func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
parserInit(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName)
{
processor = prologInitProcessor;
XmlPrologStateInit(&prologState);
protocolEncodingName = (encodingName != NULL
? poolCopyString(&tempPool, encodingName)
: NULL);
curBase = NULL;
XmlInitEncoding(&initEncoding, &encoding, 0);
userData = NULL;
handlerArg = NULL;
startElementHandler = NULL;
endElementHandler = NULL;
characterDataHandler = NULL;
processingInstructionHandler = NULL;
commentHandler = NULL;
startCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
endCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
defaultHandler = NULL;
startDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
endDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
unparsedEntityDeclHandler = NULL;
notationDeclHandler = NULL;
startNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
endNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
notStandaloneHandler = NULL;
externalEntityRefHandler = NULL;
externalEntityRefHandlerArg = parser;
skippedEntityHandler = NULL;
elementDeclHandler = NULL;
attlistDeclHandler = NULL;
entityDeclHandler = NULL;
xmlDeclHandler = NULL;
bufferPtr = buffer;
bufferEnd = buffer;
parseEndByteIndex = 0;
parseEndPtr = NULL;
declElementType = NULL;
declAttributeId = NULL;
declEntity = NULL;
doctypeName = NULL;
doctypeSysid = NULL;
doctypePubid = NULL;
declAttributeType = NULL;
declNotationName = NULL;
declNotationPublicId = NULL;
declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
memset(&position, 0, sizeof(POSITION));
errorCode = XML_ERROR_NONE;
eventPtr = NULL;
eventEndPtr = NULL;
positionPtr = NULL;
openInternalEntities = NULL;
defaultExpandInternalEntities = XML_TRUE;
tagLevel = 0;
tagStack = NULL;
inheritedBindings = NULL;
nSpecifiedAtts = 0;
unknownEncodingMem = NULL;
unknownEncodingRelease = NULL;
unknownEncodingData = NULL;
parentParser = NULL;
ps_parsing = XML_INITIALIZED;
#ifdef XML_DTD
isParamEntity = XML_FALSE;
useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
paramEntityParsing = XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif
hash_secret_salt = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
libexpat
|
ba0f9c3b40c264b8dd392e02a7a060a8fa54f032
| 289,578,243,552,329,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 |
CVE-2015-1283 Sanity check size calculations. r=peterv, a=abillings
https://sourceforge.net/p/expat/bugs/528/
|
static void php_mcrypt_module_dtor(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_mcrypt *pm = (php_mcrypt *) rsrc->ptr;
if (pm) {
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
mcrypt_module_close(pm->td);
efree(pm);
pm = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
6c5211a0cef0cc2854eaa387e0eb036e012904d0
| 289,228,263,847,761,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
void Statement::GetRow(Row* row, sqlite3_stmt* stmt) {
int rows = sqlite3_column_count(stmt);
for (int i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
int type = sqlite3_column_type(stmt, i);
const char* name = sqlite3_column_name(stmt, i);
switch (type) {
case SQLITE_INTEGER: {
row->push_back(new Values::Integer(name, sqlite3_column_int64(stmt, i)));
} break;
case SQLITE_FLOAT: {
row->push_back(new Values::Float(name, sqlite3_column_double(stmt, i)));
} break;
case SQLITE_TEXT: {
const char* text = (const char*)sqlite3_column_text(stmt, i);
int length = sqlite3_column_bytes(stmt, i);
row->push_back(new Values::Text(name, length, text));
} break;
case SQLITE_BLOB: {
const void* blob = sqlite3_column_blob(stmt, i);
int length = sqlite3_column_bytes(stmt, i);
row->push_back(new Values::Blob(name, length, blob));
} break;
case SQLITE_NULL: {
row->push_back(new Values::Null(name));
} break;
default:
assert(false);
}
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
node-sqlite3
|
593c9d498be2510d286349134537e3bf89401c4a
| 310,806,750,283,073,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
bug: fix segfault of invalid toString() object (#1450)
* bug: verify toString() returns valid data
* test: faulty toString test
|
gs_setdevice_no_init(gs_gstate * pgs, gx_device * dev)
{
/*
* Just set the device, possibly changing color space but no other
* device parameters.
*
* Make sure we don't close the device if dev == pgs->device
* This could be done by allowing the rc_assign to close the
* old 'dev' if the rc goes to 0 (via the device structure's
* finalization procedure), but then the 'code' from the dev
* closedevice would not be propagated up. We want to allow
* the code to be handled, particularly for the pdfwrite
* device.
*/
if (pgs->device != NULL && pgs->device->rc.ref_count == 1 &&
pgs->device != dev) {
int code = gs_closedevice(pgs->device);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
rc_assign(pgs->device, dev, "gs_setdevice_no_init");
gs_gstate_update_device(pgs, dev);
return pgs->overprint ? gs_do_set_overprint(pgs) : 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
79cccf641486a6595c43f1de1cd7ade696020a31
| 287,183,420,720,207,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Bug 699654(2): preserve LockSafetyParams in the nulldevice
The nulldevice does not necessarily use the normal setpagedevice machinery,
but can be set using the nulldevice operator. In which case, we don't preserve
the settings from the original device (in the way setpagedevice does).
Since nulldevice does nothing, this is not generally a problem, but in the case
of LockSafetyParams it *is* important when we restore back to the original
device, when LockSafetyParams not being set is "preserved" into the post-
restore configuration.
We have to initialise the value to false because the nulldevice is used during
initialisation (before any other device exists), and *must* be writable for
that.
|
xmlFACompareAtomTypes(xmlRegAtomType type1, xmlRegAtomType type2) {
if ((type1 == XML_REGEXP_EPSILON) ||
(type1 == XML_REGEXP_CHARVAL) ||
(type1 == XML_REGEXP_RANGES) ||
(type1 == XML_REGEXP_SUBREG) ||
(type1 == XML_REGEXP_STRING) ||
(type1 == XML_REGEXP_ANYCHAR))
return(1);
if ((type2 == XML_REGEXP_EPSILON) ||
(type2 == XML_REGEXP_CHARVAL) ||
(type2 == XML_REGEXP_RANGES) ||
(type2 == XML_REGEXP_SUBREG) ||
(type2 == XML_REGEXP_STRING) ||
(type2 == XML_REGEXP_ANYCHAR))
return(1);
if (type1 == type2) return(1);
/* simplify subsequent compares by making sure type1 < type2 */
if (type1 > type2) {
xmlRegAtomType tmp = type1;
type1 = type2;
type2 = tmp;
}
switch (type1) {
case XML_REGEXP_ANYSPACE: /* \s */
/* can't be a letter, number, mark, pontuation, symbol */
if ((type2 == XML_REGEXP_NOTSPACE) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_LETTER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_LETTER_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_NUMBER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_NUMBER_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_MARK) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS))
) return(0);
break;
case XML_REGEXP_NOTSPACE: /* \S */
break;
case XML_REGEXP_INITNAME: /* \l */
/* can't be a number, mark, separator, pontuation, symbol or other */
if ((type2 == XML_REGEXP_NOTINITNAME) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_NUMBER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_NUMBER_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_MARK) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_PARA)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_OTHER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_OTHER_NA))
) return(0);
break;
case XML_REGEXP_NOTINITNAME: /* \L */
break;
case XML_REGEXP_NAMECHAR: /* \c */
/* can't be a mark, separator, pontuation, symbol or other */
if ((type2 == XML_REGEXP_NOTNAMECHAR) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_MARK) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_PARA)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_OTHER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_OTHER_NA))
) return(0);
break;
case XML_REGEXP_NOTNAMECHAR: /* \C */
break;
case XML_REGEXP_DECIMAL: /* \d */
/* can't be a letter, mark, separator, pontuation, symbol or other */
if ((type2 == XML_REGEXP_NOTDECIMAL) ||
(type2 == XML_REGEXP_REALCHAR) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_LETTER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_LETTER_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_MARK) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_PARA)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_OTHER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_OTHER_NA))
)return(0);
break;
case XML_REGEXP_NOTDECIMAL: /* \D */
break;
case XML_REGEXP_REALCHAR: /* \w */
/* can't be a mark, separator, pontuation, symbol or other */
if ((type2 == XML_REGEXP_NOTDECIMAL) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_MARK) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_PARA)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS)) ||
((type2 >= XML_REGEXP_OTHER) &&
(type2 <= XML_REGEXP_OTHER_NA))
)return(0);
break;
case XML_REGEXP_NOTREALCHAR: /* \W */
break;
/*
* at that point we know both type 1 and type2 are from
* character categories are ordered and are different,
* it becomes simple because this is a partition
*/
case XML_REGEXP_LETTER:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_LETTER_OTHERS)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_LETTER_UPPERCASE:
case XML_REGEXP_LETTER_LOWERCASE:
case XML_REGEXP_LETTER_TITLECASE:
case XML_REGEXP_LETTER_MODIFIER:
case XML_REGEXP_LETTER_OTHERS:
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_MARK:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_MARK_NONSPACING:
case XML_REGEXP_MARK_SPACECOMBINING:
case XML_REGEXP_MARK_ENCLOSING:
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_NUMBER:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_NUMBER_OTHERS)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_NUMBER_DECIMAL:
case XML_REGEXP_NUMBER_LETTER:
case XML_REGEXP_NUMBER_OTHERS:
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_CONNECTOR:
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_DASH:
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OPEN:
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_CLOSE:
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_INITQUOTE:
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_FINQUOTE:
case XML_REGEXP_PUNCT_OTHERS:
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_SEPAR:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_PARA)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_SPACE:
case XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_LINE:
case XML_REGEXP_SEPAR_PARA:
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_MATH:
case XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_CURRENCY:
case XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_MODIFIER:
case XML_REGEXP_SYMBOL_OTHERS:
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_OTHER:
if (type2 <= XML_REGEXP_OTHER_NA)
return(1);
return(0);
case XML_REGEXP_OTHER_CONTROL:
case XML_REGEXP_OTHER_FORMAT:
case XML_REGEXP_OTHER_PRIVATE:
case XML_REGEXP_OTHER_NA:
return(0);
default:
break;
}
return(1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
libxml2
|
cbb271655cadeb8dbb258a64701d9a3a0c4835b4
| 53,481,561,381,399,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 189 |
Bug 757711: heap-buffer-overflow in xmlFAParsePosCharGroup <https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=757711>
* xmlregexp.c:
(xmlFAParseCharRange): Only advance to the next character if
there is no error. Advancing to the next character in case of
an error while parsing regexp leads to an out of bounds access.
|
static int scrub_pages(struct scrub_ctx *sctx, u64 logical, u64 len,
u64 physical, struct btrfs_device *dev, u64 flags,
u64 gen, int mirror_num, u8 *csum, int force,
u64 physical_for_dev_replace)
{
struct scrub_block *sblock;
int index;
sblock = kzalloc(sizeof(*sblock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sblock) {
spin_lock(&sctx->stat_lock);
sctx->stat.malloc_errors++;
spin_unlock(&sctx->stat_lock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* one ref inside this function, plus one for each page added to
* a bio later on */
refcount_set(&sblock->refs, 1);
sblock->sctx = sctx;
sblock->no_io_error_seen = 1;
for (index = 0; len > 0; index++) {
struct scrub_page *spage;
u64 l = min_t(u64, len, PAGE_SIZE);
spage = kzalloc(sizeof(*spage), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!spage) {
leave_nomem:
spin_lock(&sctx->stat_lock);
sctx->stat.malloc_errors++;
spin_unlock(&sctx->stat_lock);
scrub_block_put(sblock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
BUG_ON(index >= SCRUB_MAX_PAGES_PER_BLOCK);
scrub_page_get(spage);
sblock->pagev[index] = spage;
spage->sblock = sblock;
spage->dev = dev;
spage->flags = flags;
spage->generation = gen;
spage->logical = logical;
spage->physical = physical;
spage->physical_for_dev_replace = physical_for_dev_replace;
spage->mirror_num = mirror_num;
if (csum) {
spage->have_csum = 1;
memcpy(spage->csum, csum, sctx->csum_size);
} else {
spage->have_csum = 0;
}
sblock->page_count++;
spage->page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!spage->page)
goto leave_nomem;
len -= l;
logical += l;
physical += l;
physical_for_dev_replace += l;
}
WARN_ON(sblock->page_count == 0);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, &dev->dev_state)) {
/*
* This case should only be hit for RAID 5/6 device replace. See
* the comment in scrub_missing_raid56_pages() for details.
*/
scrub_missing_raid56_pages(sblock);
} else {
for (index = 0; index < sblock->page_count; index++) {
struct scrub_page *spage = sblock->pagev[index];
int ret;
ret = scrub_add_page_to_rd_bio(sctx, spage);
if (ret) {
scrub_block_put(sblock);
return ret;
}
}
if (force)
scrub_submit(sctx);
}
/* last one frees, either here or in bio completion for last page */
scrub_block_put(sblock);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
09ba3bc9dd150457c506e4661380a6183af651c1
| 30,975,144,117,832,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 |
btrfs: merge btrfs_find_device and find_device
Both btrfs_find_device() and find_device() does the same thing except
that the latter does not take the seed device onto account in the device
scanning context. We can merge them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t nbd_send_reply(QIOChannel *ioc, NBDReply *reply)
{
uint8_t buf[NBD_REPLY_SIZE];
reply->error = system_errno_to_nbd_errno(reply->error);
TRACE("Sending response to client: { .error = %" PRId32
", handle = %" PRIu64 " }",
reply->error, reply->handle);
/* Reply
[ 0 .. 3] magic (NBD_REPLY_MAGIC)
[ 4 .. 7] error (0 == no error)
[ 7 .. 15] handle
*/
stl_be_p(buf, NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
stl_be_p(buf + 4, reply->error);
stq_be_p(buf + 8, reply->handle);
return nbd_write(ioc, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
qemu
|
2b0bbc4f8809c972bad134bc1a2570dbb01dea0b
| 155,843,001,216,382,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
nbd/server: get rid of nbd_negotiate_read and friends
Functions nbd_negotiate_{read,write,drop_sync} were introduced in
1a6245a5b, when nbd_rwv (was nbd_wr_sync) was working through
qemu_co_sendv_recvv (the path is nbd_wr_sync -> qemu_co_{recv/send} ->
qemu_co_send_recv -> qemu_co_sendv_recvv), which just yields, without
setting any handlers. But starting from ff82911cd nbd_rwv (was
nbd_wr_syncv) works through qio_channel_yield() which sets handlers, so
watchers are redundant in nbd_negotiate_{read,write,drop_sync}, then,
let's just use nbd_{read,write,drop} functions.
