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Climate change has started to induce such tipping points, with the first examples including mass mortality in coral reef ecosystems (e.g., Donner et al., 2017; Hughes et al., 2018; Hughes et al., 2019)
high
2
train
6,701
AR6_WGII
2,435
23
Many terrestrial ecosystems on all continents show evidence of significant structural transformation, including woody thickening and ‘greening’ in more water-limited ecosystems, with a significant role played by rising atmospheric CO 2 fertilisation in these trends
high
2
train
6,702
AR6_WGII
2,436
8
Although anthropogenic climate forcing has increased droughts’ intensity or probability in many regions of the world
medium
1
train
6,703
AR6_WGII
2,436
12
However, anthropogenic climate forcing has become the dominant driver of sea level rise
high
2
train
6,704
AR6_WGII
2,436
13
In addition, anthropogenic climate forcing has increased the amount of rainfall associated with tropical cyclones
high
2
train
6,705
AR6_WGII
2,436
20
However, meanwhile, stagnation or decline in yields is also observed in parts of the harvested areas
high
2
train
6,706
AR6_WGII
2,437
2
Results are relatively convergent that climate change has been an important driver of the recent declines in wheat yields in Europe
medium
1
train
6,707
AR6_WGII
2,438
19
Going beyond extreme weather events, economic production depends nonlinearly on temperature fluctuations: below a certain threshold temperature, economic production increases with temperature, whereas it decreases above a certain threshold temperature
high
2
train
6,708
AR6_WGII
2,438
21
In addition, the empirical findings on the sensitivity of macroeconomic development to weather fluctuations and extreme weather events have been used to estimate the cumulative effect of historical warming on long-term economic development (see ‘Other societal impacts—Macroeconomic output’, Table SM16.22): anthropogenic climate change is estimated to have reduced gross domestic product (GDP) growth over the last 50 years, with substantially larger negative effects on developing countries and in some cases positive effects on colder industrialised countries
low
0
train
6,709
AR6_WGII
2,438
23
Climate change is estimated to have substantially slowed down this trend, that is, increased inequality compared with a counterfactual no-climate- change baseline
low
0
train
6,710
AR6_WGII
2,442
19
While many species are increasingly responding to climate change, there is limited evidence that these responses will be fully adaptive, and for many species the rate of response appears insufficient to keep pace with the rate of climate change under mid- and high-range emissions scenarios
medium
1
train
6,711
AR6_WGII
2,445
11
Some but not all adaptation-related responses are engaging vulnerable populations in planning or implementation
high
2
train
6,712
AR6_WGII
2,445
12
Consideration of vulnerable populations is most frequently focused on low-income populations and women through the inclusion of informal or formal institutions or representatives in adaptation planning, or through targeted adaptations to reduce risk in these populations
high
2
train
6,713
AR6_WGII
2,445
13
Consideration of vulnerable groups in adaptation responses is more frequently reported in the Global South
medium
1
train
6,714
AR6_WGII
2,445
14
Engagement in adaptation planning of vulnerable elderly, migrants, and ethnic minorities remains low across all global regions
medium
1
train
6,715
AR6_WGII
2,445
15
There is negligible literature on consideration of disabled peoples in planning and implementation of adaptation-related responses
medium
1
train
6,716
AR6_WGII
2,446
15
Global adaptation is predominantly slow, siloed and incremental with little evidence of transformative adaptation
high
2
train
6,717
AR6_WGII
2,446
18
Based on the literature, the overall transformative nature of adaptation across most global regions and sectors is low
high
2
train
6,718
AR6_WGII
2,446
19
Documented adaptations tend to involve minor modifications to usual practices taken to address extreme weather conditions
high
2
train
6,719
AR6_WGII
2,446
20
For example, changing crop variety or timing of crop planting to address floods or droughts, new types of irrigation, pursuing supplementary livelihoods, and home elevations are widely reported but typically do not reflect radical or novel shifts in practice or values and are therefore considered low depth
