func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
char * get_fru_area_str(uint8_t * data, uint32_t * offset)
{
static const char bcd_plus[] = "0123456789 -.:,_";
char * str;
int len, off, size, i, j, k, typecode, char_idx;
union {
uint32_t bits;
char chars[4];
} u;
size = 0;
off = *offset;
/* bits 6:7 contain format */
typecode = ((data[off] & 0xC0) >> 6);
// printf("Typecode:%i\n", typecode);
/* bits 0:5 contain length */
len = data[off++];
len &= 0x3f;
switch (typecode) {
case 0: /* 00b: binary/unspecified */
case 1: /* 01b: BCD plus */
/* hex dump or BCD -> 2x length */
size = (len * 2);
break;
case 2: /* 10b: 6-bit ASCII */
/* 4 chars per group of 1-3 bytes */
size = (((len * 4 + 2) / 3) & ~3);
break;
case 3: /* 11b: 8-bit ASCII */
/* no length adjustment */
size = len;
break;
}
if (size < 1) {
*offset = off;
return NULL;
}
str = malloc(size+1);
if (!str)
return NULL;
memset(str, 0, size+1);
if (size == 0) {
str[0] = '\0';
*offset = off;
return str;
}
switch (typecode) {
case 0: /* Binary */
strncpy(str, buf2str(&data[off], len), size);
break;
case 1: /* BCD plus */
for (k = 0; k < size; k++)
str[k] = bcd_plus[((data[off + k / 2] >> ((k % 2) ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0f)];
str[k] = '\0';
break;
case 2: /* 6-bit ASCII */
for (i = j = 0; i < len; i += 3) {
u.bits = 0;
k = ((len - i) < 3 ? (len - i) : 3);
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
u.chars[3] = data[off+i];
u.chars[2] = (k > 1 ? data[off+i+1] : 0);
u.chars[1] = (k > 2 ? data[off+i+2] : 0);
char_idx = 3;
#else
memcpy((void *)&u.bits, &data[off+i], k);
char_idx = 0;
#endif
for (k=0; k<4; k++) {
str[j++] = ((u.chars[char_idx] & 0x3f) + 0x20);
u.bits >>= 6;
}
}
str[j] = '\0';
break;
case 3:
memcpy(str, &data[off], size);
str[size] = '\0';
break;
}
off += len;
*offset = off;
return str;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] | ipmitool | e824c23316ae50beb7f7488f2055ac65e8b341f2 | 285,415,390,883,413,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 95 | fru: Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `read_fru_area_section` function only performs size validation of
requested read size, and falsely assumes that the IPMI message will not
respond with more than the requested amount of data; it uses the
unvalidated response size to copy into `frubuf`. If the response is
larger than the request, this can result in overflowing the buffer.
The same issue affects the `read_fru_area` function. |
static int wait_while_ack(gitno_buffer *buf)
{
int error;
git_pkt_ack *pkt = NULL;
while (1) {
git__free(pkt);
if ((error = recv_pkt((git_pkt **)&pkt, buf)) < 0)
return error;
if (pkt->type == GIT_PKT_NAK)
break;
if (pkt->type == GIT_PKT_ACK &&
(pkt->status != GIT_ACK_CONTINUE &&
pkt->status != GIT_ACK_COMMON)) {
git__free(pkt);
return 0;
}
}
git__free(pkt);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] | libgit2 | 2fdef641fd0dd2828bd948234ae86de75221a11a | 92,859,474,581,297,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do. |
static int mov_write_sv3d_tag(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb, AVSphericalMapping *spherical_mapping)
{
int64_t sv3d_pos, svhd_pos, proj_pos;
const char* metadata_source = s->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_BITEXACT ? "Lavf" : LIBAVFORMAT_IDENT;
if (spherical_mapping->projection != AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR &&
spherical_mapping->projection != AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR_TILE &&
spherical_mapping->projection != AV_SPHERICAL_CUBEMAP) {
av_log(pb, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported projection %d. sv3d not written.\n", spherical_mapping->projection);
return 0;
}
sv3d_pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "sv3d");
svhd_pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "svhd");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version = 0 & flags = 0 */
avio_put_str(pb, metadata_source);
update_size(pb, svhd_pos);
proj_pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "proj");
avio_wb32(pb, 24); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "prhd");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version = 0 & flags = 0 */
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->yaw);
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->pitch);
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->roll);
switch (spherical_mapping->projection) {
case AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR:
case AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR_TILE:
avio_wb32(pb, 28); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "equi");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version = 0 & flags = 0 */
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->bound_top);
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->bound_bottom);
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->bound_left);
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->bound_right);
break;
case AV_SPHERICAL_CUBEMAP:
avio_wb32(pb, 20); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "cbmp");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version = 0 & flags = 0 */
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* layout */
avio_wb32(pb, spherical_mapping->padding); /* padding */
break;
}
update_size(pb, proj_pos);
return update_size(pb, sv3d_pos);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | FFmpeg | 95556e27e2c1d56d9e18f5db34d6f756f3011148 | 252,508,449,634,740,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 | avformat/movenc: Do not pass AVCodecParameters in avpriv_request_sample
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_8.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(struct ofpbuf *openflow,
unsigned int actions_len,
enum ofp_version version,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *ofpacts_tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
return ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__(openflow, actions_len, version,
1u << OVSINST_OFPIT11_APPLY_ACTIONS,
ofpacts, 0, vl_mff_map,
ofpacts_tlv_bitmap);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ovs | 9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8 | 10,787,457,862,517,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]> |
getpattern (value, quoted, expandpat)
char *value;
int quoted, expandpat;
{
char *pat, *tword;
WORD_LIST *l;
#if 0
int i;
#endif
/* There is a problem here: how to handle single or double quotes in the
pattern string when the whole expression is between double quotes?
POSIX.2 says that enclosing double quotes do not cause the pattern to
be quoted, but does that leave us a problem with @ and array[@] and their
expansions inside a pattern? */
#if 0
if (expandpat && (quoted & (Q_HERE_DOCUMENT|Q_DOUBLE_QUOTES)) && *tword)
{
i = 0;
pat = string_extract_double_quoted (tword, &i, 1);
free (tword);
tword = pat;
}
#endif
/* expand_string_for_rhs () leaves WORD quoted and does not perform
word splitting. */
l = *value ? expand_string_for_rhs (value,
(quoted & (Q_HERE_DOCUMENT|Q_DOUBLE_QUOTES)) ? Q_PATQUOTE : quoted,
(int *)NULL, (int *)NULL)
: (WORD_LIST *)0;
pat = string_list (l);
dispose_words (l);
if (pat)
{
tword = quote_string_for_globbing (pat, QGLOB_CVTNULL);
free (pat);
pat = tword;
}
return (pat);
} | 1 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 118,580,553,315,232,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
{
SSL3_STATE *s3;
if ((s3=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL) goto err;
memset(s3,0,sizeof *s3);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s3->finish_dgst1);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s3->finish_dgst2);
pq_64bit_init(&(s3->rrec.seq_num));
pq_64bit_init(&(s3->wrec.seq_num));
s->s3=s3;
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return(1);
err:
return(0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | openssl | c6a876473cbff0fd323c8abcaace98ee2d21863d | 216,344,751,293,597,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <[email protected]> |
struct sk_buff *pep_read(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED)
pipe_grant_credits(sk, GFP_ATOMIC);
return skb;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | net | bcd0f93353326954817a4f9fa55ec57fb38acbb0 | 53,151,706,976,004,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | phonet: refcount leak in pep_sock_accep
sock_hold(sk) is invoked in pep_sock_accept(), but __sock_put(sk) is not
invoked in subsequent failure branches(pep_accept_conn() != 0).
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> |
bool kvm_vcpu_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) == lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | linux | 0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8 | 61,440,665,645,817,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
void recordLatestDataFilter(const typename FilterList<T>::iterator current_filter,
T*& latest_filter, const FilterList<T>& filters) {
// If this is the first time we're calling onData, just record the current filter.
if (latest_filter == nullptr) {
latest_filter = current_filter->get();
return;
}
// We want to keep this pointing at the latest filter in the filter list that has received the
// onData callback. To do so, we compare the current latest with the *previous* filter. If they
// match, then we must be processing a new filter for the first time. We omit this check if we're
// the first filter, since the above check handles that case.
//
// We compare against the previous filter to avoid multiple filter iterations from reseting the
// pointer: If we just set latest to current, then the first onData filter iteration would
// correctly iterate over the filters and set latest, but on subsequent onData iterations
// we'd start from the beginning again, potentially allowing filter N to modify the buffer even
// though filter M > N was the filter that inserted data into the buffer.
if (current_filter != filters.begin() && latest_filter == std::prev(current_filter)->get()) {
latest_filter = current_filter->get();
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 193,123,026,659,815,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> |
Number* Parser::lexed_dimension(const ParserState& pstate, const std::string& parsed)
{
size_t L = parsed.length();
size_t num_pos = parsed.find_first_not_of(" \n\r\t");
if (num_pos == std::string::npos) num_pos = L;
size_t unit_pos = parsed.find_first_not_of("-+0123456789.", num_pos);
if (parsed[unit_pos] == 'e' && is_number(parsed[unit_pos+1]) ) {
unit_pos = parsed.find_first_not_of("-+0123456789.", ++ unit_pos);
}
if (unit_pos == std::string::npos) unit_pos = L;
const std::string& num = parsed.substr(num_pos, unit_pos - num_pos);
Number* nr = SASS_MEMORY_NEW(Number,
pstate,
sass_strtod(num.c_str()),
Token(number(parsed.c_str())),
number_has_zero(parsed));
nr->is_interpolant(false);
nr->is_delayed(true);
return nr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-674"
] | libsass | f2db04883e5fff4e03777dcc1eb60d4373c45be1 | 257,500,565,028,567,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Make `parse_css_variable_value` non-recursive
Fixes #2658 stack overflow |
void omap_iommu_debugfs_remove(struct omap_iommu *obj)
{
if (!obj->debug_dir)
return;
debugfs_remove_recursive(obj->debug_dir);
} | 0 | [] | linux | e203db293863fa15b4b1917d4398fb5bd63c4e88 | 182,318,064,757,528,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | iommu/omap: Fix debug_read_tlb() to use seq_printf()
The debug_read_tlb() uses the sprintf() functions directly on the buffer
allocated by buf = kmalloc(count), without taking into account the size
of the buffer, with the consequence corrupting the heap, depending on
the count requested by the user.
The patch fixes the issue replacing sprintf() by seq_printf().
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> |
end_unicast_message(struct neighbour *neigh, int type, int bytes)
{
assert(unicast_neighbour == neigh && unicast_buffered >= bytes + 2 &&
unicast_buffer[unicast_buffered - bytes - 2] == type &&
unicast_buffer[unicast_buffered - bytes - 1] == bytes);
schedule_unicast_flush(jitter(babel_get_if_nfo(neigh->ifp), 0));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | frr | c3793352a8d76d2eee1edc38a9a16c1c8a6573f4 | 30,723,402,315,496,632,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | babeld: fix #10502 #10503 by repairing the checks on length
This patch repairs the checking conditions on length in four functions:
babel_packet_examin, parse_hello_subtlv, parse_ihu_subtlv, and parse_update_subtlv
Signed-off-by: qingkaishi <[email protected]> |
// Evaluation procedure.
double operator()(const double x, const double y, const double z, const double c) {
mem[_cimg_mp_slot_x] = x; mem[_cimg_mp_slot_y] = y; mem[_cimg_mp_slot_z] = z; mem[_cimg_mp_slot_c] = c;
for (p_code = code; p_code<p_code_end; ++p_code) {
opcode._data = p_code->_data;
const ulongT target = opcode[1];
mem[target] = _cimg_mp_defunc(*this);
}
return *result; | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 176,083,751,326,972,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
f_balloon_split(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv UNUSED)
{
if (rettv_list_alloc(rettv) == OK)
{
char_u *msg = tv_get_string_chk(&argvars[0]);
if (msg != NULL)
{
pumitem_T *array;
int size = split_message(msg, &array);
int i;
/* Skip the first and last item, they are always empty. */
for (i = 1; i < size - 1; ++i)
list_append_string(rettv->vval.v_list, array[i].pum_text, -1);
while (size > 0)
vim_free(array[--size].pum_text);
vim_free(array);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-78"
] | vim | 8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075 | 335,714,384,485,547,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others. |
bool r_pkcs7_parse_digestalgorithmidentifier (RPKCS7DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers *dai, RASN1Object *object) {
ut32 i;
if (!dai && !object) {
return false;
}
if (object->list.length > 0) {
dai->elements = (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier **) calloc (object->list.length, sizeof (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier*));
if (!dai->elements) {
return false;
}
dai->length = object->list.length;
for (i = 0; i < dai->length; ++i) {
// r_x509_parse_algorithmidentifier returns bool,
// so i have to allocate before calling the function
dai->elements[i] = (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier *) malloc (sizeof (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier));
//should i handle invalid memory? the function checks the pointer
//or it should return if dai->elements[i] == NULL ?
if (dai->elements[i]) {
//Memset is needed to initialize to 0 the structure and avoid garbage.
memset (dai->elements[i], 0, sizeof (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier));
r_x509_parse_algorithmidentifier (dai->elements[i], object->list.objects[i]);
}
}
}
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | radare2 | 7ab66cca5bbdf6cb2d69339ef4f513d95e532dbf | 161,362,603,553,187,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms |
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return (-1);
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
&& (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
&& (type !=
SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
{
unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k;
/* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
*dst++ = *src++;
len--;
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
n++;
}
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
if (recvd_type != NULL)
*recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
return n;
}
/*
* Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
* rr[i].type - is the type of record
* rr[i].data, - data
* rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
do {
/* get new records if necessary */
if (num_recs == 0) {
ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
if (num_recs == 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* Skip over any records we have already read */
for (curr_rec = 0;
curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
curr_rec++) ;
if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
num_recs = 0;
curr_rec = 0;
}
} while (num_recs == 0);
rr = &rr[curr_rec];
/*
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
* record that isn't an alert.
