CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-12985
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12985/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/66df248b49095c261138b5a5e34d341a6bf9ac7f
|
66df248b49095c261138b5a5e34d341a6bf9ac7f
|
CVE-2017-12985/IPv6: Check for print routines returning -1 when running past the end.
rt6_print(), ah_print(), and esp_print() return -1 if they run up
against the end of the packet while dissecting; if that happens, stop
dissecting, don't try to fetch the next header value, because 1) *it*
might be past the end of the packet and 2) we won't be using it in any
case, as we'll be exiting the loop.
Also, change mobility_print() to return -1 if it runs up against the
end of the packet, and stop dissecting if it does so.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
|
nextproto6_cksum(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6, const uint8_t *data,
u_int len, u_int covlen, u_int next_proto)
{
struct {
struct in6_addr ph_src;
struct in6_addr ph_dst;
uint32_t ph_len;
uint8_t ph_zero[3];
uint8_t ph_nxt;
} ph;
struct cksum_vec vec[2];
/* pseudo-header */
memset(&ph, 0, sizeof(ph));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ph.ph_src, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof (struct in6_addr));
switch (ip6->ip6_nxt) {
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY_OLD:
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY:
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT:
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
/*
* The next header is either a routing header or a header
* after which there might be a routing header, so scan
* for a routing header.
*/
ip6_finddst(ndo, &ph.ph_dst, ip6);
break;
default:
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ph.ph_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof (struct in6_addr));
break;
}
ph.ph_len = htonl(len);
ph.ph_nxt = next_proto;
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(void *)&ph;
vec[0].len = sizeof(ph);
vec[1].ptr = data;
vec[1].len = covlen;
return in_cksum(vec, 2);
}
|
nextproto6_cksum(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6, const uint8_t *data,
u_int len, u_int covlen, u_int next_proto)
{
struct {
struct in6_addr ph_src;
struct in6_addr ph_dst;
uint32_t ph_len;
uint8_t ph_zero[3];
uint8_t ph_nxt;
} ph;
struct cksum_vec vec[2];
/* pseudo-header */
memset(&ph, 0, sizeof(ph));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ph.ph_src, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof (struct in6_addr));
switch (ip6->ip6_nxt) {
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY_OLD:
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY:
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT:
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
/*
* The next header is either a routing header or a header
* after which there might be a routing header, so scan
* for a routing header.
*/
ip6_finddst(ndo, &ph.ph_dst, ip6);
break;
default:
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ph.ph_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof (struct in6_addr));
break;
}
ph.ph_len = htonl(len);
ph.ph_nxt = next_proto;
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(void *)&ph;
vec[0].len = sizeof(ph);
vec[1].ptr = data;
vec[1].len = covlen;
return in_cksum(vec, 2);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1828/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
|
726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
|
net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_partial_delivery_point(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
u32 val;
if (len < sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(u32);
val = sctp_sk(sk)->pd_point;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_partial_delivery_point(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
u32 val;
if (len < sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(u32);
val = sctp_sk(sk)->pd_point;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickStatusType ReadPSDMergedImage(Image* image,
const PSDInfo* psd_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
MagickStatusType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
register ssize_t
i;
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (compression != Raw && compression != RLE)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeWarning,"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
return(MagickFalse);
}
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if (compression == RLE)
{
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(image,psd_info,image->rows*psd_info->channels);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) psd_info->channels; i++)
{
if (compression == RLE)
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(image,psd_info,i,offsets+(i*image->rows),
exception);
else
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(image,psd_info->channels,i,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,psd_info->channels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(image,MagickFalse);
if (offsets != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickStatusType ReadPSDMergedImage(Image* image,
const PSDInfo* psd_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
MagickStatusType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
register ssize_t
i;
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (compression != Raw && compression != RLE)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeWarning,"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
return(MagickFalse);
}
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if (compression == RLE)
{
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(image,psd_info,image->rows*psd_info->channels);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) psd_info->channels; i++)
{
if (compression == RLE)
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(image,psd_info,i,offsets+(i*image->rows),
exception);
else
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(image,psd_info->channels,i,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,psd_info->channels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(image,MagickFalse);
if (offsets != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13300/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/a906fe9298bf89e01d5272023db687935068849a
|
a906fe9298bf89e01d5272023db687935068849a
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586
|
static PixelChannels **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *image)
static PixelChannels **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
PixelChannels
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
columns,
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(PixelChannels **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (PixelChannels **) NULL)
return((PixelChannels **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
pixels[i]=(PixelChannels *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (PixelChannels *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
{
register ssize_t
k;
for (k=0; k < MaxPixelChannels; k++)
pixels[i][j].channel[k]=0.0;
}
}
return(pixels);
}
|
static PixelChannels **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *image)
{
PixelChannels
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(PixelChannels **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (PixelChannels **) NULL)
return((PixelChannels **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
pixels[i]=(PixelChannels *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (PixelChannels *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->columns; j++)
{
register ssize_t
k;
for (k=0; k < MaxPixelChannels; k++)
pixels[i][j].channel[k]=0.0;
}
}
return(pixels);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 1 |
CVE-2014-9903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9903/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
set_table_entry(struct ctl_table *entry,
const char *procname, void *data, int maxlen,
umode_t mode, proc_handler *proc_handler,
bool load_idx)
{
entry->procname = procname;
entry->data = data;
entry->maxlen = maxlen;
entry->mode = mode;
entry->proc_handler = proc_handler;
if (load_idx) {
entry->extra1 = &min_load_idx;
entry->extra2 = &max_load_idx;
}
}
|
set_table_entry(struct ctl_table *entry,
const char *procname, void *data, int maxlen,
umode_t mode, proc_handler *proc_handler,
bool load_idx)
{
entry->procname = procname;
entry->data = data;
entry->maxlen = maxlen;
entry->mode = mode;
entry->proc_handler = proc_handler;
if (load_idx) {
entry->extra1 = &min_load_idx;
entry->extra2 = &max_load_idx;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2795
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2795/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2
|
73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2
|
There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
int Range::maxStartOffset() const
{
if (!m_start.container())
return 0;
if (!m_start.container()->offsetInCharacters())
return m_start.container()->childNodeCount();
return m_start.container()->maxCharacterOffset();
}
|
int Range::maxStartOffset() const
{
if (!m_start.container())
return 0;
if (!m_start.container()->offsetInCharacters())
return m_start.container()->childNodeCount();
return m_start.container()->maxCharacterOffset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2784/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/225e7438996c9c939bd239376dfa93e562972cf8
|
225e7438996c9c939bd239376dfa93e562972cf8
|
Update PrerenderBrowserTests to work with new
PrerenderContents.
Also update PrerenderContents to pass plugin
and HTML5 prerender tests.
BUG=81229
TEST=PrerenderBrowserTests (Once the new code is enabled)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6905169
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83841 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool UrlIsInPrerenderManager(const GURL& url) {
return (prerender_manager()->FindEntry(url) != NULL);
}
|
bool UrlIsInPrerenderManager(const GURL& url) {
return (prerender_manager()->FindEntry(url) != NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0375/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
|
connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out,
const tor_addr_t *addr,
uint32_t ttl)
{
const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
int connected_payload_len;
/* should be needless */
memset(payload_out, 0, MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
if (family == AF_INET) {
set_uint32(payload_out, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(addr));
connected_payload_len = 4;
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
set_uint32(payload_out, 0);
set_uint8(payload_out + 4, 6);
memcpy(payload_out + 5, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(addr), 16);
connected_payload_len = 21;
} else {
return -1;
}
set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(ttl)));
connected_payload_len += 4;
tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
return connected_payload_len;
}
|
connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out,
const tor_addr_t *addr,
uint32_t ttl)
{
const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
int connected_payload_len;
/* should be needless */
memset(payload_out, 0, MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
if (family == AF_INET) {
set_uint32(payload_out, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(addr));
connected_payload_len = 4;
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
set_uint32(payload_out, 0);
set_uint8(payload_out + 4, 6);
memcpy(payload_out + 5, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(addr), 16);
connected_payload_len = 21;
} else {
return -1;
}
set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(ttl)));
connected_payload_len += 4;
tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
return connected_payload_len;
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline void update_sg_lb_stats(struct lb_env *env,
struct sched_group *group,
struct sg_lb_stats *sgs,
int *sg_status)
{
int local_group = cpumask_test_cpu(env->dst_cpu, sched_group_span(group));
int load_idx = get_sd_load_idx(env->sd, env->idle);
unsigned long load;
int i, nr_running;
memset(sgs, 0, sizeof(*sgs));
for_each_cpu_and(i, sched_group_span(group), env->cpus) {
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(i);
if ((env->flags & LBF_NOHZ_STATS) && update_nohz_stats(rq, false))
env->flags |= LBF_NOHZ_AGAIN;
/* Bias balancing toward CPUs of our domain: */
if (local_group)
load = target_load(i, load_idx);
else
load = source_load(i, load_idx);
sgs->group_load += load;
sgs->group_util += cpu_util(i);
sgs->sum_nr_running += rq->cfs.h_nr_running;
nr_running = rq->nr_running;
if (nr_running > 1)
*sg_status |= SG_OVERLOAD;
if (cpu_overutilized(i))
*sg_status |= SG_OVERUTILIZED;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
sgs->nr_numa_running += rq->nr_numa_running;
sgs->nr_preferred_running += rq->nr_preferred_running;
#endif
sgs->sum_weighted_load += weighted_cpuload(rq);
/*
* No need to call idle_cpu() if nr_running is not 0
*/
if (!nr_running && idle_cpu(i))
sgs->idle_cpus++;
if (env->sd->flags & SD_ASYM_CPUCAPACITY &&
sgs->group_misfit_task_load < rq->misfit_task_load) {
sgs->group_misfit_task_load = rq->misfit_task_load;
*sg_status |= SG_OVERLOAD;
}
}
/* Adjust by relative CPU capacity of the group */
sgs->group_capacity = group->sgc->capacity;
sgs->avg_load = (sgs->group_load*SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE) / sgs->group_capacity;
if (sgs->sum_nr_running)
sgs->load_per_task = sgs->sum_weighted_load / sgs->sum_nr_running;
sgs->group_weight = group->group_weight;
sgs->group_no_capacity = group_is_overloaded(env, sgs);
sgs->group_type = group_classify(group, sgs);
}
|
static inline void update_sg_lb_stats(struct lb_env *env,
struct sched_group *group,
struct sg_lb_stats *sgs,
int *sg_status)
{
int local_group = cpumask_test_cpu(env->dst_cpu, sched_group_span(group));
int load_idx = get_sd_load_idx(env->sd, env->idle);
unsigned long load;
int i, nr_running;
memset(sgs, 0, sizeof(*sgs));
for_each_cpu_and(i, sched_group_span(group), env->cpus) {
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(i);
if ((env->flags & LBF_NOHZ_STATS) && update_nohz_stats(rq, false))
env->flags |= LBF_NOHZ_AGAIN;
/* Bias balancing toward CPUs of our domain: */
if (local_group)
load = target_load(i, load_idx);
else
load = source_load(i, load_idx);
sgs->group_load += load;
sgs->group_util += cpu_util(i);
sgs->sum_nr_running += rq->cfs.h_nr_running;
nr_running = rq->nr_running;
if (nr_running > 1)
*sg_status |= SG_OVERLOAD;
if (cpu_overutilized(i))
*sg_status |= SG_OVERUTILIZED;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
sgs->nr_numa_running += rq->nr_numa_running;
sgs->nr_preferred_running += rq->nr_preferred_running;
#endif
sgs->sum_weighted_load += weighted_cpuload(rq);
/*
* No need to call idle_cpu() if nr_running is not 0
*/
if (!nr_running && idle_cpu(i))
sgs->idle_cpus++;
if (env->sd->flags & SD_ASYM_CPUCAPACITY &&
sgs->group_misfit_task_load < rq->misfit_task_load) {
sgs->group_misfit_task_load = rq->misfit_task_load;
*sg_status |= SG_OVERLOAD;
}
}
/* Adjust by relative CPU capacity of the group */
sgs->group_capacity = group->sgc->capacity;
sgs->avg_load = (sgs->group_load*SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE) / sgs->group_capacity;
if (sgs->sum_nr_running)
sgs->load_per_task = sgs->sum_weighted_load / sgs->sum_nr_running;
sgs->group_weight = group->group_weight;
sgs->group_no_capacity = group_is_overloaded(env, sgs);
sgs->group_type = group_classify(group, sgs);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5532
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5532/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/95a69adab9acfc3981c504737a2b6578e4d846ef
|
95a69adab9acfc3981c504737a2b6578e4d846ef
|
tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <[email protected]>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static char *kvp_get_if_name(char *guid)
{
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *entry;
FILE *file;
char *p, *q, *x;
char *if_name = NULL;
char buf[256];
char *kvp_net_dir = "/sys/class/net/";
char dev_id[256];
dir = opendir(kvp_net_dir);
if (dir == NULL)
return NULL;
snprintf(dev_id, sizeof(dev_id), "%s", kvp_net_dir);
q = dev_id + strlen(kvp_net_dir);
while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
/*
* Set the state for the next pass.
*/
*q = '\0';
strcat(dev_id, entry->d_name);
strcat(dev_id, "/device/device_id");
file = fopen(dev_id, "r");
if (file == NULL)
continue;
p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), file);
if (p) {
x = strchr(p, '\n');
if (x)
*x = '\0';
if (!strcmp(p, guid)) {
/*
* Found the guid match; return the interface
* name. The caller will free the memory.
*/
if_name = strdup(entry->d_name);
fclose(file);
break;
}
}
fclose(file);
}
closedir(dir);
return if_name;
}
|
static char *kvp_get_if_name(char *guid)
{
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *entry;
FILE *file;
char *p, *q, *x;
char *if_name = NULL;
char buf[256];
char *kvp_net_dir = "/sys/class/net/";
char dev_id[256];
dir = opendir(kvp_net_dir);
if (dir == NULL)
return NULL;
snprintf(dev_id, sizeof(dev_id), "%s", kvp_net_dir);
q = dev_id + strlen(kvp_net_dir);
while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
/*
* Set the state for the next pass.
*/
*q = '\0';
strcat(dev_id, entry->d_name);
strcat(dev_id, "/device/device_id");
file = fopen(dev_id, "r");
if (file == NULL)
continue;
p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), file);
if (p) {
x = strchr(p, '\n');
if (x)
*x = '\0';
if (!strcmp(p, guid)) {
/*
* Found the guid match; return the interface
* name. The caller will free the memory.
*/
if_name = strdup(entry->d_name);
fclose(file);
break;
}
}
fclose(file);
}
closedir(dir);
return if_name;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11469
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11469/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.8.git;a=commit;h=17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
|
17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
| null |
smp_fetch_url_port(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
txn = smp->strm->txn;
url2sa(txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL);
if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_family != AF_INET)
return 0;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT;
smp->data.u.sint = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_port);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
|
smp_fetch_url_port(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
txn = smp->strm->txn;
url2sa(txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL);
if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_family != AF_INET)
return 0;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT;
smp->data.u.sint = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_port);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2019-6978
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-6978/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae
|
089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae
|
Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
|
const char * gdJpegGetVersionString()
{
switch(JPEG_LIB_VERSION) {
case 62:
return "6b";
break;
case 70:
return "7";
break;
case 80:
return "8";
break;
case 90:
return "9 compatible";
break;
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
|
const char * gdJpegGetVersionString()
{
switch(JPEG_LIB_VERSION) {
case 62:
return "6b";
break;
case 70:
return "7";
break;
case 80:
return "8";
break;
case 90:
return "9 compatible";
break;
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3168/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d
|
f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d
|
SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void SVGDocumentExtensions::markPendingResourcesForRemoval(const AtomicString& id)
{
if (id.isEmpty())
return;
ASSERT(!m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.contains(id));
OwnPtr<SVGPendingElements> existing = m_pendingResources.take(id);
if (existing && !existing->isEmpty())
m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.add(id, existing.release());
}
|
void SVGDocumentExtensions::markPendingResourcesForRemoval(const AtomicString& id)
{
if (id.isEmpty())
return;
ASSERT(!m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.contains(id));
OwnPtr<SVGPendingElements> existing = m_pendingResources.take(id);
if (existing && !existing->isEmpty())
m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.add(id, existing.release());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Browser::is_app() const {
return !app_name_.empty();
}
|
bool Browser::is_app() const {
return !app_name_.empty();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6049
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6049/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56762260ca8ef62578fa4718b7d47711f7e120dc
|
56762260ca8ef62578fa4718b7d47711f7e120dc
|
Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
|
bool PermissionPromptImpl::CanAcceptRequestUpdate() {
return !(bubble_delegate_ && bubble_delegate_->IsMouseHovered());
}
|
bool PermissionPromptImpl::CanAcceptRequestUpdate() {
return !(bubble_delegate_ && bubble_delegate_->IsMouseHovered());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/57fb5393bf051c590769c9b5723d5a9f4090a4cc
|
57fb5393bf051c590769c9b5723d5a9f4090a4cc
|
Implement range reading for NetworkReaderProxy.
