func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
**/
Tfloat linear_atXY(const float fx, const float fy, const int z=0, const int c=0) const {
if (is_empty())
throw CImgInstanceException(_cimg_instance
"linear_atXY(): Empty instance.",
cimg_instance);
return _linear_atXY(fx,fy,z,c);
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
| 130,523,629,342,364,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
|
static int vsock_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
return transport->dgram_dequeue(kiocb, vsock_sk(sock->sk), msg, len,
flags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
| 163,319,492,540,851,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err styl_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_TextStyleBox*p = (GF_TextStyleBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TextStyleBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<p->entry_count; i++) tx3g_dump_style(trace, &p->styles[i]);
if (!p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<StyleRecord startChar=\"\" endChar=\"\" fontID=\"\" styles=\"Normal|Bold|Italic|Underlined\" fontSize=\"\" textColor=\"\" />\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TextStyleBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
gpac
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
| 198,907,773,239,060,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
static struct io_buffer *io_buffer_select(struct io_kiocb *req, size_t *len,
int bgid, struct io_buffer *kbuf,
bool needs_lock)
{
struct io_buffer *head;
if (req->flags & REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED)
return kbuf;
io_ring_submit_lock(req->ctx, needs_lock);
lockdep_assert_held(&req->ctx->uring_lock);
head = idr_find(&req->ctx->io_buffer_idr, bgid);
if (head) {
if (!list_empty(&head->list)) {
kbuf = list_last_entry(&head->list, struct io_buffer,
list);
list_del(&kbuf->list);
} else {
kbuf = head;
idr_remove(&req->ctx->io_buffer_idr, bgid);
}
if (*len > kbuf->len)
*len = kbuf->len;
} else {
kbuf = ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
}
io_ring_submit_unlock(req->ctx, needs_lock);
return kbuf;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff
| 214,766,790,776,496,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
io_uring: don't rely on weak ->files references
Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
With that, we can grab proper references to the files table, and no
longer need to rely on stashing away ring_fd and ring_file to check
if the ring_fd may have been closed.
Cc: [email protected] # v5.5+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static int lru_pull_tail(const int orig_id, const int cur_lru,
const uint64_t total_bytes, uint8_t flags) {
item *it = NULL;
int id = orig_id;
int removed = 0;
if (id == 0)
return 0;
int tries = 5;
item *search;
item *next_it;
void *hold_lock = NULL;
unsigned int move_to_lru = 0;
uint64_t limit = 0;
id |= cur_lru;
pthread_mutex_lock(&lru_locks[id]);
search = tails[id];
/* We walk up *only* for locked items, and if bottom is expired. */
for (; tries > 0 && search != NULL; tries--, search=next_it) {
/* we might relink search mid-loop, so search->prev isn't reliable */
next_it = search->prev;
if (search->nbytes == 0 && search->nkey == 0 && search->it_flags == 1) {
/* We are a crawler, ignore it. */
if (flags & LRU_PULL_CRAWL_BLOCKS) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lru_locks[id]);
return 0;
}
tries++;
continue;
}
uint32_t hv = hash(ITEM_key(search), search->nkey);
/* Attempt to hash item lock the "search" item. If locked, no
* other callers can incr the refcount. Also skip ourselves. */
if ((hold_lock = item_trylock(hv)) == NULL)
continue;
/* Now see if the item is refcount locked */
if (refcount_incr(&search->refcount) != 2) {
/* Note pathological case with ref'ed items in tail.
* Can still unlink the item, but it won't be reusable yet */
itemstats[id].lrutail_reflocked++;
/* In case of refcount leaks, enable for quick workaround. */
/* WARNING: This can cause terrible corruption */
if (settings.tail_repair_time &&
search->time + settings.tail_repair_time < current_time) {
itemstats[id].tailrepairs++;
search->refcount = 1;
/* This will call item_remove -> item_free since refcnt is 1 */
do_item_unlink_nolock(search, hv);
item_trylock_unlock(hold_lock);
continue;
}
}
/* Expired or flushed */
if ((search->exptime != 0 && search->exptime < current_time)
|| item_is_flushed(search)) {
itemstats[id].reclaimed++;
if ((search->it_flags & ITEM_FETCHED) == 0) {
itemstats[id].expired_unfetched++;
}
/* refcnt 2 -> 1 */
do_item_unlink_nolock(search, hv);
/* refcnt 1 -> 0 -> item_free */
do_item_remove(search);
item_trylock_unlock(hold_lock);
removed++;
/* If all we're finding are expired, can keep going */
continue;
}
/* If we're HOT_LRU or WARM_LRU and over size limit, send to COLD_LRU.
* If we're COLD_LRU, send to WARM_LRU unless we need to evict
*/
switch (cur_lru) {
case HOT_LRU:
limit = total_bytes * settings.hot_lru_pct / 100;
case WARM_LRU:
if (limit == 0)
limit = total_bytes * settings.warm_lru_pct / 100;
if (sizes_bytes[id] > limit) {
itemstats[id].moves_to_cold++;
move_to_lru = COLD_LRU;
do_item_unlink_q(search);
it = search;
removed++;
break;
} else if ((search->it_flags & ITEM_ACTIVE) != 0) {
/* Only allow ACTIVE relinking if we're not too large. */
itemstats[id].moves_within_lru++;
search->it_flags &= ~ITEM_ACTIVE;
do_item_update_nolock(search);
do_item_remove(search);
item_trylock_unlock(hold_lock);
} else {
/* Don't want to move to COLD, not active, bail out */
it = search;
}
break;
case COLD_LRU:
it = search; /* No matter what, we're stopping */
if (flags & LRU_PULL_EVICT) {
if (settings.evict_to_free == 0) {
/* Don't think we need a counter for this. It'll OOM. */
break;
}
itemstats[id].evicted++;
itemstats[id].evicted_time = current_time - search->time;
if (search->exptime != 0)
itemstats[id].evicted_nonzero++;
if ((search->it_flags & ITEM_FETCHED) == 0) {
itemstats[id].evicted_unfetched++;
}
LOGGER_LOG(NULL, LOG_EVICTIONS, LOGGER_EVICTION, search);
do_item_unlink_nolock(search, hv);
removed++;
if (settings.slab_automove == 2) {
slabs_reassign(-1, orig_id);
}
} else if ((search->it_flags & ITEM_ACTIVE) != 0
&& settings.lru_maintainer_thread) {
itemstats[id].moves_to_warm++;
search->it_flags &= ~ITEM_ACTIVE;
move_to_lru = WARM_LRU;
do_item_unlink_q(search);
removed++;
}
break;
}
if (it != NULL)
break;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lru_locks[id]);
if (it != NULL) {
if (move_to_lru) {
it->slabs_clsid = ITEM_clsid(it);
it->slabs_clsid |= move_to_lru;
item_link_q(it);
}
do_item_remove(it);
item_trylock_unlock(hold_lock);
}
return removed;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
memcached
|
bd578fc34b96abe0f8d99c1409814a09f51ee71c
| 205,124,052,305,799,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 148 |
CVE reported by cisco talos
|
static int __init bpf_lwt_init(void)
{
return lwtunnel_encap_add_ops(&bpf_encap_ops, LWTUNNEL_ENCAP_BPF);
}
| 0 |
[] |
net
|
6c8991f41546c3c472503dff1ea9daaddf9331c2
| 219,951,558,046,515,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
net: ipv6_stub: use ip6_dst_lookup_flow instead of ip6_dst_lookup
ipv6_stub uses the ip6_dst_lookup function to allow other modules to
perform IPv6 lookups. However, this function skips the XFRM layer
entirely.
All users of ipv6_stub->ip6_dst_lookup use ip_route_output_flow (via the
ip_route_output_key and ip_route_output helpers) for their IPv4 lookups,
which calls xfrm_lookup_route(). This patch fixes this inconsistent
behavior by switching the stub to ip6_dst_lookup_flow, which also calls
xfrm_lookup_route().
This requires some changes in all the callers, as these two functions
take different arguments and have different return types.
Fixes: 5f81bd2e5d80 ("ipv6: export a stub for IPv6 symbols used by vxlan")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
onig_get_callout_start_func(regex_t* reg, int callout_num)
{
/* If used for callouts of contents, return 0. */
CalloutListEntry* e;
e = onig_reg_callout_list_at(reg, callout_num);
return e->start_func;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
oniguruma
|
850bd9b0d8186eb1637722b46b12656814ab4ad2
| 227,118,708,053,105,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
fix #87: Read unknown address in onig_error_code_to_str()
|
copy_class(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value dst, mrb_value src)
{
struct RClass *dc = mrb_class_ptr(dst);
struct RClass *sc = mrb_class_ptr(src);
/* if the origin is not the same as the class, then the origin and
the current class need to be copied */
if (sc->flags & MRB_FLAG_IS_PREPENDED) {
struct RClass *c0 = sc->super;
struct RClass *c1 = dc;
/* copy prepended iclasses */
while (!(c0->flags & MRB_FLAG_IS_ORIGIN)) {
c1->super = mrb_class_ptr(mrb_obj_dup(mrb, mrb_obj_value(c0)));
c1 = c1->super;
c0 = c0->super;
}
c1->super = mrb_class_ptr(mrb_obj_dup(mrb, mrb_obj_value(c0)));
c1->super->flags |= MRB_FLAG_IS_ORIGIN;
}
if (sc->mt) {
dc->mt = kh_copy(mt, mrb, sc->mt);
}
else {
dc->mt = kh_init(mt, mrb);
}
dc->super = sc->super;
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(dc, MRB_INSTANCE_TT(sc));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-824"
] |
mruby
|
b64ce17852b180dfeea81cf458660be41a78974d
| 196,737,554,629,942,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
Should not call `initialize_copy` for `TT_ICLASS`; fix #4027
Since `TT_ICLASS` is a internal object that should never be revealed
to Ruby world.
|
const x509_cert *ssl_get_peer_cert( const ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL )
return NULL;
return ssl->session->peer_cert;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
polarssl
|
4582999be608c9794d4518ae336b265084db9f93
| 184,586,653,148,011,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Fixed timing difference resulting from badly formatted padding.
|
finish_newstyle_options (uint64_t *exportsize,
const char *exportname_in, uint32_t exportnamelen)
{
GET_CONN;
/* Since the exportname string passed here comes directly out of the
* NBD protocol make a temporary copy of the exportname into a
* \0-terminated buffer.
*/
CLEANUP_FREE char *exportname = strndup (exportname_in, exportnamelen);
if (exportname == NULL) {
nbdkit_error ("strndup: %m");
return -1;
}
/* The NBD spec says that if the client later uses NBD_OPT_GO on a
* different export, then the context from the earlier
* NBD_OPT_SET_META_CONTEXT is not usable so discard it.
*/
if (conn->exportname_from_set_meta_context &&
strcmp (conn->exportname_from_set_meta_context, exportname) != 0) {
debug ("newstyle negotiation: NBD_OPT_SET_META_CONTEXT export name \"%s\" "
"≠ final client exportname \"%s\", "
"so discarding the previous context",
conn->exportname_from_set_meta_context, exportname);
conn->meta_context_base_allocation = false;
}
if (protocol_common_open (exportsize, &conn->eflags, exportname) == -1)
return -1;
debug ("newstyle negotiation: flags: export 0x%x", conn->eflags);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-924"
] |
nbdkit
|
09a13dafb7bb3a38ab52eb5501cba786365ba7fd
| 93,355,634,710,270,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
server: CVE-2021-3716 reset structured replies on starttls
https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/ pointed out a series of CVEs in
common implementation flaw in various SMTP and IMAP clients and
servers, all with a common thread of improperly caching plaintext
state across the STARTTLS encryption boundary; and recommended that
other protocols with a STARTTLS operation perform a similar audit.
It turns out that nbdkit has the same vulnerability in regards to the
NBD protocol: when nbdkit is run in opportunistic TLS mode, an
attacker is able to inject a plaintext NBD_OPT_STRUCTURED_REPLY before
proxying everything else a client sends to the server; if the server
then acts on that plaintext request (as nbdkit did before this patch),
then the server ends up sending structured replies to at least
NBD_CMD_READ, even though the client was assuming that the transition
to TLS has ruled out a MitM attack.
On the bright side, nbdkit's behavior on a second
NBD_OPT_STRUCTURED_REPLY was to still reply with success, so a client
that always requests structured replies after starting TLS sees no
difference in behavior (that is, qemu 2.12 and later are immune) (had
nbdkit given an error to the second request, that may have caused
confusion to more clients). And there is always the mitigation of
using --tls=require, which lets nbdkit reject the MitM message
pre-encryption. However, nbd-client 3.15 to the present do not
understand structured replies, and I have confirmed that a MitM
attacker can thus cause a denial-of-service attack that does not
trigger until the client does its first encrypted NBD_CMD_READ.
The NBD spec has been recently tightened to declare the nbdkit
behavior to be a security hole:
https://github.com/NetworkBlockDevice/nbd/commit/77e55378096aa
|
ins_need_undo_get(void)
{
return ins_need_undo;
}
| 0 |
[] |
vim
|
98a336dd497d3422e7efeef9f24cc9e25aeb8a49
| 289,189,782,547,178,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
patch 8.2.0133: invalid memory access with search command
Problem: Invalid memory access with search command.
Solution: When :normal runs out of characters in bracketed paste mode break
out of the loop.(closes #5511)
|
sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_transmit_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
int one_packet)
{
sctp_xmit_t retval;
int error = 0;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p chunk:%p\n", __func__,
packet, chunk);
switch ((retval = (sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, chunk)))) {
case SCTP_XMIT_PMTU_FULL:
if (!packet->has_cookie_echo) {
error = sctp_packet_transmit(packet);
if (error < 0)
chunk->skb->sk->sk_err = -error;
/* If we have an empty packet, then we can NOT ever
* return PMTU_FULL.
*/
if (!one_packet)
retval = sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet,
chunk);
}
break;
case SCTP_XMIT_RWND_FULL:
case SCTP_XMIT_OK:
case SCTP_XMIT_NAGLE_DELAY:
break;
}
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
196d67593439b03088913227093e374235596e33
| 295,660,278,013,436,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
sctp: Add support to per-association statistics via a new SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call
The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association
statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris'
SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS.
Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on
this.
V4:
- Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons
- Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid
returning bogus RTO values
- return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed
V3:
- Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well
- Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push()
- return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call
V2:
- Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion
- Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway
- Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out
of sequence unexpected TSNs
- Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts
- Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check
- Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks
- Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0)
- Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs
- Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API
- Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for
future struct growth
- Move association statistics in their own struct
- Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs
- return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the
transport when max_rto last changed.
Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
find_book_view (EBookBackendLDAP *bl)
{
EDataBookView *view = NULL;
GList *list;
list = e_book_backend_list_views (E_BOOK_BACKEND (bl));
if (list != NULL) {
/* FIXME Drop the EDataBookView reference for backward-
* compatibility, but at some point the LDAP backend
* should learn to expect a new reference from this
* function and clean up after itself. Currently
* this is not thread-safe. */
view = E_DATA_BOOK_VIEW (list->data);
g_list_free_full (list, (GDestroyNotify) g_object_unref);
}
return view;
}
| 0 |
[] |
evolution-data-server
|
34bad61738e2127736947ac50e0c7969cc944972
| 169,197,335,249,554,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Bug 796174 - strcat() considered unsafe for buffer overflow
|
rsvg_acquire_base64_resource (const char *data, GError ** error)
{
GByteArray *array = NULL;
gsize data_len, written_len;
int state = 0;
guint save = 0;
rsvg_return_val_if_fail (data != NULL, NULL, error);
while (*data)
if (*data++ == ',')
break;
data_len = strlen (data);
array = g_byte_array_sized_new (data_len / 4 * 3);
written_len = g_base64_decode_step (data, data_len, array->data,
&state, &save);
g_byte_array_set_size (array, written_len);
return array;
}
| 0 |
[] |
librsvg
|
34c95743ca692ea0e44778e41a7c0a129363de84
| 78,517,402,200,713,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
Store node type separately in RsvgNode
The node name (formerly RsvgNode:type) cannot be used to infer
the sub-type of RsvgNode that we're dealing with, since for unknown
elements we put type = node-name. This lead to a (potentially exploitable)
crash e.g. when the element name started with "fe" which tricked
the old code into considering it as a RsvgFilterPrimitive.