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
* 'peek' mode)
*/
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (0);
}
if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
|| (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
/*
* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
* SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
*/
/*
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
* doing a handshake for the first time
*/
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
if (recvd_type != NULL)
*recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
if (len <= 0)
return (len);
read_bytes = 0;
do {
if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
else
n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes;
memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
buf += n;
if (!peek) {
SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
}
}
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
|| (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
curr_rec++;
rr++;
}
read_bytes += n;
} while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
&& read_bytes < (unsigned int)len);
if (read_bytes == 0) {
/* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
goto start;
}
if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
&& (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
&& SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
return read_bytes;
}
/*
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
* were actually expecting a CCS).
*/
/*
* Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
*/
if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
/*
* Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
* record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
* initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
* |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
*/
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
&& (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
/*
* If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
* we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
* (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
* other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
*/
s->version = rr->rec_version;
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
* that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
} else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
}
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
while (n-- > 0) {
dest[(*dest_len)++] =
SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
}
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
}
}
}
/*-
* s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate) {
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
}
}
}
/*
* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
* again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
*/
goto start;
}
/*
* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
* allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
* experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
*/
if (s->server &&
SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto start;
}
if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
s->rlayer.alert_count++;
if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return (0);
}
/*
* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
* alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
*/
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
return (0);
#endif
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
return (0);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
* shutdown */
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
return (0);
}
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
*/
if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
&& !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
* problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
default:
/*
* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
* an unexpected message alert.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
goto start;
}
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/*
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
* that should not happen when type != rr->type
*/
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
* started), we will indulge it.
*/
if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
return (-1);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* not reached */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (-1);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | openssl | 63658103d4441924f8dbfc517b99bb54758a98b9 | 229,842,592,254,180,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 532 | Fix a hang with SSL_peek()
If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an
infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and
never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in
a Denial Of Service attack.
CVE-2016-6305
GitHub Issue #1563
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> |
static void urlParseQueryString(struct HashMap *hashmap, const char *query, int len) {
const char *key = query;
const char *value = NULL;
for (const char *ampersand = query; len-- >= 0; ampersand++) {
char ch = len >= 0 ? *ampersand : '\000';
if (ch == '=' && !value) {
value = ampersand + 1;
} else if (ch == '&' || len < 0) {
int kl = (value ? value-1 : ampersand) - key;
int vl = value ? ampersand - value : 0;
if (kl) {
char *k = urlMakeString(key, kl);
urlUnescape(k);
char *v = NULL;
if (value) {
v = urlMakeString(value, vl);
urlUnescape(v);
}
addToHashMap(hashmap, k, v);
}
key = ampersand + 1;
value = NULL;
}
if (!ch) {
break;
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] | shellinabox | 4f0ecc31ac6f985e0dd3f5a52cbfc0e9251f6361 | 26,023,007,428,824,003,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | Rolling code for version 2.21 |
htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
}
return (0);
} | 1 | [] | Varnish-Cache | 29870c8fe95e4e8a672f6f28c5fbe692bea09e9c | 29,849,788,972,958,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that. |
template<typename t>
CImg<T>& operator<<=(const t value) {
if (is_empty()) return *this;
cimg_openmp_for(*this,((longT)*ptr) << (int)value,65536);
return *this; | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | CImg | ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1 | 326,438,639,339,481,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | . |
valid_civil_p(VALUE y, int m, int d, double sg,
VALUE *nth, int *ry,
int *rm, int *rd, int *rjd,
int *ns)
{
double style = guess_style(y, sg);
int r;
if (style == 0) {
int jd;
r = c_valid_civil_p(FIX2INT(y), m, d, sg, rm, rd, &jd, ns);
if (!r)
return 0;
decode_jd(INT2FIX(jd), nth, rjd);
if (f_zero_p(*nth))
*ry = FIX2INT(y);
else {
VALUE nth2;
decode_year(y, *ns ? -1 : +1, &nth2, ry);
}
}
else {
decode_year(y, style, nth, ry);
if (style < 0)
r = c_valid_gregorian_p(*ry, m, d, rm, rd);
else
r = c_valid_julian_p(*ry, m, d, rm, rd);
if (!r)
return 0;
c_civil_to_jd(*ry, *rm, *rd, style, rjd, ns);
}
return r;
} | 0 | [] | date | 3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0 | 130,058,601,847,042,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301 |
SCM_DEFINE (scm_chown, "chown", 3, 0, 0,
(SCM object, SCM owner, SCM group),
"Change the ownership and group of the file referred to by @var{object} to\n"
"the integer values @var{owner} and @var{group}. @var{object} can be\n"
"a string containing a file name or, if the platform\n"
"supports fchown, a port or integer file descriptor\n"
"which is open on the file. The return value\n"
"is unspecified.\n\n"
"If @var{object} is a symbolic link, either the\n"
"ownership of the link or the ownership of the referenced file will be\n"
"changed depending on the operating system (lchown is\n"
"unsupported at present). If @var{owner} or @var{group} is specified\n"
"as @code{-1}, then that ID is not changed.")
#define FUNC_NAME s_scm_chown
{
int rv;
object = SCM_COERCE_OUTPORT (object);
#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
if (scm_is_integer (object) || (SCM_OPFPORTP (object)))
{
int fdes = (SCM_OPFPORTP (object)?
SCM_FPORT_FDES (object) : scm_to_int (object));
SCM_SYSCALL (rv = fchown (fdes, scm_to_int (owner), scm_to_int (group)));
}
else
#endif
{
STRING_SYSCALL (object, c_object,
rv = chown (c_object,
scm_to_int (owner), scm_to_int (group)));
}
if (rv == -1)
SCM_SYSERROR;
return SCM_UNSPECIFIED;
} | 0 | [] | guile | 245608911698adb3472803856019bdd5670b6614 | 44,907,589,533,616,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | Remove 'umask' calls from 'mkdir'.
Fixes <http://bugs.gnu.org/24659>.
* libguile/filesys.c (SCM_DEFINE): Remove calls to 'umask' when MODE is
unbound; instead, use 0777 as the mode. Update docstring to clarify
this.
* doc/ref/posix.texi (File System): Adjust accordingly.
* NEWS: Mention it. |
static inline int put_words(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, uint16_t *buf, int num)
{
int i;
addr += ohci->localmem_base;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++, buf++, addr += sizeof(*buf)) {
uint16_t tmp = cpu_to_le16(*buf);
if (dma_memory_write(ohci->as, addr, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | qemu | 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb | 45,924,928,270,257,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> |
tiff_error_handler (const char *mod, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
if (global_error) {
/* Blah, loader called us twice */
return;
}
global_error = g_strdup_vprintf (fmt, ap);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | gdk-pixbuf | 3bac204e0d0241a0d68586ece7099e6acf0e9bea | 6,054,889,614,893,061,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Initial stab at getting the focus code to work.
Fri Jun 1 18:54:47 2001 Jonathan Blandford <[email protected]>
* gtk/gtktreeview.c: (gtk_tree_view_focus): Initial stab at
getting the focus code to work.
(gtk_tree_view_class_init): Add a bunch of keybindings.
* gtk/gtktreeviewcolumn.c
(gtk_tree_view_column_set_cell_data_func):
s/GtkCellDataFunc/GtkTreeCellDataFunc.
(_gtk_tree_view_column_set_tree_view): Use "notify::model" instead
of "properties_changed" to help justify the death of the latter
signal. (-:
* tests/testtreefocus.c (main): Let some columns be focussable to
test focus better. |
static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs)
{
DisplayState *ds = vs->ds;
if (vs->csock == -1 || !vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE)) {
return;
}
if (vs->client_width == ds_get_width(ds) &&
vs->client_height == ds_get_height(ds)) {
return;
}
vs->client_width = ds_get_width(ds);
vs->client_height = ds_get_height(ds);
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->client_width, vs->client_height,
VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | qemu | 9f64916da20eea67121d544698676295bbb105a7 | 95,842,844,172,701,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc.
The vnc code uses *three* DisplaySurfaces:
First is the surface of the actual QemuConsole, usually the guest
screen, but could also be a text console (monitor/serial reachable via
Ctrl-Alt-<nr> keys). This is left as-is.
Second is the current server's view of the screen content. The vnc code
uses this to figure which parts of the guest screen did _really_ change
to reduce the amount of updates sent to the vnc clients. It is also
used as data source when sending out the updates to the clients. This
surface gets replaced by a pixman image. The format changes too,
instead of using the guest screen format we'll use fixed 32bit rgb
framebuffer and convert the pixels on the fly when comparing and
updating the server framebuffer.
