CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-0920
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0920/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf
|
12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf
|
Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BookmarksAPI::Shutdown() {
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->event_router()->UnregisterObserver(this);
}
|
void BookmarksAPI::Shutdown() {
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->event_router()->UnregisterObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/2c75e1c3b98e4e94f50c63e2b7694be5f948477c
|
2c75e1c3b98e4e94f50c63e2b7694be5f948477c
|
IOMX: do not convert ANWB to gralloc source in emptyBuffer
Bug: 29422020
Bug: 31412859
Change-Id: If48e3e0b6f1af99a459fdc3f6f03744bbf0dc375
(cherry picked from commit 534bb6132a6a664f90b42b3ef81298b42efb3dc2)
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta;
bool useBackup = mMetadataType[portIndex] != kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
OMX_U8 *data = static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer());
if (useBackup) {
data = new (std::nothrow) OMX_U8[allottedSize];
if (data == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
memset(data, 0, allottedSize);
if (allottedSize != params->size()) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, BAD_VALUE, SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete[] data;
return BAD_VALUE;
}
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyToOmx */, false /* copyFromOmx */, data);
} else {
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyToOmx */, false /* copyFromOmx */, NULL);
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, data);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta;
bool useBackup = mMetadataType[portIndex] != kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
OMX_U8 *data = static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer());
if (useBackup) {
data = new (std::nothrow) OMX_U8[allottedSize];
if (data == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
memset(data, 0, allottedSize);
if (allottedSize != params->size()) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, BAD_VALUE, SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete[] data;
return BAD_VALUE;
}
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyToOmx */, false /* copyFromOmx */, data);
} else {
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyFromOmx */, false /* copyToOmx */, NULL);
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, data);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-18218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18218/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
|
27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
|
net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jun He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static netdev_features_t hns_nic_fix_features(
struct net_device *netdev, netdev_features_t features)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
switch (priv->enet_ver) {
case AE_VERSION_1:
features &= ~(NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6 |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER);
break;
default:
break;
}
return features;
}
|
static netdev_features_t hns_nic_fix_features(
struct net_device *netdev, netdev_features_t features)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
switch (priv->enet_ver) {
case AE_VERSION_1:
features &= ~(NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6 |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER);
break;
default:
break;
}
return features;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6790/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b770d85e37b2d0e248f04cf20606a2f3871ef039
|
b770d85e37b2d0e248f04cf20606a2f3871ef039
|
Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
|
void WebPageSerializerImpl::endTagToString(Element* element,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
bool needSkip;
StringBuilder result;
result.append(preActionBeforeSerializeEndTag(element, param, &needSkip));
if (needSkip)
return;
if (element->hasChildren() || param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd) {
result.appendLiteral("</");
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
result.append('>');
} else {
if (param->isHTMLDocument) {
result.append('>');
if (!element->isHTMLElement() || !toHTMLElement(element)->ieForbidsInsertHTML()) {
result.appendLiteral("</");
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
result.append('>');
}
} else {
result.appendLiteral(" />");
}
}
result.append(postActionAfterSerializeEndTag(element, param));
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(result.toString(), param);
}
|
void WebPageSerializerImpl::endTagToString(Element* element,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
bool needSkip;
StringBuilder result;
result.append(preActionBeforeSerializeEndTag(element, param, &needSkip));
if (needSkip)
return;
if (element->hasChildren() || param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd) {
result.appendLiteral("</");
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
result.append('>');
} else {
if (param->isHTMLDocument) {
result.append('>');
if (!element->isHTMLElement() || !toHTMLElement(element)->ieForbidsInsertHTML()) {
result.appendLiteral("</");
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
result.append('>');
}
} else {
result.appendLiteral(" />");
}
}
result.append(postActionAfterSerializeEndTag(element, param));
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(result.toString(), param);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6217e5ede23285ddfee10d2e4ba0cc2d4c046205
|
6217e5ede23285ddfee10d2e4ba0cc2d4c046205
|
ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > INT_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
|
static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5940
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5940/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/commit/38d418505e9ee2d326557e5639e8da49c298858f
|
38d418505e9ee2d326557e5639e8da49c298858f
|
security fix
|
static char *check_dir_or_file(const char *name) {
assert(name);
struct stat s;
invalid_filename(name);
if (arg_debug)
printf("Private home: checking %s\n", name);
char *fname = expand_home(name, cfg.homedir);
if (!fname) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s not found.\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (fname[0] != '/') {
char* tmp;
if (asprintf(&tmp, "%s/%s", cfg.homedir, fname) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
free(fname);
fname = tmp;
}
char *rname = realpath(fname, NULL);
if (!rname) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file %s\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rname, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s is not in user home directory\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(rname, cfg.homedir) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid directory %s\n", rname);
exit(1);
}
char *ptr = rname + strlen(cfg.homedir);
if (*ptr == '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file %s\n", name);
exit(1);
}
ptr++;
ptr = strchr(ptr, '/');
if (ptr) {
if (*ptr != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: only top files and directories in user home are allowed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
if (stat(fname, &s) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s not found.\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
uid_t uid = getuid();
gid_t gid = getgid();
if (s.st_uid != uid || s.st_gid != gid) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: only files or directories created by the current user are allowed.\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode) || S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
free(fname);
return rname; // regular exit from the function
}
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file type, %s.\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
|
static char *check_dir_or_file(const char *name) {
assert(name);
struct stat s;
invalid_filename(name);
if (arg_debug)
printf("Private home: checking %s\n", name);
char *fname = expand_home(name, cfg.homedir);
if (!fname) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s not found.\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (fname[0] != '/') {
char* tmp;
if (asprintf(&tmp, "%s/%s", cfg.homedir, fname) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
free(fname);
fname = tmp;
}
char *rname = realpath(fname, NULL);
if (!rname) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file %s\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rname, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s is not in user home directory\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(rname, cfg.homedir) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid directory %s\n", rname);
exit(1);
}
char *ptr = rname + strlen(cfg.homedir);
if (*ptr == '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file %s\n", name);
exit(1);
}
ptr++;
ptr = strchr(ptr, '/');
if (ptr) {
if (*ptr != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: only top files and directories in user home are allowed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
if (stat(fname, &s) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s not found.\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
uid_t uid = getuid();
gid_t gid = getgid();
if (s.st_uid != uid || s.st_gid != gid) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: only files or directories created by the current user are allowed.\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode) || S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
free(fname);
return rname; // regular exit from the function
}
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file type, %s.\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
|
C
|
firejail
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
s->base = var->base;
s->limit = var->limit;
s->selector = var->selector;
if (var->unusable)
s->attrib = 0;
else {
s->attrib = (var->type & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK);
s->attrib |= (var->s & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->dpl & 3) << SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->present & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->avl & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->l & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->db & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->g & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_G_SHIFT;
}
/*
* This is always accurate, except if SYSRET returned to a segment
* with SS.DPL != 3. Intel does not have this quirk, and always
* forces SS.DPL to 3 on sysret, so we ignore that case; fixing it
* would entail passing the CPL to userspace and back.
*/
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
svm->vmcb->save.cpl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT) & 3;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
}
|
static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
s->base = var->base;
s->limit = var->limit;
s->selector = var->selector;
if (var->unusable)
s->attrib = 0;
else {
s->attrib = (var->type & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK);
s->attrib |= (var->s & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->dpl & 3) << SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->present & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->avl & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->l & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->db & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->g & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_G_SHIFT;
}
/*
* This is always accurate, except if SYSRET returned to a segment
* with SS.DPL != 3. Intel does not have this quirk, and always
* forces SS.DPL to 3 on sysret, so we ignore that case; fixing it
* would entail passing the CPL to userspace and back.
*/
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
svm->vmcb->save.cpl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT) & 3;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::RemoveVideoFrameController(
VideoFrameController* controller) {
video_frame_controllers_.erase(controller);
if (video_frame_controllers_.empty())
client_->SetVideoNeedsBeginFrames(false);
}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::RemoveVideoFrameController(
VideoFrameController* controller) {
video_frame_controllers_.erase(controller);
if (video_frame_controllers_.empty())
client_->SetVideoNeedsBeginFrames(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5209/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d59a4441697f6253e7dc3f7ae5caad6e5fd2c778
|
d59a4441697f6253e7dc3f7ae5caad6e5fd2c778
|
Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
bool ImageBitmap::isAccelerated() const {
return m_image && (m_image->isTextureBacked() || m_image->hasMailbox());
}
|
bool ImageBitmap::isAccelerated() const {
return m_image && (m_image->isTextureBacked() || m_image->hasMailbox());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7014/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/86736f59d6a527d8bc807d09b93f971c0fe0bb07
|
86736f59d6a527d8bc807d09b93f971c0fe0bb07
|
avcodec/pngdsp: fix (un)signed type in end comparission
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2919
Found_by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - (int)sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
|
static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 1 |
CVE-2017-9949
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9949/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/796dd28aaa6b9fa76d99c42c4d5ff8b257cc2191
|
796dd28aaa6b9fa76d99c42c4d5ff8b257cc2191
|
Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
|
static int _server_handle_vCont(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char *action = NULL;
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
g->data[g->data_len] = '\0';
if (g->data[5] == '?') {
return send_msg (g, "vCont;c;s");
}
if (!(action = strtok (g->data, ";"))) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
while (action = strtok (NULL, ";")) {
eprintf ("action: %s\n", action);
switch (action[0]) {
case 's':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "ds", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
case 'c':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "dc", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
default:
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
}
return -1;
}
|
static int _server_handle_vCont(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char *action = NULL;
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
g->data[g->data_len] = '\0';
if (g->data[5] == '?') {
return send_msg (g, "vCont;c;s");
}
if (!(action = strtok (g->data, ";"))) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
while (action = strtok (NULL, ";")) {
eprintf ("action: %s\n", action);
switch (action[0]) {
case 's':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "ds", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
case 'c':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "dc", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
default:
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
}
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16073
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16073/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0bb3f5c715eb66bb5c1fb05fd81d902ca57f33ca
|
0bb3f5c715eb66bb5c1fb05fd81d902ca57f33ca
|
Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
|
void RenderFrameHostManager::DiscardUnusedFrame(
std::unique_ptr<RenderFrameHostImpl> render_frame_host) {
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = render_frame_host->render_view_host();
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy = nullptr;
if (site_instance->HasSite() && site_instance->active_frame_count() > 1) {
proxy = GetRenderFrameProxyHost(site_instance);
if (!proxy)
proxy = CreateRenderFrameProxyHost(site_instance, rvh);
}
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
rvh->set_main_frame_routing_id(MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
rvh->SetIsActive(false);
rvh->set_is_swapped_out(true);
}
render_frame_host.reset();
if (proxy && !proxy->is_render_frame_proxy_live())
proxy->InitRenderFrameProxy();
}
|
void RenderFrameHostManager::DiscardUnusedFrame(
std::unique_ptr<RenderFrameHostImpl> render_frame_host) {
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = render_frame_host->render_view_host();
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy = nullptr;
if (site_instance->HasSite() && site_instance->active_frame_count() > 1) {
proxy = GetRenderFrameProxyHost(site_instance);
if (!proxy)
proxy = CreateRenderFrameProxyHost(site_instance, rvh);
}
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
rvh->set_main_frame_routing_id(MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
rvh->SetIsActive(false);
rvh->set_is_swapped_out(true);
}
render_frame_host.reset();
if (proxy && !proxy->is_render_frame_proxy_live())
proxy->InitRenderFrameProxy();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
bool find_numa_distance(int distance)
{
int i;
if (distance == node_distance(0, 0))
return true;
for (i = 0; i < sched_domains_numa_levels; i++) {
if (sched_domains_numa_distance[i] == distance)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool find_numa_distance(int distance)
{
int i;
if (distance == node_distance(0, 0))
return true;
for (i = 0; i < sched_domains_numa_levels; i++) {
if (sched_domains_numa_distance[i] == distance)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> Document::embeds()
{
return ensureCachedCollection(DocEmbeds);
}
|
PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> Document::embeds()
{
return ensureCachedCollection(DocEmbeds);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5844
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5844/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
|
3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
|
Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
|
read_CE(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct read_ce_queue *heap;
const unsigned char *b, *p, *end;
struct file_info *file;
size_t step;
int r;
/* Read data which RRIP "CE" extension points. */
heap = &(iso9660->read_ce_req);
step = iso9660->logical_block_size;
while (heap->cnt &&
heap->reqs[0].offset == iso9660->current_position) {
b = __archive_read_ahead(a, step, NULL);
if (b == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to read full block when scanning "
"ISO9660 directory list");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
do {
file = heap->reqs[0].file;
if (file->ce_offset + file->ce_size > step) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Malformed CE information");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
p = b + file->ce_offset;
end = p + file->ce_size;
