clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
tc_read_request_pipe
tr_alloc
tc_send_request_bufs
tc_send_request
t_close
tr_write_pipe
tc_socket
snake_modules_command
snake_free
t_setoptbin
snake_alloc
The inj_snake_Win32.dll/inj_snake_x64.dll module exports 61 functions. It is designed to perform the high-level tasks
such as:
manage the configuration data (by using a queue)
exfiltrate data by using Windows Internet (WinINet) APIs or Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock) APIs:

communicate with the C&C server and receive commands to execute

submit logs to the C&C server and other reports
When the DLL activates, it reads configuration parameters from the configuration queue, that the driver creates on a virtual volume.
One of the parameters defines the pipe name(s) that the DLL should use for its communications.
The remote commands received by this Snake DLL module are designed to set up various communication parameters:

http_log
redir_str

http_no_pragma_cache
http_max_opt

http_no_accept
http_option

proxy_useragent
http_uri

proxy_bypass
no_server_hijack

proxy_server
imp_level

proxy_discover
net_password

proxy_passwd
net_user

proxy_user
write_peer_nfo

check_inet
read_peer_nfo
To post the data, the DLL can use the following User-Agent string
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0)
It may rely on the following Internet Media types (MIME types) for data exfiltration:
application/x-shockwave-flash
image/gif
image/pjpeg
application/msword
image/jpeg
application/vnd.ms-excel
image/x-xbitmap
application/vnd.ms-powerpoint
Request type it uses can either be POST of GET, and C&C server resource name is /default.asp.
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 24
RECONNAISSANCE TOOL
One of the Snake components that could have been downloaded from a remote C&C server, was identified as a network
reconnaissance tool.
When run as a command line tool, with its logic defined with the command line switches, this tool enumerates other network hosts
and detects what Windows RPC services are enabled at the endpoints. It carries a list of interface identifiers associated with
the named pipes. It then uses these identifiers to write a message to and read a message from the associated named pipes. By
knowing what RPC services are running, it can successfully fingerprint all network hosts by mimicking the Metasploit
s logic of OS
fingerprinting via SMB. The fingerprinting allows it to reveal the following characteristics for each host found in the network:
the version of the operating system
version of the service pack
the installed network services
The data it retrieves is encrypted and saved into a configuration file %system%\vtmon.bin. This file is then further encrypted with
an NTL-based (Number Theory Library) algorithm and is uploaded by the usermode-centric Snake rootkit to the C&C server, along
with other configuration files, such as mtmon.sdb, mtmon32.sdb, gstatsnd.bin, gstat.bin, gstat32.bin, and other log
files found in the %windows%\$NtUninstallQ[random]$ directory.
By using this function the remote attacker can identify any potentially exploitable hosts located in the same network as the victim.
The attacker may then craft an exploit against those hosts, possibly by using the Metasploit framework, and then deliver the
generated shellcode back to the reconnaissance tool to be applied against the identified hosts by running the tool with the
exp_os
switch.
If the tool successfully delivers the payload and exploits the remote host(s), it will replicate the infection across the network, taking
control over new hosts, thus repeating the infection cycle all over again and spreading the infection further. Unlike traditional worm
techniques, this process is rather manual, but its danger is in the fact that the attacker can flexibly craft new attack methods,
adjusting them to the hosts present within the network, thus preying on the weakest (least updated, most vulnerable) victims along
its path.
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 25
RELATIONSHIP TO AGENT.BTZ
As seen from the check-in logs found within one of the recent samples, the time span covers almost 6 years from January 2007 till
December 2012, which is aligned with the first reports of Agent.BTZ. It
s worth noting that Agent.BTZ used the same XOR key for its
logs as the most recent variants:
1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s
Log files created by the latest samples of Snake, compiled in 2013 and 2014, were successfully decrypted with the same XOR key.
Other similarities include the usage of the virtual partition \\.\Vd1, the temporary file named FA.tmp, usage of files named

