context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "445 F.2d 1150, 1157",
"parenthetical": "holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution \"in no manner under State or City supervision or control\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 445, 453",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | 650,755 | a |
Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "445 F.2d 1150, 1157",
"parenthetical": "holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution \"in no manner under State or City supervision or control\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | 650,755 | a |
Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 U.S. 312, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 923, 924-25",
"parenthetical": "public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not \"act under color of law\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | 650,755 | b |
Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 445, 453",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 923, 924-25",
"parenthetical": "public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not \"act under color of law\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | 650,755 | b |
Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 923, 924-25",
"parenthetical": "public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not \"act under color of law\"",
"sentence": "Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although Legal Aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume, it is a private institution “in no manner under State or City supervision or control”); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir.1979) (public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys do not “act under color of law”); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”)."
} | 650,755 | b |
On January 28, 2013, Shabazz filed a motion for release pending appeal and on February 20, 2013, he filed objections to the presentence report. Because only two months have passed since Shabazz filed his objections to the presentence report and three months since the filing of his motion for release pending appeal, the delay "does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "denying a mandamus petition where the district court had not ruled on petitioner's motion in four months",
"sentence": "Madden, 102 F.3d at 79 (denying a mandamus petition where the district court had not ruled on petitioner’s motion in four months)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "five month delay between guilty plea and sentence was not \"unreasonable\" within the meaning of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692 (3d Cir.1978) (five month delay between guilty plea and sentence was not \"unreasonable” within the meaning of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a))."
} | 3,611,094 | a |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 U.S. 145, 166-67",
"parenthetical": "affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | b |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 U.S. 145, 166-67",
"parenthetical": "affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | b |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 U.S. 145, 166-67",
"parenthetical": "affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | b |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | a |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | b |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | a |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69",
"parenthetical": "concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | a |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69",
"parenthetical": "concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | b |
We turn to White's claim challenging the constitutionality of Utah's prohibition against polygamy. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that White has standing to bring the claim, we conclude it is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69",
"parenthetical": "concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and rejecting the argument that prohibition of polygamy violated the right to free exercise of religion); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (10th Cir.1985) (concluding Utah was justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision.”)."
} | 929,547 | b |
First, the government bears the initial burden of showing "an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement" such that the firm resettlement bar applies and the burden shifts to the alien to rebut it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 233, 233-34",
"parenthetical": "noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 1399, 1399",
"parenthetical": "holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | 3,089,342 | a |
First, the government bears the initial burden of showing "an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement" such that the firm resettlement bar applies and the burden shifts to the alien to rebut it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 1399, 1399",
"parenthetical": "holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 693, 693",
"parenthetical": "holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in SS 208.15(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | 3,089,342 | b |
First, the government bears the initial burden of showing "an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement" such that the firm resettlement bar applies and the burden shifts to the alien to rebut it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "359 F.3d 50, 50-51",
"parenthetical": "noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 1399, 1399",
"parenthetical": "holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | 3,089,342 | a |
First, the government bears the initial burden of showing "an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement" such that the firm resettlement bar applies and the burden shifts to the alien to rebut it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "242 F.3d 491, 491",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 1399, 1399",
"parenthetical": "holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | 3,089,342 | a |
First, the government bears the initial burden of showing "an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement" such that the firm resettlement bar applies and the burden shifts to the alien to rebut it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 1399, 1399",
"parenthetical": "holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "172 F.3d 332, 332",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been 'firmly resettled' in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sall, 437 F.3d at 233-34 (noting that the IJ misstated the burden of proof by putting it on the applicant before the government established a prima facie case of firm resettlement); Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693 (holding that after the government meets its initial burden of demonstrating firm resettlement, the asylum-seeker may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary or show that he falls within one of the two exceptions in § 208.15(a) and (b)); Salazar, 359 F.3d at 50-51 (noting that the government bears the initial burden of showing firm resettlement); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 491 (holding that “[u]n-der the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold burden of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country”); Mussie, 172 F.3d at 332 (holding that “[o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been ‘firmly resettled’ in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled”); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply)."
} | 3,089,342 | b |
Here, after the traffic stop, DiGrazia detected the odor of alcohol coming from Blanks's person, and one of the field sobriety tests (the horizontal gaze nystagmus test) and the portable breath test both indicated that Blanks was under the influence of alcohol. Also, as already explained, probable cause may rest on the collective knowledge of the investigating officers as long as there is some degree of communication between them. Thus, the facts that Blanks was swerving, unable to maintain his lane, and speeding may also be considered. We therefore conclude that the totality of the above circumstances provided DiGrazia with sufficient probable cause to arrest Blanks for driving under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he was less safe. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 Ga. App. 509, 512",
"parenthetical": "defendant's speeding, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol and failing the HGN test gave officer probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI",
"sentence": "See Harkleroad v. State, 317 Ga. App. 509, 512 (1) (c) (732 SE2d 278) (2012) (defendant’s speeding, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol and failing the HGN test gave officer probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI); see also Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) (478 SE2d 460) (1996) (“the results of the field sobriety tests constitute [ ] admissible evidence of probable cause to support [an] arrest”); compare Bostic v. State, 332 Ga. App. 604, 605 (774 SE2d 175) (2015) (driver’s admission that he had consumed one beer, his watery eyes, and a positive alco-sensor test, together with the fact that no erratic driving was observed, without more, did not constitute probable cause to arrest for DUI)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "223 Ga. App. 690, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"the results of the field sobriety tests constitute [ ] admissible evidence of probable cause to support [an] arrest\"",
"sentence": "See Harkleroad v. State, 317 Ga. App. 509, 512 (1) (c) (732 SE2d 278) (2012) (defendant’s speeding, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol and failing the HGN test gave officer probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI); see also Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) (478 SE2d 460) (1996) (“the results of the field sobriety tests constitute [ ] admissible evidence of probable cause to support [an] arrest”); compare Bostic v. State, 332 Ga. App. 604, 605 (774 SE2d 175) (2015) (driver’s admission that he had consumed one beer, his watery eyes, and a positive alco-sensor test, together with the fact that no erratic driving was observed, without more, did not constitute probable cause to arrest for DUI)."
} | 4,169,771 | a |
Here, after the traffic stop, DiGrazia detected the odor of alcohol coming from Blanks's person, and one of the field sobriety tests (the horizontal gaze nystagmus test) and the portable breath test both indicated that Blanks was under the influence of alcohol. Also, as already explained, probable cause may rest on the collective knowledge of the investigating officers as long as there is some degree of communication between them. Thus, the facts that Blanks was swerving, unable to maintain his lane, and speeding may also be considered. We therefore conclude that the totality of the above circumstances provided DiGrazia with sufficient probable cause to arrest Blanks for driving under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he was less safe. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "332 Ga. App. 604, 605",
"parenthetical": "driver's admission that he had consumed one beer, his watery eyes, and a positive alco-sensor test, together with the fact that no erratic driving was observed, without more, did not constitute probable cause to arrest for DUI",
"sentence": "See Harkleroad v. State, 317 Ga. App. 509, 512 (1) (c) (732 SE2d 278) (2012) (defendant’s speeding, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol and failing the HGN test gave officer probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI); see also Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) (478 SE2d 460) (1996) (“the results of the field sobriety tests constitute [ ] admissible evidence of probable cause to support [an] arrest”); compare Bostic v. State, 332 Ga. App. 604, 605 (774 SE2d 175) (2015) (driver’s admission that he had consumed one beer, his watery eyes, and a positive alco-sensor test, together with the fact that no erratic driving was observed, without more, did not constitute probable cause to arrest for DUI)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 Ga. App. 509, 512",
"parenthetical": "defendant's speeding, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol and failing the HGN test gave officer probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI",
"sentence": "See Harkleroad v. State, 317 Ga. App. 509, 512 (1) (c) (732 SE2d 278) (2012) (defendant’s speeding, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol and failing the HGN test gave officer probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI); see also Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) (478 SE2d 460) (1996) (“the results of the field sobriety tests constitute [ ] admissible evidence of probable cause to support [an] arrest”); compare Bostic v. State, 332 Ga. App. 604, 605 (774 SE2d 175) (2015) (driver’s admission that he had consumed one beer, his watery eyes, and a positive alco-sensor test, together with the fact that no erratic driving was observed, without more, did not constitute probable cause to arrest for DUI)."