next_CE(heap);
r = parse_rockridge(a, file, p, end);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} while (heap->cnt &&
heap->reqs[0].offset == iso9660->current_position);
/* NOTE: Do not move this consume's code to fron of
* do-while loop. Registration of nested CE extension
* might cause error because of current position. */
__archive_read_consume(a, step);
iso9660->current_position += step;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
read_CE(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct read_ce_queue *heap;
const unsigned char *b, *p, *end;
struct file_info *file;
size_t step;
int r;
/* Read data which RRIP "CE" extension points. */
heap = &(iso9660->read_ce_req);
step = iso9660->logical_block_size;
while (heap->cnt &&
heap->reqs[0].offset == iso9660->current_position) {
b = __archive_read_ahead(a, step, NULL);
if (b == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to read full block when scanning "
"ISO9660 directory list");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
do {
file = heap->reqs[0].file;
if (file->ce_offset + file->ce_size > step) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Malformed CE information");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
p = b + file->ce_offset;
end = p + file->ce_size;
next_CE(heap);
r = parse_rockridge(a, file, p, end);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} while (heap->cnt &&
heap->reqs[0].offset == iso9660->current_position);
/* NOTE: Do not move this consume's code to fron of
* do-while loop. Registration of nested CE extension
* might cause error because of current position. */
__archive_read_consume(a, step);
iso9660->current_position += step;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5221/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2a1d9fff62718d7175bf47c7903dda127ee0228c
|
2a1d9fff62718d7175bf47c7903dda127ee0228c
|
[SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
|
JNI_SendTabToSelfAndroidBridge_GetEntryByGUID(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_profile,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& j_guid) {
SendTabToSelfModel* model = GetModel(j_profile);
if (!model->IsReady()) {
return nullptr;
}
const std::string guid = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, j_guid);
const SendTabToSelfEntry* found_entry = model->GetEntryByGUID(guid);
if (found_entry == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return CreateJavaSendTabToSelfEntry(env, found_entry);
}
|
JNI_SendTabToSelfAndroidBridge_GetEntryByGUID(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_profile,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& j_guid) {
SendTabToSelfModel* model = GetModel(j_profile);
if (!model->IsReady()) {
return nullptr;
}
const std::string guid = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, j_guid);
const SendTabToSelfEntry* found_entry = model->GetEntryByGUID(guid);
if (found_entry == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return CreateJavaSendTabToSelfEntry(env, found_entry);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err odkm_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_OMADRMKMSBox *ptr = (GF_OMADRMKMSBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "OMADRMKMSBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->hdr) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->hdr, trace);
if (ptr->fmt) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->fmt, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("OMADRMKMSBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err odkm_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_OMADRMKMSBox *ptr = (GF_OMADRMKMSBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "OMADRMKMSBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->hdr) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->hdr, trace);
if (ptr->fmt) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->fmt, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("OMADRMKMSBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_init_client(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
int status = nfs4_proc_setclientid(clp, NFS4_CALLBACK,
nfs_callback_tcpport, cred);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_proc_setclientid_confirm(clp, cred);
if (status == 0)
nfs4_schedule_state_renewal(clp);
return status;
}
|
static int nfs4_init_client(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
int status = nfs4_proc_setclientid(clp, NFS4_CALLBACK,
nfs_callback_tcpport, cred);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_proc_setclientid_confirm(clp, cred);
if (status == 0)
nfs4_schedule_state_renewal(clp);
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4036
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4036/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59c816c1f24df0204e01851431d3bab3eb76719c
|
59c816c1f24df0204e01851431d3bab3eb76719c
|
vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
|
static void vhost_scsi_drop_nodeacl(struct se_node_acl *se_acl)
{
struct vhost_scsi_nacl *nacl = container_of(se_acl,
struct vhost_scsi_nacl, se_node_acl);
core_tpg_del_initiator_node_acl(se_acl->se_tpg, se_acl, 1);
kfree(nacl);
}
|
static void vhost_scsi_drop_nodeacl(struct se_node_acl *se_acl)
{
struct vhost_scsi_nacl *nacl = container_of(se_acl,
struct vhost_scsi_nacl, se_node_acl);
core_tpg_del_initiator_node_acl(se_acl->se_tpg, se_acl, 1);
kfree(nacl);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9375/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=96d87bdda3919bb16f754b3d3fd1227e1f38f13c
|
96d87bdda3919bb16f754b3d3fd1227e1f38f13c
| null |
static void xhci_event(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIEvent *event, int v)
{
XHCIInterrupter *intr;
dma_addr_t erdp;
unsigned int dp_idx;
if (v >= xhci->numintrs) {
DPRINTF("intr nr out of range (%d >= %d)\n", v, xhci->numintrs);
return;
}
intr = &xhci->intr[v];
if (intr->er_full) {
DPRINTF("xhci_event(): ER full, queueing\n");
if (((intr->ev_buffer_put+1) % EV_QUEUE) == intr->ev_buffer_get) {
DPRINTF("xhci: event queue full, dropping event!\n");
return;
}
intr->ev_buffer[intr->ev_buffer_put++] = *event;
if (intr->ev_buffer_put == EV_QUEUE) {
intr->ev_buffer_put = 0;
}
return;
}
erdp = xhci_addr64(intr->erdp_low, intr->erdp_high);
if (erdp < intr->er_start ||
erdp >= (intr->er_start + TRB_SIZE*intr->er_size)) {
DPRINTF("xhci: ERDP out of bounds: "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", erdp);
DPRINTF("xhci: ER[%d] at "DMA_ADDR_FMT" len %d\n",
v, intr->er_start, intr->er_size);
xhci_die(xhci);
return;
}
dp_idx = (erdp - intr->er_start) / TRB_SIZE;
assert(dp_idx < intr->er_size);
if ((intr->er_ep_idx+1) % intr->er_size == dp_idx) {
DPRINTF("xhci_event(): ER full, queueing\n");
#ifndef ER_FULL_HACK
XHCIEvent full = {ER_HOST_CONTROLLER, CC_EVENT_RING_FULL_ERROR};
xhci_write_event(xhci, &full);
#endif
intr->er_full = 1;
if (((intr->ev_buffer_put+1) % EV_QUEUE) == intr->ev_buffer_get) {
DPRINTF("xhci: event queue full, dropping event!\n");
return;
}
intr->ev_buffer[intr->ev_buffer_put++] = *event;
if (intr->ev_buffer_put == EV_QUEUE) {
intr->ev_buffer_put = 0;
}
} else {
xhci_write_event(xhci, event, v);
}
xhci_intr_raise(xhci, v);
}
|
static void xhci_event(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIEvent *event, int v)
{
XHCIInterrupter *intr;
dma_addr_t erdp;
unsigned int dp_idx;
if (v >= xhci->numintrs) {
DPRINTF("intr nr out of range (%d >= %d)\n", v, xhci->numintrs);
return;
}
intr = &xhci->intr[v];
if (intr->er_full) {
DPRINTF("xhci_event(): ER full, queueing\n");
if (((intr->ev_buffer_put+1) % EV_QUEUE) == intr->ev_buffer_get) {
DPRINTF("xhci: event queue full, dropping event!\n");
return;
}
intr->ev_buffer[intr->ev_buffer_put++] = *event;
if (intr->ev_buffer_put == EV_QUEUE) {
intr->ev_buffer_put = 0;
}
return;
}
erdp = xhci_addr64(intr->erdp_low, intr->erdp_high);
if (erdp < intr->er_start ||
erdp >= (intr->er_start + TRB_SIZE*intr->er_size)) {
DPRINTF("xhci: ERDP out of bounds: "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", erdp);
DPRINTF("xhci: ER[%d] at "DMA_ADDR_FMT" len %d\n",
v, intr->er_start, intr->er_size);
xhci_die(xhci);
return;
}
dp_idx = (erdp - intr->er_start) / TRB_SIZE;
assert(dp_idx < intr->er_size);
if ((intr->er_ep_idx+1) % intr->er_size == dp_idx) {
DPRINTF("xhci_event(): ER full, queueing\n");
#ifndef ER_FULL_HACK
XHCIEvent full = {ER_HOST_CONTROLLER, CC_EVENT_RING_FULL_ERROR};
xhci_write_event(xhci, &full);
#endif
intr->er_full = 1;
if (((intr->ev_buffer_put+1) % EV_QUEUE) == intr->ev_buffer_get) {
DPRINTF("xhci: event queue full, dropping event!\n");
return;
}
intr->ev_buffer[intr->ev_buffer_put++] = *event;
if (intr->ev_buffer_put == EV_QUEUE) {
intr->ev_buffer_put = 0;
}
} else {
xhci_write_event(xhci, event, v);
}
xhci_intr_raise(xhci, v);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHost::DidInitializeCompositorFrameSink() {
DCHECK(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
current_compositor_frame_sink_ = std::move(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
client_->DidInitializeCompositorFrameSink();
}
|
void LayerTreeHost::DidInitializeCompositorFrameSink() {
DCHECK(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
current_compositor_frame_sink_ = std::move(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
client_->DidInitializeCompositorFrameSink();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int tipc_sock_create_local(int type, struct socket **res)
{
int rc;
struct sock *sk;
rc = sock_create_lite(AF_TIPC, type, 0, res);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Failed to create kernel socket\n");
return rc;
}
tipc_sk_create(&init_net, *res, 0, 1);
sk = (*res)->sk;
return 0;
}
|
int tipc_sock_create_local(int type, struct socket **res)
{
int rc;
struct sock *sk;
rc = sock_create_lite(AF_TIPC, type, 0, res);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Failed to create kernel socket\n");
return rc;
}
tipc_sk_create(&init_net, *res, 0, 1);
sk = (*res)->sk;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5104/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/libimobiledevice/libusbmuxd/commit/4397b3376dc4e4cb1c991d0aed61ce6482614196
|
4397b3376dc4e4cb1c991d0aed61ce6482614196
|
common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
|
int socket_connect_unix(const char *filename)
{
struct sockaddr_un name;
int sfd = -1;
size_t size;
struct stat fst;
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
int yes = 1;
#endif
if (stat(filename, &fst) != 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: stat '%s': %s\n", __func__, filename,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISSOCK(fst.st_mode)) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: File '%s' is not a socket!\n", __func__,
filename);
return -1;
}
if ((sfd = socket(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: socket: %s\n", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
#endif
name.sun_family = AF_LOCAL;
strncpy(name.sun_path, filename, sizeof(name.sun_path));
name.sun_path[sizeof(name.sun_path) - 1] = 0;
size = (offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)
+ strlen(name.sun_path) + 1);
if (connect(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &name, size) < 0) {
socket_close(sfd);
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: connect: %s\n", __func__,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
|
int socket_connect_unix(const char *filename)
{
struct sockaddr_un name;
int sfd = -1;
size_t size;
struct stat fst;
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
int yes = 1;
#endif
if (stat(filename, &fst) != 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: stat '%s': %s\n", __func__, filename,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISSOCK(fst.st_mode)) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: File '%s' is not a socket!\n", __func__,
filename);
return -1;
}
if ((sfd = socket(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: socket: %s\n", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
#endif
name.sun_family = AF_LOCAL;
strncpy(name.sun_path, filename, sizeof(name.sun_path));
name.sun_path[sizeof(name.sun_path) - 1] = 0;
size = (offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)
+ strlen(name.sun_path) + 1);
if (connect(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &name, size) < 0) {
socket_close(sfd);
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: connect: %s\n", __func__,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
|
C
|
libimobiledevice
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5077/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const url::Origin& origin,
const content::mojom::CommonNetworkInfoPtr& network_info) {
if (origin.opaque())
return;
auto it = origins.find(origin);
if (it == origins.end()) {
OriginRequestSummary summary;
summary.origin = origin;
summary.first_occurrence = origins.size();
it = origins.insert({origin, summary}).first;
}
it->second.always_access_network |= network_info->always_access_network;
it->second.accessed_network |= network_info->network_accessed;
}
|
void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const GURL& url,
const content::mojom::CommonNetworkInfoPtr& network_info) {
GURL origin = url.GetOrigin();
if (!origin.is_valid())
return;
auto it = origins.find(origin);
if (it == origins.end()) {
OriginRequestSummary summary;
summary.origin = origin;
summary.first_occurrence = origins.size();
it = origins.insert({origin, summary}).first;
}
it->second.always_access_network |= network_info->always_access_network;
it->second.accessed_network |= network_info->network_accessed;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5216
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5216/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7
|
bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7
|
[pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
|
int PDFiumEngine::Form_GetFilePath(IPDF_JSPLATFORM* param,
void* file_path,
int length) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
std::string rv = engine->client_->GetURL();
if (file_path && rv.size() <= static_cast<size_t>(length))
memcpy(file_path, rv.c_str(), rv.size());
return rv.size();
}
|
int PDFiumEngine::Form_GetFilePath(IPDF_JSPLATFORM* param,
void* file_path,
int length) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
std::string rv = engine->client_->GetURL();
if (file_path && rv.size() <= static_cast<size_t>(length))
memcpy(file_path, rv.c_str(), rv.size());
return rv.size();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12154/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/51aa68e7d57e3217192d88ce90fd5b8ef29ec94f
|
51aa68e7d57e3217192d88ce90fd5b8ef29ec94f
|
kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int vmx_write_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
gpa_t gpa;
struct page *page = NULL;
u64 *pml_address;
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.pml_full);
/*
* Check if PML is enabled for the nested guest.
* Whether eptp bit 6 is set is already checked
* as part of A/D emulation.
*/
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (!nested_cpu_has_pml(vmcs12))
return 0;
if (vmcs12->guest_pml_index >= PML_ENTITY_NUM) {
vmx->nested.pml_full = true;
return 1;
}
gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) & ~0xFFFull;
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->pml_address);
if (is_error_page(page))
return 0;
pml_address = kmap(page);
pml_address[vmcs12->guest_pml_index--] = gpa;
kunmap(page);
kvm_release_page_clean(page);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int vmx_write_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
gpa_t gpa;
struct page *page = NULL;
u64 *pml_address;
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.pml_full);
/*
* Check if PML is enabled for the nested guest.
* Whether eptp bit 6 is set is already checked
* as part of A/D emulation.
*/
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (!nested_cpu_has_pml(vmcs12))
return 0;
if (vmcs12->guest_pml_index >= PML_ENTITY_NUM) {
vmx->nested.pml_full = true;
return 1;
}
gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) & ~0xFFFull;
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->pml_address);
if (is_error_page(page))
return 0;
pml_address = kmap(page);
pml_address[vmcs12->guest_pml_index--] = gpa;
kunmap(page);
kvm_release_page_clean(page);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec));
d* (tod(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert4();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
d* (tod(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert4();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2906/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
[SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
|
static void pmcraid_cancel_all(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd, u32 sense)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd = cmd->scsi_cmd;
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb = &cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb;
struct pmcraid_resource_entry *res = scsi_cmd->device->hostdata;
void (*cmd_done) (struct pmcraid_cmd *) = sense ? pmcraid_erp_done
: pmcraid_request_sense;
memset(ioarcb->cdb, 0, PMCRAID_MAX_CDB_LEN);
ioarcb->request_flags0 = SYNC_OVERRIDE;
ioarcb->request_type = REQ_TYPE_IOACMD;
ioarcb->cdb[0] = PMCRAID_CANCEL_ALL_REQUESTS;
if (RES_IS_GSCSI(res->cfg_entry))
ioarcb->cdb[1] = PMCRAID_SYNC_COMPLETE_AFTER_CANCEL;
ioarcb->ioadl_bus_addr = 0;
ioarcb->ioadl_length = 0;
ioarcb->data_transfer_length = 0;
ioarcb->ioarcb_bus_addr &= (~0x1FULL);
/* writing to IOARRIN must be protected by host_lock, as mid-layer
* schedule queuecommand while we are doing this
*/
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd, cmd_done,
PMCRAID_REQUEST_SENSE_TIMEOUT,
pmcraid_timeout_handler);
}
|
static void pmcraid_cancel_all(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd, u32 sense)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd = cmd->scsi_cmd;
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb = &cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb;
struct pmcraid_resource_entry *res = scsi_cmd->device->hostdata;
void (*cmd_done) (struct pmcraid_cmd *) = sense ? pmcraid_erp_done
: pmcraid_request_sense;
memset(ioarcb->cdb, 0, PMCRAID_MAX_CDB_LEN);
ioarcb->request_flags0 = SYNC_OVERRIDE;
ioarcb->request_type = REQ_TYPE_IOACMD;
ioarcb->cdb[0] = PMCRAID_CANCEL_ALL_REQUESTS;
if (RES_IS_GSCSI(res->cfg_entry))
ioarcb->cdb[1] = PMCRAID_SYNC_COMPLETE_AFTER_CANCEL;
ioarcb->ioadl_bus_addr = 0;
ioarcb->ioadl_length = 0;
ioarcb->data_transfer_length = 0;
ioarcb->ioarcb_bus_addr &= (~0x1FULL);
/* writing to IOARRIN must be protected by host_lock, as mid-layer
* schedule queuecommand while we are doing this
*/
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd, cmd_done,
PMCRAID_REQUEST_SENSE_TIMEOUT,
pmcraid_timeout_handler);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
Scheduler/child/TimeSource could be replaced with base/time/DefaultTickClock.
They both are totally same and TimeSource is removed.