Third surface carries the format expected by the vnc client. That isn't
used to store image data. This surface is switched to PixelFormat and a
boolean for bigendian byte order.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> |
int udev_util_replace_whitespace(const char *str, char *to, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
/* strip trailing whitespace */
len = strnlen(str, len);
while (len && isspace(str[len-1]))
len--;
/* strip leading whitespace */
i = 0;
while (isspace(str[i]) && (i < len))
i++;
j = 0;
while (i < len) {
/* substitute multiple whitespace with a single '_' */
if (isspace(str[i])) {
while (isspace(str[i]))
i++;
to[j++] = '_';
}
to[j++] = str[i++];
}
to[j] = '\0';
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | udev | 662c3110803bd8c1aedacc36788e6fd028944314 | 88,884,199,138,926,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | path_encode: fix max length calculation
Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
> it should reserve 4 times not 3 times len :) |
static inline void clear_file(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
F2FS_I(inode)->i_advise &= ~type;
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode, true);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 4969c06a0d83c9c3dc50b8efcdc8eeedfce896f6 | 172,733,504,257,119,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | f2fs: support swap file w/ DIO
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> |
static void phar_do_404(phar_archive_data *phar, char *fname, int fname_len, char *f404, int f404_len, char *entry, int entry_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
sapi_header_line ctr = {0};
phar_entry_info *info;
if (phar && f404_len) {
info = phar_get_entry_info(phar, f404, f404_len, NULL, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (info) {
phar_file_action(phar, info, "text/html", PHAR_MIME_PHP, f404, f404_len, fname, NULL, NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
}
ctr.response_code = 404;
ctr.line_len = sizeof("HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found")-1;
ctr.line = "HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found";
sapi_header_op(SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE, &ctr TSRMLS_CC);
sapi_send_headers(TSRMLS_C);
PHPWRITE("<html>\n <head>\n <title>File Not Found</title>\n </head>\n <body>\n <h1>404 - File ", sizeof("<html>\n <head>\n <title>File Not Found</title>\n </head>\n <body>\n <h1>404 - File ") - 1);
PHPWRITE(entry, entry_len);
PHPWRITE(" Not Found</h1>\n </body>\n</html>", sizeof(" Not Found</h1>\n </body>\n</html>") - 1);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-79"
] | php-src | 6e64aba47f4e41d97c4d010024c68320c0855f45 | 283,501,678,353,022,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Fix #76129 - remove more potential unfiltered outputs for phar |
static const char *md_config_set_names_old(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dc,
int argc, char *const argv[])
{
ap_log_error( APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server,
"mod_md: directive 'ManagedDomain' is deprecated, replace with 'MDomain'.");
return md_config_set_names(cmd, dc, argc, argv);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | mod_md | e71001955809247b3aa4d269e1e0741b4fe0fc3d | 143,002,902,061,334,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | v1.1.12, notifycmd improvements |
const char* ExpressionRound::getOpName() const {
return "$round";
} | 0 | [] | mongo | 1772b9a0393b55e6a280a35e8f0a1f75c014f301 | 224,432,259,582,466,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | SERVER-49404 Enforce additional checks in $arrayToObject |
static tjhandle _tjInitCompress(tjinstance *this)
{
static unsigned char buffer[1];
unsigned char *buf = buffer;
unsigned long size = 1;
/* This is also straight out of example.txt */
this->cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error(&this->jerr.pub);
this->jerr.pub.error_exit = my_error_exit;
this->jerr.pub.output_message = my_output_message;
this->jerr.emit_message = this->jerr.pub.emit_message;
this->jerr.pub.emit_message = my_emit_message;
this->jerr.pub.addon_message_table = turbojpeg_message_table;
this->jerr.pub.first_addon_message = JMSG_FIRSTADDONCODE;
this->jerr.pub.last_addon_message = JMSG_LASTADDONCODE;
if (setjmp(this->jerr.setjmp_buffer)) {
/* If we get here, the JPEG code has signaled an error. */
if (this) free(this);
return NULL;
}
jpeg_create_compress(&this->cinfo);
/* Make an initial call so it will create the destination manager */
jpeg_mem_dest_tj(&this->cinfo, &buf, &size, 0);
this->init |= COMPRESS;
return (tjhandle)this;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | libjpeg-turbo | 3d9c64e9f8aa1ee954d1d0bb3390fc894bb84da3 | 90,082,465,233,716,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | tjLoadImage(): Fix int overflow/segfault w/big BMP
Fixes #304 |
addRule(FileInfo *nested, TranslationTableOpcode opcode, CharsString *ruleChars,
CharsString *ruleDots, TranslationTableCharacterAttributes after,
TranslationTableCharacterAttributes before, TranslationTableOffset *newRuleOffset,
TranslationTableRule **newRule, int noback, int nofor,
TranslationTableHeader **table) {
/* Add a rule to the table, using the hash function to find the start of
* chains and chaining both the chars and dots strings */
int ruleSize = sizeof(TranslationTableRule) - (DEFAULTRULESIZE * CHARSIZE);
if (ruleChars) ruleSize += CHARSIZE * ruleChars->length;
if (ruleDots) ruleSize += CHARSIZE * ruleDots->length;
if (!allocateSpaceInTable(nested, newRuleOffset, ruleSize, table)) return 0;
TranslationTableRule *rule =
(TranslationTableRule *)&(*table)->ruleArea[*newRuleOffset];
*newRule = rule;
rule->opcode = opcode;
rule->after = after;
rule->before = before;
if (ruleChars)
memcpy(&rule->charsdots[0], &ruleChars->chars[0],
CHARSIZE * (rule->charslen = ruleChars->length));
else
rule->charslen = 0;
if (ruleDots)
memcpy(&rule->charsdots[rule->charslen], &ruleDots->chars[0],
CHARSIZE * (rule->dotslen = ruleDots->length));
else
rule->dotslen = 0;
if (!charactersDefined(nested, rule, *table)) return 0;
/* link new rule into table. */
if (opcode == CTO_SwapCc || opcode == CTO_SwapCd || opcode == CTO_SwapDd) return 1;
if (opcode >= CTO_Context && opcode <= CTO_Pass4)
if (!(opcode == CTO_Context && rule->charslen > 0)) {
if (!nofor)
if (!addForwardPassRule(newRuleOffset, rule, *table)) return 0;
if (!noback)
if (!addBackwardPassRule(newRuleOffset, rule, *table)) return 0;
return 1;
}
if (!nofor) {
if (rule->charslen == 1)
addForwardRuleWithSingleChar(nested, newRuleOffset, rule, *table);
else if (rule->charslen > 1)
addForwardRuleWithMultipleChars(newRuleOffset, rule, *table);
}
if (!noback) {
widechar *cells;
int count;
if (rule->opcode == CTO_Context) {
cells = &rule->charsdots[0];
count = rule->charslen;
} else {
cells = &rule->charsdots[rule->charslen];
count = rule->dotslen;
}
if (count == 1)
addBackwardRuleWithSingleCell(nested, *cells, newRuleOffset, rule, *table);
else if (count > 1)
addBackwardRuleWithMultipleCells(cells, count, newRuleOffset, rule, *table);
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | liblouis | fb2bfce4ed49ac4656a8f7e5b5526e4838da1dde | 239,499,538,888,719,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 | Fix yet another buffer overflow in the braille table parser
Reported by Henri Salo
Fixes #592 |
static zend_object_value php_zip_object_new(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *intern;
zval *tmp;
zend_object_value retval;
intern = emalloc(sizeof(ze_zip_object));
memset(&intern->zo, 0, sizeof(zend_object));
intern->za = NULL;
intern->buffers = NULL;
intern->filename = NULL;
intern->buffers_cnt = 0;
intern->prop_handler = &zip_prop_handlers;
#if ((PHP_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && PHP_MINOR_VERSION > 1) || (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && PHP_MINOR_VERSION == 1 && PHP_RELEASE_VERSION > 2))
zend_object_std_init(&intern->zo, class_type TSRMLS_CC);
#else
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->zo.properties);
zend_hash_init(intern->zo.properties, 0, NULL, ZVAL_PTR_DTOR, 0);
intern->zo.ce = class_type;
#endif
zend_hash_copy(intern->zo.properties, &class_type->default_properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
retval.handle = zend_objects_store_put(intern,
NULL,
(zend_objects_free_object_storage_t) php_zip_object_free_storage,
NULL TSRMLS_CC);
retval.handlers = (zend_object_handlers *) & zip_object_handlers;
return retval;
} | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 148,912,251,013,772,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus |
static int mwifiex_pcie_alloc_sleep_cookie_buf(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter)
{
struct pcie_service_card *card = adapter->card;
u32 tmp;
card->sleep_cookie_vbase = pci_alloc_consistent(card->dev, sizeof(u32),
&card->sleep_cookie_pbase);
if (!card->sleep_cookie_vbase) {
mwifiex_dbg(adapter, ERROR,
"pci_alloc_consistent failed!\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Init val of Sleep Cookie */
tmp = FW_AWAKE_COOKIE;
put_unaligned(tmp, card->sleep_cookie_vbase);
mwifiex_dbg(adapter, INFO,
"alloc_scook: sleep cookie=0x%x\n",
get_unaligned(card->sleep_cookie_vbase));
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-200",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | d10dcb615c8e29d403a24d35f8310a7a53e3050c | 73,316,775,988,856,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | mwifiex: pcie: Fix memory leak in mwifiex_pcie_init_evt_ring
In mwifiex_pcie_init_evt_ring, a new skb is allocated which should be
released if mwifiex_map_pci_memory() fails. The release for skb and
card->evtbd_ring_vbase is added.
Fixes: 0732484b47b5 ("mwifiex: separate ring initialization and ring creation routines")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> |
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 flags, int paylen)
{
return _sctp_make_chunk(asoc, SCTP_CID_DATA, flags, paylen);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-399"
] | linux | 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 | 252,531,933,404,267,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
findmust(p, g)
struct parse *p;
register struct re_guts *g;
{
register sop *scan;
sop *UNINIT_VAR(start);
register sop *UNINIT_VAR(newstart);
register sopno newlen;
register sop s;
register char *cp;
register sopno i;
/* avoid making error situations worse */
if (p->error != 0)
return;
/* find the longest OCHAR sequence in strip */
newlen = 0;
scan = g->strip + 1;
do {
s = *scan++;
switch (OP(s)) {
case OCHAR: /* sequence member */
if (newlen == 0) /* new sequence */
newstart = scan - 1;
newlen++;
break;
case OPLUS_: /* things that don't break one */
case OLPAREN:
case ORPAREN:
break;
case OQUEST_: /* things that must be skipped */
case OCH_:
scan--;
do {
scan += OPND(s);
s = *scan;
/* assert() interferes w debug printouts */
if (OP(s) != O_QUEST && OP(s) != O_CH &&
OP(s) != OOR2) {
g->iflags |= BAD;
return;
}
} while (OP(s) != O_QUEST && OP(s) != O_CH);
/* fallthrough */
default: /* things that break a sequence */
if (newlen > g->mlen) { /* ends one */
start = newstart;
g->mlen = newlen;
}
newlen = 0;
break;
}
} while (OP(s) != OEND);
if (g->mlen == 0) /* there isn't one */
return;
/* turn it into a character string */
g->must = malloc((size_t)g->mlen + 1);
if (g->must == NULL) { /* argh; just forget it */
g->mlen = 0;
return;
}
cp = g->must;
scan = start;
for (i = g->mlen; i > 0; i--) {
while (OP(s = *scan++) != OCHAR)
continue;
assert(cp < g->must + g->mlen);
*cp++ = (char)OPND(s);
}
assert(cp == g->must + g->mlen);
*cp++ = '\0'; /* just on general principles */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | mysql-server | dc45e408250c582eb532417a42cef5b5a8e2fe77 | 203,452,294,913,835,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 | Bug#20642505: HENRY SPENCER REGULAR EXPRESSIONS (REGEX) LIBRARY
The MySQL server uses Henry Spencer's library for regular
expressions to support the REGEXP/RLIKE string operator.