Functions nbd_{read,write,drop} has errp parameter, which is unused in
this patch. This will be fixed later.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
return;
}
__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-681",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
5b9fbeb75b6a98955f628e205ac26689bcb1383e
| 116,615,299,804,389,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
bpf: Fix scalar32_min_max_or bounds tracking
Simon reported an issue with the current scalar32_min_max_or() implementation.
That is, compared to the other 32 bit subreg tracking functions, the code in
scalar32_min_max_or() stands out that it's using the 64 bit registers instead
of 32 bit ones. This leads to bounds tracking issues, for example:
[...]
8: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: (b7) r0 = 1
10: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
10: (18) r2 = 0x600000002
12: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
12: (ad) if r1 < r2 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: (95) exit
14: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ffffffff)) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
14: (25) if r1 > 0x0 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: (95) exit
16: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x77fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
16: (47) r1 |= 0
17: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=32212254719,var_off=(0x1; 0x700000000),s32_max_value=1,u32_max_value=1) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
[...]
The bound tests on the map value force the upper unsigned bound to be 25769803777
in 64 bit (0b11000000000000000000000000000000001) and then lower one to be 1. By
using OR they are truncated and thus result in the range [1,1] for the 32 bit reg
tracker. This is incorrect given the only thing we know is that the value must be
positive and thus 2147483647 (0b1111111111111111111111111111111) at max for the
subregs. Fix it by using the {u,s}32_{min,max}_value vars instead. This also makes
sense, for example, for the case where we update dst_reg->s32_{min,max}_value in
the else branch we need to use the newly computed dst_reg->u32_{min,max}_value as
we know that these are positive. Previously, in the else branch the 64 bit values
of umin_value=1 and umax_value=32212254719 were used and latter got truncated to
be 1 as upper bound there. After the fix the subreg range is now correct:
[...]
8: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: (b7) r0 = 1
10: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
10: (18) r2 = 0x600000002
12: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
12: (ad) if r1 < r2 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: (95) exit
14: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ffffffff)) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
14: (25) if r1 > 0x0 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: (95) exit
16: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x77fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
16: (47) r1 |= 0
17: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=32212254719,var_off=(0x0; 0x77fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
[...]
Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Simon Scannell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification;
trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
/*
* PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
* "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
*/
if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
enable_vnmi &&
(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
/*
* PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
* here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
*/
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
| 109,567,242,196,352,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
get_key(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
char *filename, const char *fsname, EVP_PKEY **retkey,
const char *password)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
struct get_key_cb_data cb_data;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retkey == NULL)
return EINVAL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cb_data.context = context;
cb_data.id_cryptoctx = id_cryptoctx;
cb_data.filename = filename;
cb_data.fsname = fsname;
cb_data.password = password;
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tmp, NULL, get_key_cb, &cb_data);
if (pkey == NULL && !id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read private key from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retkey = pkey;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
krb5
|
fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4
| 126,699,562,885,423,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
int snd_component_add(struct snd_card *card, const char *component)
{
char *ptr;
int len = strlen(component);
ptr = strstr(card->components, component);
if (ptr != NULL) {
if (ptr[len] == '\0' || ptr[len] == ' ') /* already there */
return 1;
}
if (strlen(card->components) + 1 + len + 1 > sizeof(card->components)) {
snd_BUG();
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (card->components[0] != '\0')
strcat(card->components, " ");
strcat(card->components, component);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
2a3f7221acddfe1caa9ff09b3a8158c39b2fdeac
| 299,094,431,591,490,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
ALSA: core: Fix card races between register and disconnect
There is a small race window in the card disconnection code that
allows the registration of another card with the very same card id.
This leads to a warning in procfs creation as caught by syzkaller.
The problem is that we delete snd_cards and snd_cards_lock entries at
the very beginning of the disconnection procedure. This makes the
slot available to be assigned for another card object while the
disconnection procedure is being processed. Then it becomes possible
to issue a procfs registration with the existing file name although we
check the conflict beforehand.
The fix is simply to move the snd_cards and snd_cards_lock clearances
at the end of the disconnection procedure. The references to these
entries are merely either from the global proc files like
/proc/asound/cards or from the card registration / disconnection, so
it should be fine to shift at the very end.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int complete_emulated_insn_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
{
if (err) {
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE | EMULTYPE_SKIP |
EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
| 334,883,691,453,309,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
sys_sigsuspend(old_sigset_t mask,
unsigned long r3, unsigned long r4, unsigned long r5,
unsigned long r6, unsigned long r7,
struct pt_regs * regs)
{
sigset_t saveset;
mask &= _BLOCKABLE;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
saveset = current->blocked;
siginitset(¤t->blocked, mask);
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
REF_REG_RET = -EINTR;
while (1) {
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
schedule();
regs->pc += 4; /* because sys_sigreturn decrements the pc */
if (do_signal(regs, &saveset)) {
/* pc now points at signal handler. Need to decrement
it because entry.S will increment it. */
regs->pc -= 4;
return -EINTR;
}
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f
| 78,691,316,140,670,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
free_perturb (char *p, size_t n)
{
if (__glibc_unlikely (perturb_byte))
memset (p, perturb_byte, n);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
glibc
|
d6db68e66dff25d12c3bc5641b60cbd7fb6ab44f
| 222,252,986,899,606,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
malloc: Mitigate null-byte overflow attacks
* malloc/malloc.c (_int_free): Check for corrupt prev_size vs size.
(malloc_consolidate): Likewise.
|
inline void invert_endianness(unsigned char* const, const cimg_ulong) {}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
| 323,343,500,884,524,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
|
do_init (int event_fd, pid_t initial_pid, struct sock_fprog *seccomp_prog)
{
int initial_exit_status = 1;
LockFile *lock;
for (lock = lock_files; lock != NULL; lock = lock->next)
{
int fd = open (lock->path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Unable to open lock file %s", lock->path);
struct flock l = {
.l_type = F_RDLCK,
.l_whence = SEEK_SET,
.l_start = 0,
.l_len = 0
};
if (fcntl (fd, F_SETLK, &l) < 0)
die_with_error ("Unable to lock file %s", lock->path);
/* Keep fd open to hang on to lock */
lock->fd = fd;
}
/* Optionally bind our lifecycle to that of the caller */
handle_die_with_parent ();
if (seccomp_prog != NULL &&
prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, seccomp_prog) != 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
while (TRUE)
{
pid_t child;
int status;
child = wait (&status);
if (child == initial_pid && event_fd != -1)
{
uint64_t val;
int res UNUSED;
initial_exit_status = propagate_exit_status (status);
val = initial_exit_status + 1;
res = write (event_fd, &val, 8);
/* Ignore res, if e.g. the parent died and closed event_fd
we don't want to error out here */
}
if (child == -1 && errno != EINTR)
{
if (errno != ECHILD)
die_with_error ("init wait()");
break;
}
}
/* Close FDs. */
for (lock = lock_files; lock != NULL; lock = lock->next)
{
if (lock->fd >= 0)
{
close (lock->fd);
lock->fd = -1;
}
}
return initial_exit_status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] |
bubblewrap
|
efc89e3b939b4bde42c10f065f6b7b02958ed50e
| 334,976,744,141,613,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 |
Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
|
static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < VMX_BITMAP_NR; i++)
free_page((unsigned long)vmx_bitmap[i]);
free_kvm_area();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
| 23,324,520,328,324,847,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart(ndo, "MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tcpdump
|
877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892
| 207,709,938,637,621,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
vpnc_watch_cb (GPid pid, gint status, gpointer user_data)
{
NMVPNCPlugin *plugin = NM_VPNC_PLUGIN (user_data);
NMVPNCPluginPrivate *priv = NM_VPNC_PLUGIN_GET_PRIVATE (plugin);
guint error = 0;
if (WIFEXITED (status)) {
error = WEXITSTATUS (status);
if (error != 0)
_LOGW ("vpnc exited with error code %d", error);
} else if (WIFSTOPPED (status))
_LOGW ("vpnc stopped unexpectedly with signal %d", WSTOPSIG (status));
else if (WIFSIGNALED (status))
_LOGW ("vpnc died with signal %d", WTERMSIG (status));
else
_LOGW ("vpnc died from an unknown cause");
priv->watch_id = 0;
/* Grab any remaining output, if any */
if (priv->out.channel)
pipe_echo_finish (&priv->out);
if (priv->err.channel)
pipe_echo_finish (&priv->err);
vpnc_cleanup (plugin, FALSE);
remove_pidfile (plugin);
/* Must be after data->state is set since signals use data->state */
switch (error) {
case 2:
/* Couldn't log in due to bad user/pass */
nm_vpn_service_plugin_failure (NM_VPN_SERVICE_PLUGIN (plugin), NM_VPN_PLUGIN_FAILURE_LOGIN_FAILED);
break;
case 1:
/* Other error (couldn't bind to address, etc) */
nm_vpn_service_plugin_failure (NM_VPN_SERVICE_PLUGIN (plugin), NM_VPN_PLUGIN_FAILURE_CONNECT_FAILED);
break;
default:
nm_vpn_service_plugin_disconnect (NM_VPN_SERVICE_PLUGIN (plugin), NULL);
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
NetworkManager-vpnc
|
07ac18a32b4e361a27ef48ac757d36cbb46e8e12
| 180,456,258,513,445,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
service: disallow newlinies in configuration values (CVE-2018-10900)
The vpnc configuration format doesn't allow those. vpnc(8):
The values start exactly one space after the keywords, and run to the end
of line. This lets you put any kind of weird character (except CR, LF and
NUL) in your strings
We have no choice but to reject them. If we didn't it would allow the
user to inject arbitrary configuration directives with potential
security implications.
https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/advisories/NM-VPNC-Privesc
Reported by: Denis Andzakovic
|
int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct utsname uts;
int r;
r = crypt_random_init(ctx);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."));
return r;
}
r = crypt_backend_init(crypt_fips_mode());
if (r < 0)
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
if (!r && !_crypto_logged) {
log_dbg(ctx, "Crypto backend (%s) initialized in cryptsetup library version %s.",
crypt_backend_version(), PACKAGE_VERSION);
if (!uname(&uts))
log_dbg(ctx, "Detected kernel %s %s %s.",
uts.sysname, uts.release, uts.machine);
_crypto_logged = 1;
}
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-345"
] |
cryptsetup
|
0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c
| 210,992,135,015,609,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt part of the LUKS device.
This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
no knowledge of user passphrases.
The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
possible modification of revealed plaintext.
The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
a violation of data confidentiality.
The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
|
cdf_swap_class(cdf_classid_t *d)
{
d->cl_dword = CDF_TOLE4(d->cl_dword);
d->cl_word[0] = CDF_TOLE2(d->cl_word[0]);
d->cl_word[1] = CDF_TOLE2(d->cl_word[1]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
file
|
1859fdb4e67c49c463c4e0078054335cd46ba295
| 171,918,185,527,301,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
|
g_deinit(void)
{
#if defined(_WIN32)
WSACleanup();
#endif
g_remove_dir(g_temp_base);
}
| 1 |
[] |
xrdp
|
cadad6e181d2a67698e5eb7cacd6b233ae29eb97
| 187,669,739,876,419,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
/tmp cleanup
|
TEST(UriSuite, TestQueryListPair) {
testQueryListPairHelper("one+two+%26+three=%2B", "one two & three", "+");
testQueryListPairHelper("one=two=three", "one", "two=three", "one=two%3Dthree");
testQueryListPairHelper("one=two=three=four", "one", "two=three=four", "one=two%3Dthree%3Dfour");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
uriparser
|
cef25028de5ff872c2e1f0a6c562eb3ea9ecbce4
| 126,650,330,207,058,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix uriParse*Ex* out-of-bounds read
|
ngx_http_lua_copy_in_file_request_body(ngx_http_request_t *r)
{
ngx_temp_file_t *tf;
ngx_http_request_body_t *body;
tf = r->request_body->temp_file;
if (!tf->persistent || !tf->clean) {
ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0,
"the request body was not read by ngx_lua");
return NGX_ERROR;
}
body = ngx_palloc(r->pool, sizeof(ngx_http_request_body_t));
if (body == NULL) {
return NGX_ERROR;
}
ngx_memcpy(body, r->request_body, sizeof(ngx_http_request_body_t));
body->temp_file = ngx_palloc(r->pool, sizeof(ngx_temp_file_t));
if (body->temp_file == NULL) {
return NGX_ERROR;
}
ngx_memcpy(body->temp_file, tf, sizeof(ngx_temp_file_t));
dd("file fd: %d", body->temp_file->file.fd);
r->request_body = body;
return NGX_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-444"
] |
lua-nginx-module
|
9ab38e8ee35fc08a57636b1b6190dca70b0076fa
| 26,189,338,797,684,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
bugfix: prevented request smuggling in the ngx.location.capture API.