high
2
train
6,720
AR6_WGII
2,446
21
Adaptations documented in the literature are also frequently focused on a single sector or small geographic area
high
2
train
6,721
AR6_WGII
2,447
2
The speed of adaptation is rarely noted explicitly, but the average speed documented in the literature is slow
medium
1
train
6,722
AR6_WGII
2,447
3
Adaptation efforts frequently encounter either soft or hard limits (see Section 16.4), but there is limited evidence to suggest these limits are being challenged or overcome
medium
1
train
6,723
AR6_WGII
2,447
4
Few documented responses are simultaneously widespread, rapid and novel
high
2
train
6,724
AR6_WGII
2,447
6
In general, adaptations that are broad in scope tend to be slow
medium
1
train
6,725
AR6_WGII
2,448
38
Evidence on realised co-benefits of implemented adaptation responses with other priorities in the SDGs is emerging among the areas of poverty reduction, food security, health and well-being, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystem services, sustainable cities and communities, energy security, work and economic growth, and mitigation (Table 16.2)
high
2
train
6,726
AR6_WGII
2,451
7
Van Bavel, for example, found that the involvement of local and diverse knowledge can improve the detection (medium confidence) and attribution (medium confidence) of health impacts, and improve the action
high
2
train
6,727
AR6_WGII
2,452
13
Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG | Inter-regional Flows of Risks and Responses to Risk Authors: Birgit Bednar-Friedl (Austria, Chapter 13), Christopher Trisos (South Africa, Chapter 9), Laura Astigarraga (Uruguay, Chapter 12), Magnus Benzie (Sweden/UK), Aditi Mukherji (India, Chapter 4), Maarten Van Aalst (the Netherlands, Chapter 16) Introduction Our world today is characterised by a high degree of interconnectedness and globalisation which establish pathways for the transmission of climate-related risks across sectors and borders
high
2
train
6,728
AR6_WGII
2,452
22
When climatic events like flooding or heat affect the location of these extraction and production activities, economies are not only disrupted locally but also across borders and in distant countries
high
2
train
6,729
AR6_WGII
2,452
23
For many industrialised countries like the UK, Japan, the USA and the European Union, there is increasing evidence that the trade impacts of climate change are significant and can have substantial domestic impacts
medium
1
train
6,730
AR6_WGII
2,454
3
The export of major food crops like wheat, maize and soybeans from many of the world’s water-scarce area—the Middle East, North Africa, parts of South Asia, North China Plains, southwest USA, Australia—to relatively water-abundant parts of the world carries a high virtual water content (the net volume of water embedded in trade)
high
2
train
6,731
AR6_WGII
2,454
5
Climate change is projected to exacerbate risk and add new vulnerabilities for risk transmission
medium
1
train
6,732
AR6_WGII
2,458
14
However, much of the available evidence focuses on constraints that may lead to limits at some point with little detailed information on how limits may be related to different levels of socioeconomic or environmental change
high
2
train
6,733
AR6_WGII
2,458
16
Small islands and Central and South America show most evidence of constraints being linked to adaptation limits across sectors, while ocean and coastal ecosystems and health, well-being and communities show most evidence of constraints being linked to limits across regions
medium
1
train
6,734
AR6_WGII
2,458
18
Evidence on limits to adaptation is largely focused on terrestrial and aquatic species and ecosystems, coastal communities, water security, agricultural production, and human health and heat
high
2
train
6,735
AR6_WGII
2,458
19
Beginning at 1.5°C, autonomous and evolutionary adaptation responses by terrestrial and aquatic species and ecosystems face hard limits, resulting in biodiversity decline, species extinction and loss of related livelihoods
high
2
train
6,736
AR6_WGII
2,458
20
Interventionist adaptation strategies to reduce risks for species and ecosystems face soft limits due to governance, financial and knowledge constraints
medium
1
train
6,737
AR6_WGII
2,458
21