This changeset adapts a recent fix from the upstream for
better 32-bit compatiblity. (Note that we cannot simply use
the current upstream version as a drop-in replacement
for the version used by the server as the latter has
been extended to understand MySQL charsets etc.) |
static int vqa_decode_chunk(VqaContext *s, AVFrame *frame)
{
unsigned int chunk_type;
unsigned int chunk_size;
int byte_skip;
unsigned int index = 0;
int i;
unsigned char r, g, b;
int index_shift;
int res;
int cbf0_chunk = -1;
int cbfz_chunk = -1;
int cbp0_chunk = -1;
int cbpz_chunk = -1;
int cpl0_chunk = -1;
int cplz_chunk = -1;
int vptz_chunk = -1;
int x, y;
int lines = 0;
int pixel_ptr;
int vector_index = 0;
int lobyte = 0;
int hibyte = 0;
int lobytes = 0;
int hibytes = s->decode_buffer_size / 2;
/* first, traverse through the frame and find the subchunks */
while (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb) >= 8) {
chunk_type = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->gb);
index = bytestream2_tell(&s->gb);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->gb);
switch (chunk_type) {
case CBF0_TAG:
cbf0_chunk = index;
break;
case CBFZ_TAG:
cbfz_chunk = index;
break;
case CBP0_TAG:
cbp0_chunk = index;
break;
case CBPZ_TAG:
cbpz_chunk = index;
break;
case CPL0_TAG:
cpl0_chunk = index;
break;
case CPLZ_TAG:
cplz_chunk = index;
break;
case VPTZ_TAG:
vptz_chunk = index;
break;
default:
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Found unknown chunk type: %s (%08X)\n",
av_fourcc2str(av_bswap32(chunk_type)), chunk_type);
break;
}
byte_skip = chunk_size & 0x01;
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, chunk_size + byte_skip);
}
/* next, deal with the palette */
if ((cpl0_chunk != -1) && (cplz_chunk != -1)) {
/* a chunk should not have both chunk types */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "problem: found both CPL0 and CPLZ chunks\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* decompress the palette chunk */
if (cplz_chunk != -1) {
/* yet to be handled */
}
/* convert the RGB palette into the machine's endian format */
if (cpl0_chunk != -1) {
bytestream2_seek(&s->gb, cpl0_chunk, SEEK_SET);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
/* sanity check the palette size */
if (chunk_size / 3 > 256 || chunk_size > bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "problem: found a palette chunk with %d colors\n",
chunk_size / 3);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < chunk_size / 3; i++) {
/* scale by 4 to transform 6-bit palette -> 8-bit */
r = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->gb) * 4;
g = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->gb) * 4;
b = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->gb) * 4;
s->palette[i] = 0xFFU << 24 | r << 16 | g << 8 | b;
s->palette[i] |= s->palette[i] >> 6 & 0x30303;
}
}
/* next, look for a full codebook */
if ((cbf0_chunk != -1) && (cbfz_chunk != -1)) {
/* a chunk should not have both chunk types */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "problem: found both CBF0 and CBFZ chunks\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* decompress the full codebook chunk */
if (cbfz_chunk != -1) {
bytestream2_seek(&s->gb, cbfz_chunk, SEEK_SET);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if ((res = decode_format80(s, chunk_size, s->codebook,
s->codebook_size, 0)) < 0)
return res;
}
/* copy a full codebook */
if (cbf0_chunk != -1) {
bytestream2_seek(&s->gb, cbf0_chunk, SEEK_SET);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
/* sanity check the full codebook size */
if (chunk_size > MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "problem: CBF0 chunk too large (0x%X bytes)\n",
chunk_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
bytestream2_get_buffer(&s->gb, s->codebook, chunk_size);
}
/* decode the frame */
if (vptz_chunk == -1) {
/* something is wrong if there is no VPTZ chunk */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "problem: no VPTZ chunk found\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
bytestream2_seek(&s->gb, vptz_chunk, SEEK_SET);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if ((res = decode_format80(s, chunk_size,
s->decode_buffer, s->decode_buffer_size, 1)) < 0)
return res;
/* render the final PAL8 frame */
if (s->vector_height == 4)
index_shift = 4;
else
index_shift = 3;
for (y = 0; y < s->height; y += s->vector_height) {
for (x = 0; x < s->width; x += 4, lobytes++, hibytes++) {
pixel_ptr = y * frame->linesize[0] + x;
/* get the vector index, the method for which varies according to
* VQA file version */
switch (s->vqa_version) {
case 1:
lobyte = s->decode_buffer[lobytes * 2];
hibyte = s->decode_buffer[(lobytes * 2) + 1];
vector_index = ((hibyte << 8) | lobyte) >> 3;
vector_index <<= index_shift;
lines = s->vector_height;
/* uniform color fill - a quick hack */
if (hibyte == 0xFF) {
while (lines--) {
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 0] = 255 - lobyte;
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 1] = 255 - lobyte;
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 2] = 255 - lobyte;
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 3] = 255 - lobyte;
pixel_ptr += frame->linesize[0];
}
lines=0;
}
break;
case 2:
lobyte = s->decode_buffer[lobytes];
hibyte = s->decode_buffer[hibytes];
vector_index = (hibyte << 8) | lobyte;
vector_index <<= index_shift;
lines = s->vector_height;
break;
case 3:
/* not implemented yet */
lines = 0;
break;
}
while (lines--) {
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 0] = s->codebook[vector_index++];
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 1] = s->codebook[vector_index++];
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 2] = s->codebook[vector_index++];
frame->data[0][pixel_ptr + 3] = s->codebook[vector_index++];
pixel_ptr += frame->linesize[0];
}
}
}
/* handle partial codebook */
if ((cbp0_chunk != -1) && (cbpz_chunk != -1)) {
/* a chunk should not have both chunk types */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "problem: found both CBP0 and CBPZ chunks\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (cbp0_chunk != -1) {
bytestream2_seek(&s->gb, cbp0_chunk, SEEK_SET);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if (chunk_size > MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE - s->next_codebook_buffer_index) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cbp0 chunk too large (%u bytes)\n",
chunk_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* accumulate partial codebook */
bytestream2_get_buffer(&s->gb, &s->next_codebook_buffer[s->next_codebook_buffer_index],
chunk_size);
s->next_codebook_buffer_index += chunk_size;
s->partial_countdown--;
if (s->partial_countdown <= 0) {
/* time to replace codebook */
memcpy(s->codebook, s->next_codebook_buffer,
s->next_codebook_buffer_index);
/* reset accounting */
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
s->partial_countdown = s->partial_count;
}
}
if (cbpz_chunk != -1) {
bytestream2_seek(&s->gb, cbpz_chunk, SEEK_SET);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if (chunk_size > MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE - s->next_codebook_buffer_index) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cbpz chunk too large (%u bytes)\n",
chunk_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* accumulate partial codebook */
bytestream2_get_buffer(&s->gb, &s->next_codebook_buffer[s->next_codebook_buffer_index],
chunk_size);
s->next_codebook_buffer_index += chunk_size;
s->partial_countdown--;
if (s->partial_countdown <= 0) {
bytestream2_init(&s->gb, s->next_codebook_buffer, s->next_codebook_buffer_index);
/* decompress codebook */
if ((res = decode_format80(s, s->next_codebook_buffer_index,
s->codebook, s->codebook_size, 0)) < 0)
return res;
/* reset accounting */
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
s->partial_countdown = s->partial_count;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-129",
"CWE-787"
] | FFmpeg | 02f909dc24b1f05cfbba75077c7707b905e63cd2 | 303,893,863,622,869,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 282 | avcodec/vqavideo: Set video size
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 15919/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_VQA_fuzzer-5657368257363968
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
static int rds_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rds_sock *rs;
if (!sk)
goto out;
rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk);
sock_orphan(sk);
/* Note - rds_clear_recv_queue grabs rs_recv_lock, so
* that ensures the recv path has completed messing
* with the socket. */
rds_clear_recv_queue(rs);
rds_cong_remove_socket(rs);
rds_remove_bound(rs);
rds_send_drop_to(rs, NULL);
rds_rdma_drop_keys(rs);
rds_notify_queue_get(rs, NULL);
spin_lock_bh(&rds_sock_lock);
list_del_init(&rs->rs_item);
rds_sock_count--;
spin_unlock_bh(&rds_sock_lock);
rds_trans_put(rs->rs_transport);
sock->sk = NULL;
sock_put(sk);
out:
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 780e982905bef61d13496d9af5310bf4af3a64d3 | 163,675,534,786,259,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | RDS: validate the requested traces user input against max supported
Larger than supported value can lead to array read/write overflow.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
EC_Group::~EC_Group()
{
// shared_ptr possibly freed here
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | botan | 48fc8df51d99f9d8ba251219367b3d629cc848e3 | 124,869,680,310,286,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Address DSA/ECDSA side channel |
HttpTransact::is_request_cache_lookupable(State* s)
{
// ummm, someone has already decided that proxy should tunnel
if (s->current.mode == TUNNELLING_PROXY) {
return false;
}
// don't bother with remaining checks if we already did a cache lookup
if (s->cache_info.lookup_count > 0) {
return true;
}
// is cache turned on?
if (!s->txn_conf->cache_http) {
SET_VIA_STRING(VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL, VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL_CACHE_OFF);
return false;
}
// GET, HEAD, POST, DELETE, and PUT are all cache lookupable
if (!HttpTransactHeaders::is_method_cache_lookupable(s->method) && s->api_req_cacheable == false) {
SET_VIA_STRING(VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL, VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL_METHOD);
return false;
}
// don't cache page if URL "looks dynamic" and this filter is enabled
// We can do the check in is_response_cacheable() or here.
// It may be more efficient if we are not going to cache dynamic looking urls
// (the default config?) since we don't even need to do cache lookup.
// So for the time being, it'll be left here.
// If url looks dynamic but a ttl is set, request is cache lookupable
if ((!s->txn_conf->cache_urls_that_look_dynamic) &&
url_looks_dynamic(s->hdr_info.client_request.url_get()) && (s->cache_control.ttl_in_cache <= 0)) {
// We do not want to forward the request for a dynamic URL onto the
// origin server if the value of the Max-Forwards header is zero.
int max_forwards = -1;
if (s->hdr_info.client_request.presence(MIME_PRESENCE_MAX_FORWARDS)) {
MIMEField *max_forwards_f = s->hdr_info.client_request.field_find(MIME_FIELD_MAX_FORWARDS, MIME_LEN_MAX_FORWARDS);
if (max_forwards_f)
max_forwards = max_forwards_f->value_get_int();
}
if (max_forwards != 0) {
SET_VIA_STRING(VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL, VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL_URL);
return false;
}
}
// Don't look in cache if it's a RANGE request but the cache is not enabled for RANGE.
if (!s->txn_conf->cache_range_lookup && s->hdr_info.client_request.presence(MIME_PRESENCE_RANGE)) {
SET_VIA_STRING(VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL, VIA_DETAIL_TUNNEL_HEADER_FIELD);
return false;
}
// Even with "no-cache" directive, we want to do a cache lookup
// because we need to update our cached copy.
// Client request "no-cache" directive is handle elsewhere:
// update_cache_control_information_from_config()
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | trafficserver | 8b5f0345dade6b2822d9b52c8ad12e63011a5c12 | 151,551,422,465,381,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | Fix the internal buffer sizing. Thanks to Sudheer for helping isolating this bug |
AsyncPipeOp(async_op_t op, HANDLE pipe, LPVOID buffer, DWORD size, DWORD count, LPHANDLE events)
{
int i;
BOOL success;
HANDLE io_event;
DWORD res, bytes = 0;
OVERLAPPED overlapped;
LPHANDLE handles = NULL;
io_event = InitOverlapped(&overlapped);
if (!io_event)
{
goto out;
}
handles = malloc((count + 1) * sizeof(HANDLE));
if (!handles)
{
goto out;
}
if (op == write)
{
success = WriteFile(pipe, buffer, size, NULL, &overlapped);
}
else
{
success = ReadFile(pipe, buffer, size, NULL, &overlapped);
}
if (!success && GetLastError() != ERROR_IO_PENDING && GetLastError() != ERROR_MORE_DATA)
{
goto out;
}
handles[0] = io_event;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
handles[i + 1] = events[i];
}
res = WaitForMultipleObjects(count + 1, handles, FALSE,
op == peek ? INFINITE : IO_TIMEOUT);
if (res != WAIT_OBJECT_0)
{
CancelIo(pipe);
goto out;
}
if (op == peek)
{
PeekNamedPipe(pipe, NULL, 0, NULL, &bytes, NULL);
}
else
{
GetOverlappedResult(pipe, &overlapped, &bytes, TRUE);
}
out:
CloseHandleEx(&io_event);
free(handles);
return bytes;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | openvpn | 1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b | 186,726,517,987,100,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 62 | Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <[email protected]>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]> |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_CONCAT_SPEC_TMP_TMP_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
zend_free_op free_op1, free_op2;
concat_function(&EX_T(opline->result.u.var).tmp_var,
_get_zval_ptr_tmp(&opline->op1, EX(Ts), &free_op1 TSRMLS_CC),
_get_zval_ptr_tmp(&opline->op2, EX(Ts), &free_op2 TSRMLS_CC) TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(free_op1.var);
zval_dtor(free_op2.var);
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
} | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 125,928,023,668,019,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus |
static RBinObject *r_bin_file_object_find_by_id(RBinFile *binfile,
ut32 binobj_id) {
RBinObject *obj;
RListIter *iter;
if (binfile) {
r_list_foreach (binfile->objs, iter, obj) {
if (obj->id == binobj_id) {
return obj;
}
}
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9 | 39,150,974,374,296,024,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search |
static void ieee80211_tx_latency_start_msrmnt(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct timespec skb_arv;
struct ieee80211_tx_latency_bin_ranges *tx_latency;
tx_latency = rcu_dereference(local->tx_latency);
if (!tx_latency)
return;
ktime_get_ts(&skb_arv);
skb->tstamp = ktime_set(skb_arv.tv_sec, skb_arv.tv_nsec);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 1d147bfa64293b2723c4fec50922168658e613ba | 117,586,795,337,251,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> |
UTI_CreateDirAndParents(const char *path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
char *p;
int i, j, k, last;
/* Don't try to create current directory */
if (!strcmp(path, "."))
return 1;
p = (char *)Malloc(1 + strlen(path));
i = k = 0;
while (1) {
p[i++] = path[k++];
if (path[k] == '/' || !path[k]) {
/* Check whether its end of string, a trailing / or group of / */
last = 1;
j = k;
while (path[j]) {
if (path[j] != '/') {
/* Pick up a / into p[] thru the assignment at the top of the loop */
k = j - 1;
last = 0;
break;
}
j++;
}
p[i] = 0;
if (!create_dir(p, last ? mode : 0755, last ? uid : 0, last ? gid : 0)) {
Free(p);
return 0;
}
if (last)
break;
}
if (!path[k])
break;
}
Free(p);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59"
] | chrony | 7a4c396bba8f92a3ee8018620983529152050c74 | 248,945,075,384,653,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | util: add functions for common file operations
Add a function to open a file for reading, writing, or appending.