CVE-2011-3146
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=658014
|
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs12_export)
{
X509 * cert = NULL;
BIO * bio_out;
PKCS12 * p12 = NULL;
zval * zcert = NULL, *zout = NULL, *zpkey, *args = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
long certresource, keyresource;
char * pass;
int pass_len;
char * friendly_name = NULL;
zval ** item;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zzzs|a", &zcert, &zout, &zpkey, &pass, &pass_len, &args) == FAILURE)
return;
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(&zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
priv_key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(&zpkey, 0, "", 1, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get private key from parameter 3");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, priv_key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "private key does not correspond to cert");
goto cleanup;
}
/* parse extra config from args array, promote this to an extra function */
if (args && zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "friendly_name", sizeof("friendly_name"), (void**)&item) == SUCCESS)
friendly_name = Z_STRVAL_PP(item);
if (args && zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "extracerts", sizeof("extracerts"), (void**)&item) == SUCCESS)
ca = php_array_to_X509_sk(item TSRMLS_CC);
/* end parse extra config */
p12 = PKCS12_create(pass, friendly_name, priv_key, cert, ca, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio_out, p12)) {
BUF_MEM *bio_buf;
zval_dtor(zout);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &bio_buf);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zout, bio_buf->data, bio_buf->length, 1);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
PKCS12_free(p12);
php_sk_X509_free(ca);
cleanup:
if (keyresource == -1 && priv_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
}
if (certresource == -1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
php-src
|
2874696a5a8d46639d261571f915c493cd875897
| 117,887,529,027,971,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 68 |
Fix CVE-2013-4073 - handling of certs with null bytes
|
void arch_cpu_idle_exit(void)
{
ledtrig_cpu(CPU_LED_IDLE_END);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
a4780adeefd042482f624f5e0d577bf9cdcbb760
| 91,124,645,195,973,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
|
INST_HANDLER (las) { // LAS Z, Rd
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
// read memory from RAMPZ:Z
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 'z', 1, 0, 0, 0); // 0: Read (RAMPZ:Z)
ESIL_A ("r%d,|,", d); // 0: (Z) | Rd
ESIL_A ("DUP,r%d,=,", d); // Rd = [0]
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 'z', 1, 0, 0, 1); // Store in RAM
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68
| 236,611,070,086,723,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Fix crash in anal.avr
|
TEST(UriSuite, TestUriUserInfoHostPort1) {
// User info with ":", no port
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
// 0 4 0 3 0 7 01 0 9
const char * const input = "http" "://" "abc:def" "@" "localhost";
ASSERT_TRUE(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, input));
ASSERT_TRUE(uriA.userInfo.first == input + 4 + 3);
ASSERT_TRUE(uriA.userInfo.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 7);
ASSERT_TRUE(uriA.hostText.first == input + 4 + 3 + 7 + 1);
ASSERT_TRUE(uriA.hostText.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 7 + 1 + 9);
ASSERT_TRUE(uriA.portText.first == NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(uriA.portText.afterLast == NULL);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
uriparser
|
cef25028de5ff872c2e1f0a6c562eb3ea9ecbce4
| 184,202,791,516,172,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Fix uriParse*Ex* out-of-bounds read
|
static void flush_entryatt(annotate_state_t *state)
{
if (!state->attvalues)
return; /* nothing to flush */
state->callback(state->lastname,
state->lastuid,
state->lastentry,
state->attvalues,
state->callback_rock);
freeattvalues(state->attvalues);
state->attvalues = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-732"
] |
cyrus-imapd
|
621f9e41465b521399f691c241181300fab55995
| 76,021,451,074,969,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
annotate: don't allow everyone to write shared server entries
|
__must_hold(wqe->lock)
{
struct io_wqe_acct *acct = io_wqe_get_acct(worker);
struct io_wqe *wqe = worker->wqe;
if (!(worker->flags & IO_WORKER_F_UP))
return;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&acct->nr_running) && io_acct_run_queue(acct)) {
atomic_inc(&acct->nr_running);
atomic_inc(&wqe->wq->worker_refs);
io_queue_worker_create(worker, acct, create_worker_cb);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
713b9825a4c47897f66ad69409581e7734a8728e
| 339,090,009,910,580,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
io-wq: fix cancellation on create-worker failure
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10392 at fs/io_uring.c:1151 req_ref_put_and_test
fs/io_uring.c:1151 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10392 at fs/io_uring.c:1151 req_ref_put_and_test
fs/io_uring.c:1146 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10392 at fs/io_uring.c:1151
io_req_complete_post+0xf5b/0x1190 fs/io_uring.c:1794
Modules linked in:
Call Trace:
tctx_task_work+0x1e5/0x570 fs/io_uring.c:2158
task_work_run+0xe0/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
tracehook_notify_signal include/linux/tracehook.h:212 [inline]
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:146 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x232/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:209
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302
do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
When io_wqe_enqueue() -> io_wqe_create_worker() fails, we can't just
call io_run_cancel() to clean up the request, it's already enqueued via
io_wqe_insert_work() and will be executed either by some other worker
during cancellation (e.g. in io_wq_put_and_exit()).
Reported-by: Hao Sun <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3146cba99aa28 ("io-wq: make worker creation resilient against signals")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/93b9de0fcf657affab0acfd675d4abcd273ee863.1631092071.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
int cpia2_usb_stream_start(struct camera_data *cam, unsigned int alternate)
{
int ret;
int old_alt;
if(cam->streaming)
return 0;
if (cam->flush) {
int i;
DBG("Flushing buffers\n");
for(i=0; i<cam->num_frames; ++i) {
cam->buffers[i].status = FRAME_EMPTY;
cam->buffers[i].length = 0;
}
cam->curbuff = &cam->buffers[0];
cam->workbuff = cam->curbuff->next;
cam->flush = false;
}
old_alt = cam->params.camera_state.stream_mode;
cam->params.camera_state.stream_mode = 0;
ret = cpia2_usb_change_streaming_alternate(cam, alternate);
if (ret < 0) {
int ret2;
ERR("cpia2_usb_change_streaming_alternate() = %d!\n", ret);
cam->params.camera_state.stream_mode = old_alt;
ret2 = set_alternate(cam, USBIF_CMDONLY);
if (ret2 < 0) {
ERR("cpia2_usb_change_streaming_alternate(%d) =%d has already failed. Then tried to call set_alternate(USBIF_CMDONLY) = %d.\n",
alternate, ret, ret2);
}
} else {
cam->frame_count = 0;
cam->streaming = 1;
ret = cpia2_usb_stream_resume(cam);
}
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
eff73de2b1600ad8230692f00bc0ab49b166512a
| 26,507,993,111,895,484,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
media: cpia2_usb: first wake up, then free in disconnect
Kasan reported a use after free in cpia2_usb_disconnect()
It first freed everything and then woke up those waiting.
The reverse order is correct.
Fixes: 6c493f8b28c67 ("[media] cpia2: major overhaul to get it in a working state again")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
GF_ISOMAVCType gf_isom_get_avc_svc_type(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 DescriptionIndex)
{
u32 type;
GF_TrackBox *trak;
GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *entry;
trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, trackNumber);
if (!trak || !trak->Media || !trak->Media->handler || !DescriptionIndex) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_NONE;
if (!gf_isom_is_video_handler_type(trak->Media->handler->handlerType))
return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_NONE;
entry = (GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox*)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->child_boxes, DescriptionIndex-1);
if (!entry) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_NONE;
type = entry->type;
if (type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCV) {
GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *sinf = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *) gf_isom_box_find_child(entry->child_boxes, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SINF);
if (sinf && sinf->original_format) type = sinf->original_format->data_format;
}
else if (type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RESV) {
if (entry->rinf && entry->rinf->original_format) type = entry->rinf->original_format->data_format;
}
switch (type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC3:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC4:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MVC1:
break;
default:
return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_NONE;
}
if (entry->avc_config && !entry->svc_config && !entry->mvc_config) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_AVC_ONLY;
if (entry->avc_config && entry->svc_config) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_AVC_SVC;
if (entry->avc_config && entry->mvc_config) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_AVC_MVC;
if (!entry->avc_config && entry->svc_config) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_SVC_ONLY;
if (!entry->avc_config && entry->mvc_config) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_MVC_ONLY;
return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_NONE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
gpac
|
0a85029d694f992f3631e2f249e4999daee15cbf
| 227,435,620,295,001,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 |
fixed #1785 (fuzz)
|
void dm_put(struct mapped_device *md)
{
atomic_dec(&md->holders);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
| 139,779,970,552,504,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
mlx5_tx_packet_multi_tso(struct mlx5_txq_data *restrict txq,
struct mlx5_txq_local *restrict loc,
unsigned int olx)
{
struct mlx5_wqe *restrict wqe;
unsigned int ds, dlen, inlen, ntcp, vlan = 0;
/*
* Calculate data length to be inlined to estimate
* the required space in WQE ring buffer.
*/
dlen = rte_pktmbuf_pkt_len(loc->mbuf);
if (MLX5_TXOFF_CONFIG(VLAN) && loc->mbuf->ol_flags & PKT_TX_VLAN_PKT)
vlan = sizeof(struct rte_vlan_hdr);
inlen = loc->mbuf->l2_len + vlan +
loc->mbuf->l3_len + loc->mbuf->l4_len;
if (unlikely((!inlen || !loc->mbuf->tso_segsz)))
return MLX5_TXCMP_CODE_ERROR;
if (loc->mbuf->ol_flags & PKT_TX_TUNNEL_MASK)
inlen += loc->mbuf->outer_l2_len + loc->mbuf->outer_l3_len;
/* Packet must contain all TSO headers. */
if (unlikely(inlen > MLX5_MAX_TSO_HEADER ||
inlen <= MLX5_ESEG_MIN_INLINE_SIZE ||
inlen > (dlen + vlan)))
return MLX5_TXCMP_CODE_ERROR;
assert(inlen >= txq->inlen_mode);
/*
* Check whether there are enough free WQEBBs:
* - Control Segment
* - Ethernet Segment
* - First Segment of inlined Ethernet data
* - ... data continued ...
* - Data Segments of pointer/min inline type
*/
ds = NB_SEGS(loc->mbuf) + 2 + (inlen -
MLX5_ESEG_MIN_INLINE_SIZE +
MLX5_WSEG_SIZE +
MLX5_WSEG_SIZE - 1) / MLX5_WSEG_SIZE;
if (unlikely(loc->wqe_free < ((ds + 3) / 4)))
return MLX5_TXCMP_CODE_EXIT;
/* Check for maximal WQE size. */
if (unlikely((MLX5_WQE_SIZE_MAX / MLX5_WSEG_SIZE) < ((ds + 3) / 4)))
return MLX5_TXCMP_CODE_ERROR;
#ifdef MLX5_PMD_SOFT_COUNTERS
/* Update sent data bytes/packets counters. */
ntcp = (dlen - (inlen - vlan) + loc->mbuf->tso_segsz - 1) /
loc->mbuf->tso_segsz;
/*
* One will be added for mbuf itself
* at the end of the mlx5_tx_burst from
* loc->pkts_sent field.
*/
--ntcp;
txq->stats.opackets += ntcp;
txq->stats.obytes += dlen + vlan + ntcp * inlen;
#endif
wqe = txq->wqes + (txq->wqe_ci & txq->wqe_m);
loc->wqe_last = wqe;
mlx5_tx_cseg_init(txq, loc, wqe, 0, MLX5_OPCODE_TSO, olx);
ds = mlx5_tx_mseg_build(txq, loc, wqe, vlan, inlen, 1, olx);
wqe->cseg.sq_ds = rte_cpu_to_be_32(txq->qp_num_8s | ds);
txq->wqe_ci += (ds + 3) / 4;
loc->wqe_free -= (ds + 3) / 4;
return MLX5_TXCMP_CODE_MULTI;
}
| 0 |
[] |
dpdk-stable
|
8b090f2664e9d014cd8fa0fde90597aaf4349e7e
| 263,781,570,603,793,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 |
net/mlx5: fix Rx queue recovery mechanism
The local variables are getting inconsistent in data receiving routines
after queue error recovery.
Receive queue consumer index is getting wrong, need to reset one to the
size of the queue (as RQ was fully replenished in recovery procedure).
In MPRQ case, also the local consumed strd variable should be reset.
CVE-2022-28199
Fixes: 88c0733 ("net/mlx5: extend Rx completion with error handling")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozyrev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matan Azrad <[email protected]>
|
coolkey_get_access(sc_card_t *card, sc_cardctl_coolkey_object_t *obj, unsigned int *access_ptr)
{
return coolkey_set_bool_flags(card, obj, access_ptr, access_table, access_table_size);
}
| 0 |
[] |
OpenSC
|
7114fb71b54ddfe06ce5dfdab013f4c38f129d14
| 169,866,823,288,793,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
coolkey: Initialize potentially uninitialized memory
Thanks oss-fuzz
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=28855
|
ms_escher_read_AlignRule (MSEscherState *state, MSEscherHeader *h)
{
return FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
gnumeric
|
b5480b69345b3c6d56ee0ed9c9e9880bb2a08cdc
| 333,249,964,401,524,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
xls: fuzzed file crash.
|
xfs_inode_item_format(
struct xfs_log_item *lip,
struct xfs_log_vec *lv)
{
struct xfs_inode_log_item *iip = INODE_ITEM(lip);
struct xfs_inode *ip = iip->ili_inode;
struct xfs_inode_log_format *ilf;
struct xfs_log_iovec *vecp = NULL;
ASSERT(ip->i_d.di_version > 1);
ilf = xlog_prepare_iovec(lv, &vecp, XLOG_REG_TYPE_IFORMAT);
ilf->ilf_type = XFS_LI_INODE;
ilf->ilf_ino = ip->i_ino;
ilf->ilf_blkno = ip->i_imap.im_blkno;
ilf->ilf_len = ip->i_imap.im_len;
ilf->ilf_boffset = ip->i_imap.im_boffset;
ilf->ilf_fields = XFS_ILOG_CORE;
ilf->ilf_size = 2; /* format + core */
xlog_finish_iovec(lv, vecp, sizeof(struct xfs_inode_log_format));
xlog_copy_iovec(lv, &vecp, XLOG_REG_TYPE_ICORE,
&ip->i_d,
xfs_icdinode_size(ip->i_d.di_version));
xfs_inode_item_format_data_fork(iip, ilf, lv, &vecp);
if (XFS_IFORK_Q(ip)) {
xfs_inode_item_format_attr_fork(iip, ilf, lv, &vecp);
} else {
iip->ili_fields &=
~(XFS_ILOG_ADATA | XFS_ILOG_ABROOT | XFS_ILOG_AEXT);
}
/* update the format with the exact fields we actually logged */
ilf->ilf_fields |= (iip->ili_fields & ~XFS_ILOG_TIMESTAMP);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-19"
] |
linux
|
fc0561cefc04e7803c0f6501ca4f310a502f65b8
| 191,247,298,810,818,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
xfs: optimise away log forces on timestamp updates for fdatasync
xfs: timestamp updates cause excessive fdatasync log traffic
Sage Weil reported that a ceph test workload was writing to the
log on every fdatasync during an overwrite workload. Event tracing
showed that the only metadata modification being made was the
timestamp updates during the write(2) syscall, but fdatasync(2)
is supposed to ignore them. The key observation was that the
transactions in the log all looked like this:
INODE: #regs: 4 ino: 0x8b flags: 0x45 dsize: 32
And contained a flags field of 0x45 or 0x85, and had data and
attribute forks following the inode core. This means that the
timestamp updates were triggering dirty relogging of previously
logged parts of the inode that hadn't yet been flushed back to
disk.
There are two parts to this problem. The first is that XFS relogs
dirty regions in subsequent transactions, so it carries around the
fields that have been dirtied since the last time the inode was
written back to disk, not since the last time the inode was forced
into the log.
The second part is that on v5 filesystems, the inode change count
update during inode dirtying also sets the XFS_ILOG_CORE flag, so
on v5 filesystems this makes a timestamp update dirty the entire
inode.
As a result when fdatasync is run, it looks at the dirty fields in
the inode, and sees more than just the timestamp flag, even though
the only metadata change since the last fdatasync was just the
timestamps. Hence we force the log on every subsequent fdatasync
even though it is not needed.
To fix this, add a new field to the inode log item that tracks
changes since the last time fsync/fdatasync forced the log to flush
the changes to the journal. This flag is updated when we dirty the
inode, but we do it before updating the change count so it does not
carry the "core dirty" flag from timestamp updates. The fields are
zeroed when the inode is marked clean (due to writeback/freeing) or
when an fsync/datasync forces the log. Hence if we only dirty the
timestamps on the inode between fsync/fdatasync calls, the fdatasync
will not trigger another log force.