As sea levels rise and extreme events intensify, coastal communities face soft limits due to financial, institutional and socioeconomic constraints reducing the efficacy of coastal protection and accommodation approaches and resulting in loss of life and economic damages
medium
1
train
6,738
AR6_WGII
2,458
22
Hard limits for coastal communities reliant on nature-based coastal protection will be experienced beginning at 1.5°C
medium
1
train
6,739
AR6_WGII
2,458
23
Beginning at 3°C, hard limits are projected for water management measures, leading to decreased water quality and availability, negative impacts on health and well-being, economic losses in water and energy dependent sectors and potential migration of communities
medium
1
train
6,740
AR6_WGII
2,458
24
Soft and hard limits for agricultural production are related to water availability and the uptake and effectiveness of climate-resilient crops, which is constrained by socioeconomic and political challenges
medium
1
train
6,741
AR6_WGII
2,458
25
Adaptation measures to address risks of heat stress, heat mortality and reduced capacities for outdoor work for humans face soft and hard limits across regions beginning at 1.5°C and are particularly relevant for regions with warm climates
high
2
train
6,742
AR6_WGII
2,459
1
While individual constraints may appear straightforward to address, the combination of constraints interacting with each other leads to soft limits that are difficult to overcome
high
2
train
6,743
AR6_WGII
2,459
4
Impacts of climate change may increase financial constraints (high confidence) and contribute to soft limits to adaptation being reached
medium
1
train
6,744
AR6_WGII
2,459
6
At the national level, negative macroeconomic responses to climate change may limit the availability of financial resources, impede access to financial markets and stunt economic growth
high
2
train
6,745
AR6_WGII
2,461
7
Sectoral studies indicate that climate impacts will result in higher levels of losses and damages and decreases in income, thereby increasing financial constraints
medium
1
train
6,746
AR6_WGII
2,461
13
At the household or community level, climate impacts may increase financial constraints
high
2
train
6,747
AR6_WGII
2,466
7
In some Arctic communities and in communities reliant on warm- water coral reefs, even 1.5–2°C warming will lead to severe risks from loss of ecosystem services (Section 3.4.2.2; Cross-Chapter Paper 6)
high
2
train
6,748
AR6_WGII
2,466
17
Warm-water coral reefs are at risk of widespread loss of structural complexity and reef accretion by 2050 under 1.5°C global warming (Section 3.4.2.1)
high
2
train
6,749
AR6_WGII
2,468
3
Much evidence shows increased risk of the loss of 10% or more of terrestrial biodiversity with increasing anthropogenic climate change (Urban, 2015; Smith et al., 2018)
medium
1
train
6,750
AR6_WGII
2,468
5
Mass population-level mortality (>50% of individuals or colonies killed) and resulting abrupt ecological changes can be caused by simple or compound climate extreme events, such as exceedance of upper thermal limits by vulnerable terrestrial species (Fey et al., 2015), who also note reduced mass mortality trends due to extreme low thermal events; marine heatwaves that can cause mortality, enhance invasive alien species establishment, and damage coastal ecological communities and small-scale fisheries
high
2
train
6,751
AR6_WGII
2,468
7
Freshwater ecosystems and their biodiversity are at high risk of biodiversity loss and turnover due to climate change (precipitation change and warming, including warming of water bodies), due to high sensitivity of processes and life histories to thermal conditions and water quality (Chapter 2)
high
2
test
6,752
AR6_WGII
2,468
8
In marine systems, heatwaves cause damages in coastal systems, including extensive coral bleaching and mortality (very high confidence) (Section 3.4.2.1), mass mortality of invertebrate species (low to high confidence, depending on system) (Sections 3.4.2.2, Section 3.4.2.5, Section 3.4.4.1), and abrupt mortality of kelp-forest (high confidence) (Section 3.4.2.3) and seagrass-meadow habitat
high
2
train
6,753
AR6_WGII
2,468
9
The biodiversity of polar seas shows strong impacts of climate change on phenological timing of plankton activity, Arctic fish species range contractions and species community change (Table SM16.22)
high
2
train
6,754
AR6_WGII
2,468
10