In uppercase modes errors are handled as fatal, i.e. the caller doesn't
need to check for NULL. To avoid string manipulations in the callers,
the function accepts an optional directory and suffix. New files are
created with specified permissions, which will be needed for saving
keys. The O_EXCL flag is used in the writing mode to make sure a new
file is created (on filesystems that support it).
Also, add a function to rename a temporary file by changing its suffix,
and a function to remove a file.
All functions log all errors, at least as debug messages. |
static int tcm_loop_make_nexus(
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg,
const char *name)
{
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg;
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = tl_tpg->tl_hba;
struct tcm_loop_nexus *tl_nexus;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
if (tl_tpg->tl_hba->tl_nexus) {
printk(KERN_INFO "tl_tpg->tl_hba->tl_nexus already exists\n");
return -EEXIST;
}
se_tpg = &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
tl_nexus = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tcm_loop_nexus), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tl_nexus) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate struct tcm_loop_nexus\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Initialize the struct se_session pointer
*/
tl_nexus->se_sess = transport_init_session();
if (IS_ERR(tl_nexus->se_sess)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(tl_nexus->se_sess);
goto out;
}
/*
* Since we are running in 'demo mode' this call with generate a
* struct se_node_acl for the tcm_loop struct se_portal_group with the SCSI
* Initiator port name of the passed configfs group 'name'.
*/
tl_nexus->se_sess->se_node_acl = core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl(
se_tpg, (unsigned char *)name);
if (!tl_nexus->se_sess->se_node_acl) {
transport_free_session(tl_nexus->se_sess);
goto out;
}
/*
* Now, register the SAS I_T Nexus as active with the call to
* transport_register_session()
*/
__transport_register_session(se_tpg, tl_nexus->se_sess->se_node_acl,
tl_nexus->se_sess, tl_nexus);
tl_tpg->tl_hba->tl_nexus = tl_nexus;
printk(KERN_INFO "TCM_Loop_ConfigFS: Established I_T Nexus to emulated"
" %s Initiator Port: %s\n", tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba),
name);
return 0;
out:
kfree(tl_nexus);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8 | 265,289,047,090,621,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]> |
static void detach_mnt(struct mount *mnt, struct path *old_path)
{
old_path->dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
old_path->mnt = &mnt->mnt_parent->mnt;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_child);
list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_hash);
dentry_reset_mounted(old_path->dentry);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d | 149,889,340,947,601,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> |
static void skfp_ctl_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct s_smc *smc = netdev_priv(dev);
skfddi_priv *bp = &smc->os;
unsigned long Flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&bp->DriverLock, Flags);
skfp_ctl_set_multicast_list_wo_lock(dev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bp->DriverLock, Flags);
return;
} // skfp_ctl_set_multicast_list | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | c25b9abbc2c2c0da88e180c3933d6e773245815a | 94,407,343,372,598,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | drivers/net/skfp: if !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN): inverted logic
Fix inverted logic
Signed-off-by: Roel Kluin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
repodata_unset(Repodata *data, Id solvid, Id keyname)
{
Repokey key;
key.name = keyname;
key.type = REPOKEY_TYPE_DELETED;
key.size = 0;
key.storage = KEY_STORAGE_INCORE;
repodata_set(data, solvid, &key, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libsolv | fdb9c9c03508990e4583046b590c30d958f272da | 146,338,794,506,937,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | repodata_schema2id: fix heap-buffer-overflow in memcmp
When the length of last schema in data->schemadata is
less than length of input schema, we got a read overflow
in asan test.
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]> |
int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int val;
int valbool;
struct linger ling;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Options without arguments
*/
if (optname == SO_BINDTODEVICE)
return sock_bindtodevice(sk, optval, optlen);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
valbool = val ? 1 : 0;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SO_DEBUG:
if (val && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EACCES;
else
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_DBG, valbool);
break;
case SO_REUSEADDR:
sk->sk_reuse = (valbool ? SK_CAN_REUSE : SK_NO_REUSE);
break;
case SO_TYPE:
case SO_PROTOCOL:
case SO_DOMAIN:
case SO_ERROR:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case SO_DONTROUTE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE, valbool);
break;
case SO_BROADCAST:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST, valbool);
break;
case SO_SNDBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
* about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
* play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
* are treated in BSD as hints
*/
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max);
set_sndbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK;
sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
/* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
break;
case SO_SNDBUFFORCE:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
goto set_sndbuf;
case SO_RCVBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
* about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
* play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
* are treated in BSD as hints
*/
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_rmem_max);
set_rcvbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK;
/*
* We double it on the way in to account for
* "struct sk_buff" etc. overhead. Applications
* assume that the SO_RCVBUF setting they make will
* allow that much actual data to be received on that
* socket.
*
* Applications are unaware that "struct sk_buff" and
* other overheads allocate from the receive buffer
* during socket buffer allocation.
*
* And after considering the possible alternatives,
* returning the value we actually used in getsockopt
* is the most desirable behavior.
*/
sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
break;
case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
goto set_rcvbuf;
case SO_KEEPALIVE:
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
tcp_set_keepalive(sk, valbool);
#endif
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN, valbool);
break;
case SO_OOBINLINE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE, valbool);
break;
case SO_NO_CHECK:
sk->sk_no_check = valbool;
break;
case SO_PRIORITY:
if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) || capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
sk->sk_priority = val;
else
ret = -EPERM;
break;
case SO_LINGER:
if (optlen < sizeof(ling)) {
ret = -EINVAL; /* 1003.1g */
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ling, optval, sizeof(ling))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!ling.l_onoff)
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER);
else {
#if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
if ((unsigned int)ling.l_linger >= MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT/HZ)
sk->sk_lingertime = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
else
#endif
sk->sk_lingertime = (unsigned int)ling.l_linger * HZ;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER);
}
break;
case SO_BSDCOMPAT:
sock_warn_obsolete_bsdism("setsockopt");
break;
case SO_PASSCRED:
if (valbool)
set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
else
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_TIMESTAMP:
case SO_TIMESTAMPNS:
if (valbool) {
if (optname == SO_TIMESTAMP)
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
else
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP);
} else {
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
}
break;
case SO_TIMESTAMPING:
if (val & ~SOF_TIMESTAMPING_MASK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE);
if (val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE)
sock_enable_timestamp(sk,
SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE);
else
sock_disable_timestamp(sk,
(1UL << SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE));
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE);
break;
case SO_RCVLOWAT:
if (val < 0)
val = INT_MAX;
sk->sk_rcvlowat = val ? : 1;
break;
case SO_RCVTIMEO:
ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_rcvtimeo, optval, optlen);
break;
case SO_SNDTIMEO:
ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_sndtimeo, optval, optlen);
break;
case SO_ATTACH_FILTER:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(struct sock_fprog)) {
struct sock_fprog fprog;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, optval, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk);
}
break;
case SO_DETACH_FILTER:
ret = sk_detach_filter(sk);
break;
case SO_PASSSEC:
if (valbool)
set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
else
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_MARK:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else
sk->sk_mark = val;
break;
/* We implement the SO_SNDLOWAT etc to
not be settable (1003.1g 5.3) */
case SO_RXQ_OVFL:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_RXQ_OVFL, valbool);
break;
case SO_WIFI_STATUS:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_WIFI_STATUS, valbool);
break;
case SO_PEEK_OFF:
if (sock->ops->set_peek_off)
sock->ops->set_peek_off(sk, val);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case SO_NOFCS:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS, valbool);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582 | 59,866,883,534,030,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 272 | net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
CmdCreateUser() : BasicCommand("createUser") {} | 0 | [
"CWE-613"
] | mongo | e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7 | 122,677,715,070,815,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit |
void snd_interval_div(const struct snd_interval *a, const struct snd_interval *b, struct snd_interval *c)
{
unsigned int r;
if (a->empty || b->empty) {
snd_interval_none(c);
return;
}
c->empty = 0;
c->min = div32(a->min, b->max, &r);
c->openmin = (r || a->openmin || b->openmax);
if (b->min > 0) {
c->max = div32(a->max, b->min, &r);
if (r) {
c->max++;
c->openmax = 1;
} else
c->openmax = (a->openmax || b->openmin);
} else {
c->max = UINT_MAX;
c->openmax = 0;
}
c->integer = 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 3aa02cb664c5fb1042958c8d1aa8c35055a2ebc4 | 247,569,068,539,639,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> |
lyd_free_value(lyd_val value, LY_DATA_TYPE value_type, uint8_t value_flags, struct lys_type *type, lyd_val *old_val,
LY_DATA_TYPE *old_val_type, uint8_t *old_val_flags)
{
if (old_val) {
*old_val = value;
*old_val_type = value_type;
*old_val_flags = value_flags;
/* we only backup the values for now */
return;
}
/* otherwise the value is correctly freed */
if (value_flags & LY_VALUE_USER) {
assert(type->der && type->der->module);
lytype_free(type->der->module, type->der->name, value);
} else {
switch (value_type) {
case LY_TYPE_BITS:
if (value.bit) {
free(value.bit);
}
break;
case LY_TYPE_INST:
if (!(value_flags & LY_VALUE_UNRES)) {
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case LY_TYPE_UNION:
/* unresolved union leaf */
lydict_remove(type->parent->module->ctx, value.string);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libyang | 32fb4993bc8bb49e93e84016af3c10ea53964be5 | 134,797,039,815,980,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | schema tree BUGFIX do not check features while still resolving schema
Fixes #723 |
long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
{
CERT *cert;
cert=ctx->cert;
switch (cmd)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
{
cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
{
cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
{
cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB:
ctx->tlsext_servername_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp;
break;
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB:
ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback = (int (*)(SSL *,void *, size_t, void *))fp;
break;
#endif
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
ctx->tlsext_status_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB:
ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,unsigned char *,
unsigned char *,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback=(char *(*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
break;
#endif
#endif
default:
return(0);
}
return(1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | openssl | 6bfe55380abbf7528e04e59f18921bd6c896af1c | 250,760,782,668,224,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> |
static
void php_mysqlnd_stats_free_mem(void * _packet)
{
MYSQLND_PACKET_STATS *p= (MYSQLND_PACKET_STATS *) _packet;
