func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static int br_nf_dev_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
if (skb->nfct != NULL && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) &&
skb->len + nf_bridge_mtu_reduction(skb) > skb->dev->mtu &&
!skb_is_gso(skb)) {
if (br_parse_ip_options(skb))
/* Drop invalid packet */
return NF_DROP;
ret = ip_fragment(skb, br_dev_queue_push_xmit);
} else
ret = br_dev_queue_push_xmit(skb);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
f8e9881c2aef1e982e5abc25c046820cd0b7cf64
| 88,272,848,721,993,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static BOOL update_read_notification_icon_state_order(wStream* s, WINDOW_ORDER_INFO* orderInfo,
NOTIFY_ICON_STATE_ORDER* notify_icon_state)
{
if (orderInfo->fieldFlags & WINDOW_ORDER_FIELD_NOTIFY_VERSION)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, notify_icon_state->version); /* version (4 bytes) */
}
if (orderInfo->fieldFlags & WINDOW_ORDER_FIELD_NOTIFY_TIP)
{
if (!rail_read_unicode_string(s,
¬ify_icon_state->toolTip)) /* toolTip (UNICODE_STRING) */
return FALSE;
}
if (orderInfo->fieldFlags & WINDOW_ORDER_FIELD_NOTIFY_INFO_TIP)
{
if (!update_read_notify_icon_infotip(
s, ¬ify_icon_state->infoTip)) /* infoTip (NOTIFY_ICON_INFOTIP) */
return FALSE;
}
if (orderInfo->fieldFlags & WINDOW_ORDER_FIELD_NOTIFY_STATE)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, notify_icon_state->state); /* state (4 bytes) */
}
if (orderInfo->fieldFlags & WINDOW_ORDER_ICON)
{
if (!update_read_icon_info(s, ¬ify_icon_state->icon)) /* icon (ICON_INFO) */
return FALSE;
}
if (orderInfo->fieldFlags & WINDOW_ORDER_CACHED_ICON)
{
if (!update_read_cached_icon_info(
s, ¬ify_icon_state->cachedIcon)) /* cachedIcon (CACHED_ICON_INFO) */
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
6b2bc41935e53b0034fe5948aeeab4f32e80f30f
| 111,263,609,588,653,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 |
Fix #6010: Check length in read_icon_info
|
static int calc_wheel_index(unsigned long expires, unsigned long clk)
{
unsigned long delta = expires - clk;
unsigned int idx;
if (delta < LVL_START(1)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 0);
} else if (delta < LVL_START(2)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 1);
} else if (delta < LVL_START(3)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 2);
} else if (delta < LVL_START(4)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 3);
} else if (delta < LVL_START(5)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 4);
} else if (delta < LVL_START(6)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 5);
} else if (delta < LVL_START(7)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 6);
} else if (LVL_DEPTH > 8 && delta < LVL_START(8)) {
idx = calc_index(expires, 7);
} else if ((long) delta < 0) {
idx = clk & LVL_MASK;
} else {
/*
* Force expire obscene large timeouts to expire at the
* capacity limit of the wheel.
*/
if (delta >= WHEEL_TIMEOUT_CUTOFF)
expires = clk + WHEEL_TIMEOUT_MAX;
idx = calc_index(expires, LVL_DEPTH - 1);
}
return idx;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-330"
] |
linux
|
f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4
| 150,582,499,981,179,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity
This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.
Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.
In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state. For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void FVMenuDisplayByGroups(GWindow gw, struct gmenuitem *UNUSED(mi), GEvent *UNUSED(e)) {
FontView *fv = (FontView *) GDrawGetUserData(gw);
DisplayGroups(fv);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fontforge
|
626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
| 170,725,448,277,665,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
|
static ut64 p_ptr(ut64 decorated_addr, RKernelCacheObj *obj) {
RParsedPointer ptr;
r_parse_pointer (&ptr, decorated_addr, obj);
return ptr.address;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
radare2
|
feaa4e7f7399c51ee6f52deb84dc3f795b4035d6
| 182,069,118,532,812,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix null deref in xnu.kernelcache ##crash
* Reported by @xshad3 via huntr.dev
|
int regset_xregset_fpregs_active(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset)
{
struct fpu *target_fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR) && target_fpu->fpstate_active)
return regset->n;
else
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
814fb7bb7db5433757d76f4c4502c96fc53b0b5e
| 93,520,389,862,931,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Hao <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int __perf_install_in_context(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
struct perf_event_context *task_ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx;
bool reprogram = true;
int ret = 0;
raw_spin_lock(&cpuctx->ctx.lock);
if (ctx->task) {
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
task_ctx = ctx;
reprogram = (ctx->task == current);
/*
* If the task is running, it must be running on this CPU,
* otherwise we cannot reprogram things.
*
* If its not running, we don't care, ctx->lock will
* serialize against it becoming runnable.
*/
if (task_curr(ctx->task) && !reprogram) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto unlock;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(reprogram && cpuctx->task_ctx && cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx);
} else if (task_ctx) {
raw_spin_lock(&task_ctx->lock);
}
if (reprogram) {
ctx_sched_out(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME);
add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx);
ctx_resched(cpuctx, task_ctx);
} else {
add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx);
}
unlock:
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, task_ctx);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
| 56,717,022,408,873,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 |
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int su3000_rc_query(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
u8 key[2];
struct i2c_msg msg = {
.addr = DW2102_RC_QUERY,
.flags = I2C_M_RD,
.buf = key,
.len = 2
};
if (d->props.i2c_algo->master_xfer(&d->i2c_adap, &msg, 1) == 1) {
if (msg.buf[0] != 0xff) {
deb_rc("%s: rc code: %x, %x\n",
__func__, key[0], key[1]);
rc_keydown(d->rc_dev, RC_TYPE_RC5,
RC_SCANCODE_RC5(key[1], key[0]), 0);
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] |
linux
|
606142af57dad981b78707234cfbd15f9f7b7125
| 140,852,602,020,728,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
[media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
static inline int dccp_listen_start(struct sock *sk, int backlog)
{
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
dp->dccps_role = DCCP_ROLE_LISTEN;
return inet_csk_listen_start(sk, backlog);
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
39ebc0276bada8bb70e067cb6d0eb71839c0fb08
| 158,714,139,928,834,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
[DCCP] getsockopt: Fix DCCP_SOCKOPT_[SEND,RECV]_CSCOV
We were only checking if there was enough space to put the int, but
left len as specified by the (malicious) user, sigh, fix it by setting
len to sizeof(val) and transfering just one int worth of data, the one
asked for.
Also check for negative len values.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int vbg_hgcm_call(struct vbg_dev *gdev, u32 requestor, u32 client_id,
u32 function, u32 timeout_ms,
struct vmmdev_hgcm_function_parameter *parms, u32 parm_count,
int *vbox_status)
{
struct vmmdev_hgcm_call *call;
void **bounce_bufs = NULL;
bool leak_it;
size_t size;
int i, ret;
size = sizeof(struct vmmdev_hgcm_call) +
parm_count * sizeof(struct vmmdev_hgcm_function_parameter);
/*
* Validate and buffer the parameters for the call. This also increases
* call_size with the amount of extra space needed for page lists.
*/
ret = hgcm_call_preprocess(parms, parm_count, &bounce_bufs, &size);
if (ret) {
/* Even on error bounce bufs may still have been allocated */
goto free_bounce_bufs;
}
call = vbg_req_alloc(size, VMMDEVREQ_HGCM_CALL, requestor);
if (!call) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_bounce_bufs;
}
hgcm_call_init_call(call, client_id, function, parms, parm_count,
bounce_bufs);
ret = vbg_hgcm_do_call(gdev, call, timeout_ms, &leak_it);
if (ret == 0) {
*vbox_status = call->header.result;
ret = hgcm_call_copy_back_result(call, parms, parm_count,
bounce_bufs);
}
if (!leak_it)
vbg_req_free(call, size);
free_bounce_bufs:
if (bounce_bufs) {
for (i = 0; i < parm_count; i++)
kvfree(bounce_bufs[i]);
kfree(bounce_bufs);
}
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
e0b0cb9388642c104838fac100a4af32745621e2
| 130,122,656,578,011,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
virt: vbox: fix memory leak in hgcm_call_preprocess_linaddr
In hgcm_call_preprocess_linaddr memory is allocated for bounce_buf but
is not released if copy_form_user fails. In order to prevent memory leak
in case of failure, the assignment to bounce_buf_ret is moved before the
error check. This way the allocated bounce_buf will be released by the
caller.
Fixes: 579db9d45cb4 ("virt: Add vboxguest VMMDEV communication code")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int wvlan_rts(struct rtsreq *rrq, __u32 io_base)
{
int ioctl_ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_rts");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
DBG_PRINT("io_base: 0x%08x\n", io_base);
switch (rrq->typ) {
case WL_IOCTL_RTS_READ:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_RTS -- WL_IOCTL_RTS_READ\n");
rrq->data[0] = IN_PORT_WORD(io_base + rrq->reg);
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, " reg 0x%04x ==> 0x%04x\n", rrq->reg, CNV_LITTLE_TO_SHORT(rrq->data[0]));
break;
case WL_IOCTL_RTS_WRITE:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_RTS -- WL_IOCTL_RTS_WRITE\n");
OUT_PORT_WORD(io_base + rrq->reg, rrq->data[0]);
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, " reg 0x%04x <== 0x%04x\n", rrq->reg, CNV_LITTLE_TO_SHORT(rrq->data[0]));
break;
case WL_IOCTL_RTS_BATCH_READ:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_RTS -- WL_IOCTL_RTS_BATCH_READ\n");
IN_PORT_STRING_16(io_base + rrq->reg, rrq->data, rrq->len);
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, " reg 0x%04x ==> %d bytes\n", rrq->reg, rrq->len * sizeof(__u16));
break;
case WL_IOCTL_RTS_BATCH_WRITE:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_RTS -- WL_IOCTL_RTS_BATCH_WRITE\n");
OUT_PORT_STRING_16(io_base + rrq->reg, rrq->data, rrq->len);
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, " reg 0x%04x <== %d bytes\n", rrq->reg, rrq->len * sizeof(__u16));
break;
default:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_RTS -- UNSUPPORTED RTS CODE: 0x%X", rrq->typ);
ioctl_ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ioctl_ret;
} /* wvlan_rts */
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054
| 85,676,660,825,699,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void __net_exit igmp_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
remove_proc_entry("mcfilter", net->proc_net);
remove_proc_entry("igmp", net->proc_net);
inet_ctl_sock_destroy(net->ipv4.mc_autojoin_sk);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
23d2b94043ca8835bd1e67749020e839f396a1c2
| 327,445,327,756,171,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
igmp: Add ip_mc_list lock in ip_check_mc_rcu
I got below panic when doing fuzz test:
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 4056 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G B 5.14.0-rc1-00195-gcff5c4254439-dirty #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0x9b
panic+0x2cd/0x5af
end_report.cold+0x5a/0x5a
kasan_report+0xec/0x110
ip_check_mc_rcu+0x556/0x5d0
__mkroute_output+0x895/0x1740
ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2d0/0x1050
ip_route_output_key_hash+0x182/0x2e0
ip_route_output_flow+0x28/0x130
udp_sendmsg+0x165d/0x2280
udpv6_sendmsg+0x121e/0x24f0
inet6_sendmsg+0xf7/0x140
sock_sendmsg+0xe9/0x180
____sys_sendmsg+0x2b8/0x7a0
___sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x160
__sys_sendmmsg+0x17e/0x3c0
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9e/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x462eb9
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8
48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48>
3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3df5af1c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462eb9
RDX: 0000000000000312 RSI: 0000000020001700 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3df5af26bc
R13: 00000000004c372d R14: 0000000000700b10 R15: 00000000ffffffff
It is one use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu.
In ip_mc_del_src, the ip_sf_list of pmc has been freed under pmc->lock protection.
But access to ip_sf_list in ip_check_mc_rcu is not protected by the lock.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void lodepng_compress_settings_init(LodePNGCompressSettings* settings)
{
/*compress with dynamic huffman tree (not in the mathematical sense, just not the predefined one)*/
settings->btype = 2;
settings->use_lz77 = 1;
settings->windowsize = DEFAULT_WINDOWSIZE;
settings->minmatch = 3;
settings->nicematch = 128;
settings->lazymatching = 1;
settings->custom_zlib = 0;
settings->custom_deflate = 0;
settings->custom_context = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
FreeRDP
|
9fee4ae076b1ec97b97efb79ece08d1dab4df29a
| 240,210,511,272,958,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, SortSkipSoftLimit) {
runQuerySortProjSkipNToReturn(BSONObj(), fromjson("{a: 1}"), BSONObj(), 2, 3);
assertNumSolutions(1U);
assertSolutionExists(
"{skip: {n: 2, node: "
"{sort: {pattern: {a: 1}, limit: 5, node: {sortKeyGen: "
"{node: {cscan: {dir: 1}}}}}}}}");
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3
| 32,947,874,447,862,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr.
|
regfree (preg)
regex_t *preg;
{
if (preg->buffer != NULL)
free (preg->buffer);
preg->buffer = NULL;
preg->allocated = 0;
preg->used = 0;
if (preg->fastmap != NULL)
free (preg->fastmap);
preg->fastmap = NULL;
preg->fastmap_accurate = 0;
if (preg->translate != NULL)
free (preg->translate);
preg->translate = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-252"
] |
glibc
|
2864e767053317538feafa815046fff89e5a16be
| 233,069,779,420,277,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Update.
1999-11-09 Ulrich Drepper <[email protected]>
* elf/dl-load.c (_dl_dst_count): Allow $ORIGIN to point to
directory with the reference since this is as secure as using the
object with the dependency.
(_dl_dst_substitute): Likewise.
* elf/dl-load.c (_dl_dst_count): Change strings in first two
strncmp calls to allow reuse.
(_dl_dst_substitute): Likewise.
1999-11-01 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]>
* posix/regex.c (init_syntax_once): move below definition of
ISALNUM etc., then use ISALNUM to init the table, so that
the word ops will work if i18n'ed.
(SYNTAX): And subscript with 0xFF for 8bit character sets.
1999-11-09 Andreas Jaeger <[email protected]>
* sysdeps/unix/getlogin_r.c (getlogin_r): Sync with getlogin
implementation for ttyname_r call; fix inverted condition; return
ut_user. Closes PR libc/1438.
1999-11-09 Ulrich Drepper <[email protected]>
* timezone/checktab.awk: Update from tzcode1999h.
* timezone/africa: Update from tzdata1999i.
* timezone/asia: Likewise.
* timezone/australasia: Likewise.
* timezone/backward: Likewise.
* timezone/europe: Likewise.
* timezone/northamerica: Likewise.
* timezone/southamerica: Likewise.
* timezone/iso3166.tab: Likewise.
* timezone/zone.tab: Likewise.
* sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/bits/resource.h: Define values also as
macros. Patch by [email protected] [PR libc/1439].
1999-11-09 Andreas Jaeger <[email protected]>
* posix/Makefile (tests): Added tst-getlogin.
* posix/tst-getlogin.c: New file, contains simple tests for
getlogin and getlogin_r.
1999-11-09 Andreas Schwab <[email protected]>
* misc/syslog.c: For LOG_PERROR only append a newline if
necessary.
|
}
void dump_hevc_track_info(GF_ISOFile *file, u32 trackNum, GF_HEVCConfig *hevccfg
#if !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS) && !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC)
, HEVCState *hevc_state
#endif /*GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS && defined(GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC)*/
)
{
#if !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS) && !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC)
u32 idx;
#endif
u32 k;
Bool non_hevc_base_layer=GF_FALSE;
fprintf(stderr, "\t%s Info:", hevccfg->is_lhvc ? "LHVC" : "HEVC");
if (!hevccfg->is_lhvc)
fprintf(stderr, " Profile %s @ Level %g - Chroma Format %s\n", gf_hevc_get_profile_name(hevccfg->profile_idc), ((Double)hevccfg->level_idc) / 30.0, gf_avc_hevc_get_chroma_format_name(hevccfg->chromaFormat));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tNAL Unit length bits: %d", 8*hevccfg->nal_unit_size);
if (!hevccfg->is_lhvc)
fprintf(stderr, " - general profile compatibility 0x%08X\n", hevccfg->general_profile_compatibility_flags);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tParameter Sets: ");
for (k=0; k<gf_list_count(hevccfg->param_array); k++) {
GF_NALUFFParamArray *ar=gf_list_get(hevccfg->param_array, k);
if (ar->type==GF_HEVC_NALU_SEQ_PARAM) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d SPS ", gf_list_count(ar->nalus));
}
if (ar->type==GF_HEVC_NALU_PIC_PARAM) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d PPS ", gf_list_count(ar->nalus));
}
if (ar->type==GF_HEVC_NALU_VID_PARAM) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d VPS ", gf_list_count(ar->nalus));
#if !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS) && !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC)
for (idx=0; idx<gf_list_count(ar->nalus); idx++) {
GF_NALUFFParam *vps = gf_list_get(ar->nalus, idx);
s32 ps_idx=gf_hevc_read_vps(vps->data, vps->size, hevc_state);
if (hevccfg->is_lhvc && (ps_idx>=0)) {
non_hevc_base_layer = ! hevc_state->vps[ps_idx].base_layer_internal_flag;
}
}
#endif
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#if !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS) && !defined(GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC)
for (k=0; k<gf_list_count(hevccfg->param_array); k++) {
GF_NALUFFParamArray *ar=gf_list_get(hevccfg->param_array, k);
u32 width, height;
s32 par_n, par_d;
if (ar->type !=GF_HEVC_NALU_SEQ_PARAM) continue;
for (idx=0; idx<gf_list_count(ar->nalus); idx++) {
GF_Err e;
GF_NALUFFParam *sps = gf_list_get(ar->nalus, idx);
par_n = par_d = -1;
e = gf_hevc_get_sps_info_with_state(hevc_state, sps->data, sps->size, NULL, &width, &height, &par_n, &par_d);
if (e==GF_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "\tSPS resolution %dx%d", width, height);
if ((par_n>0) && (par_d>0)) {
u32 tw, th;
gf_isom_get_track_layout_info(file, trackNum, &tw, &th, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fprintf(stderr, " - Pixel Aspect Ratio %d:%d - Indicated track size %d x %d", par_n, par_d, tw, th);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else {
M4_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, ("Failed to read SPS: %s\n\n", gf_error_to_string(e) ));
}
}
}
#endif
if (!hevccfg->is_lhvc)
fprintf(stderr, "\tBit Depth luma %d - Chroma %d - %d temporal layers\n", hevccfg->luma_bit_depth, hevccfg->chroma_bit_depth, hevccfg->numTemporalLayers);
else
fprintf(stderr, "\t%d temporal layers\n", hevccfg->numTemporalLayers);
if (hevccfg->is_lhvc) {
fprintf(stderr, "\t%sHEVC base layer - Complete representation %d\n", non_hevc_base_layer ? "Non-" : "", hevccfg->complete_representation);
}
for (k=0; k<gf_list_count(hevccfg->param_array); k++) {
GF_NALUFFParamArray *ar=gf_list_get(hevccfg->param_array, k);
if (ar->type==GF_HEVC_NALU_SEQ_PARAM) print_config_hash(ar->nalus, "SPS");
else if (ar->type==GF_HEVC_NALU_PIC_PARAM) print_config_hash(ar->nalus, "PPS");
else if (ar->type==GF_HEVC_NALU_VID_PARAM) print_config_hash(ar->nalus, "VPS");
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-401"
] |
gpac
|
289ffce3e0d224d314f5f92a744d5fe35999f20b
| 157,835,671,745,097,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 |
fixed #1767 (fuzz)
|
execfile_finish(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
check_ostack(1);
esp -= 2;
execfile_cleanup(i_ctx_p);
return o_pop_estack;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
407cc61e87b0fd9d44d72ca740af7d3c85dee78d
| 227,207,757,171,924,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
"starting_arg_file" should only apply once.
The "starting_arg_file == true" setting should apply to the *first* call to
lib_file_open() in the context of a given call to runarg(). Previously, it
remained set for the entire duration of the runarg() call, resulting in the
current directory being searched for any resource files required by the job.
We also want "starting_arg_file == false" when runarg() is called to execute
Postscript from a buffer, rather than a file argument.
There is a very small chance this may cause problems with some strange scripts
or utilities, but I have been unable to prompt such an issue. If one does arise,
we may have rethink this entirely.
No cluster differences.
|
void kthread_destroy_worker(struct kthread_worker *worker)
{
struct task_struct *task;
task = worker->task;
if (WARN_ON(!task))
return;
kthread_flush_worker(worker);
kthread_stop(task);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&worker->work_list));
kfree(worker);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tip
|
dfb4357da6ddbdf57d583ba64361c9d792b0e0b1
| 122,489,027,504,167,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
time: Remove CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc: Xing Gao <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Marek <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t cdc_ncm_store_tx_max(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
unsigned long val;
if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val) || cdc_ncm_check_tx_max(dev, val) != val)
return -EINVAL;
cdc_ncm_update_rxtx_max(dev, ctx->rx_max, val);
return len;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
4d06dd537f95683aba3651098ae288b7cbff8274
| 275,556,858,001,093,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
MODCONSTRUCTOR(CWebAdminMod) {
VPair vParams;
vParams.push_back(make_pair("user", ""));
AddSubPage(new CWebSubPage("settings", "Global Settings", CWebSubPage::F_ADMIN));
AddSubPage(new CWebSubPage("edituser", "Your Settings", vParams));
AddSubPage(new CWebSubPage("traffic", "Traffic Info", CWebSubPage::F_ADMIN));
AddSubPage(new CWebSubPage("listusers", "List Users", CWebSubPage::F_ADMIN));
AddSubPage(new CWebSubPage("adduser", "Add User", CWebSubPage::F_ADMIN));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
znc
|
2bd410ee5570cea127233f1133ea22f25174eb28
| 287,330,368,893,751,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Fix NULL pointer dereference in webadmin.
Triggerable by any non-admin, if webadmin is loaded.
The only affected version is 1.0
Thanks to ChauffeR (Simone Esposito) for reporting this.
|
static int disk_change(int drive)
{
int fdc = FDC(drive);
if (time_before(jiffies, UDRS->select_date + UDP->select_delay))
DPRINT("WARNING disk change called early\n");
if (!(FDCS->dor & (0x10 << UNIT(drive))) ||
(FDCS->dor & 3) != UNIT(drive) || fdc != FDC(drive)) {
DPRINT("probing disk change on unselected drive\n");
DPRINT("drive=%d fdc=%d dor=%x\n", drive, FDC(drive),
(unsigned int)FDCS->dor);
}
debug_dcl(UDP->flags,
"checking disk change line for drive %d\n", drive);
debug_dcl(UDP->flags, "jiffies=%lu\n", jiffies);
debug_dcl(UDP->flags, "disk change line=%x\n", fd_inb(FD_DIR) & 0x80);
debug_dcl(UDP->flags, "flags=%lx\n", UDRS->flags);
if (UDP->flags & FD_BROKEN_DCL)
return test_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags);
if ((fd_inb(FD_DIR) ^ UDP->flags) & 0x80) {
set_bit(FD_VERIFY_BIT, &UDRS->flags);
/* verify write protection */
if (UDRS->maxblock) /* mark it changed */
set_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags);
/* invalidate its geometry */
if (UDRS->keep_data >= 0) {
if ((UDP->flags & FTD_MSG) &&
current_type[drive] != NULL)
DPRINT("Disk type is undefined after disk change\n");
current_type[drive] = NULL;
floppy_sizes[TOMINOR(drive)] = MAX_DISK_SIZE << 1;
}
return 1;
} else {
UDRS->last_checked = jiffies;
clear_bit(FD_DISK_NEWCHANGE_BIT, &UDRS->flags);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264",
"CWE-754"
] |
linux
|
ef87dbe7614341c2e7bfe8d32fcb7028cc97442c
| 157,695,887,578,553,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
floppy: ignore kernel-only members in FDRAWCMD ioctl input
Always clear out these floppy_raw_cmd struct members after copying the
entire structure from userspace so that the in-kernel version is always
valid and never left in an interdeterminate state.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int git_path_normalize_slashes(git_buf *out, const char *path)
{
int error;
char *p;
if ((error = git_buf_puts(out, path)) < 0)
return error;
for (p = out->ptr; *p; p++) {
if (*p == '\\')
*p = '/';
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-706"
] |
libgit2
|
3f7851eadca36a99627ad78cbe56a40d3776ed01
| 18,891,334,217,549,634,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Disallow NTFS Alternate Data Stream attacks, even on Linux/macOS
A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in
so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource
forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with.
These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream
name>:<stream type>`.
Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a
default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and
`abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent.
This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we
definitely want to prevent.
On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in
file/directory names.
While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not
accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via
CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access
them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS.
Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack
_everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate
Data Stream of `.git`.
This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
|
void ring_buffer_put(struct perf_buffer *rb)
{
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&rb->refcount))
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&rb->event_list));
call_rcu(&rb->rcu_head, rb_free_rcu);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
tip
|
7bdb157cdebbf95a1cd94ed2e01b338714075d00
| 31,894,518,215,468,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
perf/core: Fix a memory leak in perf_event_parse_addr_filter()
As shown through runtime testing, the "filename" allocation is not
always freed in perf_event_parse_addr_filter().
There are three possible ways that this could happen:
- It could be allocated twice on subsequent iterations through the loop,
- or leaked on the success path,
- or on the failure path.
Clean up the code flow to make it obvious that 'filename' is always
freed in the reallocation path and in the two return paths as well.
We rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) is NOP and filename is initialized
with NULL.
This fixes the leak. No other side effects expected.
[ Dan Carpenter: cleaned up the code flow & added a changelog. ]
[ Ingo Molnar: updated the changelog some more. ]
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Signed-off-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <[email protected]>
Cc: Anthony Liguori <[email protected]>
--
kernel/events/core.c | 12 +++++-------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
|
xmlStrVPrintf(xmlChar *buf, int len, const char *msg, va_list ap) {
int ret;
if((buf == NULL) || (msg == NULL)) {
return(-1);
}
ret = vsnprintf((char *) buf, len, (const char *) msg, ap);
buf[len - 1] = 0; /* be safe ! */
return(ret);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 235,132,420,310,276,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
void demote_segment_4k(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
if (mm->context.user_psize == MMU_PAGE_4K)
return;
mm->context.user_psize = MMU_PAGE_4K;
mm->context.sllp = SLB_VSID_USER | mmu_psize_defs[MMU_PAGE_4K].sllp;
get_paca()->context = mm->context;
slb_flush_and_rebolt();
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE_BASE
spu_flush_all_slbs(mm);
#endif
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
721151d004dcf01a71b12bb6b893f9160284cf6e
| 207,620,844,348,096,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
[POWERPC] Allow drivers to map individual 4k pages to userspace
Some drivers have resources that they want to be able to map into
userspace that are 4k in size. On a kernel configured with 64k pages
we currently end up mapping the 4k we want plus another 60k of
physical address space, which could contain anything. This can
introduce security problems, for example in the case of an infiniband
adaptor where the other 60k could contain registers that some other
program is using for its communications.
This patch adds a new function, remap_4k_pfn, which drivers can use to
map a single 4k page to userspace regardless of whether the kernel is
using a 4k or a 64k page size. Like remap_pfn_range, it would
typically be called in a driver's mmap function. It only maps a
single 4k page, which on a 64k page kernel appears replicated 16 times
throughout a 64k page. On a 4k page kernel it reduces to a call to
remap_pfn_range.
The way this works on a 64k kernel is that a new bit, _PAGE_4K_PFN,
gets set on the linux PTE. This alters the way that __hash_page_4K
computes the real address to put in the HPTE. The RPN field of the
linux PTE becomes the 4k RPN directly rather than being interpreted as
a 64k RPN. Since the RPN field is 32 bits, this means that physical
addresses being mapped with remap_4k_pfn have to be below 2^44,
i.e. 0x100000000000.
The patch also factors out the code in arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
that deals with demoting a process to use 4k pages into one function
that gets called in the various different places where we need to do
that. There were some discrepancies between exactly what was done in
the various places, such as a call to spu_flush_all_slbs in one case
but not in others.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
|
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_digests)
{
/*
* OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
* pulling in all the ciphers during static linking
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_add_all_digests: "
"openssl_add_all_digests()\n");
# endif
openssl_add_all_digests_int();
#endif
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-330"
] |
openssl
|
1b0fe00e2704b5e20334a16d3c9099d1ba2ef1be
| 203,613,232,650,390,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
drbg: ensure fork-safety without using a pthread_atfork handler
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd095, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.
This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.
To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.
CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
|
TensorSliceReader::VarToShapeMap TensorSliceReader::GetVariableToShapeMap()
const {
VarToShapeMap name_to_shape;
if (status().ok()) {
for (auto& e : Tensors()) {
name_to_shape[e.first] = e.second->shape();
}
}
return name_to_shape;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369",
"CWE-345"
] |
tensorflow
|
b619c6f865715ca3b15ef1842b5b95edbaa710ad
| 225,578,005,870,847,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Use BuildTensorShapeBase when parsing unverified TensorShapes during checkpoint loading.
This avoids crashing when the TensorShape has negative dimensions.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 392769882
Change-Id: Id1f7ae7fcf8142193556af47abfda81b13d3cce4
|
static int _parse_header_data(struct mailbox *mailbox,
const char *data, size_t datalen)
{
if (!datalen) return IMAP_MAILBOX_BADFORMAT;
struct parseentry_rock rock = { &mailbox->h, BUF_INITIALIZER, 0, 0, 0 };
int r = dlist_parsesax(data, datalen, 0, parseentry_cb, &rock);
buf_free(&rock.aclbuf); // should be noop, but cleans up after errors
return r;
}
| 0 |
[] |
cyrus-imapd
|
1d6d15ee74e11a9bd745e80be69869e5fb8d64d6
| 226,096,703,039,725,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
mailbox.c/reconstruct.c: Add mailbox_mbentry_from_path()
|
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
s->version, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
{
/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
/* This is not really an error but the only means to
for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
* PSK: may send PSK identity hints
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
|| (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
* Also for GOST ciphersuites when
* the client uses its key from the certificate
* for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
* at this point and digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
int offset=0;
int dgst_num;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
* FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
* should be generalized. But it is next step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
{
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0)
{
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset+=dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
/*
* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
* to set this here because we don't know if we're
* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
* In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
* In a full handshake, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
}
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
}
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
ce325c60c74b0fa784f5872404b722e120e5cab0
| 266,858,003,814,949,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 663 |
Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
|
gx_set_device_only(gs_gstate * pgs, gx_device * dev)
{
rc_assign(pgs->device, dev, "gx_set_device_only");
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
79cccf641486a6595c43f1de1cd7ade696020a31
| 271,669,445,154,876,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Bug 699654(2): preserve LockSafetyParams in the nulldevice
The nulldevice does not necessarily use the normal setpagedevice machinery,
but can be set using the nulldevice operator. In which case, we don't preserve
the settings from the original device (in the way setpagedevice does).
Since nulldevice does nothing, this is not generally a problem, but in the case
of LockSafetyParams it *is* important when we restore back to the original
device, when LockSafetyParams not being set is "preserved" into the post-
restore configuration.
We have to initialise the value to false because the nulldevice is used during
initialisation (before any other device exists), and *must* be writable for
that.
|
ec_subm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, mpi_ec_t ec)
{
(void)ec;
mpi_sub (w, u, v);
/*ec_mod (w, ec);*/
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
libgcrypt
|
88e1358962e902ff1cbec8d53ba3eee46407851a
| 336,071,849,975,763,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
ecc: Constant-time multiplication for Weierstrass curve.