Extreme weather events and storm surges exacerbated by climate change have severe and sudden adverse impacts on coastal systems, including loss of seagrass meadows and mangrove forests
high
2
train
6,755
AR6_WGII
2,468
15
Landscape- and larger-scale shifts in ecosystem structure and function (order-of-magnitude increases or abrupt decreases in cover and/or biomass of novel growth forms or functional types) are occurring in non- equilibrium ecosystems (systems which exist in multiple states, often disturbance-controlled) in response to changing disturbance regime, climate and rising CO 2 (high confidence) Woody plant encroachment has been occurring in multiple ecosystems, including subtropical and tropical fire driven grassland and savanna systems, upland grassland systems, arid grasslands and shrublands (high confidence), leading to large-scale biodiversity changes, albedo changes, and impacts on water delivery, grazing services and human livelihoods
medium
1
train
6,756
AR6_WGII
2,468
17
In tropical forests, repeated droughts and recurrence of large-scale anthropogenic fires increase forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning
high
2
train
6,757
AR6_WGII
2,468
20
The loss of a substantial fraction of biodiversity globally, abrupt impacts such as significant local biodiversity loss and mass population mortality events, and ecological disruption due to novel species interactions have been observed or are projected at global warming levels below 2°C (Chapter 2 Table SM2.5, Cross Chapter Box: EXTREMES in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4.3.1, Section 2.4.2.3.3)
medium
1
train
6,758
AR6_WGII
2,468
21
Simple and compound impacts of extreme climate events are already causing significant losses and damages in vulnerable ecosystems, including through the facilitation of important global change drivers of ecological disruption and homogenisation like invasive species
high
2
train
6,759
AR6_WGII
2,468
24
Biodiversity conservation efforts may be hampered due to climate change impacts on the effectiveness of protected areas, with high sensitivity of effectiveness to forcing scenario
medium
1
train
6,760
AR6_WGII
2,468
25
In addition, climate-related risks to ecosystems pose challenges to ecosystem-based adaptation responses (‘nature-based solutions’) (Section 2.1.3)
medium
1
train
6,761
AR6_WGII
2,469
3
The major hazards driving such risks are acute extreme events such as cyclones, floods, droughts or fires
high
2
train
6,762
AR6_WGII
2,469
11
Transport and energy infrastructure in coasts and polar systems and along rivers are projected to face a particularly steep rise in risk, resulting in severe risk even under medium warming
high
2
train
6,763
AR6_WGII
2,469
12
Risk in relation to the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme events might become severe before the middle of the century
medium
1
train
6,764
AR6_WGII
2,470
3
Already today, climate-related impacts on transport and energy infrastructure reach far beyond the direct impacts on physical infrastructure, triggering indirect impacts on, for example, health and income
medium
1
train
6,765
AR6_WGII
2,470
19
Annual economic output losses in developing countries could exceed the worst country-level losses during historical economic recessions
medium
1
train
6,766
AR6_WGII
2,471
3
More widespread severe risks would occur at high levels of warming (with high exposure/ vulnerability and low adaptation) where there is additional potential for one or more social or ecological tipping points to be triggered (Cai et al., 2015; Cai et al., 2016b; Kopp et al., 2016; Steffen et al., 2018; Lenton et al., 2019), and for severe impacts on livelihoods to cascade from relatively more climate-sensitive to relatively less climate-sensitive sectors and regions
medium
1
train
6,767
AR6_WGII
2,472
1
Without effective adaptation measures, regions with high dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods—particularly agriculture and fisheries in the tropics and coastal regions—would be severely impacted even at low levels of warming
high
2
test
6,768
AR6_WGII
2,472
5
Within populations, the poor, women, children, the elderly and Indigenous populations are especially vulnerable due to a combination of factors, including gendered divisions of paid and/or unpaid labour, as well as barriers in access to information, skills, services or resources (Bose, 2017; Thomas et al., 2019b; Anderson and Singh, 2020; Adzawla and Baumüller, 2021)