BUG=494892
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1163143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333035}
|
TaskQueueManager::TaskQueueManager(
size_t task_queue_count,
scoped_refptr<NestableSingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
TaskQueueSelector* selector,
const char* disabled_by_default_tracing_category)
: main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
selector_(selector),
task_was_run_bitmap_(0),
pending_dowork_count_(0),
work_batch_size_(1),
time_source_(new base::DefaultTickClock),
disabled_by_default_tracing_category_(
disabled_by_default_tracing_category),
deletion_sentinel_(new DeletionSentinel()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner->RunsTasksOnCurrentThread());
DCHECK_LE(task_queue_count, sizeof(task_was_run_bitmap_) * CHAR_BIT)
<< "You need a bigger int for task_was_run_bitmap_";
TRACE_EVENT_OBJECT_CREATED_WITH_ID(disabled_by_default_tracing_category,
"TaskQueueManager", this);
for (size_t i = 0; i < task_queue_count; i++) {
scoped_refptr<internal::TaskQueue> queue(make_scoped_refptr(
new internal::TaskQueue(this, disabled_by_default_tracing_category)));
queues_.push_back(queue);
}
std::vector<const base::TaskQueue*> work_queues;
for (const auto& queue : queues_)
work_queues.push_back(&queue->work_queue());
selector_->RegisterWorkQueues(work_queues);
selector_->SetTaskQueueSelectorObserver(this);
do_work_from_main_thread_closure_ =
base::Bind(&TaskQueueManager::DoWork, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), true);
do_work_from_other_thread_closure_ =
base::Bind(&TaskQueueManager::DoWork, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), false);
}
|
TaskQueueManager::TaskQueueManager(
size_t task_queue_count,
scoped_refptr<NestableSingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
TaskQueueSelector* selector,
const char* disabled_by_default_tracing_category)
: main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
selector_(selector),
task_was_run_bitmap_(0),
pending_dowork_count_(0),
work_batch_size_(1),
time_source_(new TimeSource),
disabled_by_default_tracing_category_(
disabled_by_default_tracing_category),
deletion_sentinel_(new DeletionSentinel()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner->RunsTasksOnCurrentThread());
DCHECK_LE(task_queue_count, sizeof(task_was_run_bitmap_) * CHAR_BIT)
<< "You need a bigger int for task_was_run_bitmap_";
TRACE_EVENT_OBJECT_CREATED_WITH_ID(disabled_by_default_tracing_category,
"TaskQueueManager", this);
for (size_t i = 0; i < task_queue_count; i++) {
scoped_refptr<internal::TaskQueue> queue(make_scoped_refptr(
new internal::TaskQueue(this, disabled_by_default_tracing_category)));
queues_.push_back(queue);
}
std::vector<const base::TaskQueue*> work_queues;
for (const auto& queue : queues_)
work_queues.push_back(&queue->work_queue());
selector_->RegisterWorkQueues(work_queues);
selector_->SetTaskQueueSelectorObserver(this);
do_work_from_main_thread_closure_ =
base::Bind(&TaskQueueManager::DoWork, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), true);
do_work_from_other_thread_closure_ =
base::Bind(&TaskQueueManager::DoWork, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-10133
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10133/
|
CWE-119
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mujs.git;a=commit;h=77ab465f1c394bb77f00966cd950650f3f53cb24
|
77ab465f1c394bb77f00966cd950650f3f53cb24
| null |
void js_pushstring(js_State *J, const char *v)
{
int n = strlen(v);
CHECKSTACK(1);
if (n <= soffsetof(js_Value, type)) {
char *s = STACK[TOP].u.shrstr;
while (n--) *s++ = *v++;
*s = 0;
STACK[TOP].type = JS_TSHRSTR;
} else {
STACK[TOP].type = JS_TMEMSTR;
STACK[TOP].u.memstr = jsV_newmemstring(J, v, n);
}
++TOP;
}
|
void js_pushstring(js_State *J, const char *v)
{
int n = strlen(v);
CHECKSTACK(1);
if (n <= soffsetof(js_Value, type)) {
char *s = STACK[TOP].u.shrstr;
while (n--) *s++ = *v++;
*s = 0;
STACK[TOP].type = JS_TSHRSTR;
} else {
STACK[TOP].type = JS_TMEMSTR;
STACK[TOP].u.memstr = jsV_newmemstring(J, v, n);
}
++TOP;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2508/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f81038006b4c59a5a148dcad887371206033c28f
|
f81038006b4c59a5a148dcad887371206033c28f
|
MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
|
void NuPlayer::GenericSource::restartPollBuffering() {
if (mIsStreaming) {
cancelPollBuffering();
onPollBuffering();
}
}
|
void NuPlayer::GenericSource::restartPollBuffering() {
if (mIsStreaming) {
cancelPollBuffering();
onPollBuffering();
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2828/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d560c6f5a89c582c9e12000adcebb4d4538a665d
|
d560c6f5a89c582c9e12000adcebb4d4538a665d
|
Disable OutOfProcessPPAPITest.VarDeprecated on Mac due to timeouts.
BUG=121107
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129857 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PPAPITestBase::GetHTTPDocumentRoot(FilePath* document_root) {
FilePath exe_dir = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetProgram().DirName();
FilePath src_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_SOURCE_ROOT, &src_dir))
return false;
if (!exe_dir.IsAbsolute()) file_util::AbsolutePath(&exe_dir);
if (!src_dir.IsAbsolute()) file_util::AbsolutePath(&src_dir);
if (!exe_dir.IsAbsolute())
return false;
if (!src_dir.IsAbsolute())
return false;
size_t match, exe_size, src_size;
std::vector<FilePath::StringType> src_parts, exe_parts;
exe_dir.GetComponents(&exe_parts);
src_dir.GetComponents(&src_parts);
exe_size = exe_parts.size();
src_size = src_parts.size();
for (match = 0; match < exe_size && match < src_size; ++match) {
if (exe_parts[match] != src_parts[match])
break;
}
for (size_t tmp_itr = match; tmp_itr < src_size; ++tmp_itr) {
*document_root = document_root->Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".."));
}
for (; match < exe_size; ++match) {
*document_root = document_root->Append(exe_parts[match]);
}
return true;
}
|
bool PPAPITestBase::GetHTTPDocumentRoot(FilePath* document_root) {
FilePath exe_dir = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetProgram().DirName();
FilePath src_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_SOURCE_ROOT, &src_dir))
return false;
if (!exe_dir.IsAbsolute()) file_util::AbsolutePath(&exe_dir);
if (!src_dir.IsAbsolute()) file_util::AbsolutePath(&src_dir);
if (!exe_dir.IsAbsolute())
return false;
if (!src_dir.IsAbsolute())
return false;
size_t match, exe_size, src_size;
std::vector<FilePath::StringType> src_parts, exe_parts;
exe_dir.GetComponents(&exe_parts);
src_dir.GetComponents(&src_parts);
exe_size = exe_parts.size();
src_size = src_parts.size();
for (match = 0; match < exe_size && match < src_size; ++match) {
if (exe_parts[match] != src_parts[match])
break;
}
for (size_t tmp_itr = match; tmp_itr < src_size; ++tmp_itr) {
*document_root = document_root->Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".."));
}
for (; match < exe_size; ++match) {
*document_root = document_root->Append(exe_parts[match]);
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5289
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5289/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
|
08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
| null |
get_object_end(void *state)
{
GetState *_state = (GetState *) state;
int lex_level = _state->lex->lex_level;
if (lex_level == 0 && _state->npath == 0)
{
/* Special case: return the entire object */
char *start = _state->result_start;
int len = _state->lex->prev_token_terminator - start;
_state->tresult = cstring_to_text_with_len(start, len);
}
}
|
get_object_end(void *state)
{
GetState *_state = (GetState *) state;
int lex_level = _state->lex->lex_level;
if (lex_level == 0 && _state->npath == 0)
{
/* Special case: return the entire object */
char *start = _state->result_start;
int len = _state->lex->prev_token_terminator - start;
_state->tresult = cstring_to_text_with_len(start, len);
}
}
|
C
|
postgresql
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
|
954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
| null |
_dbus_path_is_absolute (const DBusString *filename)
{
if (_dbus_string_get_length (filename) > 0)
return _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 1) == ':'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '\\'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '/';
else
return FALSE;
}
|
_dbus_path_is_absolute (const DBusString *filename)
{
if (_dbus_string_get_length (filename) > 0)
return _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 1) == ':'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '\\'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '/';
else
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0131/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void copy_skb_header(struct sk_buff *new, const struct sk_buff *old)
{
__copy_skb_header(new, old);
skb_shinfo(new)->gso_size = skb_shinfo(old)->gso_size;
skb_shinfo(new)->gso_segs = skb_shinfo(old)->gso_segs;
skb_shinfo(new)->gso_type = skb_shinfo(old)->gso_type;
}
|
static void copy_skb_header(struct sk_buff *new, const struct sk_buff *old)
{
__copy_skb_header(new, old);
skb_shinfo(new)->gso_size = skb_shinfo(old)->gso_size;
skb_shinfo(new)->gso_segs = skb_shinfo(old)->gso_segs;
skb_shinfo(new)->gso_type = skb_shinfo(old)->gso_type;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b
|
a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b
|
Move supports-high-dpi flag into registry.
Calls to SetProcessDpiAwareness need to happen immediately when the app starts. Specifically, before user profile settings have been initialized.
This patch moves the --supports-high-dpi into the registry.
BUG=339152, 149881, 160457
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/153403003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool IsInHighDPIMode() {
return GetDPIScale() > 1.0;
}
|
bool IsInHighDPIMode() {
return GetDPIScale() > 1.0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a113d35a19c0ed6500fb5c0acdc35730617fb3f
|
1a113d35a19c0ed6500fb5c0acdc35730617fb3f
|
Gracefully deal with clearing content settings for unregistered extensions.
BUG=128652
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10907093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155341 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ContentSettingsStore::NotifyOfContentSettingChanged(
const std::string& extension_id,
bool incognito) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
ContentSettingsStore::Observer,
observers_,
OnContentSettingChanged(extension_id, incognito));
}
|
void ContentSettingsStore::NotifyOfContentSettingChanged(
const std::string& extension_id,
bool incognito) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
ContentSettingsStore::Observer,
observers_,
OnContentSettingChanged(extension_id, incognito));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1
|
0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1
|
Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnEnsureBackbuffer() {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnEnsureBackbuffer");
if (!surface_)
return;
if (surface_->DeferDraws()) {
DCHECK(!IsScheduled());
channel_->RequeueMessage();
} else {
surface_->SetBackbufferAllocation(true);
}
}
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnEnsureBackbuffer() {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnEnsureBackbuffer");
if (!surface_)
return;
if (surface_->DeferDraws()) {
DCHECK(!IsScheduled());
channel_->RequeueMessage();
} else {
surface_->SetBackbufferAllocation(true);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnEstablishGpuChannel() {
GpuProcessHost::Get()->EstablishGpuChannel(id(), this);
}
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnEstablishGpuChannel() {
GpuProcessHost::Get()->EstablishGpuChannel(id(), this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-10664
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10664/
|
CWE-89
|
https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
|
void CWebServer::SetWebCompressionMode(const _eWebCompressionMode gzmode)
{
if (m_pWebEm == NULL)
return;
m_pWebEm->SetWebCompressionMode(gzmode);
}
|
void CWebServer::SetWebCompressionMode(const _eWebCompressionMode gzmode)
{
if (m_pWebEm == NULL)
return;
m_pWebEm->SetWebCompressionMode(gzmode);
}
|
C
|
domoticz
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10150/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
static int vm_stat_get(void *_offset, u64 *val)
{
unsigned offset = (long)_offset;
struct kvm *kvm;
struct kvm_stat_data stat_tmp = {.offset = offset};
u64 tmp_val;
*val = 0;
spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
stat_tmp.kvm = kvm;
vm_stat_get_per_vm((void *)&stat_tmp, &tmp_val);
*val += tmp_val;
}
spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
return 0;
}
|
static int vm_stat_get(void *_offset, u64 *val)
{
unsigned offset = (long)_offset;
struct kvm *kvm;
struct kvm_stat_data stat_tmp = {.offset = offset};
u64 tmp_val;
*val = 0;
spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
stat_tmp.kvm = kvm;
vm_stat_get_per_vm((void *)&stat_tmp, &tmp_val);
*val += tmp_val;
}
spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathMultValues(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr arg;
double val;
arg = valuePop(ctxt);
if (arg == NULL)
XP_ERROR(XPATH_INVALID_OPERAND);
val = xmlXPathCastToNumber(arg);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg);
CAST_TO_NUMBER;
CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NUMBER);
ctxt->value->floatval *= val;
}
|
xmlXPathMultValues(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr arg;
double val;
arg = valuePop(ctxt);
if (arg == NULL)
XP_ERROR(XPATH_INVALID_OPERAND);
val = xmlXPathCastToNumber(arg);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg);
CAST_TO_NUMBER;
CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NUMBER);
ctxt->value->floatval *= val;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd_inject_print_delegations(void)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
u64 count = 0;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(current->nsproxy->net_ns,
nfsd_net_id);
if (!nfsd_netns_ready(nn))
return 0;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
list_for_each_entry(clp, &nn->client_lru, cl_lru)
count += nfsd_print_client_delegations(clp);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
return count;
}
|
nfsd_inject_print_delegations(void)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
u64 count = 0;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(current->nsproxy->net_ns,
nfsd_net_id);
if (!nfsd_netns_ready(nn))
return 0;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
list_for_each_entry(clp, &nn->client_lru, cl_lru)
count += nfsd_print_client_delegations(clp);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
return count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4162
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4162/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int udp_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct udp_seq_afinfo *afinfo = PDE_DATA(inode);
struct udp_iter_state *s;
int err;
err = seq_open_net(inode, file, &afinfo->seq_ops,
sizeof(struct udp_iter_state));
if (err < 0)
return err;
s = ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private;
s->family = afinfo->family;
s->udp_table = afinfo->udp_table;
return err;
}
|
int udp_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct udp_seq_afinfo *afinfo = PDE_DATA(inode);
struct udp_iter_state *s;
int err;
err = seq_open_net(inode, file, &afinfo->seq_ops,
sizeof(struct udp_iter_state));
if (err < 0)
return err;
s = ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private;
s->family = afinfo->family;
s->udp_table = afinfo->udp_table;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4162
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4162/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int udpv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &np->daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(iocb, sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(iocb, sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &flowlabel->dst;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &np->daddr))
daddr = &np->daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &np->daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p, true);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0) {
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
hlimit = np->mcast_hops;
else
hlimit = np->hop_limit;
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst);
}
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
up->len += ulen;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info*)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &np->daddr) ?
&np->daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
|
int udpv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &np->daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(iocb, sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(iocb, sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &flowlabel->dst;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &np->daddr))
daddr = &np->daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &np->daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p, true);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0) {
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
hlimit = np->mcast_hops;
else
hlimit = np->hop_limit;
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst);
}
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
up->len += ulen;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info*)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &np->daddr) ?
&np->daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6085
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6085/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
|
BackendIO::BackendIO(InFlightIO* controller, BackendImpl* backend,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback)
: BackgroundIO(controller),
backend_(backend),
callback_(callback),
operation_(OP_NONE),
entry_ptr_(NULL),
iterator_(NULL),
entry_(NULL),
index_(0),
offset_(0),
buf_len_(0),
truncate_(false),
offset64_(0),
start_(NULL) {
start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
|
BackendIO::BackendIO(InFlightIO* controller, BackendImpl* backend,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback)
: BackgroundIO(controller),
backend_(backend),
callback_(callback),
operation_(OP_NONE),
entry_ptr_(NULL),
iterator_(NULL),
entry_(NULL),
index_(0),
offset_(0),
buf_len_(0),
truncate_(false),
offset64_(0),
start_(NULL) {
start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
parse_NOTE(const char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
size_t start_ofs = ofpacts->size;
ofpact_put_NOTE(ofpacts);
arg = ofpbuf_put_hex(ofpacts, arg, NULL);
if (arg[0]) {
return xstrdup("bad hex digit in `note' argument");
}
struct ofpact_note *note = ofpbuf_at_assert(ofpacts, start_ofs,
sizeof *note);
note->length = ofpacts->size - (start_ofs + sizeof *note);
ofpact_finish_NOTE(ofpacts, ¬e);
return NULL;
}
|
parse_NOTE(const char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
size_t start_ofs = ofpacts->size;
ofpact_put_NOTE(ofpacts);
arg = ofpbuf_put_hex(ofpacts, arg, NULL);
if (arg[0]) {
return xstrdup("bad hex digit in `note' argument");
}
struct ofpact_note *note = ofpbuf_at_assert(ofpacts, start_ofs,
sizeof *note);
note->length = ofpacts->size - (start_ofs + sizeof *note);
ofpact_finish_NOTE(ofpacts, ¬e);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793
|
6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793
|
Don't delete the current NavigationEntry when leaving an interstitial page.
