CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-19489
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19489/
|
CWE-362
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=1d20398694a3b67a388d955b7a945ba4aa90a8a8
|
1d20398694a3b67a388d955b7a945ba4aa90a8a8
| null |
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_fsync(void *opaque)
{
int err;
int32_t fid;
int datasync;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dd", &fid, &datasync);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_fsync(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, datasync);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
err = v9fs_co_fsync(pdu, fidp, datasync);
if (!err) {
err = offset;
}
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
|
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_fsync(void *opaque)
{
int err;
int32_t fid;
int datasync;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dd", &fid, &datasync);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_fsync(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, datasync);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
err = v9fs_co_fsync(pdu, fidp, datasync);
if (!err) {
err = offset;
}
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-9016
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9016/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9
|
0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9
|
blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
struct request *blk_mq_alloc_request(struct request_queue *q, int rw, gfp_t gfp,
bool reserved)
{
struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
struct request *rq;
struct blk_mq_alloc_data alloc_data;
int ret;
ret = blk_mq_queue_enter(q, gfp);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
ctx = blk_mq_get_ctx(q);
hctx = q->mq_ops->map_queue(q, ctx->cpu);
blk_mq_set_alloc_data(&alloc_data, q, gfp & ~__GFP_WAIT,
reserved, ctx, hctx);
rq = __blk_mq_alloc_request(&alloc_data, rw);
if (!rq && (gfp & __GFP_WAIT)) {
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx);
blk_mq_put_ctx(ctx);
ctx = blk_mq_get_ctx(q);
hctx = q->mq_ops->map_queue(q, ctx->cpu);
blk_mq_set_alloc_data(&alloc_data, q, gfp, reserved, ctx,
hctx);
rq = __blk_mq_alloc_request(&alloc_data, rw);
ctx = alloc_data.ctx;
}
blk_mq_put_ctx(ctx);
if (!rq) {
blk_mq_queue_exit(q);
return ERR_PTR(-EWOULDBLOCK);
}
return rq;
}
|
struct request *blk_mq_alloc_request(struct request_queue *q, int rw, gfp_t gfp,
bool reserved)
{
struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
struct request *rq;
struct blk_mq_alloc_data alloc_data;
int ret;
ret = blk_mq_queue_enter(q, gfp);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
ctx = blk_mq_get_ctx(q);
hctx = q->mq_ops->map_queue(q, ctx->cpu);
blk_mq_set_alloc_data(&alloc_data, q, gfp & ~__GFP_WAIT,
reserved, ctx, hctx);
rq = __blk_mq_alloc_request(&alloc_data, rw);
if (!rq && (gfp & __GFP_WAIT)) {
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx);
blk_mq_put_ctx(ctx);
ctx = blk_mq_get_ctx(q);
hctx = q->mq_ops->map_queue(q, ctx->cpu);
blk_mq_set_alloc_data(&alloc_data, q, gfp, reserved, ctx,
hctx);
rq = __blk_mq_alloc_request(&alloc_data, rw);
ctx = alloc_data.ctx;
}
blk_mq_put_ctx(ctx);
if (!rq) {
blk_mq_queue_exit(q);
return ERR_PTR(-EWOULDBLOCK);
}
return rq;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
void ACodec::ExecutingState::submitOutputBuffers() {
submitRegularOutputBuffers();
if (mCodec->storingMetadataInDecodedBuffers()) {
submitOutputMetaBuffers();
}
}
|
void ACodec::ExecutingState::submitOutputBuffers() {
submitRegularOutputBuffers();
if (mCodec->storingMetadataInDecodedBuffers()) {
submitOutputMetaBuffers();
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18221/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/70feee0e1ef331b22cc51f383d532a0d043fbdcc
|
70feee0e1ef331b22cc51f383d532a0d043fbdcc
|
mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Joern Engel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <[email protected]>
Cc: zhongjiang <[email protected]>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mlock, unsigned long, start, size_t, len)
{
return do_mlock(start, len, VM_LOCKED);
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mlock, unsigned long, start, size_t, len)
{
return do_mlock(start, len, VM_LOCKED);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8086
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8086/
|
CWE-772
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=4ffcdef4277a91af15a3c09f7d16af072c29f3f2
|
4ffcdef4277a91af15a3c09f7d16af072c29f3f2
| null |
int fsetxattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dirfd, filename);
int ret;
ret = lsetxattr(proc_path, name, value, size, flags);
g_free(proc_path);
return ret;
}
|
int fsetxattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dirfd, filename);
int ret;
ret = lsetxattr(proc_path, name, value, size, flags);
g_free(proc_path);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6079/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
|
uint64_t GLManager::GenerateFenceSyncRelease() {
return next_fence_sync_release_++;
}
|
uint64_t GLManager::GenerateFenceSyncRelease() {
return next_fence_sync_release_++;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0830
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0830/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/d77f1999ecece56c1cbb333f4ddc26f0b5bac2c5
|
d77f1999ecece56c1cbb333f4ddc26f0b5bac2c5
|
Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
|
bool btif_get_address_type(const BD_ADDR bd_addr, int *p_addr_type)
{
if (p_addr_type == NULL)
return FALSE;
bt_bdaddr_t bda;
bdcpy(bda.address, bd_addr);
bdstr_t bd_addr_str;
bdaddr_to_string(&bda, bd_addr_str, sizeof(bd_addr_str));
if (!btif_config_get_int(bd_addr_str, "AddrType", p_addr_type))
return FALSE;
LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "%s: Device [%s] address type %d", __FUNCTION__, bd_addr_str, *p_addr_type);
return TRUE;
}
|
bool btif_get_address_type(const BD_ADDR bd_addr, int *p_addr_type)
{
if (p_addr_type == NULL)
return FALSE;
bt_bdaddr_t bda;
bdcpy(bda.address, bd_addr);
bdstr_t bd_addr_str;
bdaddr_to_string(&bda, bd_addr_str, sizeof(bd_addr_str));
if (!btif_config_get_int(bd_addr_str, "AddrType", p_addr_type))
return FALSE;
LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "%s: Device [%s] address type %d", __FUNCTION__, bd_addr_str, *p_addr_type);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8963/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void perf_event_aux_event(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long head,
unsigned long size, u64 flags)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct perf_aux_event {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 offset;
u64 size;
u64 flags;
} rec = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_AUX,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(rec),
},
.offset = head,
.size = size,
.flags = flags,
};
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&rec.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event, rec.header.size);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, rec);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
|
void perf_event_aux_event(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long head,
unsigned long size, u64 flags)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct perf_aux_event {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 offset;
u64 size;
u64 flags;
} rec = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_AUX,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(rec),
},
.offset = head,
.size = size,
.flags = flags,
};
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&rec.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event, rec.header.size);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, rec);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void sequenceLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, v8Array(imp->sequenceLongMethod(), info.GetIsolate()));
}
|
static void sequenceLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, v8Array(imp->sequenceLongMethod(), info.GetIsolate()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2635/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int rtnl_port_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
int err;
if (!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_port || !dev->dev.parent)
return 0;
err = rtnl_port_self_fill(skb, dev);
if (err)
return err;
if (dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent)) {
err = rtnl_vf_ports_fill(skb, dev);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int rtnl_port_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
int err;
if (!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_port || !dev->dev.parent)
return 0;
err = rtnl_port_self_fill(skb, dev);
if (err)
return err;
if (dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent)) {
err = rtnl_vf_ports_fill(skb, dev);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4470
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4470/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9
|
e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9
|
ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ssize_t ip_append_page(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct rtable *rt;
struct ip_options *opt = NULL;
struct inet_cork *cork;
int hh_len;
int mtu;
int len;
int err;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, fraggap;
if (inet->hdrincl)
return -EPERM;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue))
return -EINVAL;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
rt = (struct rtable *)cork->dst;
if (cork->flags & IPCORK_OPT)
opt = cork->opt;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
mtu = cork->fragsize;
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct iphdr) + (opt ? opt->optlen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen;
if (cork->length + size > 0xFFFF - fragheaderlen) {
ip_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl4->daddr, inet->inet_dport, mtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
cork->length += size;
if ((size + skb->len > mtu) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = mtu - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
}
while (size > 0) {
int i;
if (skb_is_gso(skb))
len = size;
else {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
len = mtu - skb->len;
if (len < size)
len = maxfraglen - skb->len;
}
if (len <= 0) {
struct sk_buff *skb_prev;
int alloclen;
skb_prev = skb;
fraggap = skb_prev->len - maxfraglen;
alloclen = fragheaderlen + hh_len + fraggap + 15;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, alloclen, 1, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(!skb)) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto error;
}
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes.
*/
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + fraggap);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev,
maxfraglen,
skb_transport_header(skb),
fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue.
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
if (len > size)
len = size;
if (skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, page, offset)) {
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i-1], len);
} else if (i < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
get_page(page);
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, offset, len);
} else {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto error;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_NONE) {
__wsum csum;
csum = csum_page(page, offset, len);
skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, skb->len);
}
skb->len += len;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->truesize += len;
atomic_add(len, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
offset += len;
size -= len;
}
return 0;
error:
cork->length -= size;
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
|
ssize_t ip_append_page(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct rtable *rt;
struct ip_options *opt = NULL;
struct inet_cork *cork;
int hh_len;
int mtu;
int len;
int err;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, fraggap;
if (inet->hdrincl)
return -EPERM;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue))
return -EINVAL;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
rt = (struct rtable *)cork->dst;
if (cork->flags & IPCORK_OPT)
opt = cork->opt;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
mtu = cork->fragsize;
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct iphdr) + (opt ? opt->optlen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen;
if (cork->length + size > 0xFFFF - fragheaderlen) {
ip_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl4->daddr, inet->inet_dport, mtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
cork->length += size;
if ((size + skb->len > mtu) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = mtu - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
}
while (size > 0) {
int i;
if (skb_is_gso(skb))
len = size;
else {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
len = mtu - skb->len;
if (len < size)
len = maxfraglen - skb->len;
}
if (len <= 0) {
struct sk_buff *skb_prev;
int alloclen;
skb_prev = skb;
fraggap = skb_prev->len - maxfraglen;
alloclen = fragheaderlen + hh_len + fraggap + 15;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, alloclen, 1, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(!skb)) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto error;
}
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes.
*/
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + fraggap);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev,
maxfraglen,
skb_transport_header(skb),
fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue.
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
if (len > size)
len = size;
if (skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, page, offset)) {
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i-1], len);
} else if (i < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
get_page(page);
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, offset, len);
} else {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto error;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_NONE) {
__wsum csum;
csum = csum_page(page, offset, len);
skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, skb->len);
}
skb->len += len;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->truesize += len;
atomic_add(len, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
offset += len;
size -= len;
}
return 0;
error:
cork->length -= size;
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
void omx_vdec::append_frame_dimension_extradata(OMX_OTHER_EXTRADATATYPE *extra)
{
OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_FRAMEDIMENSION *frame_dimension;
if (!(client_extradata & OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA)) {
return;
}
extra->nSize = OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA_SIZE;
extra->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
extra->nPortIndex = OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX;
extra->eType = (OMX_EXTRADATATYPE)OMX_ExtraDataFrameDimension;
extra->nDataSize = sizeof(OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_FRAMEDIMENSION);
frame_dimension = (OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_FRAMEDIMENSION *)(void *)extra->data;
frame_dimension->nDecWidth = rectangle.nLeft;
frame_dimension->nDecHeight = rectangle.nTop;
frame_dimension->nActualWidth = rectangle.nWidth;
frame_dimension->nActualHeight = rectangle.nHeight;
}
|
void omx_vdec::append_frame_dimension_extradata(OMX_OTHER_EXTRADATATYPE *extra)
{
OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_FRAMEDIMENSION *frame_dimension;
if (!(client_extradata & OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA)) {
return;
}
extra->nSize = OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA_SIZE;
extra->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
extra->nPortIndex = OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX;
extra->eType = (OMX_EXTRADATATYPE)OMX_ExtraDataFrameDimension;
extra->nDataSize = sizeof(OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_FRAMEDIMENSION);
frame_dimension = (OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_FRAMEDIMENSION *)(void *)extra->data;
frame_dimension->nDecWidth = rectangle.nLeft;
frame_dimension->nDecHeight = rectangle.nTop;
frame_dimension->nActualWidth = rectangle.nWidth;
frame_dimension->nActualHeight = rectangle.nHeight;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7616
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7616/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cf01fb9985e8deb25ccf0ea54d916b8871ae0e62
|
cf01fb9985e8deb25ccf0ea54d916b8871ae0e62
|
mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int mpol_parse_str(char *str, struct mempolicy **mpol)
{
struct mempolicy *new = NULL;
unsigned short mode;
unsigned short mode_flags;
nodemask_t nodes;
char *nodelist = strchr(str, ':');
char *flags = strchr(str, '=');
int err = 1;
if (nodelist) {
/* NUL-terminate mode or flags string */
*nodelist++ = '\0';
if (nodelist_parse(nodelist, nodes))
goto out;
if (!nodes_subset(nodes, node_states[N_MEMORY]))
goto out;
} else
nodes_clear(nodes);
if (flags)
*flags++ = '\0'; /* terminate mode string */
for (mode = 0; mode < MPOL_MAX; mode++) {
if (!strcmp(str, policy_modes[mode])) {
break;
}
}
if (mode >= MPOL_MAX)
goto out;
switch (mode) {
case MPOL_PREFERRED:
/*
* Insist on a nodelist of one node only
*/
if (nodelist) {
char *rest = nodelist;
while (isdigit(*rest))
rest++;
if (*rest)
goto out;
}
break;
case MPOL_INTERLEAVE:
/*
* Default to online nodes with memory if no nodelist
*/
if (!nodelist)
nodes = node_states[N_MEMORY];
break;
case MPOL_LOCAL:
/*
* Don't allow a nodelist; mpol_new() checks flags
*/
if (nodelist)
goto out;
mode = MPOL_PREFERRED;
break;
case MPOL_DEFAULT:
/*
* Insist on a empty nodelist
*/
if (!nodelist)
err = 0;
goto out;
case MPOL_BIND:
/*
* Insist on a nodelist
*/
if (!nodelist)
goto out;
}
mode_flags = 0;
if (flags) {
/*
* Currently, we only support two mutually exclusive
* mode flags.
*/
if (!strcmp(flags, "static"))
mode_flags |= MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES;
else if (!strcmp(flags, "relative"))
mode_flags |= MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES;
else
goto out;
}
new = mpol_new(mode, mode_flags, &nodes);
if (IS_ERR(new))
goto out;
/*
* Save nodes for mpol_to_str() to show the tmpfs mount options
* for /proc/mounts, /proc/pid/mounts and /proc/pid/mountinfo.
*/
if (mode != MPOL_PREFERRED)
new->v.nodes = nodes;
else if (nodelist)
new->v.preferred_node = first_node(nodes);
else
new->flags |= MPOL_F_LOCAL;
/*
* Save nodes for contextualization: this will be used to "clone"
* the mempolicy in a specific context [cpuset] at a later time.
