func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TEST_F(ZNCTest, ModpythonVCString) {
if (QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment().value(
"DISABLED_ZNC_PERL_PYTHON_TEST") == "1") {
return;
}
auto znc = Run();
znc->CanLeak();
InstallModule("test.py", R"(
import znc
class test(znc.Module):
def OnUserRawMessage(self, msg):
self.PutModule(str(msg.GetParams()))
return znc.CONTINUE
)");
auto ircd = ConnectIRCd();
auto client = LoginClient();
client.Write("znc loadmod modpython");
client.Write("znc loadmod test");
client.Write("PRIVMSG *test :foo");
client.ReadUntil("'*test', 'foo'");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
znc
|
64613bc8b6b4adf1e32231f9844d99cd512b8973
| 72,598,529,378,975,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917
|
void FIPS_drbg_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval)
{
dctx->reseed_interval = interval;
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
200f249b8c3b6439e0200d01caadc24806f1a983
| 228,374,941,055,808,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Remove Dual EC DRBG from FIPS module.
|
static inline int paravirt_pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return PVOP_CALL1(int, mmu.pgd_alloc, mm);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-276"
] |
linux
|
cadfad870154e14f745ec845708bc17d166065f2
| 337,741,477,322,326,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
x86/ioperm: Fix io bitmap invalidation on Xen PV
tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() wasn't wired up properly through the pvop
machinery, so the TSS and Xen's io bitmap would get out of sync
whenever disabling a valid io bitmap.
Add a new pvop for tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() to fix it.
This is XSA-329.
Fixes: 22fe5b0439dd ("x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d53075590e1f91c19f8af705059d3ff99424c020.1595030016.git.luto@kernel.org
|
void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
* pi_state_list anymore, but we have to be careful
* versus waiters unqueueing themselves:
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
while (!list_empty(head)) {
next = head->next;
pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list);
key = pi_state->key;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
/*
* We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this
* task still owns the PI-state:
*/
if (head->next != next) {
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
continue;
}
WARN_ON(pi_state->owner != curr);
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
pi_state->owner = NULL;
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
get_pi_state(pi_state);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
put_pi_state(pi_state);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
48fb6f4db940e92cfb16cd878cddd59ea6120d06
| 150,789,850,530,146,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
futex: Remove unnecessary warning from get_futex_key
Commit 65d8fc777f6d ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in
get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the
side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully.
Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed and
the first warning assumed a correct application would not alter a
mapping backing a futex key. Since merging, it has not triggered for
any unexpected case but Mark Rutland reported the following bug
triggering due to the first warning.
kernel BUG at kernel/futex.c:679!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3695 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00020-g307fec773ba3 #3
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffff80001e271780 task.stack: ffff000010908000
PC is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679
LR is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679
pc : [<ffff00000821ac14>] lr : [<ffff00000821ac14>] pstate: 80000145
The fact that it's a bug instead of a warning was due to an unrelated
arm64 problem, but the warning itself triggered because the underlying
mapping changed.
This is an application issue but from a kernel perspective it's a
recoverable situation and the warning is unnecessary so this patch
removes the warning. The warning may potentially be triggered with the
following test program from Mark although it may be necessary to adjust
NR_FUTEX_THREADS to be a value smaller than the number of CPUs in the
system.
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define NR_FUTEX_THREADS 16
pthread_t threads[NR_FUTEX_THREADS];
void *mem;
#define MEM_PROT (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)
#define MEM_SIZE 65536
static int futex_wrapper(int *uaddr, int op, int val,
const struct timespec *timeout,
int *uaddr2, int val3)
{
syscall(SYS_futex, uaddr, op, val, timeout, uaddr2, val3);
}
void *poll_futex(void *unused)
{
for (;;) {
futex_wrapper(mem, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, NULL, mem + 4, 1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i;
mem = mmap(NULL, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
printf("Mapping @ %p\n", mem);
printf("Creating futex threads...\n");
for (i = 0; i < NR_FUTEX_THREADS; i++)
pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, poll_futex, NULL);
printf("Flipping mapping...\n");
for (;;) {
mmap(mem, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int ESS_add_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc)
{
ASN1_STRING *seq = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *pp = NULL;
int len;
len = i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, NULL);
if (!(pp = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len)))
{
TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = pp;
i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, &p);
if (!(seq = ASN1_STRING_new()) || !ASN1_STRING_set(seq, pp, len))
{
TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(pp); pp = NULL;
return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,
NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, seq);
err:
ASN1_STRING_free(seq);
OPENSSL_free(pp);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
c7235be6e36c4bef84594aa3b2f0561db84b63d8
| 139,233,012,257,609,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification.
Submitted by: Zoltan Glozik <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Ulf Moeller
|
static ssize_t clear_refs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task;
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int type;
int rv;
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1)
count = sizeof(buffer) - 1;
if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
rv = kstrtoint(strstrip(buffer), 10, &type);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (type < CLEAR_REFS_ALL || type > CLEAR_REFS_MAPPED)
return -EINVAL;
task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
struct mm_walk clear_refs_walk = {
.pmd_entry = clear_refs_pte_range,
.mm = mm,
};
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
clear_refs_walk.private = vma;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
continue;
/*
* Writing 1 to /proc/pid/clear_refs affects all pages.
*
* Writing 2 to /proc/pid/clear_refs only affects
* Anonymous pages.
*
* Writing 3 to /proc/pid/clear_refs only affects file
* mapped pages.
*/
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_ANON && vma->vm_file)
continue;
if (type == CLEAR_REFS_MAPPED && !vma->vm_file)
continue;
walk_page_range(vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
&clear_refs_walk);
}
flush_tlb_mm(mm);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
}
put_task_struct(task);
return count;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux-2.6
|
1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25
| 4,309,956,720,546,959,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 |
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38+]
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void fdctrl_handle_powerdown_mode(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
fdctrl->pwrd = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl_to_result_phase(fdctrl, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qemu
|
defac5e2fbddf8423a354ff0454283a2115e1367
| 324,040,273,288,827,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
hw/block/fdc: Prevent end-of-track overrun (CVE-2021-3507)
Per the 82078 datasheet, if the end-of-track (EOT byte in
the FIFO) is more than the number of sectors per side, the
command is terminated unsuccessfully:
* 5.2.5 DATA TRANSFER TERMINATION
The 82078 supports terminal count explicitly through
the TC pin and implicitly through the underrun/over-
run and end-of-track (EOT) functions. For full sector
transfers, the EOT parameter can define the last
sector to be transferred in a single or multisector
transfer. If the last sector to be transferred is a par-
tial sector, the host can stop transferring the data in
mid-sector, and the 82078 will continue to complete
the sector as if a hardware TC was received. The
only difference between these implicit functions and
TC is that they return "abnormal termination" result
status. Such status indications can be ignored if they
were expected.
* 6.1.3 READ TRACK
This command terminates when the EOT specified
number of sectors have been read. If the 82078
does not find an I D Address Mark on the diskette
after the second· occurrence of a pulse on the
INDX# pin, then it sets the IC code in Status Regis-
ter 0 to "01" (Abnormal termination), sets the MA bit
in Status Register 1 to "1", and terminates the com-
mand.
* 6.1.6 VERIFY
Refer to Table 6-6 and Table 6-7 for information
concerning the values of MT and EC versus SC and
EOT value.
* Table 6·6. Result Phase Table
* Table 6-7. Verify Command Result Phase Table
Fix by aborting the transfer when EOT > # Sectors Per Side.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]>
Fixes: baca51faff0 ("floppy driver: disk geometry auto detect")
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/339
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hanna Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
|
rvbd_probe_decode_version_type(const guint8 vt, guint8 *ver, guint8 *type)
{
if (vt & PROBE_VERSION_MASK) {
*ver = PROBE_VERSION_1;
*type = vt >> 4;
} else {
*ver = PROBE_VERSION_2;
*type = vt >> 1;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-354"
] |
wireshark
|
7f3fe6164a68b76d9988c4253b24d43f498f1753
| 56,310,037,003,154,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
TCP: do not use an unknown status when the checksum is 0xffff
Otherwise it triggers an assert when adding the column as the field is
defined as BASE_NONE and not BASE_DEC or BASE_HEX. Thus an unknown value
(not in proto_checksum_vals[)array) cannot be represented.
Mark the checksum as bad even if we process the packet.
Closes #16816
Conflicts:
epan/dissectors/packet-tcp.c
|
bool val_native_from_item(THD *thd, Item *item, Native *to)
{
DBUG_ASSERT(is_fixed());
null_value= item->val_native(thd, to);
DBUG_ASSERT(null_value == item->null_value);
return null_value;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8
| 102,045,457,290,038,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item.
|
static void tm_unavailable(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (user_mode(regs)) {
current->thread.load_tm++;
regs->msr |= MSR_TM;
tm_enable();
tm_restore_sprs(¤t->thread);
return;
}
#endif
pr_emerg("Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
5d176f751ee3c6eededd984ad409bff201f436a7
| 232,497,261,634,991,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
powerpc: tm: Enable transactional memory (TM) lazily for userspace
Currently the MSR TM bit is always set if the hardware is TM capable.
This adds extra overhead as it means the TM SPRS (TFHAR, TEXASR and
TFAIR) must be swapped for each process regardless of if they use TM.
For processes that don't use TM the TM MSR bit can be turned off
allowing the kernel to avoid the expensive swap of the TM registers.
A TM unavailable exception will occur if a thread does use TM and the
kernel will enable MSR_TM and leave it so for some time afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
|
bool Binary::has_nx() const {
if (!header().has(HEADER_FLAGS::MH_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION)) {
LIEF_INFO("Heap could be executable");
}
return !header().has(HEADER_FLAGS::MH_ALLOW_STACK_EXECUTION);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
LIEF
|
7acf0bc4224081d4f425fcc8b2e361b95291d878
| 40,159,539,514,789,952,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Resolve #764
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_write_jp2c(opj_jp2_t *jp2,
opj_stream_private_t *cio,
opj_event_mgr_t * p_manager)
{
OPJ_OFF_T j2k_codestream_exit;
OPJ_BYTE l_data_header [8];
/* preconditions */
assert(jp2 != 00);
assert(cio != 00);
assert(p_manager != 00);
assert(opj_stream_has_seek(cio));
j2k_codestream_exit = opj_stream_tell(cio);
opj_write_bytes(l_data_header,
(OPJ_UINT32)(j2k_codestream_exit - jp2->j2k_codestream_offset),
4); /* size of codestream */
opj_write_bytes(l_data_header + 4, JP2_JP2C,
4); /* JP2C */
if (! opj_stream_seek(cio, jp2->j2k_codestream_offset, p_manager)) {
opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, "Failed to seek in the stream.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (opj_stream_write_data(cio, l_data_header, 8, p_manager) != 8) {
opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, "Failed to seek in the stream.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_stream_seek(cio, j2k_codestream_exit, p_manager)) {
opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, "Failed to seek in the stream.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
openjpeg
|
4edb8c83374f52cd6a8f2c7c875e8ffacccb5fa5
| 150,368,411,460,426,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
Add support for generation of PLT markers in encoder
* -PLT switch added to opj_compress
* Add a opj_encoder_set_extra_options() function that
accepts a PLT=YES option, and could be expanded later
for other uses.
-------
Testing with a Sentinel2 10m band, T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2,
coming from S2A_MSIL1C_20160914T074612_N0204_R135_T36JTT_20160914T081456.SAFE
Decompress it to TIFF:
```
opj_uncompress -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 -o T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.tif
```
Recompress it with similar parameters as original:
```
opj_compress -n 5 -c [256,256],[256,256],[256,256],[256,256],[256,256] -t 1024,1024 -PLT -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.tif -o T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2
```
Dump codestream detail with GDAL dump_jp2.py utility (https://github.com/OSGeo/gdal/blob/master/gdal/swig/python/samples/dump_jp2.py)
```
python dump_jp2.py T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 > /tmp/dump_sentinel2_ori.txt
python dump_jp2.py T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 > /tmp/dump_sentinel2_openjpeg_plt.txt
```
The diff between both show very similar structure, and identical number of packets in PLT markers
Now testing with Kakadu (KDU803_Demo_Apps_for_Linux-x86-64_200210)
Full file decompression:
```
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 -o tmp.tif
Consumed 121 tile-part(s) from a total of 121 tile(s).
Consumed 80,318,806 codestream bytes (excluding any file format) = 5.329697
bits/pel.
Processed using the multi-threaded environment, with
8 parallel threads of execution
```
Partial decompresson (presumably using PLT markers):
```
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 -o tmp.pgm -region "{0.5,0.5},{0.01,0.01}"
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 -o tmp2.pgm -region "{0.5,0.5},{0.01,0.01}"
diff tmp.pgm tmp2.pgm && echo "same !"
```
-------
Funded by ESA for S2-MPC project
|
static InputObject *newInputObject(request_rec *r)
{
InputObject *self;
self = PyObject_New(InputObject, &Input_Type);
if (self == NULL)
return NULL;
self->r = r;
self->init = 0;
self->done = 0;
self->buffer = NULL;
self->size = 0;
self->offset = 0;
self->length = 0;
return self;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mod_wsgi
|
d9d5fea585b23991f76532a9b07de7fcd3b649f4
| 7,734,935,130,267,538,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Local privilege escalation when using daemon mode. (CVE-2014-0240)
|
void LibRaw::x3f_load_raw()
{
// already in try/catch
int raise_error=0;
x3f_t *x3f = (x3f_t*)_x3f_data;
if(!x3f) return; // No data pointer set
if(X3F_OK == x3f_load_data(x3f, x3f_get_raw(x3f)))
{
x3f_directory_entry_t *DE = x3f_get_raw(x3f);
x3f_directory_entry_header_t *DEH = &DE->header;
x3f_image_data_t *ID = &DEH->data_subsection.image_data;
if(!ID)
throw LIBRAW_EXCEPTION_IO_CORRUPT;
x3f_quattro_t *Q = ID->quattro;
x3f_huffman_t *HUF = ID->huffman;
x3f_true_t *TRU = ID->tru;
uint16_t *data = NULL;
if(ID->rows != S.raw_height || ID->columns != S.raw_width)
{
raise_error = 1;
goto end;
}
if (HUF != NULL)
data = HUF->x3rgb16.data;
if (TRU != NULL)
data = TRU->x3rgb16.data;
if (data == NULL)
{
raise_error = 1;
goto end;
}
size_t datasize = S.raw_height*S.raw_width*3*sizeof(unsigned short);
S.raw_pitch = S.raw_width*3*sizeof(unsigned short);
if(!(imgdata.rawdata.raw_alloc = malloc(datasize)))
throw LIBRAW_EXCEPTION_ALLOC;
imgdata.rawdata.color3_image = (ushort (*)[3])imgdata.rawdata.raw_alloc;
if(HUF)
memmove(imgdata.rawdata.raw_alloc,data,datasize);
else if(TRU && (!Q || !Q->quattro_layout))
memmove(imgdata.rawdata.raw_alloc,data,datasize);
else if(TRU && Q)
{
// Move quattro data in place
// R/B plane
for(int prow = 0; prow < TRU->x3rgb16.rows && prow < S.raw_height/2; prow++)
{
ushort (*destrow)[3] = (unsigned short (*)[3]) &imgdata.rawdata.color3_image[prow*2*S.raw_pitch/3/sizeof(ushort)][0];
ushort (*srcrow)[3] = (unsigned short (*)[3]) &data[prow*TRU->x3rgb16.row_stride];
for(int pcol = 0; pcol < TRU->x3rgb16.columns && pcol < S.raw_width/2; pcol++)
{
destrow[pcol*2][0] = srcrow[pcol][0];
destrow[pcol*2][1] = srcrow[pcol][1];
}
}
for(int row = 0; row < Q->top16.rows && row < S.raw_height; row++)
{
ushort (*destrow)[3] = (unsigned short (*)[3]) &imgdata.rawdata.color3_image[row*S.raw_pitch/3/sizeof(ushort)][0];
ushort (*srcrow) = (unsigned short *) &Q->top16.data[row * Q->top16.columns];
for(int col = 0; col < Q->top16.columns && col < S.raw_width; col++)
destrow[col][2] = srcrow[col];
}
}
#if 1
if(TRU && Q && (imgdata.params.raw_processing_options & LIBRAW_PROCESSING_DP2Q_INTERPOLATEAF)
)
{
if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 5888 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 3672) // dpN Quattro normal
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af(32,8,2);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 5888 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 3776) // sd Quattro normal raw
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af_sd(216,464,imgdata.sizes.raw_width-1,3312,16,32,2);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 6656 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 4480) // sd Quattro H normal raw
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af_sd(232,592,imgdata.sizes.raw_width-1,3888,16,32,2);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 3328 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 2240) // sd Quattro H half size
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af_sd(116,296,imgdata.sizes.raw_width-1,2200,8,16,1);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 5504 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 3680) // sd Quattro H APS-C raw
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af_sd(8,192,imgdata.sizes.raw_width-1,3185,16,32,2);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 2752 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 1840) // sd Quattro H APS-C half size
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af_sd(4, 96,imgdata.sizes.raw_width-1,1800,8,16,1);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 2944 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 1836) // dpN Quattro small raw
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af(16,4,1);
}
else if(imgdata.sizes.raw_width == 2944 && imgdata.sizes.raw_height == 1888) // sd Quattro small
{
x3f_dpq_interpolate_af_sd(108,232,imgdata.sizes.raw_width-1,1656,8,16,1);
}
}
#endif
if(TRU && Q && Q->quattro_layout && (imgdata.params.raw_processing_options & LIBRAW_PROCESSING_DP2Q_INTERPOLATERG) )
x3f_dpq_interpolate_rg();
}
else
raise_error = 1;
end:
if(raise_error)
throw LIBRAW_EXCEPTION_IO_CORRUPT;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
LibRaw
|
8682ad204392b914ab1cc6ebcca9c27c19c1a4b4
| 50,483,854,138,083,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 113 |
0.18.17
|
int kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
{
return static_call(kvm_x86_update_pi_irte)(kvm, host_irq, guest_irq, set);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
| 169,267,762,598,537,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
pkcs11rsa_destroyctx(dst_context_t *dctx) {
CK_BYTE garbage[ISC_SHA512_DIGESTLENGTH];
CK_ULONG len = ISC_SHA512_DIGESTLENGTH;
pk11_context_t *pk11_ctx = dctx->ctxdata.pk11_ctx;
if (pk11_ctx != NULL) {
(void) pkcs_C_DigestFinal(pk11_ctx->session, garbage, &len);
isc_safe_memwipe(garbage, sizeof(garbage));
pk11_return_session(pk11_ctx);
isc_safe_memwipe(pk11_ctx, sizeof(*pk11_ctx));
isc_mem_put(dctx->mctx, pk11_ctx, sizeof(*pk11_ctx));
dctx->ctxdata.pk11_ctx = NULL;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
bind9
|
8d807cc21655eaa6e6a08afafeec3682c0f3f2ab
| 295,644,335,121,677,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Fix crash in pk11_numbits() when native-pkcs11 is used
When pk11_numbits() is passed a user provided input that contains all
zeroes (via crafted DNS message), it would crash with assertion
failure. Fix that by properly handling such input.