} | 4,169,771 | b |
Under the clearly-erroneous standard, "[i]f the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it." We may affirm the district court's denial of a resentencing motion on any basis supported by the record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 674, 676",
"parenthetical": "appellate court may affirm district court's ruling on section 3582(c",
"sentence": "See United States v. Taylor, 627 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir.2010) (appellate court may affirm district court’s ruling on section 3582(c)(2) motion “on any ground supported in the record”); United States v. Green, 595 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir.2010) (same); see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 676 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“[W]e may affirm a judgment on any ground the record supports.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 670, 676",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e may affirm a judgment on any ground the record supports.... \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Taylor, 627 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir.2010) (appellate court may affirm district court’s ruling on section 3582(c)(2) motion “on any ground supported in the record”); United States v. Green, 595 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir.2010) (same); see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 676 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“[W]e may affirm a judgment on any ground the record supports.... ”)."
} | 4,324,084 | a |
Rein, Croces, and Driscoll's prior bankruptcy actions were litigated to a final judgment on the merits. Their settlement agreements, reaffirming the pre-petition debts, were approved by the respective bankruptcy courts and included as part of the final judgments issued in Rein, Croces, and Driscoll's Chapter 7 proceedings. A judicially approved settlement agreement is considered a final judgment on the merits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "215 B.R. 181, 183",
"parenthetical": "judgment order approving settlement that included a stipulation of nondischargeability given preclusive effect even though the order did not contain a specific finding of nondisehargeability",
"sentence": "In re Dominelli, 820 F.2d 313, 316-17 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that the settlement and dismissal of the trustee’s usury claim against lienholder operates as res judicata to bar appellant from raising an usury claim on behalf of the estate against the same lienholder); see Hoxworth v. Blinder, 74 F.3d 205, 208 (10th Cir.1996); see also In re Medomak Canning, 922 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir.1990); In re Klasinski, 215 B.R. 181, 183 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1997) (judgment order approving settlement that included a stipulation of nondischargeability given preclusive effect even though the order did not contain a specific finding of nondisehargeability). We therefore proceed to examine whether the final prong of the claim preclusion analysis is satisfied with regard to Rein, Croces, and Driscoll."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 313, 316-17",
"parenthetical": "holding that the settlement and dismissal of the trustee's usury claim against lienholder operates as res judicata to bar appellant from raising an usury claim on behalf of the estate against the same lienholder",
"sentence": "In re Dominelli, 820 F.2d 313, 316-17 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that the settlement and dismissal of the trustee’s usury claim against lienholder operates as res judicata to bar appellant from raising an usury claim on behalf of the estate against the same lienholder); see Hoxworth v. Blinder, 74 F.3d 205, 208 (10th Cir.1996); see also In re Medomak Canning, 922 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir.1990); In re Klasinski, 215 B.R. 181, 183 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1997) (judgment order approving settlement that included a stipulation of nondischargeability given preclusive effect even though the order did not contain a specific finding of nondisehargeability). We therefore proceed to examine whether the final prong of the claim preclusion analysis is satisfied with regard to Rein, Croces, and Driscoll."
} | 9,467,823 | b |
Based on the sealed letter that the Government has submitted, this premise appears to be inaccurate. (See Sealed Ltr.) Moreover, even if there were press reports suggesting the identity of the cooperating witness, and even if those reports prove to be accurate, see Senior Aide Implicating Bin Laden in Terrorism, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 1998), http://nytimes.com/1998/12/03/world/senioraide-implicating-bin-laden-interrorism.html (citing unnamed sources to identify prosecution's cooperating witness in ongoing terrorism investigation, but the sources' information proved inaccurate), that is not the functional equivalent of officially acknowledging the cooperating witness, let alone the information that the witness has provided. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 279, 294",
"parenthetical": "under FOIA, the government may be deemed to have waived its right to keep certain information confidential \"only where the government has officially disclosed the information the requester seeks\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“[E]ven if a fact — such as the existence of ... [a secret] liaison — is the subject of widespread media and public speculation, its official acknowledgment by an authoritative source might well be new information that could cause damage to the national security.”); cf. Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), “the law will not infer official disclosure of information classified by the CIA from ... widespread discussion of a classified matter”); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir.1999) (under FOIA, the government may be deemed to have waived its right to keep certain information confidential “only where the government has officially disclosed the information the requester seeks” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 1125, 1130",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]ven if a fact -- such as the existence of ... [a secret] liaison -- is the subject of widespread media and public speculation, its official acknowledgment by an authoritative source might well be new information that could cause damage to the national security.\"",
"sentence": "See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“[E]ven if a fact — such as the existence of ... [a secret] liaison — is the subject of widespread media and public speculation, its official acknowledgment by an authoritative source might well be new information that could cause damage to the national security.”); cf. Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), “the law will not infer official disclosure of information classified by the CIA from ... widespread discussion of a classified matter”); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir.1999) (under FOIA, the government may be deemed to have waived its right to keep certain information confidential “only where the government has officially disclosed the information the requester seeks” (emphasis added))."
} | 4,060,593 | b |
Here, the government did not engage in affirmative misconduct. While its failure to notify Wright that his case had been transferred to the DOJ -- or provide him with documentation evidencing that transfer -- represents a material omission, it does not rise to the level of affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 Fed.Cl. 565, 569",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"the risk of assessing the scope of a government agent's authority is squarely on the private party\"",
"sentence": "See In re: Dutch Masters Meats, Inc., 182 B.R. 405, 411 (Bankr. M.D.Pa.1995) (finding that an IRS agent’s failure to warn a company that he did not have authority to bind the Service did not represent affirmative misconduct); see also Jordan v. U.S., 77 Fed.Cl. 565, 569 (Fed.Cl.2007) (finding that “the risk of assessing the scope of a government agent’s authority is squarely on the private party”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "182 B.R. 405, 411",
"parenthetical": "finding that an IRS agent's failure to warn a company that he did not have authority to bind the Service did not represent affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See In re: Dutch Masters Meats, Inc., 182 B.R. 405, 411 (Bankr. M.D.Pa.1995) (finding that an IRS agent’s failure to warn a company that he did not have authority to bind the Service did not represent affirmative misconduct); see also Jordan v. U.S., 77 Fed.Cl. 565, 569 (Fed.Cl.2007) (finding that “the risk of assessing the scope of a government agent’s authority is squarely on the private party”)."
} | 4,212,282 | b |
This court has reduced convictions of murder in the first degree predicated on felony-murder only where the evidence suggested that the felony intended by the defendant would not suffice for felony-murder in the first degree. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "364 Mass. 145, 146, 151-152",
"parenthetical": "evidence that defendant distracted victim while codefendant sought to remove money from victim's pocket, with killing occurring suddenly when victim realized what defendants were doing, suggested that defendant intended \"to steal surreptitiously, not by violence as in a robbery,\" thus making conviction of felony-murder in first degree contrary to weight of evidence",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 146, 151-152 (1973) (evidence that defendant distracted victim while codefendant sought to remove money from victim’s pocket, with killing occurring suddenly when victim realized what defendants were doing, suggested that defendant intended “to steal surreptitiously, not by violence as in a robbery,” thus making conviction of felony-murder in first degree contrary to weight of evidence); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 394-396 (1971) (evidence suggested breaking and entering to steal money from vending machines after hours when factory building would likely be vacant; murder of security guard occurring during that breaking and entering would be only murder in second degree; reduction of verdict of murder in first degree appropriate, especially where judge failed to give jury option of felony-murder in second degree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 Mass. 409, 424-425",
"parenthetical": "reducing verdict where theories of felony-murder in both first and second degrees submitted to jury without defining elements of predicate felonies for either degree of murder",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 424-425 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968) (reducing verdict where theories of felony-murder in both first and second degrees submitted to jury without defining elements of predicate felonies for either degree of murder). This court’s power under G."