*/
new->w.user_nodemask = nodes;
err = 0;
out:
/* Restore string for error message */
if (nodelist)
*--nodelist = ':';
if (flags)
*--flags = '=';
if (!err)
*mpol = new;
return err;
}
|
int mpol_parse_str(char *str, struct mempolicy **mpol)
{
struct mempolicy *new = NULL;
unsigned short mode;
unsigned short mode_flags;
nodemask_t nodes;
char *nodelist = strchr(str, ':');
char *flags = strchr(str, '=');
int err = 1;
if (nodelist) {
/* NUL-terminate mode or flags string */
*nodelist++ = '\0';
if (nodelist_parse(nodelist, nodes))
goto out;
if (!nodes_subset(nodes, node_states[N_MEMORY]))
goto out;
} else
nodes_clear(nodes);
if (flags)
*flags++ = '\0'; /* terminate mode string */
for (mode = 0; mode < MPOL_MAX; mode++) {
if (!strcmp(str, policy_modes[mode])) {
break;
}
}
if (mode >= MPOL_MAX)
goto out;
switch (mode) {
case MPOL_PREFERRED:
/*
* Insist on a nodelist of one node only
*/
if (nodelist) {
char *rest = nodelist;
while (isdigit(*rest))
rest++;
if (*rest)
goto out;
}
break;
case MPOL_INTERLEAVE:
/*
* Default to online nodes with memory if no nodelist
*/
if (!nodelist)
nodes = node_states[N_MEMORY];
break;
case MPOL_LOCAL:
/*
* Don't allow a nodelist; mpol_new() checks flags
*/
if (nodelist)
goto out;
mode = MPOL_PREFERRED;
break;
case MPOL_DEFAULT:
/*
* Insist on a empty nodelist
*/
if (!nodelist)
err = 0;
goto out;
case MPOL_BIND:
/*
* Insist on a nodelist
*/
if (!nodelist)
goto out;
}
mode_flags = 0;
if (flags) {
/*
* Currently, we only support two mutually exclusive
* mode flags.
*/
if (!strcmp(flags, "static"))
mode_flags |= MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES;
else if (!strcmp(flags, "relative"))
mode_flags |= MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES;
else
goto out;
}
new = mpol_new(mode, mode_flags, &nodes);
if (IS_ERR(new))
goto out;
/*
* Save nodes for mpol_to_str() to show the tmpfs mount options
* for /proc/mounts, /proc/pid/mounts and /proc/pid/mountinfo.
*/
if (mode != MPOL_PREFERRED)
new->v.nodes = nodes;
else if (nodelist)
new->v.preferred_node = first_node(nodes);
else
new->flags |= MPOL_F_LOCAL;
/*
* Save nodes for contextualization: this will be used to "clone"
* the mempolicy in a specific context [cpuset] at a later time.
*/
new->w.user_nodemask = nodes;
err = 0;
out:
/* Restore string for error message */
if (nodelist)
*--nodelist = ':';
if (flags)
*--flags = '=';
if (!err)
*mpol = new;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-3817
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-3817/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/rpm-software-management/libcomps/commit/e3a5d056633677959ad924a51758876d415e7046
|
e3a5d056633677959ad924a51758876d415e7046
|
Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
|
void comps_objmrtree_set_n(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt, char *key,
size_t len, void *ndata) {
__comps_objmrtree_set(rt, key, len, ndata);
}
|
void comps_objmrtree_set_n(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt, char *key,
size_t len, void *ndata) {
__comps_objmrtree_set(rt, key, len, ndata);
}
|
C
|
libcomps
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnDisplayRemoved(
const gfx::Display& old_display) {
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnDisplayRemoved(
const gfx::Display& old_display) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6942
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6942/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
|
29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
| null |
Ins_IP( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
FT_F26Dot6 old_range, cur_range;
FT_Vector* orus_base;
FT_Vector* cur_base;
FT_Int twilight;
if ( exc->top < exc->GS.loop )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
goto Fail;
}
/*
* We need to deal in a special way with the twilight zone.
* Otherwise, by definition, the value of exc->twilight.orus[n] is (0,0),
* for every n.
*/
twilight = ( exc->GS.gep0 == 0 ||
exc->GS.gep1 == 0 ||
exc->GS.gep2 == 0 );
if ( BOUNDS( exc->GS.rp1, exc->zp0.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
goto Fail;
}
if ( twilight )
orus_base = &exc->zp0.org[exc->GS.rp1];
else
orus_base = &exc->zp0.orus[exc->GS.rp1];
cur_base = &exc->zp0.cur[exc->GS.rp1];
/* XXX: There are some glyphs in some braindead but popular */
/* fonts out there (e.g. [aeu]grave in monotype.ttf) */
/* calling IP[] with bad values of rp[12]. */
/* Do something sane when this odd thing happens. */
if ( BOUNDS( exc->GS.rp1, exc->zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( exc->GS.rp2, exc->zp1.n_points ) )
{
old_range = 0;
cur_range = 0;
}
else
{
if ( twilight )
old_range = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp1.org[exc->GS.rp2], orus_base );
else if ( exc->metrics.x_scale == exc->metrics.y_scale )
old_range = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp1.orus[exc->GS.rp2], orus_base );
else
{
FT_Vector vec;
vec.x = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp1.orus[exc->GS.rp2].x,
orus_base->x ),
exc->metrics.x_scale );
vec.y = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp1.orus[exc->GS.rp2].y,
orus_base->y ),
exc->metrics.y_scale );
old_range = FAST_DUALPROJ( &vec );
}
cur_range = PROJECT( &exc->zp1.cur[exc->GS.rp2], cur_base );
}
for ( ; exc->GS.loop > 0; exc->GS.loop-- )
{
FT_UInt point = (FT_UInt)exc->stack[--exc->args];
FT_F26Dot6 org_dist, cur_dist, new_dist;
/* check point bounds */
if ( BOUNDS( point, exc->zp2.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
continue;
}
if ( twilight )
org_dist = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp2.org[point], orus_base );
else if ( exc->metrics.x_scale == exc->metrics.y_scale )
org_dist = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp2.orus[point], orus_base );
else
{
FT_Vector vec;
vec.x = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp2.orus[point].x,
orus_base->x ),
exc->metrics.x_scale );
vec.y = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp2.orus[point].y,
orus_base->y ),
exc->metrics.y_scale );
org_dist = FAST_DUALPROJ( &vec );
}
cur_dist = PROJECT( &exc->zp2.cur[point], cur_base );
if ( org_dist )
{
if ( old_range )
new_dist = FT_MulDiv( org_dist, cur_range, old_range );
else
{
/* This is the same as what MS does for the invalid case: */
/* */
/* delta = (Original_Pt - Original_RP1) - */
/* (Current_Pt - Current_RP1) ; */
/* */
/* In FreeType speak: */
/* */
/* delta = org_dist - cur_dist . */
/* */
/* We move `point' by `new_dist - cur_dist' after leaving */
/* this block, thus we have */
/* */
/* new_dist - cur_dist = delta , */
/* new_dist - cur_dist = org_dist - cur_dist , */
/* new_dist = org_dist . */
new_dist = org_dist;
}
}
else
new_dist = 0;
exc->func_move( exc,
&exc->zp2,
(FT_UShort)point,
SUB_LONG( new_dist, cur_dist ) );
}
Fail:
exc->GS.loop = 1;
exc->new_top = exc->args;
}
|
Ins_IP( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
FT_F26Dot6 old_range, cur_range;
FT_Vector* orus_base;
FT_Vector* cur_base;
FT_Int twilight;
if ( exc->top < exc->GS.loop )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
goto Fail;
}
/*
* We need to deal in a special way with the twilight zone.
* Otherwise, by definition, the value of exc->twilight.orus[n] is (0,0),
* for every n.
*/
twilight = ( exc->GS.gep0 == 0 ||
exc->GS.gep1 == 0 ||
exc->GS.gep2 == 0 );
if ( BOUNDS( exc->GS.rp1, exc->zp0.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
goto Fail;
}
if ( twilight )
orus_base = &exc->zp0.org[exc->GS.rp1];
else
orus_base = &exc->zp0.orus[exc->GS.rp1];
cur_base = &exc->zp0.cur[exc->GS.rp1];
/* XXX: There are some glyphs in some braindead but popular */
/* fonts out there (e.g. [aeu]grave in monotype.ttf) */
/* calling IP[] with bad values of rp[12]. */
/* Do something sane when this odd thing happens. */
if ( BOUNDS( exc->GS.rp1, exc->zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( exc->GS.rp2, exc->zp1.n_points ) )
{
old_range = 0;
cur_range = 0;
}
else
{
if ( twilight )
old_range = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp1.org[exc->GS.rp2], orus_base );
else if ( exc->metrics.x_scale == exc->metrics.y_scale )
old_range = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp1.orus[exc->GS.rp2], orus_base );
else
{
FT_Vector vec;
vec.x = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp1.orus[exc->GS.rp2].x,
orus_base->x ),
exc->metrics.x_scale );
vec.y = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp1.orus[exc->GS.rp2].y,
orus_base->y ),
exc->metrics.y_scale );
old_range = FAST_DUALPROJ( &vec );
}
cur_range = PROJECT( &exc->zp1.cur[exc->GS.rp2], cur_base );
}
for ( ; exc->GS.loop > 0; exc->GS.loop-- )
{
FT_UInt point = (FT_UInt)exc->stack[--exc->args];
FT_F26Dot6 org_dist, cur_dist, new_dist;
/* check point bounds */
if ( BOUNDS( point, exc->zp2.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
continue;
}
if ( twilight )
org_dist = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp2.org[point], orus_base );
else if ( exc->metrics.x_scale == exc->metrics.y_scale )
org_dist = DUALPROJ( &exc->zp2.orus[point], orus_base );
else
{
FT_Vector vec;
vec.x = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp2.orus[point].x,
orus_base->x ),
exc->metrics.x_scale );
vec.y = FT_MulFix( SUB_LONG( exc->zp2.orus[point].y,
orus_base->y ),
exc->metrics.y_scale );
org_dist = FAST_DUALPROJ( &vec );
}
cur_dist = PROJECT( &exc->zp2.cur[point], cur_base );
if ( org_dist )
{
if ( old_range )
new_dist = FT_MulDiv( org_dist, cur_range, old_range );
else
{
/* This is the same as what MS does for the invalid case: */
/* */
/* delta = (Original_Pt - Original_RP1) - */
/* (Current_Pt - Current_RP1) ; */
/* */
/* In FreeType speak: */
/* */
/* delta = org_dist - cur_dist . */
/* */
/* We move `point' by `new_dist - cur_dist' after leaving */
/* this block, thus we have */
/* */
/* new_dist - cur_dist = delta , */
/* new_dist - cur_dist = org_dist - cur_dist , */
/* new_dist = org_dist . */
new_dist = org_dist;
}
}
else
new_dist = 0;
exc->func_move( exc,
&exc->zp2,
(FT_UShort)point,
SUB_LONG( new_dist, cur_dist ) );
}
Fail:
exc->GS.loop = 1;
exc->new_top = exc->args;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3899
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3899/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
|
bool OMXCodec::drainInputBuffer(BufferInfo *info) {
if (info != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ((int)info->mStatus, (int)OWNED_BY_US);
}
if (mSignalledEOS) {
return false;
}
if (mCodecSpecificDataIndex < mCodecSpecificData.size()) {
CHECK(!(mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers));
const CodecSpecificData *specific =
mCodecSpecificData[mCodecSpecificDataIndex];
size_t size = specific->mSize;
if ((!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC, mMIME) ||
!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_HEVC, mMIME))
&& !(mQuirks & kWantsNALFragments)) {
static const uint8_t kNALStartCode[4] =
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
CHECK(info->mSize >= specific->mSize + 4);
size += 4;
memcpy(info->mData, kNALStartCode, 4);
memcpy((uint8_t *)info->mData + 4,
specific->mData, specific->mSize);
} else {
CHECK(info->mSize >= specific->mSize);
memcpy(info->mData, specific->mData, specific->mSize);
}
mNoMoreOutputData = false;
CODEC_LOGV("calling emptyBuffer with codec specific data");
status_t err = mOMX->emptyBuffer(
mNode, info->mBuffer, 0, size,
OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME | OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG,
0);
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
info->mStatus = OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
++mCodecSpecificDataIndex;
return true;
}
if (mPaused) {
return false;
}
status_t err;
bool signalEOS = false;
int64_t timestampUs = 0;
size_t offset = 0;
int32_t n = 0;
for (;;) {
MediaBuffer *srcBuffer;
if (mSeekTimeUs >= 0) {
if (mLeftOverBuffer) {
mLeftOverBuffer->release();
mLeftOverBuffer = NULL;
}
MediaSource::ReadOptions options;
options.setSeekTo(mSeekTimeUs, mSeekMode);
mSeekTimeUs = -1;
mSeekMode = ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC;
mBufferFilled.signal();
err = mSource->read(&srcBuffer, &options);
if (err == OK) {
int64_t targetTimeUs;
if (srcBuffer->meta_data()->findInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, &targetTimeUs)
&& targetTimeUs >= 0) {
CODEC_LOGV("targetTimeUs = %lld us", (long long)targetTimeUs);
mTargetTimeUs = targetTimeUs;
} else {
mTargetTimeUs = -1;
}
}
} else if (mLeftOverBuffer) {
srcBuffer = mLeftOverBuffer;
mLeftOverBuffer = NULL;
err = OK;
} else {
err = mSource->read(&srcBuffer);
}
if (err != OK) {
signalEOS = true;
mFinalStatus = err;
mSignalledEOS = true;
mBufferFilled.signal();
break;
}
if (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
info = findInputBufferByDataPointer(srcBuffer->data());
CHECK(info != NULL);
}
size_t remainingBytes = info->mSize - offset;
if (srcBuffer->range_length() > remainingBytes) {
if (offset == 0) {
CODEC_LOGE(
"Codec's input buffers are too small to accomodate "
"buffer read from source (info->mSize = %zu, srcLength = %zu)",
info->mSize, srcBuffer->range_length());
srcBuffer->release();
srcBuffer = NULL;
setState(ERROR);
return false;
}
mLeftOverBuffer = srcBuffer;
break;
}
bool releaseBuffer = true;
if (mFlags & kStoreMetaDataInVideoBuffers) {
releaseBuffer = false;
info->mMediaBuffer = srcBuffer;
}
if (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
releaseBuffer = false;
CHECK(info->mMediaBuffer == NULL);
info->mMediaBuffer = srcBuffer;
} else {
CHECK(srcBuffer->data() != NULL) ;
memcpy((uint8_t *)info->mData + offset,
(const uint8_t *)srcBuffer->data()
+ srcBuffer->range_offset(),
srcBuffer->range_length());
}
int64_t lastBufferTimeUs;
CHECK(srcBuffer->meta_data()->findInt64(kKeyTime, &lastBufferTimeUs));
CHECK(lastBufferTimeUs >= 0);
if (mIsEncoder && mIsVideo) {
mDecodingTimeList.push_back(lastBufferTimeUs);
}
if (offset == 0) {
timestampUs = lastBufferTimeUs;
}
offset += srcBuffer->range_length();
if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_VORBIS, mMIME)) {
CHECK(!(mQuirks & kSupportsMultipleFramesPerInputBuffer));
CHECK_GE(info->mSize, offset + sizeof(int32_t));
int32_t numPageSamples;
if (!srcBuffer->meta_data()->findInt32(
kKeyValidSamples, &numPageSamples)) {
numPageSamples = -1;
}
memcpy((uint8_t *)info->mData + offset,
&numPageSamples,
sizeof(numPageSamples));
offset += sizeof(numPageSamples);
}
if (releaseBuffer) {
srcBuffer->release();
srcBuffer = NULL;
}
++n;
if (!(mQuirks & kSupportsMultipleFramesPerInputBuffer)) {
break;
}
int64_t coalescedDurationUs = lastBufferTimeUs - timestampUs;
if (coalescedDurationUs > 250000ll) {
break;
}
}
if (n > 1) {
ALOGV("coalesced %d frames into one input buffer", n);
}
OMX_U32 flags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
if (signalEOS) {
flags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
mNoMoreOutputData = false;
}
if (info == NULL) {
CHECK(mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers);
CHECK(signalEOS);
info = findEmptyInputBuffer();
}
CODEC_LOGV("Calling emptyBuffer on buffer %u (length %zu), "
"timestamp %lld us (%.2f secs)",
info->mBuffer, offset,
(long long)timestampUs, timestampUs / 1E6);
err = mOMX->emptyBuffer(
mNode, info->mBuffer, 0, offset,
flags, timestampUs);
if (err != OK) {
setState(ERROR);
return false;
}
info->mStatus = OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
return true;
}
|
bool OMXCodec::drainInputBuffer(BufferInfo *info) {
if (info != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ((int)info->mStatus, (int)OWNED_BY_US);
}
if (mSignalledEOS) {
return false;
}
if (mCodecSpecificDataIndex < mCodecSpecificData.size()) {
CHECK(!(mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers));
const CodecSpecificData *specific =
mCodecSpecificData[mCodecSpecificDataIndex];
size_t size = specific->mSize;
if ((!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC, mMIME) ||
!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_HEVC, mMIME))
&& !(mQuirks & kWantsNALFragments)) {
static const uint8_t kNALStartCode[4] =
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
CHECK(info->mSize >= specific->mSize + 4);
size += 4;
memcpy(info->mData, kNALStartCode, 4);
memcpy((uint8_t *)info->mData + 4,
specific->mData, specific->mSize);
} else {
CHECK(info->mSize >= specific->mSize);
memcpy(info->mData, specific->mData, specific->mSize);
}
mNoMoreOutputData = false;
CODEC_LOGV("calling emptyBuffer with codec specific data");
status_t err = mOMX->emptyBuffer(
mNode, info->mBuffer, 0, size,
OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME | OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG,
0);
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
info->mStatus = OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
++mCodecSpecificDataIndex;
return true;
}
if (mPaused) {
return false;
}
status_t err;
