clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
[4] http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network
[5] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249
[6] http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS10-002.mspx
[7] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare
[8] Inside CyberWarfare by Jeffrey Carr http://oreilly.com/catalog/9780596802165
[9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framebuffer
[10] http://www.forensicfocus.com/downloads/windows-registry-quick-reference.pdf
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Attachment 1 - Night Dragon Specific Protection
Measures for Consideration
The exploits and methods contained in Night Dragon
s attack set are not new or unique to
our industry, nor are the approaches or methods to combat it. However NERC issues this
Advisory in response to an identified pattern of activity that has been directed against the
energy sector. This Advisory communicates specific information and suggested actions for
Night Dragon in accordance with standard detection, prevention, and recovery phases of a
strong incident response program.
The following framework provides two sets of prioritized measures and countermeasures
that may be useful to prevent traffic to and from known
command and control
(C&C)
servers and domains, and identify the presence of Night Dragon activity on specific
systems. They begin with simple low-cost, low-impact, high-value prevention and detection
suggestions, and escalate to more invasive actions should evidence of Night Dragon
activity or compromise be found.
These actions are based on information available as of February 18, 2011, and while they
offer good suggestions to detect and combat Night Dragon, they provide no guarantee that
a targeted attack against your systems would be unsuccessful. If you have not already
done so, take this opportunity to establish a reporting relationship with ICS CERT and
NERC
s ES-ISAC for real-time sharing of any new information on this attack set such as
additional C&C servers, updated search strings, new variants, etc.
Entities should also closely monitor their relevant security vendors for signature updates
and detection and removal tools. Some of these measures are invasive and could create
problems with operational systems. It is important to understand your technology
environment and the impact these tools could have on operational systems prior to any
deployment.
Primary Protection and Discovery Measures
The following three actions are important first steps in detecting and preventing known
Night Dragon activity.
1. Apply access control restrictions on all perimeter devices.
a. Modify email blacklists and firewall Access Control Lists ACLs to deny, log
and alert on traffic to/from the following primary domains used by the known
C&C servers. And, according to McAfee 1 all four domains have been used
frequently by other Malware so blocking them may be warranted regardless.
i. is-a-chef.com
ii. thruhere.net
iii. office-on-the.net
http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/night-dragon.aspx?cid=WBB009
Night Dragon
Specific Protection Measures for Consideration
iv. selfip.com.
b. Modify Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems
(IPS), and other deep-packet inspection tools to detect and alert on network
traffic associated with Night Dragon activity. If detected, validate as malicious
and consider blocking the traffic in addition to triggering an alert:
i. Each communication packet between compromised hosts and the
C&C servers are signed with a plain text signature of
hW$.
(Or
\x68\x57\x24\x13
) at the byte offset 0x0C within the TCP packet.
ii. Backdoor beacon, identified by a 5-second interval with an initial
packet with the pattern:
\x01\x50[\x00-\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.
iii. Beacon acknowledgement with the pattern:
\x02\x60[\x00\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.
iv. Periodic heartbeat or keep-alive signal with the pattern:
\x03\x50[\x00-\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.
v. Plaintext password exchange with the pattern:
\x03\x50[\x00\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.
c. Open source IDS signatures have been made available on a number of open
source websites and added to open source rule sets. Some commercially
available IDS / IPS signatures have also been updated to include Night
Dragon detection.
i. CISCO specific information can be found here:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=33819&signatureSubId=0
ii. SNORT specific information can be found here:
http://www.snort.org/vrt/docs/ruleset_changelogs/2_9_0_4/changes-2011-02-10.html
d. Identify and examine any hosts generating suspected Night Dragon traffic
and take necessary action to respond and recover.
e. Maintain vigil for additions to Night Dragon
s C&C server and signature lists
and quickly update your defenses accordingly.
2. While there is no
patch
for Night Dragon, as a preventative measure ensure that
security patches on all servers are up to date, especially for external-facing web
servers as they are primary attack vectors.
3. Conduct keyword searches or
greps
of current and archived perimeter logs
looking for signs of traffic to/from the known C&C servers (e.g.
find
is-a-chef.com
grep 'is-a-chef.com' /logfilename
). Examine both ICS and corporate network
perimeter logs and as far back as possible to the dates recommended by the
MacAfee whitepaper.
Secondary Protection Measures