The feature is not yet actually used, but will be used for range reading
of DriveFileStreamReader.
BUG=127129
TEST=Ran unit_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14493008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196636 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int DriveFileStreamReader::Read(net::IOBuffer* buffer, int buffer_length,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(reader_proxy_);
DCHECK(buffer);
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
return reader_proxy_->Read(buffer, buffer_length, callback);
}
|
int DriveFileStreamReader::Read(net::IOBuffer* buffer, int buffer_length,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(reader_proxy_);
DCHECK(buffer);
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
return reader_proxy_->Read(buffer, buffer_length, callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9105
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9105/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=4c1586787ff43c9acd18a56c12d720e3e6be9f7c
|
4c1586787ff43c9acd18a56c12d720e3e6be9f7c
| null |
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
{
ssize_t err;
int32_t fid;
uint64_t off;
uint32_t count;
int32_t len = 0;
int32_t total = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
QEMUIOVector qiov_full;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dqd", &fid, &off, &count);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return;
}
offset += err;
v9fs_init_qiov_from_pdu(&qiov_full, pdu, offset, count, true);
trace_v9fs_write(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, off, count, qiov_full.niov);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
if (fidp->fs.fd == -1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
/*
* setxattr operation
*/
err = v9fs_xattr_write(s, pdu, fidp, off, count,
qiov_full.iov, qiov_full.niov);
goto out;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
qemu_iovec_init(&qiov, qiov_full.niov);
do {
qemu_iovec_reset(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&qiov, &qiov_full, total, qiov_full.size - total);
if (0) {
print_sg(qiov.iov, qiov.niov);
}
/* Loop in case of EINTR */
do {
len = v9fs_co_pwritev(pdu, fidp, qiov.iov, qiov.niov, off);
if (len >= 0) {
off += len;
total += len;
}
} while (len == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
if (len < 0) {
/* IO error return the error */
err = len;
goto out_qiov;
}
} while (total < count && len > 0);
offset = 7;
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);
out_qiov:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
|
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
{
ssize_t err;
int32_t fid;
uint64_t off;
uint32_t count;
int32_t len = 0;
int32_t total = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
QEMUIOVector qiov_full;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dqd", &fid, &off, &count);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return;
}
offset += err;
v9fs_init_qiov_from_pdu(&qiov_full, pdu, offset, count, true);
trace_v9fs_write(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, off, count, qiov_full.niov);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
if (fidp->fs.fd == -1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
/*
* setxattr operation
*/
err = v9fs_xattr_write(s, pdu, fidp, off, count,
qiov_full.iov, qiov_full.niov);
goto out;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
qemu_iovec_init(&qiov, qiov_full.niov);
do {
qemu_iovec_reset(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&qiov, &qiov_full, total, qiov_full.size - total);
if (0) {
print_sg(qiov.iov, qiov.niov);
}
/* Loop in case of EINTR */
do {
len = v9fs_co_pwritev(pdu, fidp, qiov.iov, qiov.niov, off);
if (len >= 0) {
off += len;
total += len;
}
} while (len == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
if (len < 0) {
/* IO error return the error */
err = len;
goto out_qiov;
}
} while (total < count && len > 0);
offset = 7;
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);
out_qiov:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static inline int mpol_store_user_nodemask(const struct mempolicy *pol)
{
return pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS;
}
|
static inline int mpol_store_user_nodemask(const struct mempolicy *pol)
{
return pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByResourceId(
const std::string& resource_id,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
RunTaskOnUIThread(
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByResourceIdOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
resource_id,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
|
void GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByResourceId(
const std::string& resource_id,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
RunTaskOnUIThread(
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByResourceIdOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
resource_id,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
qreal OxideQQuickWebView::viewportWidth() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return 0.f;
}
return const_cast<OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate*>(
d)->proxy_->compositorFrameViewportSize().width();
}
|
qreal OxideQQuickWebView::viewportWidth() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return 0.f;
}
return const_cast<OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate*>(
d)->proxy_->compositorFrameViewportSize().width();
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SetKnownToValidate(const std::string& signature) {
if (!listener_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_SetKnownToValidate(signature))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to update NaCl validation cache.";
}
}
|
void SetKnownToValidate(const std::string& signature) {
if (!listener_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_SetKnownToValidate(signature))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to update NaCl validation cache.";
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5155
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5155/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/32a9879fc01c24f9216bb2975200ab8a4afac80c
|
32a9879fc01c24f9216bb2975200ab8a4afac80c
|
Prefer SyncService over ProfileSyncService in foreign_session_helper
SyncService is the interface, ProfileSyncService is the concrete
implementation. Generally no clients should need to use the conrete
implementation - for one, testing will be much easier once everyone
uses the interface only.
Bug: 924508
Change-Id: Ia210665f8f02512053d1a60d627dea0f22758387
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1461119
Auto-Submit: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yaron Friedman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630662}
|
ForeignSessionHelper::~ForeignSessionHelper() {
}
|
ForeignSessionHelper::~ForeignSessionHelper() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::OnRecognitionResults(
int session_id,
const std::vector<blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionResultPtr>& results) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!SessionExists(session_id))
return;
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* delegate_listener = GetDelegateListener())
delegate_listener->OnRecognitionResults(session_id, results);
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* listener = GetListener(session_id))
listener->OnRecognitionResults(session_id, results);
}
|
void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::OnRecognitionResults(
int session_id,
const std::vector<blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionResultPtr>& results) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!SessionExists(session_id))
return;
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* delegate_listener = GetDelegateListener())
delegate_listener->OnRecognitionResults(session_id, results);
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* listener = GetListener(session_id))
listener->OnRecognitionResults(session_id, results);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
delete_cb (GtkDialog *dialog)
{
gtk_dialog_response (dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT);
return TRUE;
}
|
delete_cb (GtkDialog *dialog)
{
gtk_dialog_response (dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct net_device *dev_get_by_name_rcu(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct hlist_head *head = dev_name_hash(net, name);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, head, name_hlist)
if (!strncmp(dev->name, name, IFNAMSIZ))
return dev;
return NULL;
}
|
struct net_device *dev_get_by_name_rcu(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct hlist_head *head = dev_name_hash(net, name);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, head, name_hlist)
if (!strncmp(dev->name, name, IFNAMSIZ))
return dev;
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
void __fuse_get_request(struct fuse_req *req)
{
refcount_inc(&req->count);
}
|
void __fuse_get_request(struct fuse_req *req)
{
refcount_inc(&req->count);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6787/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
__perf_event_exit_task(struct perf_event *child_event,
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx,
struct task_struct *child)
{
/*
* Do not destroy the 'original' grouping; because of the context
* switch optimization the original events could've ended up in a
* random child task.
*
* If we were to destroy the original group, all group related
* operations would cease to function properly after this random
* child dies.
*
* Do destroy all inherited groups, we don't care about those
* and being thorough is better.
*/
perf_remove_from_context(child_event, !!child_event->parent);
/*
* It can happen that the parent exits first, and has events
* that are still around due to the child reference. These
* events need to be zapped.
*/
if (child_event->parent) {
sync_child_event(child_event, child);
free_event(child_event);
} else {
child_event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_EXIT;
perf_event_wakeup(child_event);
}
}
|
__perf_event_exit_task(struct perf_event *child_event,
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx,
struct task_struct *child)
{
/*
* Do not destroy the 'original' grouping; because of the context
* switch optimization the original events could've ended up in a
* random child task.
*
* If we were to destroy the original group, all group related
* operations would cease to function properly after this random
* child dies.
*
* Do destroy all inherited groups, we don't care about those
* and being thorough is better.
*/
perf_remove_from_context(child_event, !!child_event->parent);
/*
* It can happen that the parent exits first, and has events
* that are still around due to the child reference. These
* events need to be zapped.
*/
if (child_event->parent) {
sync_child_event(child_event, child);
free_event(child_event);
} else {
child_event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_EXIT;
perf_event_wakeup(child_event);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
SVGDocumentExtensions& Document::AccessSVGExtensions() {
if (!svg_extensions_)
svg_extensions_ = MakeGarbageCollected<SVGDocumentExtensions>(this);
return *svg_extensions_;
}
|
SVGDocumentExtensions& Document::AccessSVGExtensions() {
if (!svg_extensions_)
svg_extensions_ = MakeGarbageCollected<SVGDocumentExtensions>(this);
return *svg_extensions_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0879/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void APIPermissionInfo::RegisterAllPermissions(
PermissionsInfo* info) {
struct PermissionRegistration {
APIPermission::ID id;
const char* name;
int flags;
int l10n_message_id;
PermissionMessage::ID message_id;
APIPermissionConstructor constructor;
} PermissionsToRegister[] = {
{ APIPermission::kBackground, "background" },
{ APIPermission::kClipboardRead, "clipboardRead", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_CLIPBOARD,
PermissionMessage::kClipboard },
{ APIPermission::kClipboardWrite, "clipboardWrite" },
{ APIPermission::kDeclarativeWebRequest, "declarativeWebRequest" },
{ APIPermission::kDownloads, "downloads", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_DOWNLOADS,
PermissionMessage::kDownloads },
{ APIPermission::kExperimental, "experimental", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kGeolocation, "geolocation", kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_GEOLOCATION,
PermissionMessage::kGeolocation },
{ APIPermission::kNotification, "notifications" },
{ APIPermission::kUnlimitedStorage, "unlimitedStorage",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kAppNotifications, "appNotifications" },
{ APIPermission::kActiveTab, "activeTab" },
{ APIPermission::kAlarms, "alarms" },
{ APIPermission::kBookmark, "bookmarks", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BOOKMARKS,
PermissionMessage::kBookmarks },
{ APIPermission::kBrowsingData, "browsingData" },
{ APIPermission::kContentSettings, "contentSettings", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_CONTENT_SETTINGS,
PermissionMessage::kContentSettings },
{ APIPermission::kContextMenus, "contextMenus" },
{ APIPermission::kCookie, "cookies" },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserHandler, "fileBrowserHandler",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFontSettings, "fontSettings", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kHistory, "history", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BROWSING_HISTORY,
PermissionMessage::kBrowsingHistory },
{ APIPermission::kIdle, "idle" },
{ APIPermission::kInput, "input", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_INPUT,
PermissionMessage::kInput },
{ APIPermission::kManagement, "management", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_MANAGEMENT,
PermissionMessage::kManagement },
{ APIPermission::kPrivacy, "privacy", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_PRIVACY,
PermissionMessage::kPrivacy },
{ APIPermission::kStorage, "storage" },
{ APIPermission::kSyncFileSystem, "syncFileSystem" },
{ APIPermission::kTab, "tabs", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TABS,
PermissionMessage::kTabs },
{ APIPermission::kTopSites, "topSites", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BROWSING_HISTORY,
PermissionMessage::kBrowsingHistory },
{ APIPermission::kTts, "tts", 0, kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kTtsEngine, "ttsEngine", kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TTS_ENGINE,
PermissionMessage::kTtsEngine },
{ APIPermission::kWebNavigation, "webNavigation", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TABS, PermissionMessage::kTabs },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequest, "webRequest" },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequestBlocking, "webRequestBlocking" },
{ APIPermission::kWebView, "webview", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kBookmarkManagerPrivate, "bookmarkManagerPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kChromeosInfoPrivate, "chromeosInfoPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kDial, "dial", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserHandlerInternal, "fileBrowserHandlerInternal",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserPrivate, "fileBrowserPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kManagedModePrivate, "managedModePrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMediaPlayerPrivate, "mediaPlayerPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMetricsPrivate, "metricsPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kSystemPrivate, "systemPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kCloudPrintPrivate, "cloudPrintPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kInputMethodPrivate, "inputMethodPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kEchoPrivate, "echoPrivate", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kRtcPrivate, "rtcPrivate", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kTerminalPrivate, "terminalPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWallpaperPrivate, "wallpaperPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequestInternal, "webRequestInternal" },
{ APIPermission::kWebSocketProxyPrivate, "webSocketProxyPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWebstorePrivate, "webstorePrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesPrivate, "mediaGalleriesPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kDebugger, "debugger",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_DEBUGGER,
PermissionMessage::kDebugger },
{ APIPermission::kDevtools, "devtools",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kPageCapture, "pageCapture",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess },
{ APIPermission::kTabCapture, "tabCapture",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess },
{ APIPermission::kPlugin, "plugin",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagImpliesFullAccess |
kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_FULL_ACCESS,
PermissionMessage::kFullAccess },
{ APIPermission::kProxy, "proxy",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kSerial, "serial", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_SERIAL,
PermissionMessage::kSerial },
{ APIPermission::kSocket, "socket", kFlagCannotBeOptional, 0,
PermissionMessage::kNone, &::CreateAPIPermission<SocketPermission> },
{ APIPermission::kAppCurrentWindowInternal, "app.currentWindowInternal" },
{ APIPermission::kAppRuntime, "app.runtime" },
{ APIPermission::kAppWindow, "app.window" },
{ APIPermission::kAudioCapture, "audioCapture", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_AUDIO_CAPTURE,
PermissionMessage::kAudioCapture },
{ APIPermission::kVideoCapture, "videoCapture", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
PermissionMessage::kVideoCapture },
{ APIPermission::kFileSystem, "fileSystem" },
{ APIPermission::kFileSystemWrite, "fileSystem.write", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_FILE_SYSTEM_WRITE,
PermissionMessage::kFileSystemWrite },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleries, "mediaGalleries" },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesRead, "mediaGalleries.read" },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesAllAutoDetected,
"mediaGalleries.allAutoDetected", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_MEDIA_GALLERIES_ALL_GALLERIES,
PermissionMessage::kMediaGalleriesAllGalleries },
{ APIPermission::kPushMessaging, "pushMessaging", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kBluetooth, "bluetooth", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BLUETOOTH,
PermissionMessage::kBluetooth },
{ APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice, "bluetoothDevice",
kFlagNone, 0, PermissionMessage::kNone,
&::CreateAPIPermission<BluetoothDevicePermission> },
{ APIPermission::kUsb, "usb", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_USB,
PermissionMessage::kUsb },
{ APIPermission::kSystemIndicator, "systemIndicator", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_SYSTEM_INDICATOR,
PermissionMessage::kSystemIndicator },
{ APIPermission::kPointerLock, "pointerLock" },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(PermissionsToRegister); ++i) {
const PermissionRegistration& pr = PermissionsToRegister[i];
info->RegisterPermission(
pr.id, pr.name, pr.l10n_message_id,
pr.message_id ? pr.message_id : PermissionMessage::kNone,
pr.flags,
pr.constructor);
}
info->RegisterAlias("unlimitedStorage", kOldUnlimitedStoragePermission);
info->RegisterAlias("tabs", kWindowsPermission);
}
|
void APIPermissionInfo::RegisterAllPermissions(
PermissionsInfo* info) {
struct PermissionRegistration {
APIPermission::ID id;
const char* name;
int flags;
int l10n_message_id;
PermissionMessage::ID message_id;
APIPermissionConstructor constructor;
} PermissionsToRegister[] = {
{ APIPermission::kBackground, "background" },
{ APIPermission::kClipboardRead, "clipboardRead", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_CLIPBOARD,
PermissionMessage::kClipboard },
{ APIPermission::kClipboardWrite, "clipboardWrite" },
{ APIPermission::kDeclarativeWebRequest, "declarativeWebRequest" },
{ APIPermission::kDownloads, "downloads", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_DOWNLOADS,
PermissionMessage::kDownloads },
{ APIPermission::kExperimental, "experimental", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kGeolocation, "geolocation", kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_GEOLOCATION,
PermissionMessage::kGeolocation },
{ APIPermission::kNotification, "notifications" },
{ APIPermission::kUnlimitedStorage, "unlimitedStorage",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kAppNotifications, "appNotifications" },
{ APIPermission::kActiveTab, "activeTab" },
{ APIPermission::kAlarms, "alarms" },
{ APIPermission::kBookmark, "bookmarks", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BOOKMARKS,
PermissionMessage::kBookmarks },
{ APIPermission::kBrowsingData, "browsingData" },
{ APIPermission::kContentSettings, "contentSettings", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_CONTENT_SETTINGS,
PermissionMessage::kContentSettings },
{ APIPermission::kContextMenus, "contextMenus" },
{ APIPermission::kCookie, "cookies" },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserHandler, "fileBrowserHandler",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFontSettings, "fontSettings", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kHistory, "history", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BROWSING_HISTORY,