|
static void sit_add_v4_addrs(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr * ifp;
struct in6_addr addr;
struct net_device *dev;
int scope;
ASSERT_RTNL();
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr32[3], idev->dev->dev_addr, 4);
if (idev->dev->flags&IFF_POINTOPOINT) {
addr.s6_addr32[0] = htonl(0xfe800000);
scope = IFA_LINK;
} else {
scope = IPV6_ADDR_COMPATv4;
}
if (addr.s6_addr32[3]) {
ifp = ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, 128, scope, IFA_F_PERMANENT);
if (!IS_ERR(ifp)) {
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ifp->flags &= ~IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
}
return;
}
for (dev = dev_base; dev != NULL; dev = dev->next) {
struct in_device * in_dev = __in_dev_get(dev);
if (in_dev && (dev->flags & IFF_UP)) {
struct in_ifaddr * ifa;
int flag = scope;
for (ifa = in_dev->ifa_list; ifa; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
int plen;
addr.s6_addr32[3] = ifa->ifa_local;
if (ifa->ifa_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK)
continue;
if (ifa->ifa_scope >= RT_SCOPE_HOST) {
if (idev->dev->flags&IFF_POINTOPOINT)
continue;
flag |= IFA_HOST;
}
if (idev->dev->flags&IFF_POINTOPOINT)
plen = 64;
else
plen = 96;
ifp = ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, plen, flag,
IFA_F_PERMANENT);
if (!IS_ERR(ifp)) {
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ifp->flags &= ~IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
}
}
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
8a47077a0b5aa2649751c46e7a27884e6686ccbf
| 47,615,048,803,987,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 68 |
[NETLINK]: Missing padding fields in dumped structures
Plug holes with padding fields and initialized them to zero.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
int token,
struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
{
crypt_token_info token_info;
const char *type;
int r;
if (!params)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Requesting LUKS2 keyring token %d.", token);
if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
return r;
token_info = LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, &type);
switch (token_info) {
case CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID:
log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is invalid.", token);
return -EINVAL;
case CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE:
log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is inactive.", token);
return -EINVAL;
case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL:
if (!strcmp(type, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING))
break;
/* Fall through */
case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL:
case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
log_dbg(cd, "Token %d has unexpected type %s.", token, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
return LUKS2_token_keyring_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, params);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-345"
] |
cryptsetup
|
0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c
| 86,272,317,830,125,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt part of the LUKS device.
This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
no knowledge of user passphrases.
The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
possible modification of revealed plaintext.
The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
a violation of data confidentiality.
The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
|
static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct compat_user *dummy32 = NULL;
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
__u32 mask = PSW32_MASK_USER;
mask |= is_ri_task(child) ? PSW32_MASK_RI : 0;
/* Build a 64 bit psw mask from 31 bit mask. */
if ((tmp ^ PSW32_USER_BITS) & ~mask)
/* Invalid psw mask. */
return -EINVAL;
if ((data & PSW32_MASK_ASC) == PSW32_ASC_HOME)
/* Invalid address-space-control bits */
return -EINVAL;
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_USER) |
(regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & mask) << 32;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.addr) {
/* Build a 64 bit psw address from 31 bit address. */
regs->psw.addr = (__u64) tmp & PSW32_ADDR_INSN;
/* Transfer 31 bit amode bit to psw mask. */
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & PSW32_ADDR_AMODE);
} else {
/* gpr 0-15 */
*(__u32*)((addr_t) ®s->psw + addr*2 + 4) = tmp;
}
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs;
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent writess of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
return 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs.fpc &&
test_fp_ctl(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs;
*(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.per_info;
__poke_user_per_compat(child, addr, data);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
dab6cf55f81a6e16b8147aed9a843e1691dcd318
| 134,132,421,831,346,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 |
s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
|
int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (!opt)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case */
if (!corkreq) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip6_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb))
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
goto release_dst;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
net_dbg_ratelimited("udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
up->len += ulen;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info *)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
release_dst:
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39
| 299,616,069,918,492,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 294 |
ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_ctl_elem_lock(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_id __user *_id)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
int result;
if (copy_from_user(&id, _id, sizeof(id)))
return -EFAULT;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
result = -ENOENT;
} else {
vd = &kctl->vd[snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &id)];
if (vd->owner != NULL)
result = -EBUSY;
else {
vd->owner = file;
result = 0;
}
}
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
6ab55ec0a938c7f943a4edba3d6514f775983887
| 194,062,343,850,955,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
ALSA: control: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in get_ctl_id_hash()
Since the user can control the arguments provided to the kernel by the
ioctl() system call, an out-of-bounds bug occurs when the 'id->name'
provided by the user does not end with '\0'.
The following log can reveal it:
[ 10.002313] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.002895] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888109f5fe28 by task snd/439
[ 10.004934] Call Trace:
[ 10.007140] snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.007489] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x6cf/0x10e0
Fix this by checking the bound of 'id->name' in the loop.
Fixes: c27e1efb61c5 ("ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups")
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
void CLASS android_tight_load_raw()
{
uchar *data, *dp;
int bwide, row, col, c;
bwide = -(-5*raw_width >> 5) << 3;
data = (uchar *) malloc (bwide);
merror (data, "android_tight_load_raw()");
for (row=0; row < raw_height; row++) {
if (fread (data, 1, bwide, ifp) < bwide) derror();
for (dp=data, col=0; col < raw_width; dp+=5, col+=4)
FORC4 RAW(row,col+c) = (dp[c] << 2) | (dp[4] >> (c << 1) & 3);
}
free (data);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-129"
] |
LibRaw
|
89d065424f09b788f443734d44857289489ca9e2
| 283,016,877,462,635,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
fixed two more problems found by fuzzer
|
static int samldb_extended_allocate_rid(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
struct dsdb_extended_allocate_rid *exop;
int ret;
exop = talloc_get_type(req->op.extended.data,
struct dsdb_extended_allocate_rid);
if (!exop) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb,
"samldb_extended_allocate_rid: invalid extended data");
return LDB_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
ret = ridalloc_allocate_rid(module, &exop->rid, req);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
return ldb_module_done(req, NULL, NULL, LDB_SUCCESS);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
samba
|
0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77
| 249,474,140,391,528,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <[email protected]>
|
void *nft_set_elem_init(const struct nft_set *set,
const struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl,
const u32 *key, const u32 *key_end,
const u32 *data, u64 timeout, u64 expiration, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct nft_set_ext *ext;
void *elem;
elem = kzalloc(set->ops->elemsize + tmpl->len, gfp);
if (elem == NULL)
return NULL;
ext = nft_set_elem_ext(set, elem);
nft_set_ext_init(ext, tmpl);
if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY))
memcpy(nft_set_ext_key(ext), key, set->klen);
if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END))
memcpy(nft_set_ext_key_end(ext), key_end, set->klen);
if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_DATA))
memcpy(nft_set_ext_data(ext), data, set->dlen);
if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPIRATION)) {
*nft_set_ext_expiration(ext) = get_jiffies_64() + expiration;
if (expiration == 0)
*nft_set_ext_expiration(ext) += timeout;
}
if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_TIMEOUT))
*nft_set_ext_timeout(ext) = timeout;
return elem;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-665"
] |
linux
|
ad9f151e560b016b6ad3280b48e42fa11e1a5440
| 196,126,219,133,614,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
netfilter: nf_tables: initialize set before expression setup
nft_set_elem_expr_alloc() needs an initialized set if expression sets on
the NFT_EXPR_GC flag. Move set fields initialization before expression
setup.
[4512935.019450] ==================================================================
[4512935.019456] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019487] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000070 by task nft/23532
[4512935.019494] CPU: 1 PID: 23532 Comm: nft Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4+ #48
[...]
[4512935.019502] Call Trace:
[4512935.019505] dump_stack+0x89/0xb4
[4512935.019512] ? nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019536] ? nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019560] kasan_report.cold.12+0x5f/0xd8
[4512935.019566] ? nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019590] nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019615] nf_tables_newset+0xc7f/0x1460 [nf_tables]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 65038428b2c6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: allow to specify stateful expression in set definition")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
bool parse_method(struct pool *pool, char *s)
{
json_t *val = NULL, *method, *err_val, *params;
json_error_t err;
bool ret = false;
char *buf;
if (!s)
goto out;
val = JSON_LOADS(s, &err);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
method = json_object_get(val, "method");
if (!method)
goto out;
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
params = json_object_get(val, "params");
if (err_val && !json_is_null(err_val)) {
char *ss;
if (err_val)
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON-RPC method decode failed: %s", ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
buf = (char *)json_string_value(method);
if (!buf)
goto out;
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "mining.notify", 13)) {
if (parse_notify(pool, params))
pool->stratum_notify = ret = true;
else
pool->stratum_notify = ret = false;
goto out;
}
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "mining.set_difficulty", 21) && parse_diff(pool, params)) {
ret = true;
goto out;
}
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "client.reconnect", 16) && parse_reconnect(pool, params)) {
ret = true;
goto out;
}
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "client.get_version", 18) && send_version(pool, val)) {
ret = true;
goto out;
}
out:
if (val)
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
bfgminer
|
c80ad8548251eb0e15329fc240c89070640c9d79
| 20,670,034,528,049,558,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 |
Stratum: extract_sockaddr: Truncate overlong addresses rather than stack overflow
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <[email protected]> for finding this!
|
void Zone::adjust_segment_bytes_allocated(int delta) {
segment_bytes_allocated_ += delta;
isolate_->counters()->zone_segment_bytes()->Set(segment_bytes_allocated_);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
node
|
fcb9145e291e8cb82164bc1fe3db1c1dae219b55
| 21,606,843,915,309,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
deps: backport 3a9bfec from v8 upstream
Some of the logic from `zone.cc` is found in `zone-inl.h` in this
release stream.
Original commit message:
Fix overflow issue in Zone::New
When requesting a large allocation near the end of the address space,
the computation could overflow and erroneously *not* grow the Zone
as required.
BUG=chromium:606115
LOG=y
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1930873002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#35903}
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node-private/pull/43
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Rod Vagg <[email protected]>
|
void license_decrypt_platform_challenge(rdpLicense* license)
{
CryptoRc4 rc4;
license->PlatformChallenge->data = (BYTE*) malloc(license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge->length);
license->PlatformChallenge->length = license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge->length;
rc4 = crypto_rc4_init(license->LicensingEncryptionKey, LICENSING_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LENGTH);
crypto_rc4(rc4, license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge->length,
license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge->data,
license->PlatformChallenge->data);
crypto_rc4_free(rc4);
}
| 0 |
[] |
FreeRDP
|
f1d6afca6ae620f9855a33280bdc6f3ad9153be0
| 23,639,898,567,303,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Fix CVE-2014-0791
This patch fixes CVE-2014-0791, the remaining length in the stream is checked
before doing some malloc().
|
struct sk_buff *skb_udp_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features,
bool is_ipv6)
{
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
const struct net_offload **offloads;
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct sk_buff *(*gso_inner_segment)(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features);
rcu_read_lock();
switch (skb->inner_protocol_type) {
case ENCAP_TYPE_ETHER:
protocol = skb->inner_protocol;
gso_inner_segment = skb_mac_gso_segment;
break;
case ENCAP_TYPE_IPPROTO:
offloads = is_ipv6 ? inet6_offloads : inet_offloads;
ops = rcu_dereference(offloads[skb->inner_ipproto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gso_segment)
goto out_unlock;
gso_inner_segment = ops->callbacks.gso_segment;
break;
default:
goto out_unlock;
}
segs = __skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features, gso_inner_segment,
protocol, is_ipv6);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return segs;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
| 15,162,368,960,083,047,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
free_config_peers(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
peer_node *curr_peer;
if (ptree->peers != NULL) {
for (;;) {
UNLINK_FIFO(curr_peer, *ptree->peers, link);
if (NULL == curr_peer)
break;
destroy_address_node(curr_peer->addr);
destroy_attr_val_fifo(curr_peer->peerflags);
free(curr_peer);
}
free(ptree->peers);
ptree->peers = NULL;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-19"
] |
ntp
|
fe46889f7baa75fc8e6c0fcde87706d396ce1461
| 171,148,032,055,935,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
[Sec 2942]: Off-path DoS attack on auth broadcast mode. HStenn.
|
void Curl_getoff_all_pipelines(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
if(!conn->bundle)
return;
if(conn->bundle->multiuse == BUNDLE_PIPELINING) {
bool recv_head = (conn->readchannel_inuse &&
Curl_recvpipe_head(data, conn));
bool send_head = (conn->writechannel_inuse &&
Curl_sendpipe_head(data, conn));
if(Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->recv_pipe) && recv_head)
Curl_pipeline_leave_read(conn);
if(Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->send_pipe) && send_head)
Curl_pipeline_leave_write(conn);
}
else {
(void)Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->recv_pipe);
(void)Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->send_pipe);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
curl
|
81d135d67155c5295b1033679c606165d4e28f3f
| 132,147,005,232,296,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
|
hexValue(const FileInfo *file, const widechar *digits, int length) {
int k;
unsigned int binaryValue = 0;
for (k = 0; k < length; k++) {
unsigned int hexDigit = 0;
if (digits[k] >= '0' && digits[k] <= '9')
hexDigit = digits[k] - '0';
else if (digits[k] >= 'a' && digits[k] <= 'f')
hexDigit = digits[k] - 'a' + 10;
else if (digits[k] >= 'A' && digits[k] <= 'F')
hexDigit = digits[k] - 'A' + 10;
else {
compileError(file, "invalid %d-digit hexadecimal number", length);
return (widechar)0xffffffff;
}
binaryValue |= hexDigit << (4 * (length - 1 - k));
}
return (widechar)binaryValue;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
liblouis
|
2e4772befb2b1c37cb4b9d6572945115ee28630a
| 120,417,685,212,878,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Prevent an invalid memory writes in compileRule
Thanks to Han Zheng for reporting it
Fixes #1214
|
png_decompress_chunk(png_structrp png_ptr,
png_uint_32 chunklength, png_uint_32 prefix_size,
png_alloc_size_t *newlength /* must be initialized to the maximum! */,
int terminate /*add a '\0' to the end of the uncompressed data*/)
{
/* TODO: implement different limits for different types of chunk.