high
2
train
6,769
AR6_WGII
2,472
8
Climate change also could increase income inequality between countries
high
2
train
6,770
AR6_WGII
2,473
23
Climate change will pose severe risks in terms of increasing the number of undernourished people, affecting tens to hundreds of million people under High vulnerability and High warming, particularly among low- income populations in developing countries
high
2
train
6,771
AR6_WGII
2,473
24
Extreme weather events will increase risks of undernutrition even on a regional scale, via spikes in food price and reduced income
high
2
train
6,772
AR6_WGII
2,474
5
Climate change risks of micronutrient deficiency will become severe in high-vulnerability development pathways and in the absence of societal adaptation, leading to hundreds of millions of additional people lacking key nutrients for atmospheric CO 2 levels above 500 ppm
high
2
train
6,773
AR6_WGII
2,476
10
Regular human mobility will continue regardless of climate change, but mobility-related risks will increase with warming, notably in densely populated hazard-prone regions, in small islands and low-lying coastal zones, and among populations with limited coping capacity (RKR-A; Section CCP2.2.2; Chapter 7)
high
2
train
6,774
AR6_WGII
2,476
14
Although climate-driven human mobility generally does not increase risks to peace (medium confidence), armed conflict is a major driver of forced displacement
high
2
train
6,775
AR6_WGII
2,476
16
Expert elicitation estimates that 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels will have severe and widespread effects on armed conflict with 26% probability, assuming no change from present levels in non- climatic drivers (Mach et al., 2019). That judgement refers to impacts that exceed the threshold for severity considered here, suggesting that global warming of 4°C would produce severe risks to peace under present societal conditions
low
0
test
6,776
AR6_WGII
2,476
19
A larger empirical literature offers indirect evidence that climate change may produce severe risks to peace within this century by demonstrating how climate variability and extremes affect contemporary conflict dynamics, especially in contexts marked by low economic development, high economic dependence on climate-sensitive activities, high or increasing social marginalisation, and fragile governance
medium
1
train
6,777
AR6_WGII
2,476
27
There is high agreement that even moderate levels of future SLR will severely amplify involuntary migration and displacement in small islands and densely populated low-lying coastal areas in the absence of appropriate adaptive responses
high
2
train
6,778
AR6_WGII
2,479
20
A wide range of climate change impacts depend strongly on development pathway
high
2
train
6,779
AR6_WGII
2,479
24
Studies are increasingly going beyond exposure to incorporate future vulnerability, finding that it is often the dominant determinant of risk
high
2
train
6,780
AR6_WGII
2,481
2
Future risk in these areas is heavily driven by climate change but also greatly depends on past, current and future socioeconomic changes which influence future trends in exposure, vulnerability and adaptive capacity of natural and human systems
high
2
train
6,781
AR6_WGII
2,481
3
From a risk perspective, trends over the past decades have been unfavourable for many deltas, as most of them have experienced a simultaneous intensification of hazards, rise in exposure and stagnation or only limited reduction in vulnerability, particularly in low-income countries
high
2
train
6,782
AR6_WGII
2,481
14
The combined effects of local subsidence and GMSL rise result in a significant increase in the potential for inundation of low-lying deltas across all RCPs, with some variation according to regional sea level change rates, without significant further adaptation measures
very high
3
train
6,783
AR6_WGII
2,482
2
However, case study research from individual deltas suggests that delta populations, particularly those with agriculture-based livelihoods, have seen more limited vulnerability reduction due in particular to the impacts of environmental hazards, stress and disasters
high
2
train
6,784
AR6_WGII
2,488
5
Cooling caused by SRM would increase the global land and ocean CO 2 sinks (medium confidence), but this would not stop CO 2 from increasing in the atmosphere or affect the resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic emissions
