clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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petitions, calling for reform and an end to corruption, planning to set up a pro-democracy
party, publishing rumours about SARS, communicating with groups abroad, opposing the
persecution of the Falun Gong and calling for a review of the 1989 crackdown on the
democracy protests . . .
(Kumar 2006). Other emerging non-traditional threats include mob
mentality, consumer price manipulation, domestic hacker groups who can damage and
interfere with the Chinese government or drag it into conflict with other states, and the
security of the identity and financial details of a growing online consumer market (Delio
2001).
In addition to China
s economy being directly linked to military issues, so too are domestic
threats, soft power, and the control of information. Readily available free web sources, such
as blogs, photo uploading, video uploading, Podcasts, torrents, and RSS feeds, have given
powers to individuals that were once restricted to large media outlets. Social networking
sites allow for the spread of this information across the globe at speeds exceeding traditional
mass media, and they are capable of reaching larger markets. These social networking
services, often referred to as Web 2.0, are noted for their ability for people to collaborate and
share information online, particularly emphasizing real-time dynamic displays,
interconnectedness, and being a part of a larger community. China maintains strict
government control over television, newspapers, and radio; therefore these new forms of
distribution pose a threat to China
s control. Censorship of the internet by China, known as
the Great Firewall, can be seen in the banning of foreign sites, such as Blogger and Voice of
America, as well as a wide range of search terms and images the government deems a threat
to national security or counter-productive to the political party. During the 2007 uprising in
Tibet, China blocked access to the video website YouTube (Richards 2008), and on multiple
occasions it has been accused of using Photoshop to digitally alter photos in its favour
(Pasternack 2008; Yue 2008). With the increasing popularity and economic success of Web
2.0, coupled with China
s global presence (prestige and international scrutiny) it is unlikely
that the Chinese government will ban these new forms of news distribution on a permanent
basis. However, it will seek to understand and entrench itself within the emerging system.
China has struggled to cope with internal and external cyber dissidents. This includes prodemocracy movements and the dissemination of sensitive information such as the spread of
SARS and human rights abuses. Pro-democracy activists Li Yibing and Jiang Lijun of Hong
Kong used virtual dead drops to secretly pass messages, such as a plot to
disrupt the 16th
Communist Party Congress by phoning the police with a false bomb alert
(Reporters
Without Borders 2006). Each member knew the user name and password to a single email
account. They would save messages as drafts, allowing the other member to log in and read
it at a later point. This avoided detection, because no message was ever sent. This represents
an asymmetric advantage provided by new technology; however China demonstrated its
prowess in using the same technology to combat the cyber-dissidents by using international
cooperation, internet laws, and online eavesdropping. Activists can use the internet to build
coalitions, create e-petitions, and organize protests, using elements such as maps, lookouts,
and live broadcasts. Foreign bloggers using commercially available satellite imagery have
compromised Chinese military secrets on numerous occasions. These non-governmental
bloggers have uncovered a Chinese site used for developing submarine technology, a training
facility used to prepare for a potential conflict with India, and the construction of a fourth
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
satellite and missile launch facility in Hainan (Reporters Without Borders 2006; Yahoo
implicated in third cyberdissident trial 2006).
Determined Chinese internet users are finding ways around The Great Firewall. One popular
way is to use proxy relays. A proxy server acts as an intermediate; it allows them to access
banned sites through servers that are based abroad. Other techniques include using
specifically designed software, circumventors, tunnelling, encryption, and cached pages.
Several foreign organizations have voluntarily taken on the task of circumventing China
censorship and making this information public. Among the groups that may have breached
The Great Firewall are the University of Cambridge, the University of Toronto, M.I.T.,
underground hackers (presumably doing it just for the challenge), and groups formed by
Chinese defectors. Software such as Dynapass, Ultrasurf, Freegate and Garden Networks are
used by approximately 100,000 people in China to gain access to news and information that
is blocked by the firewall. With the increasing interconnectivity of modern times, China
must actively defend against these internal threats or risk having collateral damage to the
military, soft power, economy, and political integrity (China Tightens Vice on Internet 2006).
Despite some drawbacks, it is in China
s best interest to promote the growth of the internet as
it will boost the economy, improve education, and keep the nation competitive in the 21st
century. New freedoms for expressing political opinion will be counterbalanced by new
means of censorship and means to reduce a widening digital and social divide. The Chinese
government must be moderate in its approach to censorship and the digital divide or it runs
the risk of widespread dissent resulting from increasing socio-economic/rural-urban
disparities. The impact of the internet on China
s near future will be one of expanded
growth, a complex interaction of balances, and a constant adaptation to evolving technologies
from within pre-established ideologies. The following sections will further demonstrate how
the average internet user is becoming intertwined with military activity.
3. Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack
NCW, IO, FCS, and Informationization are not identical to cyber attack and cyber
reconnaissance; however they significantly overlap. The first four, discussed above, tend to
deal with the hi-tech advancement of traditional military assets, PSYOPS, and media warfare
all of which rely on the internet in some form. The lexicon is continuing to develop, having
at times included the terms: total dimensional warfare, expeditionary forces, command and
control warfare, information warfare, full spectrum dominance, and electronic warfare.
Cyber attack may be thought of as hacking with the intent to destroy or disrupt. This could
include the physical destruction of a computer, deleting/re-writing of files, or knocking a
network or service offline. Cyber reconnaissance is the collection of data, also known as
cyber espionage or network intrusion. This may include technology transfer or intelligence,
such as troop locations or weaknesses that could be used in an attack. In many cases a hacker
goes from reconnaissance to attack at will. Here all six will be addressed
NCW, IO, FCS,
Informationization, Cyber Attack, and Cyber Reconnaissance - as components of cyber
warfare (China
s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space
Warfare Capabilities 2008).
This section will examine cyber reconnaissance with an emphasis on Chinese examples and
military applications. In addition to China
s stated goal of informationization and the quasiofficially endorsed book, Unrestricted Warfare, this section will show that foreign allegations