} | 201,297 | a |
This court has reduced convictions of murder in the first degree predicated on felony-murder only where the evidence suggested that the felony intended by the defendant would not suffice for felony-murder in the first degree. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "364 Mass. 145, 146, 151-152",
"parenthetical": "evidence that defendant distracted victim while codefendant sought to remove money from victim's pocket, with killing occurring suddenly when victim realized what defendants were doing, suggested that defendant intended \"to steal surreptitiously, not by violence as in a robbery,\" thus making conviction of felony-murder in first degree contrary to weight of evidence",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 146, 151-152 (1973) (evidence that defendant distracted victim while codefendant sought to remove money from victim’s pocket, with killing occurring suddenly when victim realized what defendants were doing, suggested that defendant intended “to steal surreptitiously, not by violence as in a robbery,” thus making conviction of felony-murder in first degree contrary to weight of evidence); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 394-396 (1971) (evidence suggested breaking and entering to steal money from vending machines after hours when factory building would likely be vacant; murder of security guard occurring during that breaking and entering would be only murder in second degree; reduction of verdict of murder in first degree appropriate, especially where judge failed to give jury option of felony-murder in second degree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reducing verdict where theories of felony-murder in both first and second degrees submitted to jury without defining elements of predicate felonies for either degree of murder",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 424-425 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968) (reducing verdict where theories of felony-murder in both first and second degrees submitted to jury without defining elements of predicate felonies for either degree of murder). This court’s power under G."
} | 201,297 | a |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | b |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | b |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | a |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | a |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | b |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | b |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | a |
Here, we find the grant of summary judgment to Johns Beach on the basis of a lack of proximate cause was inappropriate. The facts of the case warrant further development to determine what duty, if any, Johns Beach owed to Mr. Corbett. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Dorman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 332 S.C. 176, 504 S.E.2d 127 (Ct.App.1998) (further development of facts necessary to clarify application of statute); Hurst v. Sandy, 329 S.C. 471, 494 S.E.2d 847 (Ct.App.1997) (issue of fact as to duty of defendant to plaintiff); cf. Rice v. School Dist. of Fairfield, 317 S.C. 87, 452 S.E.2d 352 (Ct.App.1994) (summary judgment appropriate because further development of facts could not create a duty on part of defendant)."
} | 193,123 | b |
We have concluded # that sovereign immunity bars Machete's- UDJA claims seeking to invalidate the Commission's denial of the Program grant, and there is no other right to judicial review of the Commission's decision. Machete's section 2001.038 claim for declaratory judgment is therefore moot. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "241 S.W.3d 123, 123-24",
"parenthetical": "because relief provided under section 2001.038 does not extend to invalidating agency decision, but only rules by which proceedings were conducted, challenge to validity of those rules would amount to mere abstract, advisory opinion",
"sentence": "See Bacon, 411 S.W.3d at 181 (“Further, absent a right of judicial review from the THC proceedings or other claim to challenge them that is within the district court’s jurisdiction, Bacon’s section 2001.038 claim for .declaratory relief is moot.”); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply, 307 S.W.3d at 526 n. 16 (agency’s final, unappealable order rendered section 2001.038 rule challenge moot); see also Texas Logos, 241 S.W.3d at 123-24 (because relief provided under section 2001.038 does not extend to invalidating agency decision, but only rules by which proceedings were conducted, challenge to validity of those rules would amount to mere abstract, advisory opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 S.W.3d 181, 181",
"parenthetical": "\"Further, absent a right of judicial review from the THC proceedings or other claim to challenge them that is within the district court's jurisdiction, Bacon's section 2001.038 claim for .declaratory relief is moot.\"",
"sentence": "See Bacon, 411 S.W.3d at 181 (“Further, absent a right of judicial review from the THC proceedings or other claim to challenge them that is within the district court’s jurisdiction, Bacon’s section 2001.038 claim for .declaratory relief is moot.”); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply, 307 S.W.3d at 526 n. 16 (agency’s final, unappealable order rendered section 2001.038 rule challenge moot); see also Texas Logos, 241 S.W.3d at 123-24 (because relief provided under section 2001.038 does not extend to invalidating agency decision, but only rules by which proceedings were conducted, challenge to validity of those rules would amount to mere abstract, advisory opinion)."
} | 6,810,336 | b |
We have concluded # that sovereign immunity bars Machete's- UDJA claims seeking to invalidate the Commission's denial of the Program grant, and there is no other right to judicial review of the Commission's decision. Machete's section 2001.038 claim for declaratory judgment is therefore moot. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "241 S.W.3d 123, 123-24",
"parenthetical": "because relief provided under section 2001.038 does not extend to invalidating agency decision, but only rules by which proceedings were conducted, challenge to validity of those rules would amount to mere abstract, advisory opinion",
"sentence": "See Bacon, 411 S.W.3d at 181 (“Further, absent a right of judicial review from the THC proceedings or other claim to challenge them that is within the district court’s jurisdiction, Bacon’s section 2001.038 claim for .declaratory relief is moot.”); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply, 307 S.W.3d at 526 n. 16 (agency’s final, unappealable order rendered section 2001.038 rule challenge moot); see also Texas Logos, 241 S.W.3d at 123-24 (because relief provided under section 2001.038 does not extend to invalidating agency decision, but only rules by which proceedings were conducted, challenge to validity of those rules would amount to mere abstract, advisory opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agency's final, unappealable order rendered section 2001.038 rule challenge moot",
"sentence": "See Bacon, 411 S.W.3d at 181 (“Further, absent a right of judicial review from the THC proceedings or other claim to challenge them that is within the district court’s jurisdiction, Bacon’s section 2001.038 claim for .declaratory relief is moot.”); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply, 307 S.W.3d at 526 n. 16 (agency’s final, unappealable order rendered section 2001.038 rule challenge moot); see also Texas Logos, 241 S.W.3d at 123-24 (because relief provided under section 2001.038 does not extend to invalidating agency decision, but only rules by which proceedings were conducted, challenge to validity of those rules would amount to mere abstract, advisory opinion)."
} | 6,810,336 | b |
The useful product cases have no applicability where, as here, the sale of a useful product necessarily and immediately results in the leakage of hazardous substances. In that circumstance, the leaked portions of the hazardous substances are never used for their intended purpose. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 1381, 1381",
"parenthetical": "rejecting application of the useful product doctrine where \"waste is generated and disposed of contemporaneously with the process\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Zands v. Nelson, 779 F.Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D.Cal.1991) (stating that “gasoline is no longer a useful product after it leaks into, and contaminates, the soil”); see also Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (rejecting application of the useful product doctrine where “waste is generated and disposed of contemporaneously with the process” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "779 F.Supp. 1254, 1262",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"gasoline is no longer a useful product after it leaks into, and contaminates, the soil\"",
"sentence": "See Zands v. Nelson, 779 F.Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D.Cal.1991) (stating that “gasoline is no longer a useful product after it leaks into, and contaminates, the soil”); see also Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (rejecting application of the useful product doctrine where “waste is generated and disposed of contemporaneously with the process” (emphasis added))."