*
* The caller supplies *newlength set to the maximum length of the
* uncompressed data, but this routine allocates space for the prefix and
* maybe a '\0' terminator too. We have to assume that 'prefix_size' is
* limited only by the maximum chunk size.
*/
png_alloc_size_t limit = PNG_SIZE_MAX;
# ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_malloc_max > 0 &&
png_ptr->user_chunk_malloc_max < limit)
limit = png_ptr->user_chunk_malloc_max;
# elif PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX > 0
if (PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX < limit)
limit = PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX;
# endif
if (limit >= prefix_size + (terminate != 0))
{
int ret;
limit -= prefix_size + (terminate != 0);
if (limit < *newlength)
*newlength = limit;
/* Now try to claim the stream. */
ret = png_inflate_claim(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name);
if (ret == Z_OK)
{
png_uint_32 lzsize = chunklength - prefix_size;
ret = png_inflate(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name, 1/*finish*/,
/* input: */ png_ptr->read_buffer + prefix_size, &lzsize,
/* output: */ NULL, newlength);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
{
/* Use 'inflateReset' here, not 'inflateReset2' because this
* preserves the previously decided window size (otherwise it would
* be necessary to store the previous window size.) In practice
* this doesn't matter anyway, because png_inflate will call inflate
* with Z_FINISH in almost all cases, so the window will not be
* maintained.
*/
if (inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream) == Z_OK)
{
/* Because of the limit checks above we know that the new,
* expanded, size will fit in a size_t (let alone an
* png_alloc_size_t). Use png_malloc_base here to avoid an
* extra OOM message.
*/
png_alloc_size_t new_size = *newlength;
png_alloc_size_t buffer_size = prefix_size + new_size +
(terminate != 0);
png_bytep text = png_voidcast(png_bytep, png_malloc_base(png_ptr,
buffer_size));
if (text != NULL)
{
memset(text, 0, buffer_size);
ret = png_inflate(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name, 1/*finish*/,
png_ptr->read_buffer + prefix_size, &lzsize,
text + prefix_size, newlength);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
{
if (new_size == *newlength)
{
if (terminate != 0)
text[prefix_size + *newlength] = 0;
if (prefix_size > 0)
memcpy(text, png_ptr->read_buffer, prefix_size);
{
png_bytep old_ptr = png_ptr->read_buffer;
png_ptr->read_buffer = text;
png_ptr->read_buffer_size = buffer_size;
text = old_ptr; /* freed below */
}
}
else
{
/* The size changed on the second read, there can be no
* guarantee that anything is correct at this point.
* The 'msg' pointer has been set to "unexpected end of
* LZ stream", which is fine, but return an error code
* that the caller won't accept.
*/
ret = PNG_UNEXPECTED_ZLIB_RETURN;
}
}
else if (ret == Z_OK)
ret = PNG_UNEXPECTED_ZLIB_RETURN; /* for safety */
/* Free the text pointer (this is the old read_buffer on
* success)
*/
png_free(png_ptr, text);
/* This really is very benign, but it's still an error because
* the extra space may otherwise be used as a Trojan Horse.
*/
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END &&
chunklength - prefix_size != lzsize)
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "extra compressed data");
}
else
{
/* Out of memory allocating the buffer */
ret = Z_MEM_ERROR;
png_zstream_error(png_ptr, Z_MEM_ERROR);
}
}
else
{
/* inflateReset failed, store the error message */
png_zstream_error(png_ptr, ret);
ret = PNG_UNEXPECTED_ZLIB_RETURN;
}
}
else if (ret == Z_OK)
ret = PNG_UNEXPECTED_ZLIB_RETURN;
/* Release the claimed stream */
png_ptr->zowner = 0;
}
else /* the claim failed */ if (ret == Z_STREAM_END) /* impossible! */
ret = PNG_UNEXPECTED_ZLIB_RETURN;
return ret;
}
else
{
/* Application/configuration limits exceeded */
png_zstream_error(png_ptr, Z_MEM_ERROR);
return Z_MEM_ERROR;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-369"
] |
libpng
|
8a05766cb74af05c04c53e6c9d60c13fc4d59bf2
| 294,731,316,747,051,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 156 |
[libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
|
int fuse_fs_symlink(struct fuse_fs *fs, const char *linkname, const char *path)
{
fuse_get_context()->private_data = fs->user_data;
if (fs->op.symlink)
return fs->op.symlink(linkname, path);
else
return -ENOSYS;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ntfs-3g
|
fb28eef6f1c26170566187c1ab7dc913a13ea43c
| 83,428,208,188,360,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Hardened the checking of directory offset requested by a readdir
When asked for the next directory entries, make sure the chunk offset
is within valid values, otherwise return no more entries in chunk.
|
set_indent(
int size, // measured in spaces
int flags)
{
char_u *p;
char_u *newline;
char_u *oldline;
char_u *s;
int todo;
int ind_len; // measured in characters
int line_len;
int doit = FALSE;
int ind_done = 0; // measured in spaces
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
int ind_col = 0;
#endif
int tab_pad;
int retval = FALSE;
int orig_char_len = -1; // number of initial whitespace chars when
// 'et' and 'pi' are both set
// First check if there is anything to do and compute the number of
// characters needed for the indent.
todo = size;
ind_len = 0;
p = oldline = ml_get_curline();
// Calculate the buffer size for the new indent, and check to see if it
// isn't already set
// if 'expandtab' isn't set: use TABs; if both 'expandtab' and
// 'preserveindent' are set count the number of characters at the
// beginning of the line to be copied
if (!curbuf->b_p_et || (!(flags & SIN_INSERT) && curbuf->b_p_pi))
{
// If 'preserveindent' is set then reuse as much as possible of
// the existing indent structure for the new indent
if (!(flags & SIN_INSERT) && curbuf->b_p_pi)
{
ind_done = 0;
// count as many characters as we can use
while (todo > 0 && VIM_ISWHITE(*p))
{
if (*p == TAB)
{
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
tab_pad = tabstop_padding(ind_done, curbuf->b_p_ts,
curbuf->b_p_vts_array);
#else
tab_pad = (int)curbuf->b_p_ts
- (ind_done % (int)curbuf->b_p_ts);
#endif
// stop if this tab will overshoot the target
if (todo < tab_pad)
break;
todo -= tab_pad;
++ind_len;
ind_done += tab_pad;
}
else
{
--todo;
++ind_len;
++ind_done;
}
++p;
}
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
// These diverge from this point.
ind_col = ind_done;
#endif
// Set initial number of whitespace chars to copy if we are
// preserving indent but expandtab is set
if (curbuf->b_p_et)
orig_char_len = ind_len;
// Fill to next tabstop with a tab, if possible
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
tab_pad = tabstop_padding(ind_done, curbuf->b_p_ts,
curbuf->b_p_vts_array);
#else
tab_pad = (int)curbuf->b_p_ts - (ind_done % (int)curbuf->b_p_ts);
#endif
if (todo >= tab_pad && orig_char_len == -1)
{
doit = TRUE;
todo -= tab_pad;
++ind_len;
// ind_done += tab_pad;
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
ind_col += tab_pad;
#endif
}
}
// count tabs required for indent
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
for (;;)
{
tab_pad = tabstop_padding(ind_col, curbuf->b_p_ts,
curbuf->b_p_vts_array);
if (todo < tab_pad)
break;
if (*p != TAB)
doit = TRUE;
else
++p;
todo -= tab_pad;
++ind_len;
ind_col += tab_pad;
}
#else
while (todo >= (int)curbuf->b_p_ts)
{
if (*p != TAB)
doit = TRUE;
else
++p;
todo -= (int)curbuf->b_p_ts;
++ind_len;
// ind_done += (int)curbuf->b_p_ts;
}
#endif
}
// count spaces required for indent
while (todo > 0)
{
if (*p != ' ')
doit = TRUE;
else
++p;
--todo;
++ind_len;
// ++ind_done;
}
// Return if the indent is OK already.
if (!doit && !VIM_ISWHITE(*p) && !(flags & SIN_INSERT))
return FALSE;
// Allocate memory for the new line.
if (flags & SIN_INSERT)
p = oldline;
else
p = skipwhite(p);
line_len = (int)STRLEN(p) + 1;
// If 'preserveindent' and 'expandtab' are both set keep the original
// characters and allocate accordingly. We will fill the rest with spaces
// after the if (!curbuf->b_p_et) below.
if (orig_char_len != -1)
{
newline = alloc(orig_char_len + size - ind_done + line_len);
if (newline == NULL)
return FALSE;
todo = size - ind_done;
ind_len = orig_char_len + todo; // Set total length of indent in
// characters, which may have been
// undercounted until now
p = oldline;
s = newline;
while (orig_char_len > 0)
{
*s++ = *p++;
orig_char_len--;
}
// Skip over any additional white space (useful when newindent is less
// than old)
while (VIM_ISWHITE(*p))
++p;
}
else
{
todo = size;
newline = alloc(ind_len + line_len);
if (newline == NULL)
return FALSE;
s = newline;
}
// Put the characters in the new line.
// if 'expandtab' isn't set: use TABs
if (!curbuf->b_p_et)
{
// If 'preserveindent' is set then reuse as much as possible of
// the existing indent structure for the new indent
if (!(flags & SIN_INSERT) && curbuf->b_p_pi)
{
p = oldline;
ind_done = 0;
while (todo > 0 && VIM_ISWHITE(*p))
{
if (*p == TAB)
{
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
tab_pad = tabstop_padding(ind_done, curbuf->b_p_ts,
curbuf->b_p_vts_array);
#else
tab_pad = (int)curbuf->b_p_ts
- (ind_done % (int)curbuf->b_p_ts);
#endif
// stop if this tab will overshoot the target
if (todo < tab_pad)
break;
todo -= tab_pad;
ind_done += tab_pad;
}
else
{
--todo;
++ind_done;
}
*s++ = *p++;
}
// Fill to next tabstop with a tab, if possible
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
tab_pad = tabstop_padding(ind_done, curbuf->b_p_ts,
curbuf->b_p_vts_array);
#else
tab_pad = (int)curbuf->b_p_ts - (ind_done % (int)curbuf->b_p_ts);
#endif
if (todo >= tab_pad)
{
*s++ = TAB;
todo -= tab_pad;
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
ind_done += tab_pad;
#endif
}
p = skipwhite(p);
}
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
for (;;)
{
tab_pad = tabstop_padding(ind_done, curbuf->b_p_ts,
curbuf->b_p_vts_array);
if (todo < tab_pad)
break;
*s++ = TAB;
todo -= tab_pad;
ind_done += tab_pad;
}
#else
while (todo >= (int)curbuf->b_p_ts)
{
*s++ = TAB;
todo -= (int)curbuf->b_p_ts;
}
#endif
}
while (todo > 0)
{
*s++ = ' ';
--todo;
}
mch_memmove(s, p, (size_t)line_len);
// Replace the line (unless undo fails).
if (!(flags & SIN_UNDO) || u_savesub(curwin->w_cursor.lnum) == OK)
{
colnr_T old_offset = (colnr_T)(p - oldline);
colnr_T new_offset = (colnr_T)(s - newline);
// this may free "newline"
ml_replace(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, newline, FALSE);
if (flags & SIN_CHANGED)
changed_bytes(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, 0);
// Correct saved cursor position if it is in this line.
if (saved_cursor.lnum == curwin->w_cursor.lnum)
{
if (saved_cursor.col >= old_offset)
// cursor was after the indent, adjust for the number of
// bytes added/removed
saved_cursor.col += ind_len - old_offset;
else if (saved_cursor.col >= new_offset)
// cursor was in the indent, and is now after it, put it back
// at the start of the indent (replacing spaces with TAB)
saved_cursor.col = new_offset;
}
#ifdef FEAT_PROP_POPUP
{
int added = ind_len - old_offset;
// When increasing indent this behaves like spaces were inserted at
// the old indent, when decreasing indent it behaves like spaces
// were deleted at the new indent.
adjust_prop_columns(curwin->w_cursor.lnum,
added > 0 ? old_offset : (colnr_T)ind_len, added, 0);
}
#endif
retval = TRUE;
}
else
vim_free(newline);
curwin->w_cursor.col = ind_len;
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-122"
] |
vim
|
b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9
| 57,566,652,044,048,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 307 |
patch 8.2.3402: invalid memory access when using :retab with large value
Problem: Invalid memory access when using :retab with large value.
Solution: Check the number is positive.
|
static int rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **tb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int i, err;
if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
return nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
err = nlmsg_parse_strict(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0; i <= NETNSA_MAX; i++) {
if (!tb[i])
continue;
switch (i) {
case NETNSA_PID:
case NETNSA_FD:
case NETNSA_NSID:
case NETNSA_TARGET_NSID:
break;
default:
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unsupported attribute in peer netns getid request");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-190",
"CWE-326"
] |
linux
|
355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92
| 171,649,380,964,533,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
perhaps_add_new_callers (cgraph_node *node, ipcp_value<valtype> *val)
{
ipcp_value_source<valtype> *src;
profile_count redirected_sum = profile_count::zero ();
for (src = val->sources; src; src = src->next)
{
struct cgraph_edge *cs = src->cs;
while (cs)
{
if (cgraph_edge_brings_value_p (cs, src, node, val)
&& cgraph_edge_brings_all_scalars_for_node (cs, val->spec_node)
&& cgraph_edge_brings_all_agg_vals_for_node (cs, val->spec_node))
{
if (dump_file)
fprintf (dump_file, " - adding an extra caller %s of %s\n",
cs->caller->dump_name (),
val->spec_node->dump_name ());
cs->redirect_callee_duplicating_thunks (val->spec_node);
val->spec_node->expand_all_artificial_thunks ();
if (cs->count.ipa ().initialized_p ())
redirected_sum = redirected_sum + cs->count.ipa ();
}
cs = get_next_cgraph_edge_clone (cs);
}
}
if (redirected_sum.nonzero_p ())
update_specialized_profile (val->spec_node, node, redirected_sum);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
gcc
|
a09ccc22459c565814f79f96586fe4ad083fe4eb
| 234,722,209,907,408,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
Avoid segfault when doing IPA-VRP but not IPA-CP (PR 93015)
2019-12-21 Martin Jambor <[email protected]>
PR ipa/93015
* ipa-cp.c (ipcp_store_vr_results): Check that info exists
testsuite/
* gcc.dg/lto/pr93015_0.c: New test.
From-SVN: r279695
|
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_IS_NOT_IDENTICAL_SPEC_VAR_CONST_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
zend_free_op free_op1;
zval *result = &EX_T(opline->result.u.var).tmp_var;
is_identical_function(result,
_get_zval_ptr_var(&opline->op1, EX(Ts), &free_op1 TSRMLS_CC),
&opline->op2.u.constant TSRMLS_CC);
Z_LVAL_P(result) = !Z_LVAL_P(result);
if (free_op1.var) {zval_ptr_dtor(&free_op1.var);};
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
}
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd
| 259,542,548,561,951,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
- fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus
|
dissect_kafka_alter_replica_log_dirs_request_topic(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, kafka_api_version_t api_version _U_)
{
proto_item *subti, *subsubti;
proto_tree *subtree, *subsubtree;
int topic_start, topic_len;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, -1, ett_kafka_resource, &subti, "Topic");
offset = dissect_kafka_string(subtree, hf_kafka_topic_name, tvb, pinfo, offset, 0, &topic_start, &topic_len);
subsubtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, -1, ett_kafka_topics, &subsubti, "Partitions");
offset = dissect_kafka_array(subsubtree, tvb, pinfo, offset, 0, api_version,
&dissect_kafka_alter_replica_log_dirs_request_partition, NULL);
proto_item_set_end(subti, tvb, offset);
proto_item_append_text(subti, " (Name=%s)",
tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb,
topic_start, topic_len, ENC_UTF_8));
return offset;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
wireshark
|
f4374967bbf9c12746b8ec3cd54dddada9dd353e
| 14,553,294,998,269,122,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
Kafka: Limit our decompression size.