BUG=107182
TEST=See bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8976014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115189 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
explicit TestTabContentsDelegate() :
navigation_state_change_count_(0) {}
|
explicit TestTabContentsDelegate() :
navigation_state_change_count_(0) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXNodeObject::isNativeCheckboxInMixedState() const {
if (!isHTMLInputElement(m_node))
return false;
HTMLInputElement* input = toHTMLInputElement(m_node);
return input->type() == InputTypeNames::checkbox &&
input->shouldAppearIndeterminate();
}
|
bool AXNodeObject::isNativeCheckboxInMixedState() const {
if (!isHTMLInputElement(m_node))
return false;
HTMLInputElement* input = toHTMLInputElement(m_node);
return input->type() == InputTypeNames::checkbox &&
input->shouldAppearIndeterminate();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::RequestNudgeForDataTypes(
const tracked_objects::Location& nudge_location,
ModelTypeSet types) {
if (!scheduler()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
debug_info_event_listener_.OnNudgeFromDatatype(types.First().Get());
base::TimeDelta nudge_delay = NudgeStrategy::GetNudgeDelayTimeDelta(
types.First().Get(),
this);
scheduler()->ScheduleNudge(nudge_delay,
browser_sync::NUDGE_SOURCE_LOCAL,
types,
nudge_location);
}
|
void SyncManager::SyncInternal::RequestNudgeForDataTypes(
const tracked_objects::Location& nudge_location,
ModelTypeSet types) {
if (!scheduler()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
debug_info_event_listener_.OnNudgeFromDatatype(types.First().Get());
base::TimeDelta nudge_delay = NudgeStrategy::GetNudgeDelayTimeDelta(
types.First().Get(),
this);
scheduler()->ScheduleNudge(nudge_delay,
browser_sync::NUDGE_SOURCE_LOCAL,
types,
nudge_location);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsViewAura::ShowContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
if (touch_editable_)
touch_editable_->EndTouchEditing();
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->ShowContextMenu(params);
}
}
|
void WebContentsViewAura::ShowContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
if (touch_editable_)
touch_editable_->EndTouchEditing();
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->ShowContextMenu(params);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5296
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5296/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=a819d2b440aafa3138d95ff6e8b824da885a70e9
|
a819d2b440aafa3138d95ff6e8b824da885a70e9
| null |
struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
DLIST_ADD_END(conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
session->conn = conn;
memcpy(session->smb2_channel.preauth_sha512,
conn->smb2.preauth_sha512,
sizeof(session->smb2_channel.preauth_sha512));
return session;
}
|
struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
DLIST_ADD_END(conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
session->conn = conn;
memcpy(session->smb2_channel.preauth_sha512,
conn->smb2.preauth_sha512,
sizeof(session->smb2_channel.preauth_sha512));
return session;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void setJSTestObjUnsignedLongLongSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedLongLongSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<unsigned long long>(exec, value));
}
|
void setJSTestObjUnsignedLongLongSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedLongLongSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<unsigned long long>(exec, value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1691
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1691/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
|
void ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::DisabledPolicy_GroupPolicySupported() {
SetEnableComponentUpdates(false);
UpdateComponent(MakeCrxComponent(true));
}
|
void ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::DisabledPolicy_GroupPolicySupported() {
SetEnableComponentUpdates(false);
UpdateComponent(MakeCrxComponent(true));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void set_process_cpu_timer(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int clock_idx,
cputime_t *newval, cputime_t *oldval)
{
union cpu_time_count now;
struct list_head *head;
BUG_ON(clock_idx == CPUCLOCK_SCHED);
cpu_clock_sample_group_locked(clock_idx, tsk, &now);
if (oldval) {
if (!cputime_eq(*oldval, cputime_zero)) {
if (cputime_le(*oldval, now.cpu)) {
/* Just about to fire. */
*oldval = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
} else {
*oldval = cputime_sub(*oldval, now.cpu);
}
}
if (cputime_eq(*newval, cputime_zero))
return;
*newval = cputime_add(*newval, now.cpu);
/*
* If the RLIMIT_CPU timer will expire before the
* ITIMER_PROF timer, we have nothing else to do.
*/
if (tsk->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur
< cputime_to_secs(*newval))
return;
}
/*
* Check whether there are any process timers already set to fire
* before this one. If so, we don't have anything more to do.
*/
head = &tsk->signal->cpu_timers[clock_idx];
if (list_empty(head) ||
cputime_ge(list_first_entry(head,
struct cpu_timer_list, entry)->expires.cpu,
*newval)) {
/*
* Rejigger each thread's expiry time so that one will
* notice before we hit the process-cumulative expiry time.
*/
union cpu_time_count expires = { .sched = 0 };
expires.cpu = *newval;
process_timer_rebalance(tsk, clock_idx, expires, now);
}
}
|
void set_process_cpu_timer(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int clock_idx,
cputime_t *newval, cputime_t *oldval)
{
union cpu_time_count now;
struct list_head *head;
BUG_ON(clock_idx == CPUCLOCK_SCHED);
cpu_clock_sample_group_locked(clock_idx, tsk, &now);
if (oldval) {
if (!cputime_eq(*oldval, cputime_zero)) {
if (cputime_le(*oldval, now.cpu)) {
/* Just about to fire. */
*oldval = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
} else {
*oldval = cputime_sub(*oldval, now.cpu);
}
}
if (cputime_eq(*newval, cputime_zero))
return;
*newval = cputime_add(*newval, now.cpu);
/*
* If the RLIMIT_CPU timer will expire before the
* ITIMER_PROF timer, we have nothing else to do.
*/
if (tsk->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur
< cputime_to_secs(*newval))
return;
}
/*
* Check whether there are any process timers already set to fire
* before this one. If so, we don't have anything more to do.
*/
head = &tsk->signal->cpu_timers[clock_idx];
if (list_empty(head) ||
cputime_ge(list_first_entry(head,
struct cpu_timer_list, entry)->expires.cpu,
*newval)) {
/*
* Rejigger each thread's expiry time so that one will
* notice before we hit the process-cumulative expiry time.
*/
union cpu_time_count expires = { .sched = 0 };
expires.cpu = *newval;
process_timer_rebalance(tsk, clock_idx, expires, now);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3062
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3062/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/689e59b7ffed34eba6159dcc78e87133862e3746
|
689e59b7ffed34eba6159dcc78e87133862e3746
|
mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_seek_stream(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, int64_t timestamp, int flags)
{
MOVStreamContext *sc = st->priv_data;
int sample, time_sample;
int i;
sample = av_index_search_timestamp(st, timestamp, flags);
av_dlog(s, "stream %d, timestamp %"PRId64", sample %d\n", st->index, timestamp, sample);
if (sample < 0 && st->nb_index_entries && timestamp < st->index_entries[0].timestamp)
sample = 0;
if (sample < 0) /* not sure what to do */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc->current_sample = sample;
av_dlog(s, "stream %d, found sample %d\n", st->index, sc->current_sample);
/* adjust ctts index */
if (sc->ctts_data) {
time_sample = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sc->ctts_count; i++) {
int next = time_sample + sc->ctts_data[i].count;
if (next > sc->current_sample) {
sc->ctts_index = i;
sc->ctts_sample = sc->current_sample - time_sample;
break;
}
time_sample = next;
}
}
return sample;
}
|
static int mov_seek_stream(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, int64_t timestamp, int flags)
{
MOVStreamContext *sc = st->priv_data;
int sample, time_sample;
int i;
sample = av_index_search_timestamp(st, timestamp, flags);
av_dlog(s, "stream %d, timestamp %"PRId64", sample %d\n", st->index, timestamp, sample);
if (sample < 0 && st->nb_index_entries && timestamp < st->index_entries[0].timestamp)
sample = 0;
if (sample < 0) /* not sure what to do */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc->current_sample = sample;
av_dlog(s, "stream %d, found sample %d\n", st->index, sc->current_sample);
/* adjust ctts index */
if (sc->ctts_data) {
time_sample = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sc->ctts_count; i++) {
int next = time_sample + sc->ctts_data[i].count;
if (next > sc->current_sample) {
sc->ctts_index = i;
sc->ctts_sample = sc->current_sample - time_sample;
break;
}
time_sample = next;
}
}
return sample;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16347
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16347/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/miniupnp/ngiflib/commit/37d939a6f511d16d4c95678025c235fe62e6417a
|
37d939a6f511d16d4c95678025c235fe62e6417a
|
fix deinterlacing for small pictures
fixes #12
|
int LoadGif(struct ngiflib_gif * g) {
struct ngiflib_gce gce;
u8 sign;
u8 tmp;
int i;
if(!g) return -1;
gce.gce_present = 0;
if(g->nimg==0) {
GetByteStr(g, g->signature, 6);
g->signature[6] = '\0';
if( g->signature[0] != 'G'
|| g->signature[1] != 'I'
|| g->signature[2] != 'F'
|| g->signature[3] != '8') {
return -1;
}
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "%s\n", g->signature);
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
g->width = GetWord(g);
g->height = GetWord(g);
/* allocate frame buffer */
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if((g->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED)==0)
g->frbuff.p32 = ngiflib_malloc(4*(long)g->height*(long)g->width);
else
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
g->frbuff.p8 = ngiflib_malloc((long)g->height*(long)g->width);
tmp = GetByte(g);/* <Packed Fields> = Global Color Table Flag 1 Bit
Color Resolution 3 Bits
Sort Flag 1 Bit
Size of Global Color Table 3 Bits */
g->colorresolution = ((tmp & 0x70) >> 4) + 1;
g->sort_flag = (tmp & 8) >> 3;
g->imgbits = (tmp & 7) + 1; /* Global Palette color resolution */
g->ncolors = 1 << g->imgbits;
g->backgroundindex = GetByte(g);
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "%hux%hu %hhubits %hu couleurs bg=%hhu\n",
g->width, g->height, g->imgbits, g->ncolors, g->backgroundindex);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
g->pixaspectratio = GetByte(g); /* pixel aspect ratio (0 : unspecified) */
if(tmp&0x80) {
/* la palette globale suit. */
g->palette = (struct ngiflib_rgb *)ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_rgb)*g->ncolors);
for(i=0; i<g->ncolors; i++) {
g->palette[i].r = GetByte(g);
g->palette[i].g = GetByte(g);
g->palette[i].b = GetByte(g);
#if defined(DEBUG) && !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "%3d %02X %02X %02X\n", i, g->palette[i].r,g->palette[i].g,g->palette[i].b);
#endif /* defined(DEBUG) && !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
}
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(g->palette_cb) g->palette_cb(g, g->palette, g->ncolors);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
} else {
g->palette = NULL;
}
g->netscape_loop_count = -1;
}
for(;;) {
char appid_auth[11];
u8 id,size;
int blockindex;
sign = GetByte(g); /* signature du prochain bloc */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "BLOCK SIGNATURE 0x%02X '%c'\n", sign, (sign >= 32) ? sign : '.');
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
switch(sign) {
case 0x3B: /* END OF GIF */
return 0;
case '!': /* Extension introducer 0x21 */
id = GetByte(g);
blockindex = 0;
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "extension (id=0x%02hhx)\n", id);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
while( (size = GetByte(g)) ) {
u8 ext[256];
GetByteStr(g, ext, size);
switch(id) {
case 0xF9: /* Graphic Control Extension */
/* The scope of this extension is the first graphic
* rendering block to follow. */
gce.gce_present = 1;
gce.disposal_method = (ext[0] >> 2) & 7;
gce.transparent_flag = ext[0] & 1;
gce.user_input_flag = (ext[0] >> 1) & 1;
gce.delay_time = ext[1] | (ext[2]<<8);
gce.transparent_color = ext[3];
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "disposal_method=%hhu delay_time=%hu (transp=%hhu)transparent_color=0x%02hhX\n",
gce.disposal_method, gce.delay_time, gce.transparent_flag, gce.transparent_color);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
/* this propably should be adjusted depending on the disposal_method
* of the _previous_ image. */
if(gce.transparent_flag && ((g->nimg == 0) || gce.disposal_method == 2)) {
FillGifBackGround(g);
}
break;
case 0xFE: /* Comment Extension. */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
if(blockindex==0) fprintf(g->log, "-------------------- Comment extension --------------------\n");
ext[size] = '\0';
fputs((char *)ext, g->log);
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
break;
case 0xFF: /* application extension */
/* NETSCAPE2.0 extension :
* http://www.vurdalakov.net/misc/gif/netscape-looping-application-extension */
if(blockindex==0) {
ngiflib_memcpy(appid_auth, ext, 11);
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "---------------- Application extension ---------------\n");
fprintf(g->log, "Application identifier : '%.8s', auth code : %02X %02X %02X (",
appid_auth, ext[8], ext[9], ext[10]);
fputc((ext[8]<32)?' ':ext[8], g->log);
fputc((ext[9]<32)?' ':ext[9], g->log);
fputc((ext[10]<32)?' ':ext[10], g->log);
fprintf(g->log, ")\n");
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
} else {
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "Datas (as hex) : ");
for(i=0; i<size; i++) {
fprintf(g->log, "%02x ", ext[i]);
}
fprintf(g->log, "\nDatas (as text) : '");
for(i=0; i<size; i++) {
putc((ext[i]<32)?' ':ext[i], g->log);
}
fprintf(g->log, "'\n");
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
if(0 == ngiflib_memcmp(appid_auth, "NETSCAPE2.0", 11)) {
/* ext[0] : Sub-block ID */
if(ext[0] == 1) {
/* 1 : Netscape Looping Extension. */
g->netscape_loop_count = (int)ext[1] | ((int)ext[2] << 8);
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "NETSCAPE loop_count = %d\n", g->netscape_loop_count);
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
}
}
}
break;
case 0x01: /* plain text extension */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "Plain text extension blockindex=%d\n", blockindex);
for(i=0; i<size; i++) {
putc((ext[i]<32)?' ':ext[i], g->log);
}
putc('\n', g->log);
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
break;
}
blockindex++;
}
switch(id) {
case 0x01: /* plain text extension */
case 0xFE: /* Comment Extension. */
case 0xFF: /* application extension */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "-----------------------------------------------------------\n");
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
break;
}
break;
case 0x2C: /* Image separator */
if(g->nimg==0) {
g->cur_img = ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_img));
if(g->cur_img == NULL) return -2; /* memory error */
g->first_img = g->cur_img;
} else {
g->cur_img->next = ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_img));
if(g->cur_img->next == NULL) return -2; /* memory error */
g->cur_img = g->cur_img->next;
}
ngiflib_memset(g->cur_img, 0, sizeof(struct ngiflib_img));
g->cur_img->parent = g;
if(gce.gce_present) {
ngiflib_memcpy(&g->cur_img->gce, &gce, sizeof(struct ngiflib_gce));
} else {
ngiflib_memset(&g->cur_img->gce, 0, sizeof(struct ngiflib_gce));
}
if (DecodeGifImg(g->cur_img) < 0) return -1;
g->nimg++;
tmp = GetByte(g);/* 0 final */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "ZERO TERMINATOR 0x%02X\n", tmp);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
return 1; /* image decode */
default:
/* unexpected byte */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "unexpected signature 0x%02X\n", sign);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
return -1;
}
}
}
|
int LoadGif(struct ngiflib_gif * g) {
struct ngiflib_gce gce;
u8 sign;
u8 tmp;
int i;
if(!g) return -1;
gce.gce_present = 0;