Signed-off-by: Yichun Zhang (agentzh) <[email protected]>
|
httpServeObject(HTTPConnectionPtr connection)
{
HTTPRequestPtr request = connection->request;
ObjectPtr object = request->object;
int i = request->from / CHUNK_SIZE;
int j = request->from % CHUNK_SIZE;
int n, len, rc;
int bufsize = CHUNK_SIZE;
int condition_result;
object->atime = current_time.tv_sec;
objectMetadataChanged(object, 0);
httpSetTimeout(connection, -1);
if((request->error_code && relaxTransparency <= 0) ||
object->flags & OBJECT_INITIAL) {
object->flags &= ~OBJECT_FAILED;
unlockChunk(object, i);
if(request->error_code)
return httpClientRawError(connection,
request->error_code,
retainAtom(request->error_message), 0);
else
return httpClientRawError(connection,
500, internAtom("Object vanished."), 0);
}
if(!(object->flags & OBJECT_INPROGRESS) && object->code == 0) {
if(object->flags & OBJECT_INITIAL) {
unlockChunk(object, i);
return httpClientRawError(connection, 503,
internAtom("Error message lost"), 0);
} else {
unlockChunk(object, i);
do_log(L_ERROR, "Internal proxy error: object has no code.\n");
return httpClientRawError(connection, 500,
internAtom("Internal proxy error: "
"object has no code"), 0);
}
}
condition_result = httpCondition(object, request->condition);
if(condition_result == CONDITION_FAILED) {
unlockChunk(object, i);
return httpClientRawError(connection, 412,
internAtom("Precondition failed"), 0);
} else if(condition_result == CONDITION_NOT_MODIFIED) {
unlockChunk(object, i);
return httpClientRawError(connection, 304,
internAtom("Not modified"), 0);
}
objectFillFromDisk(object, request->from,
(request->method == METHOD_HEAD ||
condition_result != CONDITION_MATCH) ? 0 : 1);
if(((object->flags & OBJECT_LINEAR) &&
(object->requestor != connection->request)) ||
((object->flags & OBJECT_SUPERSEDED) &&
!(object->flags & OBJECT_LINEAR))) {
if(request->request) {
request->request->request = NULL;
request->request = NULL;
request->object->requestor = NULL;
}
object = makeObject(OBJECT_HTTP,
object->key, object->key_size, 1, 0,
object->request, NULL);
if(request->object->requestor == request)
request->object->requestor = NULL;
unlockChunk(request->object, i);
releaseObject(request->object);
request->object = NULL;
if(object == NULL) {
do_log(L_ERROR, "Couldn't allocate object.");
return httpClientRawError(connection, 501,
internAtom("Couldn't allocate object"),
1);
}
if(urlIsLocal(object->key, object->key_size)) {
object->flags |= OBJECT_LOCAL;
object->request = httpLocalRequest;
}
request->object = object;
connection->flags &= ~CONN_WRITER;
return httpClientNoticeRequest(request, 1);
}
if(object->flags & OBJECT_ABORTED) {
unlockChunk(object, i);
return httpClientNoticeError(request, object->code,
retainAtom(object->message));
}
if(connection->buf == NULL)
connection->buf = get_chunk();
if(connection->buf == NULL) {
unlockChunk(object, i);
do_log(L_ERROR, "Couldn't allocate client buffer.\n");
connection->flags &= ~CONN_WRITER;
httpClientFinish(connection, 1);
return 1;
}
if(object->length >= 0 && request->to >= object->length)
request->to = object->length;
if(request->from > 0 || request->to >= 0) {
if(request->method == METHOD_HEAD) {
request->to = request->from;
} else if(request->to < 0) {
if(object->length >= 0)
request->to = object->length;
}
}
again:
connection->len = 0;
if((request->from <= 0 && request->to < 0) ||
request->method == METHOD_HEAD) {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, 0, bufsize,
"HTTP/1.1 %d %s",
object->code, atomString(object->message));
} else {
if((object->length >= 0 && request->from >= object->length) ||
(request->to >= 0 && request->from >= request->to)) {
unlockChunk(object, i);
return httpClientRawError(connection, 416,
internAtom("Requested range "
"not satisfiable"),
0);
} else {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, 0, bufsize,
"HTTP/1.1 206 Partial content");
}
}
n = httpWriteObjectHeaders(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
object, request->from, request->to);
if(n < 0)
goto fail;
if(request->method != METHOD_HEAD &&
condition_result != CONDITION_NOT_MODIFIED &&
request->to < 0 && object->length < 0) {
if(connection->version == HTTP_11) {
connection->te = TE_CHUNKED;
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked");
} else {
request->flags &= ~REQUEST_PERSISTENT;
}
}
if(object->age < current_time.tv_sec) {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nAge: %d",
(int)(current_time.tv_sec - object->age));
}
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nConnection: %s",
(request->flags & REQUEST_PERSISTENT) ?
"keep-alive" : "close");
if(!(object->flags & OBJECT_LOCAL)) {
if((object->flags & OBJECT_FAILED) && !proxyOffline) {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nWarning: 111 %s:%d Revalidation failed",
proxyName->string, proxyPort);
if(request->error_code)
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
" (%d %s)",
request->error_code,
atomString(request->error_message));
object->flags &= ~OBJECT_FAILED;
} else if(proxyOffline &&
objectMustRevalidate(object, &request->cache_control)) {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nWarning: 112 %s:%d Disconnected operation",
proxyName->string, proxyPort);
} else if(objectIsStale(object, &request->cache_control)) {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nWarning: 110 %s:%d Object is stale",
proxyName->string, proxyPort);
} else if(object->expires < 0 && object->max_age < 0 &&
object->age < current_time.tv_sec - 24 * 3600) {
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize,
"\r\nWarning: 113 %s:%d Heuristic expiration",
proxyName->string, proxyPort);
}
}
n = snnprintf(connection->buf, n, bufsize, "\r\n\r\n");
if(n < 0)
goto fail;
connection->offset = request->from;
if(request->method == METHOD_HEAD ||
condition_result == CONDITION_NOT_MODIFIED ||
(object->flags & OBJECT_ABORTED)) {
len = 0;
} else {
if(i < object->numchunks) {
if(object->chunks[i].size <= j)
len = 0;
else
len = object->chunks[i].size - j;
} else {
len = 0;
}
if(request->to >= 0)
len = MIN(len, request->to - request->from);
}
connection->offset = request->from;
httpSetTimeout(connection, clientTimeout);
do_log(D_CLIENT_DATA, "Serving on 0x%lx for 0x%lx: offset %d len %d\n",
(unsigned long)connection, (unsigned long)object,
connection->offset, len);
do_stream_h(IO_WRITE |
(connection->te == TE_CHUNKED && len > 0 ? IO_CHUNKED : 0),
connection->fd, 0,
connection->buf, n,
object->chunks[i].data + j, len,
httpServeObjectStreamHandler, connection);
return 1;
fail:
rc = 0;
connection->len = 0;
if(!(connection->flags & CONN_BIGBUF))
rc = httpConnectionBigify(connection);
if(rc > 0) {
bufsize = bigBufferSize;
goto again;
}
unlockChunk(object, i);
return httpClientRawError(connection, 500,
rc == 0 ?
internAtom("No space for headers") :
internAtom("Couldn't allocate big buffer"), 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
polipo
|
0e2b44af619e46e365971ea52b97457bc0778cd3
| 32,525,539,936,899,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 249 |
Try to read POST requests to local configuration interface correctly.
|
fep_client_send_text (FepClient *client, const char *text)
{
FepControlMessage message;
message.command = FEP_CONTROL_SEND_TEXT;
_fep_control_message_alloc_args (&message, 1);
_fep_control_message_write_string_arg (&message, 0, text, strlen (text) + 1);
if (client->filter_running)
client->messages = _fep_append_control_message (client->messages, &message);
else
_fep_write_control_message (client->control, &message);
_fep_control_message_free_args (&message);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
libfep
|
293d9d3f7565f01a9dc40b53259886832eaa2ace
| 218,549,732,027,379,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Don't use abstract Unix domain sockets
|
static void FVMenuCondense(GWindow gw, struct gmenuitem *UNUSED(mi), GEvent *UNUSED(e)) {
FontView *fv = (FontView *) GDrawGetUserData(gw);
CondenseExtendDlg(fv,NULL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fontforge
|
626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
| 300,598,283,612,231,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
|
getkey_next (getkey_ctx_t ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t *ret_keyblock)
{
int rc; /* Fixme: Make sure this is proper gpg_error */
rc = lookup (ctx, ret_keyblock, ctx->want_secret);
if (!rc && pk && ret_keyblock)
pk_from_block (ctx, pk, *ret_keyblock);
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
gnupg
|
4bde12206c5bf199dc6e12a74af8da4558ba41bf
| 116,907,403,954,047,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
gpg: Distinguish between missing and cleared key flags.
* include/cipher.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE): New.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_key_usage): Set new flag.
--
We do not want to use the default capabilities (derived from the
algorithm) if any key flags are given in a signature. Thus if key
flags are used in any way, the default key capabilities are never
used.
This allows to create a key with key flags set to all zero so it can't
be used. This better reflects common sense.
|
p11_dl_close (void *dl)
{
#ifdef OS_WIN32
FreeLibrary (dl);
#else
(void) dlclose (dl);
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
p11-kit
|
bd670b1d4984b27d6a397b9ddafaf89ab26e4e7f
| 116,684,648,524,086,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Follow-up to arithmetic overflow fix
Check if nmemb is zero in p11_rpc_message_alloc_extra_array to avoid a
division by zero trap. Additionally, change the reallocarray
compatibility shim so that it won't assert when resizing an array to
zero, and add the same nmemb != 0 check there.
|
bool localAddressRestored() const override { return local_address_restored_; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
542f84c66e9f6479bc31c6f53157c60472b25240
| 84,252,542,206,634,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
overload: Runtime configurable global connection limits (#147)
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]>
|
MonoArray *
mono_reflection_sighelper_get_signature_local (MonoReflectionSigHelper *sig)
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
return NULL;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mono
|
4905ef1130feb26c3150b28b97e4a96752e0d399
| 195,726,742,713,479,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Handle invalid instantiation of generic methods.
* verify.c: Add new function to internal verifier API to check
method instantiations.
* reflection.c (mono_reflection_bind_generic_method_parameters):
Check the instantiation before returning it.
Fixes #655847
|
prepare_fk_prelocking_list(THD *thd, Query_tables_list *prelocking_ctx,
TABLE_LIST *table_list, bool *need_prelocking,
uint8 op)
{
List <FOREIGN_KEY_INFO> fk_list;
List_iterator<FOREIGN_KEY_INFO> fk_list_it(fk_list);
FOREIGN_KEY_INFO *fk;
Query_arena *arena, backup;
arena= thd->activate_stmt_arena_if_needed(&backup);
table_list->table->file->get_parent_foreign_key_list(thd, &fk_list);
if (thd->is_error())
{
if (arena)
thd->restore_active_arena(arena, &backup);
return TRUE;
}
*need_prelocking= TRUE;
while ((fk= fk_list_it++))
{
// FK_OPTION_RESTRICT and FK_OPTION_NO_ACTION only need read access
static bool can_write[]= { true, false, true, true, false, true };
thr_lock_type lock_type;
if ((op & (1 << TRG_EVENT_DELETE) && can_write[fk->delete_method])
|| (op & (1 << TRG_EVENT_UPDATE) && can_write[fk->update_method]))
lock_type= TL_WRITE_ALLOW_WRITE;
else
lock_type= TL_READ;
if (table_already_fk_prelocked(prelocking_ctx->query_tables,
fk->foreign_db, fk->foreign_table,
lock_type))
continue;
TABLE_LIST *tl= (TABLE_LIST *) thd->alloc(sizeof(TABLE_LIST));
tl->init_one_table_for_prelocking(fk->foreign_db->str, fk->foreign_db->length,
fk->foreign_table->str, fk->foreign_table->length,
NULL, lock_type, false, table_list->belong_to_view,
op, &prelocking_ctx->query_tables_last);
}
if (arena)
thd->restore_active_arena(arena, &backup);
return FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[] |
server
|
0168d1eda30dad4b517659422e347175eb89e923
| 32,291,134,261,796,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
MDEV-25766 Unused CTE lead to a crash in find_field_in_tables/find_order_in_list
Do not assume that subquery Item always present.
|
PackLinuxElf64::elf_find_dynamic(unsigned int key) const
{
Elf64_Dyn const *dynp= dynseg;
if (dynp)
for (; (unsigned)((char const *)dynp - (char const *)dynseg) < sz_dynseg
&& Elf64_Dyn::DT_NULL!=dynp->d_tag; ++dynp) if (get_te64(&dynp->d_tag)==key) {
upx_uint64_t const t= elf_get_offset_from_address(get_te64(&dynp->d_val));
if (t) {
return &((unsigned char const *)file_image)[(size_t)t];
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-190"
] |
upx
|
8be9da8280dfa69d5df4417d4d81bda1cab78010
| 140,163,033,460,328,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Avoid bogus values in PT_DYNAMIC segment.
Detect duplicate DT_*.
Detect out-of-bounds hashtab and gashtab.
Detect missing DT_REL, DT_RELA.
Detect out-of-bounds d_val.
https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/317
modified: p_lx_elf.cpp
|
QPDFObjectHandle newName(std::string const& name)
{
return QPDFObjectHandle::newName(name);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
qpdf
|
1868a10f8b06631362618bfc85ca8646da4b4b71
| 214,765,649,635,213,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Replace all atoi calls with QUtil::string_to_int
The latter catches underflow/overflow.
|
heap_add_entry(struct archive_read *a, struct heap_queue *heap,
struct file_info *file, uint64_t key)
{
uint64_t file_key, parent_key;
int hole, parent;
/* Expand our pending files list as necessary. */
if (heap->used >= heap->allocated) {
struct file_info **new_pending_files;
int new_size = heap->allocated * 2;
if (heap->allocated < 1024)
new_size = 1024;
/* Overflow might keep us from growing the list. */
if (new_size <= heap->allocated) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
new_pending_files = (struct file_info **)
malloc(new_size * sizeof(new_pending_files[0]));
if (new_pending_files == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(new_pending_files, heap->files,
heap->allocated * sizeof(new_pending_files[0]));
if (heap->files != NULL)
free(heap->files);
heap->files = new_pending_files;
heap->allocated = new_size;
}
file_key = file->key = key;
/*
* Start with hole at end, walk it up tree to find insertion point.