Over 100 runs of the test program:
Ext4 baseline:
runtime: 1.63s +/- 0.24s
avg lat: 1.59ms +/- 0.24ms
iops: ~2000
XFS, vanilla kernel:
runtime: 2.45s +/- 0.18s
avg lat: 2.39ms +/- 0.18ms
log forces: ~400/s
iops: ~1000
XFS, patched kernel:
runtime: 1.49s +/- 0.26s
avg lat: 1.46ms +/- 0.25ms
log forces: ~30/s
iops: ~1500
Reported-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
|
void CLASS scale_colors()
{
unsigned bottom, right, size, row, col, ur, uc, i, x, y, c, sum[8];
int val, dark, sat;
double dsum[8], dmin, dmax;
float scale_mul[4], fr, fc;
ushort *img=0, *pix;
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
RUN_CALLBACK(LIBRAW_PROGRESS_SCALE_COLORS,0,2);
#endif
if (user_mul[0])
memcpy (pre_mul, user_mul, sizeof pre_mul);
if (use_auto_wb || (use_camera_wb && cam_mul[0] == -1)) {
memset (dsum, 0, sizeof dsum);
bottom = MIN (greybox[1]+greybox[3], height);
right = MIN (greybox[0]+greybox[2], width);
for (row=greybox[1]; row < bottom; row += 8)
for (col=greybox[0]; col < right; col += 8) {
memset (sum, 0, sizeof sum);
for (y=row; y < row+8 && y < bottom; y++)
for (x=col; x < col+8 && x < right; x++)
FORC4 {
if (filters) {
c = fcol(y,x);
val = BAYER2(y,x);
} else
val = image[y*width+x][c];
if (val > maximum-25) goto skip_block;
if ((val -= cblack[c]) < 0) val = 0;
sum[c] += val;
sum[c+4]++;
if (filters) break;
}
FORC(8) dsum[c] += sum[c];
skip_block: ;
}
FORC4 if (dsum[c]) pre_mul[c] = dsum[c+4] / dsum[c];
}
if (use_camera_wb && cam_mul[0] != -1) {
memset (sum, 0, sizeof sum);
for (row=0; row < 8; row++)
for (col=0; col < 8; col++) {
c = FC(row,col);
if ((val = white[row][col] - cblack[c]) > 0)
sum[c] += val;
sum[c+4]++;
}
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
if(load_raw == &LibRaw::nikon_load_sraw)
{
// Nikon sRAW: camera WB already applied:
pre_mul[0]=pre_mul[1]=pre_mul[2]=pre_mul[3]=1.0;
}
else
#endif
if (sum[0] && sum[1] && sum[2] && sum[3])
FORC4 pre_mul[c] = (float) sum[c+4] / sum[c];
else if (cam_mul[0] && cam_mul[2])
memcpy (pre_mul, cam_mul, sizeof pre_mul);
else
{
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
imgdata.process_warnings |= LIBRAW_WARN_BAD_CAMERA_WB;
#endif
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
fprintf (stderr,_("%s: Cannot use camera white balance.\n"), ifname);
#endif
}
}
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
// Nikon sRAW, daylight
if (load_raw == &LibRaw::nikon_load_sraw
&& !use_camera_wb && !use_auto_wb
&& cam_mul[0] > 0.001f && cam_mul[1] > 0.001f && cam_mul[2] > 0.001f )
{
for(c=0;c<3;c++)
pre_mul[c]/=cam_mul[c];
}
#endif
if (pre_mul[1] == 0) pre_mul[1] = 1;
if (pre_mul[3] == 0) pre_mul[3] = colors < 4 ? pre_mul[1] : 1;
dark = black;
sat = maximum;
if (threshold) wavelet_denoise();
maximum -= black;
for (dmin=DBL_MAX, dmax=c=0; c < 4; c++) {
if (dmin > pre_mul[c])
dmin = pre_mul[c];
if (dmax < pre_mul[c])
dmax = pre_mul[c];
}
if (!highlight) dmax = dmin;
FORC4 scale_mul[c] = (pre_mul[c] /= dmax) * 65535.0 / maximum;
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
if (verbose) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("Scaling with darkness %d, saturation %d, and\nmultipliers"), dark, sat);
FORC4 fprintf (stderr, " %f", pre_mul[c]);
fputc ('\n', stderr);
}
#endif
if (filters > 1000 && (cblack[4]+1)/2 == 1 && (cblack[5]+1)/2 == 1) {
FORC4 cblack[FC(c/2,c%2)] +=
cblack[6 + c/2 % cblack[4] * cblack[5] + c%2 % cblack[5]];
cblack[4] = cblack[5] = 0;
}
size = iheight*iwidth;
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
scale_colors_loop(scale_mul);
#else
for (i=0; i < size*4; i++) {
if (!(val = ((ushort *)image)[i])) continue;
if (cblack[4] && cblack[5])
val -= cblack[6 + i/4 / iwidth % cblack[4] * cblack[5] +
i/4 % iwidth % cblack[5]];
val -= cblack[i & 3];
val *= scale_mul[i & 3];
((ushort *)image)[i] = CLIP(val);
}
#endif
if ((aber[0] != 1 || aber[2] != 1) && colors == 3) {
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
if (verbose)
fprintf (stderr,_("Correcting chromatic aberration...\n"));
#endif
for (c=0; c < 4; c+=2) {
if (aber[c] == 1) continue;
img = (ushort *) malloc (size * sizeof *img);
merror (img, "scale_colors()");
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
img[i] = image[i][c];
for (row=0; row < iheight; row++) {
ur = fr = (row - iheight*0.5) * aber[c] + iheight*0.5;
if (ur > iheight-2) continue;
fr -= ur;
for (col=0; col < iwidth; col++) {
uc = fc = (col - iwidth*0.5) * aber[c] + iwidth*0.5;
if (uc > iwidth-2) continue;
fc -= uc;
pix = img + ur*iwidth + uc;
image[row*iwidth+col][c] =
(pix[ 0]*(1-fc) + pix[ 1]*fc) * (1-fr) +
(pix[iwidth]*(1-fc) + pix[iwidth+1]*fc) * fr;
}
}
free(img);
}
}
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
RUN_CALLBACK(LIBRAW_PROGRESS_SCALE_COLORS,1,2);
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-129"
] |
LibRaw
|
89d065424f09b788f443734d44857289489ca9e2
| 83,545,931,530,672,515,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 154 |
fixed two more problems found by fuzzer
|
static void tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty(struct tcf_chain *chain,
struct tcf_proto *tp, bool rtnl_held,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct tcf_chain_info chain_info;
struct tcf_proto *tp_iter;
struct tcf_proto **pprev;
struct tcf_proto *next;
mutex_lock(&chain->filter_chain_lock);
/* Atomically find and remove tp from chain. */
for (pprev = &chain->filter_chain;
(tp_iter = tcf_chain_dereference(*pprev, chain));
pprev = &tp_iter->next) {
if (tp_iter == tp) {
chain_info.pprev = pprev;
chain_info.next = tp_iter->next;
WARN_ON(tp_iter->deleting);
break;
}
}
/* Verify that tp still exists and no new filters were inserted
* concurrently.
* Mark tp for deletion if it is empty.
*/
if (!tp_iter || !tcf_proto_check_delete(tp)) {
mutex_unlock(&chain->filter_chain_lock);
return;
}
tcf_proto_signal_destroying(chain, tp);
next = tcf_chain_dereference(chain_info.next, chain);
if (tp == chain->filter_chain)
tcf_chain0_head_change(chain, next);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(*chain_info.pprev, next);
mutex_unlock(&chain->filter_chain_lock);
tcf_proto_put(tp, rtnl_held, extack);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5
| 26,229,935,356,934,977,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
net: sched: fix use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter()
Whenever tc_new_tfilter() jumps back to replay: label,
we need to make sure @q and @chain local variables are cleared again,
or risk use-after-free as in [1]
For consistency, apply the same fix in tc_ctl_chain()
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880985c4b08 by task syz-executor.4/1945
CPU: 0 PID: 1945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00495-gff58831fa02d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
tcf_chain_head_change_item net/sched/cls_api.c:372 [inline]
tcf_chain0_head_change.isra.0+0xb9/0x120 net/sched/cls_api.c:386
tcf_chain_tp_insert net/sched/cls_api.c:1657 [inline]
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique net/sched/cls_api.c:1707 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x1e67/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2086
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f2647172059
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2645aa5168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2647285100 RCX: 00007f2647172059
RDX: 040000000000009f RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f26471cc08d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 9e00000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffb3f7f02f R14: 00007f2645aa5300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1944:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:726 [inline]
qdisc_alloc+0xac/0xa10 net/sched/sch_generic.c:941
qdisc_create.constprop.0+0xce/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1211
tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5592
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 3609:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1728 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1754
slab_free mm/slub.c:3509 [inline]
kfree+0xcb/0x280 mm/slub.c:4562
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline]
rcu_core+0x7b8/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3026 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106
qdisc_put_unlocked+0x6f/0x90 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1109
tcf_block_release+0x86/0x90 net/sched/cls_api.c:1238
tc_new_tfilter+0xc0d/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880985c4800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8880985c4800, ffff8880985c4c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002617000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x985c0
head:ffffea0002617000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888010c41dc0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 1941, ts 1038999441284, free_ts 1033444432829
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389
alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline]
new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004
___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2fb/0x340 mm/slub.c:4420
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
neigh_sysctl_register+0x2c8/0x5e0 net/core/neighbour.c:3787
devinet_sysctl_register+0xb1/0x230 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2618
inetdev_init+0x286/0x580 net/ipv4/devinet.c:278
inetdev_event+0xa8a/0x15d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1532
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:84
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1919
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x1073/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:9698
veth_newlink+0x59c/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1722
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404
release_pages+0x748/0x1220 mm/swap.c:956
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:50 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:243 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0xe9/0x6b0 mm/mmu_gather.c:250
zap_pte_range mm/memory.c:1441 [inline]
zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1490 [inline]
zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1519 [inline]
zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1540 [inline]
unmap_page_range+0x1d1d/0x2a30 mm/memory.c:1561
unmap_single_vma+0x198/0x310 mm/memory.c:1606
unmap_vmas+0x16b/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:1638
exit_mmap+0x201/0x670 mm/mmap.c:3178
__mmput+0x122/0x4b0 kernel/fork.c:1114
mmput+0x56/0x60 kernel/fork.c:1135
exit_mm kernel/exit.c:507 [inline]
do_exit+0xa3c/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:793
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:946 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:944 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:944
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880985c4a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880985c4b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880985c4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
static bool open_match_attributes(connection_struct *conn,
uint32 old_dos_attr,
uint32 new_dos_attr,
mode_t existing_unx_mode,
mode_t new_unx_mode,
mode_t *returned_unx_mode)
{
uint32 noarch_old_dos_attr, noarch_new_dos_attr;
noarch_old_dos_attr = (old_dos_attr & ~FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE);
noarch_new_dos_attr = (new_dos_attr & ~FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE);
if((noarch_old_dos_attr == 0 && noarch_new_dos_attr != 0) ||
(noarch_old_dos_attr != 0 && ((noarch_old_dos_attr & noarch_new_dos_attr) == noarch_old_dos_attr))) {
*returned_unx_mode = new_unx_mode;
} else {
*returned_unx_mode = (mode_t)0;
}
DEBUG(10,("open_match_attributes: old_dos_attr = 0x%x, "
"existing_unx_mode = 0%o, new_dos_attr = 0x%x "
"returned_unx_mode = 0%o\n",
(unsigned int)old_dos_attr,
(unsigned int)existing_unx_mode,
(unsigned int)new_dos_attr,
(unsigned int)*returned_unx_mode ));
/* If we're mapping SYSTEM and HIDDEN ensure they match. */
if (lp_map_system(SNUM(conn)) || lp_store_dos_attributes(SNUM(conn))) {
if ((old_dos_attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM) &&
!(new_dos_attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM)) {
return False;
}
}
if (lp_map_hidden(SNUM(conn)) || lp_store_dos_attributes(SNUM(conn))) {
if ((old_dos_attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN) &&
!(new_dos_attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)) {
return False;
}
}
return True;
}
| 0 |
[] |
samba
|
60f922bf1bd8816eacbb32c24793ad1f97a1d9f2
| 68,120,035,305,596,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
Fix bug #10229 - No access check verification on stream files.
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10229
We need to check if the requested access mask
could be used to open the underlying file (if
it existed), as we're passing in zero for the
access mask to the base filename.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <[email protected]>
|
callbacks_window_key_release_event (GtkWidget *widget, GdkEventKey *event)
{
return TRUE;
} /* key_release_event */
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
gerbv
|
319a8af890e4d0a5c38e6d08f510da8eefc42537
| 296,627,458,584,073,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Remove local alias to parameter array
Normalizing access to `gerbv_simplified_amacro_t::parameter` as a step to fix CVE-2021-40402
|
njs_string_prop(njs_string_prop_t *string, const njs_value_t *value)
{
size_t size;
uintptr_t length;
size = value->short_string.size;
if (size != NJS_STRING_LONG) {
string->start = (u_char *) value->short_string.start;
length = value->short_string.length;
} else {
string->start = (u_char *) value->long_string.data->start;
size = value->long_string.size;
length = value->long_string.data->length;
}
string->size = size;
string->length = length;
return (length == 0) ? size : length;
}
| 0 |
[] |
njs
|
36f04a3178fcb6da8513cc3dbf35215c2a581b3f
| 15,578,226,211,660,293,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
Fixed String.prototype.replace() with byte strings.
This closes #522 issue on Github.
|
Header headerNew(void)
{
return headerCreate(NULL, 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
rpm
|
8f4b3c3cab8922a2022b9e47c71f1ecf906077ef
| 193,586,421,570,709,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
hdrblobInit() needs bounds checks too
Users can pass untrusted data to hdrblobInit() and it must be robust
against this.
|
static void fill_extnum_info(struct elfhdr *elf, struct elf_shdr *shdr4extnum,
elf_addr_t e_shoff, int segs)
{
elf->e_shoff = e_shoff;
elf->e_shentsize = sizeof(*shdr4extnum);
elf->e_shnum = 1;
elf->e_shstrndx = SHN_UNDEF;
memset(shdr4extnum, 0, sizeof(*shdr4extnum));
shdr4extnum->sh_type = SHT_NULL;
shdr4extnum->sh_size = elf->e_shnum;
shdr4extnum->sh_link = elf->e_shstrndx;
shdr4extnum->sh_info = segs;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
| 129,585,599,442,379,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <[email protected]>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
|
flatpak_dir_install_bundle (FlatpakDir *self,
GFile *file,
const char *remote,
char **out_ref,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
g_autofree char *ref = NULL;
g_autoptr(GVariant) deploy_data = NULL;
g_autoptr(GVariant) metadata = NULL;
g_autofree char *origin = NULL;
g_auto(GStrv) parts = NULL;
g_autofree char *to_checksum = NULL;
gboolean gpg_verify;
if (!flatpak_dir_check_add_remotes_config_dir (self, error))
return FALSE;
if (flatpak_dir_use_system_helper (self, NULL))
{
const char *installation = flatpak_dir_get_id (self);
if (!flatpak_dir_system_helper_call_install_bundle (self,
flatpak_file_get_path_cached (file),
0, remote,
installation ? installation : "",
&ref,
cancellable,
error))
return FALSE;
if (out_ref)
*out_ref = g_steal_pointer (&ref);
return TRUE;
}
if (!flatpak_dir_ensure_repo (self, cancellable, error))
return FALSE;
metadata = flatpak_bundle_load (file, &to_checksum,
&ref,
&origin,
NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
error);
if (metadata == NULL)
return FALSE;
parts = flatpak_decompose_ref (ref, error);
if (parts == NULL)
return FALSE;
deploy_data = flatpak_dir_get_deploy_data (self, ref, FLATPAK_DEPLOY_VERSION_ANY, cancellable, NULL);
if (deploy_data != NULL)
{
if (strcmp (flatpak_deploy_data_get_commit (deploy_data), to_checksum) == 0)
{
g_set_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR, FLATPAK_ERROR_ALREADY_INSTALLED,
_("This version of %s is already installed"), parts[1]);
return FALSE;
}
if (strcmp (remote, flatpak_deploy_data_get_origin (deploy_data)) != 0)
{
g_set_error (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
_("Can't change remote during bundle install"));
return FALSE;
}
}
if (!ostree_repo_remote_get_gpg_verify (self->repo, remote,
&gpg_verify, error))
return FALSE;
if (!flatpak_pull_from_bundle (self->repo,
file,
remote,
ref,
gpg_verify,
cancellable,
error))
return FALSE;
if (deploy_data != NULL)
{
g_autofree char *group = g_strdup_printf ("remote \"%s\"", remote);
g_autofree char *old_url = NULL;
g_autoptr(GKeyFile) new_config = NULL;
/* The pull succeeded, and this is an update. So, we need to update the repo config
if anything changed */
ostree_repo_remote_get_url (self->repo,
remote,
&old_url,
NULL);
if (origin != NULL &&
(old_url == NULL || strcmp (old_url, origin) != 0))
{
if (new_config == NULL)
new_config = ostree_repo_copy_config (self->repo);
g_key_file_set_value (new_config, group, "url", origin);
}
if (new_config)
{
if (!flatpak_dir_cleanup_remote_for_url_change (self, remote,
origin, cancellable, error))
return FALSE;
if (!ostree_repo_write_config (self->repo, new_config, error))
return FALSE;
}
}
if (deploy_data)
{
if (!flatpak_dir_deploy_update (self, ref, NULL, NULL, cancellable, error))
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (!flatpak_dir_deploy_install (self, ref, remote, NULL, FALSE, cancellable, error))
return FALSE;
}
if (out_ref)
*out_ref = g_steal_pointer (&ref);
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-668"
] |
flatpak
|
cd2142888fc4c199723a0dfca1f15ea8788a5483
| 231,235,025,522,643,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 133 |
Don't expose /proc when running apply_extra
As shown by CVE-2019-5736, it is sometimes possible for the sandbox
app to access outside files using /proc/self/exe. This is not
typically an issue for flatpak as the sandbox runs as the user which
has no permissions to e.g. modify the host files.
However, when installing apps using extra-data into the system repo
we *do* actually run a sandbox as root. So, in this case we disable mounting
/proc in the sandbox, which will neuter attacks like this.
|
daemon_msg_findallif_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
pcap_if_t *alldevs = NULL; // pointer to the header of the interface chain
pcap_if_t *d; // temp pointer needed to scan the interface chain
struct pcap_addr *address; // pcap structure that keeps a network address of an interface
struct rpcap_findalldevs_if *findalldevs_if;// rpcap structure that packet all the data of an interface together
uint16 nif = 0; // counts the number of interface listed
// Discard the rest of the message; there shouldn't be any payload.
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
// Network error.
return -1;
}
// Retrieve the device list
if (pcap_findalldevs(&alldevs, errmsgbuf) == -1)
goto error;
if (alldevs == NULL)
{
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_NOREMOTEIF,
"No interfaces found! Make sure libpcap/WinPcap is properly installed"
" and you have the right to access to the remote device.",
errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
// checks the number of interfaces and it computes the total length of the payload
for (d = alldevs; d != NULL; d = d->next)
{
nif++;
if (d->description)
plen+= strlen(d->description);
if (d->name)
plen+= strlen(d->name);
plen+= sizeof(struct rpcap_findalldevs_if);
for (address = d->addresses; address != NULL; address = address->next)
{
/*
* Send only IPv4 and IPv6 addresses over the wire.
*/
switch (address->addr->sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
#ifdef AF_INET6
case AF_INET6:
#endif
plen+= (sizeof(struct rpcap_sockaddr) * 4);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
// RPCAP findalldevs command
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_FINDALLIF_REPLY, nif, plen);
// send the interface list
for (d = alldevs; d != NULL; d = d->next)
{
uint16 lname, ldescr;
findalldevs_if = (struct rpcap_findalldevs_if *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_findalldevs_if), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(findalldevs_if, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_findalldevs_if));
if (d->description) ldescr = (short) strlen(d->description);
else ldescr = 0;
if (d->name) lname = (short) strlen(d->name);
else lname = 0;
findalldevs_if->desclen = htons(ldescr);
findalldevs_if->namelen = htons(lname);
findalldevs_if->flags = htonl(d->flags);
for (address = d->addresses; address != NULL; address = address->next)
{
/*
* Send only IPv4 and IPv6 addresses over the wire.
