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T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30",
"parenthetical": "holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 42, 47",
"parenthetical": "\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 42, 47",
"parenthetical": "\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "478 F.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "478 F.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95",
"parenthetical": "describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95",
"parenthetical": "describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "389 So.2d 318, 319",
"parenthetical": "holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "389 So.2d 318, 319",
"parenthetical": "holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 A.3d 879, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 A.3d 879, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "248 P.3d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | 6,837,090 | a |
Second, it was plainly reasonable for defendants to place plaintiff on TB hold, in light of the fact that the condition of his immune system was such that defendants could not place complete confidence in the negative results of his TB test results. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "230 F.Supp.2d 512, 512",
"parenthetical": "DOCS's placement of plaintiff on TB hold was reasonable where DOCS was \"unable to determine the extent to which Plaintiff pose[d] a risk of contagion\"",
"sentence": "See Word, 230 F.Supp.2d at 512 (DOCS’s placement of plaintiff on TB hold was reasonable where DOCS was “unable to determine the extent to which Plaintiff pose[d] a risk of contagion”); cf. Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F.Supp.2d 316, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (finding it irrational to place on TB hold inmate who refused to submit to PPD testing on religious grounds, where other diagnostic tools to which plaintiff did submit, such as a chest x-ray, sputum testing, and physical examination, indicated that plaintiff was negative for TB)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "103 F.Supp.2d 316, 337-38",
"parenthetical": "finding it irrational to place on TB hold inmate who refused to submit to PPD testing on religious grounds, where other diagnostic tools to which plaintiff did submit, such as a chest x-ray, sputum testing, and physical examination, indicated that plaintiff was negative for TB",
"sentence": "See Word, 230 F.Supp.2d at 512 (DOCS’s placement of plaintiff on TB hold was reasonable where DOCS was “unable to determine the extent to which Plaintiff pose[d] a risk of contagion”); cf. Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F.Supp.2d 316, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (finding it irrational to place on TB hold inmate who refused to submit to PPD testing on religious grounds, where other diagnostic tools to which plaintiff did submit, such as a chest x-ray, sputum testing, and physical examination, indicated that plaintiff was negative for TB)."
} | 5,560,280 | a |
However, Veith failed to preserve this issue for appeal by not offering proper objection during closing. "The rule is that the objection to argument of counsel must be made at the time of the improper argument, remark, or other misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "513 N.W.2d 97, 110",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue",
"sentence": "Janklow, 2005 SD 25, ¶ 47, 693 N.W.2d at 701. When a party deprives the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue by failing to object to argument at the time the objectionable comments are made, he waives his right to argue the issue on appeal. Id. ¶ 47, 693 N.W.2d at 701 (quoting State v. Boston, 2003 SD 71, ¶ 26, 665 N.W.2d 100, 109 (citing State v. Corey, 2001 SD 53, ¶ 9, 624 N.W.2d 841, 844); City of Sioux Falls v. Kelley, 513 N.W.2d 97, 110 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted) (holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue); see Anderson, 441 N.W.2d at 677 (S.D.1989) (holding that plaintiffs failure to request a mistrial due to defense counsel’s improper statements during closing argument foreclosed his opportunity to argue it on appeal); State v. Handy, 450 N.W.2d 434, 435 (S.D.1990) (holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object)); Arbach v. Gruba, 89 S.D. 322, 232 N.W.2d 842 (1975); see also Till, 281 N.W.2d 276; Carlson, 392 N.W.2d 89; Triple U Enterprises, Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525; John Deere Company, 306 N.W.2d 231; Matter of A.I., 289 N.W.2d 247 (S.D.1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 N.W.2d 434, 435",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object",
"sentence": "Janklow, 2005 SD 25, ¶ 47, 693 N.W.2d at 701. When a party deprives the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue by failing to object to argument at the time the objectionable comments are made, he waives his right to argue the issue on appeal. Id. ¶ 47, 693 N.W.2d at 701 (quoting State v. Boston, 2003 SD 71, ¶ 26, 665 N.W.2d 100, 109 (citing State v. Corey, 2001 SD 53, ¶ 9, 624 N.W.2d 841, 844); City of Sioux Falls v. Kelley, 513 N.W.2d 97, 110 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted) (holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue); see Anderson, 441 N.W.2d at 677 (S.D.1989) (holding that plaintiffs failure to request a mistrial due to defense counsel’s improper statements during closing argument foreclosed his opportunity to argue it on appeal); State v. Handy, 450 N.W.2d 434, 435 (S.D.1990) (holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object)); Arbach v. Gruba, 89 S.D. 322, 232 N.W.2d 842 (1975); see also Till, 281 N.W.2d 276; Carlson, 392 N.W.2d 89; Triple U Enterprises, Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525; John Deere Company, 306 N.W.2d 231; Matter of A.I., 289 N.W.2d 247 (S.D.1980)."
} | 8,341,694 | a |
See Brown v. General Servs. As a result, Title VII preempts any constitutional cause of action that a court might find under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 367, 368",
"parenthetical": "refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission",
"sentence": "See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484",
"parenthetical": "applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"sentence": "See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs)."
} | 1,000,987 | a |
See Brown v. General Servs. As a result, Title VII preempts any constitutional cause of action that a court might find under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406",
"parenthetical": "refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission",
"sentence": "See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484",
"parenthetical": "applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"sentence": "See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs)."
} | 1,000,987 | a |
See Brown v. General Servs. As a result, Title VII preempts any constitutional cause of action that a court might find under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission",
"sentence": "See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484",
"parenthetical": "applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"sentence": "See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs)."
} | 1,000,987 | a |
Instead, it was reminded over and over again that if Gravley's version of events was really true he certainly would have come forward earlier. In the face of such misconduct, we simply cannot conclude the conviction was attained through a fair judicial process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "11 F.3d 613, 617",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here, as here, the evidence of guilt is at best conflicting, egregious prosecutorial misconduct of this kind rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation, denying the defendant a fundamentally fair trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613, 617 (6th Cir.1993) (“[W]here, as here, the evidence of guilt is at best conflicting, egregious prosecutorial misconduct of this kind rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation, denying the defendant a fundamentally fair trial.”); see also United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir.1993); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1581 (6th Cir.1992) (“This is not a case where the evidence of the Gravley’s guilt was so massive or multilayered as to render harmless defense counsel’s errors.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1575, 1581",
"parenthetical": "\"This is not a case where the evidence of the Gravley's guilt was so massive or multilayered as to render harmless defense counsel's errors.\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613, 617 (6th Cir.1993) (“[W]here, as here, the evidence of guilt is at best conflicting, egregious prosecutorial misconduct of this kind rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation, denying the defendant a fundamentally fair trial.”); see also United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir.1993); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1581 (6th Cir.1992) (“This is not a case where the evidence of the Gravley’s guilt was so massive or multilayered as to render harmless defense counsel’s errors.”)."
} | 475 | a |
Similarly, we have found covenants not to compete that restrict an employee from working in any capacity for an employer's competitor or from working within portions of the business with which the employee was never associated to be unreasonable because such restrictions extend beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 437, 437-438",
"parenthetical": "holding that covenant's prohibition on the employee-doctor from practicing \"health care of every nature and kind\" was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437-438 (holding that covenant's prohibition on the employee-doctor from practicing \"health care of every nature and kind\" was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology); Pathfinder, 795 N.E.2d at 1114 (holding that covenant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the covenant's clause prohibiting the employee from being \"employed . with any corporation ... which competes with, or otherwise engages in any business of the [employer]\" was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc., 168 Ind.App. 647, 650, 344 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1976) (holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "771 N.E.2d 1245, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\"",
"sentence": "But see Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1245 (holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\")."
} | 8,483,381 | a |
Similarly, we have found covenants not to compete that restrict an employee from working in any capacity for an employer's competitor or from working within portions of the business with which the employee was never associated to be unreasonable because such restrictions extend beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "795 N.E.2d 1114, 1114",
"parenthetical": "holding that covenant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437-438 (holding that covenant's prohibition on the employee-doctor from practicing \"health care of every nature and kind\" was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology); Pathfinder, 795 N.E.2d at 1114 (holding that covenant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the covenant's clause prohibiting the employee from being \"employed . with any corporation ... which competes with, or otherwise engages in any business of the [employer]\" was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc., 168 Ind.App. 647, 650, 344 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1976) (holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "771 N.E.2d 1245, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\"",
"sentence": "But see Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1245 (holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\")."