*/
hole = heap->used++;
while (hole > 0) {
parent = (hole - 1)/2;
parent_key = heap->files[parent]->key;
if (file_key >= parent_key) {
heap->files[hole] = file;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/* Move parent into hole <==> move hole up tree. */
heap->files[hole] = heap->files[parent];
hole = parent;
}
heap->files[0] = file;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
libarchive
|
3ad08e01b4d253c66ae56414886089684155af22
| 141,344,770,209,032,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
|
static inline void unmap_mapping_range_tree(struct rb_root *root,
struct zap_details *details)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
pgoff_t vba, vea, zba, zea;
vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, root,
details->first_index, details->last_index) {
vba = vma->vm_pgoff;
vea = vba + vma_pages(vma) - 1;
zba = details->first_index;
if (zba < vba)
zba = vba;
zea = details->last_index;
if (zea > vea)
zea = vea;
unmap_mapping_range_vma(vma,
((zba - vba) << PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_start,
((zea - vba + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_start,
details);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
linux
|
1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb
| 105,888,981,241,522,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline void native_write_gdt_entry(struct desc_struct *gdt, int entry,
const void *desc, int type)
{
unsigned int size;
switch (type) {
case DESC_TSS:
size = sizeof(tss_desc);
break;
case DESC_LDT:
size = sizeof(ldt_desc);
break;
default:
size = sizeof(struct desc_struct);
break;
}
memcpy(&gdt[entry], desc, size);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
linux-2.6
|
5ac37f87ff18843aabab84cf75b2f8504c2d81fe
| 13,869,627,748,976,757,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
x86: fix ldt limit for 64 bit
Fix size of LDT entries. On x86-64, ldt_desc is a double-sized descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int uac2_ctl_value_size(int val_type)
{
switch (val_type) {
case USB_MIXER_S32:
case USB_MIXER_U32:
return 4;
case USB_MIXER_S16:
case USB_MIXER_U16:
return 2;
default:
return 1;
}
return 0; /* unreachable */
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
| 123,696,349,115,851,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
{
u64 xcr0 = xcr;
u64 old_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.xcr0;
u64 valid_bits;
/* Only support XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK(xcr0) now */
if (index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK)
return 1;
if (!(xcr0 & XSTATE_FP))
return 1;
if ((xcr0 & XSTATE_YMM) && !(xcr0 & XSTATE_SSE))
return 1;
/*
* Do not allow the guest to set bits that we do not support
* saving. However, xcr0 bit 0 is always set, even if the
* emulated CPU does not support XSAVE (see fx_init).
*/
valid_bits = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XSTATE_FP;
if (xcr0 & ~valid_bits)
return 1;
if ((!(xcr0 & XSTATE_BNDREGS)) != (!(xcr0 & XSTATE_BNDCSR)))
return 1;
kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = xcr0;
if ((xcr0 ^ old_xcr0) & XSTATE_EXTEND_MASK)
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
kvm
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
| 197,823,933,592,469,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
xmlRelaxNGParseImportRefs(xmlRelaxNGParserCtxtPtr ctxt,
xmlRelaxNGGrammarPtr grammar) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (grammar == NULL) || (ctxt->grammar == NULL))
return(-1);
if (grammar->refs == NULL)
return(0);
if (ctxt->grammar->refs == NULL)
ctxt->grammar->refs = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (ctxt->grammar->refs == NULL) {
xmlRngPErr(ctxt, NULL, XML_RNGP_REF_CREATE_FAILED,
"Could not create references hash\n", NULL, NULL);
return(-1);
}
xmlHashScan(grammar->refs, xmlRelaxNGParseImportRef, ctxt);
return(0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
502f6a6d08b08c04b3ddfb1cd21b2f699c1b7f5b
| 319,046,732,222,633,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
More format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
adds a new xmlEscapeFormatString() function to escape composed format
strings
|
static int rtsx_usb_ms_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct memstick_host *msh;
struct rtsx_usb_ms *host;
struct rtsx_ucr *ucr;
int err;
ucr = usb_get_intfdata(to_usb_interface(pdev->dev.parent));
if (!ucr)
return -ENXIO;
dev_dbg(&(pdev->dev),
"Realtek USB Memstick controller found\n");
msh = memstick_alloc_host(sizeof(*host), &pdev->dev);
if (!msh)
return -ENOMEM;
host = memstick_priv(msh);
host->ucr = ucr;
host->msh = msh;
host->pdev = pdev;
host->power_mode = MEMSTICK_POWER_OFF;
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, host);
mutex_init(&host->host_mutex);
INIT_WORK(&host->handle_req, rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&host->poll_card, rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card);
msh->request = rtsx_usb_ms_request;
msh->set_param = rtsx_usb_ms_set_param;
msh->caps = MEMSTICK_CAP_PAR4;
pm_runtime_get_noresume(ms_dev(host));
pm_runtime_set_active(ms_dev(host));
pm_runtime_enable(ms_dev(host));
err = memstick_add_host(msh);
if (err)
goto err_out;
pm_runtime_put(ms_dev(host));
return 0;
err_out:
memstick_free_host(msh);
pm_runtime_disable(ms_dev(host));
pm_runtime_put_noidle(ms_dev(host));
return err;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
42933c8aa14be1caa9eda41f65cde8a3a95d3e39
| 64,085,819,692,496,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: fix UAF
This patch fixes the following issues:
1. memstick_free_host() will free the host, so the use of ms_dev(host) after
it will be a problem. To fix this, move memstick_free_host() after when we
are done with ms_dev(host).
2. In rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove(), pm need to be disabled before we remove
and free host otherwise memstick_check will be called and UAF will
happen.
[ 11.351173] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x94/0x140 [rtsx_usb_ms]
[ 11.357077] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x94/0x140 [rtsx_usb_ms]
[ 11.357376] platform_remove+0x2a/0x50
[ 11.367531] Freed by task 298:
[ 11.368537] kfree+0xa4/0x2a0
[ 11.368711] device_release+0x51/0xe0
[ 11.368905] kobject_put+0xa2/0x120
[ 11.369090] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x8c/0x140 [rtsx_usb_ms]
[ 11.369386] platform_remove+0x2a/0x50
[ 12.038408] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock.isra.0+0x3ec/0x7c0
[ 12.045432] mutex_lock+0xc9/0xd0
[ 12.046080] memstick_check+0x6a/0x578 [memstick]
[ 12.046509] process_one_work+0x46d/0x750
[ 12.052107] Freed by task 297:
[ 12.053115] kfree+0xa4/0x2a0
[ 12.053272] device_release+0x51/0xe0
[ 12.053463] kobject_put+0xa2/0x120
[ 12.053647] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0xc4/0x140 [rtsx_usb_ms]
[ 12.053939] platform_remove+0x2a/0x50
Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
|
_cmp_int_strings(const void **_a, const void **_b)
{
const char *a = *_a, *b = *_b;
int ai = (int)tor_parse_long(a, 10, 1, INT_MAX, NULL, NULL);
int bi = (int)tor_parse_long(b, 10, 1, INT_MAX, NULL, NULL);
if (ai<bi) {
return -1;
} else if (ai==bi) {
if (ai == 0) /* Parsing failed. */
return strcmp(a, b);
return 0;
} else {
return 1;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
tor
|
973c18bf0e84d14d8006a9ae97fde7f7fb97e404
| 268,421,053,895,563,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Fix assertion failure in tor_timegm.
Fixes bug 6811.
|
static void gf_m2ts_reset_sections(GF_List *sections)
{
u32 count;
GF_M2TS_Section *section;
//GF_LOG(GF_LOG_DEBUG, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[MPEG-2 TS] Deleting sections\n"));
count = gf_list_count(sections);
while (count) {
section = gf_list_get(sections, 0);
gf_list_rem(sections, 0);
if (section->data) gf_free(section->data);
gf_free(section);
count--;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] |
gpac
|
1ab4860609f2e7a35634930571e7d0531297e090
| 200,680,416,727,601,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
fixed potential crash on PMT IOD parse - cf #1268 #1269
|
static void kgdb_initial_breakpoint(void)
{
kgdb_break_asap = 0;
pr_crit("Waiting for connection from remote gdb...\n");
kgdb_breakpoint();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066
| 29,057,374,428,572,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use
KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.
Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.
For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.
CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
aptcTimerHandler(unsigned long arg)
{
u32 numbytes;
u32 throughput;
struct ar6_softc *ar;
int status;
ar = (struct ar6_softc *)arg;
A_ASSERT(ar != NULL);
A_ASSERT(!timer_pending(&aptcTimer));
AR6000_SPIN_LOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
/* Get the number of bytes transferred */
numbytes = aptcTR.bytesTransmitted + aptcTR.bytesReceived;
aptcTR.bytesTransmitted = aptcTR.bytesReceived = 0;
/* Calculate and decide based on throughput thresholds */
throughput = ((numbytes * 8)/APTC_TRAFFIC_SAMPLING_INTERVAL); /* Kbps */
if (throughput < APTC_LOWER_THROUGHPUT_THRESHOLD) {
/* Enable Sleep and delete the timer */
A_ASSERT(ar->arWmiReady == true);
AR6000_SPIN_UNLOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
status = wmi_powermode_cmd(ar->arWmi, REC_POWER);
AR6000_SPIN_LOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
A_ASSERT(status == 0);
aptcTR.timerScheduled = false;
} else {
A_TIMEOUT_MS(&aptcTimer, APTC_TRAFFIC_SAMPLING_INTERVAL, 0);
}
AR6000_SPIN_UNLOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
| 246,241,404,853,348,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
CImg<T>& diffusion_tensors(const float sharpness=0.7f, const float anisotropy=0.6f,
const float alpha=0.6f, const float sigma=1.1f, const bool is_sqrt=false) {
CImg<Tfloat> res;
const float
nsharpness = std::max(sharpness,1e-5f),
power1 = (is_sqrt?0.5f:1)*nsharpness,
power2 = power1/(1e-7f + 1 - anisotropy);
blur(alpha).normalize(0,(T)255);
if (_depth>1) { // 3D
get_structure_tensors().move_to(res).blur(sigma);
cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for cimg_openmp_collapse(2) cimg_openmp_if(_width>=(cimg_openmp_sizefactor)*256 &&
_height*_depth>=(cimg_openmp_sizefactor)*256))
cimg_forYZ(*this,y,z) {
Tfloat
*ptrd0 = res.data(0,y,z,0), *ptrd1 = res.data(0,y,z,1), *ptrd2 = res.data(0,y,z,2),
*ptrd3 = res.data(0,y,z,3), *ptrd4 = res.data(0,y,z,4), *ptrd5 = res.data(0,y,z,5);
CImg<floatT> val(3), vec(3,3);
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
res.get_tensor_at(x,y,z).symmetric_eigen(val,vec);
const float
_l1 = val[2], _l2 = val[1], _l3 = val[0],
l1 = _l1>0?_l1:0, l2 = _l2>0?_l2:0, l3 = _l3>0?_l3:0,
ux = vec(0,0), uy = vec(0,1), uz = vec(0,2),
vx = vec(1,0), vy = vec(1,1), vz = vec(1,2),
wx = vec(2,0), wy = vec(2,1), wz = vec(2,2),
n1 = (float)std::pow(1 + l1 + l2 + l3,-power1),
n2 = (float)std::pow(1 + l1 + l2 + l3,-power2);
*(ptrd0++) = n1*(ux*ux + vx*vx) + n2*wx*wx;
*(ptrd1++) = n1*(ux*uy + vx*vy) + n2*wx*wy;
*(ptrd2++) = n1*(ux*uz + vx*vz) + n2*wx*wz;
*(ptrd3++) = n1*(uy*uy + vy*vy) + n2*wy*wy;
*(ptrd4++) = n1*(uy*uz + vy*vz) + n2*wy*wz;
*(ptrd5++) = n1*(uz*uz + vz*vz) + n2*wz*wz;
}
}
} else { // for 2D images
get_structure_tensors().move_to(res).blur(sigma);
cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for cimg_openmp_if(_width>=(cimg_openmp_sizefactor)*256 &&
_height>=(cimg_openmp_sizefactor)*256))
cimg_forY(*this,y) {
Tfloat *ptrd0 = res.data(0,y,0,0), *ptrd1 = res.data(0,y,0,1), *ptrd2 = res.data(0,y,0,2);
CImg<floatT> val(2), vec(2,2);
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
res.get_tensor_at(x,y).symmetric_eigen(val,vec);
const float
_l1 = val[1], _l2 = val[0],
l1 = _l1>0?_l1:0, l2 = _l2>0?_l2:0,
ux = vec(1,0), uy = vec(1,1),
vx = vec(0,0), vy = vec(0,1),
n1 = (float)std::pow(1 + l1 + l2,-power1),
n2 = (float)std::pow(1 + l1 + l2,-power2);
*(ptrd0++) = n1*ux*ux + n2*vx*vx;
*(ptrd1++) = n1*ux*uy + n2*vx*vy;
*(ptrd2++) = n1*uy*uy + n2*vy*vy;
}
}
}
return res.move_to(*this);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
| 123,784,313,740,204,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
|
static int kvm_probe_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
{
u64 val;
int ret;
preempt_disable();
ret = rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = wrmsrl_safe(msr, val);
out:
preempt_enable();
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
| 3,186,523,772,328,528,400,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void)
{
free_kvm_area();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
16175a796d061833aacfbd9672235f2d2725df65
| 165,060,749,802,121,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
KVM: VMX: Don't allow uninhibited access to EFER on i386
vmx_set_msr() does not allow i386 guests to touch EFER, but they can still
do so through the default: label in the switch. If they set EFER_LME, they
can oops the host.
Fix by having EFER access through the normal channel (which will check for
EFER_LME) even on i386.
Reported-and-tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
|
RGWOp *RGWHandler_REST_Obj_S3::op_put()
{
if (is_acl_op()) {
return new RGWPutACLs_ObjStore_S3;
} else if (is_tagging_op()) {
return new RGWPutObjTags_ObjStore_S3;
}
if (s->init_state.src_bucket.empty())
return new RGWPutObj_ObjStore_S3;
else
return new RGWCopyObj_ObjStore_S3;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-79"
] |
ceph
|
ba0790a01ba5252db1ebc299db6e12cd758d0ff9
| 130,239,386,196,070,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
rgw: reject unauthenticated response-header actions
Signed-off-by: Matt Benjamin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d8dd5e513c0c62bbd7d3044d7e2eddcd897bd400)
|
static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
/* send off the data */
*len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(*len, *p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);
*len += 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
openssl
|
efbe126e3ebb9123ac9d058aa2bb044261342aaa
| 60,504,933,674,098,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
int kvm_emulate_mwait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
pr_warn_once("kvm: MWAIT instruction emulated as NOP!\n");
return kvm_emulate_as_nop(vcpu);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
| 210,641,963,107,107,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
local void check_match(s, start, match, length)
deflate_state *s;
IPos start, match;
int length;
{
/* check that the match is indeed a match */
if (zmemcmp(s->window + match,
s->window + start, length) != EQUAL) {
fprintf(stderr, " start %u, match %u, length %d\n",
start, match, length);
do {
fprintf(stderr, "%c%c", s->window[match++], s->window[start++]);
} while (--length != 0);
z_error("invalid match");
}
if (z_verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr,"\\[%d,%d]", start-match, length);
do { putc(s->window[start++], stderr); } while (--length != 0);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-787"
] |
zlib
|
5c44459c3b28a9bd3283aaceab7c615f8020c531
| 129,085,934,202,529,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Fix a bug that can crash deflate on some input when using Z_FIXED.