*/
switch (address->addr->sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
#ifdef AF_INET6
case AF_INET6:
#endif
findalldevs_if->naddr++;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
findalldevs_if->naddr = htons(findalldevs_if->naddr);
if (sock_bufferize(d->name, lname, sendbuf, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_BUFFERIZE, errmsgbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
if (sock_bufferize(d->description, ldescr, sendbuf, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_BUFFERIZE, errmsgbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
// send all addresses
for (address = d->addresses; address != NULL; address = address->next)
{
struct rpcap_sockaddr *sockaddr;
/*
* Send only IPv4 and IPv6 addresses over the wire.
*/
switch (address->addr->sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
#ifdef AF_INET6
case AF_INET6:
#endif
sockaddr = (struct rpcap_sockaddr *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_sockaddr), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
daemon_seraddr((struct sockaddr_storage *) address->addr, sockaddr);
sockaddr = (struct rpcap_sockaddr *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_sockaddr), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
daemon_seraddr((struct sockaddr_storage *) address->netmask, sockaddr);
sockaddr = (struct rpcap_sockaddr *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_sockaddr), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
daemon_seraddr((struct sockaddr_storage *) address->broadaddr, sockaddr);
sockaddr = (struct rpcap_sockaddr *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_sockaddr), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
daemon_seraddr((struct sockaddr_storage *) address->dstaddr, sockaddr);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
// We no longer need the device list. Free it.
pcap_freealldevs(alldevs);
// Send a final command that says "now send it!"
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
if (alldevs)
pcap_freealldevs(alldevs);
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_FINDALLIF,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-131"
] |
libpcap
|
617b12c0339db4891d117b661982126c495439ea
| 229,055,541,511,022,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 198 |
Calculate the reply payload length in a local variable.
Using the same variable for the remaining request length and the reply
length is confusing at best and can cause errors at worst (if the
request had extra stuff at the end, so that the variable is non-zero).
This addresses Include Security issue I8: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Parameter Reuse.
|
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
{
mp_state->mp_state = vcpu->arch.mp_state;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
kvm
|
831d9d02f9522e739825a51a11e3bc5aa531a905
| 245,799,063,339,270,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
KVM: x86: fix information leak to userland
Structures kvm_vcpu_events, kvm_debugregs, kvm_pit_state2 and
kvm_clock_data are copied to userland with some padding and reserved
fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack
memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros
instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these
fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
bool load_grammar(const char *s, const Rules &rules) {
auto n = strlen(s);
return load_grammar(s, n, rules);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
| 71,628,514,496,487,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix #122
|
void visit(Repetition &ope) override { ope.ope_->accept(*this); }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
| 271,048,409,733,802,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Fix #122
|
static int on_body_fill_buffer(http_parser *parser, const char *str, size_t len)
{
parser_context *ctx = (parser_context *) parser->data;
http_subtransport *t = ctx->t;
/* If our goal is to replay the request (either an auth failure or
* a redirect) then don't bother buffering since we're ignoring the
* content anyway.
*/
if (t->parse_error == PARSE_ERROR_REPLAY)
return 0;
if (ctx->buf_size < len) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Can't fit data in the buffer");
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
memcpy(ctx->buffer, str, len);
*(ctx->bytes_read) += len;
ctx->buffer += len;
ctx->buf_size -= len;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
libgit2
|
b5c6a1b407b7f8b952bded2789593b68b1876211
| 252,983,347,752,547,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
|
bgp_attr_local_pref (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
/* Length check. */
if (length != 4)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_ERR, "LOCAL_PREF attribute length isn't 4 [%u]",
length);
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
args->total);
}
/* If it is contained in an UPDATE message that is received from an
external peer, then this attribute MUST be ignored by the
receiving speaker. */
if (peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_EBGP)
{
stream_forward_getp (peer->ibuf, length);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
attr->local_pref = stream_getl (peer->ibuf);
/* Set atomic aggregate flag. */
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_LOCAL_PREF);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
| 0 |
[] |
quagga
|
8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408
| 140,668,250,212,576,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
bgpd: Fix regression in args consolidation, total should be inited from args
* bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_unknown) total should be initialised from the args.
|
static CURLcode imap_perform_upgrade_tls(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc;
/* Start the SSL connection */
result = Curl_ssl_connect_nonblocking(conn, FIRSTSOCKET, &imapc->ssldone);
if(!result) {
if(imapc->state != IMAP_UPGRADETLS)
state(conn, IMAP_UPGRADETLS);
if(imapc->ssldone) {
imap_to_imaps(conn);
result = imap_perform_capability(conn);
}
}
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
curl
|
13c9a9ded3ae744a1e11cbc14e9146d9fa427040
| 41,529,053,053,674,602,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
imap: if a FETCH response has no size, don't call write callback
CVE-2017-1000257
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter and 0xd34db347
Also detected by OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=3586
|
QByteArray CtcpParser::xdelimDequote(const QByteArray &message)
{
QByteArray dequotedMessage;
QByteArray messagepart;
QHash<QByteArray, QByteArray>::iterator xdelimquote;
for (int i = 0; i < message.size(); i++) {
messagepart = message.mid(i, 1);
if (i+1 < message.size()) {
for (xdelimquote = _ctcpXDelimDequoteHash.begin(); xdelimquote != _ctcpXDelimDequoteHash.end(); ++xdelimquote) {
if (message.mid(i, 2) == xdelimquote.key()) {
messagepart = xdelimquote.value();
i++;
break;
}
}
}
dequotedMessage += messagepart;
}
return dequotedMessage;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
quassel
|
b5e38970ffd55e2dd9f706ce75af9a8d7730b1b8
| 312,324,195,978,356,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
Improve the message-splitting algorithm for PRIVMSG and CTCP
This introduces a new message splitting algorithm based on
QTextBoundaryFinder. It works by first starting with the entire
message to be sent, encoding it, and checking to see if it is over
the maximum message length. If it is, it uses QTBF to find the
word boundary most immediately preceding the maximum length. If no
suitable boundary can be found, it falls back to searching for
grapheme boundaries. It repeats this process until the entire
message has been sent.
Unlike what it replaces, the new splitting code is not recursive
and cannot cause stack overflows. Additionally, if it is unable
to split a string, it will give up gracefully and not crash the
core or cause a thread to run away.
This patch fixes two bugs. The first is garbage characters caused
by accidentally splitting the string in the middle of a multibyte
character. Since the new code splits at a character level instead
of a byte level, this will no longer be an issue. The second is
the core crash caused by sending an overlength CTCP query ("/me")
containing only multibyte characters. This bug was caused by the
old CTCP splitter using the byte index from lastParamOverrun() as
a character index for a QString.
|
int usb_sg_init(struct usb_sg_request *io, struct usb_device *dev,
unsigned pipe, unsigned period, struct scatterlist *sg,
int nents, size_t length, gfp_t mem_flags)
{
int i;
int urb_flags;
int use_sg;
if (!io || !dev || !sg
|| usb_pipecontrol(pipe)
|| usb_pipeisoc(pipe)
|| nents <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_init(&io->lock);
io->dev = dev;
io->pipe = pipe;
if (dev->bus->sg_tablesize > 0) {
use_sg = true;
io->entries = 1;
} else {
use_sg = false;
io->entries = nents;
}
/* initialize all the urbs we'll use */
io->urbs = kmalloc(io->entries * sizeof(*io->urbs), mem_flags);
if (!io->urbs)
goto nomem;
urb_flags = URB_NO_INTERRUPT;
if (usb_pipein(pipe))
urb_flags |= URB_SHORT_NOT_OK;
for_each_sg(sg, sg, io->entries, i) {
struct urb *urb;
unsigned len;
urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, mem_flags);
if (!urb) {
io->entries = i;
goto nomem;
}
io->urbs[i] = urb;
urb->dev = NULL;
urb->pipe = pipe;
urb->interval = period;
urb->transfer_flags = urb_flags;
urb->complete = sg_complete;
urb->context = io;
urb->sg = sg;
if (use_sg) {
/* There is no single transfer buffer */
urb->transfer_buffer = NULL;
urb->num_sgs = nents;
/* A length of zero means transfer the whole sg list */
len = length;
if (len == 0) {
struct scatterlist *sg2;
int j;
for_each_sg(sg, sg2, nents, j)
len += sg2->length;
}
} else {
/*
* Some systems can't use DMA; they use PIO instead.
* For their sakes, transfer_buffer is set whenever
* possible.
*/
if (!PageHighMem(sg_page(sg)))
urb->transfer_buffer = sg_virt(sg);
else
urb->transfer_buffer = NULL;
len = sg->length;
if (length) {
len = min_t(size_t, len, length);
length -= len;
if (length == 0)
io->entries = i + 1;
}
}
urb->transfer_buffer_length = len;
}
io->urbs[--i]->transfer_flags &= ~URB_NO_INTERRUPT;
/* transaction state */
io->count = io->entries;
io->status = 0;
io->bytes = 0;
init_completion(&io->complete);
return 0;
nomem:
sg_clean(io);
return -ENOMEM;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
| 202,969,078,627,402,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 102 |
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void test_field_misc()
{
MYSQL_STMT *stmt;
MYSQL_RES *result;
int rc;
myheader("test_field_misc");
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "SELECT @@autocommit");
myquery(rc);
result= mysql_store_result(mysql);
mytest(result);
rc= my_process_result_set(result);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == 1);
verify_prepare_field(result, 0,
"@@autocommit", "", /* field and its org name */
MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG, /* field type */
"", "", /* table and its org name */
"", 1, 0); /* db name, length(its bool flag)*/
mysql_free_result(result);
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, "SELECT @@autocommit");
check_stmt(stmt);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
result= mysql_stmt_result_metadata(stmt);
mytest(result);
rc= my_process_stmt_result(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == 1);
verify_prepare_field(result, 0,
"@@autocommit", "", /* field and its org name */
MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG, /* field type */
"", "", /* table and its org name */
"", 1, 0); /* db name, length(its bool flag)*/
mysql_free_result(result);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, "SELECT @@max_error_count");
check_stmt(stmt);
result= mysql_stmt_result_metadata(stmt);
mytest(result);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= my_process_stmt_result(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == 1);
verify_prepare_field(result, 0,
"@@max_error_count", "", /* field and its org name */
MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG, /* field type */
"", "", /* table and its org name */
/* db name, length */
"", MY_INT64_NUM_DECIMAL_DIGITS , 0);
mysql_free_result(result);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, "SELECT @@max_allowed_packet");
check_stmt(stmt);
result= mysql_stmt_result_metadata(stmt);
mytest(result);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
DIE_UNLESS(1 == my_process_stmt_result(stmt));
verify_prepare_field(result, 0,
"@@max_allowed_packet", "", /* field and its org name */
MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG, /* field type */
"", "", /* table and its org name */
/* db name, length */
"", MY_INT64_NUM_DECIMAL_DIGITS, 0);
mysql_free_result(result);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, "SELECT @@sql_warnings");
check_stmt(stmt);
result= mysql_stmt_result_metadata(stmt);
mytest(result);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= my_process_stmt_result(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == 1);
verify_prepare_field(result, 0,
"@@sql_warnings", "", /* field and its org name */
MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG, /* field type */
"", "", /* table and its org name */
"", 1, 0); /* db name, length */
mysql_free_result(result);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] |
mysql-server
|
3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390
| 312,084,438,890,626,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 110 |
WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options
|
USBDevice *usbdevice_create(const char *cmdline)
{
USBBus *bus = usb_bus_find(-1 /* any */);
LegacyUSBFactory *f = NULL;
GSList *i;
char driver[32];
const char *params;
int len;
params = strchr(cmdline,':');
if (params) {
params++;
len = params - cmdline;
if (len > sizeof(driver))
len = sizeof(driver);
pstrcpy(driver, len, cmdline);
} else {
params = "";
pstrcpy(driver, sizeof(driver), cmdline);
}
for (i = legacy_usb_factory; i; i = i->next) {
f = i->data;
if (strcmp(f->usbdevice_name, driver) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (i == NULL) {
#if 0
/* no error because some drivers are not converted (yet) */
error_report("usbdevice %s not found", driver);
#endif
return NULL;
}
if (!bus) {
error_report("Error: no usb bus to attach usbdevice %s, "
"please try -machine usb=on and check that "
"the machine model supports USB", driver);
return NULL;
}
if (!f->usbdevice_init) {
if (*params) {
error_report("usbdevice %s accepts no params", driver);
return NULL;
}
return usb_create_simple(bus, f->name);
}
return f->usbdevice_init(bus, params);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a
| 165,420,604,364,330,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load
CVE-2013-4541
s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.
setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <[email protected]>
|
static inline void queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
int prio;
/*
* The priority used to register this element is
* - either the real thread-priority for the real-time threads
* (i.e. threads with a priority lower than MAX_RT_PRIO)
* - or MAX_RT_PRIO for non-RT threads.
* Thus, all RT-threads are woken first in priority order, and
* the others are woken last, in FIFO order.
*/
prio = min(current->normal_prio, MAX_RT_PRIO);
plist_node_init(&q->list, prio);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PI_LIST
q->list.plist.spinlock = &hb->lock;
#endif
plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain);
q->task = current;
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
5ecb01cfdf96c5f465192bdb2a4fd4a61a24c6cc
| 198,218,879,814,111,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
futex_lock_pi() key refcnt fix
This fixes a futex key reference count bug in futex_lock_pi(),
where a key's reference count is incremented twice but decremented
only once, causing the backing object to not be released.
If the futex is created in a temporary file in an ext3 file system,
this bug causes the file's inode to become an "undead" orphan,
which causes an oops from a BUG_ON() in ext3_put_super() when the
file system is unmounted. glibc's test suite is known to trigger this,
see <http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14256>.
The bug is a regression from 2.6.28-git3, namely Peter Zijlstra's
38d47c1b7075bd7ec3881141bb3629da58f88dab "[PATCH] futex: rely on
get_user_pages() for shared futexes". That commit made get_futex_key()
also increment the reference count of the futex key, and updated its
callers to decrement the key's reference count before returning.
Unfortunately the normal exit path in futex_lock_pi() wasn't corrected:
the reference count is incremented by get_futex_key() and queue_lock(),
but the normal exit path only decrements once, via unqueue_me_pi().
The fix is to put_futex_key() after unqueue_me_pi(), since 2.6.31
this is easily done by 'goto out_put_key' rather than 'goto out'.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
|
bool Item_field::rename_fields_processor(void *arg)
{
Item::func_processor_rename *rename= (Item::func_processor_rename*) arg;
List_iterator<Create_field> def_it(rename->fields);
Create_field *def;
while ((def=def_it++))
{
if (def->change.str &&
(!db_name || !db_name[0] ||
!my_strcasecmp(table_alias_charset, db_name, rename->db_name.str)) &&
(!table_name || !table_name[0] ||
!my_strcasecmp(table_alias_charset, table_name, rename->table_name.str)) &&
!my_strcasecmp(system_charset_info, field_name.str, def->change.str))
{
field_name= def->field_name;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585
| 18,018,232,562,621,477,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments.
|
static void __exit loop_exit(void)
{
unsigned long range;
range = max_loop ? max_loop << part_shift : 1UL << MINORBITS;
idr_for_each(&loop_index_idr, &loop_exit_cb, NULL);
idr_destroy(&loop_index_idr);
blk_unregister_region(MKDEV(LOOP_MAJOR, 0), range);
unregister_blkdev(LOOP_MAJOR, "loop");
misc_deregister(&loop_misc);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
| 290,229,853,801,819,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static void tstream_tls_pull_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tstream_context *stream =
tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
struct tstream_context);
struct tstream_tls *tlss =
tstream_context_data(stream,
struct tstream_tls);
int ret;
int sys_errno;
tlss->pull.subreq = NULL;
ret = tstream_readv_recv(subreq, &sys_errno);
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (ret == -1) {
tlss->error = sys_errno;
tstream_tls_retry(stream, false);
return;
}
tstream_tls_retry(stream, false);
}
| 0 |
[] |
samba
|
22af043d2f20760f27150d7d469c7c7b944c6b55
| 32,978,054,321,179,766,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
CVE-2013-4476: s4:libtls: check for safe permissions of tls private key file (key.pem)
If the tls key is not owned by root or has not mode 0600 samba will not
start up.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10234
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Autobuild-User(master): Karolin Seeger <[email protected]>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 11 13:07:16 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
|
static struct port *find_port_by_devt_in_portdev(struct ports_device *portdev,
dev_t dev)
{
struct port *port;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&portdev->ports_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(port, &portdev->ports, list) {
if (port->cdev->dev == dev) {
kref_get(&port->kref);
goto out;
}
}
port = NULL;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&portdev->ports_lock, flags);
return port;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
c4baad50297d84bde1a7ad45e50c73adae4a2192
| 84,993,731,660,233,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
|
static void
php_mysqlnd_chg_user_free_mem(void * _packet)
{
MYSQLND_PACKET_CHG_USER_RESPONSE * p = (MYSQLND_PACKET_CHG_USER_RESPONSE *) _packet;
if (p->new_auth_protocol) {
mnd_efree(p->new_auth_protocol);
p->new_auth_protocol = NULL;
}
p->new_auth_protocol_len = 0;
if (p->new_auth_protocol_data) {
mnd_efree(p->new_auth_protocol_data);
p->new_auth_protocol_data = NULL;
}
p->new_auth_protocol_data_len = 0;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
php-src
|
58006537fc5f133ae8549efe5118cde418b3ace9
| 271,441,196,774,582,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix bug #81719: mysqlnd/pdo password buffer overflow
|
static int create_problem_dir(GHashTable *problem_info, unsigned pid)
{
/* Exit if free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
exit(1);
}
/* Create temp directory with the problem data.