} | 8,483,381 | a |
Similarly, we have found covenants not to compete that restrict an employee from working in any capacity for an employer's competitor or from working within portions of the business with which the employee was never associated to be unreasonable because such restrictions extend beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "737 N.E.2d 803, 812",
"parenthetical": "holding that the covenant's clause prohibiting the employee from being \"employed . with any corporation ... which competes with, or otherwise engages in any business of the [employer]\" was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437-438 (holding that covenant's prohibition on the employee-doctor from practicing \"health care of every nature and kind\" was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology); Pathfinder, 795 N.E.2d at 1114 (holding that covenant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the covenant's clause prohibiting the employee from being \"employed . with any corporation ... which competes with, or otherwise engages in any business of the [employer]\" was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc., 168 Ind.App. 647, 650, 344 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1976) (holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "771 N.E.2d 1245, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\"",
"sentence": "But see Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1245 (holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\")."
} | 8,483,381 | a |
Similarly, we have found covenants not to compete that restrict an employee from working in any capacity for an employer's competitor or from working within portions of the business with which the employee was never associated to be unreasonable because such restrictions extend beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "771 N.E.2d 1245, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\"",
"sentence": "But see Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1245 (holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 Ind.App. 647, 650",
"parenthetical": "holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437-438 (holding that covenant's prohibition on the employee-doctor from practicing \"health care of every nature and kind\" was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology); Pathfinder, 795 N.E.2d at 1114 (holding that covenant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the covenant's clause prohibiting the employee from being \"employed . with any corporation ... which competes with, or otherwise engages in any business of the [employer]\" was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc., 168 Ind.App. 647, 650, 344 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1976) (holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will)."
} | 8,483,381 | b |
Similarly, we have found covenants not to compete that restrict an employee from working in any capacity for an employer's competitor or from working within portions of the business with which the employee was never associated to be unreasonable because such restrictions extend beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "344 N.E.2d 299, 302",
"parenthetical": "holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437-438 (holding that covenant's prohibition on the employee-doctor from practicing \"health care of every nature and kind\" was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology); Pathfinder, 795 N.E.2d at 1114 (holding that covenant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the covenant's clause prohibiting the employee from being \"employed . with any corporation ... which competes with, or otherwise engages in any business of the [employer]\" was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc., 168 Ind.App. 647, 650, 344 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1976) (holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee, who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employer's customers, from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employer's legitimate interest of protecting its good will)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "771 N.E.2d 1245, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\"",
"sentence": "But see Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1245 (holding that the noncompetition clause, which restricted the employee, who was the president of a company offering annuity and brokerage services, from \"participating in any 'business competitive with the business of [his former employer,]'\" who provided financial services, was reasonably limited in the type of activity it prohibited because the employee \"was therefore free to seek employment with any business that did not provide financial services\")."
} | 8,483,381 | a |
In particular, the district court directed that the shackles and tasers be worn under the Appellants' clothing, the counsel tables skirted, and the shackles taped to the Appellants' legs, to prevent the jury from seeing or hearing the restraints. In doing so, the district court employed the least restrictive and least prejudicial means of restraint available, thus fulfilling the procedural prerequisites to utilizing this type of security measure. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "544 U.S. 634, 634-35",
"parenthetical": "finding that the lower court erred in requiring shackling of the defendant, in part because the court failed to explain \"why, if shackles were necessary, [it] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see\"",
"sentence": "See Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1226 (“[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision that shackling was appropriate during the course of the appellants’ trial and that leg irons were the least restrictive method of effective restraint.”); cf. Deck, 544 U.S. at 634-35, 125 S.Ct. at 2015 (finding that the lower court erred in requiring shackling of the defendant, in part because the court failed to explain “why, if shackles were necessary, [it] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "158 F.3d 1226, 1226",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision that shackling was appropriate during the course of the appellants' trial and that leg irons were the least restrictive method of effective restraint.\"",
"sentence": "See Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1226 (“[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision that shackling was appropriate during the course of the appellants’ trial and that leg irons were the least restrictive method of effective restraint.”); cf. Deck, 544 U.S. at 634-35, 125 S.Ct. at 2015 (finding that the lower court erred in requiring shackling of the defendant, in part because the court failed to explain “why, if shackles were necessary, [it] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see”)."
} | 4,194,922 | b |
In particular, the district court directed that the shackles and tasers be worn under the Appellants' clothing, the counsel tables skirted, and the shackles taped to the Appellants' legs, to prevent the jury from seeing or hearing the restraints. In doing so, the district court employed the least restrictive and least prejudicial means of restraint available, thus fulfilling the procedural prerequisites to utilizing this type of security measure. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2015, 2015",
"parenthetical": "finding that the lower court erred in requiring shackling of the defendant, in part because the court failed to explain \"why, if shackles were necessary, [it] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see\"",
"sentence": "See Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1226 (“[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision that shackling was appropriate during the course of the appellants’ trial and that leg irons were the least restrictive method of effective restraint.”); cf. Deck, 544 U.S. at 634-35, 125 S.Ct. at 2015 (finding that the lower court erred in requiring shackling of the defendant, in part because the court failed to explain “why, if shackles were necessary, [it] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "158 F.3d 1226, 1226",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision that shackling was appropriate during the course of the appellants' trial and that leg irons were the least restrictive method of effective restraint.\"",
"sentence": "See Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1226 (“[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision that shackling was appropriate during the course of the appellants’ trial and that leg irons were the least restrictive method of effective restraint.”); cf. Deck, 544 U.S. at 634-35, 125 S.Ct. at 2015 (finding that the lower court erred in requiring shackling of the defendant, in part because the court failed to explain “why, if shackles were necessary, [it] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see”)."
} | 4,194,922 | b |
Vargas's argument is flawed, however, because there is no evidence that he ever tried to comply with the plan. Because Vargas did not even minimally attempt to comply with the plan, there is no "performance" from which he could be excused. This court has previously found that an employee's intentional refusal to perform a task, as opposed to negligent forgetfulness, supports the commissioner's representative's decision that an employee committed misconduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "352 N.W.2d 815, 816",
"parenthetical": "stating a refusal to unload a truck was \"a deliberate act of insubordination\" constituting employment misconduct",
"sentence": "Bibeau v. Resistance Tech., Inc., 411 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn.App.1987) (finding employee misconduct when employee deliberately chose to disobey her employer’s instructions because she believed the order was “stupid”); see also Daniels v. Gnan Trucking, 352 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn.App.1984) (stating a refusal to unload a truck was “a deliberate act of insubordination” constituting employment misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "411 N.W.2d 29, 32",
"parenthetical": "finding employee misconduct when employee deliberately chose to disobey her employer's instructions because she believed the order was \"stupid\"",
"sentence": "Bibeau v. Resistance Tech., Inc., 411 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn.App.1987) (finding employee misconduct when employee deliberately chose to disobey her employer’s instructions because she believed the order was “stupid”); see also Daniels v. Gnan Trucking, 352 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn.App.1984) (stating a refusal to unload a truck was “a deliberate act of insubordination” constituting employment misconduct)."
} | 9,055,913 | b |
Hallways are "easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen and other members of the public." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 1239, 1241",
"parenthetical": "finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | 4,168,773 | b |
Hallways are "easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen and other members of the public." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "942 F.2d 1170, 1172",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the area outside one's door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside\", and holding that \"a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | 4,168,773 | b |
Hallways are "easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen and other members of the public." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "755 F.2d 253, 255",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant's zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | 4,168,773 | a |
Hallways are "easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen and other members of the public." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 F.2d 814, 816",
"parenthetical": "finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | 4,168,773 | a |
Hallways are "easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen and other members of the public." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "537 F.2d 554, 558",
"parenthetical": "finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of a high security, high rise apartment complex); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that “the area outside one’s door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside”, and holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that “common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual tenant’s zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors.”); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of an apartment building notwithstanding locks on the doors to the entryways of the apartment complex); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in well traveled common areas of a condominium or apartment complex); but see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment building where entryway into apartment building was locked); see also United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533— 34 (6th Cir.2001) (same)."
