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tatrāha tatsiddhau sādhanam ityādi / | The answer to this is provided by the following Text: [see verse 93b above] |
tatsiddhau sādhanaṃ proktaṃ jaimanīyeṣu rājate // | as it proves what is already admitted by us. In fact, it is effective only against the followers of Jaimini who deny the ‘Omniscient Being’ entirely. |
itīśvaraparīkshā // | Here ends the Examination of the Doctrine of God. |
[p.58] yadi sāmānyenāsti kaścit sarvajña iti sādhyate tadā nāsmāt pratīdaṃ bhavataṃ sādhanaṃ rājate / | and when the oneness of the creator is not proved, wherein could ‘omniscience’ subsist? (92-93a) It has been argued (under Text 55) that “The theory under dispute must be perceptible to someone, etc. etc.”. |
siddhasādhyatādoṣāt / | as it proves what is already admitted by us. |
kiṃtu ye sarvajñāpavādino jaiminīyās teṣveva śobhate / | In fact, it is effective only against the followers of Jaimini who deny the ‘Omniscient Being’ entirely. |
atreśvarākhyaḥ sarvajñaḥ sādhyate tadā pratibandhasiddher hetor anaikāntikatā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti / | If however what you seek to prove is the ‘omniscient’ God, then as there can be no Invariable Concomitance, the Reason is ‘inconclusive’, and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum. |
ato nāsmāt prati sādhanametad rājata iti bhāvaḥ / | For all these reasons, your arguments are not effective against us. Such is the meaning of the Text. |
yaccāpi vicitrodayetyādi dharmiviśeṣaṇamupāttaṃ tasya na kaścid upayogo 'sti / | The Theist, in his arguments, has made use of such qualifications for the Subject of his argument as ‘appearing in various forms’, But there is no use for such an epithet; |
kevalaṃ paravyāmohanāya svaprakriyāghoṣaṇam idaṃ kriyate bhavadbhiḥ / | it is only a loud enunciation of your views for the purpose of deluding other people. |
tathā hi vinā dharmyādiviśeṣaṇenaivaṃvidhena yadi sādhanamasiddhatādidoṣarahitaṃ tadā bhavatyevābhimatasādhyasiddhiḥ / athāsiddhatādidoṣaduṣṭaṃ sādhanam tadaivaṃvidhaviśeṣaṇopādāne 'pi na sādhyasiddhirastīti sarvathā vyarthameva viśeṣaṇam / | For instance, if, in the absence of such epithets for the Subject, the Probans is free from the defects of being ‘unproven’ and the like, then that alone suffices for proving the desired conclusion; on the other hand, if the Reason is defective by reason of being ‘unproven’ and the like, then, even on the introducing of the said epithet, the desired conclusion is not established. Hence in every way the qualification added is absolutely useless. |
kiñcāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ / | Further, the Probans is one whose very substratum is ‘unknown’, ‘unproven’; |
na hi yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭo dharmī prasiddho 'sti prativādinaḥ tasmān na śāstraprasiddho dharmī kartavyaḥ // | as the other party knows of no such subject or entity as is possessed of the qualification in question. Hence the Subject should not be one that is known to your Philosophy only. |
itīśvaraparīkṣā // | Here ends the Examination of the Doctrine of God. |
ubhayavyāpārarahitatvapratipādanārtham āha prakṛtīśvarayor ityādi / prakṛtīśvarayor eva hetutvapratiṣedhanāt / | The doctrines of ‘god’ or ‘primordial matter’ severally being the cause (of the world) having been refuted, it follows that these two together cannot be the ‘maher’ of things produced. |
pratyekaṃ sahitaṃ kartṛ nobhayaṃ janminām idam // | The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no functioning of Both (God and Primordial Matter): [see verse 94 above] |
tatra kecit sāṅkhyā āhuḥ na pradhānādeva kevalādamī kāryabhedāḥ pravartante tasyācetanatvāt / | In this connection, some Sāṃkhyas (the Theistic Sāṃkhyas, followers of the ‘Yoga’ system) have asserted as follows: “It is not from Primordial Matter alone that the various products are produced (as held by the Sāṃkhyas in general); |
na hyacetano 'dhiṣṭhāyakamantareṇa svakāryamārabhamāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ / na ca puruṣo 'dhiṣṭhāyako yuktas tasya tadānīm ajñatvāt / | no insentient entity has been found to proceed to any activity, in the absence of a Controller; the ‘Spirit’ (as postulated by the Sāṃkhya) cannot be that Controller, because at the time (of the beginning of the world) he is entirely unconscious (the ‘consciousness’ of the Spirit being dependent upon contact with the products of Primordial Matter, after these latter have come into existence). |