PermissionMessage::kBrowsingHistory },
{ APIPermission::kIdle, "idle" },
{ APIPermission::kInput, "input", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_INPUT,
PermissionMessage::kInput },
{ APIPermission::kManagement, "management", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_MANAGEMENT,
PermissionMessage::kManagement },
{ APIPermission::kPrivacy, "privacy", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_PRIVACY,
PermissionMessage::kPrivacy },
{ APIPermission::kStorage, "storage" },
{ APIPermission::kSyncFileSystem, "syncFileSystem" },
{ APIPermission::kTab, "tabs", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TABS,
PermissionMessage::kTabs },
{ APIPermission::kTopSites, "topSites", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BROWSING_HISTORY,
PermissionMessage::kBrowsingHistory },
{ APIPermission::kTts, "tts", 0, kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kTtsEngine, "ttsEngine", kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TTS_ENGINE,
PermissionMessage::kTtsEngine },
{ APIPermission::kWebNavigation, "webNavigation", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_TABS, PermissionMessage::kTabs },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequest, "webRequest" },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequestBlocking, "webRequestBlocking" },
{ APIPermission::kWebView, "webview", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kBookmarkManagerPrivate, "bookmarkManagerPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kChromeosInfoPrivate, "chromeosInfoPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserHandlerInternal, "fileBrowserHandlerInternal",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kFileBrowserPrivate, "fileBrowserPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kManagedModePrivate, "managedModePrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMediaPlayerPrivate, "mediaPlayerPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMetricsPrivate, "metricsPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kSystemPrivate, "systemPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kCloudPrintPrivate, "cloudPrintPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kInputMethodPrivate, "inputMethodPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kEchoPrivate, "echoPrivate", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kRtcPrivate, "rtcPrivate", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kTerminalPrivate, "terminalPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWallpaperPrivate, "wallpaperPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWebRequestInternal, "webRequestInternal" },
{ APIPermission::kWebSocketProxyPrivate, "webSocketProxyPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kWebstorePrivate, "webstorePrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesPrivate, "mediaGalleriesPrivate",
kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kDebugger, "debugger",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_DEBUGGER,
PermissionMessage::kDebugger },
{ APIPermission::kDevtools, "devtools",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kPageCapture, "pageCapture",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess },
{ APIPermission::kTabCapture, "tabCapture",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess },
{ APIPermission::kPlugin, "plugin",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagImpliesFullAccess |
kFlagCannotBeOptional,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_FULL_ACCESS,
PermissionMessage::kFullAccess },
{ APIPermission::kProxy, "proxy",
kFlagImpliesFullURLAccess | kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kSerial, "serial", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_SERIAL,
PermissionMessage::kSerial },
{ APIPermission::kSocket, "socket", kFlagCannotBeOptional, 0,
PermissionMessage::kNone, &::CreateAPIPermission<SocketPermission> },
{ APIPermission::kAppCurrentWindowInternal, "app.currentWindowInternal" },
{ APIPermission::kAppRuntime, "app.runtime" },
{ APIPermission::kAppWindow, "app.window" },
{ APIPermission::kAudioCapture, "audioCapture", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_AUDIO_CAPTURE,
PermissionMessage::kAudioCapture },
{ APIPermission::kVideoCapture, "videoCapture", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
PermissionMessage::kVideoCapture },
{ APIPermission::kFileSystem, "fileSystem" },
{ APIPermission::kFileSystemWrite, "fileSystem.write", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_FILE_SYSTEM_WRITE,
PermissionMessage::kFileSystemWrite },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleries, "mediaGalleries" },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesRead, "mediaGalleries.read" },
{ APIPermission::kMediaGalleriesAllAutoDetected,
"mediaGalleries.allAutoDetected", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_MEDIA_GALLERIES_ALL_GALLERIES,
PermissionMessage::kMediaGalleriesAllGalleries },
{ APIPermission::kPushMessaging, "pushMessaging", kFlagCannotBeOptional },
{ APIPermission::kBluetooth, "bluetooth", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_BLUETOOTH,
PermissionMessage::kBluetooth },
{ APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice, "bluetoothDevice",
kFlagNone, 0, PermissionMessage::kNone,
&::CreateAPIPermission<BluetoothDevicePermission> },
{ APIPermission::kUsb, "usb", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_USB,
PermissionMessage::kUsb },
{ APIPermission::kSystemIndicator, "systemIndicator", kFlagNone,
IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_WARNING_SYSTEM_INDICATOR,
PermissionMessage::kSystemIndicator },
{ APIPermission::kPointerLock, "pointerLock" },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(PermissionsToRegister); ++i) {
const PermissionRegistration& pr = PermissionsToRegister[i];
info->RegisterPermission(
pr.id, pr.name, pr.l10n_message_id,
pr.message_id ? pr.message_id : PermissionMessage::kNone,
pr.flags,
pr.constructor);
}
info->RegisterAlias("unlimitedStorage", kOldUnlimitedStoragePermission);
info->RegisterAlias("tabs", kWindowsPermission);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserTabStripController::CloseTab(int model_index,
CloseTabSource source) {
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
tabstrip_->PrepareForCloseAt(model_index, source);
model_->CloseTabContentsAt(model_index,
TabStripModel::CLOSE_USER_GESTURE |
TabStripModel::CLOSE_CREATE_HISTORICAL_TAB);
}
|
void BrowserTabStripController::CloseTab(int model_index,
CloseTabSource source) {
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
tabstrip_->PrepareForCloseAt(model_index, source);
model_->CloseTabContentsAt(model_index,
TabStripModel::CLOSE_USER_GESTURE |
TabStripModel::CLOSE_CREATE_HISTORICAL_TAB);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3695
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3695/
|
CWE-74
|
https://github.com/mjg59/linux/commit/d7a6be58edc01b1c66ecd8fcc91236bfbce0a420
|
d7a6be58edc01b1c66ecd8fcc91236bfbce0a420
|
acpi: Disable APEI error injection if securelevel is set
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.
While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
|
static int error_inject_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
if (!error_type)
return -EINVAL;
return einj_error_inject(error_type, error_flags, error_param1, error_param2,
error_param3, error_param4);
}
|
static int error_inject_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
if (!error_type)
return -EINVAL;
return einj_error_inject(error_type, error_flags, error_param1, error_param2,
error_param3, error_param4);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
void *Sys_LoadGameDll(const char *name,
intptr_t (QDECL **entryPoint)(int, ...),
intptr_t (*systemcalls)(intptr_t, ...))
{
void *libHandle;
void (*dllEntry)(intptr_t (*syscallptr)(intptr_t, ...));
assert(name);
Com_Printf( "Loading DLL file: %s\n", name);
libHandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name);
if(!libHandle)
{
Com_Printf("Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) failed:\n\"%s\"\n", name, Sys_LibraryError());
return NULL;
}
dllEntry = Sys_LoadFunction( libHandle, "dllEntry" );
*entryPoint = Sys_LoadFunction( libHandle, "vmMain" );
if ( !*entryPoint || !dllEntry )
{
Com_Printf ( "Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) failed to find vmMain function:\n\"%s\" !\n", name, Sys_LibraryError( ) );
Sys_UnloadLibrary(libHandle);
return NULL;
}
Com_Printf ( "Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) found vmMain function at %p\n", name, *entryPoint );
dllEntry( systemcalls );
return libHandle;
}
|
void *Sys_LoadGameDll(const char *name,
intptr_t (QDECL **entryPoint)(int, ...),
intptr_t (*systemcalls)(intptr_t, ...))
{
void *libHandle;
void (*dllEntry)(intptr_t (*syscallptr)(intptr_t, ...));
assert(name);
Com_Printf( "Loading DLL file: %s\n", name);
libHandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name);
if(!libHandle)
{
Com_Printf("Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) failed:\n\"%s\"\n", name, Sys_LibraryError());
return NULL;
}
dllEntry = Sys_LoadFunction( libHandle, "dllEntry" );
*entryPoint = Sys_LoadFunction( libHandle, "vmMain" );
if ( !*entryPoint || !dllEntry )
{
Com_Printf ( "Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) failed to find vmMain function:\n\"%s\" !\n", name, Sys_LibraryError( ) );
Sys_UnloadLibrary(libHandle);
return NULL;
}
Com_Printf ( "Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) found vmMain function at %p\n", name, *entryPoint );
dllEntry( systemcalls );
return libHandle;
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::OnWebContentsDestroyed(WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
RemoveDestructionObserver(web_contents);
for (PendingContents::iterator iter = pending_contents_.begin();
iter != pending_contents_.end();
++iter) {
if (iter->second != web_contents)
continue;
pending_contents_.erase(iter);
return;
}
NOTREACHED();
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::OnWebContentsDestroyed(WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
RemoveDestructionObserver(web_contents);
for (PendingContents::iterator iter = pending_contents_.begin();
iter != pending_contents_.end();
++iter) {
if (iter->second != web_contents)
continue;
pending_contents_.erase(iter);
return;
}
NOTREACHED();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2885/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/79cfdeb5fbe79fa2604d37fba467f371cb436bc3
|
79cfdeb5fbe79fa2604d37fba467f371cb436bc3
|
Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
DateTimeFormatValidator()
: m_hasYear(false)
, m_hasMonth(false)
, m_hasWeek(false)
, m_hasDay(false)
, m_hasAMPM(false)
, m_hasHour(false)
, m_hasMinute(false)
, m_hasSecond(false) { }
|
DateTimeFormatValidator()
: m_hasYear(false)
, m_hasMonth(false)
, m_hasWeek(false)
, m_hasDay(false)
, m_hasAMPM(false)
, m_hasHour(false)
, m_hasMinute(false)
, m_hasSecond(false) { }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6038
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6038/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9b99a43fc119a2533a87e2357cad8f603779a7b9
|
9b99a43fc119a2533a87e2357cad8f603779a7b9
|
Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
|
void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRG32F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing,
float,
float>(const float* source,
float* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = source[0];
destination[1] = source[1];
source += 4;
destination += 2;
}
}
|
void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRG32F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing,
float,
float>(const float* source,
float* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = source[0];
destination[1] = source[1];
source += 4;
destination += 2;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
void OxideQQuickWebView::setContextMenu(QQmlComponent* contextMenu) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->contents_view_->contextMenu() == contextMenu) {
return;
}
d->contents_view_->setContextMenu(contextMenu);
emit contextMenuChanged();
}
|
void OxideQQuickWebView::setContextMenu(QQmlComponent* contextMenu) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->contents_view_->contextMenu() == contextMenu) {
return;
}
d->contents_view_->setContextMenu(contextMenu);
emit contextMenuChanged();
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6622
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6622/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/438b99bc730bc665eedfc62c4eb864c981e5c65f
|
438b99bc730bc665eedfc62c4eb864c981e5c65f
|
Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
AppShortcutManager::~AppShortcutManager() {
if (g_browser_process && is_profile_info_cache_observer_) {
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
if (profile_manager)
profile_manager->GetProfileInfoCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
|
AppShortcutManager::~AppShortcutManager() {
if (g_browser_process && is_profile_info_cache_observer_) {
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
if (profile_manager)
profile_manager->GetProfileInfoCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7c28e7988fef9bb3e03027226bd199736d99abc3
|
7c28e7988fef9bb3e03027226bd199736d99abc3
|
Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
|
const HostCache::Entry* HostCache::Lookup(const Key& key,
base::TimeTicks now) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (caching_is_disabled())
return nullptr;
HostCache::Entry* entry = LookupInternal(key);
if (!entry) {
RecordLookup(LOOKUP_MISS_ABSENT, now, nullptr);
return nullptr;
}
if (entry->IsStale(now, network_changes_)) {
RecordLookup(LOOKUP_MISS_STALE, now, entry);
return nullptr;
}
entry->CountHit(/* hit_is_stale= */ false);
RecordLookup(LOOKUP_HIT_VALID, now, entry);
return entry;
}
|
const HostCache::Entry* HostCache::Lookup(const Key& key,
base::TimeTicks now) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (caching_is_disabled())
return nullptr;
HostCache::Entry* entry = LookupInternal(key);
if (!entry) {
RecordLookup(LOOKUP_MISS_ABSENT, now, nullptr);
return nullptr;
}
if (entry->IsStale(now, network_changes_)) {
RecordLookup(LOOKUP_MISS_STALE, now, entry);
return nullptr;
}
entry->CountHit(/* hit_is_stale= */ false);
RecordLookup(LOOKUP_HIT_VALID, now, entry);
return entry;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4594
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4594/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c
|
bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c
|
sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
CC: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CC: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = compat_ptr(arg);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (cmd >= SIOCDEVPRIVATE && cmd <= (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15))
return siocdevprivate_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCGIFBR:
return old_bridge_ioctl(argp);
case SIOCGIFNAME:
return dev_ifname32(net, argp);
case SIOCGIFCONF:
return dev_ifconf(net, argp);
case SIOCETHTOOL:
return ethtool_ioctl(net, argp);
case SIOCWANDEV:
return compat_siocwandev(net, argp);
case SIOCGIFMAP:
case SIOCSIFMAP:
return compat_sioc_ifmap(net, cmd, argp);
case SIOCBONDENSLAVE:
case SIOCBONDRELEASE:
case SIOCBONDSETHWADDR:
case SIOCBONDSLAVEINFOQUERY:
case SIOCBONDINFOQUERY:
case SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE:
return bond_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
return routing_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCGSTAMP:
return do_siocgstamp(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
return do_siocgstampns(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
return compat_siocshwtstamp(net, argp);
case FIOSETOWN:
case SIOCSPGRP:
case FIOGETOWN:
case SIOCGPGRP:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
case SIOCADDDLCI:
case SIOCDELDLCI:
return sock_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
case SIOCGIFFLAGS:
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFMETRIC:
case SIOCSIFMETRIC:
case SIOCGIFMTU:
case SIOCSIFMTU:
case SIOCGIFMEM:
case SIOCSIFMEM:
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
case SIOCADDMULTI:
case SIOCDELMULTI:
case SIOCGIFINDEX:
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWBROADCAST:
case SIOCDIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCGIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCSIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCBRADDIF:
case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCSIFNAME:
case SIOCGMIIPHY:
case SIOCGMIIREG:
case SIOCSMIIREG:
return dev_ifsioc(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCSARP:
case SIOCGARP:
case SIOCDARP:
case SIOCATMARK:
return sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, arg);
}
/* Prevent warning from compat_sys_ioctl, these always
* result in -EINVAL in the native case anyway. */
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCRTMSG:
case SIOCGIFCOUNT:
case SIOCSRARP:
case SIOCGRARP:
case SIOCDRARP:
case SIOCSIFLINK:
case SIOCGIFSLAVE:
case SIOCSIFSLAVE:
return -EINVAL;
}
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
|
static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = compat_ptr(arg);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (cmd >= SIOCDEVPRIVATE && cmd <= (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15))
return siocdevprivate_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCGIFBR:
return old_bridge_ioctl(argp);
case SIOCGIFNAME:
return dev_ifname32(net, argp);
case SIOCGIFCONF:
return dev_ifconf(net, argp);
case SIOCETHTOOL:
return ethtool_ioctl(net, argp);
case SIOCWANDEV:
return compat_siocwandev(net, argp);
case SIOCGIFMAP:
case SIOCSIFMAP:
return compat_sioc_ifmap(net, cmd, argp);
case SIOCBONDENSLAVE:
case SIOCBONDRELEASE:
case SIOCBONDSETHWADDR:
case SIOCBONDSLAVEINFOQUERY:
case SIOCBONDINFOQUERY:
case SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE:
return bond_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
return routing_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCGSTAMP:
return do_siocgstamp(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
return do_siocgstampns(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
return compat_siocshwtstamp(net, argp);
case FIOSETOWN:
case SIOCSPGRP:
case FIOGETOWN:
case SIOCGPGRP:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
case SIOCADDDLCI:
case SIOCDELDLCI:
return sock_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
case SIOCGIFFLAGS:
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFMETRIC:
case SIOCSIFMETRIC:
case SIOCGIFMTU:
case SIOCSIFMTU:
case SIOCGIFMEM:
case SIOCSIFMEM:
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
case SIOCADDMULTI:
case SIOCDELMULTI:
case SIOCGIFINDEX:
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWBROADCAST:
case SIOCDIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCGIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCSIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCBRADDIF:
case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCSIFNAME:
case SIOCGMIIPHY:
case SIOCGMIIREG:
case SIOCSMIIREG:
return dev_ifsioc(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCSARP:
case SIOCGARP:
case SIOCDARP:
case SIOCATMARK:
return sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, arg);
}
/* Prevent warning from compat_sys_ioctl, these always
* result in -EINVAL in the native case anyway. */
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCRTMSG:
case SIOCGIFCOUNT:
case SIOCSRARP:
case SIOCGRARP:
case SIOCDRARP:
case SIOCSIFLINK:
case SIOCGIFSLAVE:
case SIOCSIFSLAVE:
return -EINVAL;
}
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5147/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c0b13574dc0ddeb502d7ed92ba10f7981da6736
|
9c0b13574dc0ddeb502d7ed92ba10f7981da6736
|
Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
MockFramerVisitor::~MockFramerVisitor() {}
|
MockFramerVisitor::~MockFramerVisitor() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static int tracing_set_tracer(struct trace_array *tr, const char *buf)
{
struct tracer *t;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
bool had_max_tr;
#endif
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
if (!ring_buffer_expanded) {
ret = __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, trace_buf_size,
RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
}
for (t = trace_types; t; t = t->next) {
if (strcmp(t->name, buf) == 0)
break;
}
if (!t) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (t == tr->current_trace)
goto out;
/* Some tracers won't work on kernel command line */
if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING && t->noboot) {
pr_warn("Tracer '%s' is not allowed on command line, ignored\n",
t->name);
goto out;
}
/* Some tracers are only allowed for the top level buffer */
if (!trace_ok_for_array(t, tr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* If trace pipe files are being read, we can't change the tracer */
if (tr->current_trace->ref) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
trace_branch_disable();
tr->current_trace->enabled--;
if (tr->current_trace->reset)
tr->current_trace->reset(tr);
/* Current trace needs to be nop_trace before synchronize_sched */
tr->current_trace = &nop_trace;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
had_max_tr = tr->allocated_snapshot;
if (had_max_tr && !t->use_max_tr) {
/*
* We need to make sure that the update_max_tr sees that
* current_trace changed to nop_trace to keep it from
* swapping the buffers after we resize it.