* This directory is renamed to final directory name after
* all files have been stored into it.
*/
gchar *dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, "basename");
if (!dir_basename)
dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_TYPE);
char *path = xasprintf("%s/%s-%s-%u.new",
g_settings_dump_location,
dir_basename,
iso_date_string(NULL),
pid);
/* This item is useless, don't save it */
g_hash_table_remove(problem_info, "basename");
/* No need to check the path length, as all variables used are limited,
* and dd_create() fails if the path is too long.
*/
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_create(path, g_settings_privatereports ? 0 : client_uid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (!dd)
{
error_msg_and_die("Error creating problem directory '%s'", path);
}
dd_create_basic_files(dd, client_uid, NULL);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
gpointer gpkey = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_CMDLINE);
if (!gpkey)
{
/* Obtain and save the command line. */
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
if (cmdline)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline);
free(cmdline);
}
}
/* Store id of the user whose application crashed. */
char uid_str[sizeof(long) * 3 + 2];
sprintf(uid_str, "%lu", (long)client_uid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_UID, uid_str);
GHashTableIter iter;
gpointer gpvalue;
g_hash_table_iter_init(&iter, problem_info);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next(&iter, &gpkey, &gpvalue))
{
dd_save_text(dd, (gchar *) gpkey, (gchar *) gpvalue);
}
dd_close(dd);
/* Not needing it anymore */
g_hash_table_destroy(problem_info);
/* Move the completely created problem directory
* to final directory.
*/
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, strlen(path) - strlen(".new"));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log_notice("Saved problem directory of pid %u to '%s'", pid, path);
/* We let the peer know that problem dir was created successfully
* _before_ we run potentially long-running post-create.
*/
printf("HTTP/1.1 201 Created\r\n\r\n");
fflush(NULL);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
xdup2(STDERR_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); /* paranoia: don't leave stdout fd closed */
/* Trim old problem directories if necessary */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
run_post_create(path);
/* free(path); */
exit(0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-59"
] |
abrt
|
3287aa12eb205cff95cdd00d6d6c5c9a4f8f0eca
| 55,552,207,652,961,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 |
daemon: allow only root user to trigger the post-create
There is no reason to allow non-root users to trigger this
functionality. Regular users can create abrt problems only through
abrtd or abrt-dbus and both triggers the post-create.
Other hooks run under root user (CCpp, Koops, VMCore, Xorg).
Related: #1212861
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]>
|
ruby_brace_glob(const char *str, int flags, ruby_glob_func *func, VALUE arg)
{
return ruby_brace_glob_with_enc(str, flags, func, arg, rb_ascii8bit_encoding());
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
ruby
|
bd5661a3cbb38a8c3a3ea10cd76c88bbef7871b8
| 38,980,868,164,645,204,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
dir.c: check NUL bytes
* dir.c (GlobPathValue): should be used in rb_push_glob only.
other methods should use FilePathValue.
https://hackerone.com/reports/302338
* dir.c (rb_push_glob): expand GlobPathValue
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@62989 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
|
static uint32_t pmac_ide_readb (void *opaque,hwaddr addr)
{
uint8_t retval;
MACIOIDEState *d = opaque;
addr = (addr & 0xFFF) >> 4;
switch (addr) {
case 1 ... 7:
retval = ide_ioport_read(&d->bus, addr);
break;
case 8:
case 22:
retval = ide_status_read(&d->bus, 0);
break;
default:
retval = 0xFF;
break;
}
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
qemu
|
3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
| 218,918,376,404,484,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
ide: Correct handling of malformed/short PRDTs
This impacts both BMDMA and AHCI HBA interfaces for IDE.
Currently, we confuse the difference between a PRDT having
"0 bytes" and a PRDT having "0 complete sectors."
When we receive an incomplete sector, inconsistent error checking
leads to an infinite loop wherein the call succeeds, but it
didn't give us enough bytes -- leading us to re-call the
DMA chain over and over again. This leads to, in the BMDMA case,
leaked memory for short PRDTs, and infinite loops and resource
usage in the AHCI case.
The .prepare_buf() callback is reworked to return the number of
bytes that it successfully prepared. 0 is a valid, non-error
answer that means the table was empty and described no bytes.
-1 indicates an error.
Our current implementation uses the io_buffer in IDEState to
ultimately describe the size of a prepared scatter-gather list.
Even though the AHCI PRDT/SGList can be as large as 256GiB, the
AHCI command header limits transactions to just 4GiB. ATA8-ACS3,
however, defines the largest transaction to be an LBA48 command
that transfers 65,536 sectors. With a 512 byte sector size, this
is just 32MiB.
Since our current state structures use the int type to describe
the size of the buffer, and this state is migrated as int32, we
are limited to describing 2GiB buffer sizes unless we change the
migration protocol.
For this reason, this patch begins to unify the assertions in the
IDE pathways that the scatter-gather list provided by either the
AHCI PRDT or the PCI BMDMA PRDs can only describe, at a maximum,
2GiB. This should be resilient enough unless we need a sector
size that exceeds 32KiB.
Further, the likelihood of any guest operating system actually
attempting to transfer this much data in a single operation is
very slim.
To this end, the IDEState variables have been updated to more
explicitly clarify our maximum supported size. Callers to the
prepare_buf callback have been reworked to understand the new
return code, and all versions of the prepare_buf callback have
been adjusted accordingly.
Lastly, the ahci_populate_sglist helper, relied upon by the
AHCI implementation of .prepare_buf() as well as the PCI
implementation of the callback have had overflow assertions
added to help make clear the reasonings behind the various
type changes.
[Added %d -> %"PRId64" fix John sent because off_pos changed from int to
int64_t.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: John Snow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
|
gpointer ves_icall_System_Threading_Interlocked_Exchange_IntPtr (gpointer *location, gpointer value)
{
return InterlockedExchangePointer(location, value);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-264"
] |
mono
|
722f9890f09aadfc37ae479e7d946d5fc5ef7b91
| 151,517,026,235,807,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix access to freed members of a dead thread
* threads.c: Fix access to freed members of a dead thread. Found
and fixed by Rodrigo Kumpera <[email protected]>
Ref: CVE-2011-0992
|
XML_SetHashSalt(XML_Parser parser,
unsigned long hash_salt)
{
if (parser == NULL)
return 0;
if (parser->m_parentParser)
return XML_SetHashSalt(parser->m_parentParser, hash_salt);
/* block after XML_Parse()/XML_ParseBuffer() has been called */
if (ps_parsing == XML_PARSING || ps_parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
return 0;
hash_secret_salt = hash_salt;
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-611"
] |
libexpat
|
c4bf96bb51dd2a1b0e185374362ee136fe2c9d7f
| 36,234,042,634,467,543,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
xmlparse.c: Fix external entity infinite loop bug (CVE-2017-9233)
|
/* {{{ PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION */
PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(date)
{
const timelib_tzdb *tzdb = DATE_TIMEZONEDB;
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_row(2, "date/time support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "\"Olson\" Timezone Database Version", tzdb->version);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Timezone Database", php_date_global_timezone_db_enabled ? "external" : "internal");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Default timezone", guess_timezone(tzdb TSRMLS_CC));
php_info_print_table_end();
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
bb057498f7457e8b2eba98332a3bad434de4cf12
| 63,304,932,125,577,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Fix #70277: new DateTimeZone($foo) is ignoring text after null byte
The DateTimeZone constructors are not binary safe. They're parsing the timezone
as string, but discard the length when calling timezone_initialize(). This
patch adds a tz_len parameter and a respective check to timezone_initialize().
|
CImg<T>& operator-=(const t value) {
if (is_empty()) return *this;
cimg_openmp_for(*this,*ptr - value,524288);
return *this;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
| 84,562,763,518,050,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
|
void addReplySubcommandSyntaxError(client *c) {
sds cmd = sdsnew((char*) c->argv[0]->ptr);
sdstoupper(cmd);
addReplyErrorFormat(c,
"Unknown subcommand or wrong number of arguments for '%s'. Try %s HELP.",
(char*)c->argv[1]->ptr,cmd);
sdsfree(cmd);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
redis
|
5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8
| 290,784,718,142,523,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
|
static int request_pre_handler(REQUEST *request)
{
int rcode;
rad_assert(request->magic == REQUEST_MAGIC);
rad_assert(request->packet != NULL);
request->child_state = REQUEST_RUNNING;
/*
* Don't decode the packet if it's an internal "fake"
* request. Instead, just return so that the caller can
* process it.
*/
if (request->packet->dst_port == 0) {
request->username = pairfind(request->packet->vps,
PW_USER_NAME);
request->password = pairfind(request->packet->vps,
PW_USER_PASSWORD);
return 1;
}
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
/*
* Put the decoded packet into it's proper place.
*/
if (request->proxy_reply != NULL) {
rcode = request->proxy_listener->decode(request->proxy_listener,
request);
DEBUG_PACKET(request, request->proxy_reply, 0);
} else
#endif
if (request->packet->vps == NULL) {
rcode = request->listener->decode(request->listener, request);
if (debug_condition) {
int result = FALSE;
const char *my_debug = debug_condition;
/*
* Ignore parse errors.
*/
radius_evaluate_condition(request, RLM_MODULE_OK, 0,
&my_debug, 1,
&result);
if (result) {
request->options = 2;
request->radlog = radlog_request;
}
}
DEBUG_PACKET(request, request->packet, 0);
} else {
rcode = 0;
}
if (rcode < 0) {
RDEBUG("%s Dropping packet without response.", fr_strerror());
request->reply->offset = -2; /* bad authenticator */
request->child_state = REQUEST_DONE;
return 0;
}
if (!request->username) {
request->username = pairfind(request->packet->vps,
PW_USER_NAME);
}
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
if (request->proxy) {
return process_proxy_reply(request);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
freeradius-server
|
ff94dd35673bba1476594299d31ce8293b8bd223
| 197,140,585,099,280,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 |
Do not delete "old" requests until they are free.
If the request is in the queue for 30+ seconds, do NOT delete it.
Instead, mark it as "STOP PROCESSING", and do "wait_for_child_to_die",
which waits for a child thread to pick it up, and acknowledge that it's
done. Once it's marked done, we can finally clean it up.
This may be the underlying issue behind bug #35
|
static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getCommentIndex)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zend_long index, flags = 0;
const char * comment;
int comment_len = 0;
struct zip_stat sb;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l|l",
&index, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_INDEX(intern, index, 0, sb);
comment = zip_get_file_comment(intern, index, &comment_len, (int)flags);
RETURN_STRINGL((char *)comment, (zend_long)comment_len);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c
| 245,564,168,528,771,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
|
static void dump_summary (WavpackContext *wpc, char *name, FILE *dst)
{
uint32_t channel_mask = (uint32_t) WavpackGetChannelMask (wpc);
int num_channels = WavpackGetNumChannels (wpc);
unsigned char md5_sum [16];
char modes [80];
fprintf (dst, "\n");
if (name && *name != '-') {
fprintf (dst, "file name: %s%s\n", name, (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_WVC) ? " (+wvc)" : "");
fprintf (dst, "file size: %lld bytes\n", (long long) WavpackGetFileSize64 (wpc));
}
if ((WavpackGetQualifyMode (wpc) & QMODE_DSD_AUDIO) && !raw_pcm)
fprintf (dst, "source: 1-bit DSD at %u Hz\n", WavpackGetNativeSampleRate (wpc));
else
fprintf (dst, "source: %d-bit %s at %u Hz\n", WavpackGetBitsPerSample (wpc),
(WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_FLOAT) ? "floats" : "ints",
WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc));
if (!channel_mask)
strcpy (modes, "unassigned speakers");
else if (num_channels == 1 && channel_mask == 0x4)
strcpy (modes, "mono");
else if (num_channels == 2 && channel_mask == 0x3)
strcpy (modes, "stereo");
else if (num_channels == 4 && channel_mask == 0x33)
strcpy (modes, "quad");
else if (num_channels == 6 && channel_mask == 0x3f)
strcpy (modes, "5.1 surround");
else if (num_channels == 6 && channel_mask == 0x60f)
strcpy (modes, "5.1 surround side");
else if (num_channels == 8 && channel_mask == 0x63f)
strcpy (modes, "7.1 surround");
else if (num_channels == 8 && channel_mask == 0x6000003f)
strcpy (modes, "5.1 + stereo");
else {
int cc = num_channels, si = 0;
uint32_t cm = channel_mask;
modes [0] = 0;
while (cc && cm) {
if (cm & 1) {
strcat (modes, si < 18 ? speakers [si] : "--");
if (--cc)
strcat (modes, ",");
}
cm >>= 1;
si++;
}
if (cc)
strcat (modes, "...");
}
fprintf (dst, "channels: %d (%s)\n", num_channels, modes);
if (WavpackGetNumSamples64 (wpc) != -1) {
double seconds = (double) WavpackGetNumSamples64 (wpc) / WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc);
int minutes = (int) floor (seconds / 60.0);
int hours = (int) floor (seconds / 3600.0);
seconds -= minutes * 60.0;
minutes -= (int)(hours * 60.0);
fprintf (dst, "duration: %d:%02d:%05.2f\n", hours, minutes, seconds);
}
modes [0] = 0;
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_HYBRID)
strcat (modes, "hybrid ");
strcat (modes, (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_LOSSLESS) ? "lossless" : "lossy");
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_FAST)
strcat (modes, ", fast");
else if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_VERY_HIGH)
strcat (modes, ", very high");
else if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_HIGH)
strcat (modes, ", high");
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_EXTRA) {
strcat (modes, ", extra");
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_XMODE) {
char xmode[3] = "-0";
xmode [1] = ((WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_XMODE) >> 12) + '0';
strcat (modes, xmode);
}
}
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_SFX)
strcat (modes, ", sfx");
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_DNS)
strcat (modes, ", dns");
fprintf (dst, "modalities: %s\n", modes);
if (WavpackGetRatio (wpc) != 0.0) {
fprintf (dst, "compression: %.2f%%\n", 100.0 - (100 * WavpackGetRatio (wpc)));
fprintf (dst, "ave bitrate: %d kbps\n", (int) ((WavpackGetAverageBitrate (wpc, TRUE) + 500.0) / 1000.0));
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_WVC)
fprintf (dst, "ave lossy bitrate: %d kbps\n", (int) ((WavpackGetAverageBitrate (wpc, FALSE) + 500.0) / 1000.0));
}
if (WavpackGetVersion (wpc))
fprintf (dst, "encoder version: %d\n", WavpackGetVersion (wpc));
if (WavpackGetMD5Sum (wpc, md5_sum)) {
char md5_string [] = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
sprintf (md5_string + (i * 2), "%02x", md5_sum [i]);
fprintf (dst, "original md5: %s\n", md5_string);
}
if (summary > 1) {
uint32_t header_bytes = WavpackGetWrapperBytes (wpc), trailer_bytes, i;
unsigned char *header_data = WavpackGetWrapperData (wpc);
char header_name [5];
strcpy (header_name, "????");
for (i = 0; i < 4 && i < header_bytes; ++i)
if (header_data [i] >= 0x20 && header_data [i] <= 0x7f)
header_name [i] = header_data [i];
WavpackFreeWrapper (wpc);
WavpackSeekTrailingWrapper (wpc);
trailer_bytes = WavpackGetWrapperBytes (wpc);
if (WavpackGetFileFormat (wpc) < NUM_FILE_FORMATS)
fprintf (dst, "source format: %s with '%s' extension\n",
file_formats [WavpackGetFileFormat (wpc)].format_name, WavpackGetFileExtension (wpc));
else
fprintf (dst, "source format: '%s' file\n", WavpackGetFileExtension (wpc));
if (header_bytes && trailer_bytes) {
unsigned char *trailer_data = WavpackGetWrapperData (wpc);
char trailer_name [5];
strcpy (trailer_name, "????");
for (i = 0; i < 4 && i < trailer_bytes; ++i)
if (trailer_data [i] >= 0x20 && trailer_data [i] <= 0x7f)
trailer_name [i] = trailer_data [i];
fprintf (dst, "file wrapper: %u + %u bytes (%s, %s)\n",
header_bytes, trailer_bytes, header_name, trailer_name);
}
else if (header_bytes)
fprintf (dst, "file wrapper: %u byte %s header\n",
header_bytes, header_name);
else if (trailer_bytes)
fprintf (dst, "file wrapper: %u byte trailer only\n",
trailer_bytes);
else
fprintf (dst, "file wrapper: none stored\n");
}
if (WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_VALID_TAG) {
int ape_tag = WavpackGetMode (wpc) & MODE_APETAG;
int num_binary_items = WavpackGetNumBinaryTagItems (wpc);
int num_items = WavpackGetNumTagItems (wpc), i;
char *spaces = " ";
fprintf (dst, "\n%s tag items: %d\n", ape_tag ? "APEv2" : "ID3v1", num_items + num_binary_items);
for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i) {
int item_len, value_len, j;
char *item, *value;
item_len = WavpackGetTagItemIndexed (wpc, i, NULL, 0);
item = malloc (item_len + 1);
WavpackGetTagItemIndexed (wpc, i, item, item_len + 1);
value_len = WavpackGetTagItem (wpc, item, NULL, 0);
value = malloc (value_len * 2 + 1);
WavpackGetTagItem (wpc, item, value, value_len + 1);
fprintf (dst, "%s:%s", item, strlen (item) < strlen (spaces) ? spaces + strlen (item) : " ");
if (ape_tag) {
for (j = 0; j < value_len; ++j)
if (!value [j])
value [j] = '\\';
if (strchr (value, '\n'))
fprintf (dst, "%d-byte multi-line text string\n", value_len);
else {
dump_UTF8_string (value, dst);
fprintf (dst, "\n");
}
}
else
fprintf (dst, "%s\n", value);
free (value);
free (item);
}
for (i = 0; i < num_binary_items; ++i) {
int item_len, value_len;
char *item, fname [256];
item_len = WavpackGetBinaryTagItemIndexed (wpc, i, NULL, 0);
item = malloc (item_len + 1);
WavpackGetBinaryTagItemIndexed (wpc, i, item, item_len + 1);
value_len = dump_tag_item_to_file (wpc, item, NULL, fname);
fprintf (dst, "%s:%s", item, strlen (item) < strlen (spaces) ? spaces + strlen (item) : " ");
if (filespec_ext (fname))
fprintf (dst, "%d-byte binary item (%s)\n", value_len, filespec_ext (fname)+1);
else
fprintf (dst, "%d-byte binary item\n", value_len);
#if 0 // debug binary tag reading
{
char md5_string [] = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
unsigned char md5_result [16];
MD5_CTX md5_context;
char *value;
int i, j;
MD5_Init (&md5_context);
value_len = WavpackGetBinaryTagItem (wpc, item, NULL, 0);
value = malloc (value_len);
value_len = WavpackGetBinaryTagItem (wpc, item, value, value_len);
for (i = 0; i < value_len; ++i)
if (!value [i]) {
MD5_Update (&md5_context, (unsigned char *) value + i + 1, value_len - i - 1);
MD5_Final (md5_result, &md5_context);
for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
sprintf (md5_string + (j * 2), "%02x", md5_result [j]);
fprintf (dst, " %d byte string >>%s<<\n", i, value);
fprintf (dst, " %d bytes binary data >>%s<<\n", value_len - i - 1, md5_string);
break;
}
if (i == value_len)
fprintf (dst, " no NULL found in binary value (or value not readable)\n");
free (value);
}
#endif
free (item);
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-703"
] |
WavPack
|
25b4a2725d8568212e7cf89ca05ca29d128af7ac
| 51,852,012,862,238,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 257 |
issue #121: NULL pointer dereference in wvunpack.c
* check for NULL pointer before dereferencing in wvunpack.c
* sanitize custom extensions to be alphanumeric only
|
dns_zone_setaltxfrsource6dscp(dns_zone_t *zone, isc_dscp_t dscp) {
REQUIRE(DNS_ZONE_VALID(zone));
LOCK_ZONE(zone);
zone->altxfrsource6dscp = dscp;
UNLOCK_ZONE(zone);
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-327"
] |
bind9
|
f09352d20a9d360e50683cd1d2fc52ccedcd77a0
| 334,118,540,512,654,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Update keyfetch_done compute_tag check
If in keyfetch_done the compute_tag fails (because for example the
algorithm is not supported), don't crash, but instead ignore the
key.