* mpi/ec.c (_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point): Use simple left-to-right binary
method for Weierstrass curve when SCALAR is secure.
|
static void process_bin_get_or_touch(conn *c) {
item *it;
protocol_binary_response_get* rsp = (protocol_binary_response_get*)c->wbuf;
char* key = binary_get_key(c);
size_t nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
int should_touch = (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_TOUCH ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GAT ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GATK);
int should_return_key = (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GETK ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GATK);
int should_return_value = (c->cmd != PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_TOUCH);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d %s ", c->sfd, should_touch ? "TOUCH" : "GET");
if (fwrite(key, 1, nkey, stderr)) {}
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
if (should_touch) {
protocol_binary_request_touch *t = binary_get_request(c);
time_t exptime = ntohl(t->message.body.expiration);
it = item_touch(key, nkey, realtime(exptime), c);
} else {
it = item_get(key, nkey, c, DO_UPDATE);
}
if (it) {
/* the length has two unnecessary bytes ("\r\n") */
uint16_t keylen = 0;
uint32_t bodylen = sizeof(rsp->message.body) + (it->nbytes - 2);
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
c->thread->stats.touch_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[ITEM_clsid(it)].touch_hits++;
} else {
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[ITEM_clsid(it)].get_hits++;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_TOUCH(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
} else {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
}
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_TOUCH) {
bodylen -= it->nbytes - 2;
} else if (should_return_key) {
bodylen += nkey;
keylen = nkey;
}
add_bin_header(c, 0, sizeof(rsp->message.body), keylen, bodylen);
rsp->message.header.response.cas = htonll(ITEM_get_cas(it));
// add the flags
if (settings.inline_ascii_response) {
rsp->message.body.flags = htonl(strtoul(ITEM_suffix(it), NULL, 10));
} else {
rsp->message.body.flags = htonl(*((uint32_t *)ITEM_suffix(it)));
}
add_iov(c, &rsp->message.body, sizeof(rsp->message.body));
if (should_return_key) {
add_iov(c, ITEM_key(it), nkey);
}
if (should_return_value) {
/* Add the data minus the CRLF */
if ((it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) == 0) {
add_iov(c, ITEM_data(it), it->nbytes - 2);
} else {
add_chunked_item_iovs(c, it, it->nbytes - 2);
}
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
/* Remember this command so we can garbage collect it later */
c->item = it;
} else {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
c->thread->stats.touch_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.touch_misses++;
} else {
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.get_misses++;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_TOUCH(c->sfd, key, nkey, -1, 0);
} else {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, key, nkey, -1, 0);
}
if (c->noreply) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_new_cmd);
} else {
if (should_return_key) {
char *ofs = c->wbuf + sizeof(protocol_binary_response_header);
add_bin_header(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT,
0, nkey, nkey);
memcpy(ofs, key, nkey);
add_iov(c, ofs, nkey);
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT,
NULL, 0);
}
}
}
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_get(key, nkey, NULL != it);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-667"
] |
memcached
|
a8c4a82787b8b6c256d61bd5c42fb7f92d1bae00
| 187,306,490,826,916,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 125 |
Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
|
static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
unsigned int val = 0;
int err;
if (level != SOL_NETLINK)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (optlen >= sizeof(int) &&
get_user(val, (unsigned int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case NETLINK_PKTINFO:
if (val)
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO;
else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: {
if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (!val || val - 1 >= nlk->ngroups)
return -EINVAL;
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_socket_mc(nlk, val,
optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP);
netlink_table_ungrab();
err = 0;
break;
}
case NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR:
if (val)
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR;
else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS:
if (val) {
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS;
clear_bit(0, &nlk->state);
wake_up_interruptible(&nlk->wait);
} else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS;
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return err;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
16e5726269611b71c930054ffe9b858c1cea88eb
| 180,487,320,436,197,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 |
af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default
Since commit 7361c36c5224 (af_unix: Allow credentials to work across
user and pid namespaces) af_unix performance dropped a lot.
This is because we now take a reference on pid and cred in each write(),
and release them in read(), usually done from another process,
eventually from another cpu. This triggers false sharing.
# Events: 154K cycles
#
# Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol
# ........ ....... .................. .........................
#
10.40% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] put_pid
8.60% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_recvmsg
7.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_sendmsg
6.11% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] do_raw_spin_lock
4.95% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_scm_to_skb
4.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] pid_nr_ns
4.34% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] cred_to_ucred
2.39% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_destruct_scm
2.24% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sub_preempt_count
1.75% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fget_light
1.51% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k]
__mutex_lock_interruptible_slowpath
1.42% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sock_alloc_send_pskb
This patch includes SCM_CREDENTIALS information in a af_unix message/skb
only if requested by the sender, [man 7 unix for details how to include
ancillary data using sendmsg() system call]
Note: This might break buggy applications that expected SCM_CREDENTIAL
from an unaware write() system call, and receiver not using SO_PASSCRED
socket option.
If SOCK_PASSCRED is set on source or destination socket, we still
include credentials for mere write() syscalls.
Performance boost in hackbench : more than 50% gain on a 16 thread
machine (2 quad-core cpus, 2 threads per core)
hackbench 20 thread 2000
4.228 sec instead of 9.102 sec
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
vgr_load_dummy_buf(
char_u *fname,
char_u *dirname_start,
char_u *dirname_now)
{
int save_mls;
#if defined(FEAT_SYN_HL)
char_u *save_ei = NULL;
#endif
buf_T *buf;
#if defined(FEAT_SYN_HL)
// Don't do Filetype autocommands to avoid loading syntax and
// indent scripts, a great speed improvement.
save_ei = au_event_disable(",Filetype");
#endif
// Don't use modelines here, it's useless.
save_mls = p_mls;
p_mls = 0;
// Load file into a buffer, so that 'fileencoding' is detected,
// autocommands applied, etc.
buf = load_dummy_buffer(fname, dirname_start, dirname_now);
p_mls = save_mls;
#if defined(FEAT_SYN_HL)
au_event_restore(save_ei);
#endif
return buf;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
vim
|
4f1b083be43f351bc107541e7b0c9655a5d2c0bb
| 153,749,690,872,869,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
patch 9.0.0322: crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set
Problem: Crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set.
Solution: Do not handle errors if there aren't any.
|
MOBI_RET mobi_get_id_by_offset(char *id, const MOBIPart *html, const size_t offset, MOBIAttrType *pref_attr) {
if (!id || !html) {
debug_print("Parameter error (id (%p), html (%p)\n", (void *) id, (void *) html);
return MOBI_PARAM_ERR;
}
if (offset > html->size) {
debug_print("Parameter error: offset (%zu) > part size (%zu)\n", offset, html->size);
return MOBI_PARAM_ERR;
}
const unsigned char *data = html->data;
data += offset;
size_t length = html->size - offset;
static const char * attributes[] = {
[ATTR_ID] = "id",
[ATTR_NAME] = "name",
};
size_t off = mobi_get_attribute_value(id, data, length, attributes[*pref_attr], true);
if (off == SIZE_MAX) {
// try optional attribute
const MOBIAttrType opt_attr = (*pref_attr == ATTR_ID) ? ATTR_NAME : ATTR_ID;
off = mobi_get_attribute_value(id, data, length, attributes[opt_attr], true);
if (off == SIZE_MAX) {
id[0] = '\0';
} else {
// save optional attribute as preferred
*pref_attr = opt_attr;
}
}
return MOBI_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
libmobi
|
fb1ab50e448ddbed746fd27ae07469bc506d838b
| 281,446,414,995,877,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
Fix array boundary check when parsing inflections which could result in buffer over-read with corrupt input
|
const char* menu_cache_app_get_generic_name( MenuCacheApp* app )
{
return app->generic_name;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
menu-cache
|
56f66684592abf257c4004e6e1fff041c64a12ce
| 36,847,199,266,390,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix potential access violation, use runtime user dir instead of tmp dir.
Note: it limits libmenu-cache compatibility to menu-cached >= 0.7.0.
|
static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq,
u32 ack, u32 win, u32 tsval, u32 tsecr,
int oif, struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, int rst,
u8 tclass, __be32 label)
{
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
struct tcphdr *t1;
struct sk_buff *buff;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct net *net = sk ? sock_net(sk) : dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
struct sock *ctl_sk = net->ipv6.tcp_sk;
unsigned int tot_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
struct dst_entry *dst;
__be32 *topt;
if (tsecr)
tot_len += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
if (key)
tot_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
#endif
buff = alloc_skb(MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + tot_len,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!buff)
return;
skb_reserve(buff, MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + tot_len);
t1 = (struct tcphdr *) skb_push(buff, tot_len);
skb_reset_transport_header(buff);
/* Swap the send and the receive. */
memset(t1, 0, sizeof(*t1));
t1->dest = th->source;
t1->source = th->dest;
t1->doff = tot_len / 4;
t1->seq = htonl(seq);
t1->ack_seq = htonl(ack);
t1->ack = !rst || !th->ack;
t1->rst = rst;
t1->window = htons(win);
topt = (__be32 *)(t1 + 1);
if (tsecr) {
*topt++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
(TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP);
*topt++ = htonl(tsval);
*topt++ = htonl(tsecr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
if (key) {
*topt++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
(TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) | TCPOLEN_MD5SIG);
tcp_v6_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *)topt, key,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, t1);
}
#endif
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
fl6.saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = label;
buff->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
buff->csum = 0;
__tcp_v6_send_check(buff, &fl6.saddr, &fl6.daddr);
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
if (rt6_need_strict(&fl6.daddr) && !oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
else {
if (!oif && netif_index_is_l3_master(net, skb->skb_iif))
oif = skb->skb_iif;
fl6.flowi6_oif = oif;
}
fl6.flowi6_mark = IP6_REPLY_MARK(net, skb->mark);
fl6.fl6_dport = t1->dest;
fl6.fl6_sport = t1->source;
fl6.flowi6_uid = sock_net_uid(net, sk && sk_fullsock(sk) ? sk : NULL);
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
/* Pass a socket to ip6_dst_lookup either it is for RST
* Underlying function will use this to retrieve the network
* namespace
*/
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(ctl_sk, &fl6, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
skb_dst_set(buff, dst);
ip6_xmit(ctl_sk, buff, &fl6, fl6.flowi6_mark, NULL, tclass);
TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS);
if (rst)
TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTRSTS);
return;
}
kfree_skb(buff);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-241"
] |
linux
|
83eaddab4378db256d00d295bda6ca997cd13a52
| 168,103,884,814,414,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 |
ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int get_time_field(const struct json_tree *tree, const char *key,
int64_t *value_r)
{
time_t tvalue;
const char *value = get_field(tree, key);
int tz_offset ATTR_UNUSED;
if (value == NULL)
return 0;
if (str_to_int64(value, value_r) == 0) {
if (*value_r < 0)
return -1;
return 1;
} else if (iso8601_date_parse((const unsigned char*)value, strlen(value),
&tvalue, &tz_offset)) {
if (tvalue < 0)
return -1;
*value_r = tvalue;
return 1;
}
return -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
core
|
15682a20d5589ebf5496b31c55ecf9238ff2457b
| 101,805,454,346,467,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
lib-oauth2: Do not escape '.'
This is not really needed and just makes things difficult.
|
static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
if (sk == NULL ||
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7
| 160,594,784,273,738,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to
access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause
a number of problems.
Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was
suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit
1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective
task credentials").
This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's
objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the
current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem
reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these
cases.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials")
Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
virDomainVsockDefPostParse(virDomainVsockDefPtr vsock)
{
if (vsock->auto_cid == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT) {
if (vsock->guest_cid != 0)
vsock->auto_cid = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO;
else
vsock->auto_cid = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-212"
] |
libvirt
|
a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979
| 253,977,097,841,563,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <[email protected]>
|
static inline void ext4_r_blocks_count_set(struct ext4_super_block *es,
ext4_fsblk_t blk)
{
es->s_r_blocks_count_lo = cpu_to_le32((u32)blk);
es->s_r_blocks_count_hi = cpu_to_le32(blk >> 32);
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
06a279d636734da32bb62dd2f7b0ade666f65d7c
| 116,865,141,862,476,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
ext4: only use i_size_high for regular files
Directories are not allowed to be bigger than 2GB, so don't use
i_size_high for anything other than regular files. E2fsck should
complain about these inodes, but the simplest thing to do for the
kernel is to only use i_size_high for regular files.
This prevents an intentially corrupted filesystem from causing the
kernel to burn a huge amount of CPU and issuing error messages such
as:
EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_block_to_path: block 135090028 > max
Thanks to David Maciejak from Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security
Research Team for reporting this issue.
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12375
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
UrlQuery::UrlQuery(const std::string& encoded_str) {
if (!encoded_str.empty()) {
// Split into key value pairs separated by '&'.
for (std::size_t i = 0; i != std::string::npos;) {
std::size_t j = encoded_str.find_first_of('&', i);
std::string kv;
if (j == std::string::npos) {
kv = encoded_str.substr(i);
i = std::string::npos;
} else {
kv = encoded_str.substr(i, j - i);
i = j + 1;
}
string_view key;
string_view value;
if (SplitKV(kv, '=', false, &key, &value)) {
parameters_.push_back({ DecodeUnsafe(key), DecodeUnsafe(value) });
}
}
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
webcc
|
55a45fd5039061d5cc62e9f1b9d1f7e97a15143f
| 4,160,520,817,733,546,400,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
fix static file serving security issue; fix url path encoding issue
|
static int cmp_timestamp(void *cmp_arg,
Timestamp_or_zero_datetime *a,
Timestamp_or_zero_datetime *b)
{
return a->cmp(*b);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8
| 32,750,896,123,284,985,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item.
|
static int cpia2_g_selection(struct file *file, void *fh,
struct v4l2_selection *s)
{
struct camera_data *cam = video_drvdata(file);
if (s->type != V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
return -EINVAL;
switch (s->target) {
case V4L2_SEL_TGT_CROP_BOUNDS:
case V4L2_SEL_TGT_CROP_DEFAULT:
s->r.left = 0;
s->r.top = 0;
s->r.width = cam->width;
s->r.height = cam->height;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
dea37a97265588da604c6ba80160a287b72c7bfd
| 163,347,598,172,560,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
media: cpia2: Fix use-after-free in cpia2_exit
Syzkaller report this:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x5f/0x70 fs/sysfs/file.c:468
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881f59a6b70 by task syz-executor.0/8363
CPU: 0 PID: 8363 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x5f/0x70 fs/sysfs/file.c:468
sysfs_remove_file include/linux/sysfs.h:519 [inline]
driver_remove_file+0x40/0x50 drivers/base/driver.c:122
usb_remove_newid_files drivers/usb/core/driver.c:212 [inline]
usb_deregister+0x12a/0x3b0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1005
cpia2_exit+0xa/0x16 [cpia2]
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x3dc/0x5e0 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f86f3754c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000300
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f86f37556bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 8363:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:495
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
bus_add_driver+0xc0/0x610 drivers/base/bus.c:651
driver_register+0x1bb/0x3f0 drivers/base/driver.c:170
usb_register_driver+0x267/0x520 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:965
0xffffffffc1b4817c
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 8363:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:457
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1430 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1457 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3005 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3957
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
bus_remove_driver+0x10e/0x220 drivers/base/bus.c:732
driver_unregister+0x6c/0xa0 drivers/base/driver.c:197
usb_register_driver+0x341/0x520 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:980
0xffffffffc1b4817c
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881f59a6b40
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff8881f59a6b40, ffff8881f59a6c40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007d66980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02e00 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881f6c02e00
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881f59a6a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8881f59a6a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8881f59a6b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881f59a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881f59a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
cpia2_init does not check return value of cpia2_init, if it failed
in usb_register_driver, there is already cleanup using driver_unregister.
No need call cpia2_usb_cleanup on module exit.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
virtio_pci_write(struct vmctx *ctx, int vcpu, struct pci_vdev *dev,
int baridx, uint64_t offset, int size, uint64_t value)
{
struct virtio_base *base = dev->arg;
if (base->flags & VIRTIO_USE_MSIX) {
if (baridx == pci_msix_table_bar(dev) ||
baridx == pci_msix_pba_bar(dev)) {
pci_emul_msix_twrite(dev, offset, size, value);
return;
}
}
if (baridx == base->legacy_pio_bar_idx) {
virtio_pci_legacy_write(ctx, vcpu, dev, baridx,
offset, size, value);
return;
}
if (baridx == base->modern_mmio_bar_idx) {
virtio_pci_modern_mmio_write(ctx, vcpu, dev, baridx,
offset, size, value);
return;
}
if (baridx == base->modern_pio_bar_idx) {
virtio_pci_modern_pio_write(ctx, vcpu, dev, baridx,
offset, size, value);
return;
}
pr_err("%s: write unexpected baridx %d\r\n",
base->vops->name, baridx);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
acrn-hypervisor
|
154fe59531c12b82e26d1b24b5531f5066d224f5
| 172,910,217,163,756,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
dm: validate inputs in vq_endchains
inputs shall be validated to avoid NULL pointer access.
Tracked-On: #6129
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <[email protected]>
|
static void set_root_password(int plugin_set)
{
char *password1= 0, *password2= 0;
int reply= 0;
for(;;)
{
if (password1)
{
my_free(password1);
password1= NULL;
}
if (password2)
{
my_free(password2);
password2= NULL;
}
password1= get_tty_password("\nNew password: ");
if (password1[0] == '\0')
{
fprintf(stdout, "Sorry, you can't use an empty password here.\n");
continue;
}
password2= get_tty_password("\nRe-enter new password: ");
if (strcmp(password1, password2))
{
fprintf(stdout, "Sorry, passwords do not match.\n");
continue;
}
if (plugin_set == 1)
{
estimate_password_strength(password1);
reply= get_response((const char *) "Do you wish to continue with the "
"password provided?(Press y|Y for "
"Yes, any other key for No) : ");
}
int pass_length= strlen(password1);
if ((!plugin_set) || (reply == (int) 'y' || reply == (int) 'Y'))
{
char *query= NULL, *end;
int tmp= sizeof("SET PASSWORD=PASSWORD(") + 3;
/*
query string needs memory which is atleast the length of initial part
of query plus twice the size of variable being appended.