} | 3,703,166 | b |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | 10,713,207 | b |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "263 A.2d 692, 697",
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | 10,713,207 | a |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "302 S.E.2d 674, 675",
"parenthetical": "invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | 10,713,207 | b |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "302 S.E.2d 674, 675",
"parenthetical": "invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "263 A.2d 692, 697",
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | 10,713,207 | a |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | 10,713,207 | b |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "263 A.2d 692, 697",
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | 10,713,207 | a |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "516 P.2d 1267, 1268",
"parenthetical": "overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | 10,713,207 | b |
. We stress that the issue before this court is strictly contractual in nature: whether the shareholders are individually liable under the terms of the insurance policy. Our decision today has no bearing on the propriety of the portion of Minn. Stat. SS 319A.10 which states: "[N]o person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally participated in." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "263 A.2d 692, 697",
"parenthetical": "upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute's requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public",
"sentence": "But see In re R.I. Bar Ass’n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970) (upholding professional corporation statute that limited incorporated attorneys' liability because the statute’s requirement of mandatory liability insurance would protect clients and members of the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "516 P.2d 1267, 1268",
"parenthetical": "overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates\"",
"sentence": "See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (invalidating the applicability of the state professional corporation statute to attorneys as a violation of the separation of powers because \"the influence of the statute upon the professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for the acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of duty to a client”); Petition of Bar Ass’n of Haw., 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (overturning by rule portion of the state professional corporation act \"which would limit the liability of incorporated attorneys for the malpractice of their associates”)."
} | 10,713,207 | b |
The majority concludes that "[t]he error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis's indictment or trial." But the same could have been said in Vazquez: The instructions to the jury were sufficient to support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than that reflected in the instructions. Indeed, we characterized the sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined "trial and sentencing error" despite there being nothing incorrect about instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged in the indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 196, 207",
"parenthetical": "affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "489 U.S. 705, 717",
"parenthetical": "Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure \"suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | 4,341,281 | b |
The majority concludes that "[t]he error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis's indictment or trial." But the same could have been said in Vazquez: The instructions to the jury were sufficient to support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than that reflected in the instructions. Indeed, we characterized the sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined "trial and sentencing error" despite there being nothing incorrect about instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged in the indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 196, 207",
"parenthetical": "affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure \"suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | 4,341,281 | b |
The majority concludes that "[t]he error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis's indictment or trial." But the same could have been said in Vazquez: The instructions to the jury were sufficient to support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than that reflected in the instructions. Indeed, we characterized the sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined "trial and sentencing error" despite there being nothing incorrect about instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged in the indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure \"suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 196, 207",
"parenthetical": "affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | 4,341,281 | a |
The majority concludes that "[t]he error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis's indictment or trial." But the same could have been said in Vazquez: The instructions to the jury were sufficient to support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than that reflected in the instructions. Indeed, we characterized the sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined "trial and sentencing error" despite there being nothing incorrect about instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged in the indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 196, 207",
"parenthetical": "affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 205, 208",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.\"",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | 4,341,281 | b |
The majority concludes that "[t]he error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis's indictment or trial." But the same could have been said in Vazquez: The instructions to the jury were sufficient to support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than that reflected in the instructions. Indeed, we characterized the sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined "trial and sentencing error" despite there being nothing incorrect about instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged in the indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.\"",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 196, 207",
"parenthetical": "affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | 4,341,281 | a |
The majority concludes that "[t]he error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis's indictment or trial." But the same could have been said in Vazquez: The instructions to the jury were sufficient to support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than that reflected in the instructions. Indeed, we characterized the sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined "trial and sentencing error" despite there being nothing incorrect about instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged in the indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.\"",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 196, 207",
"parenthetical": "affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense",
"sentence": "See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction is available in equal measure to the defense and to the prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-included offense under plain-error review where jury was instructed only as to aggravated offense)."
} | 4,341,281 | a |
Plaintiff himself construed those responses as such, as indicated in his 1999 letter to the president of the University. The fact that he held out hope that the president would intercede on his behalf does not change the accrual date for the statute of limitations because that date is measured by the standard of when a person, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of his injury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "489 F.3d 227, 233",
"parenthetical": "\"Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *4 (statute of limitations under the ADA accrues “when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.”); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.2007) (“Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.”); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (holding that under the ADA “discovery of the original act of discrimination, not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful, is when the statute of limitations begins to run”) (emphasis in original)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 626921, at *4",
"parenthetical": "statute of limitations under the ADA accrues \"when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *4 (statute of limitations under the ADA accrues “when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.”); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.2007) (“Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.”); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (holding that under the ADA “discovery of the original act of discrimination, not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful, is when the statute of limitations begins to run”) (emphasis in original)."
} | 3,062,931 | b |
Plaintiff himself construed those responses as such, as indicated in his 1999 letter to the president of the University. The fact that he held out hope that the president would intercede on his behalf does not change the accrual date for the statute of limitations because that date is measured by the standard of when a person, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of his injury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "92 F.3d 551, 551",
"parenthetical": "holding that under the ADA \"discovery of the original act of discrimination, not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful, is when the statute of limitations begins to run\"",
"sentence": "See Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *4 (statute of limitations under the ADA accrues “when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.”); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.2007) (“Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.”); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (holding that under the ADA “discovery of the original act of discrimination, not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful, is when the statute of limitations begins to run”) (emphasis in original)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 626921, at *4",
"parenthetical": "statute of limitations under the ADA accrues \"when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *4 (statute of limitations under the ADA accrues “when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.”); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.2007) (“Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.”); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (holding that under the ADA “discovery of the original act of discrimination, not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful, is when the statute of limitations begins to run”) (emphasis in original)."
} | 3,062,931 | b |
P15 Thus, Troxel instructs that when a grandparent petitions for contact with a grandchild, a court must first inquire whether the child's parent is fit; that is, the court must determine whether the parent "adequately cares for his or her children." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "1998 MT 264, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied",
"sentence": "See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M., 1998 MT 264, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12 (a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent's choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child's best interests",
"sentence": "See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M., 1998 MT 264, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12 (a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied)."
} | 3,743,672 | b |
P15 Thus, Troxel instructs that when a grandparent petitions for contact with a grandchild, a court must first inquire whether the child's parent is fit; that is, the court must determine whether the parent "adequately cares for his or her children." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied",
"sentence": "See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M., 1998 MT 264, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12 (a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent's choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child's best interests",
"sentence": "See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M., 1998 MT 264, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12 (a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied)."
} | 3,743,672 | b |
P15 Thus, Troxel instructs that when a grandparent petitions for contact with a grandchild, a court must first inquire whether the child's parent is fit; that is, the court must determine whether the parent "adequately cares for his or her children." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent's choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child's best interests",
"sentence": "See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M., 1998 MT 264, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12 (a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied",
"sentence": "See Evans v. McTaggart (Alaska 2004), 88 P.3d 1078 (holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests); cf. In re Custody & Parental Rights of P.M., 1998 MT 264, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 297, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 792, ¶ 12 (a party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that every requirement set forth in the statute has been satisfied)."
} | 3,743,672 | a |
Mere evidence that defendants knew of plaintiffs protected speech is not sufficient to show retaliatory motivation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 685, 685",
"parenthetical": "\"Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.\"",
"sentence": "Keyser, 265 F.3d at 751 (mere evidence that defendant knew of plaintiffs’ charges did not create a triable issue as to whether his decision to reassign them was motivated by the charges); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (“Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "265 F.3d 751, 751",
"parenthetical": "mere evidence that defendant knew of plaintiffs' charges did not create a triable issue as to whether his decision to reassign them was motivated by the charges",
"sentence": "Keyser, 265 F.3d at 751 (mere evidence that defendant knew of plaintiffs’ charges did not create a triable issue as to whether his decision to reassign them was motivated by the charges); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (“Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.”)."
