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Resource decryption - Resource size is 0x158.
The malware does not modify the first 8 bytes of the resource and decodes the remaining
0x150 bytes using bitwise XOR on the 0x150 byte of the resource with 0x99 as the key. The
following decoding logic is used:
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
//----->Start decoding code
int k = 0;
//used for output buffer - decode result
for(int i = 0; i < 0x150; i+=4)
for(int j = 0; j < 0x04; j++)
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] ^ 0x99;
if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] >= 0x41 && rsrc_buffer[i+j] =< 0x5A ) //0x41 = 'A' | 0x5A = Z
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] - 0x41;
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] >= 0x61 && rsrc_buffer[i+j] =< 0x7A ) //0x61 = 'a' | 0x7A = 'z'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] - 0x47;
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] >= 0x30 && rsrc_buffer[i+j] =< 0x39) //0x30 = '0' | 0x39 = '9'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] + 0x04;
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] == 0x2B) // 0x2B = '+'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = 0x3E; // 0x3E = '>'
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] == 0x2F) // 0x2F = '/'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = 0x3F; // 0x3F = '?'
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] == 0x3D) // 0x2F = '='
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = 0x00;
}//for(int j = 0; j < 0x04; j++)
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] >> 0x04
rsrc_buffer[i] = rsrc_buffer[i] << 0x02
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i] | rsrc_buffer[i+1]
[rsrc_result + k] = rsrc_buffer[i+1]
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] << 0x04
rsrc_buffer[i+2] = rsrc_buffer[i+2] >> 0x02
rsrc_buffer[i+2] = rsrc_buffer[i+2] | rsrc_buffer[i+1]
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+2]
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] << 0x06
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] | rsrc_buffer[i+3]
[rsrc_result + k + 1] = rsrc_buffer[i+2]
[rsrc_result + k + 2] = rsrc_buffer[i+1]
k+=3;
//for(int i = 0; i < 0x150; i+=4)
//----->End decoding code
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Appendix D - Real-time Graphical Control
The Hydraq backdoor client can initiate real-time graphical control through the installation of Virtual Network Computing (VNC). Based on the malware code, the VNC DLL component can be
installed in this sequence:
1. Client sends Command 0x04 Task 0x08 to upload the file acelpvc.dll.
2. Client initiates Command 0x07 Task 0x0B.
a. Get the file attributes of the file %System%\acelpvc.dll,
check if it is directory or file,
exit if its a directory.
b. Get address of acelpvc.dll
s export function
EntryMain
c. Get the file attribute of the file %System%\VedioDriver.dll,
check if it is directory or file,
exit if its a directory.
3.1 If %System%\VedioDriver.dll exists,
a. Load acelpvc.dll in the memory space of the malware.
b. Execute acelpvc.dll
s EntryMain export function with the server IP address and port
as the parameter. The client is expected to have a VNC client to receive the framebuffer [9] from the server.
3.2 If %System%\VedioDriver.dll does NOT exist,
a. Contact the client to download VedioDriver.dll
b. The Server receives VedioDriver.dll from the client.
c. Verify the CRC value of the created file from the server, and delete if it is different.
d. Modify the file
s date and time attributes to be the same as the system file,
user32.dll.
[Appendix D Figure 01 - Acelpvc.dll list of APIs used in the Import Table]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
[Appendix D Figure 02 - VedioDriver.dll Export Functions]
Appendix E - Domain Name List
360.homeunix.com
www.ccmp1.com
blog1.servebeer.com
sl1.homelinux.org
update.ourhobby.com
ftp2.homeunix.com
Complete List as published at http://www.security.nl/files/aurorafiles.txt
69.164.192.4
alt1.homelinux.com
amt1.homelinux.com
aop1.homelinux.com
app1.homelinux.com
blogspot.blogsite.org
filoups.info
ftpaccess.cc
google.homeunix.com
members.linode.com
tyuqwer.dyndns.org
voanews.ath.cx
webswan.33iqst.com:4000
yahoo.8866.org
ymail.ath.cx
yahooo.8866.org
connectproxy.3322.org
csport.2288.org
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Reference
[1] http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
[2] http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm
[3] http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf