clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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acelpvc.dll
Additional File
wuauclt.exe
Additional File
jucheck.exe
Additional File
AdobeUpdateManager.exe
Additional File
zf32.dll
The above screenshot illustrates a REcon
trace on the
malware dropper and subsequent service creation. Location
A. represents the dropper program, which unpacks itself
and decompresses a file to the system32 directory. Point B.
represents the initial svchost.exe startup, which is loading the
malware payload. Location C. is the actual execution of the
malware service, which remains persistent. At points E. and F.
you can see the malware checking in with the command and
control server. Finally, location D. represents the dissolvable
batch file which deletes the initial dropper and then itself.
CAPABILITY
The malware has generic and flexible capabilities. There are
distinct command handlers in the malware that allow files to
be stolen and remote commands to be executed. The command
handler is illustrated in Figure 2. At location A. the command
number is checked. At locations marked B. are each individual
command handler, as controlled by the C&C server and command
February 10, 2010 7
number in the C&C packet. Location C. is where the result of
each command is sent back to the C&C server.
At location 1. is a dropper obtained from an exploit server
directly accessed from the extracted shellcode from a MS10002 JavaScript vector. Location 2. represents a forensic
toolmark within the dropped executable. This toolmark
was obtained using physical memory assessment of the live
executable, after it was allowed to unpack itself in a virtual
machine. This assessment was performed with HBGary
Responder
. At location 3., the recovered toolmark(s) were
researched against published source code artifacts on the
Internet. From this, a single posting was discovered with
this exact toolmark, and this posting exists only in one place
and is of Chinese origin. From this, the author of the source
code was determined to be XXXXXXXX. At location 4., all
social cyberspaces used by XXXXXXX were then enumerated.
From this, postings in Traditional and Simplified Chinese
were discovered that confirm that XXXXXX is the author
and supplier of a malware package known as
or
Netbot
Attacker
. Within the social space around
Netbot Attacker
are individuals who are testing and/or asking for technical
support regarding the malware package operation. These
individuals have been grouped within Palantir
as
technical
support for bot
at location 5.
Figure 2. C&C Command Parser
COPYCATS AND VARIANTS
With the release of MS10-002, and the subsequent
integration with Metasploit, the exploit vector used with
Aurora has been adopted laterally within the malware
development economy. Therefore, the use of MS10-002
should not be construed as an Aurora infection without
further analysis of the dropped payload. Forensic toolmarks
and link analysis have revealed several different threat
groups who are employing common IE exploit vectors.
HBGary is currently tracking several groups who operate
malware systems of this nature.
HBGary is using forensic toolmarks to trace the source
code origins of binary malware samples dropped in
conjunction with the MS10-002 exploit vector. For example,
in Figure 3, link analysis is being used to track the identity
of a threat actor in conjunction with his known Digital
. HBGary
s Digital DNA
database not only codifies the
behavior of software, but also the coding idioms, algorithms,
and methods of individual developers. In this way, individual
threat actors can be tracked with Digital DNA
In the example, link analysis is provided by Palantir
. The
screenshot illustrates only a subset of the data being tracked
by HBGary, and sensitive information has been redacted.
Figure 3. Link Analysis of Malware Actors using Palantir
The above process, when carried further, produces many
more social links. Attribution such as this allows resolution
and visibility into the intent of individual threat groups.
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
RESPOND
Several Enterprise products have the capability to scan
for and potentially remove the Aurora malware. Detection of
the malware is covered in detail, from multiple aspects, in
the Detect section above. When using a Digital DNA
capable
platform such as McAfee ePO, you can search the Enterprise
for the following Digital DNA sequence (recommend a tight
match, 90% or higher).

acelpvc.dll

Additional File

wuauclt.exe

Additional File

jucheck.exe

Additional File

AdobeUpdateManager.exe

Additional File

zf32.dll

The above screenshot illustrates a REcon

trace on the

malware dropper and subsequent service creation. Location

A. represents the dropper program, which unpacks itself

and decompresses a file to the system32 directory. Point B.

represents the initial svchost.exe startup, which is loading the

malware payload. Location C. is the actual execution of the

malware service, which remains persistent. At points E. and F.

you can see the malware checking in with the command and

control server. Finally, location D. represents the dissolvable

batch file which deletes the initial dropper and then itself.

CAPABILITY

The malware has generic and flexible capabilities. There are

distinct command handlers in the malware that allow files to

be stolen and remote commands to be executed. The command

handler is illustrated in Figure 2. At location A. the command

number is checked. At locations marked B. are each individual

command handler, as controlled by the C&C server and command

February 10, 2010 7

number in the C&C packet. Location C. is where the result of

each command is sent back to the C&C server.

At location 1. is a dropper obtained from an exploit server

directly accessed from the extracted shellcode from a MS10002 JavaScript vector. Location 2. represents a forensic

toolmark within the dropped executable. This toolmark

was obtained using physical memory assessment of the live

executable, after it was allowed to unpack itself in a virtual

machine. This assessment was performed with HBGary

Responder

. At location 3., the recovered toolmark(s) were

researched against published source code artifacts on the

Internet. From this, a single posting was discovered with

this exact toolmark, and this posting exists only in one place

and is of Chinese origin. From this, the author of the source

code was determined to be XXXXXXXX. At location 4., all

social cyberspaces used by XXXXXXX were then enumerated.

From this, postings in Traditional and Simplified Chinese

were discovered that confirm that XXXXXX is the author

and supplier of a malware package known as

or

Netbot

Attacker

. Within the social space around

Netbot Attacker

are individuals who are testing and/or asking for technical

support regarding the malware package operation. These

individuals have been grouped within Palantir

as

technical

support for bot

at location 5.

Figure 2. C&C Command Parser

COPYCATS AND VARIANTS

With the release of MS10-002, and the subsequent

integration with Metasploit, the exploit vector used with

Aurora has been adopted laterally within the malware

development economy. Therefore, the use of MS10-002

should not be construed as an Aurora infection without

further analysis of the dropped payload. Forensic toolmarks

and link analysis have revealed several different threat

groups who are employing common IE exploit vectors.

HBGary is currently tracking several groups who operate

malware systems of this nature.

HBGary is using forensic toolmarks to trace the source

code origins of binary malware samples dropped in

conjunction with the MS10-002 exploit vector. For example,

in Figure 3, link analysis is being used to track the identity

of a threat actor in conjunction with his known Digital

. HBGary

s Digital DNA

database not only codifies the

behavior of software, but also the coding idioms, algorithms,

and methods of individual developers. In this way, individual

threat actors can be tracked with Digital DNA

In the example, link analysis is provided by Palantir

. The

screenshot illustrates only a subset of the data being tracked

by HBGary, and sensitive information has been redacted.

Figure 3. Link Analysis of Malware Actors using Palantir

The above process, when carried further, produces many

more social links. Attribution such as this allows resolution

and visibility into the intent of individual threat groups.

HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA

RESPOND

Several Enterprise products have the capability to scan

for and potentially remove the Aurora malware. Detection of

the malware is covered in detail, from multiple aspects, in

the Detect section above. When using a Digital DNA

capable

platform such as McAfee ePO, you can search the Enterprise

for the following Digital DNA sequence (recommend a tight

match, 90% or higher).