tathā hi buddhyadhyavasitamevārthaṃ puruṣaścetayate / | For instance, what the Spirit cognises, and is conscious of, is only a thing that has been already ‘determined’ by Intelligence; |
buddhisaṃsargāc ca pūrvamasāvajña eva na jātu kañcidarthaṃ vijānāti / na cāvijñātamarthaṃ śaktaḥ kaścid kartumiti nāsau kartā / | so that prior to contact with Intelligence, he is absolutely unconscious, and cognises nothing at all; and until he cognises things, he cannot make or produce anything; hence he cannot be the ‘maker’ (of the World). |
tasmād īśvara eva pradhānāpekṣaḥ kāryabhedānāṃ kartā na kevalaḥ / | From this it follows that Cod is the maker, not by Himself alone, but through the help of Primordial Matter. |
na hi devadattādiḥ kevalaḥ putraṃ janayati nāpi kevalaḥ kulālo ghaṭaṃ karotīti / | For example, Devadatta alone by himself is not able to give birth to a son, nor is the Potter alone by himself able to make the Jar.” |
tad etad api pratyekaṃ prakṛtīśvarayor hetutvaniṣedhāt sahitam api nedam īśvarapradhānākhyamubhayaṃ janminām kartṛ janakam iti siddham // | The doctrines of God or Primordial Matter severally being the Cause (of the World) having been refused, it follows that the doctrine of thesë two jointly being the Cause maker of things born, i.e, of products also becomes refuted. |
nanu yadi nāma pratyekam anayoḥ kartṛtvaṃ niṣiddham tathāpi sahitayor aniṣiddham eva na hi kevalānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ cakṣur jñānotpattiṃ prati sāmarthyābhāve sahitānām api na bhavatītyāśaṅkyāha sāhityam ityādi / | Objection “If the separate makership of these two has been refuted above, their joint makership remains unrefuted; certainly, even though it is a fact that each of the Eye and other Sense-organs by itself alone has not the capacity to bring about the Visual and other perceptions, yet it does not necessarily follow that they cannot do so jointly.” |
[p.59] | The answer to this objection is provided in the following Text: [see verse 95-96 next] |
sāhityaṃ sahakāritvād etayoḥ kalpite ca yat / tat syādatiśayādhānādekārthakriyayāpi vā // | As for their ‘association’ assumed on the basis op their acting jointly, this could be due either (a) to the creation op some peculiarity, or (b) to their serving a common purpose. |
na yuktā kalpanādyasya nirvikāratayā tayoḥ / | (a) The former op these assumptions cannot be right, as both are ‘unmodifiable’; |
na dvitīyasya kāryāṇāṃ yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ // | (b) nor is the latter acceptable; as that would lead to the absurdity op all products coming into existence simultaneously. |
sāhityaṃ nāma sahakāritvaṃ tac ca dvividham parasparātiśayādhānādvā syād ekārthakāritvād vā / | ‘Association’ implies joint action; this can be of two kinds either (a) by the creation of some peculiarity in one another, or (b) by serving a common purpose. |
tatra na tāvad ādyasyātiśayādhānalakṣaṇasya sahakāritvasya kalpanā yuktākasmāt / | The assumption of the ‘association’ of the former kind, that consisting in the creating of some peculiarities cannot be right; |
tayor īśvarapradhānayor nityatvena nirvikāratvāt / | why? because both God and Primordial Matter are eternal and hence unmodifiable (unchangeable). |
nāpi dvitīyasya kalpanā yukteti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | Nor is the assumption of the second kind of association right: such is the construction of the words of the Text; |
kasmāt / kāryāṇāṃ yaugapadyānaprasaṅgāt / | why? because that would lead to the absurdity of all products coming into existence simultaneously. |
avikalāpratihatasāmarthyasyeśvarapradhānākhyakāraṇasya sadā sannihitatvenāvikalakāraṇāt / | The potency of the Joint Cause in the shape of God-Primordial-Matter being absolute and untrammelled, and they being constantly associated, its causal activity (towards the making of all things) would always be there. |
atra ca pūrvavad yadavikalakāraṇam ityādi prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vācyam //95- | In this connection, the arguments already urged before (in Commentary on Text 87) in the words ‘That Cause is present in its complete form, etc.’ may also be brought forward. |