This bug was reported by Danilo Ramos of Eideticom, Inc. It has
lain in wait 13 years before being found! The bug was introduced
in zlib 1.2.2.2, with the addition of the Z_FIXED option. That
option forces the use of fixed Huffman codes. For rare inputs with
a large number of distant matches, the pending buffer into which
the compressed data is written can overwrite the distance symbol
table which it overlays. That results in corrupted output due to
invalid distances, and can result in out-of-bound accesses,
crashing the application.
The fix here combines the distance buffer and literal/length
buffers into a single symbol buffer. Now three bytes of pending
buffer space are opened up for each literal or length/distance
pair consumed, instead of the previous two bytes. This assures
that the pending buffer cannot overwrite the symbol table, since
the maximum fixed code compressed length/distance is 31 bits, and
since there are four bytes of pending space for every three bytes
of symbol space.
|
onig_set_capture_num_limit(int num)
{
if (num < 0) return -1;
MaxCaptureNum = num;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
oniguruma
|
f015fbdd95f76438cd86366467bb2b39870dd7c6
| 207,765,199,173,373,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
fix #55 : Byte value expressed in octal must be smaller than 256
|
static int pcd_detect(void)
{
char id[18];
int k, unit;
struct pcd_unit *cd;
printk("%s: %s version %s, major %d, nice %d\n",
name, name, PCD_VERSION, major, nice);
par_drv = pi_register_driver(name);
if (!par_drv) {
pr_err("failed to register %s driver\n", name);
return -1;
}
k = 0;
if (pcd_drive_count == 0) { /* nothing spec'd - so autoprobe for 1 */
cd = pcd;
if (pi_init(cd->pi, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, pcd_buffer,
PI_PCD, verbose, cd->name)) {
if (!pcd_probe(cd, -1, id) && cd->disk) {
cd->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(cd->pi);
}
} else {
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
int *conf = *drives[unit];
if (!conf[D_PRT])
continue;
if (!pi_init(cd->pi, 0, conf[D_PRT], conf[D_MOD],
conf[D_UNI], conf[D_PRO], conf[D_DLY],
pcd_buffer, PI_PCD, verbose, cd->name))
continue;
if (!pcd_probe(cd, conf[D_SLV], id) && cd->disk) {
cd->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(cd->pi);
}
}
if (k)
return 0;
printk("%s: No CD-ROM drive found\n", name);
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
blk_cleanup_queue(cd->disk->queue);
cd->disk->queue = NULL;
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&cd->tag_set);
put_disk(cd->disk);
}
pi_unregister_driver(par_drv);
return -1;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
f0d1762554014ce0ae347b9f0d088f2c157c8c72
| 137,177,783,197,349,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static void xudc_ep0_in(struct xusb_udc *udc)
{
struct xusb_ep *ep0 = &udc->ep[0];
struct xusb_req *req;
unsigned int bytes_to_tx;
void *buffer;
u32 epcfgreg;
u16 count = 0;
u16 length;
u8 *ep0rambase;
u8 test_mode = udc->setup.wIndex >> 8;
req = list_first_entry(&ep0->queue, struct xusb_req, queue);
bytes_to_tx = req->usb_req.length - req->usb_req.actual;
switch (udc->setupseqtx) {
case STATUS_PHASE:
switch (udc->setup.bRequest) {
case USB_REQ_SET_ADDRESS:
/* Set the address of the device.*/
udc->write_fn(udc->addr, XUSB_ADDRESS_OFFSET,
udc->setup.wValue);
break;
case USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE:
if (udc->setup.bRequestType ==
USB_RECIP_DEVICE) {
if (udc->setup.wValue ==
USB_DEVICE_TEST_MODE)
udc->write_fn(udc->addr,
XUSB_TESTMODE_OFFSET,
test_mode);
}
break;
}
req->usb_req.actual = req->usb_req.length;
xudc_done(ep0, req, 0);
break;
case DATA_PHASE:
if (!bytes_to_tx) {
/*
* We're done with data transfer, next
* will be zero length OUT with data toggle of
* 1. Setup data_toggle.
*/
epcfgreg = udc->read_fn(udc->addr + ep0->offset);
epcfgreg |= XUSB_EP_CFG_DATA_TOGGLE_MASK;
udc->write_fn(udc->addr, ep0->offset, epcfgreg);
udc->setupseqtx = STATUS_PHASE;
} else {
length = count = min_t(u32, bytes_to_tx,
EP0_MAX_PACKET);
/* Copy the data to be transmitted into the DPRAM. */
ep0rambase = (u8 __force *) (udc->addr +
(ep0->rambase << 2));
buffer = req->usb_req.buf + req->usb_req.actual;
req->usb_req.actual = req->usb_req.actual + length;
memcpy(ep0rambase, buffer, length);
}
udc->write_fn(udc->addr, XUSB_EP_BUF0COUNT_OFFSET, count);
udc->write_fn(udc->addr, XUSB_BUFFREADY_OFFSET, 1);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-129"
] |
linux
|
7f14c7227f342d9932f9b918893c8814f86d2a0d
| 67,923,076,886,364,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 |
USB: gadget: validate endpoint index for xilinx udc
Assure that host may not manipulate the index to point
past endpoint array.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
size_t copy_page_to_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
struct iov_iter *i)
{
if (i->type & (ITER_BVEC|ITER_KVEC)) {
void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
size_t wanted = copy_to_iter(kaddr + offset, bytes, i);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
return wanted;
} else if (likely(!(i->type & ITER_PIPE)))
return copy_page_to_iter_iovec(page, offset, bytes, i);
else
return copy_page_to_iter_pipe(page, offset, bytes, i);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
b9dc6f65bc5e232d1c05fe34b5daadc7e8bbf1fb
| 281,059,589,077,611,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
int mainwindow_set_statusbar_lines(MAIN_WINDOW_REC *window,
int top, int bottom)
{
int ret;
ret = -1;
if (top != 0) {
ret = window->statusbar_lines_top;
window->statusbar_lines_top += top;
window->statusbar_lines += top;
}
if (bottom != 0) {
ret = window->statusbar_lines_bottom;
window->statusbar_lines_bottom += bottom;
window->statusbar_lines += bottom;
}
if (top+bottom != 0)
window->size_dirty = TRUE;
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
irssi
|
5b5bfef03596d95079c728f65f523570dd7b03aa
| 227,661,854,212,568,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
check the error condition of mainwindow_create
|
pdf14_debug_mask_stack_state(pdf14_ctx *ctx)
{
return;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
ghostpdl
|
90fd0c7ca3efc1ddff64a86f4104b13b3ac969eb
| 310,083,210,586,374,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Bug 697456. Dont create new ctx when pdf14 device reenabled
This bug had yet another weird case where the user created a
file that pushed the pdf14 device twice. We were in that case,
creating a new ctx and blowing away the original one with out
proper clean up. To avoid, only create a new one when we need it.
|
irqreturn_t ipmi_si_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
{
struct smi_info *smi_info = data;
unsigned long flags;
if (smi_info->io.si_type == SI_BT)
/* We need to clear the IRQ flag for the BT interface. */
smi_info->io.outputb(&smi_info->io, IPMI_BT_INTMASK_REG,
IPMI_BT_INTMASK_CLEAR_IRQ_BIT
| IPMI_BT_INTMASK_ENABLE_IRQ_BIT);
spin_lock_irqsave(&(smi_info->si_lock), flags);
smi_inc_stat(smi_info, interrupts);
debug_timestamp("Interrupt");
smi_event_handler(smi_info, 0);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&(smi_info->si_lock), flags);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4
| 294,510,458,971,835,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
|
int _gnutls_session_is_psk(gnutls_session_t session)
{
gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx;
kx = session->security_parameters.cs->kx_algorithm;
if (kx == GNUTLS_KX_PSK || kx == GNUTLS_KX_DHE_PSK
|| kx == GNUTLS_KX_RSA_PSK)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
gnutls
|
3d7fae761e65e9d0f16d7247ee8a464d4fe002da
| 53,296,907,857,597,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
valgrind: check if session ticket key is used without initialization
This adds a valgrind client request for
session->key.session_ticket_key to make sure that it is not used
without initialization.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_apply_peer_addr_params(struct sctp_paddrparams *params,
struct sctp_transport *trans,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_sock *sp,
int hb_change,
int pmtud_change,
int sackdelay_change)
{
int error;
if (params->spp_flags & SPP_HB_DEMAND && trans) {
struct net *net = sock_net(trans->asoc->base.sk);
error = sctp_primitive_REQUESTHEARTBEAT(net, trans->asoc, trans);
if (error)
return error;
}
/* Note that unless the spp_flag is set to SPP_HB_ENABLE the value of
* this field is ignored. Note also that a value of zero indicates
* the current setting should be left unchanged.
*/
if (params->spp_flags & SPP_HB_ENABLE) {
/* Re-zero the interval if the SPP_HB_TIME_IS_ZERO is
* set. This lets us use 0 value when this flag
* is set.
*/
if (params->spp_flags & SPP_HB_TIME_IS_ZERO)
params->spp_hbinterval = 0;
if (params->spp_hbinterval ||
(params->spp_flags & SPP_HB_TIME_IS_ZERO)) {
if (trans) {
trans->hbinterval =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_hbinterval);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->hbinterval =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_hbinterval);
} else {
sp->hbinterval = params->spp_hbinterval;
}
}
}
if (hb_change) {
if (trans) {
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_HB) | hb_change;
}
}
/* When Path MTU discovery is disabled the value specified here will
* be the "fixed" path mtu (i.e. the value of the spp_flags field must
* include the flag SPP_PMTUD_DISABLE for this field to have any
* effect).
*/
if ((params->spp_flags & SPP_PMTUD_DISABLE) && params->spp_pathmtu) {
if (trans) {
trans->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
} else {
sp->pathmtu = params->spp_pathmtu;
}
}
if (pmtud_change) {
if (trans) {
int update = (trans->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_DISABLE) &&
(params->spp_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE);
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
if (update) {
sctp_transport_pmtu(trans, sctp_opt2sk(sp));
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
}
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_PMTUD) | pmtud_change;
}
}
/* Note that unless the spp_flag is set to SPP_SACKDELAY_ENABLE the
* value of this field is ignored. Note also that a value of zero
* indicates the current setting should be left unchanged.
*/
if ((params->spp_flags & SPP_SACKDELAY_ENABLE) && params->spp_sackdelay) {
if (trans) {
trans->sackdelay =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_sackdelay);
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->sackdelay =
msecs_to_jiffies(params->spp_sackdelay);
} else {
sp->sackdelay = params->spp_sackdelay;
}
}
if (sackdelay_change) {
if (trans) {
trans->param_flags =
(trans->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->param_flags =
(asoc->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
} else {
sp->param_flags =
(sp->param_flags & ~SPP_SACKDELAY) |
sackdelay_change;
}
}
/* Note that a value of zero indicates the current setting should be
left unchanged.
*/
if (params->spp_pathmaxrxt) {
if (trans) {
trans->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
} else if (asoc) {
asoc->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
} else {
sp->pathmaxrxt = params->spp_pathmaxrxt;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74
| 266,104,679,336,253,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 140 |
sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
aggregate(struct task_group *tg, struct sched_domain *sd)
{
return &tg->cfs_rq[sd->first_cpu]->aggregate;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c
| 238,394,624,123,556,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To compute 2's load we do:
weight(2) weight(B)
------------ * -----------
rq_weight(B) rw_weight(A)
This yields load fractions in comparable units.
The consequence is that it changes virtual time. We used to have:
time_{i}
vtime_{i} = ------------
weight_{i}
vtime = \Sum vtime_{i} = time / rq_weight.
But with the new way of load calculation we get that vtime equals time.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void udf_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
int want_delete = 0;
if (!is_bad_inode(inode)) {
if (!inode->i_nlink) {
want_delete = 1;
udf_setsize(inode, 0);
udf_update_inode(inode, IS_SYNC(inode));
}
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB &&
inode->i_size != iinfo->i_lenExtents) {
udf_warn(inode->i_sb,
"Inode %lu (mode %o) has inode size %llu different from extent length %llu. Filesystem need not be standards compliant.\n",
inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode,
(unsigned long long)inode->i_size,
(unsigned long long)iinfo->i_lenExtents);
}
}
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
invalidate_inode_buffers(inode);
clear_inode(inode);
kfree(iinfo->i_data);
iinfo->i_data = NULL;
udf_clear_extent_cache(inode);
if (want_delete) {
udf_free_inode(inode);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
7fc3b7c2981bbd1047916ade327beccb90994eee
| 184,298,838,756,135,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
udf: Fix NULL ptr deref when converting from inline format
udf_expand_file_adinicb() calls directly ->writepage to write data
expanded into a page. This however misses to setup inode for writeback
properly and so we can crash on inode->i_wb dereference when submitting
page for IO like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
...
<TASK>
__folio_start_writeback+0x2ac/0x350
__block_write_full_page+0x37d/0x490
udf_expand_file_adinicb+0x255/0x400 [udf]
udf_file_write_iter+0xbe/0x1b0 [udf]
new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0
vfs_write+0x28e/0x400
Fix the problem by marking the page dirty and going through the standard
writeback path to write the page. Strictly speaking we would not even
have to write the page but we want to catch e.g. ENOSPC errors early.