petitions, calling for reform and an end to corruption, planning to set up a pro-democracy

party, publishing rumours about SARS, communicating with groups abroad, opposing the

persecution of the Falun Gong and calling for a review of the 1989 crackdown on the

democracy protests . . .

(Kumar 2006). Other emerging non-traditional threats include mob

mentality, consumer price manipulation, domestic hacker groups who can damage and

interfere with the Chinese government or drag it into conflict with other states, and the

security of the identity and financial details of a growing online consumer market (Delio

2001).

In addition to China

s economy being directly linked to military issues, so too are domestic

threats, soft power, and the control of information. Readily available free web sources, such

as blogs, photo uploading, video uploading, Podcasts, torrents, and RSS feeds, have given

powers to individuals that were once restricted to large media outlets. Social networking

sites allow for the spread of this information across the globe at speeds exceeding traditional

mass media, and they are capable of reaching larger markets. These social networking

services, often referred to as Web 2.0, are noted for their ability for people to collaborate and

share information online, particularly emphasizing real-time dynamic displays,

interconnectedness, and being a part of a larger community. China maintains strict

government control over television, newspapers, and radio; therefore these new forms of

distribution pose a threat to China

s control. Censorship of the internet by China, known as

the Great Firewall, can be seen in the banning of foreign sites, such as Blogger and Voice of

America, as well as a wide range of search terms and images the government deems a threat

to national security or counter-productive to the political party. During the 2007 uprising in

Tibet, China blocked access to the video website YouTube (Richards 2008), and on multiple

occasions it has been accused of using Photoshop to digitally alter photos in its favour

(Pasternack 2008; Yue 2008). With the increasing popularity and economic success of Web

2.0, coupled with China

s global presence (prestige and international scrutiny) it is unlikely

that the Chinese government will ban these new forms of news distribution on a permanent

basis. However, it will seek to understand and entrench itself within the emerging system.