bool signalEOS = false;
int64_t timestampUs = 0;
size_t offset = 0;
int32_t n = 0;
for (;;) {
MediaBuffer *srcBuffer;
if (mSeekTimeUs >= 0) {
if (mLeftOverBuffer) {
mLeftOverBuffer->release();
mLeftOverBuffer = NULL;
}
MediaSource::ReadOptions options;
options.setSeekTo(mSeekTimeUs, mSeekMode);
mSeekTimeUs = -1;
mSeekMode = ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC;
mBufferFilled.signal();
err = mSource->read(&srcBuffer, &options);
if (err == OK) {
int64_t targetTimeUs;
if (srcBuffer->meta_data()->findInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, &targetTimeUs)
&& targetTimeUs >= 0) {
CODEC_LOGV("targetTimeUs = %lld us", (long long)targetTimeUs);
mTargetTimeUs = targetTimeUs;
} else {
mTargetTimeUs = -1;
}
}
} else if (mLeftOverBuffer) {
srcBuffer = mLeftOverBuffer;
mLeftOverBuffer = NULL;
err = OK;
} else {
err = mSource->read(&srcBuffer);
}
if (err != OK) {
signalEOS = true;
mFinalStatus = err;
mSignalledEOS = true;
mBufferFilled.signal();
break;
}
if (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
info = findInputBufferByDataPointer(srcBuffer->data());
CHECK(info != NULL);
}
size_t remainingBytes = info->mSize - offset;
if (srcBuffer->range_length() > remainingBytes) {
if (offset == 0) {
CODEC_LOGE(
"Codec's input buffers are too small to accomodate "
"buffer read from source (info->mSize = %zu, srcLength = %zu)",
info->mSize, srcBuffer->range_length());
srcBuffer->release();
srcBuffer = NULL;
setState(ERROR);
return false;
}
mLeftOverBuffer = srcBuffer;
break;
}
bool releaseBuffer = true;
if (mFlags & kStoreMetaDataInVideoBuffers) {
releaseBuffer = false;
info->mMediaBuffer = srcBuffer;
}
if (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
releaseBuffer = false;
CHECK(info->mMediaBuffer == NULL);
info->mMediaBuffer = srcBuffer;
} else {
CHECK(srcBuffer->data() != NULL) ;
memcpy((uint8_t *)info->mData + offset,
(const uint8_t *)srcBuffer->data()
+ srcBuffer->range_offset(),
srcBuffer->range_length());
}
int64_t lastBufferTimeUs;
CHECK(srcBuffer->meta_data()->findInt64(kKeyTime, &lastBufferTimeUs));
CHECK(lastBufferTimeUs >= 0);
if (mIsEncoder && mIsVideo) {
mDecodingTimeList.push_back(lastBufferTimeUs);
}
if (offset == 0) {
timestampUs = lastBufferTimeUs;
}
offset += srcBuffer->range_length();
if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_VORBIS, mMIME)) {
CHECK(!(mQuirks & kSupportsMultipleFramesPerInputBuffer));
CHECK_GE(info->mSize, offset + sizeof(int32_t));
int32_t numPageSamples;
if (!srcBuffer->meta_data()->findInt32(
kKeyValidSamples, &numPageSamples)) {
numPageSamples = -1;
}
memcpy((uint8_t *)info->mData + offset,
&numPageSamples,
sizeof(numPageSamples));
offset += sizeof(numPageSamples);
}
if (releaseBuffer) {
srcBuffer->release();
srcBuffer = NULL;
}
++n;
if (!(mQuirks & kSupportsMultipleFramesPerInputBuffer)) {
break;
}
int64_t coalescedDurationUs = lastBufferTimeUs - timestampUs;
if (coalescedDurationUs > 250000ll) {
break;
}
}
if (n > 1) {
ALOGV("coalesced %d frames into one input buffer", n);
}
OMX_U32 flags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
if (signalEOS) {
flags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
mNoMoreOutputData = false;
}
if (info == NULL) {
CHECK(mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers);
CHECK(signalEOS);
info = findEmptyInputBuffer();
}
CODEC_LOGV("Calling emptyBuffer on buffer %u (length %zu), "
"timestamp %lld us (%.2f secs)",
info->mBuffer, offset,
(long long)timestampUs, timestampUs / 1E6);
err = mOMX->emptyBuffer(
mNode, info->mBuffer, 0, offset,
flags, timestampUs);
if (err != OK) {
setState(ERROR);
return false;
}
info->mStatus = OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int lvl, int opt, char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
int linksel;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_socket->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
switch (opt) {
case CAIFSO_LINK_SELECT:
if (ol < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (lvl != SOL_CAIF)
goto bad_sol;
if (copy_from_user(&linksel, ov, sizeof(int)))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
cf_sk->conn_req.link_selector = linksel;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
case CAIFSO_REQ_PARAM:
if (lvl != SOL_CAIF)
goto bad_sol;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_protocol != CAIFPROTO_UTIL)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
if (ol > sizeof(cf_sk->conn_req.param.data) ||
copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ov, ol)) {
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
cf_sk->conn_req.param.size = ol;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return 0;
bad_sol:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
|
static int setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int lvl, int opt, char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
int linksel;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_socket->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
switch (opt) {
case CAIFSO_LINK_SELECT:
if (ol < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (lvl != SOL_CAIF)
goto bad_sol;
if (copy_from_user(&linksel, ov, sizeof(int)))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
cf_sk->conn_req.link_selector = linksel;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
case CAIFSO_REQ_PARAM:
if (lvl != SOL_CAIF)
goto bad_sol;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_protocol != CAIFPROTO_UTIL)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
if (ol > sizeof(cf_sk->conn_req.param.data) ||
copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ov, ol)) {
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
cf_sk->conn_req.param.size = ol;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return 0;
bad_sol:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4565/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static int qib_ctxt_info(struct file *fp, struct qib_ctxt_info __user *uinfo)
{
struct qib_ctxt_info info;
int ret;
size_t sz;
struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd = ctxt_fp(fp);
struct qib_filedata *fd;
fd = fp->private_data;
info.num_active = qib_count_active_units();
info.unit = rcd->dd->unit;
info.port = rcd->ppd->port;
info.ctxt = rcd->ctxt;
info.subctxt = subctxt_fp(fp);
/* Number of user ctxts available for this device. */
info.num_ctxts = rcd->dd->cfgctxts - rcd->dd->first_user_ctxt;
info.num_subctxts = rcd->subctxt_cnt;
info.rec_cpu = fd->rec_cpu_num;
sz = sizeof(info);
if (copy_to_user(uinfo, &info, sz)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto bail;
}
ret = 0;
bail:
return ret;
}
|
static int qib_ctxt_info(struct file *fp, struct qib_ctxt_info __user *uinfo)
{
struct qib_ctxt_info info;
int ret;
size_t sz;
struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd = ctxt_fp(fp);
struct qib_filedata *fd;
fd = fp->private_data;
info.num_active = qib_count_active_units();
info.unit = rcd->dd->unit;
info.port = rcd->ppd->port;
info.ctxt = rcd->ctxt;
info.subctxt = subctxt_fp(fp);
/* Number of user ctxts available for this device. */
info.num_ctxts = rcd->dd->cfgctxts - rcd->dd->first_user_ctxt;
info.num_subctxts = rcd->subctxt_cnt;
info.rec_cpu = fd->rec_cpu_num;
sz = sizeof(info);
if (copy_to_user(uinfo, &info, sz)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto bail;
}
ret = 0;
bail:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-17862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17862/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467
|
c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467
|
bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];
if (off < 0 || size < 0 || (size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) ||
(u64)off + size > reg->range) {
verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];
if (off < 0 || size < 0 || (size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) ||
(u64)off + size > reg->range) {
verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13454
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13454/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/1ddcf2e4f28029a888cadef2e757509ef5047ad8
|
1ddcf2e4f28029a888cadef2e757509ef5047ad8
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
|
static void ClearBounds(Image *image,RectangleInfo *bounds,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ssize_t
y;
if (bounds->x < 0)
return;
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) bounds->height; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) bounds->width; x++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,TransparentAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
|
static void ClearBounds(Image *image,RectangleInfo *bounds,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ssize_t
y;
if (bounds->x < 0)
return;
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) bounds->height; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) bounds->width; x++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,TransparentAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void get_avenrun(unsigned long *loads, unsigned long offset, int shift)
{
loads[0] = (avenrun[0] + offset) << shift;
loads[1] = (avenrun[1] + offset) << shift;
loads[2] = (avenrun[2] + offset) << shift;
}
|
void get_avenrun(unsigned long *loads, unsigned long offset, int shift)
{
loads[0] = (avenrun[0] + offset) << shift;
loads[1] = (avenrun[1] + offset) << shift;
loads[2] = (avenrun[2] + offset) << shift;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexSubDimensions(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target, GLint level, GLint xoffset, GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLenum format,
TextureManager::TextureInfo* texture) {
if (xoffset < 0 || yoffset < 0) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "xoffset or yoffset < 0");
return false;
}
switch (format) {
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT: {
const int kBlockWidth = 4;
const int kBlockHeight = 4;
if ((xoffset % kBlockWidth) || (yoffset % kBlockHeight)) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"xoffset or yoffset not multiple of 4");
return false;
}
GLsizei tex_width = 0;
GLsizei tex_height = 0;
if (!texture->GetLevelSize(target, level, &tex_width, &tex_height) ||
width - xoffset > tex_width ||
height - yoffset > tex_height) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "dimensions out of range");
return false;
}
return ValidateCompressedTexDimensions(
function_name, level, width, height, format);
}
default:
return false;
}
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexSubDimensions(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target, GLint level, GLint xoffset, GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLenum format,
TextureManager::TextureInfo* texture) {
if (xoffset < 0 || yoffset < 0) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "xoffset or yoffset < 0");
return false;
}
switch (format) {
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT: {
const int kBlockWidth = 4;
const int kBlockHeight = 4;
if ((xoffset % kBlockWidth) || (yoffset % kBlockHeight)) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"xoffset or yoffset not multiple of 4");
return false;
}
GLsizei tex_width = 0;
GLsizei tex_height = 0;
if (!texture->GetLevelSize(target, level, &tex_width, &tex_height) ||
width - xoffset > tex_width ||
height - yoffset > tex_height) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "dimensions out of range");
return false;
}
return ValidateCompressedTexDimensions(
function_name, level, width, height, format);
}
default:
return false;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
bit_catenate(VarBit *arg1, VarBit *arg2)
{
VarBit *result;
int bitlen1,
bitlen2,
bytelen,
bit1pad,
bit2shift;
bits8 *pr,
*pa;
bitlen1 = VARBITLEN(arg1);
bitlen2 = VARBITLEN(arg2);
if (bitlen1 > VARBITMAXLEN - bitlen2)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
VARBITMAXLEN)));
bytelen = VARBITTOTALLEN(bitlen1 + bitlen2);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(bytelen);
SET_VARSIZE(result, bytelen);
VARBITLEN(result) = bitlen1 + bitlen2;
/* Copy the first bitstring in */
memcpy(VARBITS(result), VARBITS(arg1), VARBITBYTES(arg1));
/* Copy the second bit string */
bit1pad = VARBITPAD(arg1);
if (bit1pad == 0)
{
memcpy(VARBITS(result) + VARBITBYTES(arg1), VARBITS(arg2),
VARBITBYTES(arg2));
}
else if (bitlen2 > 0)
{
/* We need to shift all the bits to fit */
bit2shift = BITS_PER_BYTE - bit1pad;
pr = VARBITS(result) + VARBITBYTES(arg1) - 1;
for (pa = VARBITS(arg2); pa < VARBITEND(arg2); pa++)
{
*pr |= ((*pa >> bit2shift) & BITMASK);
pr++;
if (pr < VARBITEND(result))
*pr = (*pa << bit1pad) & BITMASK;
}
}
return result;
}
|
bit_catenate(VarBit *arg1, VarBit *arg2)
{
VarBit *result;
int bitlen1,
bitlen2,
bytelen,
bit1pad,
bit2shift;
bits8 *pr,
*pa;
bitlen1 = VARBITLEN(arg1);
bitlen2 = VARBITLEN(arg2);
bytelen = VARBITTOTALLEN(bitlen1 + bitlen2);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(bytelen);
SET_VARSIZE(result, bytelen);
VARBITLEN(result) = bitlen1 + bitlen2;
/* Copy the first bitstring in */
memcpy(VARBITS(result), VARBITS(arg1), VARBITBYTES(arg1));
/* Copy the second bit string */
bit1pad = VARBITPAD(arg1);
if (bit1pad == 0)
{
memcpy(VARBITS(result) + VARBITBYTES(arg1), VARBITS(arg2),
VARBITBYTES(arg2));
}
else if (bitlen2 > 0)
{
/* We need to shift all the bits to fit */
bit2shift = BITS_PER_BYTE - bit1pad;
pr = VARBITS(result) + VARBITBYTES(arg1) - 1;
for (pa = VARBITS(arg2); pa < VARBITEND(arg2); pa++)
{
*pr |= ((*pa >> bit2shift) & BITMASK);
pr++;
if (pr < VARBITEND(result))
*pr = (*pa << bit1pad) & BITMASK;
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnChannelError() {
ProcessDied(true /* already_dead */);
}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnChannelError() {
ProcessDied(true /* already_dead */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13406
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13406/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9f645bcc566a1e9f921bdae7528a01ced5bc3713
|
9f645bcc566a1e9f921bdae7528a01ced5bc3713
|
video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
|
static int uvesafb_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
{
struct fb_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(dev);
if (info) {
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
sysfs_remove_group(&dev->dev.kobj, &uvesafb_dev_attgrp);
unregister_framebuffer(info);
release_region(0x3c0, 32);
iounmap(info->screen_base);
arch_phys_wc_del(par->mtrr_handle);
release_mem_region(info->fix.smem_start, info->fix.smem_len);
fb_destroy_modedb(info->monspecs.modedb);
fb_dealloc_cmap(&info->cmap);
kfree(par->vbe_modes);
kfree(par->vbe_state_orig);
kfree(par->vbe_state_saved);
framebuffer_release(info);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int uvesafb_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
{
struct fb_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(dev);
if (info) {
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
sysfs_remove_group(&dev->dev.kobj, &uvesafb_dev_attgrp);
unregister_framebuffer(info);
release_region(0x3c0, 32);
iounmap(info->screen_base);
arch_phys_wc_del(par->mtrr_handle);
release_mem_region(info->fix.smem_start, info->fix.smem_len);
fb_destroy_modedb(info->monspecs.modedb);
fb_dealloc_cmap(&info->cmap);
kfree(par->vbe_modes);
kfree(par->vbe_state_orig);
kfree(par->vbe_state_saved);
framebuffer_release(info);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3880/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/68f67ef6cf1f41e77337be3bc4bff91f3a3c6324
|
68f67ef6cf1f41e77337be3bc4bff91f3a3c6324
|
Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
|
bool ASessionDescription::isValid() const {
return mIsValid;
}
|
bool ASessionDescription::isValid() const {
return mIsValid;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8633
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8633/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac
|
667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac
|
firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <[email protected]>
|
static netdev_tx_t fwnet_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net)
{
struct fwnet_header hdr_buf;
struct fwnet_device *dev = netdev_priv(net);
__be16 proto;
u16 dest_node;
unsigned max_payload;
u16 dg_size;
u16 *datagram_label_ptr;
struct fwnet_packet_task *ptask;
struct fwnet_peer *peer;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
/* Can this happen? */
if (netif_queue_stopped(dev->netdev)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
ptask = kmem_cache_alloc(fwnet_packet_task_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ptask == NULL)
goto fail;
skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto fail;
/*
* Make a copy of the driver-specific header.