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Fixes: 52ebea749aae ("writeback: make backing_dev_info host cgroup-specific bdi_writebacks")
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
|
static int do_help(const char *prog)
{
printf("%s, NPAPI plugin viewer. Version %s\n", NPW_VIEWER, NPW_VERSION);
printf("\n");
printf("usage: %s [GTK flags] [flags]\n", prog);
printf(" -h --help print this message\n");
printf(" -t --test check plugin is compatible\n");
printf(" -i --info print plugin information\n");
printf(" -p --plugin set plugin path\n");
printf(" -c --connection set connection path\n");
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
nspluginwrapper
|
7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98
| 299,312,719,975,859,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Support all the new variables added
|
char* crypto_cert_issuer(X509* xcert)
{
return crypto_print_name(X509_get_issuer_name(xcert));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
FreeRDP
|
8305349a943c68b1bc8c158f431dc607655aadea
| 205,497,471,462,574,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fixed GHSL-2020-102 heap overflow
(cherry picked from commit 197b16cc15a12813c2e4fa2d6ae9cd9c4a57e581)
|
smb2_negotiate_rsize(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
unsigned int rsize;
/* start with specified rsize, or default */
rsize = ctx->rsize ? ctx->rsize : CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE;
rsize = min_t(unsigned int, rsize, server->max_read);
if (!(server->capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_LARGE_MTU))
rsize = min_t(unsigned int, rsize, SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE);
return rsize;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
d6f5e358452479fa8a773b5c6ccc9e4ec5a20880
| 58,088,063,839,937,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
cifs: fix NULL ptr dereference in smb2_ioctl_query_info()
When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid
smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying
to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array.
This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init()
which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them.
Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#define die(s) perror(s), exit(1)
#define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
if (argc < 2)
exit(1);
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
die("open");
if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1)
die("ioctl");
close(fd);
return 0;
}
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...
gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0
[ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4
[ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
[ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2
[ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs]
[ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48
[ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256
[ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d
[ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0
[ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800
[ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8
[ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 1832.132801] Call Trace:
[ 1832.132962] <TASK>
[ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs]
[ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs]
[ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs]
[ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs]
[ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs]
[ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs]
[ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs]
[ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0
[ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710
[ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0
[ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0
[ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
[ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df
[ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
[ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df
[ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e
[ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48
[ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000
[ 1832.142851] </TASK>
[ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
|
do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int thread_flags, int syscall)
{
if (thread_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
do_signal(¤t->blocked, regs, syscall);
if (thread_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
}
}
| 1 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f
| 43,731,854,912,297,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
link_info_got_data (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
gboolean result,
goffset bytes_read,
char *file_contents)
{
char *link_uri, *uri, *name, *icon;
gboolean is_launcher;
gboolean is_foreign;
nautilus_directory_ref (directory);
uri = NULL;
name = NULL;
icon = NULL;
is_launcher = FALSE;
is_foreign = FALSE;
/* Handle the case where we read the Nautilus link. */
if (result) {
link_uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (file);
nautilus_link_get_link_info_given_file_contents (file_contents, bytes_read, link_uri,
&uri, &name, &icon, &is_launcher, &is_foreign);
g_free (link_uri);
} else {
/* FIXME bugzilla.gnome.org 42433: We should report this error to the user. */
}
nautilus_file_ref (file);
link_info_done (directory, file, uri, name, icon, is_launcher, is_foreign);
nautilus_file_changed (file);
nautilus_file_unref (file);
g_free (uri);
g_free (name);
g_free (icon);
nautilus_directory_unref (directory);
}
| 0 |
[] |
nautilus
|
7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983
| 161,893,264,456,971,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003
|
read_cups_files_conf(cups_file_t *fp) /* I - File to read from */
{
int linenum; /* Current line number */
char line[HTTP_MAX_BUFFER], /* Line from file */
*value; /* Value from line */
struct group *group; /* Group */
/*
* Loop through each line in the file...
*/
linenum = 0;
while (cupsFileGetConf(fp, line, sizeof(line), &value, &linenum))
{
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FatalErrors"))
FatalErrors = parse_fatal_errors(value);
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Group") && value)
{
/*
* Group ID to run as...
*/
if (isdigit(value[0]))
Group = (gid_t)atoi(value);
else
{
endgrent();
group = getgrnam(value);
if (group != NULL)
Group = group->gr_gid;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown Group \"%s\" on line %d of %s.", value,
linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PrintcapFormat") && value)
{
/*
* Format of printcap file?
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "bsd"))
PrintcapFormat = PRINTCAP_BSD;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "plist"))
PrintcapFormat = PRINTCAP_PLIST;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "solaris"))
PrintcapFormat = PRINTCAP_SOLARIS;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown PrintcapFormat \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Sandboxing") && value)
{
/*
* Level of sandboxing?
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "off") && getuid())
{
Sandboxing = CUPSD_SANDBOXING_OFF;
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Disabling sandboxing is not recommended (line %d of %s)", linenum, CupsFilesFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "relaxed"))
Sandboxing = CUPSD_SANDBOXING_RELAXED;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "strict"))
Sandboxing = CUPSD_SANDBOXING_STRICT;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown Sandboxing \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SystemGroup") && value)
{
/*
* SystemGroup (admin) group(s)...
*/
if (!parse_groups(value, linenum))
{
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "User") && value)
{
/*
* User ID to run as...
*/
if (isdigit(value[0] & 255))
{
int uid = atoi(value);
if (!uid)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Will not use User 0 as specified on line %d of %s "
"for security reasons. You must use a non-"
"privileged account instead.",
linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
else
User = (uid_t)atoi(value);
}
else
{
struct passwd *p; /* Password information */
endpwent();
p = getpwnam(value);
if (p)
{
if (!p->pw_uid)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Will not use User %s (UID=0) as specified on line "
"%d of %s for security reasons. You must use a "
"non-privileged account instead.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
else
User = p->pw_uid;
}
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown User \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerCertificate") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerKey"))
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO,
"The \"%s\" directive on line %d of %s is no longer "
"supported; this will become an error in a future "
"release.",
line, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
}
else if (!parse_variable(CupsFilesFile, linenum, line, value,
sizeof(cupsfiles_vars) / sizeof(cupsfiles_vars[0]),
cupsfiles_vars) &&
(FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG))
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
| 1 |
[] |
cups
|
d47f6aec436e0e9df6554436e391471097686ecc
| 134,273,984,066,564,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 173 |
Fix local privilege escalation to root and sandbox bypasses in scheduler
(rdar://37836779, rdar://37836995, rdar://37837252, rdar://37837581)
|
static struct blkcg_gq *blkg_create(struct blkcg *blkcg,
struct request_queue *q,
struct blkcg_gq *new_blkg)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg;
struct bdi_writeback_congested *wb_congested;
int i, ret;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
/* blkg holds a reference to blkcg */
if (!css_tryget_online(&blkcg->css)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_free_blkg;
}
wb_congested = wb_congested_get_create(q->backing_dev_info,
blkcg->css.id,
GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!wb_congested) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_put_css;
}
/* allocate */
if (!new_blkg) {
new_blkg = blkg_alloc(blkcg, q, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (unlikely(!new_blkg)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_put_congested;
}
}
blkg = new_blkg;
blkg->wb_congested = wb_congested;
/* link parent */
if (blkcg_parent(blkcg)) {
blkg->parent = __blkg_lookup(blkcg_parent(blkcg), q, false);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!blkg->parent)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_put_congested;
}
blkg_get(blkg->parent);
}
/* invoke per-policy init */
for (i = 0; i < BLKCG_MAX_POLS; i++) {
struct blkcg_policy *pol = blkcg_policy[i];
if (blkg->pd[i] && pol->pd_init_fn)
pol->pd_init_fn(blkg->pd[i]);
}
/* insert */
spin_lock(&blkcg->lock);
ret = radix_tree_insert(&blkcg->blkg_tree, q->id, blkg);
if (likely(!ret)) {
hlist_add_head_rcu(&blkg->blkcg_node, &blkcg->blkg_list);
list_add(&blkg->q_node, &q->blkg_list);
for (i = 0; i < BLKCG_MAX_POLS; i++) {
struct blkcg_policy *pol = blkcg_policy[i];
if (blkg->pd[i] && pol->pd_online_fn)
pol->pd_online_fn(blkg->pd[i]);
}
}
blkg->online = true;
spin_unlock(&blkcg->lock);
if (!ret)
return blkg;
/* @blkg failed fully initialized, use the usual release path */
blkg_put(blkg);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
err_put_congested:
wb_congested_put(wb_congested);
err_put_css:
css_put(&blkcg->css);
err_free_blkg:
blkg_free(new_blkg);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
linux
|
9b54d816e00425c3a517514e0d677bb3cec49258
| 180,498,343,183,135,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 |
blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
return SUCCESS;
}
static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(tidy)
{
REGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
REGISTER_TIDY_CLASS(tidy, doc, NULL, 0);
REGISTER_TIDY_CLASS(tidyNode, node, NULL, ZEND_ACC_FINAL_CLASS);
tidy_object_handlers_doc.cast_object = tidy_doc_cast_handler;
tidy_object_handlers_node.cast_object = tidy_node_cast_handler;
_php_tidy_register_tags(INIT_FUNC_ARGS_PASSTHRU);
_php_tidy_register_nodetypes(INIT_FUNC_ARGS_PASSTHRU);
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd
| 14,869,540,238,980,655,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
- fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus
|
TEST_P(Http2CodecImplTest, PriorityFlood) {
priorityFlood();
EXPECT_THROW(client_->sendPendingFrames(), ServerCodecError);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c
| 320,037,149,223,144,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount of data buffered.
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned long get_sb_block(void **data)
{
unsigned long sb_block;
char *options = (char *) *data;
if (!options || strncmp(options, "sb=", 3) != 0)
return 1; /* Default location */
options += 3;
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
printk("EXT2-fs: Invalid sb specification: %s\n",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}
if (*options == ',')
options++;
*data = (void *) options;
return sb_block;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-241",
"CWE-19"
] |
linux
|
be0726d33cb8f411945884664924bed3cb8c70ee
| 228,779,041,997,005,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err pasp_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_PixelAspectRatioBox *ptr = (GF_PixelAspectRatioBox*)s;
ptr->hSpacing = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->vSpacing = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 8);
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
gpac
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
| 54,777,020,291,323,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
static void nvme_compare_mdata_cb(void *opaque, int ret)
{
NvmeRequest *req = opaque;
NvmeNamespace *ns = req->ns;
NvmeCtrl *n = nvme_ctrl(req);
NvmeRwCmd *rw = (NvmeRwCmd *)&req->cmd;
uint8_t prinfo = NVME_RW_PRINFO(le16_to_cpu(rw->control));
uint16_t apptag = le16_to_cpu(rw->apptag);
uint16_t appmask = le16_to_cpu(rw->appmask);
uint32_t reftag = le32_to_cpu(rw->reftag);
struct nvme_compare_ctx *ctx = req->opaque;
g_autofree uint8_t *buf = NULL;
BlockBackend *blk = ns->blkconf.blk;
BlockAcctCookie *acct = &req->acct;
BlockAcctStats *stats = blk_get_stats(blk);
uint16_t status = NVME_SUCCESS;
trace_pci_nvme_compare_mdata_cb(nvme_cid(req));
if (ret) {
block_acct_failed(stats, acct);
nvme_aio_err(req, ret);
goto out;
}
buf = g_malloc(ctx->mdata.iov.size);
status = nvme_bounce_mdata(n, buf, ctx->mdata.iov.size,
NVME_TX_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, req);
if (status) {
req->status = status;
goto out;
}
if (NVME_ID_NS_DPS_TYPE(ns->id_ns.dps)) {
uint64_t slba = le64_to_cpu(rw->slba);
uint8_t *bufp;
uint8_t *mbufp = ctx->mdata.bounce;
uint8_t *end = mbufp + ctx->mdata.iov.size;
int16_t pil = 0;
status = nvme_dif_check(ns, ctx->data.bounce, ctx->data.iov.size,
ctx->mdata.bounce, ctx->mdata.iov.size, prinfo,
slba, apptag, appmask, &reftag);
if (status) {
req->status = status;
goto out;
}
/*
* When formatted with protection information, do not compare the DIF
* tuple.
*/
if (!(ns->id_ns.dps & NVME_ID_NS_DPS_FIRST_EIGHT)) {
pil = ns->lbaf.ms - sizeof(NvmeDifTuple);
}
for (bufp = buf; mbufp < end; bufp += ns->lbaf.ms, mbufp += ns->lbaf.ms) {
if (memcmp(bufp + pil, mbufp + pil, ns->lbaf.ms - pil)) {
req->status = NVME_CMP_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
}
goto out;
}
if (memcmp(buf, ctx->mdata.bounce, ctx->mdata.iov.size)) {
req->status = NVME_CMP_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
block_acct_done(stats, acct);
out:
qemu_iovec_destroy(&ctx->data.iov);
g_free(ctx->data.bounce);
qemu_iovec_destroy(&ctx->mdata.iov);
g_free(ctx->mdata.bounce);
g_free(ctx);
nvme_enqueue_req_completion(nvme_cq(req), req);
}
| 0 |
[] |
qemu
|
736b01642d85be832385063f278fe7cd4ffb5221
| 113,327,137,796,586,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 |
hw/nvme: fix CVE-2021-3929
This fixes CVE-2021-3929 "locally" by denying DMA to the iomem of the
device itself. This still allows DMA to MMIO regions of other devices
(e.g. doing P2P DMA to the controller memory buffer of another NVMe
device).
Fixes: CVE-2021-3929
Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <[email protected]>
|
void PSOutputDev::writeXpdfProcset() {
GBool lev1, lev2, lev3, sep, nonSep;
char **p;
char *q;
writePSFmt("%%BeginResource: procset xpdf {0:s} 0\n", "3.00");
writePSFmt("%%Copyright: {0:s}\n", xpdfCopyright);
lev1 = lev2 = lev3 = sep = nonSep = gTrue;
for (p = prolog; *p; ++p) {
if ((*p)[0] == '~') {
lev1 = lev2 = lev3 = sep = nonSep = gFalse;
for (q = *p + 1; *q; ++q) {
switch (*q) {
case '1': lev1 = gTrue; break;
case '2': lev2 = gTrue; break;
case '3': lev3 = gTrue; break;
case 's': sep = gTrue; break;
case 'n': nonSep = gTrue; break;
}
}
} else if ((level == psLevel1 && lev1 && nonSep) ||
(level == psLevel1Sep && lev1 && sep) ||
(level == psLevel2 && lev2 && nonSep) ||
(level == psLevel2Sep && lev2 && sep) ||
(level == psLevel3 && lev3 && nonSep) ||
(level == psLevel3Sep && lev3 && sep)) {
writePSFmt("{0:s}\n", *p);
}
}
writePS("%%EndResource\n");
if (level >= psLevel3) {
for (p = cmapProlog; *p; ++p) {
writePSFmt("{0:s}\n", *p);
}
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
poppler
|
abf167af8b15e5f3b510275ce619e6fdb42edd40
| 169,190,468,809,389,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
Implement tiling/patterns in SplashOutputDev
Fixes bug 13518
|
static void MagickPNGWarningHandler(png_struct *ping,png_const_charp message)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
PNGErrorInfo
*error_info;
if (LocaleCompare(message, "Missing PLTE before tRNS") == 0)
png_error(ping, message);
error_info=(PNGErrorInfo *) png_get_error_ptr(ping);
image=error_info->image;
exception=error_info->exception;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" libpng-%s warning: %s", png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),message);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderWarning,
message,"`%s'",image->filename);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
ImageMagick
|
816ecab6c532ae086ff4186b3eaf4aa7092d536f
| 155,862,348,082,870,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
|
xmlIsLetter(int c) {
return(IS_BASECHAR(c) || IS_IDEOGRAPHIC(c));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
libxml2
|
23f05e0c33987d6605387b300c4be5da2120a7ab
| 162,438,645,702,244,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Detect excessive entities expansion upon replacement
If entities expansion in the XML parser is asked for,
it is possble to craft relatively small input document leading
to excessive on-the-fly content generation.