China has struggled to cope with internal and external cyber dissidents. This includes prodemocracy movements and the dissemination of sensitive information such as the spread of

SARS and human rights abuses. Pro-democracy activists Li Yibing and Jiang Lijun of Hong

Kong used virtual dead drops to secretly pass messages, such as a plot to

disrupt the 16th

Communist Party Congress by phoning the police with a false bomb alert

(Reporters

Without Borders 2006). Each member knew the user name and password to a single email

account. They would save messages as drafts, allowing the other member to log in and read

it at a later point. This avoided detection, because no message was ever sent. This represents

an asymmetric advantage provided by new technology; however China demonstrated its

prowess in using the same technology to combat the cyber-dissidents by using international

cooperation, internet laws, and online eavesdropping. Activists can use the internet to build

coalitions, create e-petitions, and organize protests, using elements such as maps, lookouts,

and live broadcasts. Foreign bloggers using commercially available satellite imagery have

compromised Chinese military secrets on numerous occasions. These non-governmental

bloggers have uncovered a Chinese site used for developing submarine technology, a training

facility used to prepare for a potential conflict with India, and the construction of a fourth

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

satellite and missile launch facility in Hainan (Reporters Without Borders 2006; Yahoo

implicated in third cyberdissident trial 2006).

Determined Chinese internet users are finding ways around The Great Firewall. One popular

way is to use proxy relays. A proxy server acts as an intermediate; it allows them to access

banned sites through servers that are based abroad. Other techniques include using

specifically designed software, circumventors, tunnelling, encryption, and cached pages.

Several foreign organizations have voluntarily taken on the task of circumventing China

censorship and making this information public. Among the groups that may have breached

The Great Firewall are the University of Cambridge, the University of Toronto, M.I.T.,

underground hackers (presumably doing it just for the challenge), and groups formed by

Chinese defectors. Software such as Dynapass, Ultrasurf, Freegate and Garden Networks are

used by approximately 100,000 people in China to gain access to news and information that

is blocked by the firewall. With the increasing interconnectivity of modern times, China

must actively defend against these internal threats or risk having collateral damage to the

military, soft power, economy, and political integrity (China Tightens Vice on Internet 2006).

Despite some drawbacks, it is in China

s best interest to promote the growth of the internet as

it will boost the economy, improve education, and keep the nation competitive in the 21st

century. New freedoms for expressing political opinion will be counterbalanced by new

means of censorship and means to reduce a widening digital and social divide. The Chinese

government must be moderate in its approach to censorship and the digital divide or it runs

the risk of widespread dissent resulting from increasing socio-economic/rural-urban

disparities. The impact of the internet on China

s near future will be one of expanded

growth, a complex interaction of balances, and a constant adaptation to evolving technologies

from within pre-established ideologies. The following sections will further demonstrate how

the average internet user is becoming intertwined with military activity.

3. Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack

NCW, IO, FCS, and Informationization are not identical to cyber attack and cyber

reconnaissance; however they significantly overlap. The first four, discussed above, tend to

deal with the hi-tech advancement of traditional military assets, PSYOPS, and media warfare

all of which rely on the internet in some form. The lexicon is continuing to develop, having

at times included the terms: total dimensional warfare, expeditionary forces, command and

control warfare, information warfare, full spectrum dominance, and electronic warfare.

Cyber attack may be thought of as hacking with the intent to destroy or disrupt. This could

include the physical destruction of a computer, deleting/re-writing of files, or knocking a

network or service offline. Cyber reconnaissance is the collection of data, also known as

cyber espionage or network intrusion. This may include technology transfer or intelligence,

such as troop locations or weaknesses that could be used in an attack. In many cases a hacker

goes from reconnaissance to attack at will. Here all six will be addressed

NCW, IO, FCS,

Informationization, Cyber Attack, and Cyber Reconnaissance - as components of cyber

warfare (China

s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space

Warfare Capabilities 2008).

This section will examine cyber reconnaissance with an emphasis on Chinese examples and

military applications. In addition to China

s stated goal of informationization and the quasiofficially endorsed book, Unrestricted Warfare, this section will show that foreign allegations