Don't assume that the Internet has our best interests at heart when it
gives us the size of our decompression buffer. Assign an arbitrary limit
of 50 MB.
This fixes #16739 in that it takes care of
** (process:17681): WARNING **: 20:03:07.440: Dissector bug, protocol Kafka, in packet 31: ../epan/proto.c:7043: failed assertion "end >= fi->start"
which is different from the original error output. It looks like *that*
might have taken care of in one of the other recent Kafka bug fixes.
The decompression routines return a success or failure status. Use
gbooleans instead of ints for that.
|
bool run(OperationContext* opCtx,
const string& dbname,
const BSONObj& cmdObj,
BSONObjBuilder& result) {
AuthorizationManager* authzManager = getGlobalAuthorizationManager();
result.append("cacheGeneration", authzManager->getCacheGeneration());
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-613"
] |
mongo
|
6dfb92b1299de04677d0bd2230e89a52eb01003c
| 191,832,496,424,234,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit
(cherry picked from commit e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7)
|
void *addReplyDeferredLen(client *c) {
/* Note that we install the write event here even if the object is not
* ready to be sent, since we are sure that before returning to the
* event loop setDeferredAggregateLen() will be called. */
if (prepareClientToWrite(c) != C_OK) return NULL;
trimReplyUnusedTailSpace(c);
listAddNodeTail(c->reply,NULL); /* NULL is our placeholder. */
return listLast(c->reply);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
redis
|
5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8
| 313,179,264,076,991,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
|
int64_to_str_back(char *ptr, gint64 value)
{
if (value < 0) {
ptr = uint64_to_str_back(ptr, -value);
*(--ptr) = '-';
} else
ptr = uint64_to_str_back(ptr, value);
return ptr;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
wireshark
|
d5f2657825e63e4126ebd7d13a59f3c6e8a9e4e1
| 137,672,259,663,486,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
epan: Limit our bits in decode_bits_in_field.
Limit the number of bits we process in decode_bits_in_field, otherwise
we'll overrun our buffer. Fixes #16958.
|
png_read_start_row(png_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
unsigned int max_pixel_depth;
png_size_t row_bytes;
png_debug(1, "in png_read_start_row");
#ifdef PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED
png_init_read_transformations(png_ptr);
#endif
if (png_ptr->interlaced != 0)
{
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE) == 0)
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
else
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->iwidth = (png_ptr->width +
png_pass_inc[png_ptr->pass] - 1 -
png_pass_start[png_ptr->pass]) /
png_pass_inc[png_ptr->pass];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->iwidth = png_ptr->width;
}
max_pixel_depth = (unsigned int)png_ptr->pixel_depth;
/* WARNING: * png_read_transform_info (pngrtran.c) performs a simpler set of
* calculations to calculate the final pixel depth, then
* png_do_read_transforms actually does the transforms. This means that the
* code which effectively calculates this value is actually repeated in three
* separate places. They must all match. Innocent changes to the order of
* transformations can and will break libpng in a way that causes memory
* overwrites.
*
* TODO: fix this.
*/
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACK_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACK) != 0 && png_ptr->bit_depth < 8)
max_pixel_depth = 8;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND) != 0)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (png_ptr->num_trans != 0)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 24;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (max_pixel_depth < 8)
max_pixel_depth = 8;
if (png_ptr->num_trans != 0)
max_pixel_depth *= 2;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
{
if (png_ptr->num_trans != 0)
{
max_pixel_depth *= 4;
max_pixel_depth /= 3;
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_16_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND_16) != 0)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED
/* In fact it is an error if it isn't supported, but checking is
* the safe way.
*/
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND) != 0)
{
if (png_ptr->bit_depth < 16)
max_pixel_depth *= 2;
}
else
# endif
png_ptr->transformations &= ~PNG_EXPAND_16;
}
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->transformations & (PNG_FILLER)) != 0)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 8)
max_pixel_depth = 16;
else
max_pixel_depth = 32;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB ||
png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 32)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 64;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_GRAY_TO_RGB_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_GRAY_TO_RGB) != 0)
{
if (
#ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED
(png_ptr->num_trans != 0 &&
(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND) != 0) ||
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED
(png_ptr->transformations & (PNG_FILLER)) != 0 ||
#endif
png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 16)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 64;
}
else
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 8)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 24;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
max_pixel_depth = 64;
else
max_pixel_depth = 48;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_READ_USER_TRANSFORM_SUPPORTED) && \
defined(PNG_USER_TRANSFORM_PTR_SUPPORTED)
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_USER_TRANSFORM) != 0)
{
unsigned int user_pixel_depth = png_ptr->user_transform_depth *
png_ptr->user_transform_channels;
if (user_pixel_depth > max_pixel_depth)
max_pixel_depth = user_pixel_depth;
}
#endif
/* This value is stored in png_struct and double checked in the row read
* code.
*/
png_ptr->maximum_pixel_depth = (png_byte)max_pixel_depth;
png_ptr->transformed_pixel_depth = 0; /* calculated on demand */
/* Align the width on the next larger 8 pixels. Mainly used
* for interlacing
*/
row_bytes = ((png_ptr->width + 7) & ~((png_uint_32)7));
/* Calculate the maximum bytes needed, adding a byte and a pixel
* for safety's sake
*/
row_bytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(max_pixel_depth, row_bytes) +
1 + ((max_pixel_depth + 7) >> 3U);
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (row_bytes > (png_uint_32)65536L)
png_error(png_ptr, "This image requires a row greater than 64KB");
#endif
if (row_bytes + 48 > png_ptr->old_big_row_buf_size)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->big_row_buf);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->big_prev_row);
if (png_ptr->interlaced != 0)
png_ptr->big_row_buf = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
row_bytes + 48);
else
png_ptr->big_row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, row_bytes + 48);
png_ptr->big_prev_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, row_bytes + 48);
#ifdef PNG_ALIGNED_MEMORY_SUPPORTED
/* Use 16-byte aligned memory for row_buf with at least 16 bytes
* of padding before and after row_buf; treat prev_row similarly.
* NOTE: the alignment is to the start of the pixels, one beyond the start
* of the buffer, because of the filter byte. Prior to libpng 1.5.6 this
* was incorrect; the filter byte was aligned, which had the exact
* opposite effect of that intended.
*/
{
png_bytep temp = png_ptr->big_row_buf + 32;
int extra = (int)((temp - (png_bytep)0) & 0x0f);
png_ptr->row_buf = temp - extra - 1/*filter byte*/;
temp = png_ptr->big_prev_row + 32;
extra = (int)((temp - (png_bytep)0) & 0x0f);
png_ptr->prev_row = temp - extra - 1/*filter byte*/;
}
#else
/* Use 31 bytes of padding before and 17 bytes after row_buf. */
png_ptr->row_buf = png_ptr->big_row_buf + 31;
png_ptr->prev_row = png_ptr->big_prev_row + 31;
#endif
png_ptr->old_big_row_buf_size = row_bytes + 48;
}
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (png_ptr->rowbytes > 65535)
png_error(png_ptr, "This image requires a row greater than 64KB");
#endif
if (png_ptr->rowbytes > (PNG_SIZE_MAX - 1))
png_error(png_ptr, "Row has too many bytes to allocate in memory");
memset(png_ptr->prev_row, 0, png_ptr->rowbytes + 1);
png_debug1(3, "width = %u,", png_ptr->width);
png_debug1(3, "height = %u,", png_ptr->height);
png_debug1(3, "iwidth = %u,", png_ptr->iwidth);
png_debug1(3, "num_rows = %u,", png_ptr->num_rows);
png_debug1(3, "rowbytes = %lu,", (unsigned long)png_ptr->rowbytes);
png_debug1(3, "irowbytes = %lu",
(unsigned long)PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth, png_ptr->iwidth) + 1);
/* The sequential reader needs a buffer for IDAT, but the progressive reader
* does not, so free the read buffer now regardless; the sequential reader
* reallocates it on demand.
*/
if (png_ptr->read_buffer != NULL)
{
png_bytep buffer = png_ptr->read_buffer;
png_ptr->read_buffer_size = 0;
png_ptr->read_buffer = NULL;
png_free(png_ptr, buffer);
}
/* Finally claim the zstream for the inflate of the IDAT data, use the bits
* value from the stream (note that this will result in a fatal error if the
* IDAT stream has a bogus deflate header window_bits value, but this should
* not be happening any longer!)
*/
if (png_inflate_claim(png_ptr, png_IDAT) != Z_OK)
png_error(png_ptr, png_ptr->zstream.msg);
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ROW_INIT;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
libpng
|
2dca15686fadb1b8951cb29b02bad4cae73448da
| 132,003,844,260,448,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 290 |
[libpng16] Moved chunk-length check into a png_check_chunk_length() private
function (Suggested by Max Stepin).
|
static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
const char *caller)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p);
int rc;
smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
return rc;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7
| 310,304,804,443,206,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to
access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause
a number of problems.
Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was
suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit
1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective
task credentials").
This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's
objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the
current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem
reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these
cases.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials")
Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
TEST(QueryProjectionTest, IdExclusionProjectionPreservesOtherFields) {
auto proj = createProjection("{}", "{_id: 0}");
ASSERT_TRUE(proj.isFieldRetainedExactly("a"));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-732"
] |
mongo
|
cd583b6c4d8aa2364f255992708b9bb54e110cf4
| 44,278,112,056,775,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
SERVER-53929 Add stricter parser checks around positional projection
|
static void tcp_remove_reno_sacks(struct sock *sk, int acked)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (acked > 0) {
/* One ACK acked hole. The rest eat duplicate ACKs. */
tp->delivered += max_t(int, acked - tp->sacked_out, 1);
if (acked - 1 >= tp->sacked_out)
tp->sacked_out = 0;
else
tp->sacked_out -= acked - 1;
}
tcp_check_reno_reordering(sk, acked);
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
net
|
75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
| 309,906,498,430,577,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void set_type(const Column_definition &other)
{
set_handler(other.type_handler());
length= other.length;
char_length= other.char_length;
decimals= other.decimals;
flags= other.flags;
pack_length= other.pack_length;
key_length= other.key_length;
unireg_check= other.unireg_check;
interval= other.interval;
charset= other.charset;
srid= other.srid;
geom_type= other.geom_type;
pack_flag= other.pack_flag;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
| 80,573,883,971,220,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]>
|
Bool TY_(FixDocType)( TidyDocImpl* doc )
{
Lexer* lexer = doc->lexer;
Node* doctype = TY_(FindDocType)( doc );
uint dtmode = cfg( doc, TidyDoctypeMode );
uint guessed = VERS_UNKNOWN;
Bool hadSI = no;
/* Issue #167 - found doctype, and doctype is default VERS_HTML5, set VERS_HTML5 and return yes */
if (doctype && (dtmode == TidyDoctypeAuto) &&
(lexer->doctype == VERS_HTML5) )
{
lexer->versionEmitted = lexer->doctype;
return yes;
}
if (dtmode == TidyDoctypeAuto &&
lexer->versions & lexer->doctype &&
!(VERS_XHTML & lexer->doctype && !lexer->isvoyager)
&& TY_(FindDocType)(doc))
{
lexer->versionEmitted = lexer->doctype;
return yes;
}
if (dtmode == TidyDoctypeOmit)
{
if (doctype)
TY_(DiscardElement)( doc, doctype );
lexer->versionEmitted = TY_(ApparentVersion)( doc );
return yes;
}
if (cfgBool(doc, TidyXmlOut))
return yes;
if (doctype)
hadSI = TY_(GetAttrByName)(doctype, "SYSTEM") != NULL;
if ((dtmode == TidyDoctypeStrict ||
dtmode == TidyDoctypeLoose) && doctype)
{
TY_(DiscardElement)(doc, doctype);
doctype = NULL;
}
switch (dtmode)
{
case TidyDoctypeHtml5:
guessed = HT50;
break;
case TidyDoctypeStrict:
guessed = H41S;
break;
case TidyDoctypeLoose:
guessed = H41T;
break;
case TidyDoctypeAuto:
guessed = TY_(HTMLVersion)(doc);
break;
}
lexer->versionEmitted = guessed;
if (guessed == VERS_UNKNOWN)
return no;
if (doctype)
{
doctype->element = TY_(tmbstrtolower)(doctype->element);
}
else
{
doctype = NewDocTypeNode(doc);
doctype->element = TY_(tmbstrdup)(doc->allocator, "html");
}
TY_(RepairAttrValue)(doc, doctype, "PUBLIC", GetFPIFromVers(guessed));
if (hadSI)
TY_(RepairAttrValue)(doc, doctype, "SYSTEM", GetSIFromVers(guessed));
return yes;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
tidy-html5
|
c18f27a58792f7fbd0b30a0ff50d6b40a82f940d
| 221,996,289,900,301,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 82 |
Issue #217 - avoid len going negative, ever...
|
static int l2tp_ip6_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct sock *sk;
u32 session_id;
u32 tunnel_id;
unsigned char *ptr, *optr;
struct l2tp_session *session;
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = NULL;
int length;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, 4))
goto discard;
/* Point to L2TP header */
optr = ptr = skb->data;
session_id = ntohl(*((__be32 *) ptr));
ptr += 4;
/* RFC3931: L2TP/IP packets have the first 4 bytes containing
* the session_id. If it is 0, the packet is a L2TP control
* frame and the session_id value can be discarded.
*/
if (session_id == 0) {
__skb_pull(skb, 4);
goto pass_up;
}
/* Ok, this is a data packet. Lookup the session. */
session = l2tp_session_find(net, NULL, session_id);
if (session == NULL)
goto discard;
tunnel = session->tunnel;
if (tunnel == NULL)
goto discard;
/* Trace packet contents, if enabled */
if (tunnel->debug & L2TP_MSG_DATA) {
length = min(32u, skb->len);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, length))
goto discard;
/* Point to L2TP header */
optr = ptr = skb->data;
ptr += 4;
pr_debug("%s: ip recv\n", tunnel->name);
print_hex_dump_bytes("", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, ptr, length);
}
l2tp_recv_common(session, skb, ptr, optr, 0, skb->len,
tunnel->recv_payload_hook);
return 0;
pass_up:
/* Get the tunnel_id from the L2TP header */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, 12))
goto discard;
if ((skb->data[0] & 0xc0) != 0xc0)
goto discard;
tunnel_id = ntohl(*(__be32 *) &skb->data[4]);
tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find(net, tunnel_id);
if (tunnel != NULL)
sk = tunnel->sock;
else {
struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
sk = __l2tp_ip6_bind_lookup(net, &iph->daddr,
0, tunnel_id);
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
}
if (sk == NULL)
goto discard;
sock_hold(sk);
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_put;
nf_reset(skb);
return sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1);
discard_put:
sock_put(sk);
discard:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
32c231164b762dddefa13af5a0101032c70b50ef
| 111,126,456,491,071,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 94 |
l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void nfs4_open_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
/* If this request hasn't been cancelled, do nothing */
if (data->cancelled == 0)
goto out_free;
/* In case of error, no cleanup! */
if (data->rpc_status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
goto out_free;
/* In case we need an open_confirm, no cleanup! */
if (data->o_res.rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM)
goto out_free;
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(data);
if (!IS_ERR(state))
nfs4_close_state(&data->path, state, data->o_arg.open_flags);
out_free:
nfs4_opendata_put(data);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
| 273,786,875,280,630,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
void updateHandshakeState(QuicServerConnectionState& conn) {
// Zero RTT read cipher is available after chlo is processed with the
// condition that early data attempt is accepted.
auto handshakeLayer = conn.serverHandshakeLayer;
auto zeroRttReadCipher = handshakeLayer->getZeroRttReadCipher();
auto zeroRttHeaderCipher = handshakeLayer->getZeroRttReadHeaderCipher();
// One RTT write cipher is available at Fizz layer after chlo is processed.