|
const char *get_slot_tokenlabel(pkcs11_handle_t *h)
{
return h->slots[h->current_slot].label;
}
| 0 |
[] |
pam_pkcs11
|
cc51b3e2720ea862d500cab2ea517518ff39a497
| 92,063,436,292,776,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
verify using a nonce from the system, not the card
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problem.
|
static void nf_tables_set_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nft_set *set, int event,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx->net);
u32 portid = ctx->portid;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 flags = 0;
int err;
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
return;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, gfp_flags);
if (skb == NULL)
goto err;
if (ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL))
flags |= ctx->flags & (NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL);
err = nf_tables_fill_set(skb, ctx, set, event, flags);
if (err < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto err;
}
nft_notify_enqueue(skb, ctx->report, &nft_net->notify_list);
return;
err:
nfnetlink_set_err(ctx->net, portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES, -ENOBUFS);
}
| 0 |
[] |
net
|
520778042ccca019f3ffa136dd0ca565c486cedd
| 170,830,293,280,602,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
netfilter: nf_tables: disallow non-stateful expression in sets earlier
Since 3e135cd499bf ("netfilter: nft_dynset: dynamic stateful expression
instantiation"), it is possible to attach stateful expressions to set
elements.
cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate
and destroy phase") introduces conditional destruction on the object to
accomodate transaction semantics.
nft_expr_init() calls expr->ops->init() first, then check for
NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR, this stills allows to initialize a non-stateful
lookup expressions which points to a set, which might lead to UAF since
the set is not properly detached from the set->binding for this case.
Anyway, this combination is non-sense from nf_tables perspective.
This patch fixes this problem by checking for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR before
expr->ops->init() is called.
The reporter provides a KASAN splat and a poc reproducer (similar to
those autogenerated by syzbot to report use-after-free errors). It is
unknown to me if they are using syzbot or if they use similar automated
tool to locate the bug that they are reporting.
For the record, this is the KASAN splat.
[ 85.431824] ==================================================================
[ 85.432901] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_tables_bind_set+0x81b/0xa20
[ 85.433825] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880286f0e98 by task poc/776
[ 85.434756]
[ 85.434999] CPU: 1 PID: 776 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 5.18.0+ #2
[ 85.436023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Fixes: 0b2d8a7b638b ("netfilter: nf_tables: add helper functions for expression handling")
Reported-and-tested-by: Aaron Adams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
ast_for_async_funcdef(struct compiling *c, const node *n, asdl_seq *decorator_seq)
{
/* async_funcdef: ASYNC funcdef */
REQ(n, async_funcdef);
REQ(CHILD(n, 0), ASYNC);
REQ(CHILD(n, 1), funcdef);
return ast_for_funcdef_impl(c, n, decorator_seq,
true /* is_async */);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpython
|
a4d78362397fc3bced6ea80fbc7b5f4827aec55e
| 243,200,966,982,781,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
bpo-36495: Fix two out-of-bounds array reads (GH-12641)
Research and fix by @bradlarsen.
|
int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int fin)
{
size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
/* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
numexts += s->cert->custext.meths_count;
/* Parse each extension in turn */
for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) {
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
if (fin) {
/*
* Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context,
* whether we have found them or not
*/
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
i++, thisexd++) {
if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
&& !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
openssl
|
fb9fa6b51defd48157eeb207f52181f735d96148
| 268,334,502,183,987,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
ssl sigalg extension: fix NULL pointer dereference
As the variable peer_sigalgslen is not cleared on ssl rehandshake, it's
possible to crash an openssl tls secured server remotely by sending a
manipulated hello message in a rehandshake.
On such a manipulated rehandshake, tls1_set_shared_sigalgs() calls
tls12_shared_sigalgs() with the peer_sigalgslen of the previous
handshake, while the peer_sigalgs has been freed.
As a result tls12_shared_sigalgs() walks over the available
peer_sigalgs and tries to access data of a NULL pointer.
This issue was introduced by c589c34e61 (Add support for the TLS 1.3
signature_algorithms_cert extension, 2018-01-11).
Signed-off-by: Peter Kästle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Sapalski <[email protected]>
CVE-2021-3449
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
|
isodate7(const unsigned char *v)
{
struct tm tm;
int offset;
time_t t;
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
tm.tm_year = v[0];
tm.tm_mon = v[1] - 1;
tm.tm_mday = v[2];
tm.tm_hour = v[3];
tm.tm_min = v[4];
tm.tm_sec = v[5];
/* v[6] is the signed timezone offset, in 1/4-hour increments. */
offset = ((const signed char *)v)[6];
if (offset > -48 && offset < 52) {
tm.tm_hour -= offset / 4;
tm.tm_min -= (offset % 4) * 15;
}
t = time_from_tm(&tm);
if (t == (time_t)-1)
return ((time_t)0);
return (t);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libarchive
|
f9569c086ff29259c73790db9cbf39fe8fb9d862
| 52,737,155,189,138,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
iso9660: validate directory record length
|
static int snd_pcm_action_group(const struct action_ops *ops,
struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
snd_pcm_state_t state,
bool do_lock)
{
struct snd_pcm_substream *s = NULL;
struct snd_pcm_substream *s1;
int res = 0, depth = 1;
snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s, substream) {
if (do_lock && s != substream) {
if (s->pcm->nonatomic)
mutex_lock_nested(&s->self_group.mutex, depth);
else
spin_lock_nested(&s->self_group.lock, depth);
depth++;
}
res = ops->pre_action(s, state);
if (res < 0)
goto _unlock;
}
snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s, substream) {
res = ops->do_action(s, state);
if (res < 0) {
if (ops->undo_action) {
snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s1, substream) {
if (s1 == s) /* failed stream */
break;
ops->undo_action(s1, state);
}
}
s = NULL; /* unlock all */
goto _unlock;
}
}
snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s, substream) {
ops->post_action(s, state);
}
_unlock:
if (do_lock) {
/* unlock streams */
snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s1, substream) {
if (s1 != substream) {
if (s1->pcm->nonatomic)
mutex_unlock(&s1->self_group.mutex);
else
spin_unlock(&s1->self_group.lock);
}
if (s1 == s) /* end */
break;
}
}
return res;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
92ee3c60ec9fe64404dc035e7c41277d74aa26cb
| 257,905,684,544,547,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent hw_params and hw_free calls
Currently we have neither proper check nor protection against the
concurrent calls of PCM hw_params and hw_free ioctls, which may result
in a UAF. Since the existing PCM stream lock can't be used for
protecting the whole ioctl operations, we need a new mutex to protect
those racy calls.
This patch introduced a new mutex, runtime->buffer_mutex, and applies
it to both hw_params and hw_free ioctl code paths. Along with it, the
both functions are slightly modified (the mmap_count check is moved
into the state-check block) for code simplicity.
Reported-by: Hu Jiahui <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
SetHostIP(tcps_sess_t *pThis, prop_t *ip)
{
DEFiRet;
ISOBJ_TYPE_assert(pThis, tcps_sess);
if(pThis->fromHostIP != NULL) {
prop.Destruct(&pThis->fromHostIP);
}
pThis->fromHostIP = ip;
RETiRet;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
rsyslog
|
89955b0bcb1ff105e1374aad7e0e993faa6a038f
| 190,912,179,000,014,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
net bugfix: potential buffer overrun
|
DEFUN (neighbor_attr_unchanged,
neighbor_attr_unchanged_cmd,
NEIGHBOR_CMD2 "attribute-unchanged",
NEIGHBOR_STR
NEIGHBOR_ADDR_STR2
"BGP attribute is propagated unchanged to this neighbor\n")
{
return peer_af_flag_set_vty (vty, argv[0], bgp_node_afi (vty),
bgp_node_safi (vty),
(PEER_FLAG_AS_PATH_UNCHANGED |
PEER_FLAG_NEXTHOP_UNCHANGED |
PEER_FLAG_MED_UNCHANGED));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
frr
|
6d58272b4cf96f0daa846210dd2104877900f921
| 196,154,784,991,685,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
[bgpd] cleanup, compact and consolidate capability parsing code
2007-07-26 Paul Jakma <[email protected]>
* (general) Clean up and compact capability parsing slightly.
Consolidate validation of length and logging of generic TLV, and
memcpy of capability data, thus removing such from cap specifc
code (not always present or correct).
* bgp_open.h: Add structures for the generic capability TLV header
and for the data formats of the various specific capabilities we
support. Hence remove the badly named, or else misdefined, struct
capability.
* bgp_open.c: (bgp_capability_vty_out) Use struct capability_mp_data.
Do the length checks *before* memcpy()'ing based on that length
(stored capability - should have been validated anyway on input,
but..).
(bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices) new function to validate (afi,safi)
which is about to be used as index into arrays, consolidates
several instances of same, at least one of which appeared to be
incomplete..
(bgp_capability_mp) Much condensed.
(bgp_capability_orf_entry) New, process one ORF entry
(bgp_capability_orf) Condensed. Fixed to process all ORF entries.
(bgp_capability_restart) Condensed, and fixed to use a
cap-specific type, rather than abusing capability_mp.
(struct message capcode_str) added to aid generic logging.
(size_t cap_minsizes[]) added to aid generic validation of
capability length field.
(bgp_capability_parse) Generic logging and validation of TLV
consolidated here. Code compacted as much as possible.
* bgp_packet.c: (bgp_open_receive) Capability parsers now use
streams, so no more need here to manually fudge the input stream
getp.
(bgp_capability_msg_parse) use struct capability_mp_data. Validate
lengths /before/ memcpy. Use bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices.
(bgp_capability_receive) Exported for use by test harness.
* bgp_vty.c: (bgp_show_summary) fix conversion warning
(bgp_show_peer) ditto
* bgp_debug.h: Fix storage 'extern' after type 'const'.
* lib/log.c: (mes_lookup) warning about code not being in
same-number array slot should be debug, not warning. E.g. BGP
has several discontigious number spaces, allocating from
different parts of a space is not uncommon (e.g. IANA
assigned versus vendor-assigned code points in some number
space).
|
static noinline int hiddev_ioctl_usage(struct hiddev *hiddev, unsigned int cmd, void __user *user_arg)
{
struct hid_device *hid = hiddev->hid;
struct hiddev_report_info rinfo;
struct hiddev_usage_ref_multi *uref_multi = NULL;
struct hiddev_usage_ref *uref;
struct hid_report *report;
struct hid_field *field;
int i;
uref_multi = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hiddev_usage_ref_multi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uref_multi)
return -ENOMEM;
uref = &uref_multi->uref;
if (cmd == HIDIOCGUSAGES || cmd == HIDIOCSUSAGES) {
if (copy_from_user(uref_multi, user_arg,
sizeof(*uref_multi)))
goto fault;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(uref, user_arg, sizeof(*uref)))
goto fault;
}
switch (cmd) {
case HIDIOCGUCODE:
rinfo.report_type = uref->report_type;
rinfo.report_id = uref->report_id;
if ((report = hiddev_lookup_report(hid, &rinfo)) == NULL)
goto inval;
if (uref->field_index >= report->maxfield)
goto inval;
field = report->field[uref->field_index];
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
uref->usage_code = field->usage[uref->usage_index].hid;
if (copy_to_user(user_arg, uref, sizeof(*uref)))
goto fault;
goto goodreturn;
default:
if (cmd != HIDIOCGUSAGE &&
cmd != HIDIOCGUSAGES &&
uref->report_type == HID_REPORT_TYPE_INPUT)
goto inval;
if (uref->report_id == HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN) {
field = hiddev_lookup_usage(hid, uref);
if (field == NULL)
goto inval;
} else {
rinfo.report_type = uref->report_type;
rinfo.report_id = uref->report_id;
if ((report = hiddev_lookup_report(hid, &rinfo)) == NULL)
goto inval;
if (uref->field_index >= report->maxfield)
goto inval;
field = report->field[uref->field_index];
if (cmd == HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX) {
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
} else if (uref->usage_index >= field->report_count)
goto inval;
}
if ((cmd == HIDIOCGUSAGES || cmd == HIDIOCSUSAGES) &&
(uref_multi->num_values > HID_MAX_MULTI_USAGES ||
uref->usage_index + uref_multi->num_values > field->report_count))
goto inval;
switch (cmd) {
case HIDIOCGUSAGE:
uref->value = field->value[uref->usage_index];
if (copy_to_user(user_arg, uref, sizeof(*uref)))
goto fault;
goto goodreturn;
case HIDIOCSUSAGE:
field->value[uref->usage_index] = uref->value;
goto goodreturn;
case HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX:
i = field->usage[uref->usage_index].collection_index;
kfree(uref_multi);
return i;
case HIDIOCGUSAGES:
for (i = 0; i < uref_multi->num_values; i++)
uref_multi->values[i] =
field->value[uref->usage_index + i];
if (copy_to_user(user_arg, uref_multi,
sizeof(*uref_multi)))
goto fault;
goto goodreturn;
case HIDIOCSUSAGES:
for (i = 0; i < uref_multi->num_values; i++)
field->value[uref->usage_index + i] =
uref_multi->values[i];
goto goodreturn;
}
goodreturn:
kfree(uref_multi);
return 0;
fault:
kfree(uref_multi);
return -EFAULT;
inval:
kfree(uref_multi);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
93a2001bdfd5376c3dc2158653034c20392d15c5
| 63,651,797,369,670,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 118 |
HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
void gf_prompt_set_echo_off(Bool echo_off) {
return;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
f3698bb1bce62402805c3fda96551a23101a32f9
| 48,939,106,452,969,245,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
|
set_option_sctx_idx(int opt_idx, int opt_flags, sctx_T script_ctx)
{
int both = (opt_flags & (OPT_LOCAL | OPT_GLOBAL)) == 0;
int indir = (int)options[opt_idx].indir;
sctx_T new_script_ctx = script_ctx;
// Modeline already has the line number set.
if (!(opt_flags & OPT_MODELINE))
new_script_ctx.sc_lnum += SOURCING_LNUM;
// Remember where the option was set. For local options need to do that
// in the buffer or window structure.
if (both || (opt_flags & OPT_GLOBAL) || (indir & (PV_BUF|PV_WIN)) == 0)
options[opt_idx].script_ctx = new_script_ctx;
if (both || (opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL))
{
if (indir & PV_BUF)
curbuf->b_p_script_ctx[indir & PV_MASK] = new_script_ctx;
else if (indir & PV_WIN)
{
curwin->w_p_script_ctx[indir & PV_MASK] = new_script_ctx;
if (both)
// also setting the "all buffers" value
curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_script_ctx[indir & PV_MASK] =
new_script_ctx;
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-122",
"CWE-787"
] |
vim
|
652dee448618589de5528a9e9a36995803f5557a
| 226,687,660,247,157,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
patch 8.2.4245: ":retab 0" may cause illegal memory access
Problem: ":retab 0" may cause illegal memory access.