if(g->nimg==0) {
GetByteStr(g, g->signature, 6);
g->signature[6] = '\0';
if( g->signature[0] != 'G'
|| g->signature[1] != 'I'
|| g->signature[2] != 'F'
|| g->signature[3] != '8') {
return -1;
}
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "%s\n", g->signature);
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
g->width = GetWord(g);
g->height = GetWord(g);
/* allocate frame buffer */
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if((g->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED)==0)
g->frbuff.p32 = ngiflib_malloc(4*(long)g->height*(long)g->width);
else
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
g->frbuff.p8 = ngiflib_malloc((long)g->height*(long)g->width);
tmp = GetByte(g);/* <Packed Fields> = Global Color Table Flag 1 Bit
Color Resolution 3 Bits
Sort Flag 1 Bit
Size of Global Color Table 3 Bits */
g->colorresolution = ((tmp & 0x70) >> 4) + 1;
g->sort_flag = (tmp & 8) >> 3;
g->imgbits = (tmp & 7) + 1; /* Global Palette color resolution */
g->ncolors = 1 << g->imgbits;
g->backgroundindex = GetByte(g);
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "%hux%hu %hhubits %hu couleurs bg=%hhu\n",
g->width, g->height, g->imgbits, g->ncolors, g->backgroundindex);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
g->pixaspectratio = GetByte(g); /* pixel aspect ratio (0 : unspecified) */
if(tmp&0x80) {
/* la palette globale suit. */
g->palette = (struct ngiflib_rgb *)ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_rgb)*g->ncolors);
for(i=0; i<g->ncolors; i++) {
g->palette[i].r = GetByte(g);
g->palette[i].g = GetByte(g);
g->palette[i].b = GetByte(g);
#if defined(DEBUG) && !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "%3d %02X %02X %02X\n", i, g->palette[i].r,g->palette[i].g,g->palette[i].b);
#endif /* defined(DEBUG) && !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
}
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(g->palette_cb) g->palette_cb(g, g->palette, g->ncolors);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
} else {
g->palette = NULL;
}
g->netscape_loop_count = -1;
}
for(;;) {
char appid_auth[11];
u8 id,size;
int blockindex;
sign = GetByte(g); /* signature du prochain bloc */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "BLOCK SIGNATURE 0x%02X '%c'\n", sign, (sign >= 32) ? sign : '.');
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
switch(sign) {
case 0x3B: /* END OF GIF */
return 0;
case '!': /* Extension introducer 0x21 */
id = GetByte(g);
blockindex = 0;
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "extension (id=0x%02hhx)\n", id);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
while( (size = GetByte(g)) ) {
u8 ext[256];
GetByteStr(g, ext, size);
switch(id) {
case 0xF9: /* Graphic Control Extension */
/* The scope of this extension is the first graphic
* rendering block to follow. */
gce.gce_present = 1;
gce.disposal_method = (ext[0] >> 2) & 7;
gce.transparent_flag = ext[0] & 1;
gce.user_input_flag = (ext[0] >> 1) & 1;
gce.delay_time = ext[1] | (ext[2]<<8);
gce.transparent_color = ext[3];
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "disposal_method=%hhu delay_time=%hu (transp=%hhu)transparent_color=0x%02hhX\n",
gce.disposal_method, gce.delay_time, gce.transparent_flag, gce.transparent_color);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
/* this propably should be adjusted depending on the disposal_method
* of the _previous_ image. */
if(gce.transparent_flag && ((g->nimg == 0) || gce.disposal_method == 2)) {
FillGifBackGround(g);
}
break;
case 0xFE: /* Comment Extension. */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
if(blockindex==0) fprintf(g->log, "-------------------- Comment extension --------------------\n");
ext[size] = '\0';
fputs((char *)ext, g->log);
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
break;
case 0xFF: /* application extension */
/* NETSCAPE2.0 extension :
* http://www.vurdalakov.net/misc/gif/netscape-looping-application-extension */
if(blockindex==0) {
ngiflib_memcpy(appid_auth, ext, 11);
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "---------------- Application extension ---------------\n");
fprintf(g->log, "Application identifier : '%.8s', auth code : %02X %02X %02X (",
appid_auth, ext[8], ext[9], ext[10]);
fputc((ext[8]<32)?' ':ext[8], g->log);
fputc((ext[9]<32)?' ':ext[9], g->log);
fputc((ext[10]<32)?' ':ext[10], g->log);
fprintf(g->log, ")\n");
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
} else {
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "Datas (as hex) : ");
for(i=0; i<size; i++) {
fprintf(g->log, "%02x ", ext[i]);
}
fprintf(g->log, "\nDatas (as text) : '");
for(i=0; i<size; i++) {
putc((ext[i]<32)?' ':ext[i], g->log);
}
fprintf(g->log, "'\n");
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
if(0 == ngiflib_memcmp(appid_auth, "NETSCAPE2.0", 11)) {
/* ext[0] : Sub-block ID */
if(ext[0] == 1) {
/* 1 : Netscape Looping Extension. */
g->netscape_loop_count = (int)ext[1] | ((int)ext[2] << 8);
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "NETSCAPE loop_count = %d\n", g->netscape_loop_count);
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
}
}
}
break;
case 0x01: /* plain text extension */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "Plain text extension blockindex=%d\n", blockindex);
for(i=0; i<size; i++) {
putc((ext[i]<32)?' ':ext[i], g->log);
}
putc('\n', g->log);
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
break;
}
blockindex++;
}
switch(id) {
case 0x01: /* plain text extension */
case 0xFE: /* Comment Extension. */
case 0xFF: /* application extension */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) {
fprintf(g->log, "-----------------------------------------------------------\n");
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_NO_FILE */
break;
}
break;
case 0x2C: /* Image separator */
if(g->nimg==0) {
g->cur_img = ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_img));
if(g->cur_img == NULL) return -2; /* memory error */
g->first_img = g->cur_img;
} else {
g->cur_img->next = ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_img));
if(g->cur_img->next == NULL) return -2; /* memory error */
g->cur_img = g->cur_img->next;
}
ngiflib_memset(g->cur_img, 0, sizeof(struct ngiflib_img));
g->cur_img->parent = g;
if(gce.gce_present) {
ngiflib_memcpy(&g->cur_img->gce, &gce, sizeof(struct ngiflib_gce));
} else {
ngiflib_memset(&g->cur_img->gce, 0, sizeof(struct ngiflib_gce));
}
if (DecodeGifImg(g->cur_img) < 0) return -1;
g->nimg++;
tmp = GetByte(g);/* 0 final */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "ZERO TERMINATOR 0x%02X\n", tmp);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
return 1; /* image decode */
default:
/* unexpected byte */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(g->log) fprintf(g->log, "unexpected signature 0x%02X\n", sign);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
return -1;
}
}
}
|
C
|
ngiflib
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2Implementation::MultiDrawElementsWEBGLHelper(GLenum mode,
const GLsizei* counts,
GLenum type,
const GLsizei* offsets,
GLsizei drawcount) {
DCHECK_GT(drawcount, 0);
uint32_t buffer_size = ComputeCombinedCopySize(drawcount, counts, offsets);
ScopedTransferBufferPtr buffer(buffer_size, helper_, transfer_buffer_);
helper_->MultiDrawBeginCHROMIUM(drawcount);
auto DoMultiDraw = [&](const std::array<uint32_t, 2>& offsets, uint32_t,
uint32_t copy_count) {
helper_->MultiDrawElementsCHROMIUM(
mode, buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset() + offsets[0], type,
buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset() + offsets[1], copy_count);
};
if (!TransferArraysAndExecute(drawcount, &buffer, DoMultiDraw, counts,
offsets)) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glMultiDrawElementsWEBGL", "out of memory");
}
helper_->MultiDrawEndCHROMIUM();
}
|
void GLES2Implementation::MultiDrawElementsWEBGLHelper(GLenum mode,
const GLsizei* counts,
GLenum type,
const GLsizei* offsets,
GLsizei drawcount) {
DCHECK_GT(drawcount, 0);
uint32_t buffer_size = ComputeCombinedCopySize(drawcount, counts, offsets);
ScopedTransferBufferPtr buffer(buffer_size, helper_, transfer_buffer_);
helper_->MultiDrawBeginCHROMIUM(drawcount);
auto DoMultiDraw = [&](const std::array<uint32_t, 2>& offsets, uint32_t,
uint32_t copy_count) {
helper_->MultiDrawElementsCHROMIUM(
mode, buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset() + offsets[0], type,
buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset() + offsets[1], copy_count);
};
if (!TransferArraysAndExecute(drawcount, &buffer, DoMultiDraw, counts,
offsets)) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glMultiDrawElementsWEBGL", "out of memory");
}
helper_->MultiDrawEndCHROMIUM();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1643
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1643/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=8e76d0404b7f664ee6719fd98f0483f0ac4669d6
|
8e76d0404b7f664ee6719fd98f0483f0ac4669d6
| null |
static int php_libxml_unregister_node(xmlNodePtr nodep TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_libxml_node_object *wrapper;
php_libxml_node_ptr *nodeptr = nodep->_private;
if (nodeptr != NULL) {
wrapper = nodeptr->_private;
if (wrapper) {
php_libxml_clear_object(wrapper TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
if (nodeptr->node != NULL && nodeptr->node->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) {
nodeptr->node->_private = NULL;
}
nodeptr->node = NULL;
}
}
return -1;
}
|
static int php_libxml_unregister_node(xmlNodePtr nodep TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_libxml_node_object *wrapper;
php_libxml_node_ptr *nodeptr = nodep->_private;
if (nodeptr != NULL) {
wrapper = nodeptr->_private;
if (wrapper) {
php_libxml_clear_object(wrapper TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
if (nodeptr->node != NULL && nodeptr->node->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) {
nodeptr->node->_private = NULL;
}
nodeptr->node = NULL;
}
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
static inline void *alloc_stateowner(struct kmem_cache *slab, struct xdr_netobj *owner, struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_stateowner *sop;
sop = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sop)
return NULL;
sop->so_owner.data = kmemdup(owner->data, owner->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sop->so_owner.data) {
kmem_cache_free(slab, sop);
return NULL;
}
sop->so_owner.len = owner->len;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sop->so_stateids);
sop->so_client = clp;
init_nfs4_replay(&sop->so_replay);
atomic_set(&sop->so_count, 1);
return sop;
}
|
static inline void *alloc_stateowner(struct kmem_cache *slab, struct xdr_netobj *owner, struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_stateowner *sop;
sop = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sop)
return NULL;
sop->so_owner.data = kmemdup(owner->data, owner->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sop->so_owner.data) {
kmem_cache_free(slab, sop);
return NULL;
}
sop->so_owner.len = owner->len;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sop->so_stateids);
sop->so_client = clp;
init_nfs4_replay(&sop->so_replay);
atomic_set(&sop->so_count, 1);
return sop;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16530
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16530/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/786de92b3cb26012d3d0f00ee37adf14527f35c4
|
786de92b3cb26012d3d0f00ee37adf14527f35c4
|
USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
CC: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int uas_switch_interface(struct usb_device *udev,
struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = uas_find_uas_alt_setting(intf);
if (!alt)
return -ENODEV;
return usb_set_interface(udev, alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
alt->desc.bAlternateSetting);
}
|
static int uas_switch_interface(struct usb_device *udev,
struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int alt;
alt = uas_find_uas_alt_setting(intf);
if (alt < 0)
return alt;
return usb_set_interface(udev,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber, alt);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStrip::UpdateLayoutTypeFromMouseEvent(views::View* source,
const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (!GetAdjustLayout())
return;
switch (event.type()) {
case ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED:
mouse_move_count_ = 0;
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
SetResetToShrinkOnExit((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) == 0);
if (reset_to_shrink_on_exit_ && touch_layout_.get()) {
gfx::Point tab_strip_point(event.location());
views::View::ConvertPointToTarget(source, this, &tab_strip_point);
Tab* tab = FindTabForEvent(tab_strip_point);
if (tab && touch_layout_->IsStacked(GetModelIndexOfTab(tab))) {
SetLayoutType(TAB_STRIP_LAYOUT_SHRINK, true);
controller_->LayoutTypeMaybeChanged();
}
}
break;
case ui::ET_MOUSE_MOVED: {
#if defined(USE_ASH)
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(true);
#else
gfx::Point location(event.location());
ConvertPointToTarget(source, this, &location);
if (location == last_mouse_move_location_)
return; // Ignore spurious moves.
last_mouse_move_location_ = location;
if ((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) == 0 &&
(event.flags() & ui::EF_IS_SYNTHESIZED) == 0) {
if ((base::TimeTicks::Now() - last_mouse_move_time_).InMilliseconds() <
kMouseMoveTimeMS) {
if (mouse_move_count_++ == kMouseMoveCountBeforeConsiderReal)
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(true);
} else {
mouse_move_count_ = 1;
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
} else {
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
#endif
break;
}
case ui::ET_MOUSE_RELEASED: {
gfx::Point location(event.location());
ConvertPointToTarget(source, this, &location);
last_mouse_move_location_ = location;
mouse_move_count_ = 0;
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
if ((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) == ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) {
SetLayoutType(TAB_STRIP_LAYOUT_STACKED, true);
controller_->LayoutTypeMaybeChanged();
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
|
void TabStrip::UpdateLayoutTypeFromMouseEvent(views::View* source,
const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (!GetAdjustLayout())
return;
switch (event.type()) {
case ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED:
mouse_move_count_ = 0;
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
SetResetToShrinkOnExit((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) == 0);
if (reset_to_shrink_on_exit_ && touch_layout_.get()) {
gfx::Point tab_strip_point(event.location());
views::View::ConvertPointToTarget(source, this, &tab_strip_point);
Tab* tab = FindTabForEvent(tab_strip_point);
if (tab && touch_layout_->IsStacked(GetModelIndexOfTab(tab))) {
SetLayoutType(TAB_STRIP_LAYOUT_SHRINK, true);
controller_->LayoutTypeMaybeChanged();
}
}
break;
case ui::ET_MOUSE_MOVED: {
#if defined(USE_ASH)
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(true);
#else
gfx::Point location(event.location());
ConvertPointToTarget(source, this, &location);
if (location == last_mouse_move_location_)
return; // Ignore spurious moves.
last_mouse_move_location_ = location;
if ((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) == 0 &&
(event.flags() & ui::EF_IS_SYNTHESIZED) == 0) {
if ((base::TimeTicks::Now() - last_mouse_move_time_).InMilliseconds() <
kMouseMoveTimeMS) {
if (mouse_move_count_++ == kMouseMoveCountBeforeConsiderReal)
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(true);
} else {
mouse_move_count_ = 1;
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
} else {
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
#endif
break;
}
case ui::ET_MOUSE_RELEASED: {
gfx::Point location(event.location());
ConvertPointToTarget(source, this, &location);
last_mouse_move_location_ = location;
mouse_move_count_ = 0;
last_mouse_move_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
if ((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) == ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) {
SetLayoutType(TAB_STRIP_LAYOUT_STACKED, true);
controller_->LayoutTypeMaybeChanged();
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
Revert 37061 because it caused ui_tests to not finish.