if (p->message.s) {
mnd_efree(p->message.s);
p->message.s = NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | php-src | 58006537fc5f133ae8549efe5118cde418b3ace9 | 195,035,971,650,827,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Fix bug #81719: mysqlnd/pdo password buffer overflow |
static ut64 bin_obj_va2pa(ut64 p, ut32 *offset, ut32 *left, RBinFile *bf) {
if (!bf || !bf->o || !bf->o->bin_obj) {
return 0;
}
RDyldCache *cache = (RDyldCache*) ((struct MACH0_(obj_t)*)bf->o->bin_obj)->user;
if (!cache) {
return 0;
}
ut64 slide = rebase_infos_get_slide (cache);
ut64 res = va2pa (p, cache->n_maps, cache->maps, cache->buf, slide, offset, left);
if (res == UT64_MAX) {
res = 0;
}
return res;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | radare2 | c84b7232626badd075caf3ae29661b609164bac6 | 220,393,137,997,586,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Fix heap buffer overflow in dyldcache parser ##crash
* Reported by: Lazymio via huntr.dev
* Reproducer: dyldovf |
void rpc_exit_task(struct rpc_task *task)
{
task->tk_action = NULL;
if (task->tk_ops->rpc_call_done != NULL) {
task->tk_ops->rpc_call_done(task, task->tk_calldata);
if (task->tk_action != NULL) {
WARN_ON(RPC_ASSASSINATED(task));
/* Always release the RPC slot and buffer memory */
xprt_release(task);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-399",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f | 33,849,960,518,954,783,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] |
Bool gf_dom_event_fire_ex(GF_Node *node, GF_DOM_Event *event, GF_List *use_stack)
{
GF_SceneGraph *sg;
GF_List *prev_use_stack;
Bool prev_bub;
GF_DOMEventTarget cur_target;
u32 cur_par_idx;
Bool can_bubble = GF_FALSE;
if (!node || !event) return GF_FALSE;
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_DEBUG, GF_LOG_INTERACT, ("[DOM Events ] Graph %p Time %f - Firing event %s.%s\n", gf_node_get_graph(node), gf_node_get_scene_time(node), gf_node_get_log_name(node), gf_dom_event_get_name(event->type)));
/*flush any pending add_listener
see "determine the current target's candidate event listeners" in http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-Events/events.html */
gf_dom_listener_process_add(node->sgprivate->scenegraph);
event->consumed = 0;
event->target = node;
event->target_type = GF_DOM_EVENT_TARGET_NODE;
if (node->sgprivate->interact && node->sgprivate->interact->dom_evt) {
event->currentTarget = node->sgprivate->interact->dom_evt;
} else {
cur_target.ptr_type = GF_DOM_EVENT_TARGET_NODE;
cur_target.ptr = node;
cur_target.listeners = NULL;
event->currentTarget = &cur_target;
}
/*capture phase - not 100% sure, the actual capture phase should be determined by the std using the DOM events
SVGT doesn't use this phase, so we don't add it for now.*/
#if 0
if ((0)) {
Bool aborted = GF_FALSE;
u32 i, count;
GF_List *parents;
event->event_phase = GF_DOM_EVENT_PHASE_CAPTURE;
parents = gf_list_new();
/*get all parents to top*/
gf_sg_dom_stack_parents(gf_node_get_parent(node, 0), parents);
count = gf_list_count(parents);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_Node *n = (GF_Node *)gf_list_get(parents, i);
if (n->sgprivate->interact)
gf_sg_fire_dom_event(n->sgprivate->interact->dom_evt, event, node->sgprivate->scenegraph, n);
/*event has been canceled*/
if (event->event_phase & (GF_DOM_EVENT_PHASE_CANCEL|GF_DOM_EVENT_PHASE_CANCEL_ALL) ) {
aborted = GF_TRUE;
break;
}
}
gf_list_del(parents);
if (aborted) {
event->currentTarget = NULL;
return GF_TRUE;
}
}
#endif
/*target phase*/
event->event_phase = GF_DOM_EVENT_PHASE_AT_TARGET;
cur_par_idx = 0;
if (use_stack) {
cur_par_idx = gf_list_count(use_stack);
if (cur_par_idx) cur_par_idx--;
}
sg = node->sgprivate->scenegraph;
prev_use_stack = sg->use_stack ;
prev_bub = sg->abort_bubbling;
sg->use_stack = use_stack;
sg->abort_bubbling = GF_FALSE;
if (node->sgprivate->interact) {
can_bubble = gf_sg_fire_dom_event(node->sgprivate->interact->dom_evt, event, node->sgprivate->scenegraph, node);
}
if ( (!node->sgprivate->interact || can_bubble) && event->bubbles) {
/*bubbling phase*/
event->event_phase = GF_DOM_EVENT_PHASE_BUBBLE;
gf_sg_dom_event_bubble(node, event, use_stack, cur_par_idx);
}
sg->use_stack = prev_use_stack;
sg->abort_bubbling = prev_bub;
event->currentTarget = NULL;
return event->consumed ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | gpac | 9723dd0955894f2cb7be13b94cf7a47f2754b893 | 270,218,871,852,433,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 | fixed #2109 |
bool InstanceKlass::is_override(const methodHandle& super_method, Handle targetclassloader, Symbol* targetclassname, TRAPS) {
// Private methods can not be overridden
if (super_method->is_private()) {
return false;
}
// If super method is accessible, then override
if ((super_method->is_protected()) ||
(super_method->is_public())) {
return true;
}
// Package-private methods are not inherited outside of package
assert(super_method->is_package_private(), "must be package private");
return(is_same_class_package(targetclassloader(), targetclassname));
} | 0 | [] | jdk11u-dev | 41825fa33d605f8501164f9296572e4378e8183b | 195,351,098,527,670,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | 8270386: Better verification of scan methods
Reviewed-by: mbaesken
Backport-of: ac329cef45979bd0159ecd1347e36f7129bb2ce4 |
ip_rb_replaceSlaveTkCmdsCommand(clientData, interp, objc, objv)
ClientData clientData;
Tcl_Interp *interp;
int objc;
char *objv[];
#endif
{
char *slave_name;
Tcl_Interp *slave;
Tk_Window mainWin;
if (objc != 2) {
#ifdef Tcl_WrongNumArgs
Tcl_WrongNumArgs(interp, 1, objv, "slave_name");
#else
char *nameString;
#if TCL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 8
nameString = Tcl_GetStringFromObj(objv[0], (int*)NULL);
#else /* TCL_MAJOR_VERSION < 8 */
nameString = objv[0];
#endif
Tcl_AppendResult(interp, "wrong number of arguments: should be \"",
nameString, " slave_name\"", (char *) NULL);
#endif
}
#if TCL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 8
slave_name = Tcl_GetStringFromObj(objv[1], (int*)NULL);
#else
slave_name = objv[1];
#endif
slave = Tcl_GetSlave(interp, slave_name);
if (slave == NULL) {
Tcl_AppendResult(interp, "cannot find slave \"",
slave_name, "\"", (char *)NULL);
return TCL_ERROR;
}
mainWin = Tk_MainWindow(slave);
/* replace 'exit' command --> 'interp_exit' command */
#if TCL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 8
DUMP1("Tcl_CreateObjCommand(\"exit\") --> \"interp_exit\"");
Tcl_CreateObjCommand(slave, "exit", ip_InterpExitObjCmd,
(ClientData)mainWin, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
#else /* TCL_MAJOR_VERSION < 8 */
DUMP1("Tcl_CreateCommand(\"exit\") --> \"interp_exit\"");
Tcl_CreateCommand(slave, "exit", ip_InterpExitCommand,
(ClientData)mainWin, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
#endif
/* replace vwait and tkwait */
ip_replace_wait_commands(slave, mainWin);
return TCL_OK;
} | 0 | [] | tk | ebd0fc80d62eeb7b8556522256f8d035e013eb65 | 122,842,105,423,285,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | tcltklib.c: check argument
* ext/tk/tcltklib.c (ip_cancel_eval_core): check argument type and
length.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@51468 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
static int nagios_core_worker(const char *path)
{
int sd, ret;
char response[128];
is_worker = 1;
set_loadctl_defaults();
sd = nsock_unix(path, NSOCK_TCP | NSOCK_CONNECT);
if (sd < 0) {
printf("Failed to connect to query socket '%s': %s: %s\n",
path, nsock_strerror(sd), strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
ret = nsock_printf_nul(sd, "@wproc register name=Core Worker %ld;pid=%ld", (long)getpid(), (long)getpid());
if (ret < 0) {
printf("Failed to register as worker.\n");
return 1;
}
ret = read(sd, response, 3);
if (ret != 3) {
printf("Failed to read response from wproc manager\n");
return 1;
}
if (memcmp(response, "OK", 3)) {
read(sd, response + 3, sizeof(response) - 4);
response[sizeof(response) - 2] = 0;
printf("Failed to register with wproc manager: %s\n", response);
return 1;
}
enter_worker(sd, start_cmd);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-665",
"CWE-284"
] | nagioscore | 1b197346d490df2e2d3b1dcce5ac6134ad0c8752 | 270,363,596,144,049,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | halfway revert hack/configure changes - switch order of daemon_init/drop_privileges |
static void nft_setelem_catchall_remove(const struct net *net,
const struct nft_set *set,
const struct nft_set_elem *elem)
{
struct nft_set_elem_catchall *catchall, *next;
list_for_each_entry_safe(catchall, next, &set->catchall_list, list) {
if (catchall->elem == elem->priv) {
list_del_rcu(&catchall->list);
kfree_rcu(catchall, rcu);
break;
}
}
} | 0 | [] | net | 520778042ccca019f3ffa136dd0ca565c486cedd | 285,279,658,421,908,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | netfilter: nf_tables: disallow non-stateful expression in sets earlier
Since 3e135cd499bf ("netfilter: nft_dynset: dynamic stateful expression
instantiation"), it is possible to attach stateful expressions to set
elements.
cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate
and destroy phase") introduces conditional destruction on the object to
accomodate transaction semantics.
nft_expr_init() calls expr->ops->init() first, then check for
NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR, this stills allows to initialize a non-stateful
lookup expressions which points to a set, which might lead to UAF since
the set is not properly detached from the set->binding for this case.
Anyway, this combination is non-sense from nf_tables perspective.
This patch fixes this problem by checking for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR before
expr->ops->init() is called.
The reporter provides a KASAN splat and a poc reproducer (similar to
those autogenerated by syzbot to report use-after-free errors). It is
unknown to me if they are using syzbot or if they use similar automated
tool to locate the bug that they are reporting.
For the record, this is the KASAN splat.
[ 85.431824] ==================================================================
[ 85.432901] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_tables_bind_set+0x81b/0xa20
[ 85.433825] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880286f0e98 by task poc/776
[ 85.434756]
[ 85.434999] CPU: 1 PID: 776 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 5.18.0+ #2
[ 85.436023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Fixes: 0b2d8a7b638b ("netfilter: nf_tables: add helper functions for expression handling")
Reported-and-tested-by: Aaron Adams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
function_using_block_scopes(ufunc_T *fp, cstack_T *cstack)
{
if (cstack != NULL && cstack->cs_idx >= 0)
{
int count = cstack->cs_idx + 1;
int i;
fp->uf_block_ids = ALLOC_MULT(int, count);
if (fp->uf_block_ids != NULL)
{
mch_memmove(fp->uf_block_ids, cstack->cs_block_id,
sizeof(int) * count);
fp->uf_block_depth = count;
}
// Set flag in each block to indicate a function was defined. This
// is used to keep the variable when leaving the block, see
// hide_script_var().
for (i = 0; i <= cstack->cs_idx; ++i)
cstack->cs_flags[i] |= CSF_FUNC_DEF;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 9c23f9bb5fe435b28245ba8ac65aa0ca6b902c04 | 264,018,939,586,902,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | patch 8.2.3902: Vim9: double free with nested :def function
Problem: Vim9: double free with nested :def function.
Solution: Pass "line_to_free" from compile_def_function() and make sure
cmdlinep is valid. |
void MoveIndexIfNecessary(HValue* index_raw,
HBoundsCheck* insert_before,
HInstruction* end_of_scan_range) {
if (!index_raw->IsAdd() && !index_raw->IsSub()) {
// index_raw can be HAdd(index_base, offset), HSub(index_base, offset),
// or index_base directly. In the latter case, no need to move anything.
return;
}
HBinaryOperation* index =
HArithmeticBinaryOperation::cast(index_raw);
HValue* left_input = index->left();
HValue* right_input = index->right();
bool must_move_index = false;
bool must_move_left_input = false;
bool must_move_right_input = false;
for (HInstruction* cursor = end_of_scan_range; cursor != insert_before;) {
if (cursor == left_input) must_move_left_input = true;
if (cursor == right_input) must_move_right_input = true;
if (cursor == index) must_move_index = true;
if (cursor->previous() == NULL) {
cursor = cursor->block()->dominator()->end();
} else {
cursor = cursor->previous();
}
}
// The BCE algorithm only selects mergeable bounds checks that share
// the same "index_base", so we'll only ever have to move constants.
if (must_move_left_input) {
HConstant::cast(left_input)->Unlink();
HConstant::cast(left_input)->InsertBefore(index);
}
if (must_move_right_input) {
HConstant::cast(right_input)->Unlink();
HConstant::cast(right_input)->InsertBefore(index);
}
} | 0 | [] | node | 3122e0eae64c5ab494b29d0a9cadef902d93f1f9 | 335,832,632,724,202,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | deps: fix up v8 after fd80a3
fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21 has introduced a segfault
during redundant boundary check elimination (#8208).
The problem consists of two parts:
1. Abscense of instruction iterator in
`EliminateRedundantBoundsChecks`. It was present in recent v8, but
wasn't considered important at the time of backport. However, since
the function is changing instructions order in block, it is
important to not rely at `i->next()` at the end of the loop.
