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Donna also wrote, �the reason they [the intelligence community] were looking at Midhar [sic] is relatively general � basically they were looking at all individuals using the name Khalid because of some threat information.� Significantly, the e-mail also advised that the CIA had additional surveillance photographs beyond those she had taken to New York, and the source had identified one of the individuals in these additional photographs as Khallad.
Donna said that she was �requesting the details on that [Khallad�s identification].� Donna also stated in her e-mail that the clearance to show the [INFORMATION REDACTED] should not be a problem.176 This e-mail was the first reference we identified that the FBI had been informed of additional [INFORMATION REDACTED].
After her meeting with Donna on August 22, 2001, Mary asked another CTC officer to draft a CIR to the State Department, INS, U.S. Customs Service, and FBI requesting the placement of Mihdhar and his travel companions, Hazmi and Salah Saeed Muhammed bin Yousaf, on U.S. watchlists.177 The CIR briefly outlined Mihdhar�s attendance at the Malaysia meetings and his subsequent travel to the U.S. in January 2000 and July 2001.
On August 24, the State Department placed Mihdhar and his travel companions on its terrorism watchlist.
This is the first record of the placement of Mihdhar or Hazmi on any U.S. watchlist.
On August 23, 2001, Donna contacted the State Department and requested a copy of Mihdhar�s most recent visa application from the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
On August 23, Donna contacted her supervisor, an SSA who we call �Rob,� regarding the information about Mihdhar�s travel to the United States.
As discussed in Chapter Three, Rob was the acting Unit Chief of the UBLU at the time.178 After reviewing the information, Rob concurred with Donna that the appropriate course of action would be to open an intelligence investigation in New York, Mihdhar�s last known destination in the United States, to locate Mihdhar.
To expedite the investigative process and provide a �heads up [alert]� to the New York Field Office that the information was coming, on August 23 Donna telephoned an agent on the Bin Laden squad in the New York Field Office who we call �Chad.� To comply with the wall, the New York Field Office had designated agents as either �criminal� or �intelligence,� and Chad was an intelligence agent.
Donna discussed with Chad Mihdhar�s most recent entry into the United States and FBI Headquarters� request for the New York office to open a full field intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar.
Donna told the OIG that she did not normally telephonically contact the field on these types of issues, but there was some urgency to her request because the FBI did not want to lose the opportunity to locate Mihdhar before he left the United States.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] Chad told the OIG that although he routinely worked with Donna, this was the first time that Donna had relayed a need for urgency in an intelligence investigation.
Chad told us, however, that he questioned both the urgency and the need for a separate intelligence investigation.
Chad explained that the attempt to locate Mihdhar seemed to relate to the criminal investigation of the Cole attack, and efforts to locate an individual normally would be handled through a sub-file to the main investigation and not as a separate full field investigation.
Nevertheless, he told Donna that New York would open an intelligence investigation.
On August 23, Donna sent an e-mail to John concerning her telephone conversation with Chad.
She advised in the e-mail that �[Chad] will open an intel[ligence] case.� [INFORMATION REDACTED] She wrote, �I am still looking at intel, but I think we have more of a definitive connection to the Cole here than we thought.� She ended by stating that she was working on the EC requesting a full field investigation, but doubted that it would be completed that day.
On August 27, Donna requested permission through the NSA representative to the FBI to pass to the FBI agents working on the Cole investigation the information [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Donna told the OIG that she thought that the NSA information on Mihdhar could be useful to the Cole criminal investigators, even if the Mihdhar search remained an intelligence investigation.
On the morning of August 28, Donna sent Chad a draft copy of an EC requesting the intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar.
In the cover e-mail, Donna stated, �here is a draft� and that the EC had not been uploaded due to some tear line information that was not yet approved for passage.
179 She concluded, �I do want to get this going as soon as possible.� The EC, entitled �Khalid M.
Al-Mihdhar� with various aliases, stated in the synopsis, �Request to open an intelligence investigation.� The EC outlined Mihdhar�s travel to the United States in July 2001, his previous travel to the United States with Hazmi in January 2000, the background on and his attendance at the Malaysia meetings, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
As to the identification of Khallad in the [INFORMATION REDACTED] by the source, Donna told the OIG that she did not include this information because it had not yet been officially passed to the FBI, although she had requested the passage from a CTC Representative to the FBI.180 While Donna had relayed urgency to opening the investigation in her telephone conversation with Chad and in her cover e-mail, she designated the EC precedence as �routine,� the lowest precedence level.181 She explained this by saying this case was �no bigger� than any other intelligence case.
She also told us, however, that there was a time consideration because Mihdhar could be leaving the United States at any time and that is why she had personally contacted Chad.
On August 28, Chad forwarded Donna�s draft EC to his immediate supervisor, a Supervisory Special Agent who we call �Jason.� Jason became a supervisor on the JTTF in the New York Field Office in 1996.