* The update_max_tr is called from interrupts disabled
* so a synchronized_sched() is sufficient.
*/
synchronize_sched();
free_snapshot(tr);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
if (t->use_max_tr && !had_max_tr) {
ret = tracing_alloc_snapshot_instance(tr);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
#endif
if (t->init) {
ret = tracer_init(t, tr);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
tr->current_trace = t;
tr->current_trace->enabled++;
trace_branch_enable(tr);
out:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
return ret;
}
|
static int tracing_set_tracer(struct trace_array *tr, const char *buf)
{
struct tracer *t;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
bool had_max_tr;
#endif
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
if (!ring_buffer_expanded) {
ret = __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, trace_buf_size,
RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
}
for (t = trace_types; t; t = t->next) {
if (strcmp(t->name, buf) == 0)
break;
}
if (!t) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (t == tr->current_trace)
goto out;
/* Some tracers won't work on kernel command line */
if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING && t->noboot) {
pr_warn("Tracer '%s' is not allowed on command line, ignored\n",
t->name);
goto out;
}
/* Some tracers are only allowed for the top level buffer */
if (!trace_ok_for_array(t, tr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* If trace pipe files are being read, we can't change the tracer */
if (tr->current_trace->ref) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
trace_branch_disable();
tr->current_trace->enabled--;
if (tr->current_trace->reset)
tr->current_trace->reset(tr);
/* Current trace needs to be nop_trace before synchronize_sched */
tr->current_trace = &nop_trace;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
had_max_tr = tr->allocated_snapshot;
if (had_max_tr && !t->use_max_tr) {
/*
* We need to make sure that the update_max_tr sees that
* current_trace changed to nop_trace to keep it from
* swapping the buffers after we resize it.
* The update_max_tr is called from interrupts disabled
* so a synchronized_sched() is sufficient.
*/
synchronize_sched();
free_snapshot(tr);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
if (t->use_max_tr && !had_max_tr) {
ret = tracing_alloc_snapshot_instance(tr);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
#endif
if (t->init) {
ret = tracer_init(t, tr);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
tr->current_trace = t;
tr->current_trace->enabled++;
trace_branch_enable(tr);
out:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int putreg(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned long offset, unsigned long value)
{
switch (offset) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, cs):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, ds):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, es):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, fs):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, gs):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, ss):
return set_segment_reg(child, offset, value);
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, flags):
return set_flags(child, value);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs_base):
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
/*
* When changing the segment base, use do_arch_prctl
* to set either thread.fs or thread.fsindex and the
* corresponding GDT slot.
*/
if (child->thread.fs != value)
return do_arch_prctl(child, ARCH_SET_FS, value);
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs_base):
/*
* Exactly the same here as the %fs handling above.
*/
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
if (child->thread.gs != value)
return do_arch_prctl(child, ARCH_SET_GS, value);
return 0;
#endif
}
*pt_regs_access(task_pt_regs(child), offset) = value;
return 0;
}
|
static int putreg(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned long offset, unsigned long value)
{
switch (offset) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, cs):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, ds):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, es):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, fs):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, gs):
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, ss):
return set_segment_reg(child, offset, value);
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, flags):
return set_flags(child, value);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs_base):
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
/*
* When changing the segment base, use do_arch_prctl
* to set either thread.fs or thread.fsindex and the
* corresponding GDT slot.
*/
if (child->thread.fs != value)
return do_arch_prctl(child, ARCH_SET_FS, value);
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs_base):
/*
* Exactly the same here as the %fs handling above.
*/
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
if (child->thread.gs != value)
return do_arch_prctl(child, ARCH_SET_GS, value);
return 0;
#endif
}
*pt_regs_access(task_pt_regs(child), offset) = value;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0849
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0849/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bootable/recovery/+/28a566f7731b4cb76d2a9ba16d997ac5aeb07dad
|
28a566f7731b4cb76d2a9ba16d997ac5aeb07dad
|
Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
|
int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
fclose(mapf);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
|
int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-9798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9798/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static void *merge_core_dir_configs(apr_pool_t *a, void *basev, void *newv)
{
core_dir_config *base = (core_dir_config *)basev;
core_dir_config *new = (core_dir_config *)newv;
core_dir_config *conf;
/* Create this conf by duplicating the base, replacing elements
* (or creating copies for merging) where new-> values exist.
*/
conf = (core_dir_config *)apr_pmemdup(a, base, sizeof(core_dir_config));
conf->d = new->d;
conf->d_is_fnmatch = new->d_is_fnmatch;
conf->d_components = new->d_components;
conf->r = new->r;
conf->refs = new->refs;
conf->condition = new->condition;
if (new->opts & OPT_UNSET) {
/* there was no explicit setting of new->opts, so we merge
* preserve the invariant (opts_add & opts_remove) == 0
*/
conf->opts_add = (conf->opts_add & ~new->opts_remove) | new->opts_add;
conf->opts_remove = (conf->opts_remove & ~new->opts_add)
| new->opts_remove;
conf->opts = (conf->opts & ~conf->opts_remove) | conf->opts_add;
/* If Includes was enabled with exec in the base config, but
* was enabled without exec in the new config, then disable
* exec in the merged set. */
if (((base->opts & (OPT_INCLUDES|OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC))
== (OPT_INCLUDES|OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC))
&& ((new->opts & (OPT_INCLUDES|OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC))
== OPT_INCLUDES)) {
conf->opts &= ~OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC;
}
}
else {
/* otherwise we just copy, because an explicit opts setting
* overrides all earlier +/- modifiers
*/
conf->opts = new->opts;
conf->opts_add = new->opts_add;
conf->opts_remove = new->opts_remove;
}
if (!(new->override & OR_UNSET)) {
conf->override = new->override;
}
if (!(new->override_opts & OPT_UNSET)) {
conf->override_opts = new->override_opts;
}
if (new->override_list != NULL) {
conf->override_list = new->override_list;
}
if (conf->response_code_exprs == NULL) {
conf->response_code_exprs = new->response_code_exprs;
}
else if (new->response_code_exprs != NULL) {
conf->response_code_exprs = apr_hash_overlay(a,
new->response_code_exprs, conf->response_code_exprs);
}
/* Otherwise we simply use the base->response_code_exprs array
*/
if (new->hostname_lookups != HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_UNSET) {
conf->hostname_lookups = new->hostname_lookups;
}
if (new->content_md5 != AP_CONTENT_MD5_UNSET) {
conf->content_md5 = new->content_md5;
}
if (new->accept_path_info != AP_ACCEPT_PATHINFO_UNSET) {
conf->accept_path_info = new->accept_path_info;
}
if (new->use_canonical_name != USE_CANONICAL_NAME_UNSET) {
conf->use_canonical_name = new->use_canonical_name;
}
if (new->use_canonical_phys_port != USE_CANONICAL_PHYS_PORT_UNSET) {
conf->use_canonical_phys_port = new->use_canonical_phys_port;
}
#ifdef RLIMIT_CPU
if (new->limit_cpu) {
conf->limit_cpu = new->limit_cpu;
}
#endif
#if defined(RLIMIT_DATA) || defined(RLIMIT_VMEM) || defined(RLIMIT_AS)
if (new->limit_mem) {
conf->limit_mem = new->limit_mem;
}
#endif
#ifdef RLIMIT_NPROC
if (new->limit_nproc) {
conf->limit_nproc = new->limit_nproc;
}
#endif
if (new->limit_req_body != AP_LIMIT_REQ_BODY_UNSET) {
conf->limit_req_body = new->limit_req_body;
}
if (new->limit_xml_body != AP_LIMIT_UNSET)
conf->limit_xml_body = new->limit_xml_body;
if (!conf->sec_file) {
conf->sec_file = new->sec_file;
}
else if (new->sec_file) {
/* If we merge, the merge-result must have its own array
*/
conf->sec_file = apr_array_append(a, base->sec_file, new->sec_file);
}
/* Otherwise we simply use the base->sec_file array
*/
if (!conf->sec_if) {
conf->sec_if = new->sec_if;
}
else if (new->sec_if) {
/* If we merge, the merge-result must have its own array
*/
conf->sec_if = apr_array_append(a, base->sec_if, new->sec_if);
}
/* Otherwise we simply use the base->sec_if array
*/
if (new->server_signature != srv_sig_unset) {
conf->server_signature = new->server_signature;
}
if (new->add_default_charset != ADD_DEFAULT_CHARSET_UNSET) {
conf->add_default_charset = new->add_default_charset;
conf->add_default_charset_name = new->add_default_charset_name;
}
/* Overriding all negotiation
*/
if (new->mime_type) {
conf->mime_type = new->mime_type;
}
if (new->handler) {
conf->handler = new->handler;
}
if (new->expr_handler) {
conf->expr_handler = new->expr_handler;
}
if (new->output_filters) {
conf->output_filters = new->output_filters;
}
if (new->input_filters) {
conf->input_filters = new->input_filters;
}
/*
* Now merge the setting of the FileETag directive.
*/
if (new->etag_bits == ETAG_UNSET) {
conf->etag_add =
(conf->etag_add & (~ new->etag_remove)) | new->etag_add;
conf->etag_remove =
(conf->etag_remove & (~ new->etag_add)) | new->etag_remove;
conf->etag_bits =
(conf->etag_bits & (~ conf->etag_remove)) | conf->etag_add;
}
else {
conf->etag_bits = new->etag_bits;
conf->etag_add = new->etag_add;
conf->etag_remove = new->etag_remove;
}
if (conf->etag_bits != ETAG_NONE) {
conf->etag_bits &= (~ ETAG_NONE);
}
if (new->enable_mmap != ENABLE_MMAP_UNSET) {
conf->enable_mmap = new->enable_mmap;
}
if (new->enable_sendfile != ENABLE_SENDFILE_UNSET) {
conf->enable_sendfile = new->enable_sendfile;
}
if (new->allow_encoded_slashes_set) {
conf->allow_encoded_slashes = new->allow_encoded_slashes;
}
if (new->decode_encoded_slashes_set) {
conf->decode_encoded_slashes = new->decode_encoded_slashes;
}
if (new->log) {
if (!conf->log) {
conf->log = new->log;
}
else {
conf->log = ap_new_log_config(a, new->log);
ap_merge_log_config(base->log, conf->log);
}
}
conf->max_ranges = new->max_ranges != AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET ? new->max_ranges : base->max_ranges;
conf->max_overlaps = new->max_overlaps != AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET ? new->max_overlaps : base->max_overlaps;
conf->max_reversals = new->max_reversals != AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET ? new->max_reversals : base->max_reversals;
conf->cgi_pass_auth = new->cgi_pass_auth != AP_CGI_PASS_AUTH_UNSET ? new->cgi_pass_auth : base->cgi_pass_auth;
if (new->cgi_var_rules) {
if (!conf->cgi_var_rules) {
conf->cgi_var_rules = new->cgi_var_rules;
}
else {
conf->cgi_var_rules = apr_hash_overlay(a, new->cgi_var_rules, conf->cgi_var_rules);
}
}
AP_CORE_MERGE_FLAG(qualify_redirect_url, conf, base, new);
return (void*)conf;
}
|
static void *merge_core_dir_configs(apr_pool_t *a, void *basev, void *newv)
{
core_dir_config *base = (core_dir_config *)basev;
core_dir_config *new = (core_dir_config *)newv;
core_dir_config *conf;
/* Create this conf by duplicating the base, replacing elements
* (or creating copies for merging) where new-> values exist.
