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She added that it was not her job to keep information from the agents but instead to ensure they had the tools necessary to do their job.
According to Donna, the only issue regarding the [INFORMATION REDACTED] photographs would have been obtaining permission from the CIA to allow individuals outside of the FBI to see the photographs in furtherance of the Cole investigation, such as in interviews conducted in Yemen.167 Donna said at some point while she was in New York, she and the agents discussed providing the photographs to the agents working in Yemen in order to get a positive identification of Quso in the photographs and to conduct further investigation.168 She stated that she told the agents that she would attempt to obtain the requisite permission to provide the photographs to the agents working the Cole investigation in Yemen.
Although she had no explicit discussion with John regarding the use of the photographs, Donna stated she understood that the photographs were �not formally passed� to the FBI when John gave them to her, but only provided for limited use in the meeting.
Therefore, Donna said she did not believe that she could leave the photographs with the New York agents until the requisite permission to show the photographs outside of the FBI had been obtained.
However, John told the OIG that that since the photographs had been given to Donna, an FBI employee, they could be further distributed within the FBI.
John agreed that the photographs could not be used by the FBI in any manner where they would be disclosed to a foreign government.
For example, he said that without approval from the CIA, the FBI agents could not keep the photographs and show them to Quso, who was in Yemeni custody, because Yemeni officials also would see the photographs.
We looked for evidence as to whether Donna or the New York agents conducted any follow-up efforts about the [INFORMATION REDACTED] photographs or obtaining permission from the NSA to pass the intelligence information to the New York agents.
Donna said that she �probably� had follow-up conversations with John, Peter, and Mary about the photographs, but she did not specifically recall the conversations or obtaining additional information.
Mary told the OIG that she recalled conversations with Donna about obtaining permission for the FBI to use the photographs of the Malaysia meetings in their investigation.
Donna stated she was not contacted by Scott after the meeting, although she was working with another agent on the squad, who we call �Glenn,� in connection with tracking telephone toll records.
Those records related to the Cole participants, the travel of Quso to Bangkok, and Quso�s potential travel to [INFORMATION REDACTED].
According to Scott, over the course of the summer, he had several more conversations with FBI Headquarters asking about any additional information on the [INFORMATION REDACTED], but he was not provided any additional information.
He stated that he did not seek assistance from any supervisor in obtaining additional information.
He told us that he and the rest of the New York Field Office had been fighting a battle with FBI Headquarters over information sharing for months, and he was �dumbfounded� that he could not obtain the information about the [INFORMATION REDACTED].
He stated that in hindsight he probably should have sought the intervention of a supervisor.
Documentary evidence shows that, as a result of the June 11 meeting, Donna and the New York agents discussed the [INFORMATION REDACTED] in several follow-up conversations.
In an e-mail dated August 22 from Donna to Glenn, she wrote that there were additional photographs of the Malaysia meetings and that the reason that Mihdhar was of interest at the time was because of some threat information that led to the CIA looking at all persons named �Khalid.� In addition, she wrote that she had received assurances that the FBI would be able to use the [INFORMATION REDACTED] outside the FBI.
We discuss this e-mail in further detail in the next section.
Documents also show that on August 27 Donna requested permission from the NSA to provide the intelligence information about Mihdhar to the New York Cole criminal agents.
However, this request came after the FBI had discovered on August 22 that Mihdhar might be in the United States and had opened an investigation to determine whether he was in the country.
We discuss the events that led to that investigation and the investigative efforts of the FBI in the next section of the report.
While there were several interactions between FBI and CIA personnel in May and June 2001 that could have resulted in the FBI learning more about the [INFORMATION REDACTED] and Mihdhar, the FBI personnel did not become aware of significant intelligence information about Mihdhar and [INFORMATION REDACTED].
The fact that Mihdhar had possessed a United States visa was not disclosed at this time by the CIA to Donna or the FBI.
The fact that Hazmi had been at the Malaysia meeting and then traveled to Los Angeles also was not disclosed by the CIA.
In addition, the fact that the source had identified Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole bombing, from the [INFORMATION REDACTED] was not disclosed during these interactions.
Although Donna knew about the [INFORMATION REDACTED], we do not believe that she was informed that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa or that [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Donna�s contemporaneous notes on the back of the [INFORMATION REDACTED] reflect the limited information that she had obtained about the photographs and the Malaysia meetings.
The notes do not mention anything about Mihdhar�s possession of a U.S. visa.
In addition, Donna stated that she was aware of the significance of Khallad to the Cole investigation, but the notes on the photographs also do not mention Khallad.
Moreover, John, who provided the photographs to Donna, told the OIG he did not recall discussing the [INFORMATION REDACTED] with her, and he did not believe that he would have discussed with Donna that [INFORMATION REDACTED], because at the time he was not sure that this was true and he thought the information was �speculative.� Although an e mail message indicated that Peter was planning to discuss the Khallad identification with Donna in a meeting on May 29, we were unable to determine that this meeting actually occurred.