Solution: Limit the value of 'tabstop' to 10000.
|
bgp_af_caps_cmp(const void *X, const void *Y)
{
const struct bgp_af_caps *x = X, *y = Y;
return (x->afi < y->afi) ? -1 : (x->afi > y->afi) ? 1 : 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
bird
|
8388f5a7e14108a1458fea35bfbb5a453e2c563c
| 240,985,969,765,081,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
BGP: Fix bugs in handling of shutdown messages
There is an improper check for valid message size, which may lead to
stack overflow and buffer leaks to log when a large message is received.
Thanks to Daniel McCarney for bugreport and analysis.
|
bool InstanceKlass::is_shareable() const {
#if INCLUDE_CDS
ClassLoaderData* loader_data = class_loader_data();
if (!SystemDictionaryShared::is_sharing_possible(loader_data)) {
return false;
}
if (is_hidden()) {
return false;
}
if (module()->is_patched()) {
return false;
}
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
| 0 |
[] |
jdk17u
|
f8eb9abe034f7c6bea4da05a9ea42017b3f80730
| 133,524,477,604,584,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
8270386: Better verification of scan methods
Reviewed-by: coleenp
Backport-of: ac329cef45979bd0159ecd1347e36f7129bb2ce4
|
static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
{
int old_state = shift_state;
if (rep)
return;
/*
* Mimic typewriter:
* a CapsShift key acts like Shift but undoes CapsLock
*/
if (value == KVAL(K_CAPSSHIFT)) {
value = KVAL(K_SHIFT);
if (!up_flag)
clr_vc_kbd_led(kbd, VC_CAPSLOCK);
}
if (up_flag) {
/*
* handle the case that two shift or control
* keys are depressed simultaneously
*/
if (shift_down[value])
shift_down[value]--;
} else
shift_down[value]++;
if (shift_down[value])
shift_state |= (1 << value);
else
shift_state &= ~(1 << value);
/* kludge */
if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) {
if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE)
to_utf8(vc, npadch_value);
else
put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff);
npadch_active = false;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
6ca03f90527e499dd5e32d6522909e2ad390896b
| 201,935,807,462,165,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
vt: keyboard, simplify vt_kdgkbsent
Use 'strlen' of the string, add one for NUL terminator and simply do
'copy_to_user' instead of the explicit 'for' loop. This makes the
KDGKBSENT case more compact.
The only thing we need to take care about is NULL 'func_table[i]'. Use
an empty string in that case.
The original check for overflow could never trigger as the func_buf
strings are always shorter or equal to 'struct kbsentry's.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_get_property(GObject* object,
guint prop_id,
GValue* value,
GParamSpec* pspec)
{
InfGtkCertificateManager* manager;
InfGtkCertificateManagerPrivate* priv;
manager = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER(object);
priv = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_PRIVATE(manager);
switch(prop_id)
{
case PROP_PARENT_WINDOW:
g_value_set_object(value, G_OBJECT(priv->parent_window));
break;
case PROP_XMPP_MANAGER:
g_value_set_object(value, G_OBJECT(priv->xmpp_manager));
break;
case PROP_KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE:
g_value_set_string(value, priv->known_hosts_file);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
libinfinity
|
c97f870f5ae13112988d9f8ad464b4f679903706
| 122,859,806,732,077,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
Fix expired certificate validation (gobby #61)
|
static int brcmf_msgbuf_stats_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *data)
{
struct brcmf_bus *bus_if = dev_get_drvdata(seq->private);
struct brcmf_pub *drvr = bus_if->drvr;
struct brcmf_msgbuf *msgbuf = (struct brcmf_msgbuf *)drvr->proto->pd;
struct brcmf_commonring *commonring;
u16 i;
struct brcmf_flowring_ring *ring;
struct brcmf_flowring_hash *hash;
commonring = msgbuf->commonrings[BRCMF_H2D_MSGRING_CONTROL_SUBMIT];
seq_printf(seq, "h2d_ctl_submit: rp %4u, wp %4u, depth %4u\n",
commonring->r_ptr, commonring->w_ptr, commonring->depth);
commonring = msgbuf->commonrings[BRCMF_H2D_MSGRING_RXPOST_SUBMIT];
seq_printf(seq, "h2d_rx_submit: rp %4u, wp %4u, depth %4u\n",
commonring->r_ptr, commonring->w_ptr, commonring->depth);
commonring = msgbuf->commonrings[BRCMF_D2H_MSGRING_CONTROL_COMPLETE];
seq_printf(seq, "d2h_ctl_cmplt: rp %4u, wp %4u, depth %4u\n",
commonring->r_ptr, commonring->w_ptr, commonring->depth);
commonring = msgbuf->commonrings[BRCMF_D2H_MSGRING_TX_COMPLETE];
seq_printf(seq, "d2h_tx_cmplt: rp %4u, wp %4u, depth %4u\n",
commonring->r_ptr, commonring->w_ptr, commonring->depth);
commonring = msgbuf->commonrings[BRCMF_D2H_MSGRING_RX_COMPLETE];
seq_printf(seq, "d2h_rx_cmplt: rp %4u, wp %4u, depth %4u\n",
commonring->r_ptr, commonring->w_ptr, commonring->depth);
seq_printf(seq, "\nh2d_flowrings: depth %u\n",
BRCMF_H2D_TXFLOWRING_MAX_ITEM);
seq_puts(seq, "Active flowrings:\n");
hash = msgbuf->flow->hash;
for (i = 0; i < msgbuf->flow->nrofrings; i++) {
if (!msgbuf->flow->rings[i])
continue;
ring = msgbuf->flow->rings[i];
if (ring->status != RING_OPEN)
continue;
commonring = msgbuf->flowrings[i];
hash = &msgbuf->flow->hash[ring->hash_id];
seq_printf(seq, "id %3u: rp %4u, wp %4u, qlen %4u, blocked %u\n"
" ifidx %u, fifo %u, da %pM\n",
i, commonring->r_ptr, commonring->w_ptr,
skb_queue_len(&ring->skblist), ring->blocked,
hash->ifidx, hash->fifo, hash->mac);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
a4176ec356c73a46c07c181c6d04039fafa34a9f
| 135,758,406,844,348,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
brcmfmac: add subtype check for event handling in data path
For USB there is no separate channel being used to pass events
from firmware to the host driver and as such are passed over the
data path. In order to detect mock event messages an additional
check is needed on event subtype. This check is added conditionally
using unlikely() keyword.
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
GF_ISOMVVCType gf_isom_get_vvc_type(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 DescriptionIndex)
{
u32 type;
GF_TrackBox *trak;
GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *entry;
trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, trackNumber);
if (!trak || !trak->Media || !DescriptionIndex) return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NONE;
if (!gf_isom_is_video_handler_type(trak->Media->handler->handlerType))
return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NONE;
entry = (GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox*)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->child_boxes, DescriptionIndex-1);
if (!entry) return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NONE;
if (entry->internal_type != GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_ENTRY_VIDEO) return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NONE;
type = entry->type;
if (type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCV) {
GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *sinf = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *) gf_isom_box_find_child(entry->child_boxes, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SINF);
if (sinf && sinf->original_format) type = sinf->original_format->data_format;
}
else if (type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RESV) {
if (entry->rinf && entry->rinf->original_format) type = entry->rinf->original_format->data_format;
}
switch (type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_VVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_VVI1:
return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_ONLY;
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_VVS1:
return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_SUBPIC;
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_VVCN:
return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NVCL;
default:
return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NONE;
}
return GF_ISOM_VVCTYPE_NONE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
] |
gpac
|
9ea93a2ec8f555ceed1ee27294cf94822f14f10f
| 31,267,079,412,536,456,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
fixed #2165
|
filter_push(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p)
{
filter_gstate *gstate = p->gstate;
filter_gstate *new_gstate = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, filter_gstate);
*new_gstate = *gstate;
new_gstate->pushed = 0;
new_gstate->next = gstate;
p->gstate = new_gstate;
pdf_keep_font(ctx, new_gstate->pending.text.font);
pdf_keep_font(ctx, new_gstate->sent.text.font);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
mupdf
|
97096297d409ec6f206298444ba00719607e8ba8
| 212,652,825,254,749,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Bug 701292: Fix test for missing/empty string.
|
static int vc_con_write_normal(struct vc_data *vc, int tc, int c,
struct vc_draw_region *draw)
{
int next_c;
unsigned char vc_attr = vc->vc_attr;
u16 himask = vc->vc_hi_font_mask, charmask = himask ? 0x1ff : 0xff;
u8 width = 1;
bool inverse = false;
if (vc->vc_utf && !vc->vc_disp_ctrl) {
if (is_double_width(c))
width = 2;
}
/* Now try to find out how to display it */
tc = conv_uni_to_pc(vc, tc);
if (tc & ~charmask) {
if (tc == -1 || tc == -2)
return -1; /* nothing to display */
/* Glyph not found */
if ((!vc->vc_utf || vc->vc_disp_ctrl || c < 128) &&
!(c & ~charmask)) {
/*
* In legacy mode use the glyph we get by a 1:1
* mapping.
* This would make absolutely no sense with Unicode in
* mind, but do this for ASCII characters since a font
* may lack Unicode mapping info and we don't want to
* end up with having question marks only.
*/
tc = c;
} else {
/*
* Display U+FFFD. If it's not found, display an inverse
* question mark.
*/
tc = conv_uni_to_pc(vc, 0xfffd);
if (tc < 0) {
inverse = true;
tc = conv_uni_to_pc(vc, '?');
if (tc < 0)
tc = '?';
vc_attr = vc_invert_attr(vc);
con_flush(vc, draw);
}
}
}
next_c = c;
while (1) {
if (vc->vc_need_wrap || vc->vc_decim)
con_flush(vc, draw);
if (vc->vc_need_wrap) {
cr(vc);
lf(vc);
}
if (vc->vc_decim)
insert_char(vc, 1);
vc_uniscr_putc(vc, next_c);
if (himask)
tc = ((tc & 0x100) ? himask : 0) |
(tc & 0xff);
tc |= (vc_attr << 8) & ~himask;
scr_writew(tc, (u16 *)vc->vc_pos);
if (con_should_update(vc) && draw->x < 0) {
draw->x = vc->state.x;
draw->from = vc->vc_pos;
}
if (vc->state.x == vc->vc_cols - 1) {
vc->vc_need_wrap = vc->vc_decawm;
draw->to = vc->vc_pos + 2;
} else {
vc->state.x++;
draw->to = (vc->vc_pos += 2);
}
if (!--width)
break;
/* A space is printed in the second column */
tc = conv_uni_to_pc(vc, ' ');
if (tc < 0)
tc = ' ';
next_c = ' ';
}
notify_write(vc, c);
if (inverse)
con_flush(vc, draw);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
3c4e0dff2095c579b142d5a0693257f1c58b4804
| 72,291,433,864,689,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 |
vt: Disable KD_FONT_OP_COPY
It's buggy:
On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 10:30:08PM +0800, Minh Yuan wrote:
> We recently discovered a slab-out-of-bounds read in fbcon in the latest
> kernel ( v5.10-rc2 for now ). The root cause of this vulnerability is that
> "fbcon_do_set_font" did not handle "vc->vc_font.data" and
> "vc->vc_font.height" correctly, and the patch
> <https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/27/223> for VT_RESIZEX can't handle this
> issue.
>
> Specifically, we use KD_FONT_OP_SET to set a small font.data for tty6, and
> use KD_FONT_OP_SET again to set a large font.height for tty1. After that,
> we use KD_FONT_OP_COPY to assign tty6's vc_font.data to tty1's vc_font.data
> in "fbcon_do_set_font", while tty1 retains the original larger
> height. Obviously, this will cause an out-of-bounds read, because we can
> access a smaller vc_font.data with a larger vc_font.height.
Further there was only one user ever.
- Android's loadfont, busybox and console-tools only ever use OP_GET
and OP_SET
- fbset documentation only mentions the kernel cmdline font: option,
not anything else.
- systemd used OP_COPY before release 232 published in Nov 2016
Now unfortunately the crucial report seems to have gone down with
gmane, and the commit message doesn't say much. But the pull request
hints at OP_COPY being broken
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/3651
So in other words, this never worked, and the only project which
foolishly every tried to use it, realized that rather quickly too.
Instead of trying to fix security issues here on dead code by adding
missing checks, fix the entire thing by removing the functionality.
Note that systemd code using the OP_COPY function ignored the return
value, so it doesn't matter what we're doing here really - just in
case a lone server somewhere happens to be extremely unlucky and
running an affected old version of systemd. The relevant code from
font_copy_to_all_vcs() in systemd was:
/* copy font from active VT, where the font was uploaded to */
cfo.op = KD_FONT_OP_COPY;
cfo.height = vcs.v_active-1; /* tty1 == index 0 */
(void) ioctl(vcfd, KDFONTOP, &cfo);
Note this just disables the ioctl, garbage collecting the now unused
callbacks is left for -next.
v2: Tetsuo found the old mail, which allowed me to find it on another
archive. Add the link too.
Acked-by: Peilin Ye <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Minh Yuan <[email protected]>
References: https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2016-June/036935.html
References: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/3651
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Peilin Ye <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
cssp_read_tsrequest(STREAM token, STREAM pubkey)
{
STREAM s;
int length;
int tagval;
struct stream packet;
s = tcp_recv(NULL, 4);
if (s == NULL)
return False;
// verify ASN.1 header
if (s->p[0] != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
{
error("Expected BER_TAG_SEQUENCE|BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED, got %x", s->p[0]);
return False;
}
// peek at first 4 bytes to get full message length
if (s->p[1] < 0x80)
length = s->p[1] - 2;
else if (s->p[1] == 0x81)
length = s->p[2] - 1;
else if (s->p[1] == 0x82)
length = (s->p[2] << 8) | s->p[3];
else
return False;
// receive the remainings of message
s = tcp_recv(s, length);
packet = *s;
#if WITH_DEBUG_CREDSSP
streamsave(s, "tsrequest_in.raw");
printf("In TSRequest token %ld bytes\n", s_length(s));
hexdump(s->data, s_length(s));
#endif
// parse the response and into nego token
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) ||
tagval != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
return False;
// version [0]
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) ||
tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 0))
return False;
if (!s_check_rem(s, length))
{
rdp_protocol_error("cssp_read_tsrequest(), consume of version from stream would overrun",
&packet);
}
in_uint8s(s, length);
// negoToken [1]
if (token)
{
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 1))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_SEQUENCE | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 0))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) || tagval != BER_TAG_OCTET_STRING)
return False;
if (!s_check_rem(s, length))
{
rdp_protocol_error("cssp_read_tsrequest(), consume of token from stream would overrun",
&packet);
}
s_realloc(token, length);
s_reset(token);
out_uint8p(token, s->p, length);
s_mark_end(token);
}
// pubKey [3]
if (pubkey)
{
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length)
|| tagval != (BER_TAG_CTXT_SPECIFIC | BER_TAG_CONSTRUCTED | 3))
return False;
if (!ber_in_header(s, &tagval, &length) || tagval != BER_TAG_OCTET_STRING)
return False;
pubkey->data = pubkey->p = s->p;
pubkey->end = pubkey->data + length;
pubkey->size = length;
}
return True;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
rdesktop
|
766ebcf6f23ccfe8323ac10242ae6e127d4505d2
| 142,788,657,982,244,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 105 |
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
static int prepend(char **buffer, int *buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
{
*buflen -= namelen;
if (*buflen < 0)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
*buffer -= namelen;
memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
| 325,674,698,219,276,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int compat_getdrvprm(int drive,
struct compat_floppy_drive_params __user *arg)
{
struct compat_floppy_drive_params v;
memset(&v, 0, sizeof(struct compat_floppy_drive_params));
mutex_lock(&floppy_mutex);
v.cmos = UDP->cmos;
v.max_dtr = UDP->max_dtr;
v.hlt = UDP->hlt;
v.hut = UDP->hut;
v.srt = UDP->srt;
v.spinup = UDP->spinup;
v.spindown = UDP->spindown;
v.spindown_offset = UDP->spindown_offset;
v.select_delay = UDP->select_delay;
v.rps = UDP->rps;
v.tracks = UDP->tracks;
v.timeout = UDP->timeout;
v.interleave_sect = UDP->interleave_sect;
v.max_errors = UDP->max_errors;
v.flags = UDP->flags;
v.read_track = UDP->read_track;
memcpy(v.autodetect, UDP->autodetect, sizeof(v.autodetect));
v.checkfreq = UDP->checkfreq;
v.native_format = UDP->native_format;
mutex_unlock(&floppy_mutex);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &v, sizeof(struct compat_floppy_drive_params)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
2e90ca68b0d2f5548804f22f0dd61145516171e3
| 252,527,219,732,336,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
floppy: check FDC index for errors before assigning it
Jordy Zomer reported a KASAN out-of-bounds read in the floppy driver in
wait_til_ready().
Which on the face of it can't happen, since as Willy Tarreau points out,
the function does no particular memory access. Except through the FDCS
macro, which just indexes a static allocation through teh current fdc,
which is always checked against N_FDC.
Except the checking happens after we've already assigned the value.
The floppy driver is a disgrace (a lot of it going back to my original
horrd "design"), and has no real maintainer. Nobody has the hardware,
and nobody really cares. But it still gets used in virtual environment
because it's one of those things that everybody supports.
The whole thing should be re-written, or at least parts of it should be
seriously cleaned up. The 'current fdc' index, which is used by the
FDCS macro, and which is often shadowed by a local 'fdc' variable, is a
prime example of how not to write code.