// However, the cipher is only exported to QUIC if early data attempt is
// accepted. Otherwise, the cipher will be available after cfin is
// processed.
auto oneRttWriteCipher = handshakeLayer->getOneRttWriteCipher();
// One RTT read cipher is available after cfin is processed.
auto oneRttReadCipher = handshakeLayer->getOneRttReadCipher();
auto oneRttWriteHeaderCipher = handshakeLayer->getOneRttWriteHeaderCipher();
auto oneRttReadHeaderCipher = handshakeLayer->getOneRttReadHeaderCipher();
if (zeroRttReadCipher) {
if (conn.qLogger) {
conn.qLogger->addTransportStateUpdate(kDerivedZeroRttReadCipher);
}
QUIC_TRACE(fst_trace, conn, "derived 0-rtt read cipher");
conn.readCodec->setZeroRttReadCipher(std::move(zeroRttReadCipher));
}
if (zeroRttHeaderCipher) {
conn.readCodec->setZeroRttHeaderCipher(std::move(zeroRttHeaderCipher));
}
if (oneRttWriteHeaderCipher) {
conn.oneRttWriteHeaderCipher = std::move(oneRttWriteHeaderCipher);
}
if (oneRttReadHeaderCipher) {
conn.readCodec->setOneRttHeaderCipher(std::move(oneRttReadHeaderCipher));
}
if (oneRttWriteCipher) {
if (conn.qLogger) {
conn.qLogger->addTransportStateUpdate(kDerivedOneRttWriteCipher);
}
QUIC_TRACE(fst_trace, conn, "derived 1-rtt write cipher");
CHECK(!conn.oneRttWriteCipher.get());
conn.oneRttWriteCipher = std::move(oneRttWriteCipher);
updatePacingOnKeyEstablished(conn);
// We negotiate the transport parameters whenever we have the 1-RTT write
// keys available.
auto clientParams = handshakeLayer->getClientTransportParams();
if (!clientParams) {
throw QuicTransportException(
"No client transport params",
TransportErrorCode::TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR);
}
processClientInitialParams(conn, std::move(*clientParams));
}
if (oneRttReadCipher) {
if (conn.qLogger) {
conn.qLogger->addTransportStateUpdate(kDerivedOneRttReadCipher);
}
QUIC_TRACE(fst_trace, conn, "derived 1-rtt read cipher");
// Clear limit because CFIN is received at this point
conn.writableBytesLimit = folly::none;
conn.readCodec->setOneRttReadCipher(std::move(oneRttReadCipher));
}
auto handshakeReadCipher = handshakeLayer->getHandshakeReadCipher();
auto handshakeReadHeaderCipher =
handshakeLayer->getHandshakeReadHeaderCipher();
if (handshakeReadCipher) {
CHECK(handshakeReadHeaderCipher);
conn.readCodec->setHandshakeReadCipher(std::move(handshakeReadCipher));
conn.readCodec->setHandshakeHeaderCipher(
std::move(handshakeReadHeaderCipher));
}
if (handshakeLayer->isHandshakeDone()) {
CHECK(conn.oneRttWriteCipher);
if (conn.version != QuicVersion::MVFST_D24 && !conn.sentHandshakeDone) {
sendSimpleFrame(conn, HandshakeDoneFrame());
conn.sentHandshakeDone = true;
}
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
] |
mvfst
|
a67083ff4b8dcbb7ee2839da6338032030d712b0
| 181,509,801,354,210,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 |
Close connection if we derive an extra 1-rtt write cipher
Summary: Fixes CVE-2021-24029
Reviewed By: mjoras, lnicco
Differential Revision: D26613890
fbshipit-source-id: 19bb2be2c731808144e1a074ece313fba11f1945
|
static const URI_CHAR * URI_FUNC(ParseQueryFrag)(URI_TYPE(ParserState) * state,
const URI_CHAR * first, const URI_CHAR * afterLast,
UriMemoryManager * memory) {
if (first >= afterLast) {
return afterLast;
}
switch (*first) {
case _UT('!'):
case _UT('$'):
case _UT('%'):
case _UT('&'):
case _UT('('):
case _UT(')'):
case _UT('-'):
case _UT('*'):
case _UT(','):
case _UT('.'):
case _UT(':'):
case _UT(';'):
case _UT('@'):
case _UT('\''):
case _UT('_'):
case _UT('~'):
case _UT('+'):
case _UT('='):
case URI_SET_DIGIT:
case URI_SET_ALPHA:
{
const URI_CHAR * const afterPchar
= URI_FUNC(ParsePchar)(state, first, afterLast, memory);
if (afterPchar == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return URI_FUNC(ParseQueryFrag)(state, afterPchar, afterLast, memory);
}
case _UT('/'):
case _UT('?'):
return URI_FUNC(ParseQueryFrag)(state, first + 1, afterLast, memory);
default:
return first;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
uriparser
|
cef25028de5ff872c2e1f0a6c562eb3ea9ecbce4
| 285,972,431,416,792,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
Fix uriParse*Ex* out-of-bounds read
|
PackLinuxElf32armLe::~PackLinuxElf32armLe()
{
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
upx
|
ef336dbcc6dc8344482f8cf6c909ae96c3286317
| 82,016,965,951,049,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Protect against bad crafted input.
https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/128
modified: p_lx_elf.cpp
|
void mg_mqtt_sub(struct mg_connection *c, struct mg_str *topic, int qos) {
static uint16_t s_id;
uint8_t qos_ = qos & 3;
uint32_t total_len = 2 + (uint32_t) topic->len + 2 + 1;
mg_mqtt_send_header(c, MQTT_CMD_SUBSCRIBE, 2, total_len);
if (++s_id == 0) ++s_id;
mg_send_u16(c, mg_htons(s_id));
mg_send_u16(c, mg_htons((uint16_t) topic->len));
mg_send(c, topic->ptr, topic->len);
mg_send(c, &qos_, sizeof(qos_));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-552"
] |
mongoose
|
c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945
| 135,088,080,709,259,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload()
|
static inline void __xfrm_state_put(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
refcount_dec(&x->refcnt);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399
| 291,471,250,497,162,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
xfrm: clean up xfrm protocol checks
In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
default_erase(void)
{
int result;
if (over_strike
&& VALID_STRING(key_backspace)
&& strlen(key_backspace) == 1) {
result = key_backspace[0];
} else {
result = CERASE;
}
return result;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ncurses
|
790a85dbd4a81d5f5d8dd02a44d84f01512ef443
| 331,853,107,190,409,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
ncurses 6.2 - patch 20200531
+ correct configure version-check/warnng for g++ to allow for 10.x
+ re-enable "bel" in konsole-base (report by Nia Huang)
+ add linux-s entry (patch by Alexandre Montaron).
+ drop long-obsolete convert_configure.pl
+ add test/test_parm.c, for checking tparm changes.
+ improve parameter-checking for tparm, adding function _nc_tiparm() to
handle the most-used case, which accepts only numeric parameters
(report/testcase by "puppet-meteor").
+ use a more conservative estimate of the buffer-size in lib_tparm.c's
save_text() and save_number(), in case the sprintf() function
passes-through unexpected characters from a format specifier
(report/testcase by "puppet-meteor").
+ add a check for end-of-string in cvtchar to handle a malformed
string in infotocap (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor").
|
int bond_create(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct net_device *bond_dev;
struct bonding *bond;
struct alb_bond_info *bond_info;
int res;
rtnl_lock();
bond_dev = alloc_netdev_mq(sizeof(struct bonding),
name ? name : "bond%d", NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
bond_setup, tx_queues);
if (!bond_dev) {
pr_err("%s: eek! can't alloc netdev!\n", name);
rtnl_unlock();
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Initialize rx_hashtbl_used_head to RLB_NULL_INDEX.
* It is set to 0 by default which is wrong.
*/
bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
bond_info = &(BOND_ALB_INFO(bond));
bond_info->rx_hashtbl_used_head = RLB_NULL_INDEX;
dev_net_set(bond_dev, net);
bond_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &bond_link_ops;
res = register_netdevice(bond_dev);
if (res < 0) {
free_netdev(bond_dev);
rtnl_unlock();
return res;
}
netif_carrier_off(bond_dev);
bond_work_init_all(bond);
rtnl_unlock();
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
105cd17a866017b45f3c45901b394c711c97bf40
| 339,570,789,476,265,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
bonding: fix null dereference in bond_ipsec_add_sa()
If bond doesn't have real device, bond->curr_active_slave is null.
But bond_ipsec_add_sa() dereferences bond->curr_active_slave without
null checking.
So, null-ptr-deref would occur.
Test commands:
ip link add bond0 type bond
ip link set bond0 up
ip x s add proto esp dst 14.1.1.1 src 15.1.1.1 spi \
0x07 mode transport reqid 0x07 replay-window 32 aead 'rfc4106(gcm(aes))' \
0x44434241343332312423222114131211f4f3f2f1 128 sel src 14.0.0.52/24 \
dst 14.0.0.70/24 proto tcp offload dev bond0 dir in
Splat looks like:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 4 PID: 680 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #1168
RIP: 0010:bond_ipsec_add_sa+0xc4/0x2e0 [bonding]
Code: 85 21 02 00 00 4d 8b a6 48 0c 00 00 e8 75 58 44 ce 85 c0 0f 85 14
01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02
00 0f 85 fc 01 00 00 48 8d bb e0 02 00 00 4d 8b 2c 24 48
RSP: 0018:ffff88810946f508 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88810b4e8040 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fe34280 RDI: ffff888115abe100
RBP: ffff88810946f528 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffffbfff2287e11
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888115abe0c8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc0aea9a0 R14: ffff88800d7d2000 R15: ffff88810b4e8330
FS: 00007efc5552e680(0000) GS:ffff888119c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055c2530dbf40 CR3: 0000000103056004 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
xfrm_dev_state_add+0x2a9/0x770
? memcpy+0x38/0x60
xfrm_add_sa+0x2278/0x3b10 [xfrm_user]
? xfrm_get_policy+0xaa0/0xaa0 [xfrm_user]
? register_lock_class+0x1750/0x1750
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x331/0x660 [xfrm_user]
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
? xfrm_user_state_lookup.constprop.39+0x320/0x320 [xfrm_user]
? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1210/0x1210
? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
netlink_rcv_skb+0x121/0x350
? xfrm_user_state_lookup.constprop.39+0x320/0x320 [xfrm_user]
? netlink_ack+0x9d0/0x9d0
? netlink_deliver_tap+0x17c/0xa50
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x68/0x80 [xfrm_user]
netlink_unicast+0x41c/0x610
? netlink_attachskb+0x710/0x710
netlink_sendmsg+0x6b9/0xb70
[ ...]
Fixes: 18cb261afd7b ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int mov_read_jp2h(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
return mov_read_extradata(c, pb, atom, AV_CODEC_ID_JPEG2000);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-834"
] |
FFmpeg
|
9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382
| 75,203,641,530,748,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int udf_add_aext(struct inode *inode, struct extent_position *epos,
struct kernel_lb_addr *eloc, uint32_t elen, int inc)
{
int adsize;
struct short_ad *sad = NULL;
struct long_ad *lad = NULL;
struct allocExtDesc *aed;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (!epos->bh)
ptr = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + epos->offset -
udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode) +
iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
else
ptr = epos->bh->b_data + epos->offset;
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
adsize = sizeof(struct long_ad);
else
return -EIO;
if (epos->offset + (2 * adsize) > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
unsigned char *sptr, *dptr;
struct buffer_head *nbh;
int err, loffset;
struct kernel_lb_addr obloc = epos->block;
epos->block.logicalBlockNum = udf_new_block(inode->i_sb, NULL,
obloc.partitionReferenceNum,
obloc.logicalBlockNum, &err);
if (!epos->block.logicalBlockNum)
return -ENOSPC;
nbh = udf_tgetblk(inode->i_sb, udf_get_lb_pblock(inode->i_sb,
&epos->block,
0));
if (!nbh)
return -EIO;
lock_buffer(nbh);
memset(nbh->b_data, 0x00, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(nbh);
unlock_buffer(nbh);
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(nbh, inode);
aed = (struct allocExtDesc *)(nbh->b_data);
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_STRICT))
aed->previousAllocExtLocation =
cpu_to_le32(obloc.logicalBlockNum);
if (epos->offset + adsize > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
loffset = epos->offset;
aed->lengthAllocDescs = cpu_to_le32(adsize);
sptr = ptr - adsize;
dptr = nbh->b_data + sizeof(struct allocExtDesc);
memcpy(dptr, sptr, adsize);
epos->offset = sizeof(struct allocExtDesc) + adsize;
} else {
loffset = epos->offset + adsize;
aed->lengthAllocDescs = cpu_to_le32(0);
sptr = ptr;
epos->offset = sizeof(struct allocExtDesc);
if (epos->bh) {
aed = (struct allocExtDesc *)epos->bh->b_data;
le32_add_cpu(&aed->lengthAllocDescs, adsize);
} else {
iinfo->i_lenAlloc += adsize;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
}
if (UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_udfrev >= 0x0200)
udf_new_tag(nbh->b_data, TAG_IDENT_AED, 3, 1,
epos->block.logicalBlockNum, sizeof(struct tag));
else
udf_new_tag(nbh->b_data, TAG_IDENT_AED, 2, 1,
epos->block.logicalBlockNum, sizeof(struct tag));
switch (iinfo->i_alloc_type) {
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT:
sad = (struct short_ad *)sptr;
sad->extLength = cpu_to_le32(EXT_NEXT_EXTENT_ALLOCDECS |
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
sad->extPosition =
cpu_to_le32(epos->block.logicalBlockNum);
break;
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG:
lad = (struct long_ad *)sptr;
lad->extLength = cpu_to_le32(EXT_NEXT_EXTENT_ALLOCDECS |
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
lad->extLocation = cpu_to_lelb(epos->block);
memset(lad->impUse, 0x00, sizeof(lad->impUse));
break;
}
if (epos->bh) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_STRICT) ||
UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_udfrev >= 0x0201)
udf_update_tag(epos->bh->b_data, loffset);
else
udf_update_tag(epos->bh->b_data,
sizeof(struct allocExtDesc));
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(epos->bh, inode);
brelse(epos->bh);
} else {
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
epos->bh = nbh;
}
udf_write_aext(inode, epos, eloc, elen, inc);
if (!epos->bh) {
iinfo->i_lenAlloc += adsize;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
} else {
aed = (struct allocExtDesc *)epos->bh->b_data;
le32_add_cpu(&aed->lengthAllocDescs, adsize);
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_STRICT) ||
UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_udfrev >= 0x0201)
udf_update_tag(epos->bh->b_data,
epos->offset + (inc ? 0 : adsize));
else
udf_update_tag(epos->bh->b_data,
sizeof(struct allocExtDesc));
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(epos->bh, inode);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0
| 327,169,284,052,401,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 128 |
udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors
Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
u64 snmp_fold_field64(void __percpu *mib, int offt, size_t syncp_offset)
{
u64 res = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
res += snmp_get_cpu_field64(mib, cpu, offt, syncp_offset);
}
return res;
}
| 0 |
[] |
net
|
79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
| 81,526,670,270,637,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ll *saddr = (struct sockaddr_ll *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
__be16 proto;
unsigned char *addr;
int ifindex, err, reserve = 0;
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
int offset = 0;
int vnet_hdr_len;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
unsigned short gso_type = 0;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (saddr == NULL) {
ifindex = po->ifindex;
proto = po->num;
addr = NULL;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr)))
goto out;
ifindex = saddr->sll_ifindex;
proto = saddr->sll_protocol;
addr = saddr->sll_addr;
}
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
err = -ENXIO;
if (dev == NULL)
goto out_unlock;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW)
reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
err = -ENETDOWN;
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
goto out_unlock;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr);
err = -EINVAL;
if (len < vnet_hdr_len)
goto out_unlock;
len -= vnet_hdr_len;
err = memcpy_fromiovec((void *)&vnet_hdr, msg->msg_iov,
vnet_hdr_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out_unlock;
if ((vnet_hdr.flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) &&
(vnet_hdr.csum_start + vnet_hdr.csum_offset + 2 >
vnet_hdr.hdr_len))
vnet_hdr.hdr_len = vnet_hdr.csum_start +
vnet_hdr.csum_offset + 2;
err = -EINVAL;
if (vnet_hdr.hdr_len > len)
goto out_unlock;
if (vnet_hdr.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
switch (vnet_hdr.gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
break;
default:
goto out_unlock;
}
if (vnet_hdr.gso_type & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN)
gso_type |= SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN;
if (vnet_hdr.gso_size == 0)
goto out_unlock;
}
}
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu+reserve))
goto out_unlock;
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE(dev),
LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev), len, vnet_hdr.hdr_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out_unlock;
skb_set_network_header(skb, reserve);
err = -EINVAL;
if (sock->type == SOCK_DGRAM &&
(offset = dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ntohs(proto), addr, NULL, len)) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* Returns -EFAULT on error */
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, offset, msg->msg_iov, 0, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
err = sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
skb->protocol = proto;
skb->dev = dev;
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
if (vnet_hdr.flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) {
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, vnet_hdr.csum_start,
vnet_hdr.csum_offset)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
}
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = vnet_hdr.gso_size;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = gso_type;
/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs computed. */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = 0;
len += vnet_hdr_len;
}
/*
* Now send it
*/
err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
if (err > 0 && (err = net_xmit_errno(err)) != 0)
goto out_unlock;
dev_put(dev);
return len;
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_unlock:
if (dev)
dev_put(dev);
out:
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-909"
] |
linux-2.6
|
67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f