This patch accounts for those replacement and stop parsing
after a given threshold. it can be bypassed as usual with the
HUGE parser option.
|
void mlsd_fact(char fact, char *buf, size_t len, char *name, char *perms, struct stat *st)
{
char size[20];
switch (fact) {
case 'm':
strlcat(buf, "modify=", len);
strlcat(buf, mlsd_time(st->st_mtime), len);
break;
case 'p':
strlcat(buf, "perm=", len);
strlcat(buf, perms, len);
break;
case 't':
strlcat(buf, "type=", len);
strlcat(buf, mlsd_type(name, st->st_mode), len);
break;
case 's':
if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode))
return;
snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "size=%" PRIu64, st->st_size);
strlcat(buf, size, len);
break;
default:
return;
}
strlcat(buf, ";", len);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
uftpd
|
0fb2c031ce0ace07cc19cd2cb2143c4b5a63c9dd
| 269,265,994,209,335,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
FTP: Fix buffer overflow in PORT parser, reported by Aaron Esau
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <[email protected]>
|
int cli_matchmeta(cli_ctx *ctx, const char *fname, size_t fsizec, size_t fsizer, int encrypted, unsigned int filepos, int res1, void *res2)
{
const struct cli_cdb *cdb;
unsigned int viruses_found = 0;
int ret = CL_CLEAN;
cli_dbgmsg("CDBNAME:%s:%llu:%s:%llu:%llu:%d:%u:%u:%p\n",
cli_ftname(cli_get_container_type(ctx, -1)), (long long unsigned)fsizec, fname, (long long unsigned)fsizec, (long long unsigned)fsizer,
encrypted, filepos, res1, res2);
if (ctx->engine && ctx->engine->cb_meta)
if (ctx->engine->cb_meta(cli_ftname(cli_get_container_type(ctx, -1)), fsizec, fname, fsizer, encrypted, filepos, ctx->cb_ctx) == CL_VIRUS) {
cli_dbgmsg("inner file blacklisted by callback: %s\n", fname);
ret = cli_append_virus(ctx, "Detected.By.Callback");
viruses_found++;
if(!SCAN_ALL || ret != CL_CLEAN)
return ret;
}
if(!ctx->engine || !(cdb = ctx->engine->cdb))
return CL_CLEAN;
do {
if(cdb->ctype != CL_TYPE_ANY && cdb->ctype != cli_get_container_type(ctx, -1))
continue;
if(cdb->encrypted != 2 && cdb->encrypted != encrypted)
continue;
if(cdb->res1 && (cdb->ctype == CL_TYPE_ZIP || cdb->ctype == CL_TYPE_RAR) && cdb->res1 != res1)
continue;
#define CDBRANGE(field, val) \
if(field[0] != CLI_OFF_ANY) { \
if(field[0] == field[1] && field[0] != val) \
continue; \
else if(field[0] != field[1] && ((field[0] && field[0] > val) ||\
(field[1] && field[1] < val))) \
continue; \
}
CDBRANGE(cdb->csize, cli_get_container_size(ctx, -1));
CDBRANGE(cdb->fsizec, fsizec);
CDBRANGE(cdb->fsizer, fsizer);
CDBRANGE(cdb->filepos, filepos);
if(cdb->name.re_magic && (!fname || cli_regexec(&cdb->name, fname, 0, NULL, 0) == REG_NOMATCH))
continue;
ret = cli_append_virus(ctx, cdb->virname);
viruses_found++;
if(!SCAN_ALL || ret != CL_CLEAN)
return ret;
} while((cdb = cdb->next));
if (SCAN_ALL && viruses_found)
return CL_VIRUS;
return CL_CLEAN;
}
| 1 |
[] |
clamav-devel
|
167c0079292814ec5523d0b97a9e1b002bf8819b
| 117,389,727,780,499,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 61 |
fix 0.99.3 false negative of virus Pdf.Exploit.CVE_2016_1046-1.
|
set_unix_port(edge_connection_t *conn, rend_service_port_config_t *p)
{
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(p);
tor_assert(p->is_unix_addr);
conn->base_.socket_family = AF_UNIX;
tor_addr_make_unspec(&conn->base_.addr);
conn->base_.port = 1;
conn->base_.address = tor_strdup(p->unix_addr);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-532"
] |
tor
|
09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
| 172,730,866,335,438,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
|
bool isRoutable() const override { return false; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
dfddb529e914d794ac552e906b13d71233609bf7
| 185,242,985,801,624,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
listener: Add configurable accepted connection limits (#153)
Add support for per-listener limits on accepted connections.
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]>
|
static void ipa_region_frame(wmfAPI * API, wmfPolyRectangle_t * poly_rect)
{
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
if (TO_FILL(poly_rect) || TO_DRAW(poly_rect))
{
long
i;
draw_fill_color_string(WmfDrawingWand,"none");
util_set_brush(API, poly_rect->dc, BrushApplyStroke);
for (i = 0; i < (long) poly_rect->count; i++)
{
DrawRectangle(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(poly_rect->TL[i].x), YC(poly_rect->TL[i].y),
XC(poly_rect->BR[i].x), YC(poly_rect->BR[i].y));
}
}
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
ImageMagick
|
b2b48d50300a9fbcd0aa0d9230fd6d7a08f7671e
| 36,851,430,811,751,483,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/544
|
static int sctp_setsockopt_default_sndinfo(struct sock *sk,
struct sctp_sndinfo *info,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (optlen != sizeof(*info))
return -EINVAL;
if (info->snd_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info->snd_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && info->snd_assoc_id > SCTP_ALL_ASSOC &&
sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
asoc->default_stream = info->snd_sid;
asoc->default_flags = info->snd_flags;
asoc->default_ppid = info->snd_ppid;
asoc->default_context = info->snd_context;
return 0;
}
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP))
info->snd_assoc_id = SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC;
if (info->snd_assoc_id == SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC ||
info->snd_assoc_id == SCTP_ALL_ASSOC) {
sp->default_stream = info->snd_sid;
sp->default_flags = info->snd_flags;
sp->default_ppid = info->snd_ppid;
sp->default_context = info->snd_context;
}
if (info->snd_assoc_id == SCTP_CURRENT_ASSOC ||
info->snd_assoc_id == SCTP_ALL_ASSOC) {
list_for_each_entry(asoc, &sp->ep->asocs, asocs) {
asoc->default_stream = info->snd_sid;
asoc->default_flags = info->snd_flags;
asoc->default_ppid = info->snd_ppid;
asoc->default_context = info->snd_context;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
b166a20b07382b8bc1dcee2a448715c9c2c81b5b
| 15,348,127,749,340,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
net/sctp: fix race condition in sctp_destroy_sock
If sctp_destroy_sock is called without sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock
held and sp->do_auto_asconf is true, then an element is removed
from the auto_asconf_splist without any proper locking.
This can happen in the following functions:
1. In sctp_accept, if sctp_sock_migrate fails.
2. In inet_create or inet6_create, if there is a bpf program
attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE which denies
creation of the sctp socket.
The bug is fixed by acquiring addr_wq_lock in sctp_destroy_sock
instead of sctp_close.
This addresses CVE-2021-23133.
Reported-by: Or Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Fixes: 610236587600 ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
TEST_P(RBACIntegrationTest, HeaderMatchCondition) {
config_helper_.addFilter(fmt::format(RBAC_CONFIG_HEADER_MATCH_CONDITION, "yyy"));
initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
auto response = codec_client_->makeRequestWithBody(
Http::TestRequestHeaderMapImpl{
{":method", "POST"},
{":path", "/path"},
{":scheme", "http"},
{":authority", "host"},
{"xxx", "yyy"},
},
1024);
waitForNextUpstreamRequest();
upstream_request_->encodeHeaders(Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl{{":status", "200"}}, true);
response->waitForEndStream();
ASSERT_TRUE(response->complete());
EXPECT_EQ("200", response->headers().getStatusValue());
}
| 0 |
[] |
envoy
|
2c60632d41555ec8b3d9ef5246242be637a2db0f
| 60,391,297,392,304,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
http: header map security fixes for duplicate headers (#197)
Previously header matching did not match on all headers for
non-inline headers. This patch changes the default behavior to
always logically match on all headers. Multiple individual
headers will be logically concatenated with ',' similar to what
is done with inline headers. This makes the behavior effectively
consistent. This behavior can be temporary reverted by setting
the runtime value "envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers"
to "false".
Targeted fixes have been additionally performed on the following
extensions which make them consider all duplicate headers by default as
a comma concatenated list:
1) Any extension using CEL matching on headers.
2) The header to metadata filter.
3) The JWT filter.
4) The Lua filter.
Like primary header matching used in routing, RBAC, etc. this behavior
can be disabled by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers" to false.
Finally, the setCopy() header map API previously only set the first
header in the case of duplicate non-inline headers. setCopy() now
behaves similiarly to the other set*() APIs and replaces all found
headers with a single value. This may have had security implications
in the extauth filter which uses this API. This behavior can be disabled
by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.http_set_copy_replace_all_headers" to false.
Fixes https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy-setec/issues/188
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
|
static void *rose_neigh_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) ? rose_neigh_list
: ((struct rose_neigh *)v)->next;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
148ca04518070910739dfc4eeda765057856403d
| 259,345,453,213,798,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
net: rose: fix UAF bug caused by rose_t0timer_expiry
There are UAF bugs caused by rose_t0timer_expiry(). The
root cause is that del_timer() could not stop the timer
handler that is running and there is no synchronization.
One of the race conditions is shown below:
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
| rose_device_event
| rose_rt_device_down
| rose_remove_neigh
rose_t0timer_expiry | rose_stop_t0timer(rose_neigh)
... | del_timer(&neigh->t0timer)
| kfree(rose_neigh) //[1]FREE
neigh->dce_mode //[2]USE |
The rose_neigh is deallocated in position [1] and use in
position [2].
The crash trace triggered by POC is like below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in expire_timers+0x144/0x320
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888009b19658 by task swapper/0/0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x230
? expire_timers+0x144/0x320
kasan_report+0xed/0x120
? expire_timers+0x144/0x320
expire_timers+0x144/0x320
__run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0
run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80
__do_softirq+0x233/0x544
...
This patch changes rose_stop_ftimer() and rose_stop_t0timer()
in rose_remove_neigh() to del_timer_sync() in order that the
timer handler could be finished before the resources such as
rose_neigh and so on are deallocated. As a result, the UAF
bugs could be mitigated.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
ProcQueueInit(PROC_QUEUE *queue)
{
SHMQueueInit(&(queue->links));
queue->size = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-89"
] |
postgres
|
2b3a8b20c2da9f39ffecae25ab7c66974fbc0d3b
| 11,231,703,852,939,038,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Be more careful to not lose sync in the FE/BE protocol.
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244
|
static bool cmd_read_dma(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
bool lba48 = (cmd == WIN_READDMA_EXT);
if (!s->blk) {
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
ide_cmd_lba48_transform(s, lba48);
ide_sector_start_dma(s, IDE_DMA_READ);
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
qemu
|
3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
| 105,715,145,536,075,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
ide: Correct handling of malformed/short PRDTs
This impacts both BMDMA and AHCI HBA interfaces for IDE.
Currently, we confuse the difference between a PRDT having
"0 bytes" and a PRDT having "0 complete sectors."
When we receive an incomplete sector, inconsistent error checking
leads to an infinite loop wherein the call succeeds, but it
didn't give us enough bytes -- leading us to re-call the
DMA chain over and over again. This leads to, in the BMDMA case,
leaked memory for short PRDTs, and infinite loops and resource
usage in the AHCI case.
The .prepare_buf() callback is reworked to return the number of
bytes that it successfully prepared. 0 is a valid, non-error
answer that means the table was empty and described no bytes.
-1 indicates an error.
Our current implementation uses the io_buffer in IDEState to
ultimately describe the size of a prepared scatter-gather list.
Even though the AHCI PRDT/SGList can be as large as 256GiB, the
AHCI command header limits transactions to just 4GiB. ATA8-ACS3,
however, defines the largest transaction to be an LBA48 command
that transfers 65,536 sectors. With a 512 byte sector size, this
is just 32MiB.
Since our current state structures use the int type to describe
the size of the buffer, and this state is migrated as int32, we
are limited to describing 2GiB buffer sizes unless we change the
migration protocol.
For this reason, this patch begins to unify the assertions in the
IDE pathways that the scatter-gather list provided by either the
AHCI PRDT or the PCI BMDMA PRDs can only describe, at a maximum,
2GiB. This should be resilient enough unless we need a sector
size that exceeds 32KiB.
Further, the likelihood of any guest operating system actually
attempting to transfer this much data in a single operation is
very slim.
To this end, the IDEState variables have been updated to more
explicitly clarify our maximum supported size. Callers to the
prepare_buf callback have been reworked to understand the new
return code, and all versions of the prepare_buf callback have
been adjusted accordingly.
Lastly, the ahci_populate_sglist helper, relied upon by the
AHCI implementation of .prepare_buf() as well as the PCI
implementation of the callback have had overflow assertions
added to help make clear the reasonings behind the various
type changes.