} | 4,168,773 | b |
Salvador Garcia's lack-of-notice argument fails because even if the govern ment provided insufficient notice of its intent to introduce the cocaine evidence, Salvador Garcia failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the requisite prejudice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 725, 734",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | 3,651,421 | b |
Salvador Garcia's lack-of-notice argument fails because even if the govern ment provided insufficient notice of its intent to introduce the cocaine evidence, Salvador Garcia failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the requisite prejudice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | 3,651,421 | b |
Salvador Garcia's lack-of-notice argument fails because even if the govern ment provided insufficient notice of its intent to introduce the cocaine evidence, Salvador Garcia failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the requisite prejudice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | 3,651,421 | b |
Salvador Garcia's lack-of-notice argument fails because even if the govern ment provided insufficient notice of its intent to introduce the cocaine evidence, Salvador Garcia failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the requisite prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433",
"parenthetical": "\"Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano's instruction that a defendant normally 'must make a specific showing of prejudice' in order to obtain relief.\"",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | 3,651,421 | a |
Salvador Garcia's lack-of-notice argument fails because even if the govern ment provided insufficient notice of its intent to introduce the cocaine evidence, Salvador Garcia failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the requisite prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano's instruction that a defendant normally 'must make a specific showing of prejudice' in order to obtain relief.\"",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2002) (“To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights .... ” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”); Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (“Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of Olano’s instruction that a defendant normally ‘must make a specific showing of prejudice’ in order to obtain relief.”)."
} | 3,651,421 | a |
Rule 16-606 is quite clear; it requires that all attorney trust accounts be designated in one of three manners. Ellison did not comply with this Rule, whether by ignorance or willful intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 Md. 208, 228",
"parenthetical": "\"every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account\"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "373 Md. 275, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account 'Bruce David Blum Law Firm \"IOLTA\" ' \"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | 419,082 | b |
Rule 16-606 is quite clear; it requires that all attorney trust accounts be designated in one of three manners. Ellison did not comply with this Rule, whether by ignorance or willful intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 A.2d 607, 618",
"parenthetical": "\"every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account\"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "373 Md. 275, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account 'Bruce David Blum Law Firm \"IOLTA\" ' \"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | 419,082 | b |
Rule 16-606 is quite clear; it requires that all attorney trust accounts be designated in one of three manners. Ellison did not comply with this Rule, whether by ignorance or willful intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 Md. 208, 228",
"parenthetical": "\"every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account\"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "818 A.2d 219, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account 'Bruce David Blum Law Firm \"IOLTA\" ' \"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | 419,082 | b |
Rule 16-606 is quite clear; it requires that all attorney trust accounts be designated in one of three manners. Ellison did not comply with this Rule, whether by ignorance or willful intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 A.2d 607, 618",
"parenthetical": "\"every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account\"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "818 A.2d 219, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account 'Bruce David Blum Law Firm \"IOLTA\" ' \"",
"sentence": "Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 300, 818 A.2d 219, 234 (2003) (“the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rule[ ] 16-606 ... when he named his attorney trust account ‘Bruce David Blum Law Firm “IOLTA” ’ ”); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228, 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“every attorney is deemed to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and is charged with the knowledge of how to operate and maintain a trust account”)."
} | 419,082 | b |
However, when questioned by the ALJ, Ms. Knight admitted that she could carry a ten-pound sack of potatoes around a ten-foot by four-foot area once every half hour. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the ALJ erred in discounting Ms. Knight's testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 F.3d 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "stating that, court will not upset ALJ's credibility determinations on appeal unless they are \"patently wrong\" because the ALJ \"is in the best position to observe witnesses\"",
"sentence": "See Herron, 19 F.3d at 335 (stating that, court will not upset ALJ’s credibility determinations on appeal unless they are “patently wrong” because the ALJ “is in the best position to observe witnesses”); see also Luna, 22 F.3d at 690 (same); Edwards v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 384, 338 (7th Cir.1993) (“[D]eterminations of credibility often involve intangible and unarticulable elements which impress the ALJ, that, unfortunately leave no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript.”) (quotations and citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "985 F.2d 384, 338",
"parenthetical": "\"[D]eterminations of credibility often involve intangible and unarticulable elements which impress the ALJ, that, unfortunately leave no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript.\"",
"sentence": "See Herron, 19 F.3d at 335 (stating that, court will not upset ALJ’s credibility determinations on appeal unless they are “patently wrong” because the ALJ “is in the best position to observe witnesses”); see also Luna, 22 F.3d at 690 (same); Edwards v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 384, 338 (7th Cir.1993) (“[D]eterminations of credibility often involve intangible and unarticulable elements which impress the ALJ, that, unfortunately leave no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript.”) (quotations and citations omitted)."
} | 7,413,264 | a |
Trademark standards do not traverse international borders. "The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 F.2d 633, 639",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen trade-mark rights within the United States are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign courts concerning the respective trademark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmissible.\"",
"sentence": "Fuji Photo, 754 F.2d at 599 (finding it “error to admit evidence of the parties’ foreign trademark practices”); see also E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1985) (district court erred in considering status of parties’ marks in France; “Our concern must be the business and goodwill attached to United States trademarks, not French trademark rights under French law.”) (quotation omitted); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.1956) (“[W]hen trade-mark rights within the United States are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign courts concerning the respective trademark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 599, 599",
"parenthetical": "finding it \"error to admit evidence of the parties' foreign trademark practices\"",
"sentence": "Fuji Photo, 754 F.2d at 599 (finding it “error to admit evidence of the parties’ foreign trademark practices”); see also E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1985) (district court erred in considering status of parties’ marks in France; “Our concern must be the business and goodwill attached to United States trademarks, not French trademark rights under French law.”) (quotation omitted); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.1956) (“[W]hen trade-mark rights within the United States are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign courts concerning the respective trademark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmissible.”)."
} | 9,247,262 | b |
Although (accepting Petitioner's testimony as true) Punjabi police came to his house shortly before he left the country in 1999, they did not harm or threaten Petitioner in any way; he merely speculated vaguely about--but did not know--the reason for their single, uneventful visit. Additionally, the State Department Country Reports for 1996 through 2000 show that the situation of Sikhs, even in the Punjab province, had improved considerably. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "336 F.3d 995, 999",
"parenthetical": "finding a country report relevant to determining the reasonableness of internal relocation",
"sentence": "See Molinctr-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that such reports are relevant even in the face-of a presumption of future persecution); see also Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir.2003) (finding a country report relevant to determining the reasonableness of internal relocation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 1089, 1096",
"parenthetical": "stating that such reports are relevant even in the face-of a presumption of future persecution",
"sentence": "See Molinctr-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that such reports are relevant even in the face-of a presumption of future persecution); see also Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir.2003) (finding a country report relevant to determining the reasonableness of internal relocation)."
} | 15,264 | b |
Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs -- as we must -- we cannot say that a reasonable juror would have been "compelled" to conclude that plaintiffs made a net profit on their franchises. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "589 F.3d 538, 540",
"parenthetical": "stating that judgment as a matter of law is warranted \"only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable juror would be compelled to find in favor of the moving party\"",
"sentence": "See Tuccio v. Marconi 589 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that judgment as a matter of law is warranted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable juror would be compelled to find in favor of the moving party”); see also Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir.1995) (“[W]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the damages evidence, we are guided by the principle that if a plaintiff has shown it more likely than not that it has suffered damages, the amount of damages need only be proved with reasonable certainty.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 490, 496",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the damages evidence, we are guided by the principle that if a plaintiff has shown it more likely than not that it has suffered damages, the amount of damages need only be proved with reasonable certainty.\"",
"sentence": "See Tuccio v. Marconi 589 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that judgment as a matter of law is warranted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable juror would be compelled to find in favor of the moving party”); see also Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir.1995) (“[W]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the damages evidence, we are guided by the principle that if a plaintiff has shown it more likely than not that it has suffered damages, the amount of damages need only be proved with reasonable certainty.”)."