| 119,231,407,729,418,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 165 |
net: packet: fix information leak to userland
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ret = -1, i;
BN_CTX *ctx;
const BIGNUM *order;
BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const EC_POINT *pub_key;
/* check input values */
if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return -1;
}
if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING);
return -1;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (X == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
if (order == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */
goto err;
}
/* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* digest -> m */
i = BN_num_bits(order);
/*
* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
*/
if (8 * dgst_len > i)
dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8;
if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
EC_POINT_free(point);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-203"
] |
openssl
|
0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a
| 107,326,947,762,425,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 119 |
Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t slab_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct slab_attribute *attribute;
struct kmem_cache *s;
int err;
attribute = to_slab_attr(attr);
s = to_slab(kobj);
if (!attribute->show)
return -EIO;
err = attribute->show(s, buf);
return err;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
| 209,194,791,131,677,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
lyd_new_yangdata(const struct lys_module *module, const char *name_template, const char *name)
{
const struct lys_node *schema = NULL, *snode;
if (!module || !name_template || !name) {
LOGARG;
return NULL;
}
schema = lyp_get_yang_data_template(module, name_template, strlen(name_template));
if (!schema) {
LOGERR(module->ctx, LY_EINVAL, "Failed to find yang-data template \"%s\".", name_template);
return NULL;
}
if (lys_getnext_data(module, schema, name, strlen(name), LYS_CONTAINER, &snode) || !snode) {
LOGERR(module->ctx, LY_EINVAL, "Failed to find \"%s\" as a container child of \"%s:%s\".",
name, module->name, schema->name);
return NULL;
}
return _lyd_new(NULL, snode, 0);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
libyang
|
32fb4993bc8bb49e93e84016af3c10ea53964be5
| 66,300,853,156,844,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
schema tree BUGFIX do not check features while still resolving schema
Fixes #723
|
ConvertToUnicodeText (
OUT EFI_STRING StringDest,
IN CHAR8 *StringSrc,
IN OUT UINTN *BufferSize
)
{
UINTN StringSize;
UINTN Index;
ASSERT (StringSrc != NULL && BufferSize != NULL);
StringSize = AsciiStrSize (StringSrc) * 2;
if (*BufferSize < StringSize || StringDest == NULL) {
*BufferSize = StringSize;
return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
for (Index = 0; Index < AsciiStrLen (StringSrc); Index++) {
StringDest[Index] = (CHAR16) StringSrc[Index];
}
StringDest[Index] = 0;
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[] |
edk2
|
764e8ba1389a617639d79d2c4f0d53f4ea4a7387
| 134,496,354,482,093,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
MdeModulePkg/String.c: Zero memory before free (CVE-2019-14558)
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1611
Cc: Liming Gao <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dong <[email protected]>
Cc: Jian J Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <[email protected]>
|
struct razer_report razer_chroma_standard_get_device_mode(void)
{
return get_razer_report(0x00, 0x84, 0x02);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
openrazer
|
7e8a04feb378a679f1bcdcae079a5100cc45663b
| 96,874,277,233,951,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix oob memcpy in matrix_custom_frame methods
Adjust row_length if it exeeds the arguments array
|
int mnt_optstr_remove_option_at(char **optstr, char *begin, char *end)
{
size_t sz;
if (!optstr || !begin || !end)
return -EINVAL;
if ((begin == *optstr || *(begin - 1) == ',') && *end == ',')
end++;
sz = strlen(end);
memmove(begin, end, sz + 1);
if (!*begin && (begin > *optstr) && *(begin - 1) == ',')
*(begin - 1) = '\0';
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-552",
"CWE-703"
] |
util-linux
|
57202f5713afa2af20ffbb6ab5331481d0396f8d
| 241,082,039,641,657,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
libmount: fix UID check for FUSE umount [CVE-2021-3995]
Improper UID check allows an unprivileged user to unmount FUSE
filesystems of users with similar UID.
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t input_dev_show_modalias(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct input_dev *id = to_input_dev(dev);
ssize_t len;
len = input_print_modalias(buf, PAGE_SIZE, id, 1);
return min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
cb222aed03d798fc074be55e59d9a112338ee784
| 264,464,487,934,238,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Input: add safety guards to input_set_keycode()
If we happen to have a garbage in input device's keycode table with values
too big we'll end up doing clear_bit() with offset way outside of our
bitmaps, damaging other objects within an input device or even outside of
it. Let's add sanity checks to the returned old keycodes.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191207212757.GA245964@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
|
long Tags::Tag::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (size == 0) // 0 length tag, read another
continue;
if (id == libwebm::kMkvSimpleTag) {
status = ParseSimpleTag(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
34d54b04e98dd0bac32e9aab0fbda0bf501bc742
| 319,635,805,982,951,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
changelog:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/libwebm-1.0.0.27-351-g9f23fbc..libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
Change-Id: I28a6b3ae02a53fb1f2029eee11e9449afb94c8e3
|
static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base)
{
struct hlist_head heads[LVL_DEPTH];
int levels;
if (!time_after_eq(jiffies, base->clk))
return;
timer_base_lock_expiry(base);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&base->lock);
/*
* timer_base::must_forward_clk must be cleared before running
* timers so that any timer functions that call mod_timer() will
* not try to forward the base. Idle tracking / clock forwarding
* logic is only used with BASE_STD timers.
*
* The must_forward_clk flag is cleared unconditionally also for
* the deferrable base. The deferrable base is not affected by idle
* tracking and never forwarded, so clearing the flag is a NOOP.
*
* The fact that the deferrable base is never forwarded can cause
* large variations in granularity for deferrable timers, but they
* can be deferred for long periods due to idle anyway.
*/
base->must_forward_clk = false;
while (time_after_eq(jiffies, base->clk)) {
levels = collect_expired_timers(base, heads);
base->clk++;
while (levels--)
expire_timers(base, heads + levels);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&base->lock);
timer_base_unlock_expiry(base);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-330"
] |
linux
|
f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4
| 283,255,593,752,920,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 |
random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity
This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.
Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.
In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state. For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err trpy_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_TRPYBox *ptr = (GF_TRPYBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->nbBytes);
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
gpac
|
d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c
| 288,885,474,235,666,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
|
void qdisc_class_hash_destroy(struct Qdisc_class_hash *clhash)
{
qdisc_class_hash_free(clhash->hash, clhash->hashsize);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-909"
] |
linux-2.6
|
16ebb5e0b36ceadc8186f71d68b0c4fa4b6e781b
| 97,135,059,029,197,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
tc: Fix unitialized kernel memory leak
Three bytes of uninitialized kernel memory are currently leaked to user
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int udp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch(cmd)
{
case SIOCOUTQ:
{
int amount = atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
case SIOCINQ:
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned long amount;
amount = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb != NULL) {
/*
* We will only return the amount
* of this packet since that is all
* that will be read.
*/
amount = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
return(0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux-2.6
|
1e0c14f49d6b393179f423abbac47f85618d3d46
| 140,853,893,734,833,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
[UDP]: Fix MSG_PROBE crash
UDP tracks corking status through the pending variable. The
IP layer also tracks it through the socket write queue. It
is possible for the two to get out of sync when MSG_PROBE is
used.
This patch changes UDP to check the write queue to ensure
that the two stay in sync.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static avifBool avifParseImageSpatialExtentsProperty(avifProperty * prop, const uint8_t * raw, size_t rawLen)
{
BEGIN_STREAM(s, raw, rawLen);
CHECK(avifROStreamReadAndEnforceVersion(&s, 0));
avifImageSpatialExtents * ispe = &prop->u.ispe;
CHECK(avifROStreamReadU32(&s, &ispe->width));
CHECK(avifROStreamReadU32(&s, &ispe->height));
return AVIF_TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
libavif
|
0a8e7244d494ae98e9756355dfbfb6697ded2ff9
| 207,389,867,676,695,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Set max image size to 16384 * 16384
Fix https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24728 and
https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24734.
|
/* Helper function used to add an associative array of warnings and errors to a zval */
static void zval_from_error_container(zval *z, timelib_error_container *error)
{
int i;
zval *element;
add_assoc_long(z, "warning_count", error->warning_count);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(element);
array_init(element);
for (i = 0; i < error->warning_count; i++) {
add_index_string(element, error->warning_messages[i].position, error->warning_messages[i].message, 1);
}
add_assoc_zval(z, "warnings", element);
add_assoc_long(z, "error_count", error->error_count);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(element);
array_init(element);
for (i = 0; i < error->error_count; i++) {
add_index_string(element, error->error_messages[i].position, error->error_messages[i].message, 1);
}
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
bb057498f7457e8b2eba98332a3bad434de4cf12
| 281,509,042,959,228,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
Fix #70277: new DateTimeZone($foo) is ignoring text after null byte
The DateTimeZone constructors are not binary safe. They're parsing the timezone
as string, but discard the length when calling timezone_initialize(). This
patch adds a tz_len parameter and a respective check to timezone_initialize().
|
BSONObj Command::filterCommandRequestForPassthrough(const BSONObj& cmdObj) {
BSONObjBuilder bob;
for (auto elem : cmdObj) {
const auto name = elem.fieldNameStringData();
if (name == "$readPreference") {
BSONObjBuilder(bob.subobjStart("$queryOptions")).append(elem);
} else if (!Command::isGenericArgument(name) || //
name == "$queryOptions" || //
name == "maxTimeMS" || //
name == "readConcern" || //
name == "writeConcern" || //
name == "lsid" || //
name == "txnNumber") {
// This is the whitelist of generic arguments that commands can be trusted to blindly
// forward to the shards.
bob.append(elem);
}
}
return bob.obj();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mongo
|
5c7c6729c37514760fd34da462b6961a2e385417
| 206,333,584,436,662,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
SERVER-38275 ban explain with UUID
|
PJ_DEF(void) pj_scan_get_unescape( pj_scanner *scanner,
const pj_cis_t *spec, pj_str_t *out)
{
register char *s = scanner->curptr;
char *dst = s;
pj_assert(pj_cis_match(spec,0)==0);
/* Must not match character '%' */
pj_assert(pj_cis_match(spec,'%')==0);
/* EOF is detected implicitly */
if (!pj_cis_match(spec, *s) && *s != '%') {
pj_scan_syntax_err(scanner);
return;
}
out->ptr = s;
do {
if (*s == '%') {
if (s+3 <= scanner->end && pj_isxdigit(*(s+1)) &&
pj_isxdigit(*(s+2)))
{
*dst = (pj_uint8_t) ((pj_hex_digit_to_val(*(s+1)) << 4) +
pj_hex_digit_to_val(*(s+2)));
++dst;
s += 3;
} else {
*dst++ = *s++;
*dst++ = *s++;
break;
}
}
if (pj_cis_match(spec, *s)) {
char *start = s;
do {
++s;
} while (pj_cis_match(spec, *s));
if (dst != start) pj_memmove(dst, start, s-start);
dst += (s-start);
}
} while (*s == '%');
scanner->curptr = s;
out->slen = (dst - out->ptr);
if (PJ_SCAN_IS_PROBABLY_SPACE(*s) && scanner->skip_ws) {
pj_scan_skip_whitespace(scanner);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
pjproject
|
077b465c33f0aec05a49cd2ca456f9a1b112e896
| 184,763,409,583,448,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 |
Merge pull request from GHSA-7fw8-54cv-r7pm
|
static void napi_reuse_skb(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__skb_pull(skb, skb_headlen(skb));
skb_reserve(skb, NET_IP_ALIGN - skb_headroom(skb));
skb->vlan_tci = 0;
skb->dev = napi->dev;
skb->skb_iif = 0;
napi->skb = skb;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
| 258,423,549,018,973,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
doset()
{
char buf[BUFSZ], buf2[BUFSZ];
int i, pass, boolcount, pick_cnt, pick_idx, opt_indx;
boolean *bool_p;
winid tmpwin;
anything any;
menu_item *pick_list;
int indexoffset, startpass, endpass;
boolean setinitial = FALSE, fromfile = FALSE;
int biggest_name = 0;
tmpwin = create_nhwindow(NHW_MENU);
start_menu(tmpwin);
any = zeroany;
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, iflags.menu_headings,
"Booleans (selecting will toggle value):", MENU_UNSELECTED);
any.a_int = 0;
/* first list any other non-modifiable booleans, then modifiable ones */
for (pass = 0; pass <= 1; pass++)
for (i = 0; boolopt[i].name; i++)
if ((bool_p = boolopt[i].addr) != 0 &&
((boolopt[i].optflags == DISP_IN_GAME && pass == 0) ||
(boolopt[i].optflags == SET_IN_GAME && pass == 1))) {
if (bool_p == &flags.female) continue; /* obsolete */
#ifdef WIZARD
if (bool_p == &iflags.sanity_check && !wizard) continue;
if (bool_p == &iflags.menu_tab_sep && !wizard) continue;
#endif
if (is_wc_option(boolopt[i].name) &&
!wc_supported(boolopt[i].name)) continue;
if (is_wc2_option(boolopt[i].name) &&
!wc2_supported(boolopt[i].name)) continue;
any.a_int = (pass == 0) ? 0 : i + 1;
if (!iflags.menu_tab_sep)
Sprintf(buf, "%s%-13s [%s]",
pass == 0 ? " " : "",
boolopt[i].name, *bool_p ? "true" : "false");
else
Sprintf(buf, "%s\t[%s]",
boolopt[i].name, *bool_p ? "true" : "false");
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0,
ATR_NONE, buf, MENU_UNSELECTED);
}
boolcount = i;
indexoffset = boolcount;
any = zeroany;
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, ATR_NONE, "", MENU_UNSELECTED);
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, iflags.menu_headings,
"Compounds (selecting will prompt for new value):",
MENU_UNSELECTED);
#ifdef notyet /* SYSCF */
/* XXX I think this is still fragile. Fixing initial/from_file and/or changing
the SET_* etc to bitmaps will let me make this better. */
if(wizard)
startpass = SET_IN_SYS;
else
#endif
startpass = DISP_IN_GAME;
endpass = SET_IN_GAME;
/* spin through the options to find the biggest name
and adjust the format string accordingly if needed */
biggest_name = 0;
for (i = 0; compopt[i].name; i++)
if (compopt[i].optflags >= startpass && compopt[i].optflags <= endpass &&
strlen(compopt[i].name) > (unsigned) biggest_name)
biggest_name = (int) strlen(compopt[i].name);
if (biggest_name > 30) biggest_name = 30;
if (!iflags.menu_tab_sep)
Sprintf(fmtstr_doset_add_menu, "%%s%%-%ds [%%s]", biggest_name);
/* deliberately put `playmode', `name', `role', `race', `gender' first
(also alignment if anything ever comes before it in compopt[]) */
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, "playmode", 0);
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, "name", 0);
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, "role", 0);
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, "race", 0);
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, "gender", 0);
for (pass = startpass; pass <= endpass; pass++)
for (i = 0; compopt[i].name; i++)
if (compopt[i].optflags == pass) {
if (!strcmp(compopt[i].name, "playmode") ||
!strcmp(compopt[i].name, "name") ||
!strcmp(compopt[i].name, "role") ||
!strcmp(compopt[i].name, "race") ||
!strcmp(compopt[i].name, "gender"))
continue;
else if (is_wc_option(compopt[i].name) &&
!wc_supported(compopt[i].name))
continue;
else if (is_wc2_option(compopt[i].name) &&
!wc2_supported(compopt[i].name))
continue;
else
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, compopt[i].name,
(pass == DISP_IN_GAME) ? 0 : indexoffset);
}
#ifdef STATUS_VIA_WINDOWPORT
# ifdef STATUS_HILITES
any.a_int = -2;
get_status_hilites(buf2, 60);
if (!iflags.menu_tab_sep)
Sprintf(buf, fmtstr_doset_add_menu, any.a_int ? "" : " ",
"status_hilites", buf2);
else
Sprintf(buf, fmtstr_doset_add_menu_tab, "status_hilites", buf2);
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, ATR_NONE, buf, MENU_UNSELECTED);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef AUTOPICKUP_EXCEPTIONS
any.a_int = -1;
Sprintf(buf, "autopickup exceptions (%d currently set)",
count_ape_maps((int *)0, (int *)0));
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, ATR_NONE, buf, MENU_UNSELECTED);
#endif /* AUTOPICKUP_EXCEPTIONS */
#ifdef PREFIXES_IN_USE
any = zeroany;
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, ATR_NONE, "", MENU_UNSELECTED);
add_menu(tmpwin, NO_GLYPH, &any, 0, 0, iflags.menu_headings,
"Variable playground locations:", MENU_UNSELECTED);
for (i = 0; i < PREFIX_COUNT; i++)
doset_add_menu(tmpwin, fqn_prefix_names[i], 0);
#endif
end_menu(tmpwin, "Set what options?");
need_redraw = FALSE;
if ((pick_cnt = select_menu(tmpwin, PICK_ANY, &pick_list)) > 0) {
/*
* Walk down the selection list and either invert the booleans
* or prompt for new values. In most cases, call parseoptions()
* to take care of options that require special attention, like
* redraws.