He had been on the New York JTTF since 1985.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on August 28, Jason forwarded the EC to various agents on the Bin Laden squad, including the Cole criminal case agent who we call �Scott.� In the cover e-mail, Jason directed the Relief Supervisor, who we call �Jay,� to open an intelligence investigation and assign it to a Special Agent who we call �Richard.� Jason also directed another agent to check on an investigative lead related to Mihdhar while the agent was in Malaysia.182 Scott received the EC on August 28.
Scott, who had been at the June 11 meeting and had discussions with Donna about the [INFORMATION REDACTED], contacted Donna to discuss the appropriateness of opening an intelligence investigation as opposed to a criminal investigation.
Donna told the OIG that when she realized that the EC had been disseminated to Scott, she asked Scott to delete it because it contained NSA information and therefore required approval for review by criminal agents.
Scott told the OIG that he deleted the EC as she requested.
Shortly thereafter, Scott, Donna, and Rob engaged in a conference call to discuss whether the case should be opened as a criminal instead of an intelligence investigation.
Scott told the OIG that he argued that the investigation should be opened as a criminal investigation due to the nexus to the Cole investigation and the greater investigative resources that could be brought to bear in a criminal investigation.
Scott explained that more agents could be assigned to a criminal investigation due to the squad designations.
He also asserted that criminal investigation tools, such as grand jury subpoenas, were far quicker and easier to obtain than the tools available in an intelligence investigation, such as a national security letter.
Donna told the OIG that the information on Mihdhar was received through intelligence channels and, because of restrictions on using intelligence information, could not be provided directly to the criminal agents working the Cole investigation.
The only information that could be provided directly to them was the limited INS information.
She stated that without the intelligence information on Mihdhar, there would have been no potential nexus to the Cole investigation and no basis for a criminal investigation.
Rob told the OIG he had concurred with Donna�s assessment that the matter should be an intelligence investigation.
He added that there was also a process through which the information could potentially be shared with the criminal agents in the future.183 Scott was not satisfied with that response, and he asked for a legal opinion from the FBI�s National Security Law Unit (NSLU) whether the investigation should be opened as a criminal matter relating to the Cole criminal investigation.
Additionally, Scott wanted a legal opinion on whether a criminal agent could accompany an intelligence agent to interview Mihdhar if he was located.
According to Donna, she subsequently contacted the NSLU attorney who we call �Susan� on August 28, and she and Rob discussed the issue with Susan.
It is unclear how she presented the matter to Susan because there were no documents about the conversation and she and Susan had little or no recollection of the specific conversation.
Donna told the OIG that she provided the EC to Susan.
According to Donna, Susan agreed with her that the matter should be opened as an intelligence investigation.
Donna said Susan also advised that a criminal agent should not be present for an interview of Mihdhar if he was located.
During an OIG interview, Susan said she could not specifically recall this matter or the advice she gave.
Rob told the OIG that he did not recall the specifics of this consultation, but he stated that the NSLU opinion was supportive of FBI Headquarters� determination that the case should be opened as an intelligence investigation.
At approximately 7:30 a.m. on August 29, Donna sent an e-mail to Jason, which stated: Approximately 15 minutes after sending the e-mail to Jason, Donna sent an e-mail to Scott with the same language advising that the NSLU agreed the investigation should be an intelligence investigation and a criminal agent could not attend the interview if Mihdhar was located.
That same morning, Scott responded in an e-mail to Donna stating: Later that morning, Donna replied in an e-mail: On August 29, 2001, the FBI�s New York Field Office opened a full field intelligence investigation to locate Mihdhar.
The investigation was assigned to a Special Agent who we call �Richard.� Richard was a relatively inexperienced agent, who had recently been transferred to the Bin Laden squad.187 This was Richard�s first intelligence investigation.
On August 29, Donna received Mihdhar�s visa application from the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah.
The application indicated that Mihdhar planned to travel as a tourist to the United States on July 1, 2001, for a purported month long stay.
On the application, Mihdhar falsely claimed that he had not previously applied for a U.S. non-immigrant visa or been in the United States.188 On August 30, 2001, Donna sent an e-mail to Richard.
After a paragraph introducing herself, Donna advised she was attaching Mihdhar�s visa application form, which included Mihdhar�s photograph, and that she would be faxing the remaining documents.
Donna stated she would send a couple of pages from the Attorney General Guidelines �which apply to your case� and then she would mail the documents.
Richard told the OIG that on August 30, he received a telephone call from Donna in reference to the investigation.
He said that Donna said the goal of the intelligence investigation was to locate and identify Mihdhar for a potential interview.
According to Richard, Donna did not indicate the investigation was an emergency or identify any other exigent circumstance.
On August 30, 2001, the CIA sent a CIR to the FBI outlining the identification of �Khallad� from one of the [INFORMATION REDACTED] in January 2001 by the source.
The first line of the text stated the information should be passed to Rob.
The CIA cable stated the FBI should advise the CIA if the FBI did not have the [INFORMATION REDACTED] so they may be provided.
This is the first record documenting that the source�s identification of Khallad in the [INFORMATION REDACTED] was provided by the CIA to the FBI.
Richard told the OIG that he began to work on locating Mihdhar on September 4.