TBR=estade
TEST=none
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/549155
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37075 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserActionsContainer::AnimationEnded(const Animation* animation) {
container_size_.set_width(animation_target_size_);
animation_target_size_ = 0;
resize_amount_ = 0;
OnBrowserActionVisibilityChanged();
suppress_chevron_ = false;
profile_->GetPrefs()->SetInteger(prefs::kBrowserActionContainerWidth,
container_size_.width());
}
|
void BrowserActionsContainer::AnimationEnded(const Animation* animation) {
container_size_.set_width(animation_target_size_);
animation_target_size_ = 0;
resize_amount_ = 0;
OnBrowserActionVisibilityChanged();
suppress_chevron_ = false;
profile_->GetPrefs()->SetInteger(prefs::kBrowserActionContainerWidth,
container_size_.width());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2133
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2133/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/90481622d75715bfcb68501280a917dbfe516029
|
90481622d75715bfcb68501280a917dbfe516029
|
hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int hugetlb_get_quota(struct address_space *mapping, long delta)
|
int hugetlb_get_quota(struct address_space *mapping, long delta)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo = HUGETLBFS_SB(mapping->host->i_sb);
if (sbinfo->free_blocks > -1) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
if (sbinfo->free_blocks - delta >= 0)
sbinfo->free_blocks -= delta;
else
ret = -ENOMEM;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0838/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc
|
0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc
|
Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ChangeWindowDesktop(XID window, XID destination) {
int desktop;
if (!GetWindowDesktop(destination, &desktop))
return false;
if (desktop == kAllDesktops &&
!GetCurrentDesktop(&desktop))
return false;
XEvent event;
event.xclient.type = ClientMessage;
event.xclient.window = window;
event.xclient.message_type = GetAtom("_NET_WM_DESKTOP");
event.xclient.format = 32;
event.xclient.data.l[0] = desktop;
event.xclient.data.l[1] = 1; // source indication
int result = XSendEvent(GetXDisplay(), GetX11RootWindow(), False,
SubstructureNotifyMask, &event);
return result == Success;
}
|
bool ChangeWindowDesktop(XID window, XID destination) {
int desktop;
if (!GetWindowDesktop(destination, &desktop))
return false;
if (desktop == kAllDesktops &&
!GetCurrentDesktop(&desktop))
return false;
XEvent event;
event.xclient.type = ClientMessage;
event.xclient.window = window;
event.xclient.message_type = GetAtom("_NET_WM_DESKTOP");
event.xclient.format = 32;
event.xclient.data.l[0] = desktop;
event.xclient.data.l[1] = 1; // source indication
int result = XSendEvent(GetXDisplay(), GetX11RootWindow(), False,
SubstructureNotifyMask, &event);
return result == Success;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2925
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2925/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/397d425dc26da728396e66d392d5dcb8dac30c37
|
397d425dc26da728396e66d392d5dcb8dac30c37
|
vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL, 0))
return -ECHILD;
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
return error;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (d_is_negative(dentry)) {
dput(dentry);
return -ENOENT;
}
if (nd->depth)
put_link(nd);
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = nd->path.mnt;
error = should_follow_link(nd, path, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
mntget(path->mnt);
follow_mount(path);
return 0;
}
|
mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL, 0))
return -ECHILD;
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
return error;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (d_is_negative(dentry)) {
dput(dentry);
return -ENOENT;
}
if (nd->depth)
put_link(nd);
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = nd->path.mnt;
error = should_follow_link(nd, path, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
mntget(path->mnt);
follow_mount(path);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WirelessNetwork::Clear() {
Network::Clear();
name_.clear();
strength_ = 0;
auto_connect_ = false;
favorite_ = false;
}
|
void WirelessNetwork::Clear() {
Network::Clear();
name_.clear();
strength_ = 0;
auto_connect_ = false;
favorite_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7191/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct net_device *netdev_next_lower_dev_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
struct list_head **iter)
{
struct netdev_adjacent *lower;
lower = list_entry_rcu((*iter)->next, struct netdev_adjacent, list);
if (&lower->list == &dev->adj_list.lower)
return NULL;
*iter = &lower->list;
return lower->dev;
}
|
static struct net_device *netdev_next_lower_dev_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
struct list_head **iter)
{
struct netdev_adjacent *lower;
lower = list_entry_rcu((*iter)->next, struct netdev_adjacent, list);
if (&lower->list == &dev->adj_list.lower)
return NULL;
*iter = &lower->list;
return lower->dev;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10218/
|
CWE-476
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
|
d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
| null |
c_pdf14trans_get_cropping(const gs_composite_t *pcte, int *ry, int *rheight,
int cropping_min, int cropping_max)
{
gs_pdf14trans_t * pdf14pct = (gs_pdf14trans_t *) pcte;
switch (pdf14pct->params.pdf14_op) {
case PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands. */
case PDF14_POP_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands. */
case PDF14_ABORT_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands */
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP:
{ gs_int_rect rect;
pdf14_compute_group_device_int_rect(&pdf14pct->params.ctm,
&pdf14pct->params.bbox, &rect);
/* We have to crop this by the parent object. */
*ry = max(rect.p.y, cropping_min);
*rheight = min(rect.q.y, cropping_max) - *ry;
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
}
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK:
{ gs_int_rect rect;
pdf14_compute_group_device_int_rect(&pdf14pct->params.ctm,
&pdf14pct->params.bbox, &rect);
/* We have to crop this by the parent object and worry about the BC outside
the range, except for image SMask which don't affect areas outside the image */
if ( pdf14pct->params.GrayBackground == 1.0 || pdf14pct->params.mask_is_image) {
/* In this case there will not be a background effect to
worry about. The mask will not have any effect outside
the bounding box. This is NOT the default or common case. */
*ry = max(rect.p.y, cropping_min);
*rheight = min(rect.q.y, cropping_max) - *ry;
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
} else {
/* We need to make the soft mask range as large as the parent
due to the fact that the background color can have an impact
OUTSIDE the bounding box of the soft mask */
*ry = cropping_min;
*rheight = cropping_max - cropping_min;
if (pdf14pct->params.subtype == TRANSPARENCY_MASK_None)
return SAMEAS_PUSHCROP_BUTNOPUSH;
else
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
}
}
case PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP: return POPCROP; /* Pop cropping. */
case PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK: return POPCROP; /* Pop the cropping */
case PDF14_PUSH_TRANS_STATE: return CURRBANDS;
case PDF14_POP_TRANS_STATE: return CURRBANDS;
case PDF14_SET_BLEND_PARAMS: return ALLBANDS;
case PDF14_PUSH_SMASK_COLOR: return POPCROP; /* Pop cropping. */
case PDF14_POP_SMASK_COLOR: return POPCROP; /* Pop the cropping */
}
return ALLBANDS;
}
|
c_pdf14trans_get_cropping(const gs_composite_t *pcte, int *ry, int *rheight,
int cropping_min, int cropping_max)
{
gs_pdf14trans_t * pdf14pct = (gs_pdf14trans_t *) pcte;
switch (pdf14pct->params.pdf14_op) {
case PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands. */
case PDF14_POP_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands. */
case PDF14_ABORT_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands */
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP:
{ gs_int_rect rect;
pdf14_compute_group_device_int_rect(&pdf14pct->params.ctm,
&pdf14pct->params.bbox, &rect);
/* We have to crop this by the parent object. */
*ry = max(rect.p.y, cropping_min);
*rheight = min(rect.q.y, cropping_max) - *ry;
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
}
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK:
{ gs_int_rect rect;
pdf14_compute_group_device_int_rect(&pdf14pct->params.ctm,
&pdf14pct->params.bbox, &rect);
/* We have to crop this by the parent object and worry about the BC outside
the range, except for image SMask which don't affect areas outside the image */
if ( pdf14pct->params.GrayBackground == 1.0 || pdf14pct->params.mask_is_image) {
/* In this case there will not be a background effect to
worry about. The mask will not have any effect outside
the bounding box. This is NOT the default or common case. */
*ry = max(rect.p.y, cropping_min);
*rheight = min(rect.q.y, cropping_max) - *ry;
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
} else {
/* We need to make the soft mask range as large as the parent
due to the fact that the background color can have an impact
OUTSIDE the bounding box of the soft mask */
*ry = cropping_min;
*rheight = cropping_max - cropping_min;
if (pdf14pct->params.subtype == TRANSPARENCY_MASK_None)
return SAMEAS_PUSHCROP_BUTNOPUSH;
else
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
}
}
case PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP: return POPCROP; /* Pop cropping. */
case PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK: return POPCROP; /* Pop the cropping */
case PDF14_PUSH_TRANS_STATE: return CURRBANDS;
case PDF14_POP_TRANS_STATE: return CURRBANDS;
case PDF14_SET_BLEND_PARAMS: return ALLBANDS;
case PDF14_PUSH_SMASK_COLOR: return POPCROP; /* Pop cropping. */
case PDF14_POP_SMASK_COLOR: return POPCROP; /* Pop the cropping */
}
return ALLBANDS;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1294/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3ff403eecdd23a39853a4ebca52023fbba6c5d00
|
3ff403eecdd23a39853a4ebca52023fbba6c5d00
|
Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
void QuitWhenIdleTask(RunLoop* run_loop, int* counter) {
run_loop->QuitWhenIdle();
++(*counter);
}
|
void QuitWhenIdleTask(RunLoop* run_loop, int* counter) {
run_loop->QuitWhenIdle();
++(*counter);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void Textfield::ApplyColor(SkColor value, const gfx::Range& range) {
GetRenderText()->ApplyColor(value, range);
SchedulePaint();
}
|
void Textfield::ApplyColor(SkColor value, const gfx::Range& range) {
GetRenderText()->ApplyColor(value, range);
SchedulePaint();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2420
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2420/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/81df1cc77722000f8d0025c1ab00ced123aa573c
|
81df1cc77722000f8d0025c1ab00ced123aa573c
|
Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
|
static char* find_and_open_tombstone(int* fd) {
char path[128];
int oldest = -1;
struct stat oldest_sb;
for (int i = 0; i < MAX_TOMBSTONES; i++) {
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), TOMBSTONE_TEMPLATE, i);
struct stat sb;
if (!stat(path, &sb)) {
if (oldest < 0 || sb.st_mtime < oldest_sb.st_mtime) {
oldest = i;
oldest_sb.st_mtime = sb.st_mtime;
}
continue;
}
if (errno != ENOENT)
continue;
*fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (*fd < 0)
continue; // raced ?
fchown(*fd, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM);
return strdup(path);
}
if (oldest < 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to find a valid tombstone, default to using tombstone 0.\n");
oldest = 0;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), TOMBSTONE_TEMPLATE, oldest);
*fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (*fd < 0) {
ALOGE("failed to open tombstone file '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
fchown(*fd, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM);
return strdup(path);
}
|
static char* find_and_open_tombstone(int* fd) {
char path[128];
int oldest = -1;
struct stat oldest_sb;
for (int i = 0; i < MAX_TOMBSTONES; i++) {
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), TOMBSTONE_TEMPLATE, i);
struct stat sb;
if (!stat(path, &sb)) {
if (oldest < 0 || sb.st_mtime < oldest_sb.st_mtime) {
oldest = i;
oldest_sb.st_mtime = sb.st_mtime;
}
continue;
}
if (errno != ENOENT)
continue;
*fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (*fd < 0)
continue; // raced ?
fchown(*fd, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM);
return strdup(path);
}
if (oldest < 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to find a valid tombstone, default to using tombstone 0.\n");
oldest = 0;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), TOMBSTONE_TEMPLATE, oldest);
*fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (*fd < 0) {
ALOGE("failed to open tombstone file '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
fchown(*fd, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM);
return strdup(path);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionPrefs::SetExtensionPrefURLPatternSet(
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& pref_key,
const URLPatternSet& new_value) {
ListValue* value = new ListValue();
for (URLPatternSet::const_iterator i = new_value.begin();
i != new_value.end(); ++i)
value->AppendIfNotPresent(Value::CreateStringValue(i->GetAsString()));
UpdateExtensionPref(extension_id, pref_key, value);
}
|
void ExtensionPrefs::SetExtensionPrefURLPatternSet(
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& pref_key,
const URLPatternSet& new_value) {
ListValue* value = new ListValue();
for (URLPatternSet::const_iterator i = new_value.begin();
i != new_value.end(); ++i)
value->AppendIfNotPresent(Value::CreateStringValue(i->GetAsString()));
UpdateExtensionPref(extension_id, pref_key, value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1172
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1172/
|
CWE-264
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus-glib/commit/?h=rhel5&id=9a6bce9b615abca6068348c1606ba8eaf13d9ae0
|
9a6bce9b615abca6068348c1606ba8eaf13d9ae0
| null |
increment_received_cb (DBusGProxy *proxy,
DBusGProxyCall *call,
gpointer data)
{
GError *error;
guint val;
g_assert (!strcmp (data, "moo"));
error = NULL;
if (!dbus_g_proxy_end_call (proxy, call, &error,
G_TYPE_UINT, &val,
G_TYPE_INVALID))
lose_gerror ("Failed to complete (async) Increment call", error);
if (val != 43)
lose ("Increment call returned %d, should be 43", val);
g_print ("Async increment gave \"%d\"\n", val);
g_main_loop_quit (loop);
g_source_remove (exit_timeout);
}
|
increment_received_cb (DBusGProxy *proxy,
DBusGProxyCall *call,
gpointer data)
{
GError *error;
guint val;
g_assert (!strcmp (data, "moo"));
error = NULL;
if (!dbus_g_proxy_end_call (proxy, call, &error,
G_TYPE_UINT, &val,
G_TYPE_INVALID))
lose_gerror ("Failed to complete (async) Increment call", error);
if (val != 43)
lose ("Increment call returned %d, should be 43", val);
g_print ("Async increment gave \"%d\"\n", val);
g_main_loop_quit (loop);
g_source_remove (exit_timeout);
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5156/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39
|
48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39
|
virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int mergeable_ctx_to_buf_truesize(unsigned long mrg_ctx)
{
unsigned int truesize = mrg_ctx & (MERGEABLE_BUFFER_ALIGN - 1);
return (truesize + 1) * MERGEABLE_BUFFER_ALIGN;
}
|
static unsigned int mergeable_ctx_to_buf_truesize(unsigned long mrg_ctx)
{
unsigned int truesize = mrg_ctx & (MERGEABLE_BUFFER_ALIGN - 1);
return (truesize + 1) * MERGEABLE_BUFFER_ALIGN;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7510
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7510/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/keszybz/systemd/commit/cb31827d62066a04b02111df3052949fda4b6888
|
cb31827d62066a04b02111df3052949fda4b6888
|
nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002
|
enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getgrnam_r(
const char *name,
struct group *gr,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t gid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(gr);
p = startswith(name, "vg-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
if (e - p > HOST_NAME_MAX - 1) /* -1 for the last dash */
goto not_found;
r = parse_gid(e + 1, &gid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineGroup",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) gid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_GROUP_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = sizeof(char*) + strlen(name) + 1;
if (buflen < l) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
strcpy(buffer + sizeof(char*), name);
gr->gr_name = buffer + sizeof(char*);
gr->gr_gid = gid;
gr->gr_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
gr->gr_mem = (char**) buffer;
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
|
enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getgrnam_r(
const char *name,
struct group *gr,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t gid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(gr);
p = startswith(name, "vg-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
r = parse_gid(e + 1, &gid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineGroup",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) gid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_GROUP_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = sizeof(char*) + strlen(name) + 1;
if (buflen < l) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
strcpy(buffer + sizeof(char*), name);
gr->gr_name = buffer + sizeof(char*);
gr->gr_gid = gid;
gr->gr_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
gr->gr_mem = (char**) buffer;
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 1 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
gpk_match_card(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
i = _sc_match_atr(card, gpk_atrs, &card->type);
if (i < 0) {
const u8 *hist_bytes = card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes;
/* Gemplus GPK docs say we can use just the
* FMN and PRN fields of the historical bytes
* to recognize a GPK card
* See Table 43, pp. 188
* We'll use the first 2 bytes as well
*/
if ((card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7)
&& (hist_bytes[0] == 0x80)
&& (hist_bytes[1] == 0x65)
&& (hist_bytes[2] == 0xa2)) { /* FMN */
if (hist_bytes[3] == 0x08) { /* PRN? */
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_GPK_GPK8000;
return 1;
}
if (hist_bytes[3] == 0x09) { /* PRN? */
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_GPK_GPK16000;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
gpk_match_card(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
i = _sc_match_atr(card, gpk_atrs, &card->type);
if (i < 0) {
const u8 *hist_bytes = card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes;
/* Gemplus GPK docs say we can use just the
* FMN and PRN fields of the historical bytes
* to recognize a GPK card
* See Table 43, pp. 188
* We'll use the first 2 bytes as well
*/
if ((card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7)
&& (hist_bytes[0] == 0x80)
&& (hist_bytes[1] == 0x65)
&& (hist_bytes[2] == 0xa2)) { /* FMN */
if (hist_bytes[3] == 0x08) { /* PRN? */
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_GPK_GPK8000;
return 1;
}
if (hist_bytes[3] == 0x09) { /* PRN? */
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_GPK_GPK16000;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
bool HTMLMediaElement::MediaShouldBeOpaque() const {
return !IsMediaDataCorsSameOrigin() && ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
!FastGetAttribute(kSrcAttr).IsEmpty() &&
EffectivePreloadType() != WebMediaPlayer::kPreloadNone;
}
|
bool HTMLMediaElement::MediaShouldBeOpaque() const {
return !IsMediaDataCorsSameOrigin() && ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
!FastGetAttribute(kSrcAttr).IsEmpty() &&
EffectivePreloadType() != WebMediaPlayer::kPreloadNone;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6761
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6761/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
|
void FrameLoader::DetachDocumentLoader(Member<DocumentLoader>& loader) {
if (!loader)
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigation_disabler(*frame_);
loader->DetachFromFrame();
loader = nullptr;
}
|
void FrameLoader::DetachDocumentLoader(Member<DocumentLoader>& loader) {
if (!loader)
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigation_disabler(*frame_);
loader->DetachFromFrame();
loader = nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
const struct sock *sk2),
unsigned int hash2_nulladdr)
{
struct udp_hslot *hslot, *hslot2;
struct udp_table *udptable = sk->sk_prot->h.udp_table;
int error = 1;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (!snum) {
int low, high, remaining;
unsigned rand;
unsigned short first, last;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bitmap, PORTS_PER_CHAIN);
inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
remaining = (high - low) + 1;
rand = net_random();
first = (((u64)rand * remaining) >> 32) + low;
/*
* force rand to be an odd multiple of UDP_HTABLE_SIZE
*/
rand = (rand | 1) * (udptable->mask + 1);
last = first + udptable->mask + 1;
do {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, first);
bitmap_zero(bitmap, PORTS_PER_CHAIN);
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
udp_lib_lport_inuse(net, snum, hslot, bitmap, sk,
saddr_comp, udptable->log);
snum = first;
/*
* Iterate on all possible values of snum for this hash.