* We might need to rebuild the header on tx failure.
*/
memcpy(&hdr_buf, skb->data, sizeof(hdr_buf));
proto = hdr_buf.h_proto;
switch (proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_ARP):
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
#endif
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(hdr_buf));
dg_size = skb->len;
/*
* Set the transmission type for the packet. ARP packets and IP
* broadcast packets are sent via GASP.
*/
if (fwnet_hwaddr_is_multicast(hdr_buf.h_dest)) {
max_payload = dev->broadcast_xmt_max_payload;
datagram_label_ptr = &dev->broadcast_xmt_datagramlabel;
ptask->fifo_addr = FWNET_NO_FIFO_ADDR;
ptask->generation = 0;
ptask->dest_node = IEEE1394_ALL_NODES;
ptask->speed = SCODE_100;
} else {
union fwnet_hwaddr *ha = (union fwnet_hwaddr *)hdr_buf.h_dest;
__be64 guid = get_unaligned(&ha->uc.uniq_id);
u8 generation;
peer = fwnet_peer_find_by_guid(dev, be64_to_cpu(guid));
if (!peer)
goto fail;
generation = peer->generation;
dest_node = peer->node_id;
max_payload = peer->max_payload;
datagram_label_ptr = &peer->datagram_label;
ptask->fifo_addr = fwnet_hwaddr_fifo(ha);
ptask->generation = generation;
ptask->dest_node = dest_node;
ptask->speed = peer->speed;
}
ptask->hdr.w0 = 0;
ptask->hdr.w1 = 0;
ptask->skb = skb;
ptask->dev = dev;
/* Does it all fit in one packet? */
if (dg_size <= max_payload) {
fwnet_make_uf_hdr(&ptask->hdr, ntohs(proto));
ptask->outstanding_pkts = 1;
max_payload = dg_size + RFC2374_UNFRAG_HDR_SIZE;
} else {
u16 datagram_label;
max_payload -= RFC2374_FRAG_OVERHEAD;
datagram_label = (*datagram_label_ptr)++;
fwnet_make_ff_hdr(&ptask->hdr, ntohs(proto), dg_size,
datagram_label);
ptask->outstanding_pkts = DIV_ROUND_UP(dg_size, max_payload);
max_payload += RFC2374_FRAG_HDR_SIZE;
}
if (++dev->queued_datagrams == FWNET_MAX_QUEUED_DATAGRAMS)
netif_stop_queue(dev->netdev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
ptask->max_payload = max_payload;
ptask->enqueued = 0;
fwnet_send_packet(ptask);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
fail:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (ptask)
kmem_cache_free(fwnet_packet_task_cache, ptask);
if (skb != NULL)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
net->stats.tx_dropped++;
net->stats.tx_errors++;
/*
* FIXME: According to a patch from 2003-02-26, "returning non-zero
* causes serious problems" here, allegedly. Before that patch,
* -ERRNO was returned which is not appropriate under Linux 2.6.
* Perhaps more needs to be done? Stop the queue in serious
* conditions and restart it elsewhere?
*/
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
|
static netdev_tx_t fwnet_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net)
{
struct fwnet_header hdr_buf;
struct fwnet_device *dev = netdev_priv(net);
__be16 proto;
u16 dest_node;
unsigned max_payload;
u16 dg_size;
u16 *datagram_label_ptr;
struct fwnet_packet_task *ptask;
struct fwnet_peer *peer;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
/* Can this happen? */
if (netif_queue_stopped(dev->netdev)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
ptask = kmem_cache_alloc(fwnet_packet_task_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ptask == NULL)
goto fail;
skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto fail;
/*
* Make a copy of the driver-specific header.
* We might need to rebuild the header on tx failure.
*/
memcpy(&hdr_buf, skb->data, sizeof(hdr_buf));
proto = hdr_buf.h_proto;
switch (proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_ARP):
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
#endif
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(hdr_buf));
dg_size = skb->len;
/*
* Set the transmission type for the packet. ARP packets and IP
* broadcast packets are sent via GASP.
*/
if (fwnet_hwaddr_is_multicast(hdr_buf.h_dest)) {
max_payload = dev->broadcast_xmt_max_payload;
datagram_label_ptr = &dev->broadcast_xmt_datagramlabel;
ptask->fifo_addr = FWNET_NO_FIFO_ADDR;
ptask->generation = 0;
ptask->dest_node = IEEE1394_ALL_NODES;
ptask->speed = SCODE_100;
} else {
union fwnet_hwaddr *ha = (union fwnet_hwaddr *)hdr_buf.h_dest;
__be64 guid = get_unaligned(&ha->uc.uniq_id);
u8 generation;
peer = fwnet_peer_find_by_guid(dev, be64_to_cpu(guid));
if (!peer)
goto fail;
generation = peer->generation;
dest_node = peer->node_id;
max_payload = peer->max_payload;
datagram_label_ptr = &peer->datagram_label;
ptask->fifo_addr = fwnet_hwaddr_fifo(ha);
ptask->generation = generation;
ptask->dest_node = dest_node;
ptask->speed = peer->speed;
}
ptask->hdr.w0 = 0;
ptask->hdr.w1 = 0;
ptask->skb = skb;
ptask->dev = dev;
/* Does it all fit in one packet? */
if (dg_size <= max_payload) {
fwnet_make_uf_hdr(&ptask->hdr, ntohs(proto));
ptask->outstanding_pkts = 1;
max_payload = dg_size + RFC2374_UNFRAG_HDR_SIZE;
} else {
u16 datagram_label;
max_payload -= RFC2374_FRAG_OVERHEAD;
datagram_label = (*datagram_label_ptr)++;
fwnet_make_ff_hdr(&ptask->hdr, ntohs(proto), dg_size,
datagram_label);
ptask->outstanding_pkts = DIV_ROUND_UP(dg_size, max_payload);
max_payload += RFC2374_FRAG_HDR_SIZE;
}
if (++dev->queued_datagrams == FWNET_MAX_QUEUED_DATAGRAMS)
netif_stop_queue(dev->netdev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
ptask->max_payload = max_payload;
ptask->enqueued = 0;
fwnet_send_packet(ptask);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
fail:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (ptask)
kmem_cache_free(fwnet_packet_task_cache, ptask);
if (skb != NULL)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
net->stats.tx_dropped++;
net->stats.tx_errors++;
/*
* FIXME: According to a patch from 2003-02-26, "returning non-zero
* causes serious problems" here, allegedly. Before that patch,
* -ERRNO was returned which is not appropriate under Linux 2.6.
* Perhaps more needs to be done? Stop the queue in serious
* conditions and restart it elsewhere?
*/
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TabContents* Browser::OpenURL(const GURL& url,
const GURL& referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
PageTransition::Type transition) {
return OpenURLFromTab(NULL,
OpenURLParams(url, referrer, disposition, transition));
}
|
TabContents* Browser::OpenURL(const GURL& url,
const GURL& referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
PageTransition::Type transition) {
return OpenURLFromTab(NULL,
OpenURLParams(url, referrer, disposition, transition));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14395/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/fa19fbcf712a6a6cc5a5cfdc3254a97b9bce6582
|
fa19fbcf712a6a6cc5a5cfdc3254a97b9bce6582
|
avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_write_raw_metadata_tag(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
const char *name, const char *key)
{
int len;
AVDictionaryEntry *t;
if (!(t = av_dict_get(s->metadata, key, NULL, 0)))
return 0;
len = strlen(t->value);
if (len > 0) {
int size = len + 8;
avio_wb32(pb, size);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, name);
avio_write(pb, t->value, len);
return size;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int mov_write_raw_metadata_tag(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
const char *name, const char *key)
{
int len;
AVDictionaryEntry *t;
if (!(t = av_dict_get(s->metadata, key, NULL, 0)))
return 0;
len = strlen(t->value);
if (len > 0) {
int size = len + 8;
avio_wb32(pb, size);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, name);
avio_write(pb, t->value, len);
return size;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfs4_find_file(struct nfs4_stid *s, int flags)
{
if (!s)
return NULL;
switch (s->sc_type) {
case NFS4_DELEG_STID:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!s->sc_file->fi_deleg_file))
return NULL;
return get_file(s->sc_file->fi_deleg_file);
case NFS4_OPEN_STID:
case NFS4_LOCK_STID:
if (flags & RD_STATE)
return find_readable_file(s->sc_file);
else
return find_writeable_file(s->sc_file);
break;
}
return NULL;
}
|
nfs4_find_file(struct nfs4_stid *s, int flags)
{
if (!s)
return NULL;
switch (s->sc_type) {
case NFS4_DELEG_STID:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!s->sc_file->fi_deleg_file))
return NULL;
return get_file(s->sc_file->fi_deleg_file);
case NFS4_OPEN_STID:
case NFS4_LOCK_STID:
if (flags & RD_STATE)
return find_readable_file(s->sc_file);
else
return find_writeable_file(s->sc_file);
break;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int decode_attr_link_support(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint32_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
*res = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT)) {
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(*res);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT;
}
dprintk("%s: link support=%s\n", __func__, *res == 0 ? "false" : "true");
return 0;
}
|
static int decode_attr_link_support(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint32_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
*res = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT)) {
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(*res);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT;
}
dprintk("%s: link support=%s\n", __func__, *res == 0 ? "false" : "true");
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void RefreshCellularDataPlans(const CellularNetwork* network) {}
|
virtual void RefreshCellularDataPlans(const CellularNetwork* network) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010295
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010295/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
|
d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
|
core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
|
static TEE_Result get_prop_tee_dev_id(struct tee_ta_session *sess __unused,
void *buf, size_t *blen)
{
TEE_Result res;
TEE_UUID uuid;
const size_t nslen = 5;
uint8_t data[5 + FVR_DIE_ID_NUM_REGS * sizeof(uint32_t)] = {
'O', 'P', 'T', 'E', 'E' };
if (*blen < sizeof(uuid)) {
*blen = sizeof(uuid);
return TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
}
*blen = sizeof(uuid);
if (tee_otp_get_die_id(data + nslen, sizeof(data) - nslen))
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
res = tee_hash_createdigest(TEE_ALG_SHA256, data, sizeof(data),
(uint8_t *)&uuid, sizeof(uuid));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
/*
* Changes the random value into and UUID as specifiec
* in RFC 4122. The magic values are from the example
* code in the RFC.
*
* TEE_UUID is defined slightly different from the RFC,
* but close enough for our purpose.
*/
uuid.timeHiAndVersion &= 0x0fff;
uuid.timeHiAndVersion |= 5 << 12;
/* uuid.clock_seq_hi_and_reserved in the RFC */
uuid.clockSeqAndNode[0] &= 0x3f;
uuid.clockSeqAndNode[0] |= 0x80;
return tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, &uuid, sizeof(TEE_UUID));
}
|
static TEE_Result get_prop_tee_dev_id(struct tee_ta_session *sess __unused,
void *buf, size_t *blen)
{
TEE_Result res;
TEE_UUID uuid;
const size_t nslen = 5;
uint8_t data[5 + FVR_DIE_ID_NUM_REGS * sizeof(uint32_t)] = {
'O', 'P', 'T', 'E', 'E' };
if (*blen < sizeof(uuid)) {
*blen = sizeof(uuid);
return TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
}
*blen = sizeof(uuid);
if (tee_otp_get_die_id(data + nslen, sizeof(data) - nslen))
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
res = tee_hash_createdigest(TEE_ALG_SHA256, data, sizeof(data),
(uint8_t *)&uuid, sizeof(uuid));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
/*
* Changes the random value into and UUID as specifiec
* in RFC 4122. The magic values are from the example
* code in the RFC.
*
* TEE_UUID is defined slightly different from the RFC,
* but close enough for our purpose.