} | 3,748,466 | b |
Mere evidence that defendants knew of plaintiffs protected speech is not sufficient to show retaliatory motivation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.\"",
"sentence": "Keyser, 265 F.3d at 751 (mere evidence that defendant knew of plaintiffs’ charges did not create a triable issue as to whether his decision to reassign them was motivated by the charges); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (“Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "265 F.3d 751, 751",
"parenthetical": "mere evidence that defendant knew of plaintiffs' charges did not create a triable issue as to whether his decision to reassign them was motivated by the charges",
"sentence": "Keyser, 265 F.3d at 751 (mere evidence that defendant knew of plaintiffs’ charges did not create a triable issue as to whether his decision to reassign them was motivated by the charges); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (“Umbehr must show that the termination of his contract was motivated by his speech on a matter of public concern, an initial showing that requires him to prove more than the mere fact that he criticized the Board members before they terminated him.”)."
} | 3,748,466 | b |
California's FEHA and Title VII both prohibit employment discrimination based on race. See CAL. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "150 F.3d 1217, 1219",
"parenthetical": "noting that because FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII, federal case law is instructive",
"sentence": "See Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 n. 2 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]he test for determining whether there is discrimination under Title VII applies to FEHA claims as well.”) (citation omitted); see also Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir.1998) (noting that because FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII, federal case law is instructive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he test for determining whether there is discrimination under Title VII applies to FEHA claims as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 n. 2 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]he test for determining whether there is discrimination under Title VII applies to FEHA claims as well.”) (citation omitted); see also Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir.1998) (noting that because FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII, federal case law is instructive)."
} | 9,474,368 | b |
"[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement." An untimely appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the requirement cannot be waived, and is not subject to equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 2366, 2366",
"parenthetical": "\"Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the 'unique circumstances' doctrine is illegitimate.\"",
"sentence": "Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2366 (“Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the ‘unique circumstances’ doctrine is illegitimate.”); see International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 515 F.3d 1353, 1357-58 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“In Bowles, the Supreme Court emphasized the jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal and held that the jurisdictional rules lack equitable exceptions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 F.3d 1353, 1357-58",
"parenthetical": "\"In Bowles, the Supreme Court emphasized the jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal and held that the jurisdictional rules lack equitable exceptions.\"",
"sentence": "Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2366 (“Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the ‘unique circumstances’ doctrine is illegitimate.”); see International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 515 F.3d 1353, 1357-58 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“In Bowles, the Supreme Court emphasized the jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal and held that the jurisdictional rules lack equitable exceptions.”)."
} | 3,718,357 | a |
Had the trial court precluded this testimony, the jury would have been required to assess the victim's credibility with an incomplete account of relevant evidence relating to her credibility. In these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to present the challenged testimony on redirect examination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 90.403, Florida Statutes, did not preclude testimony that a critical state witness knew that the defendant had previously murdered a child, when the credibility of the witness was at issue due to his failure initially to fully cooperate with law enforcement officers investigating the crime for which the defendant was on trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Love v. State, 971 So.2d 280, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (recognizing that the opening the door concept is based on considerations of fairness and the truth seeking function of a trial and may be employed when redirect examination serves to reveal the whole story of a transaction only partly explained in cross examination); see also Williamson v. State, 681 So.2d 688 (Fla.1996) (holding that section 90.403, Florida Statutes, did not preclude testimony that a critical state witness knew that the defendant had previously murdered a child, when the credibility of the witness was at issue due to his failure initially to fully cooperate with law enforcement officers investigating the crime for which the defendant was on trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "971 So.2d 280, 286",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the opening the door concept is based on considerations of fairness and the truth seeking function of a trial and may be employed when redirect examination serves to reveal the whole story of a transaction only partly explained in cross examination",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Love v. State, 971 So.2d 280, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (recognizing that the opening the door concept is based on considerations of fairness and the truth seeking function of a trial and may be employed when redirect examination serves to reveal the whole story of a transaction only partly explained in cross examination); see also Williamson v. State, 681 So.2d 688 (Fla.1996) (holding that section 90.403, Florida Statutes, did not preclude testimony that a critical state witness knew that the defendant had previously murdered a child, when the credibility of the witness was at issue due to his failure initially to fully cooperate with law enforcement officers investigating the crime for which the defendant was on trial)."
} | 7,062,201 | b |
The reason for the durational difference matters. Here, no evidence exists that the difference resulted from any determination that relied on ALJ status to impose a longer furlough, let alone a determination aimed at or causing an impairment of decision-making independence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 604, 610",
"parenthetical": "\"Whatever the employer's decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.\"",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 787 F.2d at 1563 (agency actions “based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions” of ALJs cannot stand); cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 F.2d 1563, 1563",
"parenthetical": "agency actions \"based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions\" of ALJs cannot stand",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 787 F.2d at 1563 (agency actions “based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions” of ALJs cannot stand); cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”)."
} | 5,918,769 | b |
The reason for the durational difference matters. Here, no evidence exists that the difference resulted from any determination that relied on ALJ status to impose a longer furlough, let alone a determination aimed at or causing an impairment of decision-making independence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 F.2d 1563, 1563",
"parenthetical": "agency actions \"based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions\" of ALJs cannot stand",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 787 F.2d at 1563 (agency actions “based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions” of ALJs cannot stand); cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Whatever the employer's decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.\"",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 787 F.2d at 1563 (agency actions “based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions” of ALJs cannot stand); cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”)."
} | 5,918,769 | a |
The reason for the durational difference matters. Here, no evidence exists that the difference resulted from any determination that relied on ALJ status to impose a longer furlough, let alone a determination aimed at or causing an impairment of decision-making independence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Whatever the employer's decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.\"",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 787 F.2d at 1563 (agency actions “based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions” of ALJs cannot stand); cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 F.2d 1563, 1563",
"parenthetical": "agency actions \"based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions\" of ALJs cannot stand",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 787 F.2d at 1563 (agency actions “based on reasons which interfere with the quasi-judicial functions” of ALJs cannot stand); cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (“Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”)."
} | 5,918,769 | b |
As a result, even though the plaintiffs and defendants are "head-to-head" or direct competitors over in Russia, they do not compete at all, whether directly or indirectly, in the United States. Without a commercial presence, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have asserted a legitimate commercial interest to protect or have suffered a tangible competitive harm within the meaning of the Lanham Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 867, 873",
"parenthetical": "noting that the plaintiff was not then, nor had ever been, in competition with the defendants at any level",
"sentence": "See PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1112 (2d Cir.1997) (recognizing that the litigant “d[id] not currently sell a ... product that compete[d] with [his opponent’s] products,” regardless of whether that par ty was acting lawfully or unlawfully); see also Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that the plaintiff was not then, nor had ever been, in competition with the defendants at any level)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 F.3d 1105, 1112",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the litigant \"d[id] not currently sell a ... product that compete[d] with [his opponent's] products,\" regardless of whether that par ty was acting lawfully or unlawfully",
"sentence": "See PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1112 (2d Cir.1997) (recognizing that the litigant “d[id] not currently sell a ... product that compete[d] with [his opponent’s] products,” regardless of whether that par ty was acting lawfully or unlawfully); see also Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that the plaintiff was not then, nor had ever been, in competition with the defendants at any level)."
} | 11,586,311 | b |
As was the case in Henning, we are here presented with an "express indication" of a state legislature's "special interest in providing litigants" with full compensation for reasonable sums expended in pursuit of an Oil Spill Act claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "953 F.2d 886, 886",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1348, 1348",
"parenthetical": "\"It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants -- no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits -- with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | 9,104,295 | a |
As was the case in Henning, we are here presented with an "express indication" of a state legislature's "special interest in providing litigants" with full compensation for reasonable sums expended in pursuit of an Oil Spill Act claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1348, 1348",
"parenthetical": "\"It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants -- no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits -- with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "948 F.2d 122, 122",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | 9,104,295 | b |
As was the case in Henning, we are here presented with an "express indication" of a state legislature's "special interest in providing litigants" with full compensation for reasonable sums expended in pursuit of an Oil Spill Act claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 78, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1348, 1348",
"parenthetical": "\"It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants -- no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits -- with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | 9,104,295 | a |
As was the case in Henning, we are here presented with an "express indication" of a state legislature's "special interest in providing litigants" with full compensation for reasonable sums expended in pursuit of an Oil Spill Act claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1348, 1348",
"parenthetical": "\"It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants -- no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits -- with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886. Because “the measure of damages is a matter of state substantive law,” Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122, it would do violence to the principles enunciated in Erie to disregard Oregon law in favor of § 1821(b). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State ..-..”); see also Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1348(“It would turn things topsy-turvy to saddle [Oil Spill Act] claimants — no matter how galling their deprivations or how vindicatory the outcome of their suits — with whopping fees for the services of expert witnesses.”)."
