyetyanantaraḥ pakṣaḥ tadā nīlādisaṃvedanakāle 'pyaśruter badhirasya śabdaḥ saṃvedanaṃ prāpnoti / | If the second alternative be accepted, that It does not abandon its pristine form, then, at the time that Blue is cognised by the deaf person, he should have the perception of Sound also; |
nīlādisaṃvedanavat tadavyatirekāt / | as the cognition of Sound would be non-different from the cognition of Blue. |
prayogaḥ yadyadavyatiriktaṃ tat tasmin saṃvedyamāne saṃvedyate yathā nīlādisaṃvedanāvasthāyāṃ tasyaiva nīlāder ātmā nīlādavyatiriktaś ca śabda iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows When one thing is non-different from another, if one is cognised, the other becomes also cognised, as when the Blue is cognised, the essence of that same Blue becomes also cognised; Sound is non-different from Blue; hence this is a reason based on the nature ofngs. |
[p.69] anyathā bhinnayogakṣematvāt tatsvabhāvatvam eva prasidhyedityetad atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //129- | If it were not so, inasmuch as the conditions for better or worse would differ in the two (Sound and Blue), they could not be recognised as of the essence of the other. This would be an argument against the conclusion (of the other party). |
etad eva vistareṇa pratipādayann āha yenetyādi / | This same argument is set forth in greater detail, in the following Text: [see verse 132 next] |
yena śabdamayaṃ sarvaṃ mukhyavṛttyā vyavasthitam / | [It would be as asserted above] because all things (according to you) exist primarily in the eorm of sound; |
śabdarūpāparityāgaṃ pariṇāmānidhānataḥ // | and if the sound-form is not abandoned, there can be no modification (evolution). |
yena yasmāt; bhavaddhirmukhyatā eva śabdasvabhāvaṃ jagaditi varṇyate / | ‘Yena’ here stands for ‘yasmāt’, because, you hold that primarily the World is of the nature of Sound. |
kasmādityāha śabdarūpāparityāga iti // | The second line explains why it would be as asserted. |
yadi nāma mukhyataḥ śabdamayamavasthitaṃ tataḥ kimityāha agauṇe cetyādi / agauṇe caivam ekatve nīlādīnāṃ vyavasthite / tatsaṃvedanavelāyāṃ kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam // | The identity (of sound) with blue and other things being not figurative (but real), why should not there be cognition of sound at the time that the blue and other things are cognised? (133) Question “What if the World remains primarily of the essence of Sound?” |
ekatve nīlādīnām iti / | The Answer is provided by the following Text: [see verse 133 above] Identity of Blue, etc. |
śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ / | i.e. with Sound. |
tatsaṃvedanavelāyām iti / teṣāṃ nīlādīnāṃ saṃvedanāvasthāyām / | At the time that the Blue and other things are cognised; that is, under the circumstances when Blue, etc. are cognised; |
kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam iti / tasyāpi nīlādisvabhāvavad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvādyuktam eva saṃvedanam ityabhiprāyaḥ // | why should not there be cognition of Sound? that is to say, Sound also fulfilling all the conditions of perceptibility, it is only right that there should he perception of it, just as there is of Blue and other things. |
asyāvittau hi nīlāder api na syāt pravedanam / | If there were no cognition of it (sound), then there should be none of the blue and other things also; |
aikātmyādbhinnadharmatve bhedo 'tyantaṃ prasajyate // | in case they had different properties, there would be absolute difference between them. |
athāsya vedanaṃ neṣyate tadā nīlāder api śabdasvarūpavadasaṃvedanaprasaṅgaḥ / | If you do not admit of the Cognition of Sound (at the time of the cognition of the Blue, etc.) then there would be the absurdity of there being no cognition of the Blue, etc. also, just as there is none of Sound; |
aikātmyāt śabdena saha nīlādīnām ekasvabhāvatvādity arthaḥ / | because both are of the same essence; that is, Blue and the rest are of the same nature as Sound. |
anyathā nīlādīnāṃ śabdena saha bhinnadharmatve 'bhyupagamyamāne 'tyantabhedo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ // | Otherwise, if the Blue, etc. be held to have properties different from those of Sound, it would have to be admitted that the two are absolutely and entirely different. |
kasmād ity āha | The following Text explains why it would be so: [see verse 135 next] |
viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi bahūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam / | What indicates difference among a number of things is the presence of incompatible properties; |
nānyathā vyaktibhedānāṃ kalpito 'pi bhavedasau // | otherwise, no difference could even be assumed among diverse individuals. |
na hyekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā grahaṇam agrahaṇaṃ ca yuktam / | It cannot be right for any one object to be perceived and not perceived at the same time and by the same person; |
ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | if it were, then, the object would cease to be one. |
anyathā hi yadi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'pyekatvaṃ syāt tadā ghaṭādīnāṃ yaḥ kalpita iṣṭo vyaktibhedaḥ so 'pi na bhavet / | Otherwise, if, even in the presence of incompatible properties, there were one-ness, then even that difference which is assumed and accepted as subsisting among the Jar and other things would not be possible. |
na kevalaṃ brahmaṇaḥ svarūpabhedo nāstītyapiśabdaḥ / | The term ‘even’ is meant to imply that it is not in the form of Brahman only that there would be no diversity; |
yatas tasya svātmani vyavasthitasya nāsti bhedo vikāraviṣayatvādasyeti siddhāntaḥ / | because the established view is that while Brahman Tests within Itself, there is no diversity in It; as diversity is appertenant to modification. |
tathā hi na ghaṭādyātmanā tasyānādinidhanatvam iṣyate / | For instance, when Brahman is held to be ‘without beginning and end’, It is not in the form of such things as the Jar and the like, hut in the form of the Supreme Self. |
paramātmanā ghaṭādayo hi dṛśyamānodayavyayāḥ paricchinnadeśāścopalabhyantaiti / | The Jar and other things are actually seen to be undergoing origination and destruction and to be occupying limited place and time. |
ayaṃ cāśruteḥ spaṣṭaṃ śabdasaṃvedanaṃ syād iti yaḥ prasaṅga uktaḥ sa yadi brahmaṇo rūpamupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamiṣyate tadā draṣṭavyaḥ / | The absurdity has been urged above (in Text 131) against the other party that the deaf would clearly perceive Sound (when he perceives the Blue and other things). This should be understood to be applicable to the other party only if the form of Brahman is regarded as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility. |
kiṃ tu nīlādīnām api tādrūpyāt tatsvarūpavadagrahaṇaprasaṅga ityayaṃ doṣo vācyaḥ / | But in that case the objection to be urged should be that (if Sound be not perceived, then) the Blue, etc. also would not be perceived, as these are of the same nature as Sound; |
tataścāyaṃ niyamo nopapadyate / udayavyayavatīmevārthamātrāmaparadarśanāḥ pratiyantīti / | and in that case there could be no such generalisation as that ‘ordinary men perceive only that much ofngs as is liable to origination and destruction’, |
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ nīlādyavyatiriktaṃ nīlādisaṃvedane 'pina saṃvedyate tadvacchabdarūpam iti / | The following argument might be urged here: “Just as according to yon (Bauddha) the momentariness, though not different from Blue, etc., is not cognised when these latter are cognised, so, in the same manner, there would be no cognition of Sound |
tadetad asamyak / | This is not right; |
na hi nīlādisaṃvedane kṣaṇikatvaṃ na saṃvedyate / | it is not true that momentariness is not cognised when Blue, etc. are cognised; |
kiṃ tu gṛhītam api nirvikalpena cetasā bhrāntinimittena guṇāntarasamāropānna viniścīyata ity ucyate / | what does happen is that even though momentariness is actually apprehended by the non-conceptual Cognition, yet it is said to be not definitely cognised, because of the imposition upon it of other qualities, through Illusion. |
tenānubhavāpekṣayā tadgṛhītam eva niścayajñānāpekṣayā tvagṛhītam iti jñānabhedenaikasya gṛhītatvam agṛhītatvaṃ cāviruddham eva / | So that, so far as the man’s general indefinite apprehension is concerned, it is duly apprehended; but it is not apprehended in so far as its well-defined cognition is concerned; and as referring to distinct forms of the cognition (definite and indefinite), both characters of being apprehended and not-apprehended are quite compatible. |
na caivaṃ bhavatāṃ pakṣe śabdasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe yuktaṃ / | In the case of your theory, however, such apprehension and non-apprehension of Sound (at the time of perceiving Blue, etc.) camiot be right; |
sarvajñānānāṃ savikalpakatābhyupagamāt / ekenaivajñānena sarvātmanā tasya niścitatvāt / | because you regard all cognitions as equally determinate and well-defined; so that Sound would be definitely apprehended in its complete form by a single cognition; |
agṛhītasvabhāvāntarānupapatteḥ / | and there would be no aspect of it which would remain not-apprehended. |