*/
uuid.timeHiAndVersion &= 0x0fff;
uuid.timeHiAndVersion |= 5 << 12;
/* uuid.clock_seq_hi_and_reserved in the RFC */
uuid.clockSeqAndNode[0] &= 0x3f;
uuid.clockSeqAndNode[0] |= 0x80;
return tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, &uuid, sizeof(TEE_UUID));
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9710
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9710/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339
|
5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339
|
Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
|
static noinline void reada_for_balance(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, int level)
{
int slot;
int nritems;
struct extent_buffer *parent;
struct extent_buffer *eb;
u64 gen;
u64 block1 = 0;
u64 block2 = 0;
int blocksize;
parent = path->nodes[level + 1];
if (!parent)
return;
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(parent);
slot = path->slots[level + 1];
blocksize = root->nodesize;
if (slot > 0) {
block1 = btrfs_node_blockptr(parent, slot - 1);
gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(parent, slot - 1);
eb = btrfs_find_tree_block(root, block1);
/*
* if we get -eagain from btrfs_buffer_uptodate, we
* don't want to return eagain here. That will loop
* forever
*/
if (eb && btrfs_buffer_uptodate(eb, gen, 1) != 0)
block1 = 0;
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
if (slot + 1 < nritems) {
block2 = btrfs_node_blockptr(parent, slot + 1);
gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(parent, slot + 1);
eb = btrfs_find_tree_block(root, block2);
if (eb && btrfs_buffer_uptodate(eb, gen, 1) != 0)
block2 = 0;
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
if (block1)
readahead_tree_block(root, block1, blocksize);
if (block2)
readahead_tree_block(root, block2, blocksize);
}
|
static noinline void reada_for_balance(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, int level)
{
int slot;
int nritems;
struct extent_buffer *parent;
struct extent_buffer *eb;
u64 gen;
u64 block1 = 0;
u64 block2 = 0;
int blocksize;
parent = path->nodes[level + 1];
if (!parent)
return;
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(parent);
slot = path->slots[level + 1];
blocksize = root->nodesize;
if (slot > 0) {
block1 = btrfs_node_blockptr(parent, slot - 1);
gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(parent, slot - 1);
eb = btrfs_find_tree_block(root, block1);
/*
* if we get -eagain from btrfs_buffer_uptodate, we
* don't want to return eagain here. That will loop
* forever
*/
if (eb && btrfs_buffer_uptodate(eb, gen, 1) != 0)
block1 = 0;
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
if (slot + 1 < nritems) {
block2 = btrfs_node_blockptr(parent, slot + 1);
gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(parent, slot + 1);
eb = btrfs_find_tree_block(root, block2);
if (eb && btrfs_buffer_uptodate(eb, gen, 1) != 0)
block2 = 0;
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
if (block1)
readahead_tree_block(root, block1, blocksize);
if (block2)
readahead_tree_block(root, block2, blocksize);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
circle_right(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPgt((circle1->center.x - circle1->radius),
(circle2->center.x + circle2->radius)));
}
|
circle_right(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPgt((circle1->center.x - circle1->radius),
(circle2->center.x + circle2->radius)));
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5787/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
|
void HTMLCanvasElement::RemoveListener(CanvasDrawListener* listener) {
listeners_.erase(listener);
}
|
void HTMLCanvasElement::RemoveListener(CanvasDrawListener* listener) {
listeners_.erase(listener);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1278
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1278/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
cc::FrameSinkId TestRenderWidgetHostView::GetFrameSinkId() {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
|
cc::FrameSinkId TestRenderWidgetHostView::GetFrameSinkId() {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7166/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/6e06b1c89dd0d16f74894eac4cfc1327a06ee4a0
|
6e06b1c89dd0d16f74894eac4cfc1327a06ee4a0
|
Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
|
archive_read_open(struct archive *a, void *client_data,
archive_open_callback *client_opener, archive_read_callback *client_reader,
archive_close_callback *client_closer)
{
/* Old archive_read_open() is just a thin shell around
* archive_read_open1. */
archive_read_set_open_callback(a, client_opener);
archive_read_set_read_callback(a, client_reader);
archive_read_set_close_callback(a, client_closer);
archive_read_set_callback_data(a, client_data);
return archive_read_open1(a);
}
|
archive_read_open(struct archive *a, void *client_data,
archive_open_callback *client_opener, archive_read_callback *client_reader,
archive_close_callback *client_closer)
{
/* Old archive_read_open() is just a thin shell around
* archive_read_open1. */
archive_read_set_open_callback(a, client_opener);
archive_read_set_read_callback(a, client_reader);
archive_read_set_close_callback(a, client_closer);
archive_read_set_callback_data(a, client_data);
return archive_read_open1(a);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
NPError WebPluginDelegatePepper::Device3DGetConfigAttribs(
int32 config,
int32* attrib_list) {
if (config != 0)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
if (attrib_list) {
for (int32* attrib_pair = attrib_list; *attrib_pair; attrib_pair += 2) {
switch (attrib_pair[0]) {
case NP3DAttrib_BufferSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 32;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_AlphaSize:
case NP3DAttrib_BlueSize:
case NP3DAttrib_GreenSize:
case NP3DAttrib_RedSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 8;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_DepthSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 24;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_StencilSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 8;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_SurfaceType:
attrib_pair[1] = 0;
break;
default:
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
}
}
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
|
NPError WebPluginDelegatePepper::Device3DGetConfigAttribs(
int32 config,
int32* attrib_list) {
if (config != 0)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
if (attrib_list) {
for (int32* attrib_pair = attrib_list; *attrib_pair; attrib_pair += 2) {
switch (attrib_pair[0]) {
case NP3DAttrib_BufferSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 32;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_AlphaSize:
case NP3DAttrib_BlueSize:
case NP3DAttrib_GreenSize:
case NP3DAttrib_RedSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 8;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_DepthSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 24;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_StencilSize:
attrib_pair[1] = 8;
break;
case NP3DAttrib_SurfaceType:
attrib_pair[1] = 0;
break;
default:
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
}
}
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
static long FS_HashFileName( const char *fname, int hashSize ) {
int i;
long hash;
char letter;
hash = 0;
i = 0;
while (fname[i] != '\0') {
letter = tolower(fname[i]);
if (letter =='.') break; // don't include extension
if (letter =='\\') letter = '/'; // damn path names
if (letter == PATH_SEP) letter = '/'; // damn path names
hash+=(long)(letter)*(i+119);
i++;
}
hash = (hash ^ (hash >> 10) ^ (hash >> 20));
hash &= (hashSize-1);
return hash;
}
|
static long FS_HashFileName( const char *fname, int hashSize ) {
int i;
long hash;
char letter;
hash = 0;
i = 0;
while (fname[i] != '\0') {
letter = tolower(fname[i]);
if (letter =='.') break; // don't include extension
if (letter =='\\') letter = '/'; // damn path names
if (letter == PATH_SEP) letter = '/'; // damn path names
hash+=(long)(letter)*(i+119);
i++;
}
hash = (hash ^ (hash >> 10) ^ (hash >> 20));
hash &= (hashSize-1);
return hash;
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3913
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3913/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d
|
MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
|
Antagonizer::Antagonizer(notify_callback_f cb, void* client) :
mExit(false), mActive(false), mClient(client), mCb(cb)
{
createThread(callbackThread, this);
}
|
Antagonizer::Antagonizer(notify_callback_f cb, void* client) :
mExit(false), mActive(false), mClient(client), mCb(cb)
{
createThread(callbackThread, this);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
ScopedRenderBufferBinder::ScopedRenderBufferBinder(ContextState* state,
ErrorState* error_state,
GLuint id)
: state_(state), error_state_(error_state) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("ScopedRenderBufferBinder::ctor",
error_state_);
state->api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_RENDERBUFFER, id);
}
|
ScopedRenderBufferBinder::ScopedRenderBufferBinder(ContextState* state,
ErrorState* error_state,
GLuint id)
: state_(state), error_state_(error_state) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("ScopedRenderBufferBinder::ctor",
error_state_);
state->api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_RENDERBUFFER, id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6594
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6594/
|
CWE-295
|
https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/commit/b1e699103f08d6a0ca46a122193c9da65f6cf837
|
b1e699103f08d6a0ca46a122193c9da65f6cf837
|
Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
|
build_server_referral(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_crypto session,
krb5_const_realm referred_realm,
const PrincipalName *true_principal_name,
const PrincipalName *requested_principal,
krb5_data *outdata)
{
PA_ServerReferralData ref;
krb5_error_code ret;
EncryptedData ed;
krb5_data data;
size_t size = 0;
memset(&ref, 0, sizeof(ref));
if (referred_realm) {
ALLOC(ref.referred_realm);
if (ref.referred_realm == NULL)
goto eout;
*ref.referred_realm = strdup(referred_realm);
if (*ref.referred_realm == NULL)
goto eout;
}
if (true_principal_name) {
ALLOC(ref.true_principal_name);
if (ref.true_principal_name == NULL)
goto eout;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(true_principal_name, ref.true_principal_name);
if (ret)
goto eout;
}
if (requested_principal) {
ALLOC(ref.requested_principal_name);
if (ref.requested_principal_name == NULL)
goto eout;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(requested_principal,
ref.requested_principal_name);
if (ret)
goto eout;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ServerReferralData,
data.data, data.length,
&ref, &size, ret);
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (data.length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, session,
KRB5_KU_PA_SERVER_REFERRAL,
data.data, data.length,
0 /* kvno */, &ed);
free(data.data);
if (ret)
return ret;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData,
outdata->data, outdata->length,
&ed, &size, ret);
free_EncryptedData(&ed);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (outdata->length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
return 0;
eout:
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
return ENOMEM;
}
|
build_server_referral(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_crypto session,
krb5_const_realm referred_realm,
const PrincipalName *true_principal_name,
const PrincipalName *requested_principal,
krb5_data *outdata)
{
PA_ServerReferralData ref;
krb5_error_code ret;
EncryptedData ed;
krb5_data data;
size_t size = 0;
memset(&ref, 0, sizeof(ref));
if (referred_realm) {
ALLOC(ref.referred_realm);
if (ref.referred_realm == NULL)
goto eout;
*ref.referred_realm = strdup(referred_realm);
if (*ref.referred_realm == NULL)
goto eout;
}
if (true_principal_name) {
ALLOC(ref.true_principal_name);
if (ref.true_principal_name == NULL)
goto eout;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(true_principal_name, ref.true_principal_name);
if (ret)
goto eout;
}
if (requested_principal) {
ALLOC(ref.requested_principal_name);
if (ref.requested_principal_name == NULL)
goto eout;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(requested_principal,
ref.requested_principal_name);
if (ret)
goto eout;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ServerReferralData,
data.data, data.length,
&ref, &size, ret);
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (data.length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, session,
KRB5_KU_PA_SERVER_REFERRAL,
data.data, data.length,
0 /* kvno */, &ed);
free(data.data);
if (ret)
return ret;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData,
outdata->data, outdata->length,
&ed, &size, ret);
free_EncryptedData(&ed);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (outdata->length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
return 0;
eout:
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
return ENOMEM;
}
|
C
|
heimdal
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void LauncherView::ConfigureChildView(views::View* view) {
view->SetPaintToLayer(true);
view->layer()->SetFillsBoundsOpaquely(false);
}
|
void LauncherView::ConfigureChildView(views::View* view) {
view->SetPaintToLayer(true);
view->layer()->SetFillsBoundsOpaquely(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2804
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2804/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc7b094a338c6c521f918f478e993f0f74bbea0d
|
dc7b094a338c6c521f918f478e993f0f74bbea0d
|
Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool IBusConnectionsAreAlive() {
return ibus_ && ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_) && ibus_config_;
}
|
bool IBusConnectionsAreAlive() {
return ibus_ && ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_) && ibus_config_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2878
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2878/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool TextIterator::hasVisibleTextNode(RenderText* renderer)
{
if (renderer->style()->visibility() == VISIBLE)
return true;
if (renderer->isTextFragment()) {
RenderTextFragment* fragment = static_cast<RenderTextFragment*>(renderer);
if (fragment->firstLetter() && fragment->firstLetter()->style()->visibility() == VISIBLE)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool TextIterator::hasVisibleTextNode(RenderText* renderer)
{
if (renderer->style()->visibility() == VISIBLE)
return true;
if (renderer->isTextFragment()) {
RenderTextFragment* fragment = static_cast<RenderTextFragment*>(renderer);
if (fragment->firstLetter() && fragment->firstLetter()->style()->visibility() == VISIBLE)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1292
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1292/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5f372f899b8709dac700710b5f0f90959dcf9ecb
|
5f372f899b8709dac700710b5f0f90959dcf9ecb
|
Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
explicit TestFormStructure(const FormData& form) : FormStructure(form) {}
|
explicit TestFormStructure(const FormData& form) : FormStructure(form) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
int sched_rr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
mutex_lock(&mutex);
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
/* make sure that internally we keep jiffies */
/* also, writing zero resets timeslice to default */
if (!ret && write) {
sched_rr_timeslice = sched_rr_timeslice <= 0 ?
RR_TIMESLICE : msecs_to_jiffies(sched_rr_timeslice);
}
mutex_unlock(&mutex);
return ret;
}
|
int sched_rr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
mutex_lock(&mutex);
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
/* make sure that internally we keep jiffies */
/* also, writing zero resets timeslice to default */
if (!ret && write) {
sched_rr_timeslice = sched_rr_timeslice <= 0 ?
RR_TIMESLICE : msecs_to_jiffies(sched_rr_timeslice);
}
mutex_unlock(&mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
|
9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
| null |
SplashError Splash::fillChar(SplashCoord x, SplashCoord y,
int c, SplashFont *font) {
SplashGlyphBitmap glyph;
SplashCoord xt, yt;
int x0, y0, xFrac, yFrac;
SplashClipResult clipRes;
if (debugMode) {
printf("fillChar: x=%.2f y=%.2f c=%3d=0x%02x='%c'\n",
(double)x, (double)y, c, c, c);
}
transform(state->matrix, x, y, &xt, &yt);
x0 = splashFloor(xt);
xFrac = splashFloor((xt - x0) * splashFontFraction);
y0 = splashFloor(yt);
yFrac = splashFloor((yt - y0) * splashFontFraction);
if (!font->getGlyph(c, xFrac, yFrac, &glyph, x0, y0, state->clip, &clipRes)) {
return splashErrNoGlyph;
}
if (clipRes != splashClipAllOutside) {
fillGlyph2(x0, y0, &glyph, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
}
opClipRes = clipRes;
if (glyph.freeData) {
gfree(glyph.data);
}
return splashOk;
}
|
SplashError Splash::fillChar(SplashCoord x, SplashCoord y,
int c, SplashFont *font) {
SplashGlyphBitmap glyph;
SplashCoord xt, yt;
int x0, y0, xFrac, yFrac;
SplashClipResult clipRes;
if (debugMode) {
printf("fillChar: x=%.2f y=%.2f c=%3d=0x%02x='%c'\n",
(double)x, (double)y, c, c, c);
}
transform(state->matrix, x, y, &xt, &yt);
x0 = splashFloor(xt);
xFrac = splashFloor((xt - x0) * splashFontFraction);
y0 = splashFloor(yt);
yFrac = splashFloor((yt - y0) * splashFontFraction);
if (!font->getGlyph(c, xFrac, yFrac, &glyph, x0, y0, state->clip, &clipRes)) {
return splashErrNoGlyph;
}
if (clipRes != splashClipAllOutside) {
fillGlyph2(x0, y0, &glyph, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
}
opClipRes = clipRes;
if (glyph.freeData) {
gfree(glyph.data);
}
return splashOk;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14395/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/fa19fbcf712a6a6cc5a5cfdc3254a97b9bce6582
|
fa19fbcf712a6a6cc5a5cfdc3254a97b9bce6582
|
avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_get_rawvideo_codec_tag(AVFormatContext *s, MOVTrack *track)
{
int tag = track->par->codec_tag;
int i;
enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmt;
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(mov_pix_fmt_tags); i++) {
if (track->par->format == mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].pix_fmt) {
tag = mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].tag;
track->par->bits_per_coded_sample = mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].bps;
if (track->par->codec_tag == mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].tag)
break;
}
}
pix_fmt = avpriv_find_pix_fmt(avpriv_pix_fmt_bps_mov,
track->par->bits_per_coded_sample);
if (tag == MKTAG('r','a','w',' ') &&
track->par->format != pix_fmt &&
track->par->format != AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8 &&
track->par->format != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s rawvideo cannot be written to mov, output file will be unreadable\n",
av_get_pix_fmt_name(track->par->format));
return tag;
}
|
static int mov_get_rawvideo_codec_tag(AVFormatContext *s, MOVTrack *track)
{
int tag = track->par->codec_tag;
int i;
enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmt;
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(mov_pix_fmt_tags); i++) {
if (track->par->format == mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].pix_fmt) {
tag = mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].tag;
track->par->bits_per_coded_sample = mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].bps;
if (track->par->codec_tag == mov_pix_fmt_tags[i].tag)
break;
}
}
pix_fmt = avpriv_find_pix_fmt(avpriv_pix_fmt_bps_mov,
track->par->bits_per_coded_sample);
if (tag == MKTAG('r','a','w',' ') &&
track->par->format != pix_fmt &&
track->par->format != AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8 &&
track->par->format != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s rawvideo cannot be written to mov, output file will be unreadable\n",
av_get_pix_fmt_name(track->par->format));
return tag;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2517/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static int nl80211_set_channel(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *netdev = info->user_ptr[1];
return __nl80211_set_channel(rdev, netdev->ieee80211_ptr, info);
}
|
static int nl80211_set_channel(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *netdev = info->user_ptr[1];
return __nl80211_set_channel(rdev, netdev->ieee80211_ptr, info);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6775
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6775/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c
|
53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c
|
Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
|
void TextTrackCueList::InvalidateCueIndex(size_t index) {
first_invalid_index_ = std::min(first_invalid_index_, index);
}
|
void TextTrackCueList::InvalidateCueIndex(size_t index) {
first_invalid_index_ = std::min(first_invalid_index_, index);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool Document::inDesignMode() const
{
for (const Document* d = this; d; d = d->parentDocument()) {
if (d->m_designMode != inherit)
return d->m_designMode;
}
return false;
}
|
bool Document::inDesignMode() const
{
for (const Document* d = this; d; d = d->parentDocument()) {
if (d->m_designMode != inherit)
return d->m_designMode;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6198/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca
|
9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca
|
vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
|
int page_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *symname, int len)
{
return __page_symlink(inode, symname, len,
!mapping_gfp_constraint(inode->i_mapping, __GFP_FS));
}
|
int page_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *symname, int len)
{
return __page_symlink(inode, symname, len,
!mapping_gfp_constraint(inode->i_mapping, __GFP_FS));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4502
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4502/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ckolivas/cgminer/commit/e1c5050734123973b99d181c45e74b2cbb00272e
|
e1c5050734123973b99d181c45e74b2cbb00272e
|
Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
|
static void keep_curlalive(CURL *curl)
{
const int tcp_keepidle = 45;
const int tcp_keepintvl = 30;
const long int keepalive = 1;
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TCP_KEEPALIVE, keepalive);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TCP_KEEPIDLE, tcp_keepidle);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TCP_KEEPINTVL, tcp_keepintvl);
}
|
static void keep_curlalive(CURL *curl)
{
const int tcp_keepidle = 45;
const int tcp_keepintvl = 30;
const long int keepalive = 1;
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TCP_KEEPALIVE, keepalive);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TCP_KEEPIDLE, tcp_keepidle);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TCP_KEEPINTVL, tcp_keepintvl);
}
|
C
|
cgminer
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
long FS_filelength(fileHandle_t f)
{
FILE *h;
h = FS_FileForHandle(f);
if(h == NULL)
return -1;
else
return FS_fplength(h);
}
|
long FS_filelength(fileHandle_t f)
{
FILE *h;
h = FS_FileForHandle(f);
if(h == NULL)
return -1;
else
return FS_fplength(h);
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3076
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3076/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/72a763d805a48ac8c0bf48fdb510e84c12de51fe
|
72a763d805a48ac8c0bf48fdb510e84c12de51fe
|
crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <[email protected]> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int __init algif_hash_init(void)
{
return af_alg_register_type(&algif_type_hash);
}
|
static int __init algif_hash_init(void)
{
return af_alg_register_type(&algif_type_hash);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSObject* addErrorInfo(CallFrame* callFrame, JSObject* error, int line, const SourceCode& source)
{
JSGlobalData* globalData = &callFrame->globalData();
const UString& sourceURL = source.provider()->url();
if (line != -1)
error->putDirect(*globalData, Identifier(globalData, linePropertyName), jsNumber(line), ReadOnly | DontDelete);
if (!sourceURL.isNull())
error->putDirect(*globalData, Identifier(globalData, sourceURLPropertyName), jsString(globalData, sourceURL), ReadOnly | DontDelete);
globalData->interpreter->addStackTraceIfNecessary(callFrame, error);
return error;
}
|
JSObject* addErrorInfo(CallFrame* callFrame, JSObject* error, int line, const SourceCode& source)
{
JSGlobalData* globalData = &callFrame->globalData();
const UString& sourceURL = source.provider()->url();
if (line != -1)
error->putDirect(*globalData, Identifier(globalData, linePropertyName), jsNumber(line), ReadOnly | DontDelete);
if (!sourceURL.isNull())
error->putDirect(*globalData, Identifier(globalData, sourceURLPropertyName), jsString(globalData, sourceURL), ReadOnly | DontDelete);
globalData->interpreter->addStackTraceIfNecessary(callFrame, error);
return error;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6094/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0749ec24fae74ec32d0567eef0e5ec43c84dbcb9
|
0749ec24fae74ec32d0567eef0e5ec43c84dbcb9
|
Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
void BaseArena::prepareForSweep() {
ASSERT(getThreadState()->isInGC());
ASSERT(!m_firstUnsweptPage);
m_firstUnsweptPage = m_firstPage;
m_firstPage = nullptr;
}
|
void BaseArena::prepareForSweep() {
ASSERT(getThreadState()->isInGC());
ASSERT(!m_firstUnsweptPage);
m_firstUnsweptPage = m_firstPage;
m_firstPage = nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3085
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3085/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c7e50b5ef454efd6ab9527d795442c213eeb6afa
|
c7e50b5ef454efd6ab9527d795442c213eeb6afa
|
[REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool PopupContainer::handleKeyEvent(const PlatformKeyboardEvent& event)
{
UserGestureIndicator gestureIndicator(DefinitelyProcessingUserGesture);
return m_listBox->handleKeyEvent(event);
}
|
bool PopupContainer::handleKeyEvent(const PlatformKeyboardEvent& event)
{
UserGestureIndicator gestureIndicator(DefinitelyProcessingUserGesture);
return m_listBox->handleKeyEvent(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsSync(GLuint client_id) {
GLsync service_sync = 0;
return group_->GetSyncServiceId(client_id, &service_sync);
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsSync(GLuint client_id) {
GLsync service_sync = 0;
return group_->GetSyncServiceId(client_id, &service_sync);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Added test for bug 27239 (ignore Refresh for view source mode).