He stated that he had received the assignment on Thursday, August 30, but he worked all weekend and Monday on another exigent investigative matter involving a Canadian hijacking.
As a result, he said he did not have the opportunity to begin work on the Mihdhar investigation until Tuesday, September 4.
On September 4, Richard completed a lookout request for the INS, identifying Mihdhar as a potential witness in a terrorist investigation.
Due to his unfamiliarity with completing the lookout form, Richard contacted an INS Special Agent who was assigned to the FBI�s JTTF in New York.
We call this Special Agent �Patrick.� The INS lookout form has a box indicating whether the individual was wanted for �security/terrorism� reasons.
Richard did not check this box.
He said that he thought Patrick told him to identify the subject on the form as a witness, not a potential terrorist, to prevent overzealous immigration officials from overreacting.
By contrast, Patrick, who was assigned to the JTTF since September 1996, told us that he did not provide this advice to Richard and he always checked the security/terrorism box whenever he completed the lookout form for a potential witness in a terrorism investigation.
However, Richard asked Patrick to review the lookout request form for completeness, and Patrick sent the form to INS Inspections for inclusion in the INS lookout system, without making any changes.189 During his initial interview with the OIG, Richard asserted that he also asked Patrick to review and explain Mihdhar�s travel documents, including the INS indices printouts and the visa application.
In a follow-up interview, Richard said he could not definitively recall whether he had actually provided the predicating materials to Patrick or whether he merely had Patrick review the INS lookout request form.
Patrick told the OIG that he recalled this request because it was the first one from Richard and because of Mihdhar�s subsequent involvement in the September 11 attacks.
Patrick stated that he had not reviewed the predicating materials, but had only checked the request form for completeness.
He added that if he had been shown any of the predicating materials on Mihdhar�s travel, the review would only have been cursory.
Patrick and Richard both acknowledged that they did not notice the false statements on Mihdhar�s visa application.
Richard also contacted a U.S. Customs Service representative assigned to the JTTF and verified that a TECS lookout was in place for Mihdhar.
Richard conducted other administrative tasks such as uploading the initial information about Mihdhar into ACS.
On September 4, Richard requested a local criminal history check on Mihdhar through the New York City Police Department.
Richard told the OIG that he initially focused on Mihdhar, since he was captioned as the subject of the investigation in the predicating EC.
After reviewing the EC several times, Richard noted the connection to Hazmi, so he conducted the same record checks on Hazmi as he had on Mihdhar.
On September 5, Richard requested an NCIC criminal history check, credit checks, and motor vehicle records be searched in reference to Mihdhar and Hazmi.
On September 5, Richard and another JTTF agent contacted the loss prevention personnel for the New York area Marriott hotels, since Mihdhar had indicated when he entered the United States in July 2001 that his destination was the Marriott hotel in New York.
Richard learned that Mihdhar had not registered as a guest at six New York City Marriotts.
Richard stated he also conducted Choicepoint� searches on Hazmi and Mihdhar.190 Richard said he recalled he had another JTTF officer assist him with the searches because he was not familiar with the system.
Richard did not locate any records on either Hazmi or Mihdhar in Choicepoint�.191 Richard told the OIG that it was not uncommon not to find a record because of variations in spelling of names or other identifying information.
Hazmi and Mihdhar had traveled to Los Angeles, California on January 1, 2000, via United Airlines, and INS records indicated that they claimed to be destined for a �Sheraton hotel� in Los Angeles.
Therefore, on September 10, 2001, Richard drafted an investigative lead for the FBI Los Angeles Field Office.
He asked that office to request a search of the Sheraton hotel records concerning any stays by Mihdhar and Hazmi in early 2000.
He also requested that the Los Angeles office check United Airlines and Lufthansa Airlines records for any payment or other information concerning Mihdhar and Hazmi.
However, the lead was not transmitted to Los Angeles until the next day, September 11, 2001.
By the morning of September 11, when the American Airlines flight 77 that Mihdhar and Hazmi hijacked and crashed into the Pentagon, Richard had not uncovered any information regarding Mihdhar�s or Hazmi�s location in the United States.
Although FBI and CIA personnel had many discussions throughout July and August 2001 about the Cole attacks [INFORMATION REDACTED], the CIA did not provide and the FBI did not become aware of the significant intelligence information about Mihdhar�s U.S. visa, the Malaysian matter, and the [INFORMATION REDACTED] until August 22, 2001.
In May 2001, one detailee to the CTC was assigned to �get up to speed� on the Malaysian matter in her spare time but said she had been unable to focus on the matter until August 2001.
On July 13, even after John had suggested in an e-mail to the CTC that the [INFORMATION REDACTED] be passed to the FBI via CIR, this was not done for several weeks.
The CIR was not sent to the FBI until August 30, after the FBI learned of Mihdhar�s presence in the United States.
The CIA also did not provide to the FBI the information about Hazmi�s travel to the United States in January 2000 until August 22.
Donna stated that she did not receive this information until August 22, and her actions upon receipt of the information clearly indicate that she understood the significance of this information when she received it.