} | 4,292,209 | a |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 652, 654",
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | 199,966 | a |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 652, 654",
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | 199,966 | a |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | 199,966 | a |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | 199,966 | a |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | 199,966 | a |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | 199,966 | b |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | 199,966 | b |
Several other courts have agreed that there are limits to the actions which the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. As the Second Circuit explained, the Supreme Court's "rejection [in Gaubert ] of any simplistic reliance on the dichotomy between planning-level actions and operation-level actions" did not abolish the requirement that policy considerations "remain the touchstone for determining whether the discretionary function exception applies." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception",
"sentence": "See also Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.1994) (held that the discretionary function did not shield the Mine Safety and Health Administration from an action by survivors of a mine explosion because the safety inspectors were not authorized to conduct their inspections on the basis of social, economic or political policy); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to require specific safety equipment was not subject to discretionary function exception)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme",
"sentence": "Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 654 (2nd Cir.1991) (held that the negligent omission of a warning of unsafe laboratory conditions unnecessarily placing the lives of workers at risk could not have been grounded in a policy scheme), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204, 112 S.Ct. 2992, 120 L.Ed.2d 869 (1992)."
} | 199,966 | b |
Finally, because the issue will recur on remand, we also address whether the trial court is entitled to award attorney fees and expenses for time specifically expended on the frivolous claims that occurred during the course of the original suit filed by Trotter that was voluntarily dismissed. We conclude that the trial court is authorized to do so on remand. Trotter refiled his suit approximately two months after it was voluntarily dismissed, raising the same allegations and seeking the same types of damages. Since Trotter properly renewed his suit, the deadline for Summerour to file a fees motion under OCGA SS 9-15-14 for time expended on the voluntarily dismissed suit did not begin to run until the "final disposition" of the renewed suit. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "268 Ga. App. 849, 849-850",
"parenthetical": "if suit is voluntarily dismissed, 45-day time limit set forth in OCGA SS 9-15-14 (e",
"sentence": "Meister v. Brock, 268 Ga. App. 849, 849-850 (1) (602 SE2d 867) (2004) (if suit is voluntarily dismissed, 45-day time limit set forth in OCGA § 9-15-14 (e) does not begin to run until a second dismissal, or if the case is not renewed, until expiration of the original statute of limitation period or six months after the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later). As such, we conclude that as part of his request for sanctions timely filed after final disposition of the renewed suit, Summerour was entitled to seek fees and expenses incurred in defending against the frivolous claims during the course of the original suit."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "201 Ga. App. 248, 250",
"parenthetical": "upholding fees award in second suit under OCGA SS 9-15-14 that included fees and expenses incurred during original suit that was later voluntarily dismissed, even though original suit was filed before the effective date of the fees statute",
"sentence": "See also Moore v. Harris, 201 Ga. App. 248, 250 (2) (410 SE2d 804) (1991) (upholding fees award in second suit under OCGA § 9-15-14 that included fees and expenses incurred during original suit that was later voluntarily dismissed, even though original suit was filed before the effective date of the fees statute)."
} | 1,235,175 | a |
Even acknowledging that the Court's decision altered or overruled then-existing precedent on the "clearly erroneous" standard of review of the Board's findings of fact, the law and regulation are well-established with respect to the Board's duty to assign due weight to the evidence and to return an inadequate medical examination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 Vet.App. 295, 302",
"parenthetical": "\"Part of the Board's consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.\"",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "18 Vet.App. 218, 221",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision\"",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | 6,053,260 | a |
Even acknowledging that the Court's decision altered or overruled then-existing precedent on the "clearly erroneous" standard of review of the Board's findings of fact, the law and regulation are well-established with respect to the Board's duty to assign due weight to the evidence and to return an inadequate medical examination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "13 Vet.App. 308, 311",
"parenthetical": "providing that even prior to the Court's clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, \"there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record\"",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 Vet.App. 295, 302",
"parenthetical": "\"Part of the Board's consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.\"",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | 6,053,260 | b |
Even acknowledging that the Court's decision altered or overruled then-existing precedent on the "clearly erroneous" standard of review of the Board's findings of fact, the law and regulation are well-established with respect to the Board's duty to assign due weight to the evidence and to return an inadequate medical examination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "8 Vet. App. 202, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"When a medical examination report \"does not contain sufficient detail,\" the adjudicator is required to \"return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.\" \" (quoting 38 C.F.R. SS 4.2 (1994",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "18 Vet.App. 218, 221",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision\"",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | 6,053,260 | a |
Even acknowledging that the Court's decision altered or overruled then-existing precedent on the "clearly erroneous" standard of review of the Board's findings of fact, the law and regulation are well-established with respect to the Board's duty to assign due weight to the evidence and to return an inadequate medical examination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "8 Vet. App. 202, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"When a medical examination report \"does not contain sufficient detail,\" the adjudicator is required to \"return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.\" \" (quoting 38 C.F.R. SS 4.2 (1994",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "13 Vet.App. 308, 311",
"parenthetical": "providing that even prior to the Court's clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, \"there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record\"",
"sentence": "See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 302 (2008) (“Part of the Board’s consideration of how much weight to assign is the foundation upon which the medical opinion is based.”); Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing Board’s duty to return inadequate examination report); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995) (“When a medical examination report “does not contain sufficient detail,” the adjudicator is required to “return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes.” ” (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1994))); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) (concluding that an inadequate medical examination frustrates judicial review); see also Bonny v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 218, 221 (2004) (stating that “in judging reasonableness during the administrative proceedings, the Court looks to the relevant, determinative circumstances, including the state of the law at the time of the Board decision”); Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”)."
} | 6,053,260 | a |
The Commissioner argued that back pay was taxable income because it was paid on account of a nonper-sonal injury. Although we have rejected that argument here, given that the Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court on the issue, that Byrne had not yet been decided by this Court, the inconsistency we have found in the Tax Court's approach to this issue, see supra n. 5, and the assumption by many courts that such back pay awards are taxable, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, we think that the Commissioner's position could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting the phrase \"substantially justified\" for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person",
"sentence": "Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (interpreting the phrase “substantially justified” for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "850 F.2d 242, 246",
"parenthetical": "requiring taxpayer to prove that the government's position was unjustified",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 850 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1988) (requiring taxpayer to prove that the government’s position was unjustified); Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 723 F.Supp. 163, 170 (W.D.Mo.1989); Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416 (1989) (“In determining whether [the government’s] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government’s] position in the litigation was unreasonable.”)."
} | 10,533,535 | b |
The Commissioner argued that back pay was taxable income because it was paid on account of a nonper-sonal injury. Although we have rejected that argument here, given that the Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court on the issue, that Byrne had not yet been decided by this Court, the inconsistency we have found in the Tax Court's approach to this issue, see supra n. 5, and the assumption by many courts that such back pay awards are taxable, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, we think that the Commissioner's position could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550",
"parenthetical": "interpreting the phrase \"substantially justified\" for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person",
"sentence": "Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (interpreting the phrase “substantially justified” for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "850 F.2d 242, 246",
"parenthetical": "requiring taxpayer to prove that the government's position was unjustified",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 850 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1988) (requiring taxpayer to prove that the government’s position was unjustified); Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 723 F.Supp. 163, 170 (W.D.Mo.1989); Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416 (1989) (“In determining whether [the government’s] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government’s] position in the litigation was unreasonable.”)."
} | 10,533,535 | b |
The Commissioner argued that back pay was taxable income because it was paid on account of a nonper-sonal injury. Although we have rejected that argument here, given that the Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court on the issue, that Byrne had not yet been decided by this Court, the inconsistency we have found in the Tax Court's approach to this issue, see supra n. 5, and the assumption by many courts that such back pay awards are taxable, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, we think that the Commissioner's position could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "850 F.2d 242, 246",
"parenthetical": "requiring taxpayer to prove that the government's position was unjustified",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 850 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1988) (requiring taxpayer to prove that the government’s position was unjustified); Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 723 F.Supp. 163, 170 (W.D.Mo.1989); Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416 (1989) (“In determining whether [the government’s] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government’s] position in the litigation was unreasonable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting the phrase \"substantially justified\" for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person",
"sentence": "Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (interpreting the phrase “substantially justified” for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person)."
} | 10,533,535 | a |
The Commissioner argued that back pay was taxable income because it was paid on account of a nonper-sonal injury. Although we have rejected that argument here, given that the Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court on the issue, that Byrne had not yet been decided by this Court, the inconsistency we have found in the Tax Court's approach to this issue, see supra n. 5, and the assumption by many courts that such back pay awards are taxable, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, we think that the Commissioner's position could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting the phrase \"substantially justified\" for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person",
"sentence": "Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (interpreting the phrase “substantially justified” for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether [the government's] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government's] position in the litigation was unreasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 850 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1988) (requiring taxpayer to prove that the government’s position was unjustified); Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 723 F.Supp. 163, 170 (W.D.Mo.1989); Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416 (1989) (“In determining whether [the government’s] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government’s] position in the litigation was unreasonable.”)."