*/
query= (char *)my_malloc(PSI_NOT_INSTRUMENTED,
(pass_length*2 + tmp)*sizeof(char), MYF(MY_WME));
end= my_stpcpy(query, "SET PASSWORD=PASSWORD(");
*end++ = '\'';
end+= mysql_real_escape_string(&mysql, end, password1, pass_length);
*end++ = '\'';
*end++ = ')';
my_free(password1);
my_free(password2);
password1= NULL;
password2= NULL;
if (!execute_query((const char **)&query,(unsigned int) (end-query)))
{
my_free(query);
break;
}
else
fprintf(stdout, " ... Failed! Error: %s\n", mysql_error(&mysql));
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] |
mysql-server
|
3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390
| 197,090,833,740,200,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options
|
int gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, const char *oid,
int indx, unsigned int raw_flag,
void *buf, size_t * sizeof_buf)
{
if (cert == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
return _gnutls_x509_parse_dn_oid(cert->cert,
"tbsCertificate.subject.rdnSequence",
oid, indx, raw_flag, buf, sizeof_buf);
}
| 0 |
[] |
gnutls
|
112d537da5f3500f14316db26d18c37d678a5e0e
| 194,938,969,397,131,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
some changes for 64bit machines.
|
static inline u128_t u128_xor(u128_t x, u128_t y) {
u128_t rv;
rv.h = x.h ^ y.h;
rv.l = x.l ^ y.l;
return rv;
}
| 0 |
[] |
netmask
|
29a9c239bd1008363f5b34ffd6c2cef906f3660c
| 168,605,531,502,356,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
bump version to 2.4.4
* remove checks for negative unsigned ints, fixes #2
* harden error logging functions, fixes #3
|
static int update_stream_output_window(h2o_http2_stream_t *stream, ssize_t delta)
{
ssize_t cur = h2o_http2_window_get_window(&stream->output_window);
if (h2o_http2_window_update(&stream->output_window, delta) != 0)
return -1;
if (cur <= 0 && h2o_http2_window_get_window(&stream->output_window) > 0 && h2o_http2_stream_has_pending_data(stream)) {
assert(!h2o_linklist_is_linked(&stream->_refs.link));
h2o_http2_scheduler_activate(&stream->_refs.scheduler);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
h2o
|
1c0808d580da09fdec5a9a74ff09e103ea058dd4
| 329,245,314,899,611,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
|
static void unref_inode(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode, uint64_t n)
{
if (!inode) {
return;
}
assert(inode->nlookup >= n);
inode->nlookup -= n;
if (!inode->nlookup) {
lo_map_remove(&lo->ino_map, inode->fuse_ino);
g_hash_table_remove(lo->inodes, &inode->key);
if (g_hash_table_size(inode->posix_locks)) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_WARNING, "Hash table is not empty\n");
}
g_hash_table_destroy(inode->posix_locks);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&inode->plock_mutex);
/* Drop our refcount from lo_do_lookup() */
lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
qemu
|
6084633dff3a05d63176e06d7012c7e15aba15be
| 230,531,930,196,554,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
tools/virtiofsd: xattr name mappings: Add option
Add an option to define mappings of xattr names so that
the client and server filesystems see different views.
This can be used to have different SELinux mappings as
seen by the guest, to run the virtiofsd with less privileges
(e.g. in a case where it can't set trusted/system/security
xattrs but you want the guest to be able to), or to isolate
multiple users of the same name; e.g. trusted attributes
used by stacking overlayfs.
A mapping engine is used with 3 simple rules; the rules can
be combined to allow most useful mapping scenarios.
The ruleset is defined by -o xattrmap='rules...'.
This patch doesn't use the rule maps yet.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
|
bool excl_dep_on_table(table_map tab_map)
{
table_map used= used_tables();
if (used & OUTER_REF_TABLE_BIT)
return false;
return (used == tab_map) || (*ref)->excl_dep_on_table(tab_map);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772
| 63,341,468,618,853,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <[email protected]>
|
static void cleanup_bmc_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bmc_device *bmc = container_of(work, struct bmc_device,
remove_work);
int id = bmc->pdev.id; /* Unregister overwrites id */
platform_device_unregister(&bmc->pdev);
ida_simple_remove(&ipmi_bmc_ida, id);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8
| 78,725,520,533,840,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int mdstat_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
{
struct seq_file *seq = filp->private_data;
int mask;
if (md_unloading)
return POLLIN|POLLRDNORM|POLLERR|POLLPRI;
poll_wait(filp, &md_event_waiters, wait);
/* always allow read */
mask = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (seq->poll_event != atomic_read(&md_event_count))
mask |= POLLERR | POLLPRI;
return mask;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
| 146,596,531,548,712,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
ArgParser::handleArgFileArguments()
{
// Support reading arguments from files. Create a new argv. Ensure
// that argv itself as well as all its contents are automatically
// deleted by using PointerHolder objects to back the pointers in
// argv.
new_argv.push_back(PointerHolder<char>(true, QUtil::copy_string(argv[0])));
for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i)
{
char* argfile = 0;
if ((strlen(argv[i]) > 1) && (argv[i][0] == '@'))
{
try
{
argfile = 1 + argv[i];
if (strcmp(argfile, "-") != 0)
{
fclose(QUtil::safe_fopen(argfile, "rb"));
}
}
catch (std::runtime_error&)
{
// The file's not there; treating as regular option
argfile = 0;
}
}
if (argfile)
{
readArgsFromFile(1+argv[i]);
}
else
{
new_argv.push_back(
PointerHolder<char>(true, QUtil::copy_string(argv[i])));
}
}
argv_ph = PointerHolder<char*>(true, new char*[1+new_argv.size()]);
argv = argv_ph.getPointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < new_argv.size(); ++i)
{
argv[i] = new_argv.at(i).getPointer();
}
argc = static_cast<int>(new_argv.size());
argv[argc] = 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qpdf
|
d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e
| 238,979,509,617,587,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition.
|
int CIFSFindNext(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
__u16 searchHandle, struct cifs_search_info *psrch_inf)
{
TRANSACTION2_FNEXT_REQ *pSMB = NULL;
TRANSACTION2_FNEXT_RSP *pSMBr = NULL;
T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS *parms;
char *response_data;
int rc = 0;
int bytes_returned, name_len;
__u16 params, byte_count;
cFYI(1, "In FindNext");
if (psrch_inf->endOfSearch)
return -ENOENT;
rc = smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB,
(void **) &pSMBr);
if (rc)
return rc;
params = 14; /* includes 2 bytes of null string, converted to LE below*/
byte_count = 0;
pSMB->TotalDataCount = 0; /* no EAs */
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(8);
pSMB->MaxDataCount =
cpu_to_le16((tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE) &
0xFFFFFF00);
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(
offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_fnext_req,SearchHandle) - 4);
pSMB->DataCount = 0;
pSMB->DataOffset = 0;
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_FIND_NEXT);
pSMB->SearchHandle = searchHandle; /* always kept as le */
pSMB->SearchCount =
cpu_to_le16(CIFSMaxBufSize / sizeof(FILE_UNIX_INFO));
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(psrch_inf->info_level);
pSMB->ResumeKey = psrch_inf->resume_key;
pSMB->SearchFlags =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_AT_END | CIFS_SEARCH_RETURN_RESUME);
name_len = psrch_inf->resume_name_len;
params += name_len;
if (name_len < PATH_MAX) {
memcpy(pSMB->ResumeFileName, psrch_inf->presume_name, name_len);
byte_count += name_len;
/* 14 byte parm len above enough for 2 byte null terminator */
pSMB->ResumeFileName[name_len] = 0;
pSMB->ResumeFileName[name_len+1] = 0;
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto FNext2_err_exit;
}
byte_count = params + 1 /* pad */ ;
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->ParameterCount = pSMB->TotalParameterCount;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
rc = SendReceive(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMBr, &bytes_returned, 0);
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_fnext);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EBADF) {
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
rc = 0; /* search probably was closed at end of search*/
} else
cFYI(1, "FindNext returned = %d", rc);
} else { /* decode response */
rc = validate_t2((struct smb_t2_rsp *)pSMBr);
if (rc == 0) {
unsigned int lnoff;
/* BB fixme add lock for file (srch_info) struct here */
if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE)
psrch_inf->unicode = true;
else
psrch_inf->unicode = false;
response_data = (char *) &pSMBr->hdr.Protocol +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.ParameterOffset);
parms = (T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS *)response_data;
response_data = (char *)&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataOffset);
if (psrch_inf->smallBuf)
cifs_small_buf_release(
psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
else
cifs_buf_release(psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
psrch_inf->srch_entries_start = response_data;
psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)pSMB;
psrch_inf->smallBuf = 0;
if (parms->EndofSearch)
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
else
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = false;
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer =
le16_to_cpu(parms->SearchCount);
psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry +=
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
lnoff = le16_to_cpu(parms->LastNameOffset);
if (tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE <
lnoff) {
cERROR(1, "ignoring corrupt resume name");
psrch_inf->last_entry = NULL;
return rc;
} else
psrch_inf->last_entry =
psrch_inf->srch_entries_start + lnoff;
/* cFYI(1, "fnxt2 entries in buf %d index_of_last %d",
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer, psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry); */
/* BB fixme add unlock here */
}
}
/* BB On error, should we leave previous search buf (and count and
last entry fields) intact or free the previous one? */
/* Note: On -EAGAIN error only caller can retry on handle based calls
since file handle passed in no longer valid */
FNext2_err_exit:
if (rc != 0)
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
return rc;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
9438fabb73eb48055b58b89fc51e0bc4db22fabd
| 138,784,959,946,490,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 136 |
cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
|
static inline int64_t lpGetIntegerIfValid(unsigned char *ele, int *valid) {
int64_t v;
unsigned char *e = lpGet(ele,&v,NULL);
if (e == NULL) {
if (valid)
*valid = 1;
return v;
}
/* The following code path should never be used for how listpacks work:
* they should always be able to store an int64_t value in integer
* encoded form. However the implementation may change. */
long long ll;
int ret = string2ll((char*)e,v,&ll);
if (valid)
*valid = ret;
else
serverAssert(ret != 0);
v = ll;
return v;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-401"
] |
redis
|
4a7a4e42db8ff757cdf3f4a824f66426036034ef
| 329,475,732,740,807,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Fix memory leak in streamGetEdgeID (#10753)
si is initialized by streamIteratorStart(), we should call
streamIteratorStop() on it when done.
regression introduced in #9127 (redis 7.0)
|
void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
// Read input Tensor.
const Tensor& encoded_variant = context->input(0);
auto input_ragged_rank_ = input_ragged_rank_attr_;
if (input_ragged_rank_ == -1) { // Infer input_ragged_rank_.
input_ragged_rank_ = output_ragged_rank_ - encoded_variant.dims();
OP_REQUIRES(context, input_ragged_rank_ >= 0,
errors::InvalidArgument(
"Inferred input_ragged_rank (output_ragged_rank - "
"encoded_variant.dims()) must be >= 0, found "
"output_ragged_rank: ",
output_ragged_rank_,
", encoded_variant.dims(): ", encoded_variant.dims(),
", inferred input_ragged_rank: ", input_ragged_rank_));
}
OP_REQUIRES(
context,
output_ragged_rank_ == encoded_variant.dims() + input_ragged_rank_,
errors::InvalidArgument(
"output_ragged_rank must be equal to input_ragged_rank + "
"encoded_ragged.dims(); output_ragged_rank: ",
output_ragged_rank_, ", input_ragged_rank: ", input_ragged_rank_,
", encoded_variant.dims(): ", encoded_variant.dims(), "."));
// Decode all variants.
const auto value_dtype = DataTypeToEnum<VALUE_TYPE>::v();
const auto split_dtype = DataTypeToEnum<SPLIT_TYPE>::v();
std::vector<RaggedTensorVariant> decoded_components;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, RaggedComponentsFromVariant(
encoded_variant, input_ragged_rank_,
value_dtype, split_dtype, &decoded_components));
// Corner case: input is a scalar.
if (encoded_variant.dims() == 0) {
ReturnRaggedTensor(context, decoded_components[0]);
return;
}
// Nested-Stack Ragged components into a batched RaggedTensor.
std::vector<int> encoded_dim_sizes(encoded_variant.dims(), 0);
for (int i = 0; i < encoded_variant.dims(); i++) {
encoded_dim_sizes[i] = encoded_variant.dim_size(i);
}
RaggedTensorVariant output_ragged;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(
context, NestedStackRaggedTensors<VALUE_TYPE, SPLIT_TYPE>(
decoded_components, encoded_dim_sizes, input_ragged_rank_,
output_ragged_rank_, &output_ragged));
// Set output.
ReturnRaggedTensor(context, output_ragged);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-681"
] |
tensorflow
|
4e2565483d0ffcadc719bd44893fb7f609bb5f12
| 242,249,246,756,154,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 |
Fix bug that could cause map_fn to produce incorrect results (rather than an error)
when mapping over a ragged tensor with an inappropriate fn_output_signature. (Note: there are cases where the default value for fn_output_signature is not appropriate, so the user needs to explicitly specify the correct output signature.)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387606546
Change-Id: Ib4ea27b9634e6ab413f211cfe809a69a90f0e2cd
|
inline void LstmCell(
const LstmCellParams& params, const RuntimeShape& unextended_input_shape,
const uint8* input_data_uint8,
const RuntimeShape& unextended_prev_activ_shape,
const uint8* prev_activ_data_uint8, const RuntimeShape& weights_shape,
const uint8* weights_data_uint8, const RuntimeShape& unextended_bias_shape,
const int32* bias_data_int32,
const RuntimeShape& unextended_prev_state_shape,
const int16* prev_state_data_int16,
const RuntimeShape& unextended_output_state_shape,
int16* output_state_data_int16,
const RuntimeShape& unextended_output_activ_shape,
uint8* output_activ_data_uint8,
const RuntimeShape& unextended_concat_temp_shape,
uint8* concat_temp_data_uint8,
const RuntimeShape& unextended_activ_temp_shape,
int16* activ_temp_data_int16, CpuBackendContext* cpu_backend_context) {
ruy::profiler::ScopeLabel label(
"LstmCell/quantized (8bit external, 16bit internal)");
int32 weights_zero_point = params.weights_zero_point;
int32 accum_multiplier = params.accum_multiplier;
int accum_shift = params.accum_shift;
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_input_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_prev_activ_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_bias_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_prev_state_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_output_state_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_output_activ_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_concat_temp_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
TFLITE_DCHECK_LE(unextended_activ_temp_shape.DimensionsCount(), 4);
const RuntimeShape input_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_input_shape);
const RuntimeShape prev_activ_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_prev_activ_shape);
const RuntimeShape bias_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_bias_shape);
const RuntimeShape prev_state_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_prev_state_shape);
const RuntimeShape output_state_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_output_state_shape);
const RuntimeShape output_activ_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_output_activ_shape);
const RuntimeShape concat_temp_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_concat_temp_shape);
const RuntimeShape activ_temp_shape =
RuntimeShape::ExtendedShape(4, unextended_activ_temp_shape);
TFLITE_DCHECK_GE(weights_shape.DimensionsCount(), 2);
// Gather dimensions information, and perform consistency checks.
const int weights_dim_count = weights_shape.DimensionsCount();
const int outer_size = MatchingFlatSizeSkipDim(
input_shape, 3, prev_activ_shape, prev_state_shape, output_state_shape,
output_activ_shape);
const int input_depth = input_shape.Dims(3);
const int prev_activ_depth = prev_activ_shape.Dims(3);
const int total_input_depth = prev_activ_depth + input_depth;
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(weights_shape.Dims(weights_dim_count - 1),
total_input_depth);
const int intern_activ_depth =
MatchingDim(weights_shape, weights_dim_count - 2, bias_shape, 3);
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(weights_shape.FlatSize(),
intern_activ_depth * total_input_depth);
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(FlatSizeSkipDim(bias_shape, 3), 1);
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(intern_activ_depth % 4, 0);
const int output_depth =
MatchingDim(prev_state_shape, 3, prev_activ_shape, 3, output_state_shape,
3, output_activ_shape, 3);
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(output_depth, intern_activ_depth / 4);
const int fc_batches = FlatSizeSkipDim(activ_temp_shape, 3);
const int fc_output_depth =
MatchingDim(weights_shape, weights_dim_count - 2, activ_temp_shape, 3);
const int fc_accum_depth = total_input_depth;
TFLITE_DCHECK_EQ(fc_output_depth, 4 * output_depth);
// Depth-concatenate prev_activ and input data together.
uint8 const* concat_input_arrays_data[2] = {input_data_uint8,
prev_activ_data_uint8};
const RuntimeShape* concat_input_arrays_shapes[2] = {&input_shape,
&prev_activ_shape};
tflite::ConcatenationParams concat_params;
concat_params.axis = 3;
concat_params.inputs_count = 2;
Concatenation(concat_params, concat_input_arrays_shapes,
concat_input_arrays_data, concat_temp_shape,
concat_temp_data_uint8);
// Implementation of the fully connected node inside the LSTM cell.