[Added %d -> %"PRId64" fix John sent because off_pos changed from int to
int64_t.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: John Snow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
|
static int dec(struct cstate *g, int c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0';
die(g, "invalid quantifier");
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-674"
] |
mujs
|
160ae29578054dc09fd91e5401ef040d52797e61
| 35,942,881,872,111,996,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Issue #162: Check stack overflow during regexp compilation.
Only bother checking during the first compilation pass that counts
the size of the program.
|
Item_cache_real(THD *thd, const Type_handler *h)
:Item_cache(thd, h),
value(0)
{}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8
| 135,494,014,456,997,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item.
|
RateLimiter(qqueue_t *pThis)
{
DEFiRet;
int iDelay;
int iHrCurr;
time_t tCurr;
struct tm m;
ISOBJ_TYPE_assert(pThis, qqueue);
iDelay = 0;
if(pThis->iDeqtWinToHr != 25) { /* 25 means disabled */
/* time calls are expensive, so only do them when needed */
datetime.GetTime(&tCurr);
localtime_r(&tCurr, &m);
iHrCurr = m.tm_hour;
if(pThis->iDeqtWinToHr < pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr) {
if(iHrCurr < pThis->iDeqtWinToHr || iHrCurr > pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr) {
; /* do not delay */
} else {
iDelay = (pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr - iHrCurr) * 3600;
/* this time, we are already into the next hour, so we need
* to subtract our current minute and seconds.
*/
iDelay -= m.tm_min * 60;
iDelay -= m.tm_sec;
}
} else {
if(iHrCurr >= pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr && iHrCurr < pThis->iDeqtWinToHr) {
; /* do not delay */
} else {
if(iHrCurr < pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr) {
iDelay = (pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr - iHrCurr - 1) * 3600; /* -1 as we are already in the hour */
iDelay += (60 - m.tm_min) * 60;
iDelay += 60 - m.tm_sec;
} else {
iDelay = (24 - iHrCurr + pThis->iDeqtWinFromHr) * 3600;
/* this time, we are already into the next hour, so we need
* to subtract our current minute and seconds.
*/
iDelay -= m.tm_min * 60;
iDelay -= m.tm_sec;
}
}
}
}
if(iDelay > 0) {
DBGOPRINT((obj_t*) pThis, "outside dequeue time window, delaying %d seconds\n", iDelay);
srSleep(iDelay, 0);
}
RETiRet;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
rsyslog
|
dfa88369d4ca4290db56b843f9eabdae1bfe0fd5
| 294,661,340,683,307,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
bugfix: memory leak when $RepeatedMsgReduction on was used
bug tracker: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=225
|
static inline funcid_t readAPIFuncID(struct cli_bc *bc, unsigned char *p,
unsigned *off, unsigned len, char *ok)
{
funcid_t id = readNumber(p, off, len, ok)-1;
if (*ok && !cli_bitset_test(bc->uses_apis, id)) {
cli_errmsg("Called undeclared API function: %u\n", id);
*ok = 0;
return ~0;
}
return id;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
clamav-devel
|
3d664817f6ef833a17414a4ecea42004c35cc42f
| 64,849,602,926,787,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
fix recursion level crash (bb #3706).
Thanks to Stephane Chazelas for the analysis.
|
static void gf_dom_refresh_event_filter(GF_SceneGraph *sg)
{
GF_SceneGraph *par;
u32 prev_flags = sg->dom_evt_filter;
sg->dom_evt_filter = 0;
if (sg->nb_evts_mouse) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_MOUSE;
if (sg->nb_evts_focus) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_FOCUS;
if (sg->nb_evts_key) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_KEY;
if (sg->nb_evts_ui) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_UI;
if (sg->nb_evts_mutation) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_MUTATION;
if (sg->nb_evts_text) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_TEXT;
if (sg->nb_evts_smil) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_SMIL;
if (sg->nb_evts_laser) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_LASER;
if (sg->nb_evts_svg) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_SVG;
if (sg->nb_evts_media) sg->dom_evt_filter |= GF_DOM_EVENT_MEDIA;
/*for each graph until top, update event filter*/
par = sg->parent_scene;
while (par) {
par->dom_evt_filter &= ~prev_flags;
par->dom_evt_filter |= sg->dom_evt_filter;
par = par->parent_scene;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
gpac
|
9723dd0955894f2cb7be13b94cf7a47f2754b893
| 257,349,062,215,749,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
fixed #2109
|
void CIRCSock::PutIRC(const CString& sLine) {
PutIRC(CMessage(sLine));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-284"
] |
znc
|
d22fef8620cdd87490754f607e7153979731c69d
| 67,614,457,566,072,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Better cleanup lines coming from network.
Thanks for Jeriko One <[email protected]> for finding and reporting this.
|
static void xennet_tx_setup_grant(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
unsigned int len, void *data)
{
struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq *info = data;
unsigned int id;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *tx;
grant_ref_t ref;
/* convenient aliases */
struct page *page = info->page;
struct netfront_queue *queue = info->queue;
struct sk_buff *skb = info->skb;
id = get_id_from_list(&queue->tx_skb_freelist, queue->tx_link);
tx = RING_GET_REQUEST(&queue->tx, queue->tx.req_prod_pvt++);
ref = gnttab_claim_grant_reference(&queue->gref_tx_head);
WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)(int)ref));
gnttab_grant_foreign_access_ref(ref, queue->info->xbdev->otherend_id,
gfn, GNTMAP_readonly);
queue->tx_skbs[id] = skb;
queue->grant_tx_page[id] = page;
queue->grant_tx_ref[id] = ref;
info->tx_local.id = id;
info->tx_local.gref = ref;
info->tx_local.offset = offset;
info->tx_local.size = len;
info->tx_local.flags = 0;
*tx = info->tx_local;
/*
* Put the request in the pending queue, it will be set to be pending
* when the producer index is about to be raised.
*/
add_id_to_list(&queue->tx_pend_queue, queue->tx_link, id);
info->tx = tx;
info->size += info->tx_local.size;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
f63c2c2032c2e3caad9add3b82cc6e91c376fd26
| 339,929,557,758,556,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 |
xen-netfront: restore __skb_queue_tail() positioning in xennet_get_responses()
The commit referenced below moved the invocation past the "next" label,
without any explanation. In fact this allows misbehaving backends undue
control over the domain the frontend runs in, as earlier detected errors
require the skb to not be freed (it may be retained for later processing
via xennet_move_rx_slot(), or it may simply be unsafe to have it freed).
This is CVE-2022-33743 / XSA-405.
Fixes: 6c5aa6fc4def ("xen networking: add basic XDP support for xen-netfront")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_t1_encode ( opj_tcd_t *p_tcd )
{
opj_t1_t * l_t1;
const OPJ_FLOAT64 * l_mct_norms;
OPJ_UINT32 l_mct_numcomps = 0U;
opj_tcp_t * l_tcp = p_tcd->tcp;
l_t1 = opj_t1_create(OPJ_TRUE);
if (l_t1 == 00) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (l_tcp->mct == 1) {
l_mct_numcomps = 3U;
/* irreversible encoding */
if (l_tcp->tccps->qmfbid == 0) {
l_mct_norms = opj_mct_get_mct_norms_real();
}
else {
l_mct_norms = opj_mct_get_mct_norms();
}
}
else {
l_mct_numcomps = p_tcd->image->numcomps;
l_mct_norms = (const OPJ_FLOAT64 *) (l_tcp->mct_norms);
}
if (! opj_t1_encode_cblks(l_t1, p_tcd->tcd_image->tiles , l_tcp, l_mct_norms, l_mct_numcomps)) {
opj_t1_destroy(l_t1);
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
opj_t1_destroy(l_t1);
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
openjpeg
|
8f9cc62b3f9a1da9712329ddcedb9750d585505c
| 207,684,976,924,986,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
Fix division by zero
Fix uclouvain/openjpeg#733
|
e1000e_intmgr_timer_resume(E1000IntrDelayTimer *timer)
{
if (timer->running) {
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(timer);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
qemu
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| 298,381,396,430,473,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
net: e1000e: fix an infinite loop issue
This issue is like the issue in e1000 network card addressed in
this commit:
e1000: eliminate infinite loops on out-of-bounds transfer start.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
|
scroll_cursor_top(int min_scroll, int always)
{
int scrolled = 0;
int extra = 0;
int used;
int i;
linenr_T top; // just above displayed lines
linenr_T bot; // just below displayed lines
linenr_T old_topline = curwin->w_topline;
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
linenr_T old_topfill = curwin->w_topfill;
#endif
linenr_T new_topline;
int off = get_scrolloff_value();
if (mouse_dragging > 0)
off = mouse_dragging - 1;
/*
* Decrease topline until:
* - it has become 1
* - (part of) the cursor line is moved off the screen or
* - moved at least 'scrolljump' lines and
* - at least 'scrolloff' lines above and below the cursor
*/
validate_cheight();
used = curwin->w_cline_height; // includes filler lines above
if (curwin->w_cursor.lnum < curwin->w_topline)
scrolled = used;
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
if (hasFolding(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, &top, &bot))
{
--top;
++bot;
}
else
#endif
{
top = curwin->w_cursor.lnum - 1;
bot = curwin->w_cursor.lnum + 1;
}
new_topline = top + 1;
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
// "used" already contains the number of filler lines above, don't add it
// again.
// Hide filler lines above cursor line by adding them to "extra".
extra += diff_check_fill(curwin, curwin->w_cursor.lnum);
#endif
/*
* Check if the lines from "top" to "bot" fit in the window. If they do,
* set new_topline and advance "top" and "bot" to include more lines.
*/
while (top > 0)
{
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
if (hasFolding(top, &top, NULL))
// count one logical line for a sequence of folded lines
i = 1;
else
#endif
i = PLINES_NOFILL(top);
used += i;
if (extra + i <= off && bot < curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count)
{
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
if (hasFolding(bot, NULL, &bot))
// count one logical line for a sequence of folded lines
++used;
else
#endif
used += plines(bot);
}
if (used > curwin->w_height)
break;
if (top < curwin->w_topline)
scrolled += i;
/*
* If scrolling is needed, scroll at least 'sj' lines.
*/
if ((new_topline >= curwin->w_topline || scrolled > min_scroll)
&& extra >= off)
break;
extra += i;
new_topline = top;
--top;
++bot;
}
/*
* If we don't have enough space, put cursor in the middle.
* This makes sure we get the same position when using "k" and "j"
* in a small window.
*/
if (used > curwin->w_height)
scroll_cursor_halfway(FALSE);
else
{
/*
* If "always" is FALSE, only adjust topline to a lower value, higher
* value may happen with wrapping lines
*/
if (new_topline < curwin->w_topline || always)
curwin->w_topline = new_topline;
if (curwin->w_topline > curwin->w_cursor.lnum)
curwin->w_topline = curwin->w_cursor.lnum;
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
curwin->w_topfill = diff_check_fill(curwin, curwin->w_topline);
if (curwin->w_topfill > 0 && extra > off)
{
curwin->w_topfill -= extra - off;
if (curwin->w_topfill < 0)
curwin->w_topfill = 0;
}
check_topfill(curwin, FALSE);
#endif
if (curwin->w_topline != old_topline
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
|| curwin->w_topfill != old_topfill
#endif
)
curwin->w_valid &=
~(VALID_WROW|VALID_CROW|VALID_BOTLINE|VALID_BOTLINE_AP);
curwin->w_valid |= VALID_TOPLINE;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-122"
] |
vim
|
777e7c21b7627be80961848ac560cb0a9978ff43
| 150,651,827,368,098,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 130 |
patch 8.2.3564: invalid memory access when scrolling without valid screen
Problem: Invalid memory access when scrolling without a valid screen.
Solution: Do not set VALID_BOTLINE in w_valid.
|
static int nfs4_xdr_enc_setclientid(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs4_setclientid *sc)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 1,
};
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
return encode_setclientid(&xdr, sc);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
| 329,678,407,054,629,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static void parse_feature(const char *feature)
{
if (seen_data_command)
die("Got feature command '%s' after data command", feature);
if (parse_one_feature(feature, 1))
return;
die("This version of fast-import does not support feature %s.", feature);
}
| 0 |
[] |
git
|
68061e3470210703cb15594194718d35094afdc0
| 278,093,642,077,259,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
fast-import: disallow "feature export-marks" by default
The fast-import stream command "feature export-marks=<path>" lets the
stream write marks to an arbitrary path. This may be surprising if you
are running fast-import against an untrusted input (which otherwise
cannot do anything except update Git objects and refs).
Let's disallow the use of this feature by default, and provide a
command-line option to re-enable it (you can always just use the
command-line --export-marks as well, but the in-stream version provides
an easy way for exporters to control the process).
This is a backwards-incompatible change, since the default is flipping
to the new, safer behavior. However, since the main users of the
in-stream versions would be import/export-based remote helpers, and
since we trust remote helpers already (which are already running
arbitrary code), we'll pass the new option by default when reading a
remote helper's stream. This should minimize the impact.
Note that the implementation isn't totally simple, as we have to work
around the fact that fast-import doesn't parse its command-line options
until after it has read any "feature" lines from the stream. This is how
it lets command-line options override in-stream. But in our case, it's
important to parse the new --allow-unsafe-features first.
There are three options for resolving this:
1. Do a separate "early" pass over the options. This is easy for us to
do because there are no command-line options that allow the
"unstuck" form (so there's no chance of us mistaking an argument
for an option), though it does introduce a risk of incorrect
parsing later (e.g,. if we convert to parse-options).
2. Move the option parsing phase back to the start of the program, but
teach the stream-reading code never to override an existing value.
This is tricky, because stream "feature" lines override each other
(meaning we'd have to start tracking the source for every option).
3. Accept that we might parse a "feature export-marks" line that is
forbidden, as long we don't _act_ on it until after we've parsed
the command line options.
This would, in fact, work with the current code, but only because
the previous patch fixed the export-marks parser to avoid touching
the filesystem.
So while it works, it does carry risk of somebody getting it wrong
in the future in a rather subtle and unsafe way.
I've gone with option (1) here as simple, safe, and unlikely to cause
regressions.
This fixes CVE-2019-1348.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.