athocyate pradhānasya trirūpatvaṃ vyavasthitam / | The theistic Sāṃkhya may argue as follows: “it is a well-established pact that primordial matter is triple in its essence; |
tatrāyaṃ rajasā yuktaḥ sargaheturmaheśvaraḥ // | when the supreme lord comes into contact with the manifested rajas-aspect (energy), he becomes the cause of creation; |
udbhūtavṛttisattvaṃ tu yadā saṃśrayate punaḥ / tadā sarvasya lokasya sthiter yāti nimittatām // udbhūtaśaktirūpeṇa tamasā yujyate yadā / | when again, he has recourse to the manifested sattva-aspect (harmony), then he becomes the cause of the subsistence of the world; when he comes into contact with the manifestly operative tamas-aspect (inertia), then he brings about the dissolution of the entire world. |
rajaḥsatvādirūpādi tadevaṃ sahakāriṇaḥ / | thus the attributes of harmony, energy and the rest are his auxiliaries, and these become operative only consecutively; |
krameṇaivāsya vartante kāryāṇāṃ nākramastataḥ // yadyapi kāraṇadvayametannityasannihitam / | With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out, from the standpoint of the Opponent, the inadmissibility (unproven character) of the Reason put forward above (under 87), to the effect that ‘when the Cause is present in its complete form, the Effect must appear as a matter of course, just as it is found in the case of the Sprout, etc. etc.’: [see verse 97-100 above] |
tathāpi krameṇaivāmī kāryabhedāḥ pravartiṣyante yata īśvarasya pradhānagatāstrayo guṇāḥ satvādayaḥ sahakāriṇaḥ teṣāṃ ca kramavṛttitvāt tatkāryeṣvapi kramo bhavati / | “Even though these two Causes (Primordial Matter and God) are constantly present together, yet the various products will come into existence only consecutively, one after the other; because the three Attributes of Primordial Matter, Sattva and the rest, are the auxiliaries of God; and as these Attributes function only consecutively, there is bound to be consecutiveness in the Products also. |
tathā hi yadodbhūtavṛttinā rajasā yukto bhavati maheśvaras tadā sargahetuḥ prajānāṃ bhavati prasavakāryatvād rajasaḥ / | For instance, when God becomes affected by the operative Rajas-attribute, He becomes the Creator of creatures, as the Rajas-attribute is conducive to production; |
yadā tu sattvaṃ samudbhūtavṛtti saṃśrayate tadā lokānāṃ sthitikāraṇaṃ bhavati satvasya sthitihetutvāt / yadā tu tamasodbhūtaśaktinā samāyukto bhavati tadā pralayaṃ nāśaṃ sarvajagataḥ karoti tamasaḥ pratyayahetutvāt yathoktam | when however, He has recourse to the operative Sattva-attribute, then He becomes the Cause of the continued existence of the worlds, because the Sattva-attribute is conducive to subsistence when He comes into contact with the operative Tamos-attribute, then He brings about the dissolution destruction of the entire World; as the Tamas-attribute is conducive to mergence(dissolution). |
rajojuṣe janmani sattvavṛttaye sthitau prajānāṃ pralaye tamaḥspṛśe / ajāya sarvasthitināśatastriṇe trayīmayāya triguṇātmane namaḥ // iti / | This process has been thus described (by Bāṇa-Bhaṭṭa in the opening verse of his Kādambarī): ‘He who has recourse to Rajas at the birth of creatures, to Sattva during their existence, and to Tamas at their dissolution, who is unborn, and controls the birth, existence and destruction, who consists of the Three Vedas, the very essence of the Three Attributes, to Him obeisance!’ |
kilaśabdo 'sambhavanāyām //97- | “The particle ‘Kila’ (in Text 99) is meant to indicate improbability (of any complete Dissolution).” (97-100) |
[p.60] ihocyata ityādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above is provided in the following Text: [see verse 101-102 next] |
ihocyate tayor ekakriyākāle samasti kim / tadanyakāryaniṣpattisāmarthyaṃ yadi vā na tat // yadyasti sargakāle 'pi dvayamapyaparaṃ bhavet / | The answer to this is as follows at the time that the two are performing one act (of creating or maintaining or dissolving), is their capacity to perform the other acts present? or is it not present? If it is present, then at the time of creation, the other two acts also should come about; |
evam anyasya sadbhāve dvayamanyatprasajyate // | thus whenever any one of the acts would be there, the other two would have to be there! |