// The operands are 8-bit integers, the accumulators are internally 32bit
// integers, and the output is 16-bit fixed-point with 3 integer bits so
// the output range is [-2^3, 2^3] == [-8, 8]. The rationale for that
// is explained in the function comment above.
cpu_backend_gemm::MatrixParams<uint8> lhs_params;
lhs_params.rows = fc_output_depth;
lhs_params.cols = fc_accum_depth;
lhs_params.order = cpu_backend_gemm::Order::kRowMajor;
lhs_params.zero_point = weights_zero_point;
cpu_backend_gemm::MatrixParams<uint8> rhs_params;
rhs_params.rows = fc_accum_depth;
rhs_params.cols = fc_batches;
rhs_params.order = cpu_backend_gemm::Order::kColMajor;
rhs_params.zero_point = 128;
cpu_backend_gemm::MatrixParams<int16> dst_params;
dst_params.rows = fc_output_depth;
dst_params.cols = fc_batches;
dst_params.order = cpu_backend_gemm::Order::kColMajor;
dst_params.zero_point = 0;
cpu_backend_gemm::GemmParams<int32, int16> gemm_params;
gemm_params.bias = bias_data_int32;
gemm_params.multiplier_fixedpoint = accum_multiplier;
gemm_params.multiplier_exponent = accum_shift;
cpu_backend_gemm::Gemm(
lhs_params, weights_data_uint8, rhs_params, concat_temp_data_uint8,
dst_params, activ_temp_data_int16, gemm_params, cpu_backend_context);
// Rest of the LSTM cell: tanh and logistic math functions, and some adds
// and muls, all done in 16-bit fixed-point.
const int16* input_gate_input_ptr = activ_temp_data_int16;
const int16* input_modulation_gate_input_ptr =
activ_temp_data_int16 + output_depth;
const int16* forget_gate_input_ptr = activ_temp_data_int16 + 2 * output_depth;
const int16* output_gate_input_ptr = activ_temp_data_int16 + 3 * output_depth;
const int16* prev_state_ptr = prev_state_data_int16;
int16* output_state_data_ptr = output_state_data_int16;
uint8* output_activ_data_ptr = output_activ_data_uint8;
for (int b = 0; b < outer_size; ++b) {
int c = 0;
#ifdef GEMMLOWP_NEON
for (; c <= output_depth - 8; c += 8) {
// Define the fixed-point data types that we will use here. All use
// int16 as the underlying integer type i.e. all are 16-bit fixed-point.
// They only differ by the number of integral vs. fractional bits,
// determining the range of values that they can represent.
//
// F0 uses 0 integer bits, range [-1, 1].
// This is the return type of math functions such as tanh, logistic,
// whose range is in [-1, 1].
using F0 = gemmlowp::FixedPoint<int16x8_t, 0>;
// F3 uses 3 integer bits, range [-8, 8].
// This is the range of the previous fully-connected node's output,
// which is our input here.
using F3 = gemmlowp::FixedPoint<int16x8_t, 3>;
// FS uses StateIntegerBits integer bits, range [-2^StateIntegerBits,
// 2^StateIntegerBits]. It's used to represent the internal state, whose
// number of integer bits is currently dictated by the model. See comment
// on the StateIntegerBits template parameter above.
using FS = gemmlowp::FixedPoint<int16x8_t, StateIntegerBits>;
// Implementation of input gate, using fixed-point logistic function.
F3 input_gate_input = F3::FromRaw(vld1q_s16(input_gate_input_ptr));
input_gate_input_ptr += 8;
F0 input_gate_output = gemmlowp::logistic(input_gate_input);
// Implementation of input modulation gate, using fixed-point tanh
// function.
F3 input_modulation_gate_input =
F3::FromRaw(vld1q_s16(input_modulation_gate_input_ptr));
input_modulation_gate_input_ptr += 8;
F0 input_modulation_gate_output =
gemmlowp::tanh(input_modulation_gate_input);
// Implementation of forget gate, using fixed-point logistic function.
F3 forget_gate_input = F3::FromRaw(vld1q_s16(forget_gate_input_ptr));
forget_gate_input_ptr += 8;
F0 forget_gate_output = gemmlowp::logistic(forget_gate_input);
// Implementation of output gate, using fixed-point logistic function.
F3 output_gate_input = F3::FromRaw(vld1q_s16(output_gate_input_ptr));
output_gate_input_ptr += 8;
F0 output_gate_output = gemmlowp::logistic(output_gate_input);
// Implementation of internal multiplication nodes, still in fixed-point.
F0 input_times_input_modulation =
input_gate_output * input_modulation_gate_output;
FS prev_state = FS::FromRaw(vld1q_s16(prev_state_ptr));
prev_state_ptr += 8;
FS prev_state_times_forget_state = forget_gate_output * prev_state;
// Implementation of internal addition node, saturating.
FS new_state = gemmlowp::SaturatingAdd(
gemmlowp::Rescale<StateIntegerBits>(input_times_input_modulation),
prev_state_times_forget_state);
// Implementation of last internal Tanh node, still in fixed-point.
// Since a Tanh fixed-point implementation is specialized for a given
// number or integer bits, and each specialization can have a substantial
// code size, and we already used above a Tanh on an input with 3 integer
// bits, and per the table in the above function comment there is no
// significant accuracy to be lost by clamping to [-8, +8] for a
// 3-integer-bits representation, let us just do that. This helps people
// porting this to targets where code footprint must be minimized.
F3 new_state_f3 = gemmlowp::Rescale<3>(new_state);
F0 output_activ_int16 = output_gate_output * gemmlowp::tanh(new_state_f3);
// Store the new internal state back to memory, as 16-bit integers.
// Note: here we store the original value with StateIntegerBits, not
// the rescaled 3-integer-bits value fed to tanh.
vst1q_s16(output_state_data_ptr, new_state.raw());
output_state_data_ptr += 8;
// Down-scale the output activations to 8-bit integers, saturating,
// and store back to memory.
int16x8_t rescaled_output_activ =
gemmlowp::RoundingDivideByPOT(output_activ_int16.raw(), 8);
int8x8_t int8_output_activ = vqmovn_s16(rescaled_output_activ);
uint8x8_t uint8_output_activ =
vadd_u8(vdup_n_u8(128), vreinterpret_u8_s8(int8_output_activ));
vst1_u8(output_activ_data_ptr, uint8_output_activ);
output_activ_data_ptr += 8;
}
#endif
for (; c < output_depth; ++c) {
// Define the fixed-point data types that we will use here. All use
// int16 as the underlying integer type i.e. all are 16-bit fixed-point.
// They only differ by the number of integral vs. fractional bits,
// determining the range of values that they can represent.
//
// F0 uses 0 integer bits, range [-1, 1].
// This is the return type of math functions such as tanh, logistic,
// whose range is in [-1, 1].
using F0 = gemmlowp::FixedPoint<std::int16_t, 0>;
// F3 uses 3 integer bits, range [-8, 8].
// This is the range of the previous fully-connected node's output,
// which is our input here.
using F3 = gemmlowp::FixedPoint<std::int16_t, 3>;
// FS uses StateIntegerBits integer bits, range [-2^StateIntegerBits,
// 2^StateIntegerBits]. It's used to represent the internal state, whose
// number of integer bits is currently dictated by the model. See comment
// on the StateIntegerBits template parameter above.
using FS = gemmlowp::FixedPoint<std::int16_t, StateIntegerBits>;
// Implementation of input gate, using fixed-point logistic function.
F3 input_gate_input = F3::FromRaw(*input_gate_input_ptr++);
F0 input_gate_output = gemmlowp::logistic(input_gate_input);
// Implementation of input modulation gate, using fixed-point tanh
// function.
F3 input_modulation_gate_input =
F3::FromRaw(*input_modulation_gate_input_ptr++);
F0 input_modulation_gate_output =
gemmlowp::tanh(input_modulation_gate_input);
// Implementation of forget gate, using fixed-point logistic function.
F3 forget_gate_input = F3::FromRaw(*forget_gate_input_ptr++);
F0 forget_gate_output = gemmlowp::logistic(forget_gate_input);
// Implementation of output gate, using fixed-point logistic function.
F3 output_gate_input = F3::FromRaw(*output_gate_input_ptr++);
F0 output_gate_output = gemmlowp::logistic(output_gate_input);
// Implementation of internal multiplication nodes, still in fixed-point.
F0 input_times_input_modulation =
input_gate_output * input_modulation_gate_output;
FS prev_state = FS::FromRaw(*prev_state_ptr++);
FS prev_state_times_forget_state = forget_gate_output * prev_state;
// Implementation of internal addition node, saturating.
FS new_state = gemmlowp::SaturatingAdd(
gemmlowp::Rescale<StateIntegerBits>(input_times_input_modulation),
prev_state_times_forget_state);
// Implementation of last internal Tanh node, still in fixed-point.
// Since a Tanh fixed-point implementation is specialized for a given
// number or integer bits, and each specialization can have a substantial
// code size, and we already used above a Tanh on an input with 3 integer
// bits, and per the table in the above function comment there is no
// significant accuracy to be lost by clamping to [-8, +8] for a
// 3-integer-bits representation, let us just do that. This helps people
// porting this to targets where code footprint must be minimized.
F3 new_state_f3 = gemmlowp::Rescale<3>(new_state);
F0 output_activ_int16 = output_gate_output * gemmlowp::tanh(new_state_f3);
// Store the new internal state back to memory, as 16-bit integers.
// Note: here we store the original value with StateIntegerBits, not
// the rescaled 3-integer-bits value fed to tanh.
*output_state_data_ptr++ = new_state.raw();
// Down-scale the output activations to 8-bit integers, saturating,
// and store back to memory.
int16 rescaled_output_activ =
gemmlowp::RoundingDivideByPOT(output_activ_int16.raw(), 8);
int16 clamped_output_activ =
std::max<int16>(-128, std::min<int16>(127, rescaled_output_activ));
*output_activ_data_ptr++ = 128 + clamped_output_activ;
}
input_gate_input_ptr += 3 * output_depth;
input_modulation_gate_input_ptr += 3 * output_depth;
forget_gate_input_ptr += 3 * output_depth;
output_gate_input_ptr += 3 * output_depth;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-369"
] |
tensorflow
|
15691e456c7dc9bd6be203b09765b063bf4a380c
| 150,444,386,461,995,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 273 |
Prevent dereferencing of null pointers in TFLite's `add.cc`.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387244946
Change-Id: I56094233327fbd8439b92e1dbb1262176e00eeb9
|
static gboolean avdtp_getcap_cmd(struct avdtp *session, uint8_t transaction,
struct seid_req *req, unsigned int size,
gboolean get_all)
{
GSList *l, *caps;
struct avdtp_local_sep *sep = NULL;
unsigned int rsp_size;
uint8_t err, buf[1024], *ptr = buf;
uint8_t cmd;
cmd = get_all ? AVDTP_GET_ALL_CAPABILITIES : AVDTP_GET_CAPABILITIES;
if (size < sizeof(struct seid_req)) {
err = AVDTP_BAD_LENGTH;
goto failed;
}
sep = find_local_sep_by_seid(session, req->acp_seid);
if (!sep) {
err = AVDTP_BAD_ACP_SEID;
goto failed;
}
if (!sep->ind->get_capability(session, sep, get_all, &caps,
&err, sep->user_data))
goto failed;
for (l = caps, rsp_size = 0; l != NULL; l = g_slist_next(l)) {
struct avdtp_service_capability *cap = l->data;
if (rsp_size + cap->length + 2 > sizeof(buf))
break;
memcpy(ptr, cap, cap->length + 2);
rsp_size += cap->length + 2;
ptr += cap->length + 2;
g_free(cap);
}
g_slist_free(caps);
return avdtp_send(session, transaction, AVDTP_MSG_TYPE_ACCEPT, cmd,
buf, rsp_size);
failed:
return avdtp_send(session, transaction, AVDTP_MSG_TYPE_REJECT, cmd,
&err, sizeof(err));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
bluez
|
7a80d2096f1b7125085e21448112aa02f49f5e9a
| 127,806,168,731,910,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
avdtp: Fix accepting invalid/malformed capabilities
Check if capabilities are valid before attempting to copy them.
|
static void free_partial(struct kmem_cache *s, struct kmem_cache_node *n)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct page *page, *h;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry_safe(page, h, &n->partial, lru) {
if (!page->inuse) {
list_del(&page->lru);
discard_slab(s, page);
n->nr_partial--;
} else {
list_slab_objects(s, page,
"Objects remaining on kmem_cache_close()");
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
| 49,625,918,055,747,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static struct inet_peer *rt6_get_peer_create(struct rt6_info *rt)
{
return __rt6_get_peer(rt, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
net
|
c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39
| 159,609,064,806,630,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ipv6: don't set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes
DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct dn_dev *dn_dev_by_index(int ifindex)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct dn_dev *dn_dev = NULL;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(&init_net, ifindex);
if (dev)
dn_dev = rtnl_dereference(dev->dn_ptr);
return dn_dev;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
net
|
90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e
| 190,287,148,150,277,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
CImg<_cimg_Tt> get_mul(const CImg<t>& img) const {
return CImg<_cimg_Tt>(*this,false).mul(img);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
| 210,358,333,954,338,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
|
makemap(
FILE *fd,
buf_T *buf) /* buffer for local mappings or NULL */
{
mapblock_T *mp;
char_u c1, c2, c3;
char_u *p;
char *cmd;
int abbr;
int hash;
int did_cpo = FALSE;
int i;
validate_maphash();
/*
* Do the loop twice: Once for mappings, once for abbreviations.
* Then loop over all map hash lists.
*/
for (abbr = 0; abbr < 2; ++abbr)
for (hash = 0; hash < 256; ++hash)
{
if (abbr)
{
if (hash > 0) /* there is only one abbr list */
break;
#ifdef FEAT_LOCALMAP
if (buf != NULL)
mp = buf->b_first_abbr;
else
#endif
mp = first_abbr;
}
else
{
#ifdef FEAT_LOCALMAP
if (buf != NULL)
mp = buf->b_maphash[hash];
else
#endif
mp = maphash[hash];
}
for ( ; mp; mp = mp->m_next)
{
/* skip script-local mappings */
if (mp->m_noremap == REMAP_SCRIPT)
continue;
/* skip mappings that contain a <SNR> (script-local thing),
* they probably don't work when loaded again */
for (p = mp->m_str; *p != NUL; ++p)
if (p[0] == K_SPECIAL && p[1] == KS_EXTRA
&& p[2] == (int)KE_SNR)
break;
if (*p != NUL)
continue;
/* It's possible to create a mapping and then ":unmap" certain
* modes. We recreate this here by mapping the individual
* modes, which requires up to three of them. */
c1 = NUL;
c2 = NUL;
c3 = NUL;
if (abbr)
cmd = "abbr";
else
cmd = "map";
switch (mp->m_mode)
{
case NORMAL + VISUAL + SELECTMODE + OP_PENDING:
break;
case NORMAL:
c1 = 'n';
break;
case VISUAL:
c1 = 'x';
break;
case SELECTMODE:
c1 = 's';
break;
case OP_PENDING:
c1 = 'o';
break;
case NORMAL + VISUAL:
c1 = 'n';
c2 = 'x';
break;
case NORMAL + SELECTMODE:
c1 = 'n';
c2 = 's';
break;
case NORMAL + OP_PENDING:
c1 = 'n';
c2 = 'o';
break;
case VISUAL + SELECTMODE:
c1 = 'v';
break;
case VISUAL + OP_PENDING:
c1 = 'x';
c2 = 'o';
break;
case SELECTMODE + OP_PENDING:
c1 = 's';
c2 = 'o';
break;
case NORMAL + VISUAL + SELECTMODE:
c1 = 'n';
c2 = 'v';
break;
case NORMAL + VISUAL + OP_PENDING:
c1 = 'n';
c2 = 'x';
c3 = 'o';
break;
case NORMAL + SELECTMODE + OP_PENDING:
c1 = 'n';
c2 = 's';
c3 = 'o';
break;
case VISUAL + SELECTMODE + OP_PENDING:
c1 = 'v';
c2 = 'o';
break;
case CMDLINE + INSERT:
if (!abbr)
cmd = "map!";
break;
case CMDLINE:
c1 = 'c';
break;
case INSERT:
c1 = 'i';
break;
case LANGMAP:
c1 = 'l';
break;
case TERMINAL:
c1 = 't';
break;
default:
iemsg(_("E228: makemap: Illegal mode"));
return FAIL;
}
do /* do this twice if c2 is set, 3 times with c3 */
{
/* When outputting <> form, need to make sure that 'cpo'
* is set to the Vim default. */
if (!did_cpo)
{
if (*mp->m_str == NUL) /* will use <Nop> */
did_cpo = TRUE;
else
for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i)
for (p = (i ? mp->m_str : mp->m_keys); *p; ++p)
if (*p == K_SPECIAL || *p == NL)
did_cpo = TRUE;
if (did_cpo)
{
if (fprintf(fd, "let s:cpo_save=&cpo") < 0
|| put_eol(fd) < 0
|| fprintf(fd, "set cpo&vim") < 0
|| put_eol(fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
}
}
if (c1 && putc(c1, fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
if (mp->m_noremap != REMAP_YES && fprintf(fd, "nore") < 0)
return FAIL;
if (fputs(cmd, fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
if (buf != NULL && fputs(" <buffer>", fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
if (mp->m_nowait && fputs(" <nowait>", fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
if (mp->m_silent && fputs(" <silent>", fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
if (mp->m_noremap == REMAP_SCRIPT
&& fputs("<script>", fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
if (mp->m_expr && fputs(" <expr>", fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
#endif
if ( putc(' ', fd) < 0
|| put_escstr(fd, mp->m_keys, 0) == FAIL
|| putc(' ', fd) < 0
|| put_escstr(fd, mp->m_str, 1) == FAIL
|| put_eol(fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
c1 = c2;
c2 = c3;
c3 = NUL;
} while (c1 != NUL);
}
}
if (did_cpo)
if (fprintf(fd, "let &cpo=s:cpo_save") < 0
|| put_eol(fd) < 0
|| fprintf(fd, "unlet s:cpo_save") < 0
|| put_eol(fd) < 0)
return FAIL;
return OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
vim
|
53575521406739cf20bbe4e384d88e7dca11f040
| 171,054,255,938,276,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 208 |
patch 8.1.1365: source command doesn't check for the sandbox
Problem: Source command doesn't check for the sandbox. (Armin Razmjou)
Solution: Check for the sandbox when sourcing a file.