*/
for (pick_idx = 0; pick_idx < pick_cnt; ++pick_idx) {
opt_indx = pick_list[pick_idx].item.a_int - 1;
#ifdef AUTOPICKUP_EXCEPTIONS
if (opt_indx == -2) { /* -3 due to -1 offset for select_menu() */
(void)special_handling("autopickup_exception",
setinitial, fromfile);
} else
#endif
#ifdef STATUS_VIA_WINDOWPORT
# ifdef STATUS_HILITES
if (opt_indx == -3) { /* -3 due to -1 offset for select_menu() */
if (!status_hilite_menu())
pline("Bad status hilite(s) specified.");
else {
if (wc2_supported("status_hilites"))
preference_update("status_hilites");
}
} else
# endif
#endif
if (opt_indx < boolcount) {
/* boolean option */
Sprintf(buf, "%s%s", *boolopt[opt_indx].addr ? "!" : "",
boolopt[opt_indx].name);
parseoptions(buf, setinitial, fromfile);
if (wc_supported(boolopt[opt_indx].name) ||
wc2_supported(boolopt[opt_indx].name))
preference_update(boolopt[opt_indx].name);
} else {
/* compound option */
opt_indx -= boolcount;
if (!special_handling(compopt[opt_indx].name,
setinitial, fromfile)) {
Sprintf(buf, "Set %s to what?", compopt[opt_indx].name);
getlin(buf, buf2);
if (buf2[0] == '\033')
continue;
Sprintf(buf, "%s:%s", compopt[opt_indx].name, buf2);
/* pass the buck */
parseoptions(buf, setinitial, fromfile);
}
if (wc_supported(compopt[opt_indx].name) ||
wc2_supported(compopt[opt_indx].name))
preference_update(compopt[opt_indx].name);
}
}
free((genericptr_t)pick_list);
pick_list = (menu_item *)0;
}
destroy_nhwindow(tmpwin);
if (need_redraw)
(void) doredraw();
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
NetHack
|
612755bfb5c412079795c68ba392df5d93874ed8
| 293,278,838,098,053,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 193 |
escapes() revamp
Partial rewrite of escapes(), mostly changing its if-then-else
logic so that end-of-string can be checked once instead for each case.
The previous version had a bug if the input string ended with backslash
and one decimal digit (due to being lumped together with the handling
for trailing \X or \O).
|
gs_main_arg_fopen(const char *fname, void *vminst)
{
gs_main_set_lib_paths((gs_main_instance *) vminst);
return lib_fopen(&((gs_main_instance *)vminst)->lib_path,
((gs_main_instance *)vminst)->heap, fname);
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
407cc61e87b0fd9d44d72ca740af7d3c85dee78d
| 116,319,610,456,022,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
"starting_arg_file" should only apply once.
The "starting_arg_file == true" setting should apply to the *first* call to
lib_file_open() in the context of a given call to runarg(). Previously, it
remained set for the entire duration of the runarg() call, resulting in the
current directory being searched for any resource files required by the job.
We also want "starting_arg_file == false" when runarg() is called to execute
Postscript from a buffer, rather than a file argument.
There is a very small chance this may cause problems with some strange scripts
or utilities, but I have been unable to prompt such an issue. If one does arise,
we may have rethink this entirely.
No cluster differences.
|
TEST_F(RouterTest, UpstreamPerTryTimeout) {
NiceMock<Http::MockRequestEncoder> encoder;
Http::ResponseDecoder* response_decoder = nullptr;
EXPECT_CALL(cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_, newStream(_, _))
.WillOnce(Invoke(
[&](Http::ResponseDecoder& decoder,
Http::ConnectionPool::Callbacks& callbacks) -> Http::ConnectionPool::Cancellable* {
response_decoder = &decoder;
callbacks.onPoolReady(encoder, cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_.host_,
upstream_stream_info_, Http::Protocol::Http10);
return nullptr;
}));
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_.stream_info_, onUpstreamHostSelected(_))
.WillOnce(Invoke([&](const Upstream::HostDescriptionConstSharedPtr host) -> void {
EXPECT_EQ(host_address_, host->address());
}));
Http::TestRequestHeaderMapImpl headers{{"x-envoy-internal", "true"},
{"x-envoy-upstream-rq-per-try-timeout-ms", "5"}};
HttpTestUtility::addDefaultHeaders(headers);
router_.decodeHeaders(headers, false);
// We verify that both timeouts are started after decodeData(_, true) is called. This
// verifies that we are not starting the initial per try timeout on the first onPoolReady.FOO
expectPerTryTimerCreate();
expectResponseTimerCreate();
Buffer::OwnedImpl data;
router_.decodeData(data, true);
EXPECT_EQ(1U,
callbacks_.route_->route_entry_.virtual_cluster_.stats().upstream_rq_total_.value());
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_.stream_info_,
setResponseFlag(StreamInfo::ResponseFlag::UpstreamRequestTimeout));
EXPECT_CALL(encoder.stream_, resetStream(Http::StreamResetReason::LocalReset));
Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl response_headers{
{":status", "504"}, {"content-length", "24"}, {"content-type", "text/plain"}};
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_, encodeHeaders_(HeaderMapEqualRef(&response_headers), false));
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks_, encodeData(_, true));
EXPECT_CALL(
cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_.host_->outlier_detector_,
putResult(Upstream::Outlier::Result::LocalOriginTimeout, absl::optional<uint64_t>(504)));
per_try_timeout_->invokeCallback();
EXPECT_EQ(1U, cm_.thread_local_cluster_.cluster_.info_->stats_store_
.counter("upstream_rq_per_try_timeout")
.value());
EXPECT_EQ(1UL, cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_.host_->stats().rq_timeout_.value());
EXPECT_TRUE(verifyHostUpstreamStats(0, 1));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
envoy
|
18871dbfb168d3512a10c78dd267ff7c03f564c6
| 326,199,877,712,789,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 |
[1.18] CVE-2022-21655
Crash with direct_response
Signed-off-by: Otto van der Schaaf <[email protected]>
|
static int mon_text_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct mon_bus *mbus;
struct mon_reader_text *rp;
int rc;
mutex_lock(&mon_lock);
mbus = inode->i_private;
rp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mon_reader_text), GFP_KERNEL);
if (rp == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rp->e_list);
init_waitqueue_head(&rp->wait);
mutex_init(&rp->printf_lock);
rp->printf_size = PRINTF_DFL;
rp->printf_buf = kmalloc(rp->printf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rp->printf_buf == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc_pr;
}
rp->r.m_bus = mbus;
rp->r.r_data = rp;
rp->r.rnf_submit = mon_text_submit;
rp->r.rnf_error = mon_text_error;
rp->r.rnf_complete = mon_text_complete;
snprintf(rp->slab_name, SLAB_NAME_SZ, "mon_text_%p", rp);
rp->e_slab = kmem_cache_create(rp->slab_name,
sizeof(struct mon_event_text), sizeof(long), 0,
mon_text_ctor);
if (rp->e_slab == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err_slab;
}
mon_reader_add(mbus, &rp->r);
file->private_data = rp;
mutex_unlock(&mon_lock);
return 0;
// err_busy:
// kmem_cache_destroy(rp->e_slab);
err_slab:
kfree(rp->printf_buf);
err_alloc_pr:
kfree(rp);
err_alloc:
mutex_unlock(&mon_lock);
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
a5f596830e27e15f7a0ecd6be55e433d776986d8
| 69,824,825,765,865,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 |
usb: usbmon: Read text within supplied buffer size
This change fixes buffer overflows and silent data corruption with the
usbmon device driver text file read operations.
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Noring <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static inline void vmsvga_cursor_define(struct vmsvga_state_s *s,
struct vmsvga_cursor_definition_s *c)
{
QEMUCursor *qc;
int i, pixels;
qc = cursor_alloc(c->width, c->height);
assert(qc != NULL);
qc->hot_x = c->hot_x;
qc->hot_y = c->hot_y;
switch (c->bpp) {
case 1:
cursor_set_mono(qc, 0xffffff, 0x000000, (void *)c->image,
1, (void *)c->mask);
#ifdef DEBUG
cursor_print_ascii_art(qc, "vmware/mono");
#endif
break;
case 32:
/* fill alpha channel from mask, set color to zero */
cursor_set_mono(qc, 0x000000, 0x000000, (void *)c->mask,
1, (void *)c->mask);
/* add in rgb values */
pixels = c->width * c->height;
for (i = 0; i < pixels; i++) {
qc->data[i] |= c->image[i] & 0xffffff;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
cursor_print_ascii_art(qc, "vmware/32bit");
#endif
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unhandled bpp %d, using fallback cursor\n",
__func__, c->bpp);
cursor_put(qc);
qc = cursor_builtin_left_ptr();
}
dpy_cursor_define(s->vga.con, qc);
cursor_put(qc);
}
| 0 |
[] |
qemu
|
fa892e9abb728e76afcf27323ab29c57fb0fe7aa
| 143,789,060,302,136,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
ui/cursor: fix integer overflow in cursor_alloc (CVE-2021-4206)
Prevent potential integer overflow by limiting 'width' and 'height' to
512x512. Also change 'datasize' type to size_t. Refer to security
advisory https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4206/ for more information.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4206
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
|
static int sfb_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sfb_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
struct nlattr *opts;
struct tc_sfb_qopt opt = {
.rehash_interval = jiffies_to_msecs(q->rehash_interval),
.warmup_time = jiffies_to_msecs(q->warmup_time),
.limit = q->limit,
.max = q->max,
.bin_size = q->bin_size,
.increment = q->increment,
.decrement = q->decrement,
.penalty_rate = q->penalty_rate,
.penalty_burst = q->penalty_burst,
};
sch->qstats.backlog = q->qdisc->qstats.backlog;
opts = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TCA_OPTIONS);
if (opts == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put(skb, TCA_SFB_PARMS, sizeof(opt), &opt))
goto nla_put_failure;
return nla_nest_end(skb, opts);
nla_put_failure:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, opts);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-330"
] |
linux
|
55667441c84fa5e0911a0aac44fb059c15ba6da2
| 169,033,866,306,311,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
net/flow_dissector: switch to siphash
UDP IPv6 packets auto flowlabels are using a 32bit secret
(static u32 hashrnd in net/core/flow_dissector.c) and
apply jhash() over fields known by the receivers.
Attackers can easily infer the 32bit secret and use this information
to identify a device and/or user, since this 32bit secret is only
set at boot time.
Really, using jhash() to generate cookies sent on the wire
is a serious security concern.
Trying to change the rol32(hash, 16) in ip6_make_flowlabel() would be
a dead end. Trying to periodically change the secret (like in sch_sfq.c)
could change paths taken in the network for long lived flows.
Let's switch to siphash, as we did in commit df453700e8d8
("inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash")
Using a cryptographically strong pseudo random function will solve this
privacy issue and more generally remove other weak points in the stack.
Packet schedulers using skb_get_hash_perturb() benefit from this change.
Fixes: b56774163f99 ("ipv6: Enable auto flow labels by default")
Fixes: 42240901f7c4 ("ipv6: Implement different admin modes for automatic flow labels")
Fixes: 67800f9b1f4e ("ipv6: Call skb_get_hash_flowi6 to get skb->hash in ip6_make_flowlabel")
Fixes: cb1ce2ef387b ("ipv6: Implement automatic flow label generation on transmit")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jonathan Berger <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Herbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int partitions_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &partitions_op);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux-stable
|
77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84
| 110,047,249,719,659,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
void pop_args() { args_stack.pop_back(); }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
| 22,396,599,545,230,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Fix #122
|
R_API int r_cmd_alias_set_str(RCmd *cmd, const char *k, const char *v) {
RCmdAliasVal val;
val.data = (ut8 *)strdup (v);
if (!val.data) {
return 1;
}
val.is_str = true;
val.is_data = true;
/* No trailing newline */
int len = strlen (v);
while (len-- > 0) {
if (v[len] == '\r' || v[len] == '\n') {
val.data[len] = '\0';
} else {
break;
}
}
// len is strlen()-1 now
val.sz = len + 2;
int ret = ht_pp_update (cmd->aliases, k, &val);
free (val.data);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
radare2
|
0052500c1ed5bf8263b26b9fd7773dbdc6f170c4
| 153,200,830,387,882,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Fix heap OOB read in macho.iterate_chained_fixups ##crash
* Reported by peacock-doris via huntr.dev
* Reproducer 'tests_65305'
mrmacete:
* Return early if segs_count is 0
* Initialize segs_count also for reconstructed fixups
Co-authored-by: pancake <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Francesco Tamagni <[email protected]>
|
MONGO_EXPORT double mongo_count( mongo *conn, const char *db, const char *ns, const bson *query ) {
bson cmd;
bson out = {NULL, 0};
double count = -1;
bson_init( &cmd );
bson_append_string( &cmd, "count", ns );
if ( query && bson_size( query ) > 5 ) /* not empty */
bson_append_bson( &cmd, "query", query );
bson_finish( &cmd );
if( mongo_run_command( conn, db, &cmd, &out ) == MONGO_OK ) {
bson_iterator it;
if( bson_find( &it, &out, "n" ) )
count = bson_iterator_double( &it );
bson_destroy( &cmd );
bson_destroy( &out );
return count;
}
else {
bson_destroy( &out );
bson_destroy( &cmd );
return MONGO_ERROR;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
mongo-c-driver-legacy
|
1a1f5e26a4309480d88598913f9eebf9e9cba8ca
| 291,643,931,575,110,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
don't mix up int and size_t (first pass to fix that)
|
static void vhost_net_buf_init(struct vhost_net_buf *rxq)
{
rxq->head = rxq->tail = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
e2b3b35eb9896f26c98b9a2c047d9111638059a2
| 50,742,051,714,271,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
vhost_net: batch used ring update in rx
This patch tries to batched used ring update during RX. This is pretty
fit for the case when guest is much faster (e.g dpdk based
backend). In this case, used ring is almost empty:
- we may get serious cache line misses/contending on both used ring
and used idx.