tayor iti / prakṛtirīśarayoḥ / | The term ‘tayoḥ’, ‘the two’, stands for Primordial Matter and God; |
ekakriyākāla iti / | at the time of performing one act; |
sargasthitipralayānām anyatamasyaikasya kriyākāle tadaparakāryadvayotpādanasāmarthyaṃ kimastyuta nāstīti vikalpadvayam / | i.e. from among the three acts of creating, maintaining and dissolving, at the time that any one is being done, is their capacity to do the other two acts present in them or not? These are the two alternatives. |
tatra yadyasti tadā sargakāleṣvavikalakāraṇatvād aparaṃ kāryadvayaṃ sthitipralayātmakaṃ bhaved utpādavat / | If the capacity is there, then, inasmuch as at the time of creating, their Cause would be present in its untrammelled form, the other two acts of maintaining and dissolving should also come about, just like the act of creating; |
evaṃ sthitikāle 'pyutpādavināśau prāpnutaḥ / pralayakāle ca sthityutpādau syātām / | so that at the time that a thing would be maintained in existence its creation and dissolution also should be there! And at the time of dissolution, there should be its maintained existence and creation! |
na caivaṃ yuktam / | This certainly cannot be right. |
na hi parasparaparihāreṇāvasthitānām ekatra dharmiṇyekadā sadbhāvo yuktaḥ //101- | Because when the three conditions are mutually nugatory (and incompatible) it is not possible that they should co-exist in the same object. |
syād etat tadekakāryotpādakāle tayoḥ prakṛtīśvarayor aparakāryadvayotpādanāya rūpāntaraṃ na sannihitamiti tena tadānīṃ tayor na prasaṅga ity āha na hītyādi / na hi tatpararūpeṇa punar anyasya kārakam / svarūpaṃ ca tadevāsya tatkriyāviratiḥ kutaḥ // | why then should there be any cessation of the functioning of any act at all? (103) The following might be urged “At the time that Primordial Matter and God are bringing about one effect in the shape of the Creation (Birth) of one thing, there is not present in them that particular form of theirs which would be productive of the other two effects (Maintenance and Dissolution); that is why there is no possibility of the absurdity that has been urged.” |
taditi / | [see verse 103 above] |
prakṛtīśvarākhyaṃ kāraṇam anyasyeti / pāścāttyasya kāryadvayasya / | The Pronoun ‘Tat’ stands for the Cause, that is, Primordial Matter and God, of the other, i.e. of the two subsequent acts. |
na pararūpeṇa kiṃ tarhi/ | because it is devoid of that potency at some other time; |
svarūpeṇaiva kāraṇam iti bhāvaḥ // | just like the ‘sky-lotus’ and such other things. |
syādedyadyapi tatpararūpeṇa na kāraṇaṃ tathāpyekakāryotpādakāle pariśiṣṭakāryadvayotpattaye sāmarthyamasya nāsti / | The following might be urged: “Though it does not serve as the Cause in any other form, yet at the time that it is producing one effect, the capacity necessary for the producing of other effects is not present in it for the time being; |
tena kāryadvayasya tadānīm anutpāda ity āha tatsāmarthyetyādi / | that is why the other two effects do not appear at that time.” The answer to this is provided in the following Text: [see verse 104 above] |
anyadā śaktiśūnyatvād viyadambhoruhādivat // anyadeti / | At some other time, i.e. at the time of the producing of the particular effect meant by the Sāṃkhya. |
syād etadyadyapi pradhāne sarvā śaktiḥ sannihitā tathāpi yodbhūtavṛttir bhavati / saiva kāraṇatāṃ pratipadyate nānyā tena yaugapadyaṃ kāryāṇāṃ na bhaviṣyatītyāha utkaṭam ityādi / utkaṭaṃ śaktirūpaṃ ca yadi tanmātrakāraṇam / | If the manifested form of the potency had that same (primordial matter and god) for its cause, then, that would continue to be there at all times, because of the proximity of the cause, which is eternal. The following might be urged: “Even though all the Potencies are present in Primordial Matter, yet a particular effect is produced only by that particular Potency which becomes manifestly operative and thereby becomes the Cause of that effect; thus it is that there is no simultaneity in the appearance of effects.” |
sarvadā tadbhaveddhetor nityarūpasya sannidheḥ // [p.61] idaṃ hi sarvā{tvā---}dīnām utkaṭaṃ rūpaṃ na tāvannityaṃ yuktaṃ vaktum kādācitkatvāt / | The answer to this is provided in the following Text: [see verse 105 above] The ‘manifested form’ of Sattva and other Attributes that you speak of, cannot be said to be eternal; because these are found to appear at only certain times; |