|
rl_get_keymap_name_from_edit_mode ()
{
if (rl_editing_mode == emacs_mode)
return "emacs";
#if defined (VI_MODE)
else if (rl_editing_mode == vi_mode)
return "vi";
#endif /* VI_MODE */
else
return "none";
}
| 0 |
[] |
bash
|
955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c
| 29,566,799,840,385,596,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
bash-4.4-rc2 release
|
execcmd(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc > 1) {
iflag = 0; /* exit on error */
mflag = 0;
optschanged();
shellexec(argv + 1, pathval(), 0);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
dash
|
29d6f2148f10213de4e904d515e792d2cf8c968e
| 101,660,754,938,741,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
eval: Check nflag in evaltree instead of cmdloop
This patch moves the nflag check from cmdloop into evaltree. This
is so that nflag will be in force even if we enter the shell via a
path other than cmdloop, e.g., through sh -c.
Reported-by: Joey Hess <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err emsg_box_write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 len;
GF_EventMessageBox *ptr = (GF_EventMessageBox*) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->version==1) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->timescale);
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->presentation_time_delta);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->event_duration);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->event_id);
}
len = ptr->scheme_id_uri ? (u32) strlen(ptr->scheme_id_uri) : 0;
if (len) gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->scheme_id_uri, len);
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, 0);
len = ptr->value ? (u32) strlen(ptr->value) : 0;
if (len) gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->value, len);
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, 0);
if (ptr->version==0) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->timescale);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, (u32) ptr->presentation_time_delta);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->event_duration);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->event_id);
}
if (ptr->message_data)
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->message_data, ptr->message_data_size);
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3
| 331,890,198,623,080,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
fixed #2255
|
static PHP_MSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(mcrypt) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_filter_unregister_factory("mcrypt.*" TSRMLS_CC);
php_stream_filter_unregister_factory("mdecrypt.*" TSRMLS_CC);
if (MCG(fd[RANDOM]) > 0) {
close(MCG(fd[RANDOM]));
}
if (MCG(fd[URANDOM]) > 0) {
close(MCG(fd[URANDOM]));
}
UNREGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
6c5211a0cef0cc2854eaa387e0eb036e012904d0
| 183,497,296,711,160,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
static void perf_event__header_size(struct perf_event *event)
{
__perf_event_read_size(event,
event->group_leader->nr_siblings);
__perf_event_header_size(event, event->attr.sample_type);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
| 265,080,385,084,790,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void lg4ff_set_autocenter_default(struct input_dev *dev, u16 magnitude)
{
struct hid_device *hid = input_get_drvdata(dev);
s32 *value;
u32 expand_a, expand_b;
struct lg4ff_device_entry *entry;
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data;
unsigned long flags;
drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hid);
if (!drv_data) {
hid_err(hid, "Private driver data not found!\n");
return;
}
entry = drv_data->device_props;
if (!entry) {
hid_err(hid, "Device properties not found!\n");
return;
}
value = entry->report->field[0]->value;
/* De-activate Auto-Center */
spin_lock_irqsave(&entry->report_lock, flags);
if (magnitude == 0) {
value[0] = 0xf5;
value[1] = 0x00;
value[2] = 0x00;
value[3] = 0x00;
value[4] = 0x00;
value[5] = 0x00;
value[6] = 0x00;
hid_hw_request(hid, entry->report, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&entry->report_lock, flags);
return;
}
if (magnitude <= 0xaaaa) {
expand_a = 0x0c * magnitude;
expand_b = 0x80 * magnitude;
} else {
expand_a = (0x0c * 0xaaaa) + 0x06 * (magnitude - 0xaaaa);
expand_b = (0x80 * 0xaaaa) + 0xff * (magnitude - 0xaaaa);
}
/* Adjust for non-MOMO wheels */
switch (entry->wdata.product_id) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL2:
break;
default:
expand_a = expand_a >> 1;
break;
}
value[0] = 0xfe;
value[1] = 0x0d;
value[2] = expand_a / 0xaaaa;
value[3] = expand_a / 0xaaaa;
value[4] = expand_b / 0xaaaa;
value[5] = 0x00;
value[6] = 0x00;
hid_hw_request(hid, entry->report, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
/* Activate Auto-Center */
value[0] = 0x14;
value[1] = 0x00;
value[2] = 0x00;
value[3] = 0x00;
value[4] = 0x00;
value[5] = 0x00;
value[6] = 0x00;
hid_hw_request(hid, entry->report, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&entry->report_lock, flags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
d9d4b1e46d9543a82c23f6df03f4ad697dab361b
| 120,655,846,771,297,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 78 |
HID: Fix assumption that devices have inputs
The syzbot fuzzer found a slab-out-of-bounds write bug in the hid-gaff
driver. The problem is caused by the driver's assumption that the
device must have an input report. While this will be true for all
normal HID input devices, a suitably malicious device can violate the
assumption.
The same assumption is present in over a dozen other HID drivers.
This patch fixes them by checking that the list of hid_inputs for the
hid_device is nonempty before allowing it to be used.
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
|
pos_params (string, start, end, quoted)
char *string;
int start, end, quoted;
{
WORD_LIST *save, *params, *h, *t;
char *ret;
int i;
/* see if we can short-circuit. if start == end, we want 0 parameters. */
if (start == end)
return ((char *)NULL);
save = params = list_rest_of_args ();
if (save == 0 && start > 0)
return ((char *)NULL);
if (start == 0) /* handle ${@:0[:x]} specially */
{
t = make_word_list (make_word (dollar_vars[0]), params);
save = params = t;
}
for (i = start ? 1 : 0; params && i < start; i++)
params = params->next;
if (params == 0)
{
dispose_words (save);
return ((char *)NULL);
}
for (h = t = params; params && i < end; i++)
{
t = params;
params = params->next;
}
t->next = (WORD_LIST *)NULL;
ret = string_list_pos_params (string[0], h, quoted);
if (t != params)
t->next = params;
dispose_words (save);
return (ret);
}
| 0 |
[] |
bash
|
955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c
| 163,291,295,266,545,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
bash-4.4-rc2 release
|
void DISOpticalFlowImpl::calc(InputArray I0, InputArray I1, InputOutputArray flow)
{
CV_Assert(!I0.empty() && I0.depth() == CV_8U && I0.channels() == 1);
CV_Assert(!I1.empty() && I1.depth() == CV_8U && I1.channels() == 1);
CV_Assert(I0.sameSize(I1));
CV_Assert(I0.isContinuous());
CV_Assert(I1.isContinuous());
CV_OCL_RUN(flow.isUMat() &&
(patch_size == 8) && (use_spatial_propagation == true),
ocl_calc(I0, I1, flow));
Mat I0Mat = I0.getMat();
Mat I1Mat = I1.getMat();
bool use_input_flow = false;
if (flow.sameSize(I0) && flow.depth() == CV_32F && flow.channels() == 2)
use_input_flow = true;
else
flow.create(I1Mat.size(), CV_32FC2);
Mat flowMat = flow.getMat();
coarsest_scale = min((int)(log(max(I0Mat.cols, I0Mat.rows) / (4.0 * patch_size)) / log(2.0) + 0.5), /* Original code serach for maximal movement of width/4 */
(int)(log(min(I0Mat.cols, I0Mat.rows) / patch_size) / log(2.0))); /* Deepest pyramid level greater or equal than patch*/
int num_stripes = getNumThreads();
prepareBuffers(I0Mat, I1Mat, flowMat, use_input_flow);
Ux[coarsest_scale].setTo(0.0f);
Uy[coarsest_scale].setTo(0.0f);
for (int i = coarsest_scale; i >= finest_scale; i--)
{
w = I0s[i].cols;
h = I0s[i].rows;
ws = 1 + (w - patch_size) / patch_stride;
hs = 1 + (h - patch_size) / patch_stride;
precomputeStructureTensor(I0xx_buf, I0yy_buf, I0xy_buf, I0x_buf, I0y_buf, I0xs[i], I0ys[i]);
if (use_spatial_propagation)
{
/* Use a fixed number of stripes regardless the number of threads to make inverse search
* with spatial propagation reproducible
*/
parallel_for_(Range(0, 8), PatchInverseSearch_ParBody(*this, 8, hs, Sx, Sy, Ux[i], Uy[i], I0s[i],
I1s_ext[i], I0xs[i], I0ys[i], 2, i));
}
else
{
parallel_for_(Range(0, num_stripes),
PatchInverseSearch_ParBody(*this, num_stripes, hs, Sx, Sy, Ux[i], Uy[i], I0s[i], I1s_ext[i],
I0xs[i], I0ys[i], 1, i));
}
parallel_for_(Range(0, num_stripes),
Densification_ParBody(*this, num_stripes, I0s[i].rows, Ux[i], Uy[i], Sx, Sy, I0s[i], I1s[i]));
if (variational_refinement_iter > 0)
variational_refinement_processors[i]->calcUV(I0s[i], I1s[i], Ux[i], Uy[i]);
if (i > finest_scale)
{
resize(Ux[i], Ux[i - 1], Ux[i - 1].size());
resize(Uy[i], Uy[i - 1], Uy[i - 1].size());
Ux[i - 1] *= 2;
Uy[i - 1] *= 2;
}
}
Mat uxy[] = {Ux[finest_scale], Uy[finest_scale]};
merge(uxy, 2, U);
resize(U, flowMat, flowMat.size());
flowMat *= 1 << finest_scale;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-369"
] |
opencv
|
d1615ba11a93062b1429fce9f0f638d1572d3418
| 4,285,423,619,324,696,500,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 |
video:fixed DISOpticalFlow segfault from small img
|
int emulator_write_phys(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
const void *val, int bytes)
{
int ret;
ret = kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, gpa, val, bytes);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
kvm_mmu_pte_write(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes, 1);
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux-2.6
|
59839dfff5eabca01cc4e20b45797a60a80af8cb
| 260,921,565,497,647,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
KVM: x86: check for cr3 validity in ioctl_set_sregs
Matt T. Yourst notes that kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs lacks validity
checking for the new cr3 value:
"Userspace callers of KVM_SET_SREGS can pass a bogus value of cr3 to
the kernel. This will trigger a NULL pointer access in gfn_to_rmap()
when userspace next tries to call KVM_RUN on the affected VCPU and kvm
attempts to activate the new non-existent page table root.
This happens since kvm only validates that cr3 points to a valid guest
physical memory page when code *inside* the guest sets cr3. However, kvm
currently trusts the userspace caller (e.g. QEMU) on the host machine to
always supply a valid page table root, rather than properly validating
it along with the rest of the reloaded guest state."
http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail&atid=893831&aid=2687641&group_id=180599
Check for a valid cr3 address in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs, triple
fault in case of failure.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
|
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
void *arg)
{
tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
tls->callback_arg = arg;
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (cb) {
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
} else {
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
}
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
tor
|
638fdedcf16cf7d6f7c586d36f7ef335c1c9714f
| 190,243,380,424,812,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Don't send a certificate chain on outgoing TLS connections from non-relays
|
void syscall_log(const void *buf __maybe_unused, size_t len __maybe_unused)
{
#ifdef CFG_TEE_CORE_TA_TRACE
char *kbuf;
if (len == 0)
return;
kbuf = malloc(len + 1);
if (kbuf == NULL)
return;
if (tee_svc_copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, len) == TEE_SUCCESS) {
kbuf[len] = '\0';
trace_ext_puts(kbuf);
}
free(kbuf);
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
optee_os
|
d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
| 244,494,008,442,964,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
|
int fuse_fs_readdir(struct fuse_fs *fs, const char *path, void *buf,
fuse_fill_dir_t filler, off_t off,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
fuse_get_context()->private_data = fs->user_data;
if (fs->op.readdir)
return fs->op.readdir(path, buf, filler, off, fi);
else
return -ENOSYS;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ntfs-3g
|
fb28eef6f1c26170566187c1ab7dc913a13ea43c
| 22,847,505,614,662,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Hardened the checking of directory offset requested by a readdir
When asked for the next directory entries, make sure the chunk offset
is within valid values, otherwise return no more entries in chunk.
|
xmlIOHTTPMatch (const char *filename) {
if (!xmlStrncasecmp(BAD_CAST filename, BAD_CAST "http://", 7))
return(1);
return(0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 147,659,476,055,881,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
xps_parse_glyphs(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict, fz_xml *root)
{
fz_xml *node;
char *fill_uri;
char *opacity_mask_uri;
char *bidi_level_att;
char *fill_att;
char *font_size_att;
char *font_uri_att;
char *origin_x_att;
char *origin_y_att;
char *is_sideways_att;
char *indices_att;
char *unicode_att;
char *style_att;
char *transform_att;
char *clip_att;
char *opacity_att;
char *opacity_mask_att;
char *navigate_uri_att;
fz_xml *transform_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *clip_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *fill_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
char *fill_opacity_att = NULL;
xps_part *part;
fz_font *font;
char partname[1024];
char fakename[1024];
char *subfont;
float font_size = 10;
int subfontid = 0;
int is_sideways = 0;
int bidi_level = 0;
fz_text *text;
fz_rect area;
fz_matrix local_ctm = *ctm;
/*
* Extract attributes and extended attributes.
*/
bidi_level_att = fz_xml_att(root, "BidiLevel");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Fill");
font_size_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FontRenderingEmSize");
font_uri_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FontUri");
origin_x_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OriginX");
origin_y_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OriginY");
is_sideways_att = fz_xml_att(root, "IsSideways");
indices_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Indices");
unicode_att = fz_xml_att(root, "UnicodeString");
style_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StyleSimulations");
transform_att = fz_xml_att(root, "RenderTransform");
clip_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Clip");
opacity_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Opacity");
opacity_mask_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OpacityMask");
navigate_uri_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FixedPage.NavigateUri");
for (node = fz_xml_down(root); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.RenderTransform"))
transform_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.OpacityMask"))
opacity_mask_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.Clip"))
clip_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.Fill"))
fill_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
}
fill_uri = base_uri;
opacity_mask_uri = base_uri;
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &transform_att, &transform_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &clip_att, &clip_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &fill_att, &fill_tag, &fill_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &opacity_mask_att, &opacity_mask_tag, &opacity_mask_uri);
/*
* Check that we have all the necessary information.