tc_read_request_pipe

tr_alloc

tc_send_request_bufs

tc_send_request

t_close

tr_write_pipe

tc_socket

snake_modules_command

snake_free

t_setoptbin

snake_alloc

The inj_snake_Win32.dll/inj_snake_x64.dll module exports 61 functions. It is designed to perform the high-level tasks

such as:

manage the configuration data (by using a queue)

exfiltrate data by using Windows Internet (WinINet) APIs or Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock) APIs:

communicate with the C&C server and receive commands to execute

submit logs to the C&C server and other reports

When the DLL activates, it reads configuration parameters from the configuration queue, that the driver creates on a virtual volume.

One of the parameters defines the pipe name(s) that the DLL should use for its communications.

The remote commands received by this Snake DLL module are designed to set up various communication parameters:

http_log

redir_str

http_no_pragma_cache

http_max_opt

http_no_accept

http_option

proxy_useragent

http_uri

proxy_bypass

no_server_hijack

proxy_server

imp_level

proxy_discover

net_password

proxy_passwd

net_user

proxy_user

write_peer_nfo

check_inet

read_peer_nfo

To post the data, the DLL can use the following User-Agent string

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0)

It may rely on the following Internet Media types (MIME types) for data exfiltration:

application/x-shockwave-flash

image/gif

image/pjpeg

application/msword

image/jpeg

application/vnd.ms-excel

image/x-xbitmap

application/vnd.ms-powerpoint

Request type it uses can either be POST of GET, and C&C server resource name is /default.asp.

BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 24

RECONNAISSANCE TOOL

One of the Snake components that could have been downloaded from a remote C&C server, was identified as a network

reconnaissance tool.

When run as a command line tool, with its logic defined with the command line switches, this tool enumerates other network hosts

and detects what Windows RPC services are enabled at the endpoints. It carries a list of interface identifiers associated with

the named pipes. It then uses these identifiers to write a message to and read a message from the associated named pipes. By

knowing what RPC services are running, it can successfully fingerprint all network hosts by mimicking the Metasploit

s logic of OS

fingerprinting via SMB. The fingerprinting allows it to reveal the following characteristics for each host found in the network:

the version of the operating system

version of the service pack

the installed network services

The data it retrieves is encrypted and saved into a configuration file %system%\vtmon.bin. This file is then further encrypted with

an NTL-based (Number Theory Library) algorithm and is uploaded by the usermode-centric Snake rootkit to the C&C server, along

with other configuration files, such as mtmon.sdb, mtmon32.sdb, gstatsnd.bin, gstat.bin, gstat32.bin, and other log

files found in the %windows%\$NtUninstallQ[random]$ directory.

By using this function the remote attacker can identify any potentially exploitable hosts located in the same network as the victim.

The attacker may then craft an exploit against those hosts, possibly by using the Metasploit framework, and then deliver the

generated shellcode back to the reconnaissance tool to be applied against the identified hosts by running the tool with the

exp_os

switch.

If the tool successfully delivers the payload and exploits the remote host(s), it will replicate the infection across the network, taking

control over new hosts, thus repeating the infection cycle all over again and spreading the infection further. Unlike traditional worm

techniques, this process is rather manual, but its danger is in the fact that the attacker can flexibly craft new attack methods,

adjusting them to the hosts present within the network, thus preying on the weakest (least updated, most vulnerable) victims along

its path.

BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 25

RELATIONSHIP TO AGENT.BTZ

As seen from the check-in logs found within one of the recent samples, the time span covers almost 6 years from January 2007 till

December 2012, which is aligned with the first reports of Agent.BTZ. It

s worth noting that Agent.BTZ used the same XOR key for its

logs as the most recent variants:

1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s

Log files created by the latest samples of Snake, compiled in 2013 and 2014, were successfully decrypted with the same XOR key.

Other similarities include the usage of the virtual partition \\.\Vd1, the temporary file named FA.tmp, usage of files named