tataścāsya bhāvaḥ kadacit prakṛtīśvarādeva kāraṇādanyato vā hetoḥ svatantro vā syād iti trayo vikalpāḥ / | then, in regard to the coming into existence of this ‘manifested form’, there are only three alternatives: they could be either (a) produced by the same Cause, Primordial Matter and God , or (b) produced by some other Cause, or (c) they would be self-sufficient. |
tatra prathame pakṣe tadutkaṭaṃ rūpaṃ sarvadā bhavet prakṛtīśvarākhyasya hetor nityarūpatvena sadā sannihitatvāt // | (a) Under the first of these alternatives, the said ‘manifested form’ would always be there, because its Cause, in the shape of Primordial Matter and God, is eternal and hence always present close at hand. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe prāha na cāparam ityādi / na cāparamparir iṣṭamato naivānyato 'pi tat / | As regards to second alternative, the objection is stated in the following Text: [see verse 106 next] (b) As regards the second alternative, that cannot be accepted by the other party; |
nāpi svatantram evedaṃ kādācitkatvasambhavāt // na hi prakṛtīśvaravyatiriktam aparaṃ kāraṇam iṣṭam yenānyatas tadudbhavet / | and for that very reason, it could not be the effect of some other cause. (c) Nor can it be self-sufficient; as it appears only at certain times. Apart from Primordial Matter and God, no other Cause is admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, from which the said ‘manifested form’ could be produced. |
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣo yukta ity āha nāpītyādi // | Nor is the third alternative right; this is what is asserted by the words ‘nor can it be self-sufficient’. |
atha svātantrye sati kādācitkatvasya ko virodha ity āha svata ityādi / svato bhāve hyahetutvaṃ svakriyāyā virodhataḥ / apekṣayā hi bhāvānāṃ kādācitkatvasambhavaḥ // | as any operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms. if there were dependence (upon something else) then the effects would be such as would appear at only certain times. Says the Opponent “If the said manifested Potency be self-sufficient (self-produced) why should that be incompatible with the fact of its appearing at only certain times?” |
svataḥ svabhāvāt bhāve janmani sati ahetukatvaṃ niyamato bhavet / | If the ‘production’ (of the Manifested Potency) were due to itself its own nature, then it would most certainly be causeless. |
nanu svabhāvādutpadyamānaḥ katham ahetuko bhavati yāvatā svabhāva eva tasya hetuḥ pratīyata ity āha svakriyāyā virodhata iti svasmin svarūpe kriyāyā hetubhāvasya virodhāt / | Question “Why should an effect produced from itself be causeless, when its own nature (or essence) would be its Cause?” Answer Any operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms; any causal action of a thing upon itself its own essence, is incompatible. |
syād etad bhavatvahetukatvam tathāpi kimiti kādācitkatvaṃ na yujyata ity āha apekṣayā hītyādi / | The following might be urged: “Let it be causeless; even so the Effect would not appear at only certain times.” Answer If there were dependence, etc. etc. |
svabhāvāntarāyattavṛttayo hi bhāvāḥ kādācitkā yuktāḥ / | Things that are dependent for their existence upon other things can appear only at certain times; |
parabhāvābhāvapratibaddhatvāt teṣāṃ sadasattayoḥ / | as their existence and non-existence would be dependent upon the presence and absence of those other things. |
ye punar aparāyattavṛttayasteṣām apekṣaṇīyasya kasyacid abhāvāt kimiti kadācidbhaveyuḥ // | Those that are not dependent for their existence upon other things, as they do not need the aid of anything else, why should they appear at certain times only? (107) |
tathā hi na hyabhāvasya svātmani vyāpṛtir matā / | For instance, mere negation (absence) is not regarded as having any action upon itself; |
niṣpannasyātmano 'pyasyāmavasthāyāṃ prasiddhitaḥ // | as for the well-established positive entity, it is well known and recognised under the circumstances. |
ātmānaṃ hi janayansvabhāvo niṣpanno vā na vā / na tāvanniṣpannaḥ / | When the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of the Effect produces itself, is it itself an established entity or not? It cannot be an established entity; |