*/
if (!font_size_att || !font_uri_att || !origin_x_att || !origin_y_att) {
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "missing attributes in glyphs element");
return;
}
if (!indices_att && !unicode_att)
return; /* nothing to draw */
if (is_sideways_att)
is_sideways = !strcmp(is_sideways_att, "true");
if (bidi_level_att)
bidi_level = atoi(bidi_level_att);
/*
* Find and load the font resource
*/
xps_resolve_url(partname, base_uri, font_uri_att, sizeof partname);
subfont = strrchr(partname, '#');
if (subfont)
{
subfontid = atoi(subfont + 1);
*subfont = 0;
}
/* Make a new part name for font with style simulation applied */
fz_strlcpy(fakename, partname, sizeof fakename);
if (style_att)
{
if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldSimulation"))
fz_strlcat(fakename, "#Bold", sizeof fakename);
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "ItalicSimulation"))
fz_strlcat(fakename, "#Italic", sizeof fakename);
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldItalicSimulation"))
fz_strlcat(fakename, "#BoldItalic", sizeof fakename);
}
font = xps_lookup_font(doc, fakename);
if (!font)
{
fz_try(doc->ctx)
{
part = xps_read_part(doc, partname);
}
fz_catch(doc->ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(doc->ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot find font resource part '%s'", partname);
return;
}
/* deobfuscate if necessary */
if (strstr(part->name, ".odttf"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(doc, part);
if (strstr(part->name, ".ODTTF"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(doc, part);
fz_try(doc->ctx)
{
fz_buffer *buf = fz_new_buffer_from_data(doc->ctx, part->data, part->size);
font = fz_new_font_from_buffer(doc->ctx, NULL, buf, subfontid, 1);
fz_drop_buffer(doc->ctx, buf);
}
fz_catch(doc->ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(doc->ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot load font resource '%s'", partname);
xps_free_part(doc, part);
return;
}
if (style_att)
{
font->ft_bold = !!strstr(style_att, "Bold");
font->ft_italic = !!strstr(style_att, "Italic");
}
xps_select_best_font_encoding(doc, font);
xps_insert_font(doc, fakename, font);
/* NOTE: we already saved part->data in the buffer in the font */
fz_free(doc->ctx, part->name);
fz_free(doc->ctx, part);
}
/*
* Set up graphics state.
*/
if (transform_att || transform_tag)
{
fz_matrix transform;
if (transform_att)
xps_parse_render_transform(doc, transform_att, &transform);
if (transform_tag)
xps_parse_matrix_transform(doc, transform_tag, &transform);
fz_concat(&local_ctm, &transform, &local_ctm);
}
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
xps_clip(doc, &local_ctm, dict, clip_att, clip_tag);
font_size = fz_atof(font_size_att);
text = xps_parse_glyphs_imp(doc, &local_ctm, font, font_size,
fz_atof(origin_x_att), fz_atof(origin_y_att),
is_sideways, bidi_level, indices_att, unicode_att);
fz_bound_text(doc->ctx, text, NULL, &local_ctm, &area);
if (navigate_uri_att)
xps_add_link(doc, &area, base_uri, navigate_uri_att);
xps_begin_opacity(doc, &local_ctm, &area, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
/* If it's a solid color brush fill/stroke do a simple fill */
if (fill_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(fill_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
fill_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Opacity");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Color");
fill_tag = NULL;
}
if (fill_att)
{
float samples[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, fill_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (fill_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= fz_atof(fill_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(doc, colorspace, samples);
fz_fill_text(doc->dev, text, &local_ctm,
doc->colorspace, doc->color, doc->alpha);
}
/* If it's a complex brush, use the charpath as a clip mask */
if (fill_tag)
{
fz_clip_text(doc->dev, text, &local_ctm, 0);
xps_parse_brush(doc, &local_ctm, &area, fill_uri, dict, fill_tag);
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
xps_end_opacity(doc, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
fz_free_text(doc->ctx, text);
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
fz_drop_font(doc->ctx, font);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
mupdf
|
60dabde18d7fe12b19da8b509bdfee9cc886aafc
| 101,480,961,008,667,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 250 |
Bug 694957: fix stack buffer overflow in xps_parse_color
xps_parse_color happily reads more than FZ_MAX_COLORS values out of a
ContextColor array which overflows the passed in samples array.
Limiting the number of allowed samples to FZ_MAX_COLORS and make sure
to use that constant for all callers fixes the problem.
Thanks to Jean-Jamil Khalifé for reporting and investigating the issue
and providing a sample exploit file.
|
static void fill_remaining_elem_value(struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info,
u32 pattern)
{
size_t offset = value_sizes[info->type] * info->count;
offset = DIV_ROUND_UP(offset, sizeof(u32));
memset32((u32 *)control->value.bytes.data + offset, pattern,
sizeof(control->value) / sizeof(u32) - offset);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
6ab55ec0a938c7f943a4edba3d6514f775983887
| 105,852,899,434,487,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
ALSA: control: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in get_ctl_id_hash()
Since the user can control the arguments provided to the kernel by the
ioctl() system call, an out-of-bounds bug occurs when the 'id->name'
provided by the user does not end with '\0'.
The following log can reveal it:
[ 10.002313] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.002895] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888109f5fe28 by task snd/439
[ 10.004934] Call Trace:
[ 10.007140] snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.007489] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x6cf/0x10e0
Fix this by checking the bound of 'id->name' in the loop.
Fixes: c27e1efb61c5 ("ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups")
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
unsigned find_compr_idx(compr_methodnum)
unsigned compr_methodnum;
{
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_METHODS; i++) {
if (ComprIDs[i] == compr_methodnum) break;
}
return i;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
unzip
|
47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
| 77,559,639,075,855,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
zip file is rejected.
See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
invalid.
This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
undefer_input() that misplaced the input state."
|
static void test_bug49972()
{
int rc;
MYSQL_STMT *stmt;
MYSQL_BIND in_param_bind;
MYSQL_BIND out_param_bind;
int int_data;
my_bool is_null;
DBUG_ENTER("test_bug49972");
myheader("test_bug49972");
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS f1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS p1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "CREATE FUNCTION f1() RETURNS INT RETURN 1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "CREATE PROCEDURE p1(IN a INT, OUT b INT) SET b = a");
myquery(rc);
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, "CALL p1((SELECT f1()), ?)");
check_stmt(stmt);
bzero((char *) &in_param_bind, sizeof (in_param_bind));
in_param_bind.buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG;
in_param_bind.buffer= (char *) &int_data;
in_param_bind.length= 0;
in_param_bind.is_null= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_param(stmt, &in_param_bind);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
{
bzero(&out_param_bind, sizeof (out_param_bind));
out_param_bind.buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG;
out_param_bind.is_null= &is_null;
out_param_bind.buffer= &int_data;
out_param_bind.buffer_length= sizeof (int_data);
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_result(stmt, &out_param_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
DBUG_ASSERT(rc == MYSQL_NO_DATA);
mysql_stmt_next_result(stmt);
mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
}
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP FUNCTION f1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "CREATE FUNCTION f1() RETURNS INT RETURN 1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
{
bzero(&out_param_bind, sizeof (out_param_bind));
out_param_bind.buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG;
out_param_bind.is_null= &is_null;
out_param_bind.buffer= &int_data;
out_param_bind.buffer_length= sizeof (int_data);
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_result(stmt, &out_param_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
DBUG_ASSERT(rc == MYSQL_NO_DATA);
mysql_stmt_next_result(stmt);
mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
}
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP PROCEDURE p1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP FUNCTION f1");
myquery(rc);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
eef21014898d61e77890359d6546d4985d829ef6
| 29,284,215,439,841,655,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 |
MDEV-11933 Wrong usage of linked list in mysql_prune_stmt_list
mysql_prune_stmt_list() was walking the list following
element->next pointers, but inside the loop it was invoking
list_add(element) that modified element->next. So, mysql_prune_stmt_list()
failed to visit and reset all elements, and some of them were left
with pointers to invalid MYSQL.
|
int blk_rq_append_bio(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
{
if (!rq->bio) {
blk_rq_bio_prep(rq->q, rq, bio);
} else {
if (!ll_back_merge_fn(rq->q, rq, bio))
return -EINVAL;
rq->biotail->bi_next = bio;
rq->biotail = bio;
rq->__data_len += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a0ac402cfcdc904f9772e1762b3fda112dcc56a0
| 271,791,533,625,357,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int RGWGetObj_ObjStore_S3::send_response_data(bufferlist& bl, off_t bl_ofs,
off_t bl_len)
{
const char *content_type = NULL;
string content_type_str;
map<string, string> response_attrs;
map<string, string>::iterator riter;
bufferlist metadata_bl;
if (sent_header)
goto send_data;
if (custom_http_ret) {
set_req_state_err(s, 0);
dump_errno(s, custom_http_ret);
} else {
set_req_state_err(s, (partial_content && !op_ret) ? STATUS_PARTIAL_CONTENT
: op_ret);
dump_errno(s);
}
if (op_ret)
goto done;
if (range_str)
dump_range(s, start, end, s->obj_size);
if (s->system_request &&
s->info.args.exists(RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "prepend-metadata")) {
dump_header(s, "Rgwx-Object-Size", (long long)total_len);
if (rgwx_stat) {
/*
* in this case, we're not returning the object's content, only the prepended
* extra metadata
*/
total_len = 0;
}
/* JSON encode object metadata */
JSONFormatter jf;
jf.open_object_section("obj_metadata");
encode_json("attrs", attrs, &jf);
utime_t ut(lastmod);
encode_json("mtime", ut, &jf);
jf.close_section();
stringstream ss;
jf.flush(ss);
metadata_bl.append(ss.str());
dump_header(s, "Rgwx-Embedded-Metadata-Len", metadata_bl.length());
total_len += metadata_bl.length();
}
if (s->system_request && !real_clock::is_zero(lastmod)) {
/* we end up dumping mtime in two different methods, a bit redundant */
dump_epoch_header(s, "Rgwx-Mtime", lastmod);
uint64_t pg_ver = 0;
int r = decode_attr_bl_single_value(attrs, RGW_ATTR_PG_VER, &pg_ver, (uint64_t)0);
if (r < 0) {
ldout(s->cct, 0) << "ERROR: failed to decode pg ver attr, ignoring" << dendl;
}
dump_header(s, "Rgwx-Obj-PG-Ver", pg_ver);
uint32_t source_zone_short_id = 0;
r = decode_attr_bl_single_value(attrs, RGW_ATTR_SOURCE_ZONE, &source_zone_short_id, (uint32_t)0);
if (r < 0) {
ldout(s->cct, 0) << "ERROR: failed to decode pg ver attr, ignoring" << dendl;
}
if (source_zone_short_id != 0) {
dump_header(s, "Rgwx-Source-Zone-Short-Id", source_zone_short_id);
}
}
for (auto &it : crypt_http_responses)
dump_header(s, it.first, it.second);
dump_content_length(s, total_len);
dump_last_modified(s, lastmod);
dump_header_if_nonempty(s, "x-amz-version-id", version_id);
if (attrs.find(RGW_ATTR_APPEND_PART_NUM) != attrs.end()) {
dump_header(s, "x-rgw-object-type", "Appendable");
dump_header(s, "x-rgw-next-append-position", s->obj_size);
} else {
dump_header(s, "x-rgw-object-type", "Normal");
}
if (! op_ret) {
if (! lo_etag.empty()) {
/* Handle etag of Swift API's large objects (DLO/SLO). It's entirerly
* legit to perform GET on them through S3 API. In such situation,
* a client should receive the composited content with corresponding
* etag value. */
dump_etag(s, lo_etag);
} else {
auto iter = attrs.find(RGW_ATTR_ETAG);
if (iter != attrs.end()) {
dump_etag(s, iter->second.to_str());
}
}
for (struct response_attr_param *p = resp_attr_params; p->param; p++) {
bool exists;
string val = s->info.args.get(p->param, &exists);
if (exists) {
if (strcmp(p->param, "response-content-type") != 0) {
response_attrs[p->http_attr] = val;
} else {
content_type_str = val;
content_type = content_type_str.c_str();
}
}
}
for (auto iter = attrs.begin(); iter != attrs.end(); ++iter) {
const char *name = iter->first.c_str();
map<string, string>::iterator aiter = rgw_to_http_attrs.find(name);
if (aiter != rgw_to_http_attrs.end()) {
if (response_attrs.count(aiter->second) == 0) {
/* Was not already overridden by a response param. */
size_t len = iter->second.length();
string s(iter->second.c_str(), len);
while (len && !s[len - 1]) {
--len;
s.resize(len);
}
response_attrs[aiter->second] = s;
}
} else if (iter->first.compare(RGW_ATTR_CONTENT_TYPE) == 0) {
/* Special handling for content_type. */
if (!content_type) {
content_type_str = rgw_bl_str(iter->second);
content_type = content_type_str.c_str();
}
} else if (strcmp(name, RGW_ATTR_SLO_UINDICATOR) == 0) {
// this attr has an extra length prefix from encode() in prior versions
dump_header(s, "X-Object-Meta-Static-Large-Object", "True");
} else if (strncmp(name, RGW_ATTR_META_PREFIX,
sizeof(RGW_ATTR_META_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
/* User custom metadata. */
name += sizeof(RGW_ATTR_PREFIX) - 1;
dump_header(s, name, iter->second);
} else if (iter->first.compare(RGW_ATTR_TAGS) == 0) {
RGWObjTags obj_tags;
try{
auto it = iter->second.cbegin();
obj_tags.decode(it);
} catch (buffer::error &err) {
ldout(s->cct,0) << "Error caught buffer::error couldn't decode TagSet " << dendl;
}
dump_header(s, RGW_AMZ_TAG_COUNT, obj_tags.count());
} else if (iter->first.compare(RGW_ATTR_OBJECT_RETENTION) == 0 && get_retention){
RGWObjectRetention retention;
try {
decode(retention, iter->second);
dump_header(s, "x-amz-object-lock-mode", retention.get_mode());
dump_time_header(s, "x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date", retention.get_retain_until_date());
} catch (buffer::error& err) {
ldpp_dout(this, 0) << "ERROR: failed to decode RGWObjectRetention" << dendl;
}
} else if (iter->first.compare(RGW_ATTR_OBJECT_LEGAL_HOLD) == 0 && get_legal_hold) {
RGWObjectLegalHold legal_hold;
try {
decode(legal_hold, iter->second);
dump_header(s, "x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold",legal_hold.get_status());
} catch (buffer::error& err) {
ldpp_dout(this, 0) << "ERROR: failed to decode RGWObjectLegalHold" << dendl;
}
}
}
}
done:
for (riter = response_attrs.begin(); riter != response_attrs.end();
++riter) {
dump_header(s, riter->first, riter->second);
}
if (op_ret == -ERR_NOT_MODIFIED) {
end_header(s, this);
} else {
if (!content_type)
content_type = "binary/octet-stream";
end_header(s, this, content_type);
}
if (metadata_bl.length()) {
dump_body(s, metadata_bl);
}
sent_header = true;
send_data:
if (get_data && !op_ret) {
int r = dump_body(s, bl.c_str() + bl_ofs, bl_len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-79"
] |
ceph
|
fce0b267446d6f3f631bb4680ebc3527bbbea002
| 194,522,038,655,282,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 202 |
rgw: reject unauthenticated response-header actions
Signed-off-by: Matt Benjamin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d8dd5e513c0c62bbd7d3044d7e2eddcd897bd400)
|
sc_encode_oid (struct sc_context *ctx, struct sc_object_id *id,
unsigned char **out, size_t *size)
{
static const struct sc_asn1_entry c_asn1_object_id[2] = {
{ "oid", SC_ASN1_OBJECT, SC_ASN1_TAG_OBJECT, SC_ASN1_ALLOC, NULL, NULL },
{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
};
struct sc_asn1_entry asn1_object_id[2];
int rv;
sc_copy_asn1_entry(c_asn1_object_id, asn1_object_id);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_object_id + 0, id, NULL, 1);
rv = _sc_asn1_encode(ctx, asn1_object_id, out, size, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot encode object ID");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
OpenSC
|
412a6142c27a5973c61ba540e33cdc22d5608e68
| 15,298,378,342,028,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
fixed out of bounds access of ASN.1 Bitstring
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
|
ebb_ews_get_collection_settings (EBookBackendEws *bbews)
{
ESource *source;
ESource *collection;
ESourceCamel *extension;
ESourceRegistry *registry;
CamelSettings *settings;
const gchar *extension_name;
source = e_backend_get_source (E_BACKEND (bbews));
registry = e_book_backend_get_registry (E_BOOK_BACKEND (bbews));
extension_name = e_source_camel_get_extension_name ("ews");
e_source_camel_generate_subtype ("ews", CAMEL_TYPE_EWS_SETTINGS);
/* The collection settings live in our parent data source. */
collection = e_source_registry_find_extension (registry, source, extension_name);
g_return_val_if_fail (collection != NULL, NULL);
extension = e_source_get_extension (collection, extension_name);
settings = e_source_camel_get_settings (extension);
g_object_unref (collection);
return CAMEL_EWS_SETTINGS (settings);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
| 97,016,402,963,923,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
|
check_l4_icmp(const void *data, size_t size, bool validate_checksum)
{
if (validate_checksum && csum(data, size) != 0) {
COVERAGE_INC(conntrack_l4csum_err);
return false;
} else {
return true;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
ovs
|
79349cbab0b2a755140eedb91833ad2760520a83
| 154,570,829,320,224,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
flow: Support extra padding length.