} | 10,533,535 | b |
The Commissioner argued that back pay was taxable income because it was paid on account of a nonper-sonal injury. Although we have rejected that argument here, given that the Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court on the issue, that Byrne had not yet been decided by this Court, the inconsistency we have found in the Tax Court's approach to this issue, see supra n. 5, and the assumption by many courts that such back pay awards are taxable, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, we think that the Commissioner's position could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550",
"parenthetical": "interpreting the phrase \"substantially justified\" for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person",
"sentence": "Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (interpreting the phrase “substantially justified” for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether [the government's] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government's] position in the litigation was unreasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 850 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1988) (requiring taxpayer to prove that the government’s position was unjustified); Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 723 F.Supp. 163, 170 (W.D.Mo.1989); Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416 (1989) (“In determining whether [the government’s] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government’s] position in the litigation was unreasonable.”)."
} | 10,533,535 | b |
The Commissioner argued that back pay was taxable income because it was paid on account of a nonper-sonal injury. Although we have rejected that argument here, given that the Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court on the issue, that Byrne had not yet been decided by this Court, the inconsistency we have found in the Tax Court's approach to this issue, see supra n. 5, and the assumption by many courts that such back pay awards are taxable, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, we think that the Commissioner's position could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting the phrase \"substantially justified\" for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person",
"sentence": "Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (interpreting the phrase “substantially justified” for purposes of the closely related Equal Access to Justice Act to mean justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether [the government's] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government's] position in the litigation was unreasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 850 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1988) (requiring taxpayer to prove that the government’s position was unjustified); Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 723 F.Supp. 163, 170 (W.D.Mo.1989); Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414, 1416 (1989) (“In determining whether [the government’s] position was not substantially justified, the question is one of whether [the government’s] position in the litigation was unreasonable.”)."
} | 10,533,535 | b |
Rather, CU would be liable for the full amount of Payless's liability as the only insurer. In fact, during oral argument, CU's counsel agreed that if we determined that CU provided primary coverage and USF & G provided excess coverage, then the $200,000 SIR was no longer at issue. If the SIR truly was self-insurance as CU wants to define that term, then the SIR would arguably be primary regardless of what we determined USF & G's coverage to be. CU's concession cements our conclusion that the SIR is nothing more than a deductible contracted between Payless and USF & G. Because the SIR contained in the USF & G policy is not "other insurance" within the meaning of CU's "other insurance" clause, CU's policy provides the only insurance coverage for the first $200,000 of Payless's liability (subject of course to the $10,000 SIR in CU's own policy). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "889 F.2d 180, 180",
"parenthetical": "applying Minnesota law and holding that, up to the higher deductible contained in one of two applicable insurance policies, only one insurance policy provided coverage so that its \"other insurance\" clause was not triggered",
"sentence": "See Cargill, Inc., 889 F.2d at 180 (applying Minnesota law and holding that, up to the higher deductible contained in one of two applicable insurance policies, only one insurance policy provided coverage so that its “other insurance” clause was not triggered); cf. Wallace v. TriState Ins. Co. of Minn., 302 N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Minn.1980) (holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insured’s deductible, which was not covered by the primary insurer)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "302 N.W.2d 337, 340-41",
"parenthetical": "holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insured's deductible, which was not covered by the primary insurer",
"sentence": "See Cargill, Inc., 889 F.2d at 180 (applying Minnesota law and holding that, up to the higher deductible contained in one of two applicable insurance policies, only one insurance policy provided coverage so that its “other insurance” clause was not triggered); cf. Wallace v. TriState Ins. Co. of Minn., 302 N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Minn.1980) (holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insured’s deductible, which was not covered by the primary insurer)."
} | 1,594,195 | a |
Indeed, the Government candidly conceded that the officers made a show of authority from the moment they first approached Lowe. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 308, 314",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was no show of authority when two officers repeatedly asked an individual 'Where is your girl's house?\", but where \"the two officers were still in their car, neither officer displayed his weapon, there was no physical touching, and no indication as to the language or tone of the officer's voice that might have signaled a clear show of authority\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 144-46 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that a show of authority occurred when two uniformed police officers approached a house and commanded that people on the porch show their hands); cf. United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that there was no show of authority when two officers repeatedly asked an individual ‘Where is your girl’s house?”, but where “the two officers were still in their car, neither officer displayed his weapon, there was no physical touching, and no indication as to the language or tone of the officer’s voice that might have signaled a clear show of authority”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 144, 144-46",
"parenthetical": "holding that a show of authority occurred when two uniformed police officers approached a house and commanded that people on the porch show their hands",
"sentence": "See United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 144-46 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that a show of authority occurred when two uniformed police officers approached a house and commanded that people on the porch show their hands); cf. United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that there was no show of authority when two officers repeatedly asked an individual ‘Where is your girl’s house?”, but where “the two officers were still in their car, neither officer displayed his weapon, there was no physical touching, and no indication as to the language or tone of the officer’s voice that might have signaled a clear show of authority”)."
} | 4,274,747 | b |
The plaintiff alleges that the incident took place as Miller took her son's file away from her. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "239 F.3d 252, 252",
"parenthetical": "finding that head trauma, lacerations and bruising to children which required hospital treatment due to a teacher's choking, punching and deliberate slamming of objects into the children's heads rose to the level of conscience shocking",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (finding that head trauma, lacerations and bruising to children which required hospital treatment due to a teacher’s choking, punching and deliberate slamming of objects into the children’s heads rose to the level of conscience shocking)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "105 F.3d 857, 862",
"parenthetical": "finding that bumping, grabbing and elbowing does not reach the level of constitutional dimensions",
"sentence": "But see Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that bumping, grabbing and elbowing does not reach the level of constitutional dimensions)."
} | 9,448,671 | a |
Our paramount goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by the language of the agreement. Given that the policy calls for arbitration and that we must enforce the arbitration clause as written, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Safety's motion to compel arbitration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "559 N.E.2d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[the proper posture for the court is to find and enforce the contract as it is written and leave the parties where it finds them\"",
"sentence": "See, eg., Lloyds of London, 549 N.E.2d at 70 (noting that when issues exist that fall under the arbitration agreement, \"it is better to compel arbitration on those issues and ... leave it up to the trial court to determine how much weight to give the arbitrators' findings\"); see also First Federal Sav. Bank of Indiana v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ind.1990) (noting that \"[the proper posture for the court is to find and enforce the contract as it is written and leave the parties where it finds them\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "549 N.E.2d 70, 70",
"parenthetical": "noting that when issues exist that fall under the arbitration agreement, \"it is better to compel arbitration on those issues and ... leave it up to the trial court to determine how much weight to give the arbitrators' findings\"",
"sentence": "See, eg., Lloyds of London, 549 N.E.2d at 70 (noting that when issues exist that fall under the arbitration agreement, \"it is better to compel arbitration on those issues and ... leave it up to the trial court to determine how much weight to give the arbitrators' findings\"); see also First Federal Sav. Bank of Indiana v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ind.1990) (noting that \"[the proper posture for the court is to find and enforce the contract as it is written and leave the parties where it finds them\")."
} | 8,948,200 | b |
Several courts, including this one, find that the burden shifts to the debtor to establish that the debt should be discharged under either subparagraph (A) or (B) of Section 523(a)(15). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "185 B.R. 569, 569",
"parenthetical": "burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15",
"sentence": "Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669, 672-73 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A) or (B)); Slover, 191 B.R. at 891-92 (obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B)); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 764-65 (burden of coming forward shifts to debtor); In re Florez, 191 B.R. 112, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (burden of going forward shifts to the debtor); Silvers, 187 B.R. at 649 (burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368-69 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor); see also Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15)); In re Woodworth, 187 B.R. 174 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (initially describes the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff; later states the debtor/defendant “met the requirements” of Section 523(a)(15)(A), suggesting the burden is placed on the debtor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 B.R. 669, 672-73",
"parenthetical": "debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A",
"sentence": "Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669, 672-73 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A) or (B)); Slover, 191 B.R. at 891-92 (obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B)); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 764-65 (burden of coming forward shifts to debtor); In re Florez, 191 B.R. 112, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (burden of going forward shifts to the debtor); Silvers, 187 B.R. at 649 (burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368-69 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor); see also Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15)); In re Woodworth, 187 B.R. 174 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (initially describes the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff; later states the debtor/defendant “met the requirements” of Section 523(a)(15)(A), suggesting the burden is placed on the debtor)."