*/
conf = (core_dir_config *)apr_pmemdup(a, base, sizeof(core_dir_config));
conf->d = new->d;
conf->d_is_fnmatch = new->d_is_fnmatch;
conf->d_components = new->d_components;
conf->r = new->r;
conf->refs = new->refs;
conf->condition = new->condition;
if (new->opts & OPT_UNSET) {
/* there was no explicit setting of new->opts, so we merge
* preserve the invariant (opts_add & opts_remove) == 0
*/
conf->opts_add = (conf->opts_add & ~new->opts_remove) | new->opts_add;
conf->opts_remove = (conf->opts_remove & ~new->opts_add)
| new->opts_remove;
conf->opts = (conf->opts & ~conf->opts_remove) | conf->opts_add;
/* If Includes was enabled with exec in the base config, but
* was enabled without exec in the new config, then disable
* exec in the merged set. */
if (((base->opts & (OPT_INCLUDES|OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC))
== (OPT_INCLUDES|OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC))
&& ((new->opts & (OPT_INCLUDES|OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC))
== OPT_INCLUDES)) {
conf->opts &= ~OPT_INC_WITH_EXEC;
}
}
else {
/* otherwise we just copy, because an explicit opts setting
* overrides all earlier +/- modifiers
*/
conf->opts = new->opts;
conf->opts_add = new->opts_add;
conf->opts_remove = new->opts_remove;
}
if (!(new->override & OR_UNSET)) {
conf->override = new->override;
}
if (!(new->override_opts & OPT_UNSET)) {
conf->override_opts = new->override_opts;
}
if (new->override_list != NULL) {
conf->override_list = new->override_list;
}
if (conf->response_code_exprs == NULL) {
conf->response_code_exprs = new->response_code_exprs;
}
else if (new->response_code_exprs != NULL) {
conf->response_code_exprs = apr_hash_overlay(a,
new->response_code_exprs, conf->response_code_exprs);
}
/* Otherwise we simply use the base->response_code_exprs array
*/
if (new->hostname_lookups != HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_UNSET) {
conf->hostname_lookups = new->hostname_lookups;
}
if (new->content_md5 != AP_CONTENT_MD5_UNSET) {
conf->content_md5 = new->content_md5;
}
if (new->accept_path_info != AP_ACCEPT_PATHINFO_UNSET) {
conf->accept_path_info = new->accept_path_info;
}
if (new->use_canonical_name != USE_CANONICAL_NAME_UNSET) {
conf->use_canonical_name = new->use_canonical_name;
}
if (new->use_canonical_phys_port != USE_CANONICAL_PHYS_PORT_UNSET) {
conf->use_canonical_phys_port = new->use_canonical_phys_port;
}
#ifdef RLIMIT_CPU
if (new->limit_cpu) {
conf->limit_cpu = new->limit_cpu;
}
#endif
#if defined(RLIMIT_DATA) || defined(RLIMIT_VMEM) || defined(RLIMIT_AS)
if (new->limit_mem) {
conf->limit_mem = new->limit_mem;
}
#endif
#ifdef RLIMIT_NPROC
if (new->limit_nproc) {
conf->limit_nproc = new->limit_nproc;
}
#endif
if (new->limit_req_body != AP_LIMIT_REQ_BODY_UNSET) {
conf->limit_req_body = new->limit_req_body;
}
if (new->limit_xml_body != AP_LIMIT_UNSET)
conf->limit_xml_body = new->limit_xml_body;
if (!conf->sec_file) {
conf->sec_file = new->sec_file;
}
else if (new->sec_file) {
/* If we merge, the merge-result must have its own array
*/
conf->sec_file = apr_array_append(a, base->sec_file, new->sec_file);
}
/* Otherwise we simply use the base->sec_file array
*/
if (!conf->sec_if) {
conf->sec_if = new->sec_if;
}
else if (new->sec_if) {
/* If we merge, the merge-result must have its own array
*/
conf->sec_if = apr_array_append(a, base->sec_if, new->sec_if);
}
/* Otherwise we simply use the base->sec_if array
*/
if (new->server_signature != srv_sig_unset) {
conf->server_signature = new->server_signature;
}
if (new->add_default_charset != ADD_DEFAULT_CHARSET_UNSET) {
conf->add_default_charset = new->add_default_charset;
conf->add_default_charset_name = new->add_default_charset_name;
}
/* Overriding all negotiation
*/
if (new->mime_type) {
conf->mime_type = new->mime_type;
}
if (new->handler) {
conf->handler = new->handler;
}
if (new->expr_handler) {
conf->expr_handler = new->expr_handler;
}
if (new->output_filters) {
conf->output_filters = new->output_filters;
}
if (new->input_filters) {
conf->input_filters = new->input_filters;
}
/*
* Now merge the setting of the FileETag directive.
*/
if (new->etag_bits == ETAG_UNSET) {
conf->etag_add =
(conf->etag_add & (~ new->etag_remove)) | new->etag_add;
conf->etag_remove =
(conf->etag_remove & (~ new->etag_add)) | new->etag_remove;
conf->etag_bits =
(conf->etag_bits & (~ conf->etag_remove)) | conf->etag_add;
}
else {
conf->etag_bits = new->etag_bits;
conf->etag_add = new->etag_add;
conf->etag_remove = new->etag_remove;
}
if (conf->etag_bits != ETAG_NONE) {
conf->etag_bits &= (~ ETAG_NONE);
}
if (new->enable_mmap != ENABLE_MMAP_UNSET) {
conf->enable_mmap = new->enable_mmap;
}
if (new->enable_sendfile != ENABLE_SENDFILE_UNSET) {
conf->enable_sendfile = new->enable_sendfile;
}
if (new->allow_encoded_slashes_set) {
conf->allow_encoded_slashes = new->allow_encoded_slashes;
}
if (new->decode_encoded_slashes_set) {
conf->decode_encoded_slashes = new->decode_encoded_slashes;
}
if (new->log) {
if (!conf->log) {
conf->log = new->log;
}
else {
conf->log = ap_new_log_config(a, new->log);
ap_merge_log_config(base->log, conf->log);
}
}
conf->max_ranges = new->max_ranges != AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET ? new->max_ranges : base->max_ranges;
conf->max_overlaps = new->max_overlaps != AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET ? new->max_overlaps : base->max_overlaps;
conf->max_reversals = new->max_reversals != AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET ? new->max_reversals : base->max_reversals;
conf->cgi_pass_auth = new->cgi_pass_auth != AP_CGI_PASS_AUTH_UNSET ? new->cgi_pass_auth : base->cgi_pass_auth;
if (new->cgi_var_rules) {
if (!conf->cgi_var_rules) {
conf->cgi_var_rules = new->cgi_var_rules;
}
else {
conf->cgi_var_rules = apr_hash_overlay(a, new->cgi_var_rules, conf->cgi_var_rules);
}
}
AP_CORE_MERGE_FLAG(qualify_redirect_url, conf, base, new);
return (void*)conf;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce
|
DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GpuChannelHost* RenderThread::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kLost)
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
if (!gpu_channel_.get())
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
|
GpuChannelHost* RenderThread::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kLost)
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
if (!gpu_channel_.get())
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4623/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl/commit/1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
|
int ssl_handshake_step( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_CLIENT )
ret = ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER )
ret = ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl );
#endif
return( ret );
}
|
int ssl_handshake_step( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_CLIENT )
ret = ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER )
ret = ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl );
#endif
return( ret );
}
|
C
|
polarssl
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3927/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
[skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool isCoordinateSkiaSafe(float coord)
{
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
if (!_finite(coord))
#else
if (!finite(coord))
#endif
return false;
static const int maxPointMagnitude = 32767;
if (coord > maxPointMagnitude || coord < -maxPointMagnitude)
return false;
return true;
}
|
static bool isCoordinateSkiaSafe(float coord)
{
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
if (!_finite(coord))
#else
if (!finite(coord))
#endif
return false;
static const int maxPointMagnitude = 32767;
if (coord > maxPointMagnitude || coord < -maxPointMagnitude)
return false;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::SetClosedByUserGesture(bool value) {
closed_by_user_gesture_ = value;
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::SetClosedByUserGesture(bool value) {
closed_by_user_gesture_ = value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7446
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7446/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
|
7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
|
unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int unix_seqpacket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
int err;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (msg->msg_namelen)
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
return unix_dgram_sendmsg(sock, msg, len);
}
|
static int unix_seqpacket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
int err;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (msg->msg_namelen)
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
return unix_dgram_sendmsg(sock, msg, len);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3172/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/684a212a93141908bcc10f4bc57f3edb53d2d21f
|
684a212a93141908bcc10f4bc57f3edb53d2d21f
|
Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PermissionsData::SetActivePermissions(
const PermissionSet* permissions) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
active_permissions_unsafe_ = permissions;
}
|
void PermissionsData::SetActivePermissions(
const PermissionSet* permissions) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
active_permissions_unsafe_ = permissions;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1066/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
|
small_smb2_init(__le16 smb2_command, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
void **request_buf)
{
int rc;
unsigned int total_len;
struct smb2_pdu *pdu;
rc = smb2_reconnect(smb2_command, tcon);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* BB eventually switch this to SMB2 specific small buf size */
*request_buf = cifs_small_buf_get();
if (*request_buf == NULL) {
/* BB should we add a retry in here if not a writepage? */
return -ENOMEM;
}
pdu = (struct smb2_pdu *)(*request_buf);
fill_small_buf(smb2_command, tcon, get_sync_hdr(pdu), &total_len);
/* Note this is only network field converted to big endian */
pdu->hdr.smb2_buf_length = cpu_to_be32(total_len);
if (tcon != NULL) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2
uint16_t com_code = le16_to_cpu(smb2_command);
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_sent[com_code]);
#endif
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_smbs_sent);
}
return rc;
}
|
small_smb2_init(__le16 smb2_command, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
void **request_buf)
{
int rc;
unsigned int total_len;
struct smb2_pdu *pdu;
rc = smb2_reconnect(smb2_command, tcon);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* BB eventually switch this to SMB2 specific small buf size */
*request_buf = cifs_small_buf_get();
if (*request_buf == NULL) {
/* BB should we add a retry in here if not a writepage? */
return -ENOMEM;
}
pdu = (struct smb2_pdu *)(*request_buf);
fill_small_buf(smb2_command, tcon, get_sync_hdr(pdu), &total_len);
/* Note this is only network field converted to big endian */
pdu->hdr.smb2_buf_length = cpu_to_be32(total_len);
if (tcon != NULL) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2
uint16_t com_code = le16_to_cpu(smb2_command);
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_sent[com_code]);
#endif
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_smbs_sent);
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3842/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/aeea52da00d210587fb3ed895de3d5f2e0264c88
|
aeea52da00d210587fb3ed895de3d5f2e0264c88
|
audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
|
int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer __unused, bool init __unused) {
return 0;
}
|
int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165
|
cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165
|
CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
l2tp_packet_proc_delay_print(netdissect_options *ndo)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "obsolete"));
}
|
l2tp_packet_proc_delay_print(netdissect_options *ndo)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "obsolete"));
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataCache::OnUnpinned(base::PlatformFileError* error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const CacheOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(error);
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(*error, resource_id, md5);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_, OnCacheUnpinned(resource_id, md5));
bool* has_enough_space = new bool(false);
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::FreeDiskSpaceIfNeededFor,
base::Unretained(this),
0,
base::Owned(has_enough_space)));
}
|
void GDataCache::OnUnpinned(base::PlatformFileError* error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const CacheOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(error);
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(*error, resource_id, md5);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_, OnCacheUnpinned(resource_id, md5));
bool* has_enough_space = new bool(false);
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::FreeDiskSpaceIfNeededFor,
base::Unretained(this),
0,
base::Owned(has_enough_space)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9510
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9510/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/6e4b8e505173f803a5fc05abc09f64eef89dc308
|
6e4b8e505173f803a5fc05abc09f64eef89dc308
|
Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
|
void smp_process_dhkey_check(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_dhkey_check, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_DHK_CHK;
}
|
void smp_process_dhkey_check(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_dhkey_check, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_DHK_CHK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7540/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=530d50a1abdcdf4d1775652d4c456c1274d83d8d
|
530d50a1abdcdf4d1775652d4c456c1274d83d8d
| null |
static bool decode_vlv_request(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB assertion_value, context_id;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_vlv_req_control *lvrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lvrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_vlv_req_control);
if (!lvrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->beforeCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->afterCount))) {
return false;
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
lvrc->type = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->match.byOffset.offset))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->match.byOffset.contentCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*SEQUENCE*/
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*CONTEXT*/
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->type = 1;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(1))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &assertion_value)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value_len = assertion_value.length;
if (lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value_len) {
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value = talloc_memdup(lvrc, assertion_value.data, assertion_value.length);
if (!(lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*CONTEXT*/
return false;
}
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &context_id)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->ctxid_len = context_id.length;
if (lvrc->ctxid_len) {
lvrc->contextId = talloc_memdup(lvrc, context_id.data, context_id.length);
if (!(lvrc->contextId)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
}
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
lvrc->ctxid_len = 0;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lvrc;
return true;
}
|
static bool decode_vlv_request(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB assertion_value, context_id;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_vlv_req_control *lvrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lvrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_vlv_req_control);
if (!lvrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->beforeCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->afterCount))) {
return false;
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
lvrc->type = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->match.byOffset.offset))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->match.byOffset.contentCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*SEQUENCE*/
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*CONTEXT*/
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->type = 1;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(1))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &assertion_value)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value_len = assertion_value.length;
if (lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value_len) {
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value = talloc_memdup(lvrc, assertion_value.data, assertion_value.length);
if (!(lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*CONTEXT*/
return false;
}
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &context_id)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->ctxid_len = context_id.length;
if (lvrc->ctxid_len) {
lvrc->contextId = talloc_memdup(lvrc, context_id.data, context_id.length);
if (!(lvrc->contextId)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
}
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
lvrc->ctxid_len = 0;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lvrc;
return true;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasStencilAttachment() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasStencilAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_stencil_format_ != 0 ||
offscreen_target_depth_format_ == GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
}
return back_buffer_has_stencil_;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasStencilAttachment() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasStencilAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_stencil_format_ != 0 ||
offscreen_target_depth_format_ == GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
}
return back_buffer_has_stencil_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
content::BrowserMainParts* ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateBrowserMainParts(
const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
ChromeBrowserMainParts* main_parts;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsWin(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsMac(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
main_parts = new chromeos::ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsAndroid(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsPosix(parameters);
#else
NOTREACHED();
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainParts(parameters);
#endif
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
chrome::AddGtkToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
#if defined(TOOLKIT_VIEWS)
chrome::AddViewsToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
#if defined(USE_ASH)
chrome::AddAshToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
#if defined(USE_AURA)
chrome::AddAuraToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
return main_parts;
}
|
content::BrowserMainParts* ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateBrowserMainParts(
const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
ChromeBrowserMainParts* main_parts;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsWin(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsMac(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
main_parts = new chromeos::ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsAndroid(parameters);
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainPartsPosix(parameters);
#else
NOTREACHED();
main_parts = new ChromeBrowserMainParts(parameters);
#endif
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
chrome::AddGtkToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
#if defined(TOOLKIT_VIEWS)
chrome::AddViewsToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
#if defined(USE_ASH)
chrome::AddAshToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
#if defined(USE_AURA)
chrome::AddAuraToolkitExtraParts(main_parts);
#endif
return main_parts;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void NullableTestInterfaceMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->nullableTestInterfaceMethod());
}
|
static void NullableTestInterfaceMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->nullableTestInterfaceMethod());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ReadPixels(
GLint x, GLint y, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, void* pixels) const {
DCHECK_GE(x, 0);
DCHECK_GE(y, 0);
DCHECK_LE(x + width, width_);
DCHECK_LE(y + height, height_);
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
const int8* src = GetPixelAddress(src_pixels_, x, y + yy);
const void* dst = ComputePackAlignmentAddress(0, yy, width, pixels);
memcpy(const_cast<void*>(dst), src, width * bytes_per_pixel_);
}
}
|
void ReadPixels(
GLint x, GLint y, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, void* pixels) const {
DCHECK_GE(x, 0);
DCHECK_GE(y, 0);
DCHECK_LE(x + width, width_);
DCHECK_LE(y + height, height_);
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
const int8* src = GetPixelAddress(src_pixels_, x, y + yy);
const void* dst = ComputePackAlignmentAddress(0, yy, width, pixels);
memcpy(const_cast<void*>(dst), src, width * bytes_per_pixel_);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10165/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
|
cmsBool WriteSetOfCurves(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsTagTypeSignature Type, cmsStage* mpe)
{
cmsUInt32Number i, n;
cmsTagTypeSignature CurrentType;
cmsToneCurve** Curves;
n = cmsStageOutputChannels(mpe);
Curves = _cmsStageGetPtrToCurveSet(mpe);
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
CurrentType = Type;
if ((Curves[i] ->nSegments == 0)||
((Curves[i]->nSegments == 2) && (Curves[i] ->Segments[1].Type == 0)) )
CurrentType = cmsSigCurveType;
else
if (Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Type < 0)
CurrentType = cmsSigCurveType;
if (!_cmsWriteTypeBase(io, CurrentType)) return FALSE;
switch (CurrentType) {
case cmsSigCurveType:
if (!Type_Curve_Write(self, io, Curves[i], 1)) return FALSE;
break;
case cmsSigParametricCurveType:
if (!Type_ParametricCurve_Write(self, io, Curves[i], 1)) return FALSE;
break;
default:
{
char String[5];
_cmsTagSignature2String(String, (cmsTagSignature) Type);
cmsSignalError(self ->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "Unknown curve type '%s'", String);
}
return FALSE;
}
if (!_cmsWriteAlignment(io)) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
|
cmsBool WriteSetOfCurves(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsTagTypeSignature Type, cmsStage* mpe)
{
cmsUInt32Number i, n;
cmsTagTypeSignature CurrentType;
cmsToneCurve** Curves;
n = cmsStageOutputChannels(mpe);
Curves = _cmsStageGetPtrToCurveSet(mpe);
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
CurrentType = Type;
if ((Curves[i] ->nSegments == 0)||
((Curves[i]->nSegments == 2) && (Curves[i] ->Segments[1].Type == 0)) )
CurrentType = cmsSigCurveType;
else
if (Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Type < 0)
CurrentType = cmsSigCurveType;
if (!_cmsWriteTypeBase(io, CurrentType)) return FALSE;
switch (CurrentType) {
case cmsSigCurveType:
if (!Type_Curve_Write(self, io, Curves[i], 1)) return FALSE;
break;
case cmsSigParametricCurveType:
if (!Type_ParametricCurve_Write(self, io, Curves[i], 1)) return FALSE;
break;
default:
{
char String[5];
_cmsTagSignature2String(String, (cmsTagSignature) Type);
cmsSignalError(self ->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "Unknown curve type '%s'", String);
}
return FALSE;
}
if (!_cmsWriteAlignment(io)) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1503
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1503/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/dhcpcd/+/1390ace71179f04a09c300ee8d0300aa69d9db09
|
1390ace71179f04a09c300ee8d0300aa69d9db09
|
Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
|
valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
/* The size of RFC3442 and RFC5969 options is checked at a later
* stage in the code */
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
/* The code does not use SINT16 / SINT32 together with ARRAY.