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html: Added
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh-expected.txt: Added
* http/tests/security/resources/view-source-no-refresh.php: Added
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ignore the Refresh header if we're in view source mode.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
Test: http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp: ignore Refresh in view-source mode.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@50018 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::checkCompleted()
{
m_shouldCallCheckCompleted = false;
if (m_frame->view())
m_frame->view()->checkStopDelayingDeferredRepaints();
if (!allChildrenAreComplete())
return;
if (m_isComplete)
return;
if (m_frame->document()->parsing())
return;
if (numRequests(m_frame->document()))
return;
m_isComplete = true;
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
checkCallImplicitClose(); // if we didn't do it before
m_frame->redirectScheduler()->startTimer();
completed();
if (m_frame->page())
checkLoadComplete();
}
|
void FrameLoader::checkCompleted()
{
m_shouldCallCheckCompleted = false;
if (m_frame->view())
m_frame->view()->checkStopDelayingDeferredRepaints();
if (!allChildrenAreComplete())
return;
if (m_isComplete)
return;
if (m_frame->document()->parsing())
return;
if (numRequests(m_frame->document()))
return;
m_isComplete = true;
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
checkCallImplicitClose(); // if we didn't do it before
m_frame->redirectScheduler()->startTimer();
completed();
if (m_frame->page())
checkLoadComplete();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4700/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be
|
3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be
|
x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs
x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying
to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction.
While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing
multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes.
Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs
may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the
pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration
the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns.
Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program.
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static u8 add_1reg(u8 byte, u32 dst_reg)
{
return byte + reg2hex[dst_reg];
}
|
static u8 add_1reg(u8 byte, u32 dst_reg)
{
return byte + reg2hex[dst_reg];
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6177
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6177/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4504a474c069d07104237d0c03bfce7b29a42de6
|
4504a474c069d07104237d0c03bfce7b29a42de6
|
defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::enterPictureInPicture(
WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowSizeCallback callback) {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer())
GetWebMediaPlayer()->EnterPictureInPicture(std::move(callback));
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::enterPictureInPicture(
WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowSizeCallback callback) {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer())
GetWebMediaPlayer()->EnterPictureInPicture(std::move(callback));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17468
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17468/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteCommand(const WebString& name,
const WebString& value) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
std::unique_ptr<UserGestureIndicator> gesture_indicator =
Frame::NotifyUserActivation(GetFrame(), UserGestureToken::kNewGesture);
WebPluginContainerImpl* plugin_container =
GetFrame()->GetWebPluginContainer();
if (plugin_container && plugin_container->ExecuteEditCommand(name, value))
return true;
return GetFrame()->GetEditor().ExecuteCommand(name, value);
}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteCommand(const WebString& name,
const WebString& value) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
std::unique_ptr<UserGestureIndicator> gesture_indicator =
Frame::NotifyUserActivation(GetFrame(), UserGestureToken::kNewGesture);
WebPluginContainerImpl* plugin_container =
GetFrame()->GetWebPluginContainer();
if (plugin_container && plugin_container->ExecuteEditCommand(name, value))
return true;
return GetFrame()->GetEditor().ExecuteCommand(name, value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2015
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2015/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca
|
0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca
|
ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static inline unsigned dx_get_hash(struct dx_entry *entry)
{
return le32_to_cpu(entry->hash);
}
|
static inline unsigned dx_get_hash(struct dx_entry *entry)
{
return le32_to_cpu(entry->hash);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6035/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2649de11c562aa96d336c06136a1a20c01711be0
|
2649de11c562aa96d336c06136a1a20c01711be0
|
Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
|
ExtensionApiTest::ExtensionApiTest() {
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleServerRedirectRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleEchoHeaderRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleSetCookieRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleSetHeaderRequest));
}
|
ExtensionApiTest::ExtensionApiTest() {
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleServerRedirectRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleEchoHeaderRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleSetCookieRequest));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::Bind(&HandleSetHeaderRequest));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5289
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5289/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
|
08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
| null |
make_row_from_rec_and_jsonb(Jsonb *element, PopulateRecordsetState *state)
{
Datum *values;
bool *nulls;
int i;
RecordIOData *my_extra = state->my_extra;
int ncolumns = my_extra->ncolumns;
TupleDesc tupdesc = state->ret_tdesc;
HeapTupleHeader rec = state->rec;
HeapTuple rettuple;
values = (Datum *) palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(Datum));
nulls = (bool *) palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(bool));
if (state->rec)
{
HeapTupleData tuple;
/* Build a temporary HeapTuple control structure */
tuple.t_len = HeapTupleHeaderGetDatumLength(state->rec);
ItemPointerSetInvalid(&(tuple.t_self));
tuple.t_tableOid = InvalidOid;
tuple.t_data = state->rec;
/* Break down the tuple into fields */
heap_deform_tuple(&tuple, tupdesc, values, nulls);
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < ncolumns; ++i)
{
values[i] = (Datum) 0;
nulls[i] = true;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < ncolumns; ++i)
{
ColumnIOData *column_info = &my_extra->columns[i];
Oid column_type = tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypid;
JsonbValue *v = NULL;
char *key;
/* Ignore dropped columns in datatype */
if (tupdesc->attrs[i]->attisdropped)
{
nulls[i] = true;
continue;
}
key = NameStr(tupdesc->attrs[i]->attname);
v = findJsonbValueFromContainerLen(&element->root, JB_FOBJECT,
key, strlen(key));
/*
* We can't just skip here if the key wasn't found since we might have
* a domain to deal with. If we were passed in a non-null record
* datum, we assume that the existing values are valid (if they're
* not, then it's not our fault), but if we were passed in a null,
* then every field which we don't populate needs to be run through
* the input function just in case it's a domain type.
*/
if (v == NULL && rec)
continue;
/*
* Prepare to convert the column value from text
*/
if (column_info->column_type != column_type)
{
getTypeInputInfo(column_type,
&column_info->typiofunc,
&column_info->typioparam);
fmgr_info_cxt(column_info->typiofunc, &column_info->proc,
state->fn_mcxt);
column_info->column_type = column_type;
}
if (v == NULL || v->type == jbvNull)
{
/*
* Need InputFunctionCall to happen even for nulls, so that domain
* checks are done
*/
values[i] = InputFunctionCall(&column_info->proc, NULL,
column_info->typioparam,
tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypmod);
nulls[i] = true;
}
else
{
char *s = NULL;
if (v->type == jbvString)
s = pnstrdup(v->val.string.val, v->val.string.len);
else if (v->type == jbvBool)
s = pnstrdup((v->val.boolean) ? "t" : "f", 1);
else if (v->type == jbvNumeric)
s = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(numeric_out,
PointerGetDatum(v->val.numeric)));
else if (v->type == jbvBinary)
s = JsonbToCString(NULL, (JsonbContainer *) v->val.binary.data, v->val.binary.len);
else
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized jsonb type: %d", (int) v->type);
values[i] = InputFunctionCall(&column_info->proc, s,
column_info->typioparam,
tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypmod);
nulls[i] = false;
}
}
rettuple = heap_form_tuple(tupdesc, values, nulls);
tuplestore_puttuple(state->tuple_store, rettuple);
}
|
make_row_from_rec_and_jsonb(Jsonb *element, PopulateRecordsetState *state)
{
Datum *values;
bool *nulls;
int i;
RecordIOData *my_extra = state->my_extra;
int ncolumns = my_extra->ncolumns;
TupleDesc tupdesc = state->ret_tdesc;
HeapTupleHeader rec = state->rec;
HeapTuple rettuple;
values = (Datum *) palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(Datum));
nulls = (bool *) palloc(ncolumns * sizeof(bool));
if (state->rec)
{
HeapTupleData tuple;
/* Build a temporary HeapTuple control structure */
tuple.t_len = HeapTupleHeaderGetDatumLength(state->rec);
ItemPointerSetInvalid(&(tuple.t_self));
tuple.t_tableOid = InvalidOid;
tuple.t_data = state->rec;
/* Break down the tuple into fields */
heap_deform_tuple(&tuple, tupdesc, values, nulls);
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < ncolumns; ++i)
{
values[i] = (Datum) 0;
nulls[i] = true;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < ncolumns; ++i)
{
ColumnIOData *column_info = &my_extra->columns[i];
Oid column_type = tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypid;
JsonbValue *v = NULL;
char *key;
/* Ignore dropped columns in datatype */
if (tupdesc->attrs[i]->attisdropped)
{
nulls[i] = true;
continue;
}
key = NameStr(tupdesc->attrs[i]->attname);
v = findJsonbValueFromContainerLen(&element->root, JB_FOBJECT,
key, strlen(key));
/*
* We can't just skip here if the key wasn't found since we might have
* a domain to deal with. If we were passed in a non-null record
* datum, we assume that the existing values are valid (if they're
* not, then it's not our fault), but if we were passed in a null,
* then every field which we don't populate needs to be run through
* the input function just in case it's a domain type.