} | 9,104,295 | a |
. Other courts have recognized the existence of a determinable easement, or an easement subject to a condition subsequent. Although this Court has never recognized a defeasible easement, we have held an easement no longer used for its stated purposes has been abandoned and therefore extinguished. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment",
"sentence": "See Immanuel Baptist Church v. Barnes, 274 S.C. 125, 264 S.E.2d 142 (1980) (owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way",
"sentence": "See also Saluda Motor Lines v. Crouch, 300 S.C. 43, 386 S.E.2d 290 (Ct.App.1989)(where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way)."
} | 169,581 | a |
. Other courts have recognized the existence of a determinable easement, or an easement subject to a condition subsequent. Although this Court has never recognized a defeasible easement, we have held an easement no longer used for its stated purposes has been abandoned and therefore extinguished. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment",
"sentence": "See Immanuel Baptist Church v. Barnes, 274 S.C. 125, 264 S.E.2d 142 (1980) (owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way",
"sentence": "See also Saluda Motor Lines v. Crouch, 300 S.C. 43, 386 S.E.2d 290 (Ct.App.1989)(where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way)."
} | 169,581 | a |
. Other courts have recognized the existence of a determinable easement, or an easement subject to a condition subsequent. Although this Court has never recognized a defeasible easement, we have held an easement no longer used for its stated purposes has been abandoned and therefore extinguished. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way",
"sentence": "See also Saluda Motor Lines v. Crouch, 300 S.C. 43, 386 S.E.2d 290 (Ct.App.1989)(where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment",
"sentence": "See Immanuel Baptist Church v. Barnes, 274 S.C. 125, 264 S.E.2d 142 (1980) (owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment)."
} | 169,581 | b |
. Other courts have recognized the existence of a determinable easement, or an easement subject to a condition subsequent. Although this Court has never recognized a defeasible easement, we have held an easement no longer used for its stated purposes has been abandoned and therefore extinguished. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment",
"sentence": "See Immanuel Baptist Church v. Barnes, 274 S.C. 125, 264 S.E.2d 142 (1980) (owner of easement may relinquish that easement by express or implied abandonment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way",
"sentence": "See also Saluda Motor Lines v. Crouch, 300 S.C. 43, 386 S.E.2d 290 (Ct.App.1989)(where railroad ceased to use its right-of-way for railroad purposes, it abandons right-of-way)."
} | 169,581 | a |
The statutory language, however, focuses on a veteran's incarceration for a felony conviction in any facility and does not distinguish between government-operated prisons and privately operated prisons. The statute's failure to distinguish between the two types of prisons indicates that incarceration in a privately owned and operated prison under contract with the state is tantamount to incarceration in a state penal institution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "382 U.S. 296, 299",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... \"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 810, 814",
"parenthetical": "stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a \"traditionally state function\" by operating a prison",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | 4,152,654 | a |
The statutory language, however, focuses on a veteran's incarceration for a felony conviction in any facility and does not distinguish between government-operated prisons and privately operated prisons. The statute's failure to distinguish between the two types of prisons indicates that incarceration in a privately owned and operated prison under contract with the state is tantamount to incarceration in a state penal institution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "382 U.S. 296, 299",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... \"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of SS 1983 suit because \"[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | 4,152,654 | a |
The statutory language, however, focuses on a veteran's incarceration for a felony conviction in any facility and does not distinguish between government-operated prisons and privately operated prisons. The statute's failure to distinguish between the two types of prisons indicates that incarceration in a privately owned and operated prison under contract with the state is tantamount to incarceration in a state penal institution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 810, 814",
"parenthetical": "stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a \"traditionally state function\" by operating a prison",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... \"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | 4,152,654 | b |
The statutory language, however, focuses on a veteran's incarceration for a felony conviction in any facility and does not distinguish between government-operated prisons and privately operated prisons. The statute's failure to distinguish between the two types of prisons indicates that incarceration in a privately owned and operated prison under contract with the state is tantamount to incarceration in a state penal institution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of SS 1983 suit because \"[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... \"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | 4,152,654 | b |
The statutory language, however, focuses on a veteran's incarceration for a felony conviction in any facility and does not distinguish between government-operated prisons and privately operated prisons. The statute's failure to distinguish between the two types of prisons indicates that incarceration in a privately owned and operated prison under contract with the state is tantamount to incarceration in a state penal institution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... \"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 810, 814",
"parenthetical": "stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a \"traditionally state function\" by operating a prison",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | 4,152,654 | a |
The statutory language, however, focuses on a veteran's incarceration for a felony conviction in any facility and does not distinguish between government-operated prisons and privately operated prisons. The statute's failure to distinguish between the two types of prisons indicates that incarceration in a privately owned and operated prison under contract with the state is tantamount to incarceration in a state penal institution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of SS 1983 suit because \"[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... \"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-talities of the State .... ”); see also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that employees of the Corrections Corporation of America perform a “traditionally state function” by operating a prison); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that a Corrections Corporation of America prison guard acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit because “[t]he function of incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive prerogative of the state.”)."
} | 4,152,654 | b |
Devine argues that the guns were not connected to the cocaine sales to the undercover officer to which he pled guilty, which did not occur at his home. The storing and cutting of drugs, however, is conduct relevant to drug distribution, and the district court did not err in concluding that weighing and cutting cocaine at home comprised part of Devine's drug dealing, even if not directly linked to the cocaine sold to the undercover agent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 F.3d 240, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government had established that the presence of weapons was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant during his drug dealing where officers discovered handguns in residence where defendant kept cocaine base and drug paraphernalia",
"sentence": "See Smith, 215 F.3d at 240-41 (holding that the government had established that the presence of weapons was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant during his drug dealing where officers discovered handguns in residence where defendant kept cocaine base and drug paraphernalia); see also United States v. Sweet, 25 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding enhancement applicable where the record supported conclusion that drugs were stored and cut in the same location as the guns, even though a search of the location yielded no drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 F.3d 160, 163",
"parenthetical": "holding enhancement applicable where the record supported conclusion that drugs were stored and cut in the same location as the guns, even though a search of the location yielded no drugs",
"sentence": "See Smith, 215 F.3d at 240-41 (holding that the government had established that the presence of weapons was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant during his drug dealing where officers discovered handguns in residence where defendant kept cocaine base and drug paraphernalia); see also United States v. Sweet, 25 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding enhancement applicable where the record supported conclusion that drugs were stored and cut in the same location as the guns, even though a search of the location yielded no drugs)."
} | 3,770,029 | a |
She kept it solvent, tallying receipts, monitoring cash flow, and passing along relevant records to an accountant. When considered in light of the tavern's gross receipts during the relevant period -- more than $75,000 in 2000 and nearly $84,000 in 2001 -- it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Froncheck's contributions were clearly worth more than the threshold amounts. We have upheld the denial of benefits to self-employed applicants with similar management roles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 F.3d 1384, 1391",
"parenthetical": "upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity",
"sentence": "See Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1391 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1999); Callaghan v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 692, 695-96 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time); see also Johnson v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 F.2d 596, 598",
"parenthetical": "upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful",
"sentence": "See Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1391 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1999); Callaghan v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 692, 695-96 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time); see also Johnson v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful)."