* It is however far easier to reason about the code if all
* possible array elements are included, and also does not code
* any additional CPU resources. sizeof(uintXX_t) ==
* sizeof(intXX_t) can be assumed. */
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | SINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
else if (opt->type & (UINT16 | SINT16))
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
else if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & ARRAY) {
/* The result of modulo zero is undefined. There are no
* options defined in this file that do not match one of
* the if-clauses above, so the following is not really
* necessary. However, to avoid confusion and unexpected
* behavior if the defined options are ever extended,
* returning false here seems sensible. */
if (!sz) return -1;
return (dl % sz == 0) ? 0 : -1;
}
return (sz == dl) ? 0 : -1;
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
|
valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
if (opt->type & UINT16)
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & (IPV4 | ARRAY))
return dl % sz;
return (dl == sz ? 0 : -1);
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2802
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2802/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ab22cfc619ee8ff17a8c50e289ec3b30731ceba
|
4ab22cfc619ee8ff17a8c50e289ec3b30731ceba
|
In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool SendWaitForAllTabsToStopLoadingJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading");
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
|
bool SendWaitForAllTabsToStopLoadingJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading");
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripGtk::ExtendTabSelection(TabGtk* tab) {
int index = GetIndexOfTab(tab);
if (model_->ContainsIndex(index))
model_->ExtendSelectionTo(index);
}
|
void TabStripGtk::ExtendTabSelection(TabGtk* tab) {
int index = GetIndexOfTab(tab);
if (model_->ContainsIndex(index))
model_->ExtendSelectionTo(index);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0402
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0402/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/audio/+/d72ea85c78a1a68bf99fd5804ad9784b4102fe57
|
d72ea85c78a1a68bf99fd5804ad9784b4102fe57
|
Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
|
int equalizer_get_band_freq_range(equalizer_context_t *context __unused, int32_t band,
uint32_t *low, uint32_t *high)
{
ALOGV("%s: band: %d", __func__, band);
*low = equalizer_band_freq_range[band][0];
*high = equalizer_band_freq_range[band][1];
return 0;
}
|
int equalizer_get_band_freq_range(equalizer_context_t *context __unused, int32_t band,
uint32_t *low, uint32_t *high)
{
ALOGV("%s: band: %d", __func__, band);
*low = equalizer_band_freq_range[band][0];
*high = equalizer_band_freq_range[band][1];
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6782
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6782/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e1e0c4301aaa8228e362f2409dbde2d4d1896866
|
e1e0c4301aaa8228e362f2409dbde2d4d1896866
|
Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
|
WeakPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> Document::contextDocument()
{
if (m_contextDocument)
return m_contextDocument;
if (m_frame) {
#if ENABLE(OILPAN)
return this;
#else
return m_weakFactory.createWeakPtr();
#endif
}
return nullptr;
}
|
WeakPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> Document::contextDocument()
{
if (m_contextDocument)
return m_contextDocument;
if (m_frame) {
#if ENABLE(OILPAN)
return this;
#else
return m_weakFactory.createWeakPtr();
#endif
}
return nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
RenderFrameImpl* RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(int routing_id) {
DCHECK(RenderThread::IsMainThread());
auto iter = g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().find(routing_id);
if (iter != g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().end())
return iter->second;
return nullptr;
}
|
RenderFrameImpl* RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(int routing_id) {
DCHECK(RenderThread::IsMainThread());
auto iter = g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().find(routing_id);
if (iter != g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().end())
return iter->second;
return nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(stream_get_meta_data)
{
zval *arg1;
php_stream *stream;
zval *newval;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &arg1) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &arg1);
array_init(return_value);
if (stream->wrapperdata) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(newval);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&stream->wrapperdata, newval);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "wrapper_data", newval);
}
if (stream->wrapper) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "wrapper_type", (char *)stream->wrapper->wops->label, 1);
}
add_assoc_string(return_value, "stream_type", (char *)stream->ops->label, 1);
add_assoc_string(return_value, "mode", stream->mode, 1);
#if 0 /* TODO: needs updating for new filter API */
if (stream->filterhead) {
php_stream_filter *filter;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(newval);
array_init(newval);
for (filter = stream->filterhead; filter != NULL; filter = filter->next) {
add_next_index_string(newval, (char *)filter->fops->label, 1);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "filters", newval);
}
#endif
add_assoc_long(return_value, "unread_bytes", stream->writepos - stream->readpos);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "seekable", (stream->ops->seek) && (stream->flags & PHP_STREAM_FLAG_NO_SEEK) == 0);
if (stream->orig_path) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "uri", stream->orig_path, 1);
}
if (!php_stream_populate_meta_data(stream, return_value)) {
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "timed_out", 0);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "blocked", 1);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "eof", php_stream_eof(stream));
}
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(stream_get_meta_data)
{
zval *arg1;
php_stream *stream;
zval *newval;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &arg1) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &arg1);
array_init(return_value);
if (stream->wrapperdata) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(newval);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&stream->wrapperdata, newval);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "wrapper_data", newval);
}
if (stream->wrapper) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "wrapper_type", (char *)stream->wrapper->wops->label, 1);
}
add_assoc_string(return_value, "stream_type", (char *)stream->ops->label, 1);
add_assoc_string(return_value, "mode", stream->mode, 1);
#if 0 /* TODO: needs updating for new filter API */
if (stream->filterhead) {
php_stream_filter *filter;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(newval);
array_init(newval);
for (filter = stream->filterhead; filter != NULL; filter = filter->next) {
add_next_index_string(newval, (char *)filter->fops->label, 1);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "filters", newval);
}
#endif
add_assoc_long(return_value, "unread_bytes", stream->writepos - stream->readpos);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "seekable", (stream->ops->seek) && (stream->flags & PHP_STREAM_FLAG_NO_SEEK) == 0);
if (stream->orig_path) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "uri", stream->orig_path, 1);
}
if (!php_stream_populate_meta_data(stream, return_value)) {
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "timed_out", 0);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "blocked", 1);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "eof", php_stream_eof(stream));
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7799/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/a7bb158b7bedd1449a34432feb3a67c8f1873bfa
|
a7bb158b7bedd1449a34432feb3a67c8f1873bfa
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280
|
MagickBooleanType SyncExifProfile(Image *image,StringInfo *profile)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
} DirectoryInfo;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries;
ssize_t
id,
level,
offset;
static int
format_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
/*
Set EXIF resolution tag.
*/
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
if ((id != 0x4949) && (id != 0x4D4D))
{
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
}
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadProfileShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
return(MagickFalse);
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
do
{
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=ReadProfileShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
int
components;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_bytes;
ssize_t
format,
tag_value;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+2+(12*entry));
if (q > (exif+length-12))
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
tag_value=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q);
format=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q+2);
if ((format < 0) || ((format-1) >= EXIF_NUM_FORMATS))
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+4);
if (components < 0)
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
number_bytes=(size_t) components*format_bytes[format];
if ((ssize_t) number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+8);
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
if (~length < number_bytes)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
switch (tag_value)
{
case 0x011a:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.x+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x011b:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.y+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x0112:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) image->orientation,p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) image->orientation,
p);
break;
}
case 0x0128:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET))
{
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
MagickBooleanType SyncExifProfile(Image *image,StringInfo *profile)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
} DirectoryInfo;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries;
ssize_t
id,
level,
offset;
static int
format_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
/*
Set EXIF resolution tag.
*/
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
if ((id != 0x4949) && (id != 0x4D4D))
{
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
}
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadProfileShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
return(MagickFalse);
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
do
{
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=ReadProfileShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
int
components;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_bytes;
ssize_t
format,
tag_value;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+2+(12*entry));
if (q > (exif+length-12))
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
tag_value=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q);
format=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q+2);
if ((format-1) >= EXIF_NUM_FORMATS)
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+4);
if (components < 0)
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
number_bytes=(size_t) components*format_bytes[format];
if ((ssize_t) number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+8);
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
if (~length < number_bytes)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
switch (tag_value)
{
case 0x011a:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.x+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x011b:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.y+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x0112:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) image->orientation,p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) image->orientation,
p);
break;
}
case 0x0128:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET))
{
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4538/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=d650063a0457aec56364e4005a636dc6c401f9cd
|
d650063a0457aec56364e4005a636dc6c401f9cd
| null |
static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(bcmath)
{
bcmath_globals->bc_precision = 0;
bc_init_numbers(TSRMLS_C);
}
|
static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(bcmath)
{
bcmath_globals->bc_precision = 0;
bc_init_numbers(TSRMLS_C);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int pvc_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
pvc_device *pvc = dev->ml_priv;
fr_proto_pvc_info info;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.type == IF_GET_PROTO) {
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_PROTO_FR_ETH_PVC;
else
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_PROTO_FR_PVC;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof(info)) {
/* data size wanted */
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof(info);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
info.dlci = pvc->dlci;
memcpy(info.master, pvc->frad->name, IFNAMSIZ);
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.fr_pvc_info,
&info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int pvc_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
pvc_device *pvc = dev->ml_priv;
fr_proto_pvc_info info;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.type == IF_GET_PROTO) {
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_PROTO_FR_ETH_PVC;
else
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_PROTO_FR_PVC;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof(info)) {
/* data size wanted */
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof(info);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
info.dlci = pvc->dlci;
memcpy(info.master, pvc->frad->name, IFNAMSIZ);
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.fr_pvc_info,
&info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Box *tfdt_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TFDT);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
GF_Box *tfdt_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TFDT);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2487/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/4e32001e4196f39ddd0b86686ae0231c8f5ed944
|
4e32001e4196f39ddd0b86686ae0231c8f5ed944
|
DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.opus",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(opusParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.opus",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(opusParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000039/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05;hp=8ec561d1bccc46e9db40a9f61310cd8b3763914e
|
4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05
| null |
static void pdf_run_MP(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *tag)
{
}
|
static void pdf_run_MP(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *tag)
{
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da5e5f78f02bc0af5ddc5694090defbef7853af1
|
da5e5f78f02bc0af5ddc5694090defbef7853af1
|
DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool InspectorPageAgent::applyViewportStyleOverride(StyleResolver* resolver)
{
if (!m_deviceMetricsOverridden || !m_emulateViewportEnabled)
return false;
RefPtr<StyleSheetContents> styleSheet = StyleSheetContents::create(CSSParserContext(UASheetMode));
styleSheet->parseString(String(viewportAndroidUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(viewportAndroidUserAgentStyleSheet)));
OwnPtr<RuleSet> ruleSet = RuleSet::create();
ruleSet->addRulesFromSheet(styleSheet.get(), MediaQueryEvaluator("screen"));
resolver->viewportStyleResolver()->collectViewportRules(ruleSet.get(), ViewportStyleResolver::UserAgentOrigin);
return true;
}
|
bool InspectorPageAgent::applyViewportStyleOverride(StyleResolver* resolver)
{
if (!m_deviceMetricsOverridden || !m_emulateViewportEnabled)
return false;
RefPtr<StyleSheetContents> styleSheet = StyleSheetContents::create(CSSParserContext(UASheetMode));
styleSheet->parseString(String(viewportAndroidUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(viewportAndroidUserAgentStyleSheet)));
OwnPtr<RuleSet> ruleSet = RuleSet::create();
ruleSet->addRulesFromSheet(styleSheet.get(), MediaQueryEvaluator("screen"));
resolver->viewportStyleResolver()->collectViewportRules(ruleSet.get(), ViewportStyleResolver::UserAgentOrigin);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5787/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
6a7063ae61cf031630b48bdcdb09863ffc199962
|
Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
|
void OffscreenCanvas::DidDraw(const FloatRect& rect) {
if (rect.IsEmpty())
return;
if (HasPlaceholderCanvas()) {
needs_push_frame_ = true;
GetOrCreateResourceDispatcher()->SetNeedsBeginFrame(true);
}
}
|
void OffscreenCanvas::DidDraw(const FloatRect& rect) {
if (rect.IsEmpty())
return;
if (HasPlaceholderCanvas()) {
needs_push_frame_ = true;
GetOrCreateResourceDispatcher()->SetNeedsBeginFrame(true);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static Image *ReadWMFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
int
unique_file;
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
flags;
wmfAPI
*wmf_info;
wmfAPI_Options
options;
wmfD_Rect
bounding_box;
wmf_eps_t
*eps_info;
wmf_error_t
wmf_status;
/*
Read WMF image.
*/
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
wmf_info=(wmfAPI *) NULL;
flags=0;
flags|=WMF_OPT_IGNORE_NONFATAL;
flags|=WMF_OPT_FUNCTION;
options.function=wmf_eps_function;
wmf_status=wmf_api_create(&wmf_info,(unsigned long) flags,&options);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
if (wmf_info != (wmfAPI *) NULL)
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToInitializeWMFLibrary");
}
wmf_status=wmf_bbuf_input(wmf_info,WMFReadBlob,WMFSeekBlob,WMFTellBlob,
(void *) image);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
wmf_status=wmf_scan(wmf_info,0,&bounding_box);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"FailedToScanFile");
}
eps_info=WMF_EPS_GetData(wmf_info);
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
}
eps_info->out=wmf_stream_create(wmf_info,file);
eps_info->bbox=bounding_box;
wmf_status=wmf_play(wmf_info,0,&bounding_box);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"FailedToRenderFile");
}
(void) fclose(file);
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/*
Read EPS image.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"eps:%s",
filename);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"WMF",MaxTextExtent);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadWMFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
int
unique_file;
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
flags;
wmfAPI
*wmf_info;
wmfAPI_Options
options;
wmfD_Rect
bounding_box;
wmf_eps_t
*eps_info;
wmf_error_t
wmf_status;
/*
Read WMF image.