} | 6,475,266 | b |
Several courts, including this one, find that the burden shifts to the debtor to establish that the debt should be discharged under either subparagraph (A) or (B) of Section 523(a)(15). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 B.R. 891, 891-92",
"parenthetical": "obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B",
"sentence": "Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669, 672-73 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A) or (B)); Slover, 191 B.R. at 891-92 (obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B)); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 764-65 (burden of coming forward shifts to debtor); In re Florez, 191 B.R. 112, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (burden of going forward shifts to the debtor); Silvers, 187 B.R. at 649 (burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368-69 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor); see also Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15)); In re Woodworth, 187 B.R. 174 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (initially describes the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff; later states the debtor/defendant “met the requirements” of Section 523(a)(15)(A), suggesting the burden is placed on the debtor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "185 B.R. 569, 569",
"parenthetical": "burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15",
"sentence": "Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669, 672-73 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A) or (B)); Slover, 191 B.R. at 891-92 (obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B)); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 764-65 (burden of coming forward shifts to debtor); In re Florez, 191 B.R. 112, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (burden of going forward shifts to the debtor); Silvers, 187 B.R. at 649 (burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368-69 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor); see also Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15)); In re Woodworth, 187 B.R. 174 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (initially describes the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff; later states the debtor/defendant “met the requirements” of Section 523(a)(15)(A), suggesting the burden is placed on the debtor)."
} | 6,475,266 | a |
Several courts, including this one, find that the burden shifts to the debtor to establish that the debt should be discharged under either subparagraph (A) or (B) of Section 523(a)(15). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "187 B.R. 649, 649",
"parenthetical": "burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor",
"sentence": "Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669, 672-73 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A) or (B)); Slover, 191 B.R. at 891-92 (obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B)); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 764-65 (burden of coming forward shifts to debtor); In re Florez, 191 B.R. 112, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (burden of going forward shifts to the debtor); Silvers, 187 B.R. at 649 (burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368-69 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor); see also Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15)); In re Woodworth, 187 B.R. 174 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (initially describes the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff; later states the debtor/defendant “met the requirements” of Section 523(a)(15)(A), suggesting the burden is placed on the debtor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "185 B.R. 569, 569",
"parenthetical": "burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15",
"sentence": "Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669, 672-73 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (debtor must be successful in assertion of affirmative defenses of (A) or (B)); Slover, 191 B.R. at 891-92 (obligation under Section 523(a)(15) nondischargeable unless debtor can prove one of two things as set forth in (A) or (B)); Taylor, 191 B.R. at 764-65 (burden of coming forward shifts to debtor); In re Florez, 191 B.R. 112, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995); Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Florio, 187 B.R. at 657 (burden of going forward shifts to the debtor); Silvers, 187 B.R. at 649 (burden of going forward, not burden of proof shifts to the debtor); In re Phillips, 187 B.R. 363, 368-69 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor); see also Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 (burden of proof shifts to the debtor after plaintiff brings the dischargeability action under Section 523(a)(15)); In re Woodworth, 187 B.R. 174 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (initially describes the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff; later states the debtor/defendant “met the requirements” of Section 523(a)(15)(A), suggesting the burden is placed on the debtor)."
} | 6,475,266 | a |
Maj. Op. at 431. To the extent this blanket statement is intended to condemn all affirmative action plans that adopt a racial parity goal, it is incorrect. Adopting race-conscious employment practices that seek to achieve racial balance is a time-honored, court-approved, appropriate remedial response to discrimination. Affirmative action plans approved by courts have striven to achieve this very result. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 3036, 3036",
"parenthetical": "describing instances when a court might order an employer \"to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the work force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 99 S.Ct. at 2724 (approving plan that reserves 50 percent of the positions for blacks “until the percentage of black[s] ... in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force”); see also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3036 (describing instances when a court might order an employer “to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the work force”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "443 U.S. 197, 197",
"parenthetical": "approving plan that reserves 50 percent of the positions for blacks \"until the percentage of black[s] ... in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 99 S.Ct. at 2724 (approving plan that reserves 50 percent of the positions for blacks “until the percentage of black[s] ... in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force”); see also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3036 (describing instances when a court might order an employer “to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the work force”)."
} | 1,689,810 | b |
Maj. Op. at 431. To the extent this blanket statement is intended to condemn all affirmative action plans that adopt a racial parity goal, it is incorrect. Adopting race-conscious employment practices that seek to achieve racial balance is a time-honored, court-approved, appropriate remedial response to discrimination. Affirmative action plans approved by courts have striven to achieve this very result. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 2724, 2724",
"parenthetical": "approving plan that reserves 50 percent of the positions for blacks \"until the percentage of black[s] ... in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 99 S.Ct. at 2724 (approving plan that reserves 50 percent of the positions for blacks “until the percentage of black[s] ... in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force”); see also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3036 (describing instances when a court might order an employer “to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the work force”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 3036, 3036",
"parenthetical": "describing instances when a court might order an employer \"to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the work force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 99 S.Ct. at 2724 (approving plan that reserves 50 percent of the positions for blacks “until the percentage of black[s] ... in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force”); see also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3036 (describing instances when a court might order an employer “to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the work force”)."
} | 1,689,810 | a |
Curiously, defendant commissioners do not explain why this court does not have federal question jurisdiction stemming from TDS's assertion of a violation of its federal due process rights coupled with its request for declaratory and injunctive relief. It is well established that a lack of adequate procedures by state officials may implicate federal due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief); see also MCI Telecommunications, 183 F.3d at 563 (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief); see also MCI Telecommunications, 183 F.3d at 563 (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine”)."
} | 11,433,696 | a |
Curiously, defendant commissioners do not explain why this court does not have federal question jurisdiction stemming from TDS's assertion of a violation of its federal due process rights coupled with its request for declaratory and injunctive relief. It is well established that a lack of adequate procedures by state officials may implicate federal due process rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief); see also MCI Telecommunications, 183 F.3d at 563 (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief); see also MCI Telecommunications, 183 F.3d at 563 (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine”)."
} | 11,433,696 | b |
Curiously, defendant commissioners do not explain why this court does not have federal question jurisdiction stemming from TDS's assertion of a violation of its federal due process rights coupled with its request for declaratory and injunctive relief. It is well established that a lack of adequate procedures by state officials may implicate federal due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief); see also MCI Telecommunications, 183 F.3d at 563 (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state officials for injunctive relief); see also MCI Telecommunications, 183 F.3d at 563 (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine”)."
} | 11,433,696 | a |
The Dolan Court also noted that the plaintiff in that case was required to "deed portions of [her] property to the city." Id Despite this language in Dolan, it is unclear whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to generally applicable legislative determinations that affect property rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.3d 1219, 1225",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that courts have come to different conclusions on whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to a \"legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property\"",
"sentence": "See Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the majority in Koontz accepts the Dolan distinction between legislative determinations and adjudicative decisions); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that courts have come to different conclusions on whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to a \"legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property”), abrogated by Koontz, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2586; see also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004) (noting that \"a workable distinction can[not] always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"a workable distinction can[not] always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative\"",
"sentence": "See Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the majority in Koontz accepts the Dolan distinction between legislative determinations and adjudicative decisions); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that courts have come to different conclusions on whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to a \"legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property”), abrogated by Koontz, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2586; see also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004) (noting that \"a workable distinction can[not] always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative”)."
} | 12,365,331 | a |
The Dolan Court also noted that the plaintiff in that case was required to "deed portions of [her] property to the city." Id Despite this language in Dolan, it is unclear whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to generally applicable legislative determinations that affect property rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that courts have come to different conclusions on whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to a \"legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property\"",
"sentence": "See Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the majority in Koontz accepts the Dolan distinction between legislative determinations and adjudicative decisions); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that courts have come to different conclusions on whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to a \"legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property”), abrogated by Koontz, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2586; see also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004) (noting that \"a workable distinction can[not] always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"a workable distinction can[not] always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative\"",
"sentence": "See Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the majority in Koontz accepts the Dolan distinction between legislative determinations and adjudicative decisions); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that courts have come to different conclusions on whether the Nollan and Dolan standard applies to a \"legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property”), abrogated by Koontz, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2586; see also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004) (noting that \"a workable distinction can[not] always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative”)."