Although not required, padding can be optionally added until
the packet length is MTU bytes. A packet with extra padding
currently fails sanity checks.
Vulnerability: CVE-2020-35498
Fixes: fa8d9001a624 ("miniflow_extract: Properly handle small IP packets.")
Reported-by: Joakim Hindersson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
|
unsigned dev_get_flags(const struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned flags;
flags = (dev->flags & ~(IFF_PROMISC |
IFF_ALLMULTI |
IFF_RUNNING)) |
(dev->gflags & (IFF_PROMISC |
IFF_ALLMULTI));
if (netif_running(dev) && netif_carrier_ok(dev))
flags |= IFF_RUNNING;
return flags;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac
| 272,481,654,339,056,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach
Attached is kernel patch for UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) feature.
1. This patch incorporate the review comments by Jeff Garzik.
2. Renamed USO as UFO (UDP Fragmentation Offload)
3. udp sendfile support with UFO
This patches uses scatter-gather feature of skb to generate large UDP
datagram. Below is a "how-to" on changes required in network device
driver to use the UFO interface.
UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) Interface:
-------------------------------------------
UFO is a feature wherein the Linux kernel network stack will offload the
IP fragmentation functionality of large UDP datagram to hardware. This
will reduce the overhead of stack in fragmenting the large UDP datagram to
MTU sized packets
1) Drivers indicate their capability of UFO using
dev->features |= NETIF_F_UFO | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG
NETIF_F_HW_CSUM is required for UFO over ipv6.
2) UFO packet will be submitted for transmission using driver xmit routine.
UFO packet will have a non-zero value for
"skb_shinfo(skb)->ufo_size"
skb_shinfo(skb)->ufo_size will indicate the length of data part in each IP
fragment going out of the adapter after IP fragmentation by hardware.
skb->data will contain MAC/IP/UDP header and skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[]
contains the data payload. The skb->ip_summed will be set to CHECKSUM_HW
indicating that hardware has to do checksum calculation. Hardware should
compute the UDP checksum of complete datagram and also ip header checksum of
each fragmented IP packet.
For IPV6 the UFO provides the fragment identification-id in
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id. The adapter should use this ID for generating
IPv6 fragments.
Signed-off-by: Ananda Raju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> (forwarded)
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
|
static int prepare_coming_module(struct module *mod)
{
int err;
ftrace_module_enable(mod);
err = klp_module_coming(mod);
if (err)
return err;
err = blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust(&module_notify_list,
MODULE_STATE_COMING, MODULE_STATE_GOING, mod);
err = notifier_to_errno(err);
if (err)
klp_module_going(mod);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-347"
] |
linux
|
0c18f29aae7ce3dadd26d8ee3505d07cc982df75
| 272,044,196,490,809,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
module: limit enabling module.sig_enforce
Irrespective as to whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, specifying
"module.sig_enforce=1" on the boot command line sets "sig_enforce".
Only allow "sig_enforce" to be set when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured.
This patch makes the presence of /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce
dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y.
Fixes: fda784e50aac ("module: export module signature enforcement status")
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
base_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_ISDN, GFP_KERNEL, &mISDN_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sock->ops = &base_sock_ops;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_state = MISDN_OPEN;
mISDN_sock_link(&base_sockets, sk);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862"
] |
linux
|
b91ee4aa2a2199ba4d4650706c272985a5a32d80
| 254,599,123,437,705,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
mISDN: enforce CAP_NET_RAW for raw sockets
When creating a raw AF_ISDN socket, CAP_NET_RAW needs to be checked
first.
Signed-off-by: Ori Nimron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct ip_tunnel *ipgre_tunnel_find(struct net *net,
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms,
int type)
{
__be32 remote = parms->iph.daddr;
__be32 local = parms->iph.saddr;
__be32 key = parms->i_key;
int link = parms->link;
struct ip_tunnel *t, **tp;
struct ipgre_net *ign = net_generic(net, ipgre_net_id);
for (tp = __ipgre_bucket(ign, parms); (t = *tp) != NULL; tp = &t->next)
if (local == t->parms.iph.saddr &&
remote == t->parms.iph.daddr &&
key == t->parms.i_key &&
link == t->parms.link &&
type == t->dev->type)
break;
return t;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794
| 180,157,139,648,273,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static bool calc_nx_huge_pages_recovery_period(uint *period)
{
/*
* Use READ_ONCE to get the params, this may be called outside of the
* param setters, e.g. by the kthread to compute its next timeout.
*/
bool enabled = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages);
uint ratio = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio);
if (!enabled || !ratio)
return false;
*period = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_period_ms);
if (!*period) {
/* Make sure the period is not less than one second. */
ratio = min(ratio, 3600u);
*period = 60 * 60 * 1000 / ratio;
}
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
9f46c187e2e680ecd9de7983e4d081c3391acc76
| 188,603,450,488,803,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID
With shadow paging enabled, the INVPCID instruction results in a call
to kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva. If INVPCID is executed with CR0.PG=0, the
invlpg callback is not set and the result is a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix it trivially by checking for mmu->invlpg before every call.
There are other possibilities:
- check for CR0.PG, because KVM (like all Intel processors after P5)
flushes guest TLB on CR0.PG changes so that INVPCID/INVLPG are a
nop with paging disabled
- check for EFER.LMA, because KVM syncs and flushes when switching
MMU contexts outside of 64-bit mode
All of these are tricky, go for the simple solution. This is CVE-2022-1789.
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void on_btn_failed_cb(GtkButton *button)
{
/* Since the Repeat button has been introduced, the event chain isn't
* terminated upon a failure in order to be able to continue in processing
* in the retry action.
*
* Now, user decided to run the emergency analysis instead of trying to
* reconfigure libreport, so we have to terminate the event chain.
*/
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_repeat);
terminate_event_chain(TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
/* Show detailed log */
gtk_expander_set_expanded(g_exp_report_log, TRUE);
clear_warnings();
update_ls_details_checkboxes(EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME);
start_event_run(EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME);
/* single shot button -> hide after click */
gtk_widget_hide(GTK_WIDGET(button));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
libreport
|
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
| 224,593,697,263,274,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
|
char *format_get_level_tag(THEME_REC *theme, TEXT_DEST_REC *dest)
{
int format;
/* check for flags if we want to override defaults */
if (dest->flags & PRINT_FLAG_UNSET_LINE_START)
return NULL;
if (dest->flags & PRINT_FLAG_SET_LINE_START)
format = TXT_LINE_START;
else if (dest->flags & PRINT_FLAG_SET_LINE_START_IRSSI)
format = TXT_LINE_START_IRSSI;
else {
/* use defaults */
if (dest->level & LINE_START_IRSSI_LEVEL)
format = TXT_LINE_START_IRSSI;
else if ((dest->level & NOT_LINE_START_LEVEL) == 0)
format = TXT_LINE_START;
else
return NULL;
}
return format_get_text_theme(theme, MODULE_NAME, dest, format);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
irssi
|
6c6c42e3d1b49d90aacc0b67f8540471cae02a1d
| 255,914,052,153,544,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
See merge request !7
|
**/
CImg<T>& operator*=(const char *const expression) {
return mul((+*this)._fill(expression,true,1,0,0,"operator*=",this));
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 266,203,762,071,578,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
.
|
static void bnx2x_set_endianity(struct bnx2x *bp)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
bnx2x_config_endianity(bp, 1);
#else
bnx2x_config_endianity(bp, 0);
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
8914a595110a6eca69a5e275b323f5d09e18f4f9
| 202,354,373,769,138,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
bnx2x: disable GSO where gso_size is too big for hardware
If a bnx2x card is passed a GSO packet with a gso_size larger than
~9700 bytes, it will cause a firmware error that will bring the card
down:
bnx2x: [bnx2x_attn_int_deasserted3:4323(enP24p1s0f0)]MC assert!
bnx2x: [bnx2x_mc_assert:720(enP24p1s0f0)]XSTORM_ASSERT_LIST_INDEX 0x2
bnx2x: [bnx2x_mc_assert:736(enP24p1s0f0)]XSTORM_ASSERT_INDEX 0x0 = 0x00000000 0x25e43e47 0x00463e01 0x00010052
bnx2x: [bnx2x_mc_assert:750(enP24p1s0f0)]Chip Revision: everest3, FW Version: 7_13_1
... (dump of values continues) ...
Detect when the mac length of a GSO packet is greater than the maximum
packet size (9700 bytes) and disable GSO.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
xsltNumberFormatGetMultipleLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array,
int max)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt;
xmlNodePtr oldCtxtNode;
xmlNodePtr ancestor;
xmlNodePtr preceding;
xmlXPathParserContextPtr parser;
oldCtxtNode = context->xpathCtxt->node;
parser = xmlXPathNewParserContext(NULL, context->xpathCtxt);
if (parser) {
/* ancestor-or-self::*[count] */
ancestor = node;
while ((ancestor != NULL) && (ancestor->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, fromPat))
break; /* for */
/*
* The xmlXPathNext* iterators require that the context node is
* set to the start node. Calls to xsltTestCompMatch* may also
* leave the context node in an undefined state, so make sure
* that the context node is reset before each iterator invocation.
*/
if (xsltTestCompMatchCount(context, ancestor, countPat, node)) {
/* count(preceding-sibling::*) */
cnt = 1;
context->xpathCtxt->node = ancestor;
preceding = xmlXPathNextPrecedingSibling(parser, ancestor);
while (preceding != NULL) {
if (xsltTestCompMatchCount(context, preceding, countPat,
node))
cnt++;
context->xpathCtxt->node = ancestor;
preceding =
xmlXPathNextPrecedingSibling(parser, preceding);
}
array[amount++] = (double)cnt;
if (amount >= max)
break; /* for */
}
context->xpathCtxt->node = node;
ancestor = xmlXPathNextAncestor(parser, ancestor);
}
xmlXPathFreeParserContext(parser);
}
context->xpathCtxt->node = oldCtxtNode;
return amount;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-843"
] |
libxslt
|
6ce8de69330783977dd14f6569419489875fb71b
| 310,566,846,003,003,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 |
Fix uninitialized read with UTF-8 grouping chars
The character type in xsltFormatNumberConversion was too narrow and
an invalid character/length combination could be passed to
xsltNumberFormatDecimal, resulting in an uninitialized read.
Found by OSS-Fuzz.
|
static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*tiff_pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t) TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point",
exception);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV",exception);
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK",exception);
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR",exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown",exception);
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric",
exception));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb",exception);
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb",exception);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,exception);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image,exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if (IsStringFalse(option) == MagickFalse) /* enabled by default */
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image,exception);
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->resolution.x=x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->resolution.x-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->resolution.y-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MagickPathExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,&horizontal,
&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MagickPathExtent,
"%dx%d",horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor,exception);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
value=(unsigned short) image->scene;
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified",exception);
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated",
exception);
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated",
exception);
}
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%u",
(unsigned int) rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value,exception);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 3) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(samples_per_pixel >= 4))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 4) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(samples_per_pixel >= 5))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
tiff_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireMagickMemory(MagickMax(
TIFFScanlineSize(tiff),(ssize_t) (image->columns*samples_per_pixel*
pow(2.0,ceil(log(bits_per_sample)/log(2.0))))));
if (tiff_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*pow(2,ceil(log(
bits_per_sample)/log(2))));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,tiff_pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,tiff_pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,tiff_pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=tiff_pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) *(p+3)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) tiff_pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) tiff_pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(rows,sizeof(*tile_pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,rows*
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q,
*magick_restrict tile;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+
x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(image->rows,sizeof(*pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns-1);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p--;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
tiff_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tiff_pixels);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
ImageMagick
|
5fcb3321ae36c4dda0f460a0defc99b5b4db55ef
| 151,890,151,401,255,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1,059 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/664
|
int octetStringFilter(
slap_mask_t use,
slap_mask_t flags,
Syntax *syntax,
MatchingRule *mr,
struct berval *prefix,
void * assertedValue,
BerVarray *keysp,
void *ctx )
{
size_t slen, mlen;
BerVarray keys;
HASH_CONTEXT HASHcontext;
unsigned char HASHdigest[HASH_BYTES];
struct berval *value = (struct berval *) assertedValue;
struct berval digest;
digest.bv_val = (char *)HASHdigest;
digest.bv_len = sizeof(HASHdigest);
slen = syntax->ssyn_oidlen;
mlen = mr->smr_oidlen;
keys = slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( struct berval ) * 2, ctx );
hashPreset( &HASHcontext, prefix, 0, syntax, mr );
hashIter( &HASHcontext, HASHdigest,
(unsigned char *)value->bv_val, value->bv_len );
ber_dupbv_x( keys, &digest, ctx );
BER_BVZERO( &keys[1] );
*keysp = keys;
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
openldap
|
67670f4544e28fb09eb7319c39f404e1d3229e65
| 202,784,542,755,017,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
ITS#9383 remove assert in certificateListValidate
|
ZEND_VM_HANDLER(29, ZEND_ASSIGN_STATIC_PROP_OP, ANY, ANY, OP)
{
/* This helper actually never will receive IS_VAR as second op, and has the same handling for VAR and TMP in the first op, but for interoperability with the other binary_assign_op helpers, it is necessary to "include" it */
USE_OPLINE
zend_free_op free_op_data;
zval *prop, *value;
zend_property_info *prop_info;
zend_reference *ref;
SAVE_OPLINE();
if (UNEXPECTED(zend_fetch_static_property_address(&prop, &prop_info, (opline+1)->extended_value, BP_VAR_RW, 0 OPLINE_CC EXECUTE_DATA_CC) != SUCCESS)) {
ZEND_ASSERT(EG(exception));
UNDEF_RESULT();
FREE_UNFETCHED_OP_DATA();
HANDLE_EXCEPTION();
}
value = GET_OP_DATA_ZVAL_PTR(BP_VAR_R);
do {
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISREF_P(prop))) {
ref = Z_REF_P(prop);
prop = Z_REFVAL_P(prop);
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_REF_HAS_TYPE_SOURCES(ref))) {
zend_binary_assign_op_typed_ref(ref, value OPLINE_CC EXECUTE_DATA_CC);
break;
}
}
if (UNEXPECTED(prop_info->type)) {
/* special case for typed properties */
zend_binary_assign_op_typed_prop(prop_info, prop, value OPLINE_CC EXECUTE_DATA_CC);
} else {
zend_binary_op(prop, prop, value OPLINE_CC);
}
} while (0);
if (UNEXPECTED(RETURN_VALUE_USED(opline))) {
ZVAL_COPY(EX_VAR(opline->result.var), prop);
}
FREE_OP_DATA();
/* assign_static_prop has two opcodes! */
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE_EX(1, 2);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
php-src
|
f1ce8d5f5839cb2069ea37ff424fb96b8cd6932d
| 238,750,941,805,815,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
Fix #73122: Integer Overflow when concatenating strings
We must avoid integer overflows in memory allocations, so we introduce
an additional check in the VM, and bail out in the rare case of an
overflow. Since the recent fix for bug #74960 still doesn't catch all
possible overflows, we fix that right away.
|
cockpit_session_unref (gpointer data)
{
CockpitSession *session = data;
CockpitCreds *creds;
GObject *object;
session->refs--;
if (session->refs > 0)
return;
cockpit_session_reset (data);
g_free (session->name);
g_free (session->cookie);
if (session->authorize)
json_object_unref (session->authorize);
if (session->transport)
{
if (session->control_sig)
g_signal_handler_disconnect (session->transport, session->control_sig);
if (session->close_sig)
g_signal_handler_disconnect (session->transport, session->close_sig);
g_object_unref (session->transport);
}
if (session->service)
{
creds = cockpit_web_service_get_creds (session->service);
object = G_OBJECT (session->service);
session->service = NULL;
if (creds)
cockpit_creds_poison (creds);
if (session->idling_sig)
g_signal_handler_disconnect (object, session->idling_sig);
if (session->destroy_sig)
g_signal_handler_disconnect (object, session->destroy_sig);
g_object_weak_unref (object, on_web_service_gone, session);
g_object_run_dispose (object);
g_object_unref (object);
}
if (session->timeout_tag)
g_source_remove (session->timeout_tag);
g_free (session);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-1021"
] |
cockpit
|
46f6839d1af4e662648a85f3e54bba2d57f39f0e
| 144,420,420,462,973,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 |
ws: Restrict our cookie to the login host only
Mark our cookie as `SameSite: Strict` [1]. The current `None` default
will soon be moved to `Lax` by Firefox and Chromium, and recent versions
started to throw a warning about it.
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Set-Cookie/SameSite
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1891944
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.