*/
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
wmf_info=(wmfAPI *) NULL;
flags=0;
flags|=WMF_OPT_IGNORE_NONFATAL;
flags|=WMF_OPT_FUNCTION;
options.function=wmf_eps_function;
wmf_status=wmf_api_create(&wmf_info,(unsigned long) flags,&options);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
if (wmf_info != (wmfAPI *) NULL)
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToInitializeWMFLibrary");
}
wmf_status=wmf_bbuf_input(wmf_info,WMFReadBlob,WMFSeekBlob,WMFTellBlob,
(void *) image);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
wmf_status=wmf_scan(wmf_info,0,&bounding_box);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"FailedToScanFile");
}
eps_info=WMF_EPS_GetData(wmf_info);
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
}
eps_info->out=wmf_stream_create(wmf_info,file);
eps_info->bbox=bounding_box;
wmf_status=wmf_play(wmf_info,0,&bounding_box);
if (wmf_status != wmf_E_None)
{
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"FailedToRenderFile");
}
(void) fclose(file);
wmf_api_destroy(wmf_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/*
Read EPS image.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"eps:%s",
filename);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"WMF",MaxTextExtent);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::RenderViewGone(base::TerminationStatus status,
int error_code) {
Destroy();
plugin_container_manager_.set_host_widget(NULL);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::RenderViewGone(base::TerminationStatus status,
int error_code) {
Destroy();
plugin_container_manager_.set_host_widget(NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18338
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18338/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/78d89fe556cb5dabbc47b4967cdf55e607e29580
|
78d89fe556cb5dabbc47b4967cdf55e607e29580
|
Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CopyToTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* dest_gl,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_texture_id,
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha,
bool unpack_flip_y,
const IntPoint& dest_point,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsCrossThread() ||
dest_gl != ContextProviderWrapper()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL());
EnsureMailbox(kUnverifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
dest_gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetSyncToken().GetConstData());
GLuint source_texture_id = dest_gl->CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetMailbox().name);
dest_gl->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
source_texture_id, 0, dest_target, dest_texture_id, 0, dest_point.X(),
dest_point.Y(), source_sub_rectangle.X(), source_sub_rectangle.Y(),
source_sub_rectangle.Width(), source_sub_rectangle.Height(),
unpack_flip_y ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE, GL_FALSE,
unpack_premultiply_alpha ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE);
dest_gl->DeleteTextures(1, &source_texture_id);
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
dest_gl->GenUnverifiedSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token.GetData());
texture_holder_->UpdateSyncToken(sync_token);
return true;
}
|
bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CopyToTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* dest_gl,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_texture_id,
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha,
bool unpack_flip_y,
const IntPoint& dest_point,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
CheckThread();
if (!IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsCrossThread() ||
dest_gl != ContextProviderWrapper()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL());
EnsureMailbox(kUnverifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
dest_gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetSyncToken().GetConstData());
GLuint source_texture_id = dest_gl->CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetMailbox().name);
dest_gl->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
source_texture_id, 0, dest_target, dest_texture_id, 0, dest_point.X(),
dest_point.Y(), source_sub_rectangle.X(), source_sub_rectangle.Y(),
source_sub_rectangle.Width(), source_sub_rectangle.Height(),
unpack_flip_y ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE, GL_FALSE,
unpack_premultiply_alpha ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE);
dest_gl->DeleteTextures(1, &source_texture_id);
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
dest_gl->GenUnverifiedSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token.GetData());
texture_holder_->UpdateSyncToken(sync_token);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
int32_t WebPage::setComposingText(spannable_string_t* spannableString, int32_t relativeCursorPosition)
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return -1;
return d->m_inputHandler->setComposingText(spannableString, relativeCursorPosition);
}
|
int32_t WebPage::setComposingText(spannable_string_t* spannableString, int32_t relativeCursorPosition)
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return -1;
return d->m_inputHandler->setComposingText(spannableString, relativeCursorPosition);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0813
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0813/
|
CWE-772
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7fa3f552a6f34ed05c15e64ea30b8eed53f77a41
|
7fa3f552a6f34ed05c15e64ea30b8eed53f77a41
|
Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
|
int32_t SampleTable::CompositionDeltaLookup::getCompositionTimeOffset(
uint32_t sampleIndex) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
if (mDeltaEntries == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (sampleIndex < mCurrentEntrySampleIndex) {
mCurrentDeltaEntry = 0;
mCurrentEntrySampleIndex = 0;
}
while (mCurrentDeltaEntry < mNumDeltaEntries) {
uint32_t sampleCount = mDeltaEntries[2 * mCurrentDeltaEntry];
if (sampleIndex < mCurrentEntrySampleIndex + sampleCount) {
return mDeltaEntries[2 * mCurrentDeltaEntry + 1];
}
mCurrentEntrySampleIndex += sampleCount;
++mCurrentDeltaEntry;
}
return 0;
}
|
int32_t SampleTable::CompositionDeltaLookup::getCompositionTimeOffset(
uint32_t sampleIndex) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
if (mDeltaEntries == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (sampleIndex < mCurrentEntrySampleIndex) {
mCurrentDeltaEntry = 0;
mCurrentEntrySampleIndex = 0;
}
while (mCurrentDeltaEntry < mNumDeltaEntries) {
uint32_t sampleCount = mDeltaEntries[2 * mCurrentDeltaEntry];
if (sampleIndex < mCurrentEntrySampleIndex + sampleCount) {
return mDeltaEntries[2 * mCurrentDeltaEntry + 1];
}
mCurrentEntrySampleIndex += sampleCount;
++mCurrentDeltaEntry;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1292
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1292/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5f372f899b8709dac700710b5f0f90959dcf9ecb
|
5f372f899b8709dac700710b5f0f90959dcf9ecb
|
Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutoFillManager::OnInfoBarClosed(bool should_save) {
if (should_save)
personal_data_->SaveImportedCreditCard();
}
|
void AutoFillManager::OnInfoBarClosed(bool should_save) {
if (should_save)
personal_data_->SaveImportedCreditCard();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __net_init int ipv4_mib_init_net(struct net *net)
{
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.tcp_statistics,
sizeof(struct tcp_mib),
__alignof__(struct tcp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_tcp_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.ip_statistics,
sizeof(struct ipstats_mib),
__alignof__(struct ipstats_mib)) < 0)
goto err_ip_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.net_statistics,
sizeof(struct linux_mib),
__alignof__(struct linux_mib)) < 0)
goto err_net_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.udp_statistics,
sizeof(struct udp_mib),
__alignof__(struct udp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_udp_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.udplite_statistics,
sizeof(struct udp_mib),
__alignof__(struct udp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_udplite_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.icmp_statistics,
sizeof(struct icmp_mib),
__alignof__(struct icmp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_icmp_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.icmpmsg_statistics,
sizeof(struct icmpmsg_mib),
__alignof__(struct icmpmsg_mib)) < 0)
goto err_icmpmsg_mib;
tcp_mib_init(net);
return 0;
err_icmpmsg_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.icmp_statistics);
err_icmp_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.udplite_statistics);
err_udplite_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.udp_statistics);
err_udp_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.net_statistics);
err_net_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.ip_statistics);
err_ip_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.tcp_statistics);
err_tcp_mib:
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
static __net_init int ipv4_mib_init_net(struct net *net)
{
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.tcp_statistics,
sizeof(struct tcp_mib),
__alignof__(struct tcp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_tcp_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.ip_statistics,
sizeof(struct ipstats_mib),
__alignof__(struct ipstats_mib)) < 0)
goto err_ip_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.net_statistics,
sizeof(struct linux_mib),
__alignof__(struct linux_mib)) < 0)
goto err_net_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.udp_statistics,
sizeof(struct udp_mib),
__alignof__(struct udp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_udp_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.udplite_statistics,
sizeof(struct udp_mib),
__alignof__(struct udp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_udplite_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.icmp_statistics,
sizeof(struct icmp_mib),
__alignof__(struct icmp_mib)) < 0)
goto err_icmp_mib;
if (snmp_mib_init((void __percpu **)net->mib.icmpmsg_statistics,
sizeof(struct icmpmsg_mib),
__alignof__(struct icmpmsg_mib)) < 0)
goto err_icmpmsg_mib;
tcp_mib_init(net);
return 0;
err_icmpmsg_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.icmp_statistics);
err_icmp_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.udplite_statistics);
err_udplite_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.udp_statistics);
err_udp_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.net_statistics);
err_net_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.ip_statistics);
err_ip_mib:
snmp_mib_free((void __percpu **)net->mib.tcp_statistics);
err_tcp_mib:
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19497
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19497/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/sleuthkit/sleuthkit/commit/bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d
|
bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d
|
Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
|
hfs_load_attrs(TSK_FS_FILE * fs_file)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs;
HFS_INFO *hfs;
TSK_FS_ATTR *fs_attr;
TSK_FS_ATTR_RUN *attr_run;
hfs_fork *forkx;
unsigned char resource_fork_has_contents = FALSE;
unsigned char compression_flag = FALSE;
unsigned char isCompressed = FALSE;
unsigned char compDataInRSRCFork = FALSE;
unsigned char cmpType = 0;
uint64_t uncompressedSize;
uint64_t logicalSize; // of a fork
tsk_error_reset();
if ((fs_file == NULL) || (fs_file->meta == NULL)
|| (fs_file->fs_info == NULL)) {
error_detected(TSK_ERR_FS_ARG,
"hfs_load_attrs: fs_file or meta is NULL");
return 1;
}
fs = (TSK_FS_INFO *) fs_file->fs_info;
hfs = (HFS_INFO *) fs;
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Processing file %" PRIuINUM "\n",
fs_file->meta->addr);
if (fs_file->meta->attr_state == TSK_FS_META_ATTR_STUDIED) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Attributes already loaded\n");
return 0;
}
else if (fs_file->meta->attr_state == TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Previous attempt to load attributes resulted in error\n");
return 1;
}
if (fs_file->meta->attr != NULL) {
tsk_fs_attrlist_markunused(fs_file->meta->attr);
}
else if (fs_file->meta->attr == NULL) {
fs_file->meta->attr = tsk_fs_attrlist_alloc();
}
/****************** EXTENDED ATTRIBUTES *******************************/
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: loading the HFS+ extended attributes\n");
if (hfs_load_extended_attrs(fs_file, &isCompressed,
&cmpType, &uncompressedSize)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs A");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
switch (cmpType) {
case DECMPFS_TYPE_ZLIB_RSRC:
case DECMPFS_TYPE_LZVN_RSRC:
compDataInRSRCFork = TRUE;
break;
default:
compDataInRSRCFork = FALSE;
break;
}
if (isCompressed) {
fs_file->meta->size = uncompressedSize;
}
compression_flag = (fs_file->meta->flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_COMP) != 0;
if (compression_flag && !isCompressed) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: WARNING, HFS marks this as a"
" compressed file, but no compression record was found.\n");
}
if (isCompressed && !compression_flag) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: WARNING, this file has a compression"
" record, but the HFS compression flag is not set.\n");
}
/************* FORKS (both) ************************************/
if (fs_file->meta->content_ptr != NULL) {
/************** DATA FORK STUFF ***************************/
forkx = (hfs_fork *) fs_file->meta->content_ptr;
if (!isCompressed) {
logicalSize = tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz);
if (logicalSize > 0 ||
fs_file->meta->type == TSK_FS_META_TYPE_REG ||
fs_file->meta->type == TSK_FS_META_TYPE_LNK) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: loading the data fork attribute\n");
if ((fs_attr = tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(fs_file->meta->attr,
TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES)) == NULL) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs");
return 1;
}
/* NOTE that fs_attr is now tied to fs_file->meta->attr.
* that means that we do not need to free it if we abort in the
* following code (and doing so will cause double free errors). */
if (logicalSize > 0) {
if (((attr_run =
hfs_extents_to_attr(fs, forkx->extents,
0)) == NULL)
&& (tsk_error_get_errno() != 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs");
return 1;
}
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, attr_run,
"", TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA,
HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA, logicalSize, logicalSize,
(TSK_OFF_T) tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
forkx->total_blk) * fs->block_size, 0,
0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (DATA)");
tsk_fs_attr_run_free(attr_run);
return 1;
}
if (hfs_ext_find_extent_record_attr(hfs,
(uint32_t) fs_file->meta->addr, fs_attr,
TRUE)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs B");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
}
else {
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, NULL, "",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (non-file)");
return 1;
}
}
} // END logicalSize>0 or REG or LNK file type
} // END if not Compressed
/************** RESOURCE FORK STUFF ************************************/
forkx = &((hfs_fork *) fs_file->meta->content_ptr)[1];
logicalSize = tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz);
if (logicalSize > 0) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: loading the resource fork\n");
resource_fork_has_contents = TRUE;
if ((fs_attr =
tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(fs_file->meta->attr,
TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES)) == NULL) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC)");
return 1;
}
/* NOTE that fs_attr is now tied to fs_file->meta->attr.
* that means that we do not need to free it if we abort in the
* following code (and doing so will cause double free errors). */
if (((attr_run =
hfs_extents_to_attr(fs, forkx->extents,
0)) == NULL)
&& (tsk_error_get_errno() != 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs");
return 1;
}
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, attr_run, "RSRC",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_RSRC, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_RSRC,
tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz),
tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz),
(TSK_OFF_T) tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
forkx->total_blk) * fs->block_size, 0, 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC)");
tsk_fs_attr_run_free(attr_run);
return 1;
}
if (hfs_ext_find_extent_record_attr(hfs,
(uint32_t) fs_file->meta->addr, fs_attr, FALSE)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs C");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
if (isCompressed && compDataInRSRCFork) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"File is compressed with data in the resource fork. "
"Loading the default DATA attribute.\n");
if ((fs_attr =
tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(fs_file->meta->attr,
TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES)) == NULL) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC loading as DATA)");
return 1;
}
/* NOTE that fs_attr is now tied to fs_file->meta->attr.
* that means that we do not need to free it if we abort in the
* following code (and doing so will cause double free errors). */
switch (cmpType) {
case DECMPFS_TYPE_ZLIB_RSRC:
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
fs_attr->w = hfs_attr_walk_zlib_rsrc;
fs_attr->r = hfs_file_read_zlib_rsrc;
#else
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: No zlib compression library, so setting a zero-length default DATA attribute.\n");
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, NULL, "DATA",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (non-file)");
return 1;
}
#endif
break;
case DECMPFS_TYPE_LZVN_RSRC:
fs_attr->w = hfs_attr_walk_lzvn_rsrc;
fs_attr->r = hfs_file_read_lzvn_rsrc;
break;
}
if (((attr_run =
hfs_extents_to_attr(fs, forkx->extents,
0)) == NULL)
&& (tsk_error_get_errno() != 0)) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs, RSRC fork as DATA fork");
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Loading RSRC fork block runs as the default DATA attribute.\n");
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, attr_run, "DECOMP",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA,
logicalSize,
logicalSize,
(TSK_OFF_T) tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
forkx->total_blk) * fs->block_size,
TSK_FS_ATTR_COMP | TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES, 0)) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC loading as DATA)");
tsk_fs_attr_run_free(attr_run);
return 1;
}
if (hfs_ext_find_extent_record_attr(hfs,
(uint32_t) fs_file->meta->addr, fs_attr, FALSE)) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC loading as DATA");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: setting the \"special\" function pointers to inflate compressed data.\n");
}
} // END resource fork size > 0
} // END the fork data structures are non-NULL
if (isCompressed && compDataInRSRCFork && !resource_fork_has_contents) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: WARNING, compression record claims that compressed data"
" is in the Resource Fork, but that fork is empty or non-existent.\n");
}
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_STUDIED;
return 0;
}
|
hfs_load_attrs(TSK_FS_FILE * fs_file)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs;
HFS_INFO *hfs;
TSK_FS_ATTR *fs_attr;
TSK_FS_ATTR_RUN *attr_run;
hfs_fork *forkx;
unsigned char resource_fork_has_contents = FALSE;
unsigned char compression_flag = FALSE;
unsigned char isCompressed = FALSE;
unsigned char compDataInRSRCFork = FALSE;
unsigned char cmpType = 0;
uint64_t uncompressedSize;
uint64_t logicalSize; // of a fork
tsk_error_reset();
if ((fs_file == NULL) || (fs_file->meta == NULL)
|| (fs_file->fs_info == NULL)) {
error_detected(TSK_ERR_FS_ARG,
"hfs_load_attrs: fs_file or meta is NULL");
return 1;
}
fs = (TSK_FS_INFO *) fs_file->fs_info;
hfs = (HFS_INFO *) fs;
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Processing file %" PRIuINUM "\n",
fs_file->meta->addr);
if (fs_file->meta->attr_state == TSK_FS_META_ATTR_STUDIED) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Attributes already loaded\n");
return 0;
}
else if (fs_file->meta->attr_state == TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Previous attempt to load attributes resulted in error\n");
return 1;
}
if (fs_file->meta->attr != NULL) {
tsk_fs_attrlist_markunused(fs_file->meta->attr);
}
else if (fs_file->meta->attr == NULL) {
fs_file->meta->attr = tsk_fs_attrlist_alloc();
}
/****************** EXTENDED ATTRIBUTES *******************************/
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: loading the HFS+ extended attributes\n");
if (hfs_load_extended_attrs(fs_file, &isCompressed,
&cmpType, &uncompressedSize)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs A");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
switch (cmpType) {
case DECMPFS_TYPE_ZLIB_RSRC:
case DECMPFS_TYPE_LZVN_RSRC:
compDataInRSRCFork = TRUE;
break;
default:
compDataInRSRCFork = FALSE;
break;
}
if (isCompressed) {
fs_file->meta->size = uncompressedSize;
}
compression_flag = (fs_file->meta->flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_COMP) != 0;
if (compression_flag && !isCompressed) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: WARNING, HFS marks this as a"
" compressed file, but no compression record was found.\n");
}
if (isCompressed && !compression_flag) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: WARNING, this file has a compression"
" record, but the HFS compression flag is not set.\n");
}
/************* FORKS (both) ************************************/
if (fs_file->meta->content_ptr != NULL) {
/************** DATA FORK STUFF ***************************/
forkx = (hfs_fork *) fs_file->meta->content_ptr;
if (!isCompressed) {
logicalSize = tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz);
if (logicalSize > 0 ||
fs_file->meta->type == TSK_FS_META_TYPE_REG ||
fs_file->meta->type == TSK_FS_META_TYPE_LNK) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: loading the data fork attribute\n");
if ((fs_attr = tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(fs_file->meta->attr,
TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES)) == NULL) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs");
return 1;
}
/* NOTE that fs_attr is now tied to fs_file->meta->attr.