But because nobody has the hardware or the motivation, let's just fix up
the immediate problem with a nasty band-aid: test the fdc index before
actually assigning it to the static 'fdc' variable.
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void incNumConnections() override { ++num_listener_connections_; }
| 1 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
dfddb529e914d794ac552e906b13d71233609bf7
| 138,043,373,633,916,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
listener: Add configurable accepted connection limits (#153)
Add support for per-listener limits on accepted connections.
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]>
|
funcdepth_decrement(void)
{
--funcdepth;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
vim
|
9c23f9bb5fe435b28245ba8ac65aa0ca6b902c04
| 93,352,055,876,780,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
patch 8.2.3902: Vim9: double free with nested :def function
Problem: Vim9: double free with nested :def function.
Solution: Pass "line_to_free" from compile_def_function() and make sure
cmdlinep is valid.
|
CAMLexport value caml_alloc (mlsize_t wosize, tag_t tag)
{
value result;
mlsize_t i;
Assert (tag < 256);
Assert (tag != Infix_tag);
if (wosize == 0){
result = Atom (tag);
}else if (wosize <= Max_young_wosize){
Alloc_small (result, wosize, tag);
if (tag < No_scan_tag){
for (i = 0; i < wosize; i++) Field (result, i) = Val_unit;
}
}else{
result = caml_alloc_shr (wosize, tag);
if (tag < No_scan_tag){
for (i = 0; i < wosize; i++) Field (result, i) = Val_unit;
}
result = caml_check_urgent_gc (result);
}
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
ocaml
|
659615c7b100a89eafe6253e7a5b9d84d0e8df74
| 290,979,981,197,824,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
fix PR#7003 and a few other bugs caused by misuse of Int_val
git-svn-id: http://caml.inria.fr/svn/ocaml/trunk@16525 f963ae5c-01c2-4b8c-9fe0-0dff7051ff02
|
static void gf_dump_vrml_sffield(GF_SceneDumper *sdump, u32 type, void *ptr, Bool is_mf, GF_Node *node)
{
switch (type) {
case GF_SG_VRML_SFBOOL:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%s", * ((SFBool *)ptr) ? "true" : "false");
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFINT32:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%d", * ((SFInt32 *)ptr) );
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFFLOAT:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g", FIX2FLT( * ((SFFloat *)ptr) ) );
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFDOUBLE:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g", * ((SFDouble *)ptr) );
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFTIME:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g", * ((SFTime *)ptr) );
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFCOLOR:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g %g", FIX2FLT( ((SFColor *)ptr)->red ), FIX2FLT( ((SFColor *)ptr)->green ), FIX2FLT( ((SFColor *)ptr)->blue ));
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFCOLORRGBA:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g %g %g", FIX2FLT( ((SFColorRGBA *)ptr)->red ), FIX2FLT( ((SFColorRGBA *)ptr)->green ), FIX2FLT( ((SFColorRGBA *)ptr)->blue ), FIX2FLT( ((SFColorRGBA *)ptr)->alpha ));
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFVEC2F:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g", FIX2FLT( ((SFVec2f *)ptr)->x ), FIX2FLT( ((SFVec2f *)ptr)->y ));
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFVEC2D:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g", ((SFVec2d *)ptr)->x, ((SFVec2d *)ptr)->y);
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFVEC3F:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g %g", FIX2FLT( ((SFVec3f *)ptr)->x ), FIX2FLT( ((SFVec3f *)ptr)->y ), FIX2FLT( ((SFVec3f *)ptr)->z ));
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFVEC3D:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g %g", ((SFVec3d *)ptr)->x, ((SFVec3d *)ptr)->y, ((SFVec3d *)ptr)->z);
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFROTATION:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%g %g %g %g", FIX2FLT( ((SFRotation *)ptr)->x ), FIX2FLT( ((SFRotation *)ptr)->y ), FIX2FLT( ((SFRotation *)ptr)->z ), FIX2FLT( ((SFRotation *)ptr)->q ) );
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFATTRREF:
{
SFAttrRef *ar = (SFAttrRef *)ptr;
if (ar->node) {
GF_FieldInfo pinfo;
gf_node_get_field(ar->node, ar->fieldIndex, &pinfo);
scene_dump_vrml_id(sdump, ar->node);
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, ".%s", pinfo.name);
}
}
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFSCRIPT:
{
u32 len, i;
char *str;
str = (char*)((SFScript *)ptr)->script_text;
if (!str) {
if (!sdump->XMLDump) {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "\"\"");
}
break;
}
len = (u32)strlen(str);
if (!sdump->XMLDump) {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "\"%s\"", str);
}
else {
u16 *uniLine;
uniLine = (u16*)gf_malloc(sizeof(short) * (len + 1));
len = gf_utf8_mbstowcs(uniLine, len, (const char **)&str);
if (len != GF_UTF8_FAIL) {
for (i = 0; i<len; i++) {
switch (uniLine[i]) {
case '&':
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "&");
break;
case '<':
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "<");
break;
case '>':
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, ">");
break;
case '\'':
case '"':
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "'");
break;
case 0:
break;
/*FIXME: how the heck can we preserve newlines and spaces of JavaScript in
an XML attribute in any viewer ? */
default:
if (uniLine[i]<128) {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%c", (u8)uniLine[i]);
}
else {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "&#%d;", uniLine[i]);
}
break;
}
}
}
gf_free(uniLine);
}
DUMP_IND(sdump);
}
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFSTRING:
{
char *str;
if (sdump->XMLDump) {
if (is_mf) gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, sdump->X3DDump ? "\"" : """);
} else {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "\"");
}
/*dump in unicode*/
str = ((SFString *)ptr)->buffer;
if (node && (gf_node_get_tag(node)==TAG_MPEG4_BitWrapper)) {
u32 bufsize = 37 + ((M_BitWrapper*)node)->buffer_len * 2 + 3;
str = gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * bufsize);
if (str) {
s32 res;
strcpy(str, "data:application/octet-string;base64,");
res = gf_base64_encode(((M_BitWrapper*)node)->buffer.buffer, ((M_BitWrapper*)node)->buffer_len, str+37, bufsize-37);
if (res<0) {
gf_free(str);
str = NULL;
} else {
str[res+37] = 0;
}
}
}
if (str && str[0]) {
if (sdump->XMLDump) {
scene_dump_utf_string(sdump, 1, str);
} else if (!strchr(str, '\"')) {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%s", str);
} else {
u32 i, len = (u32)strlen(str);
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
if (str[i]=='\"') gf_fputc('\\', sdump->trace);
gf_fputc(str[i], sdump->trace);
}
}
}
if (node && (gf_node_get_tag(node)==TAG_MPEG4_BitWrapper)) {
if (str) gf_free(str);
}
if (sdump->XMLDump) {
if (is_mf) gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, sdump->X3DDump ? "\"" : """);
} else {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "\"");
}
}
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFURL:
if (((SFURL *)ptr)->url) {
#if 0
u32 len;
char *str;
short uniLine[5000];
str = ((SFURL *)ptr)->url;
len = gf_utf8_mbstowcs(uniLine, 5000, (const char **) &str);
if (len != GF_UTF8_FAIL) {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, sdump->XMLDump ? (sdump->X3DDump ? "'" : """) : "\"");
fwprintf(sdump->trace, (unsigned short *) uniLine);
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, sdump->XMLDump ? (sdump->X3DDump ? "'" : """) : "\"");
}
#else
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, sdump->XMLDump ? (sdump->X3DDump ? "'" : """) : "\"");
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%s", ((SFURL *)ptr)->url);
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, sdump->XMLDump ? (sdump->X3DDump ? "'" : """) : "\"");
#endif
} else {
if (sdump->XMLDump) {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, ""od://od%d"", ((SFURL *)ptr)->OD_ID);
} else {
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "od:%d", ((SFURL *)ptr)->OD_ID);
}
}
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_SFIMAGE:
{
u32 i, count;
SFImage *img = (SFImage *)ptr;
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, "%d %d %d", img->width, img->height, img->numComponents);
count = img->width * img->height * img->numComponents;
for (i=0; i<count; ) {
switch (img->numComponents) {
case 1:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, " 0x%02X", img->pixels[i]);
i++;
break;
case 2:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, " 0x%02X%02X", img->pixels[i], img->pixels[i+1]);
i+=2;
break;
case 3:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, " 0x%02X%02X%02X", img->pixels[i], img->pixels[i+1], img->pixels[i+2]);
i+=3;
break;
case 4:
gf_fprintf(sdump->trace, " 0x%02X%02X%02X%02X", img->pixels[i], img->pixels[i+1], img->pixels[i+2], img->pixels[i+3]);
i+=4;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
gpac
|
0102c5d4db7fdbf08b5b591b2a6264de33867a07
| 114,250,990,107,172,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 218 |
fixed #2232
|
number_format(int value)
{
const char *result = "%d";
if ((outform != F_TERMCAP) && (value > 255)) {
unsigned long lv = (unsigned long) value;
unsigned long mm;
int bits = sizeof(unsigned long) * 8;
int nn;
for (nn = 8; nn < bits; ++nn) {
mm = 1UL << nn;
if ((mm - 16) <= lv && (mm + 16) > lv) {
result = "%#x";
break;
}
}
}
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
ncurses
|
b025434573f466efe27862656a6a9d41dd2bd609
| 85,666,894,564,340,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
ncurses 6.1 - patch 20191012
+ amend recent changes to ncurses*-config and pc-files to filter out
Debian linker-flags (report by Sven Joachim, cf: 20150516).
+ clarify relationship between tic, infocmp and captoinfo in manpage.
+ check for invalid hashcode in _nc_find_type_entry and
_nc_find_name_entry.
> fix several errata in tic (reports/testcases by "zjuchenyuan"):
+ check for invalid hashcode in _nc_find_entry.
+ check for missing character after backslash in fmt_entry
+ check for acsc with odd length in dump_entry in check for one-one
mapping (cf: 20060415);
+ check length when converting from old AIX box_chars_1 capability,
overlooked in changes to eliminate strcpy (cf: 20001007).
+ amend the ncurses*-config and pc-files to take into account the rpath
|
static void free_all_urbs(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
usb_free_urb(pegasus->intr_urb);
usb_free_urb(pegasus->tx_urb);
usb_free_urb(pegasus->rx_urb);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
5593523f968bc86d42a035c6df47d5e0979b5ace
| 100,068,339,774,553,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
TEST_F(ConnectionManagerUtilityTest, ExternalAddressExternalRequestDontUseRemote) {
connection_.stream_info_.downstream_address_provider_->setRemoteAddress(
std::make_shared<Network::Address::Ipv4Instance>("60.0.0.2"));
ON_CALL(config_, useRemoteAddress()).WillByDefault(Return(false));
TestRequestHeaderMapImpl headers{{"x-envoy-external-address", "60.0.0.1"},
{"x-forwarded-for", "60.0.0.1"}};
EXPECT_EQ((MutateRequestRet{"60.0.0.1:0", false, Tracing::Reason::NotTraceable}),
callMutateRequestHeaders(headers, Protocol::Http2));
EXPECT_EQ("60.0.0.1", headers.get_("x-envoy-external-address"));
EXPECT_EQ("60.0.0.1", headers.get_("x-forwarded-for"));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
envoy
|
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
| 252,465,646,548,115,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
static int avic_update_access_page(struct kvm *kvm, bool activate)
{
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
/*
* During kvm_destroy_vm(), kvm_pit_set_reinject() could trigger
* APICv mode change, which update APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT
* memory region. So, we need to ensure that kvm->mm == current->mm.
*/
if ((kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done == activate) ||
(kvm->mm != current->mm))
goto out;
ret = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE,
activate ? PAGE_SIZE : 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done = activate;
out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
d80b64ff297e40c2b6f7d7abc1b3eba70d22a068
| 157,794,681,911,344,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
KVM: SVM: Fix potential memory leak in svm_cpu_init()
When kmalloc memory for sd->sev_vmcbs failed, we forget to free the page
held by sd->save_area. Also get rid of the var r as '-ENOMEM' is actually
the only possible outcome here.
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
S3BootScriptSaveInformationAsciiString (
IN CONST CHAR8 *String
)
{
return S3BootScriptSaveInformation (
(UINT32) AsciiStrLen (String) + 1,
(VOID*) String
);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
edk2
|
322ac05f8bbc1bce066af1dabd1b70ccdbe28891
| 252,187,189,627,006,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib: Fix potential numeric truncation (CVE-2019-14563)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2001
For S3BootScriptLib APIs:
S3BootScriptSaveIoWrite
S3BootScriptSaveMemWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfgWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2Write
S3BootScriptSaveSmbusExecute
S3BootScriptSaveInformation
S3BootScriptSaveInformationAsciiString
S3BootScriptLabel (happen in S3BootScriptLabelInternal())
possible numeric truncations will happen that may lead to S3 boot script
entry with improper size being returned to store the boot script data.
This commit will add checks to prevent this kind of issue.
Please note that the remaining S3BootScriptLib APIs:
S3BootScriptSaveIoReadWrite
S3BootScriptSaveMemReadWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfgReadWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2ReadWrite
S3BootScriptSaveStall
S3BootScriptSaveDispatch2
S3BootScriptSaveDispatch
S3BootScriptSaveMemPoll
S3BootScriptSaveIoPoll
S3BootScriptSavePciPoll
S3BootScriptSavePci2Poll
S3BootScriptCloseTable
S3BootScriptExecute
S3BootScriptMoveLastOpcode
S3BootScriptCompare
are not affected by such numeric truncation.
Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jian J Wang <[email protected]>
|
authority_cert_dup(authority_cert_t *cert)
{
authority_cert_t *out = tor_malloc(sizeof(authority_cert_t));
tor_assert(cert);
memcpy(out, cert, sizeof(authority_cert_t));
/* Now copy pointed-to things. */
out->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
tor_strndup(cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len);
out->cache_info.saved_location = SAVED_NOWHERE;
out->identity_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(cert->identity_key);
out->signing_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(cert->signing_key);
return out;
}
| 0 |
[] |
tor
|
973c18bf0e84d14d8006a9ae97fde7f7fb97e404
| 120,210,053,465,161,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix assertion failure in tor_timegm.
Fixes bug 6811.
|
PrepareRowForJpeg24(rfbClientPtr cl,
uint8_t *dst,
int x,
int y,
int count)
{
uint32_t *fbptr;
uint32_t pix;
fbptr = (uint32_t *)
&cl->scaledScreen->frameBuffer[y * cl->scaledScreen->paddedWidthInBytes + x * 4];
while (count--) {
pix = *fbptr++;
*dst++ = (uint8_t)(pix >> cl->screen->serverFormat.redShift);
*dst++ = (uint8_t)(pix >> cl->screen->serverFormat.greenShift);
*dst++ = (uint8_t)(pix >> cl->screen->serverFormat.blueShift);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
libvncserver
|
804335f9d296440bb708ca844f5d89b58b50b0c6
| 243,152,270,095,818,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Thread safety for zrle, zlib, tight.
Proposed tight security type fix for debian bug 517422.
|
static void *genlocaldata(void *_gt,int32 *len) {
GTextField *gt = _gt;
unichar_t *temp =u_copyn(gt->text+gt->sel_start,gt->sel_end-gt->sel_start);
char *ret = u2def_copy(temp);
free(temp);
*len = strlen(ret);
return( ret );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fontforge
|
626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
| 38,723,697,737,586,907,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
|
static int compare_vavail(const void *v1, const void *v2)
{
struct vavailability *a = (struct vavailability *) v1;
struct vavailability *b = (struct vavailability *) v2;
int r = a->priority - b->priority;
if (r == 0) {
r = icaltime_compare(a->per.start, b->per.start);
if (r == 0) r = icaltime_compare(a->per.end, b->per.end);
}
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
cyrus-imapd
|
a5779db8163b99463e25e7c476f9cbba438b65f3
| 5,702,954,791,148,625,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
HTTP: don't overrun buffer when parsing strings with sscanf()
|
void cil_destroy_bounds(struct cil_bounds *bounds)
{
if (bounds == NULL) {
return;
}
free(bounds);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
selinux
|
340f0eb7f3673e8aacaf0a96cbfcd4d12a405521
| 268,863,753,618,851,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
libsepol/cil: Check for statements not allowed in optional blocks
While there are some checks for invalid statements in an optional
block when resolving the AST, there are no checks when building the
AST.
OSS-Fuzz found the following policy which caused a null dereference
in cil_tree_get_next_path().
(blockinherit b3)
(sid SID)
(sidorder(SID))
(optional o
(ibpkeycon :(1 0)s)
(block b3
(filecon""block())
(filecon""block())))
The problem is that the blockinherit copies block b3 before
the optional block is disabled. When the optional is disabled,
block b3 is deleted along with everything else in the optional.
Later, when filecon statements with the same path are found an
error message is produced and in trying to find out where the block
was copied from, the reference to the deleted block is used. The
error handling code assumes (rightly) that if something was copied
from a block then that block should still exist.
It is clear that in-statements, blocks, and macros cannot be in an
optional, because that allows nodes to be copied from the optional
block to somewhere outside even though the optional could be disabled
later. When optionals are disabled the AST is reset and the
resolution is restarted at the point of resolving macro calls, so
anything resolved before macro calls will never be re-resolved.
This includes tunableifs, in-statements, blockinherits,
blockabstracts, and macro definitions. Tunable declarations also
cannot be in an optional block because they are needed to resolve
tunableifs. It should be fine to allow blockinherit statements in
an optional, because that is copying nodes from outside the optional
to the optional and if the optional is later disabled, everything
will be deleted anyway.
Check and quit with an error if a tunable declaration, in-statement,
block, blockabstract, or macro definition is found within an
optional when either building or resolving the AST.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <[email protected]>
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.