Datasets:
clydeiii
/
cybersecurity

Dataset card Data Studio Files Community
1
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Potential variation
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL
Data: %temp%\c_1758.nls
PAYLOAD
The payload uses
two-stage installation. GLANCE UNDER THE HOOD
buffer after phase one XOR:
During stage one, the
mJ2bhcPExs7excLThcjExqurnauYq
dropper will install the
buffer after base64 decoding:
payload as a service
running under the
name Ups??? (where
??? are three random characters). Once executing, the
payload will immediately delete the first service and enter
stage-two. During stage-two, the payload will register a new,
second service under the name RaS??? (where ??? are three
random characters). This new service will point to the same
backdoor DLL, no new files are involved. Note: the three
character prefixes Ups and RaS can easily be modified by
the attacker.
Once the new service is registered, the payload will access
an embedded resource that is encrypted. The decryption goes
through several phases. The encrypted data block contains
the DNS name for the command and control server (homeunix.
com, etc). This data block is configurable before the malware
is deployed. The data block length is hard-coded (0x150 or
336 bytes). During phase one, this data block is fed through
a simple XOR (0x99), resulting in an ASCII-string. Next, the
resulting ASCII-string is fed into a base64 decoding function,
producing a binary string. Finally, the resulting base64
decoded binary string is fed through another XOR (0xAB),
resulting in clear-text. The three primary encryption loops are
colored and marked in Figure 1. The resulting clear-text buffer
contains several fields in both ASCII and UNICODE, including
the C&C server address.
Figure 1. Base64 and XOR Encryption Scheme
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
C&C Server DNS
* .homeunix.com
(where * is any subdomain)
* .homelinux.com
* .ourhobby.com
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The payload communicates with its command and control
server over port 443. The source port is randomly selected.
While outbound traffic appears to be HTTPS, the actual traffic
uses a weak custom encryption scheme. The command and
control packets have a very specific format.iv
* .3322.org
* .2288.org
command
parms
0x00000001
payload len CRC KEY payload
* .8866.org
* .ath.cx
* .33iqst.com
* .dyndns.org
* .linode.com
* .ftpaccess.cc
* .filoups.info
* .blogsite.org
The payload will create additional registry keys.
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
Additional Key
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\IsoTp
Additional Key
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk
The payload section is encrypted with a key selected by
using GetTickCount. This means each infected node has its own
key. The key is embedded in the header of the packet, and is
easily recovered.
DIAGNOSE
HOW THE MALWARE WORKS
The primary control logic can be found in the module
registered under the service key (rasmon.dll, etc.). This
module has been written in c and includes several specific
methods and encodings that provide forensic track-ability.
Other potential dropped files, as reported by McAfee:
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
Additional File
securmon.dll
Additional File
AppMgmt.dll
Additional File
A0029670.dll (A00#####.dll)
Additional File
msconfig32.sys
Additional File
VedioDriver.dll
Additional File