} | 12,365,331 | a |
Likewise, the medical evidence is devoid of any evidence showing that Claimant's condition has deteriorated or required aggressive medical treatment although Claimant testified otherwise at the hearing. After undergoing a discectomy and internal fixation with spinal reconstruction C5-C6 in July, 2004, Claimant's functional use of her cervical spine had been restored. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "479 F.3d 979, 983",
"parenthetical": "noting that if impairment can be controlled by treatment, it cannot be considered disabling",
"sentence": "Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that if impairment can be controlled by treatment, it cannot be considered disabling); see also Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir.2004) (“If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "390 F.3d 535, 540",
"parenthetical": "\"If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.\"",
"sentence": "Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that if impairment can be controlled by treatment, it cannot be considered disabling); see also Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir.2004) (“If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.”)."
} | 3,671,145 | a |
Appel-lees were forced to defend numerous cases in separate jurisdictions simultaneously, and Appellants' absenteeism in the case below left Appellees alone to comply with the district court's pre-trial deadlines. In sum, the court's dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Sherriff's Dept. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 602, 607-08",
"parenthetical": "maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816",
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | 4,048,642 | b |
Appel-lees were forced to defend numerous cases in separate jurisdictions simultaneously, and Appellants' absenteeism in the case below left Appellees alone to comply with the district court's pre-trial deadlines. In sum, the court's dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Sherriff's Dept. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 602, 607-08",
"parenthetical": "maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | 4,048,642 | a |
Appel-lees were forced to defend numerous cases in separate jurisdictions simultaneously, and Appellants' absenteeism in the case below left Appellees alone to comply with the district court's pre-trial deadlines. In sum, the court's dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Sherriff's Dept. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 602, 607-08",
"parenthetical": "maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | 4,048,642 | b |
Appel-lees were forced to defend numerous cases in separate jurisdictions simultaneously, and Appellants' absenteeism in the case below left Appellees alone to comply with the district court's pre-trial deadlines. In sum, the court's dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Sherriff's Dept. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 602, 607-08",
"parenthetical": "maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | 4,048,642 | b |
Appel-lees were forced to defend numerous cases in separate jurisdictions simultaneously, and Appellants' absenteeism in the case below left Appellees alone to comply with the district court's pre-trial deadlines. In sum, the court's dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Sherriff's Dept. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 602, 607-08",
"parenthetical": "maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present",
"sentence": "Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184 L.Ed.2d 678 (2013), reli’g denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1627, 185 L.Ed.2d 610 (2013); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998) (maintaining that dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion where delay, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party is present)."
} | 4,048,642 | a |
These courts require the potential extraditee to establish the following two factors before the Court can grant bail in a foreign extradition case: (1) "special circumstances" exist in their particular case; and (2) they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. However, at least two courts have had difficulty in applying flight risk as a separate, independent factor from the special circumstances inquiry. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-27",
"parenthetical": "'While this Court recognizes lack of flight risk as the initial threshold Respondents must cross, it is such a prominent aspect of this case that it rises to the level of a special circumstance in and of itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1997) (indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause), withdrawn and appeal dismissed on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); see also In re Extradition of Chapman, 459 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-27 (D.Haw.2006) (‘While this Court recognizes lack of flight risk as the initial threshold Respondents must cross, it is such a prominent aspect of this case that it rises to the level of a special circumstance in and of itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1997) (indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause), withdrawn and appeal dismissed on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); see also In re Extradition of Chapman, 459 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-27 (D.Haw.2006) (‘While this Court recognizes lack of flight risk as the initial threshold Respondents must cross, it is such a prominent aspect of this case that it rises to the level of a special circumstance in and of itself.”)."
} | 4,182,088 | b |
These courts require the potential extraditee to establish the following two factors before the Court can grant bail in a foreign extradition case: (1) "special circumstances" exist in their particular case; and (2) they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. However, at least two courts have had difficulty in applying flight risk as a separate, independent factor from the special circumstances inquiry. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-27",
"parenthetical": "'While this Court recognizes lack of flight risk as the initial threshold Respondents must cross, it is such a prominent aspect of this case that it rises to the level of a special circumstance in and of itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1997) (indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause), withdrawn and appeal dismissed on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); see also In re Extradition of Chapman, 459 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-27 (D.Haw.2006) (‘While this Court recognizes lack of flight risk as the initial threshold Respondents must cross, it is such a prominent aspect of this case that it rises to the level of a special circumstance in and of itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.1997) (indicating that detention pending an extradition hearing without some indicia of flight risk violates the Due Process Clause), withdrawn and appeal dismissed on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); see also In re Extradition of Chapman, 459 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1026-27 (D.Haw.2006) (‘While this Court recognizes lack of flight risk as the initial threshold Respondents must cross, it is such a prominent aspect of this case that it rises to the level of a special circumstance in and of itself.”)."
} | 4,182,088 | b |
Further, the gun had been fired from a position against the victim's clothing. The jury could reasonably have concluded that this evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder with deliberate premeditation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "351 Mass. 68, 75",
"parenthetical": "lack of sign of struggle may be considered in regard to deliberately premeditated malice aforethought",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Stirling, 351 Mass. 68, 75 (1966) (lack of sign of struggle may be considered in regard to deliberately premeditated malice aforethought)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 Mass. 111, 123",
"parenthetical": "use of firearm in killing enough to support deliberately premeditated murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 123 (1996) (use of firearm in killing enough to support deliberately premeditated murder); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 408 Mass. 747, 756-757 (1990) (use of firearm supports finding of malice; evidence sufficient to support deliberate premeditation even if killing followed reflection by only few seconds)."
} | 286,750 | b |
Many jurors would no doubt feel threatened or intimidated by such contacts, and excluding evidence that is improperly obtained from jurors effectively deters such contacts and preserves the integrity of our judicial process. For these reasons, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that was obtained in violation of Local Rule 5.01(d). | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "169 F.2d 739, 745-46",
"parenthetical": "stating in slightly different context that \"[h]e who makes studied inquiries of jurors ... acts at his peril, ... [and] [i]t is incumbent upon the courts to protect jurors from [such inquiries].\"",
"sentence": "See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126, 107 S.Ct. at 2750 (recognizing in dicta that “[t]he juror affidavit submitted in support of the second new trial motion was obtained in clear violation of the District Court’s order and the court’s local rule against juror interviews ...; on this basis alone the District Court would have been acting within its discretion in disregarding the affidavit.”) (emphasis added); Arney v. Helbig, 383 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (affirming court’s denial- of hearing to plaintiff where his attorney conducted improper juror interview and recognizing state’s policy to decline hearings based on information improperly obtained from jurors); cf. Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir.1948) (stating in slightly different context that “[h]e who makes studied inquiries of jurors ... acts at his peril, ... [and] [i]t is incumbent upon the courts to protect jurors from [such inquiries].”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "383 N.W.2d 4, 6",
"parenthetical": "affirming court's denial- of hearing to plaintiff where his attorney conducted improper juror interview and recognizing state's policy to decline hearings based on information improperly obtained from jurors",
"sentence": "See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126, 107 S.Ct. at 2750 (recognizing in dicta that “[t]he juror affidavit submitted in support of the second new trial motion was obtained in clear violation of the District Court’s order and the court’s local rule against juror interviews ...; on this basis alone the District Court would have been acting within its discretion in disregarding the affidavit.”) (emphasis added); Arney v. Helbig, 383 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (affirming court’s denial- of hearing to plaintiff where his attorney conducted improper juror interview and recognizing state’s policy to decline hearings based on information improperly obtained from jurors); cf. Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir.1948) (stating in slightly different context that “[h]e who makes studied inquiries of jurors ... acts at his peril, ... [and] [i]t is incumbent upon the courts to protect jurors from [such inquiries].”)."