*/
if (v == NULL && rec)
continue;
/*
* Prepare to convert the column value from text
*/
if (column_info->column_type != column_type)
{
getTypeInputInfo(column_type,
&column_info->typiofunc,
&column_info->typioparam);
fmgr_info_cxt(column_info->typiofunc, &column_info->proc,
state->fn_mcxt);
column_info->column_type = column_type;
}
if (v == NULL || v->type == jbvNull)
{
/*
* Need InputFunctionCall to happen even for nulls, so that domain
* checks are done
*/
values[i] = InputFunctionCall(&column_info->proc, NULL,
column_info->typioparam,
tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypmod);
nulls[i] = true;
}
else
{
char *s = NULL;
if (v->type == jbvString)
s = pnstrdup(v->val.string.val, v->val.string.len);
else if (v->type == jbvBool)
s = pnstrdup((v->val.boolean) ? "t" : "f", 1);
else if (v->type == jbvNumeric)
s = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(numeric_out,
PointerGetDatum(v->val.numeric)));
else if (v->type == jbvBinary)
s = JsonbToCString(NULL, (JsonbContainer *) v->val.binary.data, v->val.binary.len);
else
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized jsonb type: %d", (int) v->type);
values[i] = InputFunctionCall(&column_info->proc, s,
column_info->typioparam,
tupdesc->attrs[i]->atttypmod);
nulls[i] = false;
}
}
rettuple = heap_form_tuple(tupdesc, values, nulls);
tuplestore_puttuple(state->tuple_store, rettuple);
}
|
C
|
postgresql
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4819
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4819/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/render/render.c?id=5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
|
5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
| null |
SProcRenderCreateRadialGradient (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
int len;
REQUEST (xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->pid, n);
swapl(&stuff->inner.x, n);
swapl(&stuff->inner.y, n);
swapl(&stuff->outer.x, n);
swapl(&stuff->outer.y, n);
swapl(&stuff->inner_radius, n);
swapl(&stuff->outer_radius, n);
swapl(&stuff->nStops, n);
len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
if (stuff->nStops > UINT32_MAX/(sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
if (len != stuff->nStops*(sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
swapStops(stuff+1, stuff->nStops);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
|
SProcRenderCreateRadialGradient (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
int len;
REQUEST (xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->pid, n);
swapl(&stuff->inner.x, n);
swapl(&stuff->inner.y, n);
swapl(&stuff->outer.x, n);
swapl(&stuff->outer.y, n);
swapl(&stuff->inner_radius, n);
swapl(&stuff->outer_radius, n);
swapl(&stuff->nStops, n);
len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
if (stuff->nStops > UINT32_MAX/(sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
if (len != stuff->nStops*(sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
swapStops(stuff+1, stuff->nStops);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int readSsidRid(struct airo_info*ai, SsidRid *ssidr)
{
return PC4500_readrid(ai, RID_SSID, ssidr, sizeof(*ssidr), 1);
}
|
static int readSsidRid(struct airo_info*ai, SsidRid *ssidr)
{
return PC4500_readrid(ai, RID_SSID, ssidr, sizeof(*ssidr), 1);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void CloseBalloon(const std::string id) {
g_browser_process->notification_ui_manager()->CancelById(id);
}
|
void CloseBalloon(const std::string id) {
g_browser_process->notification_ui_manager()->CancelById(id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13715/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a6e544b0a88b53114bfa5a57e21b7be7a8dfc9d0
|
a6e544b0a88b53114bfa5a57e21b7be7a8dfc9d0
|
flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void __skb_get_hash(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct flow_keys keys;
u32 hash;
__flow_hash_secret_init();
hash = ___skb_get_hash(skb, &keys, hashrnd);
if (!hash)
return;
__skb_set_sw_hash(skb, hash,
flow_keys_have_l4(&keys));
}
|
void __skb_get_hash(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct flow_keys keys;
u32 hash;
__flow_hash_secret_init();
hash = ___skb_get_hash(skb, &keys, hashrnd);
if (!hash)
return;
__skb_set_sw_hash(skb, hash,
flow_keys_have_l4(&keys));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLInputElement::updateClearButtonVisibility()
{
m_inputType->updateClearButtonVisibility();
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::updateClearButtonVisibility()
{
m_inputType->updateClearButtonVisibility();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline struct task_group *task_group(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
css = task_subsys_state_check(p, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id,
lockdep_is_held(&task_rq(p)->lock));
return container_of(css, struct task_group, css);
}
|
static inline struct task_group *task_group(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
css = task_subsys_state_check(p, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id,
lockdep_is_held(&task_rq(p)->lock));
return container_of(css, struct task_group, css);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0600
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0600/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/961e5ac5788b52304e64b9a509781beaf5201fb0
|
961e5ac5788b52304e64b9a509781beaf5201fb0
|
Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
|
void PVDecPostProcess(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, uint8 *outputYUV)
{
uint8 *outputBuffer;
#ifdef PV_POSTPROC_ON
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *) decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
int32 tmpvar;
if (outputYUV)
{
outputBuffer = outputYUV;
}
else
{
if (video->postFilterType)
{
outputBuffer = video->currVop->yChan;
}
else
{
outputBuffer = decCtrl->outputFrame;
}
}
if (video->postFilterType)
{
/* Post-processing, */
PostFilter(video, video->postFilterType, outputBuffer);
}
else
{
if (outputYUV)
{
/* Copy decoded frame to the output buffer. */
tmpvar = (int32)video->width * video->height;
oscl_memcpy(outputBuffer, decCtrl->outputFrame, tmpvar*3 / 2); /* 3/3/01 */
}
}
#else
outputBuffer = decCtrl->outputFrame;
outputYUV;
#endif
decCtrl->outputFrame = outputBuffer;
return;
}
|
void PVDecPostProcess(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, uint8 *outputYUV)
{
uint8 *outputBuffer;
#ifdef PV_POSTPROC_ON
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *) decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
int32 tmpvar;
if (outputYUV)
{
outputBuffer = outputYUV;
}
else
{
if (video->postFilterType)
{
outputBuffer = video->currVop->yChan;
}
else
{
outputBuffer = decCtrl->outputFrame;
}
}
if (video->postFilterType)
{
/* Post-processing, */
PostFilter(video, video->postFilterType, outputBuffer);
}
else
{
if (outputYUV)
{
/* Copy decoded frame to the output buffer. */
tmpvar = (int32)video->width * video->height;
oscl_memcpy(outputBuffer, decCtrl->outputFrame, tmpvar*3 / 2); /* 3/3/01 */
}
}
#else
outputBuffer = decCtrl->outputFrame;
outputYUV;
#endif
decCtrl->outputFrame = outputBuffer;
return;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12107
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12107/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/commit/bec6ccec63cadc95655721bc0e1dd49dac759d94
|
bec6ccec63cadc95655721bc0e1dd49dac759d94
|
upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
|
upnpevents_renewSubscription(const char * sid, int sidlen, int timeout)
{
struct subscriber * sub;
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; sub = sub->entries.le_next) {
if((sidlen == 41) && (memcmp(sid, sub->uuid, 41) == 0)) {
#ifdef UPNP_STRICT
/* check if the subscription already timeouted */
if(sub->timeout && upnp_time() > sub->timeout)
continue;
#endif
sub->timeout = (timeout ? upnp_time() + timeout : 0);
return sub->uuid;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
upnpevents_renewSubscription(const char * sid, int sidlen, int timeout)
{
struct subscriber * sub;
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; sub = sub->entries.le_next) {
if((sidlen == 41) && (memcmp(sid, sub->uuid, 41) == 0)) {
#ifdef UPNP_STRICT
/* check if the subscription already timeouted */
if(sub->timeout && upnp_time() > sub->timeout)
continue;
#endif
sub->timeout = (timeout ? upnp_time() + timeout : 0);
return sub->uuid;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
miniupnp
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0884/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c39b8e5670c4a0f2bb06008502ebb0c4fe322e0
|
4c39b8e5670c4a0f2bb06008502ebb0c4fe322e0
|
[4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InspectorClientImpl::resetTraceEventCallback()
{
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* agent = devToolsAgent())
agent->resetTraceEventCallback();
}
|
void InspectorClientImpl::resetTraceEventCallback()
{
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* agent = devToolsAgent())
agent->resetTraceEventCallback();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
cliprdr_send_data(uint8 * data, uint32 length)
{
logger(Clipboard, Debug, "cliprdr_send_data(), length %d bytes", length);
cliprdr_send_packet(CLIPRDR_DATA_RESPONSE, CLIPRDR_RESPONSE, data, length);
}
|
cliprdr_send_data(uint8 * data, uint32 length)
{
logger(Clipboard, Debug, "cliprdr_send_data(), length %d bytes", length);
cliprdr_send_packet(CLIPRDR_DATA_RESPONSE, CLIPRDR_RESPONSE, data, length);
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
void Document::updateRangesAfterNodeMovedToAnotherDocument(const Node& node)
{
DCHECK_NE(node.document(), this);
if (m_ranges.isEmpty())
return;
AttachedRangeSet ranges = m_ranges;
for (Range* range : ranges)
range->updateOwnerDocumentIfNeeded();
}
|
void Document::updateRangesAfterNodeMovedToAnotherDocument(const Node& node)
{
DCHECK_NE(node.document(), this);
if (m_ranges.isEmpty())
return;
AttachedRangeSet ranges = m_ranges;
for (Range* range : ranges)
range->updateOwnerDocumentIfNeeded();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2785
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2785/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/697cd7e2ce2535696f1b9e5cfb474cc36a734747
|
697cd7e2ce2535696f1b9e5cfb474cc36a734747
|
Prevent extensions from defining homepages with schemes other than valid web extents.
BUG=84402
TEST=ExtensionManifestTest.ParseHomepageURLs
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87722 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::vector<std::string> Extension::GetDistinctHostsForDisplay(
const URLPatternList& list) {
return GetDistinctHosts(list, true);
}
|
std::vector<std::string> Extension::GetDistinctHostsForDisplay(
const URLPatternList& list) {
return GetDistinctHosts(list, true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5089
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5089/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/507241119f279c31766bd41c33d6ffb6851e2d7e
|
507241119f279c31766bd41c33d6ffb6851e2d7e
|
Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
|
void CheckClientDownloadRequest::PopulateRequest(
ClientDownloadRequest* request) {
request->mutable_digests()->set_sha256(item_->GetHash());
request->set_length(item_->GetReceivedBytes());
for (size_t i = 0; i < item_->GetUrlChain().size(); ++i) {
ClientDownloadRequest::Resource* resource = request->add_resources();
resource->set_url(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetUrlChain()[i]));
if (i == item_->GetUrlChain().size() - 1) {
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_URL);
resource->set_referrer(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetReferrerUrl()));
DVLOG(2) << "dl url " << resource->url();
if (!item_->GetRemoteAddress().empty()) {
resource->set_remote_ip(item_->GetRemoteAddress());
DVLOG(2) << " dl url remote addr: " << resource->remote_ip();
}
DVLOG(2) << "dl referrer " << resource->referrer();
} else {
DVLOG(2) << "dl redirect " << i << " " << resource->url();
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_REDIRECT);
}
}
request->set_user_initiated(item_->HasUserGesture());
auto* referrer_chain_data = static_cast<ReferrerChainData*>(
item_->GetUserData(ReferrerChainData::kDownloadReferrerChainDataKey));
if (referrer_chain_data &&
!referrer_chain_data->GetReferrerChain()->empty()) {
request->mutable_referrer_chain()->Swap(
referrer_chain_data->GetReferrerChain());
request->mutable_referrer_chain_options()
->set_recent_navigations_to_collect(
referrer_chain_data->recent_navigations_to_collect());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(
"SafeBrowsing.ReferrerURLChainSize.DownloadAttribution",
referrer_chain_data->referrer_chain_length());
}
}
|
void CheckClientDownloadRequest::PopulateRequest(
ClientDownloadRequest* request) {
request->mutable_digests()->set_sha256(item_->GetHash());
request->set_length(item_->GetReceivedBytes());
for (size_t i = 0; i < item_->GetUrlChain().size(); ++i) {
ClientDownloadRequest::Resource* resource = request->add_resources();
resource->set_url(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetUrlChain()[i]));
if (i == item_->GetUrlChain().size() - 1) {
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_URL);
resource->set_referrer(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetReferrerUrl()));
DVLOG(2) << "dl url " << resource->url();
if (!item_->GetRemoteAddress().empty()) {
resource->set_remote_ip(item_->GetRemoteAddress());
DVLOG(2) << " dl url remote addr: " << resource->remote_ip();
}
DVLOG(2) << "dl referrer " << resource->referrer();
} else {
DVLOG(2) << "dl redirect " << i << " " << resource->url();
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_REDIRECT);
}
}
request->set_user_initiated(item_->HasUserGesture());
auto* referrer_chain_data = static_cast<ReferrerChainData*>(
item_->GetUserData(ReferrerChainData::kDownloadReferrerChainDataKey));
if (referrer_chain_data &&
!referrer_chain_data->GetReferrerChain()->empty()) {
request->mutable_referrer_chain()->Swap(
referrer_chain_data->GetReferrerChain());
request->mutable_referrer_chain_options()
->set_recent_navigations_to_collect(
referrer_chain_data->recent_navigations_to_collect());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(
"SafeBrowsing.ReferrerURLChainSize.DownloadAttribution",
referrer_chain_data->referrer_chain_length());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_migrate_info(SpiceServer *s, const char* dest,
int port, int secure_port,
const char* cert_subject)
{
spice_info(NULL);
spice_assert(!migration_interface);
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (!reds_set_migration_dest_info(dest, port, secure_port, cert_subject)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
|
SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_migrate_info(SpiceServer *s, const char* dest,
int port, int secure_port,
const char* cert_subject)
{
spice_info(NULL);
spice_assert(!migration_interface);
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (!reds_set_migration_dest_info(dest, port, secure_port, cert_subject)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4071
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4071/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=6e25966544fb1d2f3d7596e060ce9c9269bbdcf8
|
6e25966544fb1d2f3d7596e060ce9c9269bbdcf8
| null |
static int php_snmp_write_info(php_snmp_object *snmp_object, zval *newval)
{
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "info property is read-only");
return FAILURE;
}
|
static int php_snmp_write_info(php_snmp_object *snmp_object, zval *newval)
{
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "info property is read-only");
return FAILURE;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool nested)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int pi_vec = nested ? POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR : POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
/*
* The vector of interrupt to be delivered to vcpu had
* been set in PIR before this function.
*
* Following cases will be reached in this block, and
* we always send a notification event in all cases as
* explained below.
*
* Case 1: vcpu keeps in non-root mode. Sending a
* notification event posts the interrupt to vcpu.
*
* Case 2: vcpu exits to root mode and is still
* runnable. PIR will be synced to vIRR before the
* next vcpu entry. Sending a notification event in
* this case has no effect, as vcpu is not in root
* mode.
*
* Case 3: vcpu exits to root mode and is blocked.
* vcpu_block() has already synced PIR to vIRR and
* never blocks vcpu if vIRR is not cleared. Therefore,
* a blocked vcpu here does not wait for any requested
* interrupts in PIR, and sending a notification event
* which has no effect is safe here.
*/
apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
|
static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool nested)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int pi_vec = nested ? POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR : POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
/*
* The vector of interrupt to be delivered to vcpu had
* been set in PIR before this function.
*
* Following cases will be reached in this block, and
* we always send a notification event in all cases as
* explained below.
*
* Case 1: vcpu keeps in non-root mode. Sending a
* notification event posts the interrupt to vcpu.
*
* Case 2: vcpu exits to root mode and is still
* runnable. PIR will be synced to vIRR before the
* next vcpu entry. Sending a notification event in
* this case has no effect, as vcpu is not in root
* mode.
*
* Case 3: vcpu exits to root mode and is blocked.
* vcpu_block() has already synced PIR to vIRR and
* never blocks vcpu if vIRR is not cleared. Therefore,
* a blocked vcpu here does not wait for any requested
* interrupts in PIR, and sending a notification event
* which has no effect is safe here.