- at most 1 packet could be dequeued at one time, batching in guest
does not make much effect.
Update used ring in a batch can help since guest won't access the used
ring until used idx was advanced for several descriptors and since we
advance used ring for every N packets, guest will only need to access
used idx for every N packet since it can cache the used idx. To have a
better interaction for both batch dequeuing and dpdk batching,
VHOST_RX_BATCH was used as the maximum number of descriptors that
could be batched.
Test were done between two machines with 2.40GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2630 connected back to back through ixgbe. Traffic were generated
on one remote ixgbe through MoonGen and measure the RX pps through
testpmd in guest when do xdp_redirect_map from local ixgbe to
tap. RX pps were increased from 3.05 Mpps to 4.00 Mpps (about 31%
improvement).
One possible concern for this is the implications for TCP (especially
latency sensitive workload). Result[1] does not show obvious changes
for most of the netperf test (RR, TX, and RX). And we do get some
improvements for RX on some specific size.
Guest RX:
size/sessions/+thu%/+normalize%
64/ 1/ +2%/ +2%
64/ 2/ +2%/ -1%
64/ 4/ +1%/ +1%
64/ 8/ 0%/ 0%
256/ 1/ +6%/ -3%
256/ 2/ -3%/ +2%
256/ 4/ +11%/ +11%
256/ 8/ 0%/ 0%
512/ 1/ +4%/ 0%
512/ 2/ +2%/ +2%
512/ 4/ 0%/ -1%
512/ 8/ -8%/ -8%
1024/ 1/ -7%/ -17%
1024/ 2/ -8%/ -7%
1024/ 4/ +1%/ 0%
1024/ 8/ 0%/ 0%
2048/ 1/ +30%/ +14%
2048/ 2/ +46%/ +40%
2048/ 4/ 0%/ 0%
2048/ 8/ 0%/ 0%
4096/ 1/ +23%/ +22%
4096/ 2/ +26%/ +23%
4096/ 4/ 0%/ +1%
4096/ 8/ 0%/ 0%
16384/ 1/ -2%/ -3%
16384/ 2/ +1%/ -4%
16384/ 4/ -1%/ -3%
16384/ 8/ 0%/ -1%
65535/ 1/ +15%/ +7%
65535/ 2/ +4%/ +7%
65535/ 4/ 0%/ +1%
65535/ 8/ 0%/ 0%
TCP_RR:
size/sessions/+thu%/+normalize%
1/ 1/ 0%/ +1%
1/ 25/ +2%/ +1%
1/ 50/ +4%/ +1%
64/ 1/ 0%/ -4%
64/ 25/ +2%/ +1%
64/ 50/ 0%/ -1%
256/ 1/ 0%/ 0%
256/ 25/ 0%/ 0%
256/ 50/ +4%/ +2%
Guest TX:
size/sessions/+thu%/+normalize%
64/ 1/ +4%/ -2%
64/ 2/ -6%/ -5%
64/ 4/ +3%/ +6%
64/ 8/ 0%/ +3%
256/ 1/ +15%/ +16%
256/ 2/ +11%/ +12%
256/ 4/ +1%/ 0%
256/ 8/ +5%/ +5%
512/ 1/ -1%/ -6%
512/ 2/ 0%/ -8%
512/ 4/ -2%/ +4%
512/ 8/ +6%/ +9%
1024/ 1/ +3%/ +1%
1024/ 2/ +3%/ +9%
1024/ 4/ 0%/ +7%
1024/ 8/ 0%/ +7%
2048/ 1/ +8%/ +2%
2048/ 2/ +3%/ -1%
2048/ 4/ -1%/ +11%
2048/ 8/ +3%/ +9%
4096/ 1/ +8%/ +8%
4096/ 2/ 0%/ -7%
4096/ 4/ +4%/ +4%
4096/ 8/ +2%/ +5%
16384/ 1/ -3%/ +1%
16384/ 2/ -1%/ -12%
16384/ 4/ -1%/ +5%
16384/ 8/ 0%/ +1%
65535/ 1/ 0%/ -3%
65535/ 2/ +5%/ +16%
65535/ 4/ +1%/ +2%
65535/ 8/ +1%/ -1%
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int dcbnl_getpfccfg(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nlattr *data[DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_MAX + 1], *nest;
u8 value;
int ret;
int i;
int getall = 0;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG])
return -EINVAL;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfccfg)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nla_parse_nested(data, DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_MAX,
tb[DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG],
dcbnl_pfc_up_nest);
if (ret)
return ret;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG);
if (!nest)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (data[DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_ALL])
getall = 1;
for (i = DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_0; i <= DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_7; i++) {
if (!getall && !data[i])
continue;
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfccfg(netdev, i - DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_0,
&value);
ret = nla_put_u8(skb, i, value);
if (ret) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest);
return ret;
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0
| 220,479,382,663,300,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err BM_ParseCommand(GF_BifsDecoder *codec, GF_BitStream *bs, GF_List *com_list)
{
u8 go, type;
GF_Err e;
go = 1;
e = GF_OK;
GF_SceneGraph *cur_graph = codec->current_graph;
GF_Proto *cur_proto = codec->pCurrentProto;
codec->LastError = GF_OK;
while (go) {
type = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
switch (type) {
case 0:
e = BM_ParseInsert(codec, bs, com_list);
break;
case 1:
e = BM_ParseDelete(codec, bs, com_list);
break;
case 2:
e = BM_ParseReplace(codec, bs, com_list);
break;
case 3:
e = BM_SceneReplace(codec, bs, com_list);
break;
}
if (e) break;
go = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
}
while (gf_list_count(codec->QPs)) {
gf_bifs_dec_qp_remove(codec, GF_TRUE);
}
codec->current_graph = cur_graph;
codec->pCurrentProto = cur_proto;
return e;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
gpac
|
c535bad50d5812d27ee5b22b54371bddec411514
| 200,406,588,652,508,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
fixed #2194
|
MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *,
list_authority_ids_with_downloads, (void))
{
smartlist_t *ids = smartlist_new();
digestmap_iter_t *i;
const char *digest;
char *tmp;
void *cl;
if (trusted_dir_certs) {
for (i = digestmap_iter_init(trusted_dir_certs);
!(digestmap_iter_done(i));
i = digestmap_iter_next(trusted_dir_certs, i)) {
/*
* We always have at least dl_status_by_id to query, so no need to
* probe deeper than the existence of a cert_list_t.
*/
digestmap_iter_get(i, &digest, &cl);
tmp = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(tmp, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
smartlist_add(ids, tmp);
}
}
/* else definitely no downlaods going since nothing even has a cert list */
return ids;
}
| 0 |
[] |
tor
|
1afc2ed956a35b40dfd1d207652af5b50c295da7
| 46,562,889,946,133,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
Fix policies.c instance of the "if (r=(a-b)) return r" pattern
I think this one probably can't underflow, since the input ranges
are small. But let's not tempt fate.
This patch also replaces the "cmp" functions here with just "eq"
functions, since nothing actually checked for anything besides 0 and
nonzero.
Related to 21278.
|
xmlCreateZMemBuff( int compression ) {
int z_err;
int hdr_lgth;
xmlZMemBuffPtr buff = NULL;
if ( ( compression < 1 ) || ( compression > 9 ) )
return ( NULL );
/* Create the control and data areas */
buff = xmlMalloc( sizeof( xmlZMemBuff ) );
if ( buff == NULL ) {
xmlIOErrMemory("creating buffer context");
return ( NULL );
}
(void)memset( buff, 0, sizeof( xmlZMemBuff ) );
buff->size = INIT_HTTP_BUFF_SIZE;
buff->zbuff = xmlMalloc( buff->size );
if ( buff->zbuff == NULL ) {
xmlFreeZMemBuff( buff );
xmlIOErrMemory("creating buffer");
return ( NULL );
}
z_err = deflateInit2( &buff->zctrl, compression, Z_DEFLATED,
DFLT_WBITS, DFLT_MEM_LVL, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY );
if ( z_err != Z_OK ) {
xmlChar msg[500];
xmlFreeZMemBuff( buff );
buff = NULL;
xmlStrPrintf(msg, 500,
"xmlCreateZMemBuff: %s %d\n",
"Error initializing compression context. ZLIB error:",
z_err );
xmlIOErr(XML_IO_WRITE, (const char *) msg);
return ( NULL );
}
/* Set the header data. The CRC will be needed for the trailer */
buff->crc = crc32( 0L, NULL, 0 );
hdr_lgth = snprintf( (char *)buff->zbuff, buff->size,
"%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c",
GZ_MAGIC1, GZ_MAGIC2, Z_DEFLATED,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, LXML_ZLIB_OS_CODE );
buff->zctrl.next_out = buff->zbuff + hdr_lgth;
buff->zctrl.avail_out = buff->size - hdr_lgth;
return ( buff );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 54,511,962,788,192,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
static void first_valueFinalizeFunc(sqlite3_context *pCtx){
struct NthValueCtx *p;
p = (struct NthValueCtx*)sqlite3_aggregate_context(pCtx, sizeof(*p));
if( p && p->pValue ){
sqlite3_result_value(pCtx, p->pValue);
sqlite3_value_free(p->pValue);
p->pValue = 0;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
sqlite
|
75e95e1fcd52d3ec8282edb75ac8cd0814095d54
| 224,735,450,180,267,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
When processing constant integer values in ORDER BY clauses of window
definitions (see check-in [7e4809eadfe99ebf]) be sure to fully disable
the constant value to avoid an invalid pointer dereference if the expression
is ever duplicated. This fixes a crash report from Yongheng and Rui.
FossilOrigin-Name: 1ca0bd982ab1183bbafce0d260e4dceda5eb766ed2e7793374a88d1ae0bdd2ca
|
ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
"attempting to determine the owner state");
if (rc)
return 0;
rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned);
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
1309d7afbed112f0e8e90be9af975550caa0076b
| 96,291,443,251,181,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <[email protected]>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int read_private_key(RSA *rsa)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
const sc_acl_entry_t *e;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I0012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
e = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
if (e == NULL || e->method == SC_AC_NEVER)
return 10;
bufsize = file->size;
sc_file_free(file);
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, buf, bufsize, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
bufsize = r;
do {
if (bufsize < 4)
return 3;
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
if (keysize < 3)
return 3;
if (p[2] == opt_key_num)
break;
p += keysize;
bufsize -= keysize;
} while (1);
if (keysize == 0) {
printf("Key number %d not found.\n", opt_key_num);
return 2;
}
return parse_private_key(p, keysize, rsa);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-415",
"CWE-119"
] |
OpenSC
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad
| 273,441,930,739,679,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
char *fmt(const char *format, ...)
{
static char buf[8][1024];
static int bufidx;
int len;
va_list args;
bufidx++;
bufidx &= 7;
va_start(args, format);
len = vsnprintf(buf[bufidx], sizeof(buf[bufidx]), format, args);
va_end(args);
if (len>sizeof(buf[bufidx])) {
fprintf(stderr, "[html.c] string truncated: %s\n", format);
exit(1);
}
return buf[bufidx];
}
| 0 |
[] |
cgit
|
02a545e63454530c1639014d3239c14ced2022c6
| 290,790,344,037,366,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Add support for cloning over http
This patch implements basic support for cloning over http, based on the
work on git-http-backend by Shawn O. Pearce.
Signed-off-by: Lars Hjemli <[email protected]>
|
static void lsr_read_fraction_12(GF_LASeRCodec *lsr, GF_Node *elt, u32 tag, const char *name)
{
GF_FieldInfo info;
u32 i, count;
GF_LSR_READ_INT(lsr, count, 1, name);
if (!count) return;
lsr->last_error = gf_node_get_attribute_by_tag(elt, tag, GF_TRUE, 0, &info);
count = lsr_read_vluimsbf5(lsr, "name");
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
Fixed *f = lsr_read_fraction_12_item(lsr);
gf_list_add( *((SMIL_KeyTimes*)info.far_ptr), f);
if (lsr->last_error) return;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
gpac
|
faa75edde3dfeba1e2cf6ffa48e45a50f1042096
| 127,776,082,558,666,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
fixed #2213
|
TfLiteRegistration* Register_LOG_SOFTMAX_REF() {
static TfLiteRegistration r = {
activations::LogSoftmaxInit, activations::LogSoftmaxFree,
activations::LogSoftmaxPrepare,
activations::LogSoftmaxEval<activations::kReference>};
return &r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35
| 269,406,254,822,249,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
[tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299
Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56
|
static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
void *context)
{
struct p54u_priv *priv = context;
struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev;
struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf;
int err;
if (firmware) {
priv->fw = firmware;
err = p54u_start_ops(priv);
} else {
err = -ENOENT;
dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n");
}
complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
/*
* At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed
* the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
*/
priv = NULL;
if (err) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
usb_lock_device(udev);
usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf);
usb_unlock_device(udev);
}
usb_put_intf(intf);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
6e41e2257f1094acc37618bf6c856115374c6922
| 7,078,931,777,118,056,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
p54usb: Fix race between disconnect and firmware loading
The syzbot fuzzer found a bug in the p54 USB wireless driver. The
issue involves a race between disconnect and the firmware-loader
callback routine, and it has several aspects.
One big problem is that when the firmware can't be loaded, the
callback routine tries to unbind the driver from the USB _device_ (by
calling device_release_driver) instead of from the USB _interface_ to
which it is actually bound (by calling usb_driver_release_interface).
The race involves access to the private data structure. The driver's
disconnect handler waits for a completion that is signalled by the
firmware-loader callback routine. As soon as the completion is
signalled, you have to assume that the private data structure may have
been deallocated by the disconnect handler -- even if the firmware was
loaded without errors. However, the callback routine does access the
private data several times after that point.
Another problem is that, in order to ensure that the USB device
structure hasn't been freed when the callback routine runs, the driver
takes a reference to it. This isn't good enough any more, because now
that the callback routine calls usb_driver_release_interface, it has
to ensure that the interface structure hasn't been freed.
Finally, the driver takes an unnecessary reference to the USB device
structure in the probe function and drops the reference in the
disconnect handler. This extra reference doesn't accomplish anything,
because the USB core already guarantees that a device structure won't
be deallocated while a driver is still bound to any of its interfaces.
To fix these problems, this patch makes the following changes:
Call usb_driver_release_interface() rather than
device_release_driver().
Don't signal the completion until after the important
information has been copied out of the private data structure,
and don't refer to the private data at all thereafter.
Lock udev (the interface's parent) before unbinding the driver
instead of locking udev->parent.
During the firmware loading process, take a reference to the
USB interface instead of the USB device.
Don't take an unnecessary reference to the device during probe
(and then don't drop it during disconnect).
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
CC: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
void nm_walk(NM self, void (*cb)(int, nm_addr *, nm_addr *)) {
int domain;
nm_addr neta, mask;
while(self) {
neta.s6 = s6_of_u128(self->neta);
mask.s6 = s6_of_u128(self->mask);
if(is_v4(self)) {
domain = AF_INET;
neta.s.s_addr = htonl(
neta.s6.s6_addr[12] << 24 |
neta.s6.s6_addr[13] << 16 |
neta.s6.s6_addr[14] << 8 |
neta.s6.s6_addr[15] << 0);
mask.s.s_addr = htonl(
mask.s6.s6_addr[12] << 24 |
mask.s6.s6_addr[13] << 16 |
mask.s6.s6_addr[14] << 8 |
mask.s6.s6_addr[15] << 0);
} else {
domain = AF_INET6;
}
cb(domain, &neta, &mask);
self = self->next;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
netmask
|
29a9c239bd1008363f5b34ffd6c2cef906f3660c
| 33,886,120,902,428,146,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
bump version to 2.4.4
* remove checks for negative unsigned ints, fixes #2
* harden error logging functions, fixes #3
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.