} | 3,955,872 | a |
She kept it solvent, tallying receipts, monitoring cash flow, and passing along relevant records to an accountant. When considered in light of the tavern's gross receipts during the relevant period -- more than $75,000 in 2000 and nearly $84,000 in 2001 -- it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Froncheck's contributions were clearly worth more than the threshold amounts. We have upheld the denial of benefits to self-employed applicants with similar management roles. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 F.2d 596, 598",
"parenthetical": "upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful",
"sentence": "See Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1391 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1999); Callaghan v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 692, 695-96 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time); see also Johnson v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 561, 562",
"parenthetical": "upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity",
"sentence": "See Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1391 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1999); Callaghan v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 692, 695-96 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time); see also Johnson v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful)."
} | 3,955,872 | b |
She kept it solvent, tallying receipts, monitoring cash flow, and passing along relevant records to an accountant. When considered in light of the tavern's gross receipts during the relevant period -- more than $75,000 in 2000 and nearly $84,000 in 2001 -- it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Froncheck's contributions were clearly worth more than the threshold amounts. We have upheld the denial of benefits to self-employed applicants with similar management roles. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 F.2d 596, 598",
"parenthetical": "upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful",
"sentence": "See Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1391 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1999); Callaghan v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 692, 695-96 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time); see also Johnson v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 692, 695-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time",
"sentence": "See Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1391 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding determination that part-time, self-employed owner of tax preparation and dry-cleaning businesses was engaged in substantial gainful activity), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1999); Callaghan v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 692, 695-96 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding determination that self-employed owner of upholstery business engaged in substantial gainful activity by administering the company part-time); see also Johnson v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding determination that supervisory activities of self-employed land surveyor were substantial and gainful)."
} | 3,955,872 | b |
Within the context of a different legal issue, our Supreme Court declined to impose a duty on law enforcement officials to consent to defense interviews. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 P.3d 602, 608",
"parenthetical": "finding certain provisions of the Alaska Victims' Right Act of 1991, Alaska Stat. SSSS 12.61.100 to -.150, were unconstitutional because they interfered with criminal defense investigations without adequate justification",
"sentence": "See also State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 608 (Alaska 2007) (finding certain provisions of the Alaska Victims’ Right Act of 1991, Alaska Stat. §§ 12.61.100 to -.150, were unconstitutional because they interfered with criminal defense investigations without adequate justification)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "266 F.Supp. 930, 935-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that medical examiner's order to toxicologist not to speak with accused, his counsel or experts, violated defendant's constitutional rights",
"sentence": "Cf. Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F.Supp. 930, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (holding that medical examiner’s order to toxicologist not to speak with accused, his counsel or experts, violated defendant’s constitutional rights); but see Fenenbock, supra, 681 F.3d at 970-71, 974 (finding no violation of constitutional rights when an agency unrelated to the prosecution, acting in the interest of a witness who was a minor, denied pretrial access to eight defendants)."
} | 3,823,313 | a |
Within the context of a different legal issue, our Supreme Court declined to impose a duty on law enforcement officials to consent to defense interviews. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 970, 970-71, 974",
"parenthetical": "finding no violation of constitutional rights when an agency unrelated to the prosecution, acting in the interest of a witness who was a minor, denied pretrial access to eight defendants",
"sentence": "Cf. Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F.Supp. 930, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (holding that medical examiner’s order to toxicologist not to speak with accused, his counsel or experts, violated defendant’s constitutional rights); but see Fenenbock, supra, 681 F.3d at 970-71, 974 (finding no violation of constitutional rights when an agency unrelated to the prosecution, acting in the interest of a witness who was a minor, denied pretrial access to eight defendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 P.3d 602, 608",
"parenthetical": "finding certain provisions of the Alaska Victims' Right Act of 1991, Alaska Stat. SSSS 12.61.100 to -.150, were unconstitutional because they interfered with criminal defense investigations without adequate justification",
"sentence": "See also State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 608 (Alaska 2007) (finding certain provisions of the Alaska Victims’ Right Act of 1991, Alaska Stat. §§ 12.61.100 to -.150, were unconstitutional because they interfered with criminal defense investigations without adequate justification)."
} | 3,823,313 | b |
Within the context of a different legal issue, our Supreme Court declined to impose a duty on law enforcement officials to consent to defense interviews. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "266 F.Supp. 930, 935-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that medical examiner's order to toxicologist not to speak with accused, his counsel or experts, violated defendant's constitutional rights",
"sentence": "Cf. Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F.Supp. 930, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (holding that medical examiner’s order to toxicologist not to speak with accused, his counsel or experts, violated defendant’s constitutional rights); but see Fenenbock, supra, 681 F.3d at 970-71, 974 (finding no violation of constitutional rights when an agency unrelated to the prosecution, acting in the interest of a witness who was a minor, denied pretrial access to eight defendants)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 970, 970-71, 974",
"parenthetical": "finding no violation of constitutional rights when an agency unrelated to the prosecution, acting in the interest of a witness who was a minor, denied pretrial access to eight defendants",
"sentence": "Cf. Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F.Supp. 930, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (holding that medical examiner’s order to toxicologist not to speak with accused, his counsel or experts, violated defendant’s constitutional rights); but see Fenenbock, supra, 681 F.3d at 970-71, 974 (finding no violation of constitutional rights when an agency unrelated to the prosecution, acting in the interest of a witness who was a minor, denied pretrial access to eight defendants)."
} | 3,823,313 | a |
This Court has been reluctant to look to legislative history to divine the Legislature's meaning, and rightly so when the statute's words clearly convey legislative intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 S.W.3d 349, 356",
"parenthetical": "looking to legislative history to determine meaning of term that lent itself to two equally plausible interpretations",
"sentence": "See HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex.2009) (looking to legislative history to determine meaning of term that lent itself to two equally plausible interpretations); see also Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 149 (Tex.2010) (looking to legislative record to determine public interest Legislature sought to serve in enacting Chapter 149 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "335 S.W.3d 126, 149",
"parenthetical": "looking to legislative record to determine public interest Legislature sought to serve in enacting Chapter 149 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code",
"sentence": "See HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex.2009) (looking to legislative history to determine meaning of term that lent itself to two equally plausible interpretations); see also Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 149 (Tex.2010) (looking to legislative record to determine public interest Legislature sought to serve in enacting Chapter 149 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code)."
} | 7,316,935 | a |
The United States has committed to the development of nuclear energy, yet to-date it lacks a permanent solution for one consequence of that commitment--the generation of spent nuclear fuel, which "poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk." This case is not the first, nor even the second, time that concerned parties have petitioned this Court to address the spent-nuclear-waste problem. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19",
"parenthetical": "remanding the NRC's decision to expand \"on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies\" in light of \"[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 F.3d 428, 430",
"parenthetical": "considering a challenge to the Department of Energy's attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | 12,310,316 | a |
The United States has committed to the development of nuclear energy, yet to-date it lacks a permanent solution for one consequence of that commitment--the generation of spent nuclear fuel, which "poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk." This case is not the first, nor even the second, time that concerned parties have petitioned this Court to address the spent-nuclear-waste problem. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 1272, 1277",
"parenthetical": "requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19",
"parenthetical": "remanding the NRC's decision to expand \"on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies\" in light of \"[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | 12,310,316 | b |
The United States has committed to the development of nuclear energy, yet to-date it lacks a permanent solution for one consequence of that commitment--the generation of spent nuclear fuel, which "poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk." This case is not the first, nor even the second, time that concerned parties have petitioned this Court to address the spent-nuclear-waste problem. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 483, 483",
"parenthetical": "vacating the NRC's rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 F.3d 428, 430",
"parenthetical": "considering a challenge to the Department of Energy's attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | 12,310,316 | a |
The United States has committed to the development of nuclear energy, yet to-date it lacks a permanent solution for one consequence of that commitment--the generation of spent nuclear fuel, which "poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk." This case is not the first, nor even the second, time that concerned parties have petitioned this Court to address the spent-nuclear-waste problem. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 483, 483",
"parenthetical": "vacating the NRC's rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 1272, 1277",
"parenthetical": "requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483 (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by operators of civilian nuclear power plants)."