tasyāmavasthāyāmātmano 'pi niṣpannarūpāvyatirekitvena prasiddher niṣpannatvāt svabhāvavat / | because under the circumstances, the said ‘essence’ is nothing apart from the established form; so that the recognition is as established as the ‘essence’ itself. |
tataś ca janyāsambhavāt kutrāsau bhāvo vyāpriyeta // | Hence, as there would be nothing to be produced, whereupon could the Entity operate? (108) |
nāpyaniṣpanna iti darśayati aniṣpannetyādi / | The following Text proceeds to show that the ‘Essence’ cannot be something not-established: [see verse 109 above] |
aniṣpannātmatatvastu naiva vyāpriyate kvacit / | If its own ‘essence’ is still unestablished, it cannot be operated upon by anything; |
sarvaśaktiviyuktatvād ākāśakamalādivat // | because it is bereft of all potency, like the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things. |
ity ubhayaparīksā // | this is a general statement; |
na svātmabhūte nāpi parabhūta ity arthaḥ / | the meaning is that it cannot operate either upon itself or upon any other thing. |
sati vyāpāre niṣpannātmatatva eva syāt / | If it did operate, then it would itself be an established entity; |
etāvanmātralakṣaṇatvān niṣpannasyeti bhāvaḥ // | as such operation is the only characteristic of an established entity. |
KAPITEL Svabhāvikavādaparīkṣā ādiśabdopāttasvabhāvavādivādamalpavaktavyatayā kramamanāśrityaiva nirākurvannāha sarvetyādi / | End of Chapter (3) dealing with the Doctrine of Primordial Matter and God, both being the Joint Cause of the World. The propounders of the doctrine of the ‘thing- by itself’ describe the origination of things as being independent of all causes. |
svabhāvavādibhis te hi nāhuḥ svamapi kāraṇam // | they do not declare even the thing itself to be its own ‘cause (110) |
svabhāvavādas tu yady apy ādiśabdenāhatyanopāttaḥ / tathāpi svabhāvavādina{ṃ---}topādānāt sūcita eva / | Though the Doctrine of the ‘Thing by Itself’ has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by the doctrine that the Things are produced by themselves (as detailed in Texts 106 et seq.). |
tatra ye svata eva bhāvā jāyanta iti varṇayanti / te svakriyāyā virodhata ityādinā nirastāḥ sāmprataṃ svabhāvavādino nirasyante / | Those who assert thatngs are born out of themselves have been silenced by the words (in Text 107) ‘The operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms’; now the upholders of the doctrine of ‘the Thing by Itself’ are going to be silenced. |
ta evam āhur na svato nāpi parato bhāvānāṃ janma kiṃ tarhi sarvahetunirāśaṃsam svaparakāraṇanirapekṣam ity arthaḥ / | These philosophers assert as follows: “The origination ofngs does not proceed either from themselves or from any other thing; in fact, it is independent of all Causes; i.e. it does not depend on the action of any ‘Cause’ at all.” |
nanu ye svata eva bhāvā bhavantīti varṇayanti tebhya eṣāṃ ko bheda ity āha ---te hītyādi / | Questions “What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves?” Answer They do not, etc. |
te svabhāvavādinaḥ svamiti / svarūpam / | ‘They’ i.e. the upholders of the ‘Thing by Itself’; the thing itself, i.e. its own form (prior to origination); |
apiśabdāt pararūpam api / pūrvakās tu svabhāvaṃ kāraṇamicchanti ete tamapi necchantīti bhedaḥ // | the difference thus is that while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its ‘Cause’, these other people do not accept even that as the ‘Cause’, (110) |
atra ca yuktiṃ varṇayanti yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sad anupalabhyamānasattākam, tat prekṣāvatām asadvyavahāraviṣayaḥ, yathā śaśaviṣāṇam. | this is the doctrine that is taken up now for refutation, even out of its proper sequence, because there is little to be said regarding it, by the following Text: [see verse 110 above] Though the Doctrine of the ‘Thing by Itself’ has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by the doctrine that the Things are produced by themselves (as detailed in Texts 106 et seq.). |
anupalabhyamānasattākaṃ ca bhāvānāṃ kāraṇam iti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ / | Answer They do not, etc. ‘They’ i.e. the upholders of the ‘Thing by Itself’; the thing itself, i.e. its own form (prior to origination); |
na cāyam asiddho hetur ity ādarśayann āha rājīvetyādi / | ‘even’ this implies that they do not accept the form of any other thing to-be the ‘Cause’; |
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