It was impossible for us to determine exactly what happened at the June 11 meeting with respect to the [INFORMATION REDACTED] because the witnesses cannot recall the specifics of the discussions and there is little documentary evidence.
It is clear, however, that the information regarding Mihdhar�s U.S. visa and the fact that [INFORMATION REDACTED] was not discussed at the June 11 meeting.
Donna told the agents about the photographs and provided them limited information that she had obtained from the CIA about the photographs.
Most of the questioning about the photographs took place after the meeting, when Peter and Mary had left.
We believe those interactions after the meeting became very contentious, with the New York FBI wanting more information.
Donna did not provide the New York agents with the NSA intelligence information about the Mihdhar�s [INFORMATION REDACTED], which she obtained through her research.
She said she did not because of the restrictions placed on sharing such NSA information.
As we discuss further in the next section, Donna subsequently contacted the NSA in reference to having the NSA information passed to the agents, but this did not occur until much later, on August 27, 2001.
We found little attempt by either the FBI agents or Donna after June 11 to follow up on the information about the photographs that was discussed at the meeting.
There is little evidence of follow-up until some time in August 2001, when, as we discuss in the next section, the FBI learned that Mihdhar had recently entered the United States, and the FBI opened an investigation to locate him.
The interaction between the CIA and the FBI in May and June 2001 was another failed opportunity for the FBI to obtain the critical information about Mihdhar and Khallad.
The failure of the FBI to learn about Mihdhar, [INFORMATION REDACTED], and his travel to the United States at that time demonstrated significant problems in the flow of information between the CIA and the FBI.
We discuss these deficiencies in the analysis section of this chapter.
The fifth and final opportunity for the FBI to locate Mihdhar and Hazmi occurred in late August 2001, when it was informed that Mihdhar and Hazmi had traveled to the United States.
The FBI learned in August 2001 that Mihdhar had entered the United States in July 2001 and that Mihdhar and Hazmi had previously traveled together to the United States in January 2000.
On August 29, the FBI began an investigation to locate Mihdhar, but it did not assign great urgency or priority to the investigation.
The New York FBI criminal agents who wanted to participate in the investigation were specifically prohibited from doing so because of concerns about the wall and the procedures to keep criminal and intelligence investigations separate.
The FBI did not locate Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks.
We review the facts surrounding the FBI�s discovery of this information about Mihdhar and Hazmi and what the FBI did with this information in August.
We also examine the FBI�s unsuccessful efforts to locate Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks.
As discussed above, John, the CIA Bin Laden Unit Deputy Chief, was detailed to the FBI�s ITOS in May 2001.
Shortly before assuming his duties at the FBI, John had asked CTC management to assign a CTC desk officer with �getting up to speed� on the Malaysia meetings and determining any potential [INFORMATION REDACTED].
This assignment was given to Mary.
She told the OIG that �getting up to speed� meant she would have to research and read the pertinent cable traffic as her schedule permitted.
She emphasized that her priority assignment during this period was the credible threats of an imminent attack on U.S. personnel in Yemen, and she said that she worked the Malaysia meetings connections to the Cole attack whenever she had an opportunity.
In early July 2001, based on recent intelligence information, the CIA had concerns about the possibility of a terrorist attack in Southeast Asia.
On July 5, 2001, John sent an e-mail to managers at the CTC�s Bin Laden Unit noting �how bad things look in Malaysia.� He wrote that there was a potential connection between the recent threat information and information developed about the [INFORMATION REDACTED].
In addition, he noted that in January 2000 when Mihdhar was traveling to Malaysia, [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Therefore, he recommended that the Cole and [INFORMATION REDACTED]be re-examined for potential connections to the current threat information involving [INFORMATION REDACTED].
He wrote, �I know your resources are strained, but if we can prevent something in SE Asia, this would seem to be a productive place to start.� He ended the e-mail by stating that �all the indicators are of a massively bad infrastructure being readily completed with just one purpose in mind.� On July 13, John wrote another e-mail to CTC managers stating that he had discovered the CIA cable relating to the source�s identification of [INFORMATION REDACTED].
John began the e-mail by announcing �OK.
This is important.� He then described Khallad as a �major league killer who orchestrated the Cole attack and possibly the Africa bombings.� The e-mail recommended revisiting the [INFORMATION REDACTED], especially in relation to any potential information on [INFORMATION REDACTED].
Significantly, John ended the e-mail asking, �can this [information] be sent via CIR to [the FBI]?� Despite John�s recommendation that this information be forwarded to the FBI in a CIR, we found no evidence indicating that the CIA provided this information to the FBI until August 30, 2001, which, as we describe below, was after the FBI learned about Mihdhar�s presence in the United States.