*/
apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6491/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/dd84447b63a71fa8c3f47071b09454efc667767b
|
dd84447b63a71fa8c3f47071b09454efc667767b
|
Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProperty(Image *image,
const char *property,const char *value,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties == (void *) NULL)
image->properties=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,
RelinquishMagickMemory,RelinquishMagickMemory); /* create splay-tree */
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(DeleteImageProperty(image,property)); /* delete if NULL */
status=MagickTrue;
if (strlen(property) <= 1)
{
/*
Do not 'set' single letter properties - read only shorthand.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* FUTURE: binary chars or quotes in key should produce a error */
/* Set attributes with known names or special prefixes
return result is found, or break to set a free form properity
*/
switch (*property)
{
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case '8':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("8bim:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
#endif
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare("background",property) == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image->background_color,exception);
/* check for FUTURE: value exception?? */
/* also add user input to splay tree */
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channels",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("colorspace",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (colorspace < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
return(SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) colorspace,exception));
}
if (LocaleCompare("compose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compose;
compose=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (compose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compose=(CompositeOperator) compose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("compress",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (compression < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("delay",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & GreaterValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay > (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
else
if ((flags & LessValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay < (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(ssize_t)
floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
else
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("delay_units",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("density",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("depth",property) == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("dispose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (dispose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("exif:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("fx:",property,3) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gamma",property) == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("gravity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (gravity < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->gravity=(GravityType) gravity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("height",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("intensity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (intensity < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
interpolate;
interpolate=ParseCommandOption(MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (interpolate < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->interpolate=(PixelInterpolateMethod) interpolate;
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("iptc:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'K':
case 'k':
if (LocaleCompare("kurtosis",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("loop",property) == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
if ((LocaleCompare("magick",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("max",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("mean",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'O':
case 'o':
if (LocaleCompare("opaque",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("page",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("pixel:",property,6) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
if (LocaleCompare("profile",property) == 0)
{
ImageInfo
*image_info;
StringInfo
*profile;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) SetImageInfo(image_info,1,exception);
profile=FileToStringInfo(image_info->filename,~0UL,exception);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
status=SetImageProfile(image,image_info->magick,profile,exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("rendering-intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'S':
case 's':
if ((LocaleCompare("size",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("skewness",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("scenes",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("standard-deviation",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare("tile-offset",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare("units",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (units < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'V':
case 'v':
{
if (LocaleCompare("version",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("width",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("xmp:",property,4) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
}
/* Default: not an attribute, add as a property */
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->properties,
ConstantString(property),ConstantString(value));
/* FUTURE: error if status is bad? */
return(status);
}
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProperty(Image *image,
const char *property,const char *value,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties == (void *) NULL)
image->properties=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,
RelinquishMagickMemory,RelinquishMagickMemory); /* create splay-tree */
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(DeleteImageProperty(image,property)); /* delete if NULL */
status=MagickTrue;
if (strlen(property) <= 1)
{
/*
Do not 'set' single letter properties - read only shorthand.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* FUTURE: binary chars or quotes in key should produce a error */
/* Set attributes with known names or special prefixes
return result is found, or break to set a free form properity
*/
switch (*property)
{
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case '8':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("8bim:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
#endif
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare("background",property) == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image->background_color,exception);
/* check for FUTURE: value exception?? */
/* also add user input to splay tree */
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channels",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("colorspace",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (colorspace < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
return(SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) colorspace,exception));
}
if (LocaleCompare("compose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compose;
compose=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (compose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compose=(CompositeOperator) compose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("compress",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (compression < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("delay",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & GreaterValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay > (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
else
if ((flags & LessValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay < (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(ssize_t)
floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
else
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("delay_units",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("density",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("depth",property) == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("dispose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (dispose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("exif:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("fx:",property,3) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gamma",property) == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("gravity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (gravity < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->gravity=(GravityType) gravity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("height",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("intensity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (intensity < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
interpolate;
interpolate=ParseCommandOption(MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (interpolate < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->interpolate=(PixelInterpolateMethod) interpolate;
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("iptc:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'K':
case 'k':
if (LocaleCompare("kurtosis",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("loop",property) == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
if ((LocaleCompare("magick",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("max",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("mean",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'O':
case 'o':
if (LocaleCompare("opaque",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("page",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("pixel:",property,6) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
if (LocaleCompare("profile",property) == 0)
{
ImageInfo
*image_info;
StringInfo
*profile;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) SetImageInfo(image_info,1,exception);
profile=FileToStringInfo(image_info->filename,~0UL,exception);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
status=SetImageProfile(image,image_info->magick,profile,exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("rendering-intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'S':
case 's':
if ((LocaleCompare("size",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("skewness",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("scenes",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("standard-deviation",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare("tile-offset",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare("units",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (units < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'V':
case 'v':
{
if (LocaleCompare("version",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("width",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("xmp:",property,4) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
}
/* Default: not an attribute, add as a property */
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->properties,
ConstantString(property),ConstantString(value));
/* FUTURE: error if status is bad? */
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5093/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::IsShowingContextMenu() const {
return showing_context_menu_;
}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::IsShowingContextMenu() const {
return showing_context_menu_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
void AXObject::tokenVectorFromAttribute(Vector<String>& tokens,
const QualifiedName& attribute) const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node || !node->isElementNode())
return;
String attributeValue = getAttribute(attribute).getString();
if (attributeValue.isEmpty())
return;
attributeValue.simplifyWhiteSpace();
attributeValue.split(' ', tokens);
}
|
void AXObject::tokenVectorFromAttribute(Vector<String>& tokens,
const QualifiedName& attribute) const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node || !node->isElementNode())
return;
String attributeValue = getAttribute(attribute).getString();
if (attributeValue.isEmpty())
return;
attributeValue.simplifyWhiteSpace();
attributeValue.split(' ', tokens);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8Float64Array::wrapSlow(PassRefPtr<Float64Array> impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper;
V8Proxy* proxy = 0;
wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::instantiateV8Object(proxy, &info, impl.get());
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapperHandle = v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper);
if (!hasDependentLifetime)
wrapperHandle.MarkIndependent();
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl, wrapperHandle, isolate);
return wrapper;
}
|
v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8Float64Array::wrapSlow(PassRefPtr<Float64Array> impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper;
V8Proxy* proxy = 0;
wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::instantiateV8Object(proxy, &info, impl.get());
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapperHandle = v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper);
if (!hasDependentLifetime)
wrapperHandle.MarkIndependent();
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl, wrapperHandle, isolate);
return wrapper;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6401
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6401/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/akheron/jansson/commit/8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
static void json_delete_object(json_object_t *object)
{
hashtable_close(&object->hashtable);
jsonp_free(object);
}
|
static void json_delete_object(json_object_t *object)
{
hashtable_close(&object->hashtable);
jsonp_free(object);
}
|
C
|
jansson
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8816/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void usb_disconnect(struct usb_device **pdev)
{
struct usb_port *port_dev = NULL;
struct usb_device *udev = *pdev;
struct usb_hub *hub = NULL;
int port1 = 1;
/* mark the device as inactive, so any further urb submissions for
* this device (and any of its children) will fail immediately.
* this quiesces everything except pending urbs.
*/
usb_set_device_state(udev, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
dev_info(&udev->dev, "USB disconnect, device number %d\n",
udev->devnum);
usb_lock_device(udev);
hub_disconnect_children(udev);
/* deallocate hcd/hardware state ... nuking all pending urbs and
* cleaning up all state associated with the current configuration
* so that the hardware is now fully quiesced.
*/
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "unregistering device\n");
usb_disable_device(udev, 0);
usb_hcd_synchronize_unlinks(udev);
if (udev->parent) {
port1 = udev->portnum;
hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
port_dev = hub->ports[port1 - 1];
sysfs_remove_link(&udev->dev.kobj, "port");
sysfs_remove_link(&port_dev->dev.kobj, "device");
/*
* As usb_port_runtime_resume() de-references udev, make
* sure no resumes occur during removal
*/
if (!test_and_set_bit(port1, hub->child_usage_bits))
pm_runtime_get_sync(&port_dev->dev);
}
usb_remove_ep_devs(&udev->ep0);
usb_unlock_device(udev);
/* Unregister the device. The device driver is responsible
* for de-configuring the device and invoking the remove-device
* notifier chain (used by usbfs and possibly others).
*/
device_del(&udev->dev);
/* Free the device number and delete the parent's children[]
* (or root_hub) pointer.
*/
release_devnum(udev);
/* Avoid races with recursively_mark_NOTATTACHED() */
spin_lock_irq(&device_state_lock);
*pdev = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&device_state_lock);
if (port_dev && test_and_clear_bit(port1, hub->child_usage_bits))
pm_runtime_put(&port_dev->dev);
hub_free_dev(udev);
put_device(&udev->dev);
}
|
void usb_disconnect(struct usb_device **pdev)
{
struct usb_port *port_dev = NULL;
struct usb_device *udev = *pdev;
struct usb_hub *hub = NULL;
int port1 = 1;
/* mark the device as inactive, so any further urb submissions for
* this device (and any of its children) will fail immediately.
* this quiesces everything except pending urbs.
*/
usb_set_device_state(udev, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
dev_info(&udev->dev, "USB disconnect, device number %d\n",
udev->devnum);
usb_lock_device(udev);
hub_disconnect_children(udev);
/* deallocate hcd/hardware state ... nuking all pending urbs and
* cleaning up all state associated with the current configuration
* so that the hardware is now fully quiesced.
*/
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "unregistering device\n");
usb_disable_device(udev, 0);
usb_hcd_synchronize_unlinks(udev);
if (udev->parent) {
port1 = udev->portnum;
hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
port_dev = hub->ports[port1 - 1];
sysfs_remove_link(&udev->dev.kobj, "port");
sysfs_remove_link(&port_dev->dev.kobj, "device");
/*
* As usb_port_runtime_resume() de-references udev, make
* sure no resumes occur during removal
*/
if (!test_and_set_bit(port1, hub->child_usage_bits))
pm_runtime_get_sync(&port_dev->dev);
}
usb_remove_ep_devs(&udev->ep0);
usb_unlock_device(udev);
/* Unregister the device. The device driver is responsible
* for de-configuring the device and invoking the remove-device
* notifier chain (used by usbfs and possibly others).
*/
device_del(&udev->dev);
/* Free the device number and delete the parent's children[]
* (or root_hub) pointer.
*/
release_devnum(udev);
/* Avoid races with recursively_mark_NOTATTACHED() */
spin_lock_irq(&device_state_lock);
*pdev = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&device_state_lock);
if (port_dev && test_and_clear_bit(port1, hub->child_usage_bits))
pm_runtime_put(&port_dev->dev);
hub_free_dev(udev);
put_device(&udev->dev);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-0494
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-0494/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
|
1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
| null |
http_cleanup (void)
{
xfree (pconn.host);
if (wget_cookie_jar)
cookie_jar_delete (wget_cookie_jar);
}
|
http_cleanup (void)
{
xfree (pconn.host);
if (wget_cookie_jar)
cookie_jar_delete (wget_cookie_jar);
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0349/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b
|
0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b
|
Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
|
static int hidp_send_frame(struct socket *sock, unsigned char *data, int len)
{
struct kvec iv = { data, len };
struct msghdr msg;
BT_DBG("sock %p data %p len %d", sock, data, len);
if (!len)
return 0;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
return kernel_sendmsg(sock, &msg, &iv, 1, len);
}
|
static int hidp_send_frame(struct socket *sock, unsigned char *data, int len)
{
struct kvec iv = { data, len };
struct msghdr msg;
BT_DBG("sock %p data %p len %d", sock, data, len);
if (!len)
return 0;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
return kernel_sendmsg(sock, &msg, &iv, 1, len);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int nested_vmx_store_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
{
u32 i;
struct vmx_msr_entry e;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
struct msr_data msr_info;
if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu,
gpa + i * sizeof(e),
&e, 2 * sizeof(u32))) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s cannot read MSR entry (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
__func__, i, gpa + i * sizeof(e));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nested_vmx_store_msr_check(vcpu, &e)) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s check failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%x)\n",
__func__, i, e.index, e.reserved);
return -EINVAL;
}
msr_info.host_initiated = false;
msr_info.index = e.index;
if (kvm_get_msr(vcpu, &msr_info)) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s cannot read MSR (%u, 0x%x)\n",
__func__, i, e.index);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu,
gpa + i * sizeof(e) +
offsetof(struct vmx_msr_entry, value),
&msr_info.data, sizeof(msr_info.data))) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s cannot write MSR (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
__func__, i, e.index, msr_info.data);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int nested_vmx_store_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
{
u32 i;
struct vmx_msr_entry e;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
struct msr_data msr_info;
if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu,
gpa + i * sizeof(e),
&e, 2 * sizeof(u32))) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s cannot read MSR entry (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
__func__, i, gpa + i * sizeof(e));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nested_vmx_store_msr_check(vcpu, &e)) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s check failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%x)\n",
__func__, i, e.index, e.reserved);
return -EINVAL;
}
msr_info.host_initiated = false;
msr_info.index = e.index;
if (kvm_get_msr(vcpu, &msr_info)) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s cannot read MSR (%u, 0x%x)\n",
__func__, i, e.index);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu,
gpa + i * sizeof(e) +
offsetof(struct vmx_msr_entry, value),
&msr_info.data, sizeof(msr_info.data))) {
pr_debug_ratelimited(
"%s cannot write MSR (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
__func__, i, e.index, msr_info.data);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsProgram(GLuint client_id) {
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* program = GetProgramInfo(client_id);
return program != NULL && !program->IsDeleted();
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsProgram(GLuint client_id) {
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* program = GetProgramInfo(client_id);
return program != NULL && !program->IsDeleted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AeroPeekWindow::OnActivate(UINT action,
BOOL minimized,
HWND window) {
if (action == WA_INACTIVE)
return;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ActivateTab(tab_id_);
}
|
void AeroPeekWindow::OnActivate(UINT action,
BOOL minimized,
HWND window) {
if (action == WA_INACTIVE)
return;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ActivateTab(tab_id_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
unsigned long last_addr = m->version;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *tail_vma = NULL;
loff_t l = *pos;
/* Clear the per syscall fields in priv */
priv->task = NULL;
priv->tail_vma = NULL;
/*
* We remember last_addr rather than next_addr to hit with
* mmap_cache most of the time. We have zero last_addr at
* the beginning and also after lseek. We will have -1 last_addr
* after the end of the vmas.
*/
if (last_addr == -1UL)
return NULL;
priv->task = get_pid_task(priv->pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!priv->task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
mm = mm_for_maps(priv->task);
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
return mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
tail_vma = get_gate_vma(priv->task->mm);
priv->tail_vma = tail_vma;
/* Start with last addr hint */
vma = find_vma(mm, last_addr);
if (last_addr && vma) {
vma = vma->vm_next;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check the vma index is within the range and do
* sequential scan until m_index.
*/
vma = NULL;
if ((unsigned long)l < mm->map_count) {
vma = mm->mmap;
while (l-- && vma)
vma = vma->vm_next;
goto out;
}
if (l != mm->map_count)
tail_vma = NULL; /* After gate vma */
out:
if (vma)
return vma;
/* End of vmas has been reached */
m->version = (tail_vma != NULL)? 0: -1UL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
return tail_vma;
}
|
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
unsigned long last_addr = m->version;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *tail_vma = NULL;
loff_t l = *pos;
/* Clear the per syscall fields in priv */
priv->task = NULL;
priv->tail_vma = NULL;
/*
* We remember last_addr rather than next_addr to hit with
* mmap_cache most of the time. We have zero last_addr at
* the beginning and also after lseek. We will have -1 last_addr
* after the end of the vmas.
*/
if (last_addr == -1UL)
return NULL;
priv->task = get_pid_task(priv->pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!priv->task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
mm = mm_for_maps(priv->task);
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
return mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
tail_vma = get_gate_vma(priv->task->mm);
priv->tail_vma = tail_vma;
/* Start with last addr hint */
vma = find_vma(mm, last_addr);
if (last_addr && vma) {
vma = vma->vm_next;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check the vma index is within the range and do
* sequential scan until m_index.
*/
vma = NULL;
if ((unsigned long)l < mm->map_count) {
vma = mm->mmap;
while (l-- && vma)
vma = vma->vm_next;
goto out;
}
if (l != mm->map_count)
tail_vma = NULL; /* After gate vma */
out:
if (vma)
return vma;
/* End of vmas has been reached */
m->version = (tail_vma != NULL)? 0: -1UL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
return tail_vma;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
Scheduler/child/TimeSource could be replaced with base/time/DefaultTickClock.
They both are totally same and TimeSource is removed.
BUG=494892
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1163143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333035}
|
const char* TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicyToString(
TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy pump_policy) {
switch (pump_policy) {
case TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy::AUTO:
return "auto";
case TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy::AFTER_WAKEUP:
return "after_wakeup";
case TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy::MANUAL:
return "manual";
default:
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
}
|
const char* TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicyToString(
TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy pump_policy) {
switch (pump_policy) {
case TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy::AUTO:
return "auto";
case TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy::AFTER_WAKEUP:
return "after_wakeup";
case TaskQueueManager::PumpPolicy::MANUAL:
return "manual";
default:
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1281/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dff368031150a1033a1a3c913f8857679a0279be
|
dff368031150a1033a1a3c913f8857679a0279be
|
Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool layoutTestMode()
{
return LayoutTestSupport::isRunningLayoutTest();
}
|
bool layoutTestMode()
{
return LayoutTestSupport::isRunningLayoutTest();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6053/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2
|
6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2
|
TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
|
void DeleteURL(const GURL& url) { history_service()->DeleteURL(url); }
|
void DeleteURL(const GURL& url) { history_service()->DeleteURL(url); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
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