[4] http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network

[5] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249

[6] http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS10-002.mspx

[7] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare

[8] Inside CyberWarfare by Jeffrey Carr http://oreilly.com/catalog/9780596802165

[9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framebuffer

[10] http://www.forensicfocus.com/downloads/windows-registry-quick-reference.pdf

CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ

Attachment 1 - Night Dragon Specific Protection

Measures for Consideration

The exploits and methods contained in Night Dragon

s attack set are not new or unique to

our industry, nor are the approaches or methods to combat it. However NERC issues this

Advisory in response to an identified pattern of activity that has been directed against the

energy sector. This Advisory communicates specific information and suggested actions for

Night Dragon in accordance with standard detection, prevention, and recovery phases of a

strong incident response program.

The following framework provides two sets of prioritized measures and countermeasures

that may be useful to prevent traffic to and from known

command and control

(C&C)

servers and domains, and identify the presence of Night Dragon activity on specific

systems. They begin with simple low-cost, low-impact, high-value prevention and detection

suggestions, and escalate to more invasive actions should evidence of Night Dragon

activity or compromise be found.

These actions are based on information available as of February 18, 2011, and while they

offer good suggestions to detect and combat Night Dragon, they provide no guarantee that

a targeted attack against your systems would be unsuccessful. If you have not already

done so, take this opportunity to establish a reporting relationship with ICS CERT and

NERC

s ES-ISAC for real-time sharing of any new information on this attack set such as

additional C&C servers, updated search strings, new variants, etc.

Entities should also closely monitor their relevant security vendors for signature updates

and detection and removal tools. Some of these measures are invasive and could create

problems with operational systems. It is important to understand your technology

environment and the impact these tools could have on operational systems prior to any

deployment.

Primary Protection and Discovery Measures

The following three actions are important first steps in detecting and preventing known

Night Dragon activity.

1. Apply access control restrictions on all perimeter devices.

a. Modify email blacklists and firewall Access Control Lists ACLs to deny, log

and alert on traffic to/from the following primary domains used by the known

C&C servers. And, according to McAfee 1 all four domains have been used

frequently by other Malware so blocking them may be warranted regardless.

i. is-a-chef.com

ii. thruhere.net

iii. office-on-the.net

http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/night-dragon.aspx?cid=WBB009

Night Dragon

Specific Protection Measures for Consideration

iv. selfip.com.

b. Modify Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems

(IPS), and other deep-packet inspection tools to detect and alert on network

traffic associated with Night Dragon activity. If detected, validate as malicious

and consider blocking the traffic in addition to triggering an alert:

i. Each communication packet between compromised hosts and the

C&C servers are signed with a plain text signature of

hW$.

(Or

\x68\x57\x24\x13

) at the byte offset 0x0C within the TCP packet.

ii. Backdoor beacon, identified by a 5-second interval with an initial

packet with the pattern:

\x01\x50[\x00-\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.

iii. Beacon acknowledgement with the pattern:

\x02\x60[\x00\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.

iv. Periodic heartbeat or keep-alive signal with the pattern:

\x03\x50[\x00-\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.

v. Plaintext password exchange with the pattern:

\x03\x50[\x00\xff]+\x68\x57\x24\x13.

c. Open source IDS signatures have been made available on a number of open

source websites and added to open source rule sets. Some commercially

available IDS / IPS signatures have also been updated to include Night

Dragon detection.

i. CISCO specific information can be found here:

http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=33819&signatureSubId=0

ii. SNORT specific information can be found here:

http://www.snort.org/vrt/docs/ruleset_changelogs/2_9_0_4/changes-2011-02-10.html

d. Identify and examine any hosts generating suspected Night Dragon traffic

and take necessary action to respond and recover.

e. Maintain vigil for additions to Night Dragon

s C&C server and signature lists

and quickly update your defenses accordingly.

2. While there is no

patch

for Night Dragon, as a preventative measure ensure that

security patches on all servers are up to date, especially for external-facing web

servers as they are primary attack vectors.

3. Conduct keyword searches or

greps

of current and archived perimeter logs

looking for signs of traffic to/from the known C&C servers (e.g.

find

is-a-chef.com

grep 'is-a-chef.com' /logfilename

). Examine both ICS and corporate network

perimeter logs and as far back as possible to the dates recommended by the

MacAfee whitepaper.

Secondary Protection Measures