} | 9,407,225 | b |
However, our holding that Brigham abrogated Dortch's "particularized suspicion" requirement does not allow police officers to detain an individual indefinitely, fishing for evidence of every conceivable crime that might explain the suspicious facts they articulate as having created their reasonable suspicion. This limitation follows from the fact that both the length of the detention and the scope of the investigation to be conducted which may justify the detention remain subject to a "reasonableness" requirement under Brigham and Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 1575, 1575",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\"",
"sentence": "See also Sharpe, 105 S.Ct. at 1575 (“[W]e consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.”); Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506 (“Courts ... inquire whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "382 F.3d 507, 507",
"parenthetical": "\"The correct analysis requires district courts to consider the facts and circumstances of each case ... to determine whether the actions taken by the officers, including the length of the detention, were reasonable under the circumstances.\"",
"sentence": "See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (“We have long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ ” (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991))); Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507 (“The correct analysis requires district courts to consider the facts and circumstances of each case ... to determine whether the actions taken by the officers, including the length of the detention, were reasonable under the circumstances.”)."
} | 3,701,179 | b |
However, our holding that Brigham abrogated Dortch's "particularized suspicion" requirement does not allow police officers to detain an individual indefinitely, fishing for evidence of every conceivable crime that might explain the suspicious facts they articulate as having created their reasonable suspicion. This limitation follows from the fact that both the length of the detention and the scope of the investigation to be conducted which may justify the detention remain subject to a "reasonableness" requirement under Brigham and Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "382 F.3d 506, 506",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts ... inquire whether the officer's subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.\"",
"sentence": "See also Sharpe, 105 S.Ct. at 1575 (“[W]e consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.”); Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506 (“Courts ... inquire whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "382 F.3d 507, 507",
"parenthetical": "\"The correct analysis requires district courts to consider the facts and circumstances of each case ... to determine whether the actions taken by the officers, including the length of the detention, were reasonable under the circumstances.\"",
"sentence": "See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (“We have long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ ” (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991))); Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507 (“The correct analysis requires district courts to consider the facts and circumstances of each case ... to determine whether the actions taken by the officers, including the length of the detention, were reasonable under the circumstances.”)."
} | 3,701,179 | b |
Second, he had extensive contact with counsel prior to his decision to proceed pro se, including three court-appointed lawyers in this very case. In fact, one had represented him through a jury trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "800 F.2d 1066, 1066",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the defendant's \"significant contact\" with an attorney before trial, even though he never actually retained counsel, was enough to satisfy this factor",
"sentence": "See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 647-48 (holding that representation by counsel until the first day of trial “likely exposed [the defndant] to the complexity of his case and the legal process”); cf. Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (explaining that the defendant’s “significant contact” with an attorney before trial, even though he never actually retained counsel, was enough to satisfy this factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.3d 647, 647-48",
"parenthetical": "holding that representation by counsel until the first day of trial \"likely exposed [the defndant] to the complexity of his case and the legal process\"",
"sentence": "See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 647-48 (holding that representation by counsel until the first day of trial “likely exposed [the defndant] to the complexity of his case and the legal process”); cf. Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (explaining that the defendant’s “significant contact” with an attorney before trial, even though he never actually retained counsel, was enough to satisfy this factor)."
} | 4,339,449 | b |
Those allegations focused on the integrity of Petrowski that included improper claims for overtime, improper use of state funds to purchase alcohol, and the inclusion of false information in certain search warrants, as well as improper procedures used in undercover purchases of illicit drugs. The plaintiffs' speech was clearly a matter of public concern. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that law clerk's accusation that judge was \"corrupt\" and a \"son of a bitch\" in context that judge acted improperly in several cases constituted speech on matter of public concern",
"sentence": "See Schnabel v. Tyler, supra, 230 Conn. 754-55 (concluding that police officer’s allegations of chief of police’s abuse of authority and misconduct constituted matters of public concern); see also Sheppard v. Beerman, 911 F. Sup. 606, 609, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that law clerk’s accusation that judge was “corrupt” and a “son of a bitch” in context that judge acted improperly in several cases constituted speech on matter of public concern), vacated on other grounds, 94 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that police officer's allegations of chief of police's abuse of authority and misconduct constituted matters of public concern",
"sentence": "See Schnabel v. Tyler, supra, 230 Conn. 754-55 (concluding that police officer’s allegations of chief of police’s abuse of authority and misconduct constituted matters of public concern); see also Sheppard v. Beerman, 911 F. Sup. 606, 609, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that law clerk’s accusation that judge was “corrupt” and a “son of a bitch” in context that judge acted improperly in several cases constituted speech on matter of public concern), vacated on other grounds, 94 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1996)."
} | 300,286 | b |
Moreover, a finding in this court in favor of plaintiffs would have the effect of rendering the settlement agreement in the underlying probate case meaningless and re-litigating the issues that were originally brought by plaintiffs before the probate court with respect to Darwit's accounting and reimbursement of estate funds. Plaintiffs cannot simply re-title their claims from probate court against Darwit as RICO claims in order to seek relief in a different forum. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 1009, 1011-12",
"parenthetical": "RICO claims were barred when they required the court \"to construe the trust and define the duties, obligations and responsibilities of [tjrustees\"",
"sentence": "See Cas-sity v. Pitts, 995 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (10th Cir.1993) (RICO claims were barred when they required the court “to construe the trust and define the duties, obligations and responsibilities of [tjrustees”); Wozniak v. Corrigan, No. 1:05 CV 2259, 2006 WL 4512815, at *4 (N.D.Ohio May 12, 2006) (“Recasting the language of the [probate] suit as a RICO claim does not alter the landscape of the case which implores the Court to interfere with a state probate proceeding.”); cf. Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir.2006) (“It is too facile a litigation.move to recast a claim of maladministration [of an estate] as a denial of due process.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 304, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"It is too facile a litigation.move to recast a claim of maladministration [of an estate] as a denial of due process.\"",
"sentence": "See Cas-sity v. Pitts, 995 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (10th Cir.1993) (RICO claims were barred when they required the court “to construe the trust and define the duties, obligations and responsibilities of [tjrustees”); Wozniak v. Corrigan, No. 1:05 CV 2259, 2006 WL 4512815, at *4 (N.D.Ohio May 12, 2006) (“Recasting the language of the [probate] suit as a RICO claim does not alter the landscape of the case which implores the Court to interfere with a state probate proceeding.”); cf. Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir.2006) (“It is too facile a litigation.move to recast a claim of maladministration [of an estate] as a denial of due process.”)."
} | 3,670,461 | a |
Moreover, a finding in this court in favor of plaintiffs would have the effect of rendering the settlement agreement in the underlying probate case meaningless and re-litigating the issues that were originally brought by plaintiffs before the probate court with respect to Darwit's accounting and reimbursement of estate funds. Plaintiffs cannot simply re-title their claims from probate court against Darwit as RICO claims in order to seek relief in a different forum. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 304, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"It is too facile a litigation.move to recast a claim of maladministration [of an estate] as a denial of due process.\"",
"sentence": "See Cas-sity v. Pitts, 995 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (10th Cir.1993) (RICO claims were barred when they required the court “to construe the trust and define the duties, obligations and responsibilities of [tjrustees”); Wozniak v. Corrigan, No. 1:05 CV 2259, 2006 WL 4512815, at *4 (N.D.Ohio May 12, 2006) (“Recasting the language of the [probate] suit as a RICO claim does not alter the landscape of the case which implores the Court to interfere with a state probate proceeding.”); cf. Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir.2006) (“It is too facile a litigation.move to recast a claim of maladministration [of an estate] as a denial of due process.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 4512815, at *4",
"parenthetical": "\"Recasting the language of the [probate] suit as a RICO claim does not alter the landscape of the case which implores the Court to interfere with a state probate proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "See Cas-sity v. Pitts, 995 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (10th Cir.1993) (RICO claims were barred when they required the court “to construe the trust and define the duties, obligations and responsibilities of [tjrustees”); Wozniak v. Corrigan, No. 1:05 CV 2259, 2006 WL 4512815, at *4 (N.D.Ohio May 12, 2006) (“Recasting the language of the [probate] suit as a RICO claim does not alter the landscape of the case which implores the Court to interfere with a state probate proceeding.”); cf. Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir.2006) (“It is too facile a litigation.move to recast a claim of maladministration [of an estate] as a denial of due process.”)."
} | 3,670,461 | b |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | b |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | a |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | b |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | b |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | a |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | a |
Subsets and Splits