high
2
train
6,785
AR6_WGII
2,488
26
A gradual phase-out of SRM combined with emission reduction and CDR could avoid these termination effects
medium
1
train
6,786
AR6_WGII
2,490
3
Aligning climate change adaptation to the SDGs could bring potential co-benefits and increased efficiency in funding, and reduce the gap between adaptation planning and implementation
very high
3
train
6,787
AR6_WGII
2,490
14
From Figure 16.12, aside from SDG13 (climate action), the strongest connections and risk challenges are with zero hunger (SDG2), sustainable cities and communities (SDG11), life below water (SDG14), decent work and economic growth (SDG8), no poverty (SDG1), clean water and sanitation (SDG6) and good health and well-being (SDG3)
high
2
train
6,788
AR6_WGII
2,490
15
Other SDGs have strong linkages with specific RKRs, for example, terrestrial and marine ecosystems with life on land (SDG15); infrastructure (RKR-C) with industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG9) and affordable and clean energy (SDG7); living standards (RKR-D) with gender equality (SDG5); and peace and human mobility (RKR-H) with peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16)
high
2
train
6,789
AR6_WGII
2,490
17
The greatest linkages and effects on the SDGs will be due to risks to water (RKR-G), living standards (RKR-D), coastal socio-ecological systems (RKR-A) and peace and human mobility (RKR-H)
high
2
train
6,790
AR6_WGII
2,490
18
In particular, coastal socio-ecological systems (RKR-A), living standards (RKR-D), food security (RKR-F), water security (RKR-G) and peace and human mobility (RKR-H), have strong linkages with SDG 2 (zero hunger), for which there are significant to major challenges for all regions
high
2
train
6,791
AR6_WGII
2,490
19
Almost all the RKRs are strongly linked to SDGs 8 (decent work and economic growth) and 11 (sustainable cities and communities)
high
2
train
6,792
AR6_WGII
2,490
20
All regions also face major to significant challenges affecting SDGs 14 (life below water) and 15 (life on land), which relate to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems (RKR-B)
high
2
train
6,793
AR6_WGII
2,492
1
They also will be indirectly linked to, and thus affect, the SDGs overall, due to the interactions between the key risks (Section 16.5) and between the SDGs themselves
very high
3
train
6,794
AR6_WGII
2,492
5
In the near term, the strength of connection between the RKRs and the SDGs, with respect to existing SDG challenges, indicate probable systemic vulnerabilities and issues in responding to climatic hazards (UN-IATFFD, 2019; Leal Filho et al., 2020; Weaver et al., 2020; Tiedemann et al., 2021)
high
2
train
6,795
AR6_WGII
2,495
17
Species extinction is irreversible, and Chapter 2 assesses that, at ~1.6°C, >10% of species are projected to become endangered as compared with >20% at ~2.1°C (median), representing high and very high biodiversity risk, respectively
medium
1
train
6,796
AR6_WGII
2,498
9
Based on observed and modelled impacts to unique and threatened systems, including in particular coral reefs, sea-ice-dependent systems and biodiversity hotspots, AR6 assesses that the transition to high risks for RFC1 have already occurred at a median level of 0.9°C, with a lower bound at 0.7°C and an upper bound at the present-day level of global warming of 1.2°C (WMO, 2020)
very high
3
train
6,797
AR6_WGII
2,498
21
Small island communities are confronted by socio-ecological limits to adaptation well before 2100, especially those reliant on coral reef systems for their livelihoods, even for a low-emissions pathway (Chapter 3)
high
2
train
6,798
AR6_WGII
2,498
22
At warming levels beyond 1.5°C, the potential to reach biophysical limits to adaptation due to limited water resources are reported for small islands (medium confidence) and unique systems dependent on glaciers and snowmelt (Chapter 4)
medium
1
train
6,799
AR6_WGII
2,498
25
In AR6, risks are considered to start to transition from high to very high risks above 1.2°C warming (present day, WMO, 2020), with a median value of 1.5°C, owing in particular to the observation of a present-day onset of ecosystem degradation in coral reefs, which are projected in the SR15 report ‘to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C
very high
3
train