} | 12,310,316 | a |
However, whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a third-party or in this case, a fourth-party cause of action, is distinct from an assessment of the propriety and merits of an impleader action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "866 F.Supp. 686, 686",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the propriety of a third-party action separately from the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the third-party action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Telecom International, 1999 WL 777954, at *4 (stating that “Rule 14(a) ... provides only the procedural mechanism for impleader; the substantive merit of the action depends on the federal or state theory of contribution, indemnity, or any other theory found in the third-party complaint”) (citation omitted); Van-Tulco, 866 F.Supp. at 686 (analyzing the propriety of a third-party action separately from the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the third-party action); see also Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Group, Inc. (In re Tidewater Group, Inc.), 63 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1986) (stating that “whether or not [a party] was a proper party to implead has nothing to do with whether subject matter jurisdiction exists”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 B.R. 670, 674",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whether or not [a party] was a proper party to implead has nothing to do with whether subject matter jurisdiction exists\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Telecom International, 1999 WL 777954, at *4 (stating that “Rule 14(a) ... provides only the procedural mechanism for impleader; the substantive merit of the action depends on the federal or state theory of contribution, indemnity, or any other theory found in the third-party complaint”) (citation omitted); Van-Tulco, 866 F.Supp. at 686 (analyzing the propriety of a third-party action separately from the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the third-party action); see also Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Group, Inc. (In re Tidewater Group, Inc.), 63 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1986) (stating that “whether or not [a party] was a proper party to implead has nothing to do with whether subject matter jurisdiction exists”)."
} | 11,076,003 | a |
We review de novo the legal question of whether the 2001 and 2008 rules amending the Board's patient copy rule violate HIPAA and its related regulations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "681 P.2d 503, 503",
"parenthetical": "in reviewing an agency action, courts shall determine all legal questions, interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved, and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly found or established",
"sentence": "See Transponder Corp., 681 P.2d at 503 (in reviewing an agency action, courts shall determine all legal questions, interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved, and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly found or established). Moreover, because the Board is charged with administering and enforcing state public health laws and not federal health laws, we need not defer to the Board's HIPAA interpretations."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "240 P.3d 387, 387",
"parenthetical": "court generally defers to statute's interpretation by agency charged with its enforcement",
"sentence": "Cf. Meridian Ranch Metropolitan Dist., 240 P.3d at 387, 2009 WL 3765490 (court generally defers to statute's interpretation by agency charged with its enforcement)."
} | 6,990,695 | a |
We review de novo the legal question of whether the 2001 and 2008 rules amending the Board's patient copy rule violate HIPAA and its related regulations. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court generally defers to statute's interpretation by agency charged with its enforcement",
"sentence": "Cf. Meridian Ranch Metropolitan Dist., 240 P.3d at 387, 2009 WL 3765490 (court generally defers to statute's interpretation by agency charged with its enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "681 P.2d 503, 503",
"parenthetical": "in reviewing an agency action, courts shall determine all legal questions, interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved, and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly found or established",
"sentence": "See Transponder Corp., 681 P.2d at 503 (in reviewing an agency action, courts shall determine all legal questions, interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved, and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly found or established). Moreover, because the Board is charged with administering and enforcing state public health laws and not federal health laws, we need not defer to the Board's HIPAA interpretations."
} | 6,990,695 | b |
. In any event, Corning likely makes out a prima facie case because viewing the facts in the light most favorable to him, (1) he engaged in protected activity when he requested an accommodation including to not work out of the storage shed; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action when LodgeNet terminated him; and (3) given that there were only two days between the request and his termination, Corning shows that the adverse action was causally related to the protected conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "197 F.3d 1337, 1337",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiff satisfies [the causal connection] element if he provides sufficient evidence that the decision-maker became aware of the protected conduct, and that there was close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse employment action.\"",
"sentence": "See Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337 (\"[A] plaintiff satisfies [the causal connection] element if he provides sufficient evidence that the decision-maker became aware of the protected conduct, and that there was close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse employment action.”); Reis, 442 F.Supp.2d at 1254 (same); but see Jenks, 829 F.Supp.2d at 1254 (\"Close temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is generally sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the causal connection, however this alone may not be sufficient to establish pretext.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "829 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1254",
"parenthetical": "\"Close temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is generally sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the causal connection, however this alone may not be sufficient to establish pretext.\"",
"sentence": "See Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337 (\"[A] plaintiff satisfies [the causal connection] element if he provides sufficient evidence that the decision-maker became aware of the protected conduct, and that there was close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse employment action.”); Reis, 442 F.Supp.2d at 1254 (same); but see Jenks, 829 F.Supp.2d at 1254 (\"Close temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is generally sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the causal connection, however this alone may not be sufficient to establish pretext.”)."
} | 4,282,941 | a |
The class of beneficiaries rarely seems to be a contested issue when determining whether an informal ERISA plan exists. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 F.2d 546, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that the class of beneficiaries was terminated non-union salaried employees",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Deibler, 973 F.2d at 210 (finding a regular plan for retiring union officers); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the class of beneficiaries was terminated non-union salaried employees); see also Shaver, 670 F.3d at 479 (observing that if plan existed, it would include “legacy employees”); Williams v. WCI Steel Co., 170 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that although-informal plan did not exist, the class of beneficiaries was clear)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "670 F.3d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "observing that if plan existed, it would include \"legacy employees\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Deibler, 973 F.2d at 210 (finding a regular plan for retiring union officers); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the class of beneficiaries was terminated non-union salaried employees); see also Shaver, 670 F.3d at 479 (observing that if plan existed, it would include “legacy employees”); Williams v. WCI Steel Co., 170 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that although-informal plan did not exist, the class of beneficiaries was clear)."
} | 12,268,034 | a |
The class of beneficiaries rarely seems to be a contested issue when determining whether an informal ERISA plan exists. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 598, 603",
"parenthetical": "ruling that although-informal plan did not exist, the class of beneficiaries was clear",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Deibler, 973 F.2d at 210 (finding a regular plan for retiring union officers); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the class of beneficiaries was terminated non-union salaried employees); see also Shaver, 670 F.3d at 479 (observing that if plan existed, it would include “legacy employees”); Williams v. WCI Steel Co., 170 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that although-informal plan did not exist, the class of beneficiaries was clear)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 F.2d 546, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that the class of beneficiaries was terminated non-union salaried employees",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Deibler, 973 F.2d at 210 (finding a regular plan for retiring union officers); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the class of beneficiaries was terminated non-union salaried employees); see also Shaver, 670 F.3d at 479 (observing that if plan existed, it would include “legacy employees”); Williams v. WCI Steel Co., 170 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that although-informal plan did not exist, the class of beneficiaries was clear)."
} | 12,268,034 | b |
T61 Other courts have' recognized what the interests of justice compel in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction",
"sentence": "But see Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497, 248 P.3d 748, 751 (2011) (holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendant's payments had gone to the state's Industrial Commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction),"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30",
"parenthetical": "holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (Oth Cir.2004) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction was reversed on collateral review, the government must return amounts paid as special - assessments and costs, though it need not reimburse for restitution disbursed after the conviction became final); Telink Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47 (9th Cir.1994) (\"If [the defendants] prevail in setting aside their convictions, the wrongly paid fines would be automatically refunded, without requiring a civil action. ...\"); United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir.1973) (\"Since the district court was empowered to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine, restitution, and probation costs); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 (Pa.Super.Ct.2012) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's refund petition after his convictions were overturned on direct appeal)."
} | 6,837,090 | b |
Subsets and Splits