* Using steps of an odd multiple of UDP_HTABLE_SIZE
* give us randomization and full range coverage.
*/
do {
if (low <= snum && snum <= high &&
!test_bit(snum >> udptable->log, bitmap) &&
!inet_is_reserved_local_port(snum))
goto found;
snum += rand;
} while (snum != first);
spin_unlock_bh(&hslot->lock);
} while (++first != last);
goto fail;
} else {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, snum);
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
if (hslot->count > 10) {
int exist;
unsigned int slot2 = udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash ^ snum;
slot2 &= udptable->mask;
hash2_nulladdr &= udptable->mask;
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, slot2);
if (hslot->count < hslot2->count)
goto scan_primary_hash;
exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
sk, saddr_comp);
if (!exist && (hash2_nulladdr != slot2)) {
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, hash2_nulladdr);
exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
sk, saddr_comp);
}
if (exist)
goto fail_unlock;
else
goto found;
}
scan_primary_hash:
if (udp_lib_lport_inuse(net, snum, hslot, NULL, sk,
saddr_comp, 0))
goto fail_unlock;
}
found:
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = snum;
udp_sk(sk)->udp_port_hash = snum;
udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash ^= snum;
if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, &hslot->head);
hslot->count++;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash);
spin_lock(&hslot2->lock);
hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_node,
&hslot2->head);
hslot2->count++;
spin_unlock(&hslot2->lock);
}
error = 0;
fail_unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&hslot->lock);
fail:
return error;
}
|
int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
const struct sock *sk2),
unsigned int hash2_nulladdr)
{
struct udp_hslot *hslot, *hslot2;
struct udp_table *udptable = sk->sk_prot->h.udp_table;
int error = 1;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (!snum) {
int low, high, remaining;
unsigned rand;
unsigned short first, last;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bitmap, PORTS_PER_CHAIN);
inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
remaining = (high - low) + 1;
rand = net_random();
first = (((u64)rand * remaining) >> 32) + low;
/*
* force rand to be an odd multiple of UDP_HTABLE_SIZE
*/
rand = (rand | 1) * (udptable->mask + 1);
last = first + udptable->mask + 1;
do {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, first);
bitmap_zero(bitmap, PORTS_PER_CHAIN);
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
udp_lib_lport_inuse(net, snum, hslot, bitmap, sk,
saddr_comp, udptable->log);
snum = first;
/*
* Iterate on all possible values of snum for this hash.
* Using steps of an odd multiple of UDP_HTABLE_SIZE
* give us randomization and full range coverage.
*/
do {
if (low <= snum && snum <= high &&
!test_bit(snum >> udptable->log, bitmap) &&
!inet_is_reserved_local_port(snum))
goto found;
snum += rand;
} while (snum != first);
spin_unlock_bh(&hslot->lock);
} while (++first != last);
goto fail;
} else {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, snum);
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
if (hslot->count > 10) {
int exist;
unsigned int slot2 = udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash ^ snum;
slot2 &= udptable->mask;
hash2_nulladdr &= udptable->mask;
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, slot2);
if (hslot->count < hslot2->count)
goto scan_primary_hash;
exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
sk, saddr_comp);
if (!exist && (hash2_nulladdr != slot2)) {
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, hash2_nulladdr);
exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
sk, saddr_comp);
}
if (exist)
goto fail_unlock;
else
goto found;
}
scan_primary_hash:
if (udp_lib_lport_inuse(net, snum, hslot, NULL, sk,
saddr_comp, 0))
goto fail_unlock;
}
found:
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = snum;
udp_sk(sk)->udp_port_hash = snum;
udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash ^= snum;
if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, &hslot->head);
hslot->count++;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash);
spin_lock(&hslot2->lock);
hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_node,
&hslot2->head);
hslot2->count++;
spin_unlock(&hslot2->lock);
}
error = 0;
fail_unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&hslot->lock);
fail:
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12981
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12981/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libming/libming/pull/179/commits/3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9
|
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
|
newShapeRecord(SWFShape shape, shapeRecordType type)
{
if ( shape->nRecords % SHAPERECORD_INCREMENT == 0 )
{
shape->records = (ShapeRecord*) realloc(shape->records,
sizeof(ShapeRecord) *
(shape->nRecords + SHAPERECORD_INCREMENT));
}
switch ( type )
{
case SHAPERECORD_STATECHANGE:
{
StateChangeRecord change = (StateChangeRecord)calloc(1,sizeof(struct stateChangeRecord));
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.stateChange = change;
break;
}
case SHAPERECORD_LINETO:
{
LineToRecord lineTo = (LineToRecord) calloc(1,sizeof(struct lineToRecord));
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.lineTo = lineTo;
break;
}
case SHAPERECORD_CURVETO:
{
CurveToRecord curveTo = (CurveToRecord) calloc(1,sizeof(struct curveToRecord));
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.curveTo = curveTo;
break;
}
}
shape->records[shape->nRecords].type = type;
shape->nRecords++;
return shape->records[shape->nRecords-1];
}
|
newShapeRecord(SWFShape shape, shapeRecordType type)
{
if ( shape->nRecords % SHAPERECORD_INCREMENT == 0 )
{
shape->records = (ShapeRecord*) realloc(shape->records,
sizeof(ShapeRecord) *
(shape->nRecords + SHAPERECORD_INCREMENT));
}
switch ( type )
{
case SHAPERECORD_STATECHANGE:
{
StateChangeRecord change = (StateChangeRecord)calloc(1,sizeof(struct stateChangeRecord));
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.stateChange = change;
break;
}
case SHAPERECORD_LINETO:
{
LineToRecord lineTo = (LineToRecord) calloc(1,sizeof(struct lineToRecord));
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.lineTo = lineTo;
break;
}
case SHAPERECORD_CURVETO:
{
CurveToRecord curveTo = (CurveToRecord) calloc(1,sizeof(struct curveToRecord));
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.curveTo = curveTo;
break;
}
}
shape->records[shape->nRecords].type = type;
shape->nRecords++;
return shape->records[shape->nRecords-1];
}
|
C
|
libming
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfs3svc_decode_readdirargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ~0;
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
args->count = min_t(u32, args->count, PAGE_SIZE);
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return 1;
}
|
nfs3svc_decode_readdirargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ~0;
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = min_t(u32, args->count, PAGE_SIZE);
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::computePositionedLogicalHeightUsing(Length logicalHeightLength, const RenderBoxModelObject* containerBlock,
LayoutUnit containerLogicalHeight, LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding, LayoutUnit logicalHeight,
Length logicalTop, Length logicalBottom, Length marginBefore, Length marginAfter,
LogicalExtentComputedValues& computedValues) const
{
ASSERT(!(logicalTop.isAuto() && logicalBottom.isAuto()));
LayoutUnit logicalHeightValue;
LayoutUnit contentLogicalHeight = logicalHeight - bordersPlusPadding;
const LayoutUnit containerRelativeLogicalWidth = containingBlockLogicalWidthForPositioned(containerBlock, false);
LayoutUnit logicalTopValue = 0;
bool logicalHeightIsAuto = logicalHeightLength.isAuto();
bool logicalTopIsAuto = logicalTop.isAuto();
bool logicalBottomIsAuto = logicalBottom.isAuto();
LayoutUnit resolvedLogicalHeight;
if (isTable()) {
resolvedLogicalHeight = contentLogicalHeight;
logicalHeightIsAuto = false;
} else {
if (logicalHeightLength.isIntrinsic())
resolvedLogicalHeight = computeIntrinsicLogicalContentHeightUsing(logicalHeightLength, contentLogicalHeight, bordersPlusPadding);
else
resolvedLogicalHeight = adjustContentBoxLogicalHeightForBoxSizing(valueForLength(logicalHeightLength, containerLogicalHeight));
}
if (!logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* If none of the three are 'auto': If both 'margin-top' and 'margin-
* bottom' are 'auto', solve the equation under the extra constraint that
* the two margins get equal values. If one of 'margin-top' or 'margin-
* bottom' is 'auto', solve the equation for that value. If the values
* are over-constrained, ignore the value for 'bottom' and solve for that
* value.
\*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
const LayoutUnit availableSpace = containerLogicalHeight - (logicalTopValue + logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight) + bordersPlusPadding);
if (marginBefore.isAuto() && marginAfter.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = availableSpace / 2; // split the difference
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_before; // account for odd valued differences
} else if (marginBefore.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = valueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_after;
} else if (marginAfter.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = valueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_before;
} else {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = valueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = valueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
}
} else {
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* Otherwise, set 'auto' values for 'margin-top' and 'margin-bottom'
* to 0, and pick the one of the following six rules that applies.
*
* 1. 'top' and 'height' are 'auto' and 'bottom' is not 'auto', then
* the height is based on the content, and solve for 'top'.
*
* OMIT RULE 2 AS IT SHOULD NEVER BE HIT
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
* 2. 'top' and 'bottom' are 'auto' and 'height' is not 'auto', then
* set 'top' to the static position, and solve for 'bottom'.
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* 3. 'height' and 'bottom' are 'auto' and 'top' is not 'auto', then
* the height is based on the content, and solve for 'bottom'.
* 4. 'top' is 'auto', 'height' and 'bottom' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'top'.
* 5. 'height' is 'auto', 'top' and 'bottom' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'height'.
* 6. 'bottom' is 'auto', 'top' and 'height' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'bottom'.
\*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = minimumValueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = minimumValueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
const LayoutUnit availableSpace = containerLogicalHeight - (computedValues.m_margins.m_before + computedValues.m_margins.m_after + bordersPlusPadding);
if (logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = contentLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = availableSpace - (logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
logicalHeightValue = contentLogicalHeight;
} else if (logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = availableSpace - (logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
logicalHeightValue = max<LayoutUnit>(0, availableSpace - (logicalTopValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight)));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
}
}
computedValues.m_extent = logicalHeightValue;
computedValues.m_position = logicalTopValue + computedValues.m_margins.m_before;
computeLogicalTopPositionedOffset(computedValues.m_position, this, logicalHeightValue, containerBlock, containerLogicalHeight);
}
|
void RenderBox::computePositionedLogicalHeightUsing(Length logicalHeightLength, const RenderBoxModelObject* containerBlock,
LayoutUnit containerLogicalHeight, LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding, LayoutUnit logicalHeight,
Length logicalTop, Length logicalBottom, Length marginBefore, Length marginAfter,
LogicalExtentComputedValues& computedValues) const
{
ASSERT(!(logicalTop.isAuto() && logicalBottom.isAuto()));
LayoutUnit logicalHeightValue;
LayoutUnit contentLogicalHeight = logicalHeight - bordersPlusPadding;
const LayoutUnit containerRelativeLogicalWidth = containingBlockLogicalWidthForPositioned(containerBlock, false);
LayoutUnit logicalTopValue = 0;
bool logicalHeightIsAuto = logicalHeightLength.isAuto();
bool logicalTopIsAuto = logicalTop.isAuto();
bool logicalBottomIsAuto = logicalBottom.isAuto();
LayoutUnit resolvedLogicalHeight;
if (isTable()) {
resolvedLogicalHeight = contentLogicalHeight;
logicalHeightIsAuto = false;
} else {
if (logicalHeightLength.isIntrinsic())
resolvedLogicalHeight = computeIntrinsicLogicalContentHeightUsing(logicalHeightLength, contentLogicalHeight, bordersPlusPadding);
else
resolvedLogicalHeight = adjustContentBoxLogicalHeightForBoxSizing(valueForLength(logicalHeightLength, containerLogicalHeight));
}
if (!logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* If none of the three are 'auto': If both 'margin-top' and 'margin-
* bottom' are 'auto', solve the equation under the extra constraint that
* the two margins get equal values. If one of 'margin-top' or 'margin-
* bottom' is 'auto', solve the equation for that value. If the values
* are over-constrained, ignore the value for 'bottom' and solve for that
* value.
\*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
const LayoutUnit availableSpace = containerLogicalHeight - (logicalTopValue + logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight) + bordersPlusPadding);
if (marginBefore.isAuto() && marginAfter.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = availableSpace / 2; // split the difference
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_before; // account for odd valued differences
} else if (marginBefore.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = valueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_after;
} else if (marginAfter.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = valueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_before;
} else {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = valueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = valueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
}
} else {
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* Otherwise, set 'auto' values for 'margin-top' and 'margin-bottom'
* to 0, and pick the one of the following six rules that applies.
*
* 1. 'top' and 'height' are 'auto' and 'bottom' is not 'auto', then
* the height is based on the content, and solve for 'top'.
*
* OMIT RULE 2 AS IT SHOULD NEVER BE HIT
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
* 2. 'top' and 'bottom' are 'auto' and 'height' is not 'auto', then
* set 'top' to the static position, and solve for 'bottom'.
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* 3. 'height' and 'bottom' are 'auto' and 'top' is not 'auto', then
* the height is based on the content, and solve for 'bottom'.
* 4. 'top' is 'auto', 'height' and 'bottom' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'top'.
* 5. 'height' is 'auto', 'top' and 'bottom' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'height'.
* 6. 'bottom' is 'auto', 'top' and 'height' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'bottom'.