yathoktam niścayaḥ / yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham iti / atha kiñcidavikalpam api jñānamabhyupagamyate / na tarhi vaktavyam na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte / | This has been thus asserted “How can that aspect of it which is not definitely apprehended by well-defined cognitions form the object of these latter?” If some cognition is admitted by you to be undefined and non-conceptual, then you should not make such an assertion as the following “There is no cognition in the world which is not associated with words In this case too, the reason adduced (by you) that “Things are associated with the form of Word-Sound” would not be true, and as a result of this, there being no proof, any attempt to prove the fact of all things being of the essence of Sound would be entirely baseless. |
kiñca kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ pramāṇāntarataḥ siddheranubhūtam api na niścīyata iti vyapadiśyate / | Further, as regards the momentariness of things, it is actually established by means of proofs; and even though thus duly apprehended, it is spoken of as not definitely cognised. |
śabdātmatā tu bhāvānāṃ kutaḥ siddhā yena sāpyevaṃ vyavasthāpyate // | As regards the fact of Things being of the essence of Sound however, by what proof is it established that it could be admitted in the same manner as momentariness is admitted? (135) |
pratibhāvaṃ ca yadyekaḥ śabdātmā bhinna iṣyate / sarveṣām ekadeśatvamekākārā ca vidhavet // | If the one ‘sound-essence’ be held to be different with each individual thing, then all things would occupy the same point in space and would be cognised in one and the same form. |
sa hi śabdātmā pariṇāmaṃ gacchan pratipadārthaṃ bhedaṃ vā pratipadyate na vā / tatra yadi na bhinna iti pakṣas tadā sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekadeśatvaṃ prāpnoti / | When (according to you) the ‘Sound-essence’ undergoes modification, does it become different with each object, or not? If the view is that it does not become different, then all things, Blue and the rest, should occupy the same point in space. |
ekadeśatvamityupalakṣaṇam / | That they should occupy the same point in space is said only by way of illustration. |
kālapariṇāmavyāpārāvasthāviśeṣādyapi grāhyam / | Time, modifications, functions and conditions also are meant to be included. |
ekākārā ca vit pratibhāsaḥ bhavet prāpnoti / | The Cognition, appearance (in Consciousness) also would he in one and the same form; |
sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekaśabdarūpāvyatirekāt // | as all things, Blue and the rest, would be non-diiferent from the one essence of Sound. |
prativyakti tu bhede 'sya brahmānekaṃ prasajyate / vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvād vyaktibhedavat // | If (on the other hand) it differs with each individual (thing), then brahman becomes many, as having a form which is diverse and of the nature of several things, just like the diversity of individuals. |
atha prativyakti bhedo 'sya śabdātmano 'ṅgīkriyate / | If the ‘Sound-essence’ is admitted to differ with each individual, then Brahman becomes many; |
[p.71] vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvāt vibhinno 'nekabhāvātmānekapadārthasvabhāvo rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ tadbhāvastatvam / | as having a form which is diverse and of the nature of several things; i.e. one whose nature character is diverse and of the nature of several things; |
ekaṃ ca paramabrahmeṣyate / | and yet Brahman is held to be one. |
ato 'bhyupetabādhāpratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ // | Thus your theory goes directly against your own tenet. |
nityaśabdamayatve ca bhāvānām api nityatā / | If things consisted of eternal ‘sound’, they also would be eternal; |
tadyaugapadyataḥ siddheḥ pariṇāmo na saṅgataḥ // | and hence as things would be accomplished simultaneously with the sound, no ‘modification’ would be compatible. |
nityaśabdamayatve nityaśabdasvabhāvatve; jagataḥ śabdaḥ svarūpaṃ cedbhāvānām api nityatvaṃ prāpnoti / | If Things consisted of eternal Sound, i.e. if they were of the same nature as eternal Sound, i.e. if Sound constitutes the very essence of the World, then Things also should be held to be eternal; |
tataś ca sarvakālaṃ bhāvānāṃ śabdena saha yaugapadyataḥ siddhe siddhatvāt pariṇāmātmā na prāpnoti taditi tasmād ityarthe teṣāṃ vā nīlādīnāṃ yaugapadyaṃ tadyaugapadyam iti vigrahaḥ // | and hence as at all times the Things would be accomplished simultaneously with Sound, on account of their being so accomplished, it is not possible for them to be of the nature of ‘modifications’, ‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, Hence. Or the ‘simultaneity’ meant may be that of all such things as the Blue and the like. |
ekarūpatirobhāvaṃ hyanyarūpasamudbhave / mṛdādāviva saṃsidhyetpariṇāmastu nākrame // | There could be ‘modification’ only if there were disappearance of one form followed by the appearance of another form, as is found to be the case with ölay and other things; |
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