In a response e-mail dated July 13, 2001, a CTC Bin Laden Unit supervisor stated that Mary had been assigned to handle the request for additional information on the Malaysia meetings.
In addition, the e-mail stated that another FBI detailee to the CTC, Dwight, who was out of the office at the time, would be assigned to assist Mary upon his return.
Later in July, Mary drafted a cable to another CIA office requesting follow-up information about the Malaysia meetings.
[INFORMATION REDACTED] A week later, the CTC supervisor forwarded the cable to John for his review prior to release, and the cable was sent to the office to which it was addressed three days after that.
On the same day she drafted the cable referencing the source�s identification of Khallad, Mary located one of the CIA cables referencing Mihdhar�s possession of a U.S. visa.
On the same date, Mary also reviewed the CIA cable that stated this visa information had been passed to the FBI in January 2000.169 In early August, Mary and Donna continued to discuss the [INFORMATION REDACTED].
In an e-mail on August 7 from Donna to Mary, Donna requested a copy of the flight manifest for Mihdhar�s January 2000 trip to Malaysia in order to determine whether [INFORMATION REDACTED] had traveled with Mihdhar.
She also asked, �if we could get the pictures cleared to show [INFORMATION REDACTED].�170 She continued, �the reasoning behind this would be that first, we do not have a concensous [sic] that the individual with Midhar [sic] is in fact [INFORMATION REDACTED] .
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[second] to determine if [INFORMATION REDACTED] can identify Midher by an other [sic] name.� Donna then discussed her continuing efforts to track telephone number information developed in the investigation.
At the close of the e-mail, Donna wrote, �I plan to write something up, but perhaps we should schedule another sit down to compare notes on both sides.
Let me know.� In a response e-mail on the same date, Mary wrote, �okay, all sounds good.� Mary also wrote that she thought Donna had Mihdhar�s flight manifest because John had mentioned it, but Mary indicated she would find the manifest.
She wrote, �I think we will be able to clear the pictures, they are for passage to Quso, right?� Mary also asked whether the FBI would be able to meet with Quso again.
Mary ended the e-mail, �I think a sit down again would be great� and mentioned the potential logistics of arranging the meeting.
In another e-mail exchange on August 7, Donna thanked Mary and advised her that the FBI would again have access to Quso.
Donna continued by stating that the [INFORMATION REDACTED] also would be passed to a foreign government because Quso was currently in its custody.
She stated that John could call if he had any questions.
Donna tentatively scheduled a meeting with Mary at FBI Headquarters on August 15, 2001.
However, it appears that the meeting did not take place.171 On August 21, Mary located the CIA cables referencing Hazmi�s travel to the United States on January 15, 2000.172 Mary checked with a U.S. Customs Service representative to the CTC about Hazmi�s and Mihdhar�s travel.
She discovered that Mihdhar had entered the United States on July 4, 2001, and had not departed.
In addition, she confirmed that Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000.
Mary immediately relayed to Donna in a voicemail message on August 21 that Mary had something important to discuss with her.
Donna was on annual leave on August 21.
Mary told the OIG she did not have an opportunity to focus on the Malaysia meetings until August, but upon discovering on August 21 that Hazmi had traveled to the United States �it [the importance of the information] all clicks for me.� On August 22, Mary met with Donna at FBI Headquarters and informed her of Mihdhar�s July 4 entry and Hazmi�s travel to the United States in March 2000.173 Donna verified in INS indices Mihdhar�s recent entry.
She also learned that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had entered the United States on January 15, 2000, and that they were allegedly destined for the Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles, California.
The INS records showed Mihdhar had departed the United States from Los Angeles on June 10, 2000, on Lufthansa Airlines.
No departure record could be located for Hazmi.
An INS representative advised Donna that departure information often was not captured in INS indices.
Therefore, she incorrectly surmised Hazmi had also departed on June 10, 2000.175 Further INS indices checks confirmed Mihdhar had re-entered the U.S. on July 4, 2001, at the JFK Airport in New York, allegedly destined for the �Marriott hotel� in New York City.
By the terms of his entry, Mihdhar was authorized to remain in the United States until October 3, 2001.
The INS had no record indicating Mihdhar had departed the United States as of August 22, 2001.
Mary and Donna met with John on August 22 in his office at FBI Headquarters to discuss their discovery that Mihdhar recently had entered the United States and there was no record of his departure.
All of them said they could not recall the specifics of the conversation, but all agreed that they realized it was important to initiate an investigation to determine whether Mihdhar was still in the United States and locate him if he was.
On August 22, 2001, Donna sent an e-mail to the New York FBI Special Agent who we call �Glenn.� He was one of the agents assigned to the Cole investigation.
In the e-mail, Donna advised Glenn that she had obtained Mihdhar�s flight manifest.