\*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = minimumValueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = minimumValueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
const LayoutUnit availableSpace = containerLogicalHeight - (computedValues.m_margins.m_before + computedValues.m_margins.m_after + bordersPlusPadding);
if (logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = contentLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = availableSpace - (logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
logicalHeightValue = contentLogicalHeight;
} else if (logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = availableSpace - (logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
logicalHeightValue = max<LayoutUnit>(0, availableSpace - (logicalTopValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight)));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
}
}
computedValues.m_extent = logicalHeightValue;
computedValues.m_position = logicalTopValue + computedValues.m_margins.m_before;
computeLogicalTopPositionedOffset(computedValues.m_position, this, logicalHeightValue, containerBlock, containerLogicalHeight);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
decode_NXAST_RAW_NAT(const struct nx_action_nat *nan,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_nat *nat;
uint16_t range_present = ntohs(nan->range_present);
const char *opts = (char *)(nan + 1);
uint16_t len = ntohs(nan->len) - sizeof *nan;
nat = ofpact_put_NAT(out);
nat->flags = ntohs(nan->flags);
/* Check for unknown or mutually exclusive flags. */
if ((nat->flags & ~NX_NAT_F_MASK)
|| (nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_SRC && nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_DST)
|| (nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_PROTO_HASH
&& nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_PROTO_RANDOM)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
#define NX_NAT_GET_OPT(DST, SRC, LEN, TYPE) \
(LEN >= sizeof(TYPE) \
? (memcpy(DST, SRC, sizeof(TYPE)), LEN -= sizeof(TYPE), \
SRC += sizeof(TYPE)) \
: NULL)
nat->range_af = AF_UNSPEC;
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MIN) {
if (range_present & (NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MIN | NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv4.min, opts, len, ovs_be32)
|| !nat->range.addr.ipv4.min) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range_af = AF_INET;
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MAX) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv4.max, opts, len,
ovs_be32)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (ntohl(nat->range.addr.ipv4.max)
< ntohl(nat->range.addr.ipv4.min)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MIN) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.min, opts, len,
struct in6_addr)
|| ipv6_mask_is_any(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.min)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range_af = AF_INET6;
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.max, opts, len,
struct in6_addr)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (memcmp(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.max, &nat->range.addr.ipv6.min,
sizeof(struct in6_addr)) < 0) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MIN) {
ovs_be16 proto;
if (nat->range_af == AF_UNSPEC) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&proto, opts, len, ovs_be16) || proto == 0) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range.proto.min = ntohs(proto);
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MAX) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&proto, opts, len, ovs_be16)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range.proto.max = ntohs(proto);
if (nat->range.proto.max < nat->range.proto.min) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
}
|
decode_NXAST_RAW_NAT(const struct nx_action_nat *nan,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_nat *nat;
uint16_t range_present = ntohs(nan->range_present);
const char *opts = (char *)(nan + 1);
uint16_t len = ntohs(nan->len) - sizeof *nan;
nat = ofpact_put_NAT(out);
nat->flags = ntohs(nan->flags);
/* Check for unknown or mutually exclusive flags. */
if ((nat->flags & ~NX_NAT_F_MASK)
|| (nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_SRC && nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_DST)
|| (nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_PROTO_HASH
&& nat->flags & NX_NAT_F_PROTO_RANDOM)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
#define NX_NAT_GET_OPT(DST, SRC, LEN, TYPE) \
(LEN >= sizeof(TYPE) \
? (memcpy(DST, SRC, sizeof(TYPE)), LEN -= sizeof(TYPE), \
SRC += sizeof(TYPE)) \
: NULL)
nat->range_af = AF_UNSPEC;
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MIN) {
if (range_present & (NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MIN | NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv4.min, opts, len, ovs_be32)
|| !nat->range.addr.ipv4.min) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range_af = AF_INET;
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MAX) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv4.max, opts, len,
ovs_be32)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (ntohl(nat->range.addr.ipv4.max)
< ntohl(nat->range.addr.ipv4.min)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV4_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MIN) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.min, opts, len,
struct in6_addr)
|| ipv6_mask_is_any(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.min)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range_af = AF_INET6;
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.max, opts, len,
struct in6_addr)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (memcmp(&nat->range.addr.ipv6.max, &nat->range.addr.ipv6.min,
sizeof(struct in6_addr)) < 0) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_IPV6_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MIN) {
ovs_be16 proto;
if (nat->range_af == AF_UNSPEC) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&proto, opts, len, ovs_be16) || proto == 0) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range.proto.min = ntohs(proto);
if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MAX) {
if (!NX_NAT_GET_OPT(&proto, opts, len, ovs_be16)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
nat->range.proto.max = ntohs(proto);
if (nat->range.proto.max < nat->range.proto.min) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else if (range_present & NX_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int debug_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
static const struct tree_descr debug_files[] = {{""}};
struct debugfs_fs_info *fsi;
int err;
save_mount_options(sb, data);
fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct debugfs_fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
if (!fsi) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
err = debugfs_parse_options(data, &fsi->mount_opts);
if (err)
goto fail;
err = simple_fill_super(sb, DEBUGFS_MAGIC, debug_files);
if (err)
goto fail;
sb->s_op = &debugfs_super_operations;
sb->s_d_op = &debugfs_dops;
debugfs_apply_options(sb);
return 0;
fail:
kfree(fsi);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
return err;
}
|
static int debug_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
static const struct tree_descr debug_files[] = {{""}};
struct debugfs_fs_info *fsi;
int err;
save_mount_options(sb, data);
fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct debugfs_fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
if (!fsi) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
err = debugfs_parse_options(data, &fsi->mount_opts);
if (err)
goto fail;
err = simple_fill_super(sb, DEBUGFS_MAGIC, debug_files);
if (err)
goto fail;
sb->s_op = &debugfs_super_operations;
sb->s_d_op = &debugfs_dops;
debugfs_apply_options(sb);
return 0;
fail:
kfree(fsi);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static void lz4hc_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct lz4hc_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
vfree(ctx->lz4hc_comp_mem);
}
|
static void lz4hc_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct lz4hc_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
vfree(ctx->lz4hc_comp_mem);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2616
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2616/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891
|
dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891
|
su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
|
static void log_btmp(struct passwd const *pw)
{
struct utmpx ut;
struct timeval tv;
const char *tty_name, *tty_num;
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
strncpy(ut.ut_user,
pw && pw->pw_name ? pw->pw_name : "(unknown)",
sizeof(ut.ut_user));
get_terminal_name(NULL, &tty_name, &tty_num);
if (tty_num)
xstrncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_num, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
if (tty_name)
xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ut.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ut.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; /* XXX doesn't matter */
ut.ut_pid = getpid();
updwtmpx(_PATH_BTMP, &ut);
}
|
static void log_btmp(struct passwd const *pw)
{
struct utmpx ut;
struct timeval tv;
const char *tty_name, *tty_num;
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
strncpy(ut.ut_user,
pw && pw->pw_name ? pw->pw_name : "(unknown)",
sizeof(ut.ut_user));
get_terminal_name(NULL, &tty_name, &tty_num);
if (tty_num)
xstrncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_num, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
if (tty_name)
xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ut.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ut.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; /* XXX doesn't matter */
ut.ut_pid = getpid();
updwtmpx(_PATH_BTMP, &ut);
}
|
C
|
util-linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14980
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14980/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/commit/614a257295bdcdeda347086761062ac7658b6830
|
614a257295bdcdeda347086761062ac7658b6830
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
|
MagickExport ssize_t WriteBlobString(Image *image,const char *string)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(string != (const char *) NULL);
return(WriteBlobStream(image,strlen(string),(const unsigned char *) string));
}
|
MagickExport ssize_t WriteBlobString(Image *image,const char *string)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(string != (const char *) NULL);
return(WriteBlobStream(image,strlen(string),(const unsigned char *) string));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9374/
|
CWE-772
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0
|
d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0
| null |
static void usb_ehci_pci_init(Object *obj)
{
DeviceClass *dc = OBJECT_GET_CLASS(DeviceClass, obj, TYPE_DEVICE);
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(obj);
EHCIState *s = &i->ehci;
s->caps[0x09] = 0x68; /* EECP */
s->capsbase = 0x00;
s->opregbase = 0x20;
s->portscbase = 0x44;
s->portnr = NB_PORTS;
if (!dc->hotpluggable) {
s->companion_enable = true;
}
usb_ehci_init(s, DEVICE(obj));
}
|
static void usb_ehci_pci_init(Object *obj)
{
DeviceClass *dc = OBJECT_GET_CLASS(DeviceClass, obj, TYPE_DEVICE);
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(obj);
EHCIState *s = &i->ehci;
s->caps[0x09] = 0x68; /* EECP */
s->capsbase = 0x00;
s->opregbase = 0x20;
s->portscbase = 0x44;
s->portnr = NB_PORTS;
if (!dc->hotpluggable) {
s->companion_enable = true;
}
usb_ehci_init(s, DEVICE(obj));
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::RequestExecuteScriptAndReturnValue(
const WebScriptSource& source,
bool user_gesture,
WebScriptExecutionCallback* callback) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
RefPtr<DOMWrapperWorld> main_world = &DOMWrapperWorld::MainWorld();
SuspendableScriptExecutor* executor = SuspendableScriptExecutor::Create(
GetFrame(), std::move(main_world), CreateSourcesVector(&source, 1),
user_gesture, callback);
executor->Run();
}
|
void WebLocalFrameImpl::RequestExecuteScriptAndReturnValue(
const WebScriptSource& source,
bool user_gesture,
WebScriptExecutionCallback* callback) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
RefPtr<DOMWrapperWorld> main_world = &DOMWrapperWorld::MainWorld();
SuspendableScriptExecutor* executor = SuspendableScriptExecutor::Create(
GetFrame(), std::move(main_world), CreateSourcesVector(&source, 1),
user_gesture, callback);
executor->Run();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1714/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5b0d76edd5d6d4054b2e1263e23c852226c5f701
|
5b0d76edd5d6d4054b2e1263e23c852226c5f701
|
Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadRTF(ui::ClipboardType type,
std::string* result) {
GetClipboard()->ReadRTF(type, result);
}
|
void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadRTF(ui::ClipboardType type,
std::string* result) {
GetClipboard()->ReadRTF(type, result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidReceiveResourceResponse(
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceResponse& response,
Resource* cached_resource) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
bool is_not_modified = response.HttpStatusCode() == 304;
bool resource_is_empty = true;
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Response> resource_response =
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(response, cached_resource,
&resource_is_empty);
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type =
cached_resource
? InspectorPageAgent::ToResourceType(cached_resource->GetType())
: InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType saved_type =
resources_data_->GetResourceType(request_id);
if (saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kScriptResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kFetchResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kEventSourceResource) {
type = saved_type;
}
if (type == InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource && loader &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
if (cached_resource)
resources_data_->AddResource(request_id, cached_resource);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResponseReceived(request_id, frame_id, response);
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
if (response.GetSecurityStyle() != ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnknown &&
response.GetSecurityStyle() !=
ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnauthenticated) {
const ResourceResponse::SecurityDetails* response_security_details =
response.GetSecurityDetails();
resources_data_->SetCertificate(request_id,
response_security_details->certificate);
}
if (resource_response && !resource_is_empty) {
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->responseReceived(
request_id, loader_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type),
std::move(resource_response), std::move(maybe_frame_id));
}
if (is_not_modified && cached_resource && cached_resource->EncodedSize())
DidReceiveData(identifier, loader, 0, cached_resource->EncodedSize());
}
|
void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidReceiveResourceResponse(
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceResponse& response,
Resource* cached_resource) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
bool is_not_modified = response.HttpStatusCode() == 304;
bool resource_is_empty = true;
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Response> resource_response =
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(response, cached_resource,
&resource_is_empty);
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type =
cached_resource ? InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceType(*cached_resource)
: InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType saved_type =
resources_data_->GetResourceType(request_id);
if (saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kScriptResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kFetchResource ||
saved_type == InspectorPageAgent::kEventSourceResource) {
type = saved_type;
}
if (type == InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource && loader &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
if (cached_resource)
resources_data_->AddResource(request_id, cached_resource);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResponseReceived(request_id, frame_id, response);
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
if (response.GetSecurityStyle() != ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnknown &&
response.GetSecurityStyle() !=
ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnauthenticated) {
const ResourceResponse::SecurityDetails* response_security_details =
response.GetSecurityDetails();
resources_data_->SetCertificate(request_id,
response_security_details->certificate);
}
if (resource_response && !resource_is_empty) {
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->responseReceived(
request_id, loader_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type),
std::move(resource_response), std::move(maybe_frame_id));
}
if (is_not_modified && cached_resource && cached_resource->EncodedSize())
DidReceiveData(identifier, loader, 0, cached_resource->EncodedSize());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5384
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5384/
|
CWE-415
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/commit/?id=7a4a5bd7897d216f0794ca9dbce0a4a5c9d14940
|
7a4a5bd7897d216f0794ca9dbce0a4a5c9d14940
| null |
lock_cache (void)
{
FcMutex *lock;
retry:
lock = fc_atomic_ptr_get (&cache_lock);
if (!lock) {
lock = (FcMutex *) malloc (sizeof (FcMutex));
FcMutexInit (lock);
if (!fc_atomic_ptr_cmpexch (&cache_lock, NULL, lock)) {
FcMutexFinish (lock);
goto retry;
}
FcMutexLock (lock);
/* Initialize random state */
FcRandom ();
return;
}
FcMutexLock (lock);
}
|
lock_cache (void)
{
FcMutex *lock;
retry:
lock = fc_atomic_ptr_get (&cache_lock);
if (!lock) {
lock = (FcMutex *) malloc (sizeof (FcMutex));
FcMutexInit (lock);
if (!fc_atomic_ptr_cmpexch (&cache_lock, NULL, lock)) {
FcMutexFinish (lock);
goto retry;
}
FcMutexLock (lock);
/* Initialize random state */
FcRandom ();
return;
}
FcMutexLock (lock);
}
|
C
|
fontconfig
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5770
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5770/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!intern->u.file.current_line && !intern->u.file.current_zval) {
spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (intern->u.file.current_line && (!SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV) || !intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
RETURN_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::key()
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!intern->u.file.current_line && !intern->u.file.current_zval) {
spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (intern->u.file.current_line && (!SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV) || !intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
RETURN_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::key()
|
C
|
php-src
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9a3dbf43f97aa7cb6b4399f9b11ce1de20f0680f
|
9a3dbf43f97aa7cb6b4399f9b11ce1de20f0680f
|
Fix crash if utterance is garbage-collected before speech ends.
BUG=359130,348863
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/228133002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@171077 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
SpeechSynthesisUtterance* SpeechSynthesis::currentSpeechUtterance() const
{
if (!m_utteranceQueue.isEmpty())
return m_utteranceQueue.first().get();
return 0;
}
|
SpeechSynthesisUtterance* SpeechSynthesis::currentSpeechUtterance() const
{
if (!m_utteranceQueue.isEmpty())
return m_utteranceQueue.first().get();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12248
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12248/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/778500563a9f7ceba996937dc886bd8cde29b42b
|
778500563a9f7ceba996937dc886bd8cde29b42b
|
Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
|
fiber_switch_context(mrb_state *mrb, struct mrb_context *c)
{
c->status = MRB_FIBER_RUNNING;
mrb->c = c;
}
|
fiber_switch_context(mrb_state *mrb, struct mrb_context *c)
{
c->status = MRB_FIBER_RUNNING;
mrb->c = c;
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0268
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0268/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00
|
c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00
|
x86/msr: Add capabilities check
At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.
In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
some capability and security model based systems down towards
that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.
Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
tighter.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Horses <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int __init msr_init(void)
{
int i, err = 0;
i = 0;
if (__register_chrdev(MSR_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS, "cpu/msr", &msr_fops)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "msr: unable to get major %d for msr\n",
MSR_MAJOR);
err = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
msr_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "msr");
if (IS_ERR(msr_class)) {
err = PTR_ERR(msr_class);
goto out_chrdev;
}
msr_class->devnode = msr_devnode;
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(i) {
err = msr_device_create(i);
if (err != 0)
goto out_class;
}
register_hotcpu_notifier(&msr_class_cpu_notifier);
put_online_cpus();
err = 0;
goto out;
out_class:
i = 0;
for_each_online_cpu(i)
msr_device_destroy(i);
put_online_cpus();
class_destroy(msr_class);
out_chrdev:
__unregister_chrdev(MSR_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS, "cpu/msr");
out:
return err;
}
|
static int __init msr_init(void)
{
int i, err = 0;
i = 0;
if (__register_chrdev(MSR_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS, "cpu/msr", &msr_fops)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "msr: unable to get major %d for msr\n",
MSR_MAJOR);
err = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
msr_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "msr");
if (IS_ERR(msr_class)) {
err = PTR_ERR(msr_class);
goto out_chrdev;
}
msr_class->devnode = msr_devnode;
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(i) {
err = msr_device_create(i);
if (err != 0)
goto out_class;
}
register_hotcpu_notifier(&msr_class_cpu_notifier);
put_online_cpus();
err = 0;
goto out;
out_class:
i = 0;
for_each_online_cpu(i)
msr_device_destroy(i);
put_online_cpus();
class_destroy(msr_class);
out_chrdev:
__unregister_chrdev(MSR_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS, "cpu/msr");
out:
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10011/
|
CWE-320
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/ac8147a06ed2e2403fb6b9a0c03e618a9333c0e9
|
ac8147a06ed2e2403fb6b9a0c03e618a9333c0e9
|
use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for loading
keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This
doesn't appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but
was observed for novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
|
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return r;
}
|
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return r;
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10065
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10065/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/134463b926fa965571aa4febd61b810be5e7da05
|
134463b926fa965571aa4febd61b810be5e7da05
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
|
static void ImportRGBOQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelOpacity(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
}
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
|
static void ImportRGBOQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelOpacity(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
}
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void qeth_core_free_discipline(struct qeth_card *card)
{
if (card->options.layer2)
symbol_put(qeth_l2_discipline);
else
symbol_put(qeth_l3_discipline);
card->discipline = NULL;
}
|
void qeth_core_free_discipline(struct qeth_card *card)
{
if (card->options.layer2)
symbol_put(qeth_l2_discipline);
else
symbol_put(qeth_l3_discipline);
card->discipline = NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.