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clydeiii
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cybersecurity

Dataset card Data Studio Files Community
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mswmpdat.tlb, wmcache.nld, winview.ocx.
CONCLUSION
The cyber-espionage operation behind the Snake rootkit is well established, a sample comiled in January 2006 indicates that
the activity would have begun in at least 2005. It is also sophisticated, using complex techniques for evading host defences and
providing the attackers covert communication channels. Toolmarks left behind by the authors
vlad
gilg
, leave tantalizing clues
as to the personas behind this.
From a technical perspective, Snake demonstrates two very different approaches to the task of building a cyber-espionage toolkit.
One approach is to delegate the network communication engine to usermode code, backed up by a usermode rootkit. Another
approach is to carry out all of the communications from the kernel-mode driver, which is a very challenging task by itself.
The complexity of the usermode-centric approach is on par with Rustock rootkit - it uses similar techniques. It
s an old well-polished
technology that evolved over the years and demonstrated its resilience and survivability under the stress of security counter-
measures. The complexity of the kernel-centric architecture of Snake is quite unique. This architecture is designed to grant Snake
as much flexibility as possible. When most of the infected hosts are cut off from the outside world, it only needs one host to be
connected online. The traffic is then routed through that host to make external control and data exfiltration still possible.
The presence of the reconnaissance tool in the Snake operators
framework suggests the existence of an arsenal of infiltration
tools, designed to compromise a system, then find a way to replicate into other hosts, infect them, and spread the infection
even further. As demonstrated, the backdoor commands allow Snake to provide remote attackers with full remote access to the
compromised system. Its ability to hibernate, staying fully inactive for a number of days, makes its detection during that time very
difficult.
The analysed code suggests that even file system and registry operations can be delegated by an infected module to another
module in order to stay unnoticed by behaviour analysis engines of the antivirus products, and to overcome account restrictions of
the browser processes so that the injected module could still write into files and into the sensitive registry hives.
The logs and dumps it creates on the hidden virtual volumes contributes to its stealthiness too. A great deal of attention has also
been given to keep its network communications as quiet as possible. Its ability to generate malicious traffic whenever the user
goes online and start loading the web pages allows it to
blend in
with the legitimate communications.
We expect much more will be uncovered by researchers in the coming weeks as the capabilities of this operation are further fleshed
out. However, as we implied in the opening section, we view this threat to be a permanent feature of the landscape. Whether they
dismantle this toolset and start from scratch, or continue using tools which have been exposed, remains to be seen. For their
targets though the considerable challenge of keeping secrets safe on sensitive networks will certainly continue for years to come.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Search logs for connections to Snake
s command and control servers (see Appendix A)
Search for MD5 hashes of the known samples (see Appendix B)
Use Indicators of Compromise for building host-based rules (see Appendix C)
Deploy SNORT rules for network based detection of Snake (see Appendix D)
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 26
APPENDIX A
Domain IP Address Country Contact Email Nameserver
arctic-zone.bbsindex.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NS1.DTDNS.COM
cars-online.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
eunews-online.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
fifa-rules.25u.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG
forum.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
franceonline.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
freeutils.3utilities.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
health-everyday.faqserv.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG
nhl-blog.servegame.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
olympik-blog.4dq.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG
pockerroom.servebeer.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
pressforum.serveblog.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
scandinavia-facts.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
sportmusic.servemp3.com 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
stockholm-blog.hopto.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
supernews.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
sweeden-history.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
tiger.got-game.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG
top-facts.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
weather-online.hopto.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
wintersport.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
x-files.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
forum.4dq.com 203.117.122.51 SG [email protected] NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG
forum.acmetoy.com 203.117.122.51 SG [email protected] NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG
marketplace.servehttp.com 59.125.160.178 TW [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
music-world.servemp3.com 80.152.223.171 DE [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
newutils.3utilities.com 80.152.223.171 DE [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
interesting-news.zapto.org 80.152.223.171 DE [email protected] NF1.NO-IP.COM
north-area.bbsindex.com [email protected] NS1.DTDNS.COM
academyawards.effers.com [email protected] NS1.DTDNS.COM
cheapflights.etowns.net [email protected] NS1.DTDNS.COM
toolsthem.xp3.biz [email protected] NS2.FREETZI.COM
softprog.freeoda.com [email protected] NS1.ORGFREE.COM
euassociate.6te.net [email protected] NS1.6TE.NET
euland.freevar.com [email protected] NS1.UEUO.COM
communityeu.xp3.biz [email protected] NS2.FREETZI.COM
swim.onlinewebshop.net [email protected] NS1.RUNHOSTING.COM
july.mypressonline.com [email protected] NS1.RUNHOSTING.COM
winter.site11.com [email protected] NS1.000WEBHOST.COM
eu-sciffi.99k.org [email protected] NF1.99K.ORG
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 27
APPENDIX B
MD5 Hash File Type FileSize Compile Time Notes
Kernel-centric architecture
f4f192004df1a4723cb9a8b4a9eb2fbf 32-bit driver 206 KB 2011-06-24 07:49:41 fdisk.sys, Ultra3.sys
626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267 32-bit dropper 1,669 KB 2013-02-04 13:19:21 fdisk_mon.exe
90478f6ed92664e0a6e6a25ecfa8e395 64-bit driver 584 KB 2013-02-04 13:17:56 fdisk.sys, Ultra3.sys
1c6c857fa17ef0aa3373ff16084f2f1c 32-bit driver 219 KB 2013-02-04 13:20:00 fdisk.sys, Ultra3.sys
Usermode-centric architecture
973fce2d142e1323156ff1ad3735e50d 32-bit driver 673 KB 2013-08-29 07:34:54 msw32.sys,
cmbawt.sys
2eb233a759642abaae2e3b29b7c85b89 32-bit DLL 416 KB 2013-07-25 05:58:47 dropped DLL
Reconnaissance tool
c82c631bf739936810c0297d31b15519 32-bit exe 176 KB 2013-03-27 08:25:43 wextract.exe
Other analysed samples