* that means that we do not need to free it if we abort in the
* following code (and doing so will cause double free errors). */
if (logicalSize > 0) {
if (((attr_run =
hfs_extents_to_attr(fs, forkx->extents,
0)) == NULL)
&& (tsk_error_get_errno() != 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs");
return 1;
}
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, attr_run,
"", TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA,
HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA, logicalSize, logicalSize,
(TSK_OFF_T) tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
forkx->total_blk) * fs->block_size, 0,
0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (DATA)");
tsk_fs_attr_run_free(attr_run);
return 1;
}
if (hfs_ext_find_extent_record_attr(hfs,
(uint32_t) fs_file->meta->addr, fs_attr,
TRUE)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs B");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
}
else {
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, NULL, "",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (non-file)");
return 1;
}
}
} // END logicalSize>0 or REG or LNK file type
} // END if not Compressed
/************** RESOURCE FORK STUFF ************************************/
forkx = &((hfs_fork *) fs_file->meta->content_ptr)[1];
logicalSize = tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz);
if (logicalSize > 0) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: loading the resource fork\n");
resource_fork_has_contents = TRUE;
if ((fs_attr =
tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(fs_file->meta->attr,
TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES)) == NULL) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC)");
return 1;
}
/* NOTE that fs_attr is now tied to fs_file->meta->attr.
* that means that we do not need to free it if we abort in the
* following code (and doing so will cause double free errors). */
if (((attr_run =
hfs_extents_to_attr(fs, forkx->extents,
0)) == NULL)
&& (tsk_error_get_errno() != 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs");
return 1;
}
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, attr_run, "RSRC",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_RSRC, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_RSRC,
tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz),
tsk_getu64(fs->endian, forkx->logic_sz),
(TSK_OFF_T) tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
forkx->total_blk) * fs->block_size, 0, 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC)");
tsk_fs_attr_run_free(attr_run);
return 1;
}
if (hfs_ext_find_extent_record_attr(hfs,
(uint32_t) fs_file->meta->addr, fs_attr, FALSE)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs C");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
if (isCompressed && compDataInRSRCFork) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"File is compressed with data in the resource fork. "
"Loading the default DATA attribute.\n");
if ((fs_attr =
tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(fs_file->meta->attr,
TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES)) == NULL) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC loading as DATA)");
return 1;
}
/* NOTE that fs_attr is now tied to fs_file->meta->attr.
* that means that we do not need to free it if we abort in the
* following code (and doing so will cause double free errors). */
switch (cmpType) {
case DECMPFS_TYPE_ZLIB_RSRC:
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
fs_attr->w = hfs_attr_walk_zlib_rsrc;
fs_attr->r = hfs_file_read_zlib_rsrc;
#else
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: No zlib compression library, so setting a zero-length default DATA attribute.\n");
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, NULL, "DATA",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0)) {
error_returned(" - hfs_load_attrs (non-file)");
return 1;
}
#endif
break;
case DECMPFS_TYPE_LZVN_RSRC:
fs_attr->w = hfs_attr_walk_lzvn_rsrc;
fs_attr->r = hfs_file_read_lzvn_rsrc;
break;
}
if (((attr_run =
hfs_extents_to_attr(fs, forkx->extents,
0)) == NULL)
&& (tsk_error_get_errno() != 0)) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs, RSRC fork as DATA fork");
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: Loading RSRC fork block runs as the default DATA attribute.\n");
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_run(fs_file, fs_attr, attr_run, "DECOMP",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA, HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA,
logicalSize,
logicalSize,
(TSK_OFF_T) tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
forkx->total_blk) * fs->block_size,
TSK_FS_ATTR_COMP | TSK_FS_ATTR_NONRES, 0)) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC loading as DATA)");
tsk_fs_attr_run_free(attr_run);
return 1;
}
if (hfs_ext_find_extent_record_attr(hfs,
(uint32_t) fs_file->meta->addr, fs_attr, FALSE)) {
error_returned
(" - hfs_load_attrs (RSRC loading as DATA");
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: setting the \"special\" function pointers to inflate compressed data.\n");
}
} // END resource fork size > 0
} // END the fork data structures are non-NULL
if (isCompressed && compDataInRSRCFork && !resource_fork_has_contents) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_load_attrs: WARNING, compression record claims that compressed data"
" is in the Resource Fork, but that fork is empty or non-existent.\n");
}
fs_file->meta->attr_state = TSK_FS_META_ATTR_STUDIED;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
sleuthkit
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
|
9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
| null |
int Splash::getLineJoin() {
return state->lineJoin;
}
|
int Splash::getLineJoin() {
return state->lineJoin;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2883
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2883/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7b020b3d36def118881daa4402c44ca72271482
|
f7b020b3d36def118881daa4402c44ca72271482
|
INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::setEmptyValue(EventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
if (isReadOnly())
return;
m_selectedIndex = invalidIndex;
updateVisibleValue(eventBehavior);
}
|
void DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::setEmptyValue(EventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
if (isReadOnly())
return;
m_selectedIndex = invalidIndex;
updateVisibleValue(eventBehavior);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010208
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010208/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt/commit/f30f9339c9a0b9bbcc6f5ad38804af39db1f479e
|
f30f9339c9a0b9bbcc6f5ad38804af39db1f479e
|
Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
|
static VOID SendDeviceIoControlRequestWorkItemRoutine (PDEVICE_OBJECT rootDeviceObject, SendDeviceIoControlRequestWorkItemArgs *arg)
{
arg->Status = SendDeviceIoControlRequest (arg->deviceObject, arg->ioControlCode, arg->inputBuffer, arg->inputBufferSize, arg->outputBuffer, arg->outputBufferSize);
KeSetEvent (&arg->WorkItemCompletedEvent, IO_NO_INCREMENT, FALSE);
}
|
static VOID SendDeviceIoControlRequestWorkItemRoutine (PDEVICE_OBJECT rootDeviceObject, SendDeviceIoControlRequestWorkItemArgs *arg)
{
arg->Status = SendDeviceIoControlRequest (arg->deviceObject, arg->ioControlCode, arg->inputBuffer, arg->inputBufferSize, arg->outputBuffer, arg->outputBufferSize);
KeSetEvent (&arg->WorkItemCompletedEvent, IO_NO_INCREMENT, FALSE);
}
|
C
|
VeraCrypt
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsTabStripSupported() const {
return browser_->SupportsWindowFeature(Browser::FEATURE_TABSTRIP);
}
|
bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsTabStripSupported() const {
return browser_->SupportsWindowFeature(Browser::FEATURE_TABSTRIP);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9835/
|
CWE-190
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=cfde94be1d4286bc47633c6e6eaf4e659bd78066
|
cfde94be1d4286bc47633c6e6eaf4e659bd78066
| null |
alloc_size_is_ok(gs_memory_type_ptr_t stype)
{
return (stype->ssize > 0 && stype->ssize < 0x200000);
}
|
alloc_size_is_ok(gs_memory_type_ptr_t stype)
{
return (stype->ssize > 0 && stype->ssize < 0x200000);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6563
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6563/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b
|
d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b
|
Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
|
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
&m);
major = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return(major);
}
|
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
&m);
major = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return(major);
}
|
C
|
openssh-portable
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4483
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4483/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6062a8dc0517bce23e3c2f7d2fea5e22411269a3
|
6062a8dc0517bce23e3c2f7d2fea5e22411269a3
|
ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
copy_semid_from_user(struct semid64_ds *out, void __user *buf, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
if (copy_from_user(out, buf, sizeof(*out)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct semid_ds tbuf_old;
if(copy_from_user(&tbuf_old, buf, sizeof(tbuf_old)))
return -EFAULT;
out->sem_perm.uid = tbuf_old.sem_perm.uid;
out->sem_perm.gid = tbuf_old.sem_perm.gid;
out->sem_perm.mode = tbuf_old.sem_perm.mode;
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
|
copy_semid_from_user(struct semid64_ds *out, void __user *buf, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
if (copy_from_user(out, buf, sizeof(*out)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct semid_ds tbuf_old;
if(copy_from_user(&tbuf_old, buf, sizeof(tbuf_old)))
return -EFAULT;
out->sem_perm.uid = tbuf_old.sem_perm.uid;
out->sem_perm.gid = tbuf_old.sem_perm.gid;
out->sem_perm.mode = tbuf_old.sem_perm.mode;
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
AuthenticatorBlePowerOnAutomaticSheetModel::GetAcceptButtonLabel() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLUETOOTH_POWER_ON_AUTO_NEXT);
}
|
AuthenticatorBlePowerOnAutomaticSheetModel::GetAcceptButtonLabel() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLUETOOTH_POWER_ON_AUTO_NEXT);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void methodWithEnforceRangeUInt64MethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithEnforceRangeUInt64Method(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void methodWithEnforceRangeUInt64MethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithEnforceRangeUInt64Method(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6764
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6764/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7b2214a08547e0d28b1a2fef3c19ee0f9febd19
|
f7b2214a08547e0d28b1a2fef3c19ee0f9febd19
|
Reland "[Fuchsia] Use Netstack FIDL interface to get network interfaces."
This is a reland of b29fc269716e556be6b4e999bb4b24332cc43c6e
Original change's description:
> [Fuchsia] Use Netstack FIDL interface to get network interfaces.
>
> 1. Updated FILD GN template to generate and compile tables file, FIDL
> generated code was failing to link without them.
> 2. Updated GetNetworkList() for Fuchsia to FIDL API instead of ioctl().
>
> Bug: 831384
> Change-Id: Ib90303a5110a465ea5f2bad787a7b63a2bf13f61
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023124
> Commit-Queue: Sergey Ulanov <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: James Robinson <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554868}
[email protected]
Bug: 831384
Change-Id: Iabb29661680b835b947b2780d169e204fd5e2559
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1036484
Commit-Queue: Sergey Ulanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554946}
|
std::string GetWifiSSID() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return std::string();
}
|
std::string GetWifiSSID() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return std::string();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2875/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2
|
ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::addICECandidate(const WebRTCICECandidateDescriptor& iceCandidate)
{
m_client->didGenerateICECandidate(iceCandidate);
return true;
}
|
bool MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::addICECandidate(const WebRTCICECandidateDescriptor& iceCandidate)
{
m_client->didGenerateICECandidate(iceCandidate);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8284
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
CC: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static inline void gen_op_mov_v_reg(TCGMemOp ot, TCGv t0, int reg)
{
if (ot == MO_8 && byte_reg_is_xH(reg)) {
tcg_gen_extract_tl(t0, cpu_regs[reg - 4], 8, 8);
} else {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(t0, cpu_regs[reg]);
}
}
|
static inline void gen_op_mov_v_reg(TCGMemOp ot, TCGv t0, int reg)
{
if (ot == MO_8 && byte_reg_is_xH(reg)) {
tcg_gen_extract_tl(t0, cpu_regs[reg - 4], 8, 8);
} else {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(t0, cpu_regs[reg]);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9490/
|
CWE-704
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/v8/+/a24543157ae2cdd25da43e20f4e48a07481e6ceb
|
a24543157ae2cdd25da43e20f4e48a07481e6ceb
|
Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
|
void ElementsAccessor::InitializeOncePerProcess() {
static ElementsAccessor* accessor_array[] = {
#define ACCESSOR_ARRAY(Class, Kind, Store) new Class(#Kind),
ELEMENTS_LIST(ACCESSOR_ARRAY)
#undef ACCESSOR_ARRAY
};
STATIC_ASSERT((sizeof(accessor_array) / sizeof(*accessor_array)) ==
kElementsKindCount);
elements_accessors_ = accessor_array;
}
|
void ElementsAccessor::InitializeOncePerProcess() {
static ElementsAccessor* accessor_array[] = {
#define ACCESSOR_ARRAY(Class, Kind, Store) new Class(#Kind),
ELEMENTS_LIST(ACCESSOR_ARRAY)
#undef ACCESSOR_ARRAY
};
STATIC_ASSERT((sizeof(accessor_array) / sizeof(*accessor_array)) ==
kElementsKindCount);
elements_accessors_ = accessor_array;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2117/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void atl2_init_pcie(struct atl2_hw *hw)
{
u32 value;
value = LTSSM_TEST_MODE_DEF;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_LTSSM_TEST_MODE, value);
value = PCIE_DLL_TX_CTRL1_DEF;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_PCIE_DLL_TX_CTRL1, value);
}
|
static void atl2_init_pcie(struct atl2_hw *hw)
{
u32 value;
value = LTSSM_TEST_MODE_DEF;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_LTSSM_TEST_MODE, value);
value = PCIE_DLL_TX_CTRL1_DEF;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_PCIE_DLL_TX_CTRL1, value);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
if (r)
goto out;
r = mmu_alloc_roots(vcpu);
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
if (r)
goto out;
/* set_cr3() should ensure TLB has been flushed */
vcpu->arch.mmu.set_cr3(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa);
out:
return r;
}
|
int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
if (r)
goto out;
r = mmu_alloc_roots(vcpu);
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
if (r)
goto out;
/* set_cr3() should ensure TLB has been flushed */
vcpu->arch.mmu.set_cr3(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa);
out:
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static struct sc_card_driver * sc_get_driver(void)
{
if (iso_ops == NULL)
iso_ops = sc_get_iso7816_driver()->ops;
asepcos_ops = *iso_ops;
asepcos_ops.match_card = asepcos_match_card;
asepcos_ops.init = asepcos_init;
asepcos_ops.select_file = asepcos_select_file;
asepcos_ops.set_security_env = asepcos_set_security_env;
asepcos_ops.decipher = asepcos_decipher;
asepcos_ops.compute_signature = asepcos_compute_signature;
asepcos_ops.create_file = asepcos_create_file;
asepcos_ops.delete_file = asepcos_delete_file;
asepcos_ops.list_files = asepcos_list_files;
asepcos_ops.card_ctl = asepcos_card_ctl;
asepcos_ops.pin_cmd = asepcos_pin_cmd;
asepcos_ops.card_reader_lock_obtained = asepcos_card_reader_lock_obtained;
return &asepcos_drv;
}
|
static struct sc_card_driver * sc_get_driver(void)
{
if (iso_ops == NULL)
iso_ops = sc_get_iso7816_driver()->ops;
asepcos_ops = *iso_ops;
asepcos_ops.match_card = asepcos_match_card;
asepcos_ops.init = asepcos_init;
asepcos_ops.select_file = asepcos_select_file;
asepcos_ops.set_security_env = asepcos_set_security_env;
asepcos_ops.decipher = asepcos_decipher;
asepcos_ops.compute_signature = asepcos_compute_signature;
asepcos_ops.create_file = asepcos_create_file;
asepcos_ops.delete_file = asepcos_delete_file;
asepcos_ops.list_files = asepcos_list_files;
asepcos_ops.card_ctl = asepcos_card_ctl;
asepcos_ops.pin_cmd = asepcos_pin_cmd;
asepcos_ops.card_reader_lock_obtained = asepcos_card_reader_lock_obtained;
return &asepcos_drv;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.