2. Too strict ASSERT in `MoveIndexIfNecessary`. It is essentially a
backport of a45c96ab from v8's upstream. See
https://github.com/v8/v8/commit/a45c96ab for details.
fix #8208 |
static struct btrfs_block_group *btrfs_create_block_group_cache(
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 start)
{
struct btrfs_block_group *cache;
cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_NOFS);
if (!cache)
return NULL;
cache->free_space_ctl = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache->free_space_ctl),
GFP_NOFS);
if (!cache->free_space_ctl) {
kfree(cache);
return NULL;
}
cache->start = start;
cache->fs_info = fs_info;
cache->full_stripe_len = btrfs_full_stripe_len(fs_info, start);
cache->discard_index = BTRFS_DISCARD_INDEX_UNUSED;
refcount_set(&cache->refs, 1);
spin_lock_init(&cache->lock);
init_rwsem(&cache->data_rwsem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->cluster_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->bg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->ro_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->discard_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->dirty_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->io_list);
btrfs_init_free_space_ctl(cache, cache->free_space_ctl);
atomic_set(&cache->frozen, 0);
mutex_init(&cache->free_space_lock);
btrfs_init_full_stripe_locks_tree(&cache->full_stripe_locks_root);
return cache;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-667"
] | linux | 1cb3db1cf383a3c7dbda1aa0ce748b0958759947 | 171,976,931,938,594,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | btrfs: fix deadlock with concurrent chunk allocations involving system chunks
When a task attempting to allocate a new chunk verifies that there is not
currently enough free space in the system space_info and there is another
task that allocated a new system chunk but it did not finish yet the
creation of the respective block group, it waits for that other task to
finish creating the block group. This is to avoid exhaustion of the system
chunk array in the superblock, which is limited, when we have a thundering
herd of tasks allocating new chunks. This problem was described and fixed
by commit eafa4fd0ad0607 ("btrfs: fix exhaustion of the system chunk array
due to concurrent allocations").
However there are two very similar scenarios where this can lead to a
deadlock:
1) Task B allocated a new system chunk and task A is waiting on task B
to finish creation of the respective system block group. However before
task B ends its transaction handle and finishes the creation of the
system block group, it attempts to allocate another chunk (like a data
chunk for an fallocate operation for a very large range). Task B will
be unable to progress and allocate the new chunk, because task A set
space_info->chunk_alloc to 1 and therefore it loops at
btrfs_chunk_alloc() waiting for task A to finish its chunk allocation
and set space_info->chunk_alloc to 0, but task A is waiting on task B
to finish creation of the new system block group, therefore resulting
in a deadlock;
2) Task B allocated a new system chunk and task A is waiting on task B to
finish creation of the respective system block group. By the time that
task B enter the final phase of block group allocation, which happens
at btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(), when it modifies the extent
tree, the device tree or the chunk tree to insert the items for some
new block group, it needs to allocate a new chunk, so it ends up at
btrfs_chunk_alloc() and keeps looping there because task A has set
space_info->chunk_alloc to 1, but task A is waiting for task B to
finish creation of the new system block group and release the reserved
system space, therefore resulting in a deadlock.
In short, the problem is if a task B needs to allocate a new chunk after
it previously allocated a new system chunk and if another task A is
currently waiting for task B to complete the allocation of the new system
chunk.
Unfortunately this deadlock scenario introduced by the previous fix for
the system chunk array exhaustion problem does not have a simple and short
fix, and requires a big change to rework the chunk allocation code so that
chunk btree updates are all made in the first phase of chunk allocation.
And since this deadlock regression is being frequently hit on zoned
filesystems and the system chunk array exhaustion problem is triggered
in more extreme cases (originally observed on PowerPC with a node size
of 64K when running the fallocate tests from stress-ng), revert the
changes from that commit. The next patch in the series, with a subject
of "btrfs: rework chunk allocation to avoid exhaustion of the system
chunk array" does the necessary changes to fix the system chunk array
exhaustion problem.
Reported-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20210621015922.ewgbffxuawia7liz@naota-xeon/
Fixes: eafa4fd0ad0607 ("btrfs: fix exhaustion of the system chunk array due to concurrent allocations")
CC: [email protected] # 5.12+
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Tested-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> |
static s32 gf_vvc_read_sps_bs_internal(GF_BitStream *bs, VVCState *vvc, u8 layer_id, u32 *vui_flag_pos)
{
s32 vps_id, sps_id;
u32 i, CtbSizeY;
VVC_SPS *sps;
u8 sps_ptl_dpb_hrd_params_present_flag;
if (vui_flag_pos) *vui_flag_pos = 0;
sps_id = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 4, "sps_id");
if ((sps_id<0) || (sps_id >= 16)) {
return -1;
}
vps_id = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 4, "vps_id");
if ((vps_id<0) || (vps_id >= 16)) {
return -1;
}
if (!vps_id && !vvc->vps[0].state) {
vvc->vps[0].state = 1;
vvc->vps[0].num_ptl = 1;
vvc->vps[0].max_layers = 1;
vvc->vps[0].all_layers_independent = 1;
}
sps = &vvc->sps[sps_id];
if (!sps->state) {
sps->state = 1;
sps->id = sps_id;
sps->vps_id = vps_id;
}
sps->max_sublayers = 1 + gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 3, "max_sublayers_minus1");
sps->chroma_format_idc = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 2, "chroma_format_idc");
sps->log2_ctu_size = 5 + gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 2, "log2_ctu_size_minus5");
CtbSizeY = 1<<sps->log2_ctu_size;
sps_ptl_dpb_hrd_params_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_ptl_dpb_hrd_params_present_flag");
if (sps_ptl_dpb_hrd_params_present_flag) {
VVC_ProfileTierLevel ptl, *p_ptl;
if (sps->vps_id) {
p_ptl = &ptl;
} else {
p_ptl = &vvc->vps[0].ptl[0];
}
memset(p_ptl, 0, sizeof(VVC_ProfileTierLevel));
p_ptl->pt_present = 1;
p_ptl->ptl_max_tid = sps->max_sublayers-1;
vvc_profile_tier_level(bs, p_ptl, 0);
}
sps->gdr_enabled = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "gdr_enabled");
sps->ref_pic_resampling = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "ref_pic_resampling");
if (sps->ref_pic_resampling)
sps->res_change_in_clvs = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "res_change_in_clvs");
sps->width = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "width");
sps->height = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "height");
sps->conf_window = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "conformance_window_present_flag");
if (sps->conf_window) {
u32 SubWidthC, SubHeightC;
sps->cw_left = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "conformance_window_left");
sps->cw_right = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "conformance_window_right");
sps->cw_top = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "conformance_window_top");
sps->cw_bottom = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "conformance_window_bottom");
if (sps->chroma_format_idc == 1) {
SubWidthC = SubHeightC = 2;
} else if (sps->chroma_format_idc == 2) {
SubWidthC = 2;
SubHeightC = 1;
} else {
SubWidthC = SubHeightC = 1;
}
sps->width -= SubWidthC * (sps->cw_left + sps->cw_right);
sps->height -= SubHeightC * (sps->cw_top + sps->cw_bottom);
}
sps->subpic_info_present = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "subpic_info_present");
if (sps->subpic_info_present) {
sps->nb_subpics = 1 + gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "nb_subpics_minus1");
if (sps->nb_subpics>1) {
u32 tmpWidthVal, tmpHeightVal;
sps->independent_subpic_flags = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "independent_subpic_flags");
sps->subpic_same_size = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "subpic_same_size");
tmpWidthVal = (sps->width + CtbSizeY-1) / CtbSizeY;
tmpWidthVal = gf_get_bit_size(tmpWidthVal);
tmpHeightVal = (sps->height + CtbSizeY-1) / CtbSizeY;
tmpHeightVal = gf_get_bit_size(tmpHeightVal);
for (i=0; i<sps->nb_subpics; i++) {
if( !sps->subpic_same_size || !i) {
if (i && (sps->width > CtbSizeY))
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, tmpWidthVal, "subpic_ctu_top_left_x");
if (i && (sps->height > CtbSizeY))
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, tmpHeightVal, "subpic_ctu_top_left_y");
if ((i+1 < sps->nb_subpics) && (sps->width > CtbSizeY))
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, tmpWidthVal, "subpic_width_minus1");
if ((i+1 < sps->nb_subpics) && (sps->height > CtbSizeY))
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, tmpHeightVal, "subpic_height_minus1");
}
if (!sps->independent_subpic_flags) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "subpic_treated_as_pic_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "loop_filter_across_subpic_enabled_flag");
}
}
sps->subpicid_len = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "subpic_id_len_minus1") + 1;
sps->subpicid_mapping_explicit = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "subpic_id_mapping_explicitly_signalled_flag");
if (sps->subpicid_mapping_explicit) {
sps->subpicid_mapping_present = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "subpic_id_mapping_present_flag");
if (sps->subpicid_mapping_present) {
for (i=0; i<sps->nb_subpics; i++) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "subpic_id");
}
}
}
}
} else {
sps->nb_subpics = 1;
}
sps->bitdepth = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "bitdepth_minus8") + 8;
sps->entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag");
sps->entry_point_offsets_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "entry_point_offsets_present_flag");
sps->log2_max_poc_lsb = 4 + gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 4, "log2_max_poc_lsb_minus4");
if ((sps->poc_msb_cycle_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "poc_msb_cycle_flag")))
sps->poc_msb_cycle_len = 1 + gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "poc_msb_cycle_len_minus1");
u8 sps_num_extra_ph_bits = 8 * gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 2, "sps_num_extra_ph_bytes");
for (i=0; i<sps_num_extra_ph_bits; i++) {
if (gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "extra_ph_bit_present_flag", 1))
sps->ph_num_extra_bits++;
}
u8 sps_num_extra_sh_bits = 8 * gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 2, "num_extra_sh_bytes");
for (i=0; i<sps_num_extra_sh_bits; i++) {
if (gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "extra_sh_bit_present_flag", i))
sps->sh_num_extra_bits++;
}
if (sps_ptl_dpb_hrd_params_present_flag) {
u8 sps_sublayer_dpb_params_flag = 0;
if (sps->max_sublayers>1) {
sps_sublayer_dpb_params_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_sublayer_dpb_params_flag");
}
for (i=(sps_sublayer_dpb_params_flag ? 0 : sps->max_sublayers-1); i < sps->max_sublayers; i++ ) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "dpb_max_dec_pic_buffering_minus1", i);
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "dpb_max_num_reorder_pics", i);
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "dpb_max_latency_increase_plus1", i);
}
}
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_min_luma_coding_block_size_minus2");
sps->partition_constraints_override_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_partition_constraints_override_enabled_flag");
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_min_luma_coding_block_size_minus2");
u8 sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_intra_slice_luma = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_intra_slice_luma");
if (sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_intra_slice_luma != 0) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_max_bt_min_qt_intra_slice_luma");
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_max_tt_min_qt_intra_slice_luma");
}
u8 sps_qtbtt_dual_tree_intra_flag = 0;
if (sps->chroma_format_idc) {
sps_qtbtt_dual_tree_intra_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_qtbtt_dual_tree_intra_flag");
}
if (sps_qtbtt_dual_tree_intra_flag) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_min_qt_min_cb_intra_slice_chroma");
u8 sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_intra_slice_chroma = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_intra_slice_chroma");
if( sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_intra_slice_chroma != 0) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_max_bt_min_qt_intra_slice_chroma");
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_max_tt_min_qt_intra_slice_chroma");
}
}
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_min_qt_min_cb_inter_slice");
u8 sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_inter_slice = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_inter_slice");
if (sps_max_mtt_hierarchy_depth_inter_slice != 0) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_max_bt_min_qt_inter_slice");
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_diff_max_tt_min_qt_inter_slice");
}
u8 max_luma_transform_size_64_flag = 0;
if (CtbSizeY > 32) {
max_luma_transform_size_64_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_max_luma_transform_size_64_flag");
}
sps->transform_skip_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_transform_skip_enabled_flag");
if (sps->transform_skip_enabled_flag) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_transform_skip_max_size_minus2");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_bdpcm_enabled_flag");
}
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_mts_enabled_flag")) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_explicit_mts_intra_enabled_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_explicit_mts_inter_enabled_flag");
}
Bool lfnst_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_lfnst_enabled_flag");
sps->joint_cbcr_enabled_flag = 0;
if (sps->chroma_format_idc) {
sps->joint_cbcr_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_joint_cbcr_enabled_flag");
u8 sps_same_qp_table_for_chroma_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_same_qp_table_for_chroma_flag");
u32 numQpTables = sps_same_qp_table_for_chroma_flag ? 1 : (sps->joint_cbcr_enabled_flag ? 3 : 2);
for (i=0; i<numQpTables; i++) {
gf_bs_read_se_log_idx(bs, "sps_qp_table_start_minus26", i);
u32 j, sps_num_points_in_qp_table = 1 + gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "sps_num_points_in_qp_table_minus1", i);
for (j=0; j<sps_num_points_in_qp_table; j++) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx2(bs, "sps_delta_qp_in_val_minus1", i, j);
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx2(bs, "sps_delta_qp_diff_val", i, j);
}
}
}
sps->sao_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_sao_enabled_flag");
sps->alf_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_alf_enabled_flag");
if (sps->alf_enabled_flag && sps->chroma_format_idc) {
sps->ccalf_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_ccalf_enabled_flag");
}
sps->lmcs_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_lmcs_enabled_flag");
sps->weighted_pred_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_weighted_pred_flag");
sps->weighted_bipred_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_weighted_bipred_flag");
sps->long_term_ref_pics_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_long_term_ref_pics_flag");
if (sps->vps_id>0)
sps->inter_layer_prediction_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_inter_layer_prediction_enabled_flag");
sps->idr_rpl_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_idr_rpl_present_flag");
u32 sps_rpl1_same_as_rpl0 = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_rpl1_same_as_rpl0_flag") ? 1: 2;
for (i=0; i<sps_rpl1_same_as_rpl0; i++) {
u32 j;
sps->num_ref_pic_lists[i] = gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "sps_num_ref_pic_lists", i);
for (j=0; j<sps->num_ref_pic_lists[i]; j++) {
s32 res = vvc_parse_ref_pic_list_struct(bs, sps, i, j, &sps->rps[i][j]);
if (res<0) return res;
}
}
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_ref_wraparound_enabled_flag");
sps->temporal_mvp_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag");
if (sps->temporal_mvp_enabled_flag) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_sbtmvp_enabled_flag");
}
Bool amvr_enabled = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_amvr_enabled_flag");
sps->bdof_control_present_in_ph_flag = 0;
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_bdof_enabled_flag")) {
sps->bdof_control_present_in_ph_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_bdof_control_present_in_ph_flag");
}
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_smvd_enabled_flag");
sps->dmvr_control_present_in_ph_flag = 0;
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_dmvr_enabled_flag")) {
sps->dmvr_control_present_in_ph_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_dmvr_control_present_in_ph_flag");
}
sps->mmvd_fullpel_only_enabled_flag = 0;
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_mmvd_enabled_flag")) {
sps->mmvd_fullpel_only_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_mmvd_fullpel_only_enabled_flag");
}
u32 MaxNumMergeCand = 6 - gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_six_minus_max_num_merge_cand");
sps->prof_control_present_in_ph_flag = 0;
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_sbt_enabled_flag");
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_affine_enabled_flag")) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_five_minus_max_num_subblock_merge_cand");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_6param_affine_enabled_flag");
if (amvr_enabled) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_affine_amvr_enabled_flag");
}
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_affine_prof_enabled_flag")) {
sps->prof_control_present_in_ph_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_prof_control_present_in_ph_flag");
}
}
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_bcw_enabled_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_ciip_enabled_flag");
if (MaxNumMergeCand >= 2) {
Bool gpm_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_gpm_enabled_flag");
if (gpm_enabled_flag && (MaxNumMergeCand >= 3)) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_max_num_merge_cand_minus_max_num_gpm_cand");
}
}
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_log2_parallel_merge_level_minus2");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_isp_enabled_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_mrl_enabled_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_mip_enabled_flag");
if (sps->chroma_format_idc != 0) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_cclm_enabled_flag");
}
if (sps->chroma_format_idc == 1) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_chroma_horizontal_collocated_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_chroma_vertical_collocated_flag");
}
Bool act_enabled_flag = GF_FALSE;
Bool palette_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_palette_enabled_flag");
if ((sps->chroma_format_idc == 3) && !max_luma_transform_size_64_flag) {
act_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_act_enabled_flag");
}
if (sps->transform_skip_enabled_flag || palette_enabled_flag) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_min_qp_prime_ts");
}
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_ibc_enabled_flag")) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_six_minus_max_num_ibc_merge_cand");
}
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_ladf_enabled_flag")) {
u32 num_ladf_intervals_minus2 = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 2, "sps_num_ladf_intervals_minus2");
gf_bs_read_se_log(bs, "sps_ladf_lowest_interval_qp_offset");
for (i=0; i<num_ladf_intervals_minus2+1; i++) {
gf_bs_read_se_log_idx(bs, "sps_ladf_qp_offset", i);
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "sps_ladf_delta_threshold_minus1", i);
}
}
sps->explicit_scaling_list_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_explicit_scaling_list_enabled_flag");
if (lfnst_enabled_flag && sps->explicit_scaling_list_enabled_flag) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_scaling_matrix_for_lfnst_disabled_flag");
}
Bool scaling_matrix_for_alternative_colour_space_disabled_flag = 0;
if (act_enabled_flag && sps->explicit_scaling_list_enabled_flag) {
scaling_matrix_for_alternative_colour_space_disabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_scaling_matrix_for_alternative_colour_space_disabled_flag");
}
if (scaling_matrix_for_alternative_colour_space_disabled_flag) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_scaling_matrix_designated_colour_space_flag");
}
sps->dep_quant_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_dep_quant_enabled_flag");
sps->sign_data_hiding_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_sign_data_hiding_enabled_flag");
sps->virtual_boundaries_enabled_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_virtual_boundaries_enabled_flag");
if (sps->virtual_boundaries_enabled_flag) {
sps->virtual_boundaries_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_virtual_boundaries_present_flag");
if (sps->virtual_boundaries_present_flag) {
u32 num_virtual_boundaries = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_num_ver_virtual_boundaries");
for (i=0; i<num_virtual_boundaries; i++) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "sps_virtual_boundary_pos_x_minus1", i);
}
num_virtual_boundaries = gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_num_hor_virtual_boundaries");
for (i=0; i<num_virtual_boundaries; i++) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log_idx(bs, "sps_virtual_boundary_pos_y_minus1", i);
}
}
}
if (sps_ptl_dpb_hrd_params_present_flag) {
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_timing_hrd_params_present_flag")) {
Bool general_nal_hrd_params_present_flag, general_vcl_hrd_params_present_flag, general_du_hrd_params_present_flag;
u32 hrd_cpb_cnt_minus1=0;
u32 sublayer_cpb_params_present_flag = 0;
vvc_parse_general_timing_hrd_parameters(bs, sps, NULL, &general_nal_hrd_params_present_flag, &general_vcl_hrd_params_present_flag, &general_du_hrd_params_present_flag, &hrd_cpb_cnt_minus1);
if (sps->max_sublayers > 1) {
sublayer_cpb_params_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_sublayer_cpb_params_present_flag");
}
u32 firstSubLayer = sublayer_cpb_params_present_flag ? 0 : sps->max_sublayers - 1;
vvc_parse_ols_timing_hrd_parameters(bs, firstSubLayer, sps->max_sublayers-1, general_nal_hrd_params_present_flag, general_vcl_hrd_params_present_flag, general_du_hrd_params_present_flag, hrd_cpb_cnt_minus1);
}
}
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_field_seq_flag");
if (vui_flag_pos) {
*vui_flag_pos = (u32)gf_bs_get_bit_offset(bs);
}
//all this to get to VUI !!!
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_vui_parameters_present_flag")) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "sps_vui_payload_size_minus1");
while (!gf_bs_is_align(bs)) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "sps_vui_alignment_zero_bit");
}
//vui parameters
Bool vui_progressive_source_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_progressive_source_flag");
Bool vui_interlaced_source_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_interlaced_source_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_non_packed_constraint_flag");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_non_projected_constraint_flag");
sps->aspect_ratio_info_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag");
if (sps->aspect_ratio_info_present_flag) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_aspect_ratio_constant_flag");
sps->sar_idc = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 8, "vui_aspect_ratio_idc");
if (sps->sar_idc== 0xFF) {
sps->sar_width = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 16, "vui_sar_width");
sps->sar_height = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 16, "vui_sar_height");
}
}
sps->overscan_info_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_overscan_info_present_flag");
if (sps->overscan_info_present_flag) {
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_overscan_appropriate_flag");
}
sps->colour_description_present_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_colour_description_present_flag");
if (sps->colour_description_present_flag) {
sps->colour_primaries = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 8, "vui_colour_primaries");
sps->transfer_characteristics = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 8, "vui_transfer_characteristics");
sps->matrix_coefficients = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 8, "vui_matrix_coeffs");
sps->video_full_range_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, "vui_full_range_flag");
}
if (gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1, " vui_chroma_loc_info_present_flag")) {
if (vui_progressive_source_flag && !vui_interlaced_source_flag) {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "vui_chroma_sample_loc_type_frame");
} else {
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "vui_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field");
gf_bs_read_ue_log(bs, "vui_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field");
}
}
//WE DON'T PARSE vui_payload_bit_equal_to_one because we dont parse the rest (sps extensions)
//if needed, see rewrite_vui code
}
return sps_id;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | gpac | 0cd19f4db70615d707e0e6202933c2ea0c1d36df | 280,318,984,793,872,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 388 | fixed #2067 |
xfrm_policy_lookup_inexact_addr(const struct rb_root *r,
seqcount_spinlock_t *count,
const xfrm_address_t *addr, u16 family)
{
const struct rb_node *parent;
int seq;
again:
seq = read_seqcount_begin(count);
parent = rcu_dereference_raw(r->rb_node);
while (parent) {
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
int delta;
node = rb_entry(parent, struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node, node);
delta = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(addr, &node->addr,
node->prefixlen, family);
if (delta < 0) {
parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left);
continue;
} else if (delta > 0) {
parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_right);
continue;
}
return node;
}
if (read_seqcount_retry(count, seq))
goto again;
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | f85daf0e725358be78dfd208dea5fd665d8cb901 | 36,817,527,012,711,465,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | xfrm: xfrm_policy: fix a possible double xfrm_pols_put() in xfrm_bundle_lookup()
xfrm_policy_lookup() will call xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() to get a refcount of
pols[0]. This refcount can be dropped in xfrm_expand_policies() when
xfrm_expand_policies() return error. pols[0]'s refcount is balanced in
here. But xfrm_bundle_lookup() will also call xfrm_pols_put() with
num_pols == 1 to drop this refcount when xfrm_expand_policies() return
error.
This patch also fix an illegal address access. pols[0] will save a error
point when xfrm_policy_lookup fails. This lead to xfrm_pols_put to resolve
an illegal address in xfrm_bundle_lookup's error path.
Fix these by setting num_pols = 0 in xfrm_expand_policies()'s error path.
Fixes: 80c802f3073e ("xfrm: cache bundles instead of policies for outgoing flows")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> |
boost::optional<DocumentSource::DistributedPlanLogic> DocumentSourceGroup::distributedPlanLogic() {
intrusive_ptr<DocumentSourceGroup> mergingGroup(new DocumentSourceGroup(pExpCtx));
mergingGroup->setDoingMerge(true);
VariablesParseState vps = pExpCtx->variablesParseState;
/* the merger will use the same grouping key */
mergingGroup->setIdExpression(ExpressionFieldPath::parse(pExpCtx, "$$ROOT._id", vps));
for (auto&& accumulatedField : _accumulatedFields) {
// The merger's output field names will be the same, as will the accumulator factories.
// However, for some accumulators, the expression to be accumulated will be different. The
// original accumulator may be collecting an expression based on a field expression or
// constant. Here, we accumulate the output of the same name from the prior group.
auto copiedAccumulatedField = accumulatedField;
copiedAccumulatedField.expr.argument =
ExpressionFieldPath::parse(pExpCtx, "$$ROOT." + copiedAccumulatedField.fieldName, vps);
mergingGroup->addAccumulator(copiedAccumulatedField);
}
// {shardsStage, mergingStage, sortPattern}
return DistributedPlanLogic{this, mergingGroup, boost::none};
} | 0 | [] | mongo | 07b8851825836911265e909d6842d4586832f9bb | 264,574,960,936,225,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | SERVER-60218-44: SERVER-60218 add initialize helper function for document_source_group (cherry picked from commit 867f52afbb79bc00e35c70f8e0681b7d602f97b2) |
void *cpu_physical_memory_map(hwaddr addr,
hwaddr *plen,
bool is_write)
{
return address_space_map(&address_space_memory, addr, plen, is_write,
MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | 4bfb024bc76973d40a359476dc0291f46e435442 | 183,535,990,214,683,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | memory: clamp cached translation in case it points to an MMIO region
In using the address_space_translate_internal API, address_space_cache_init
forgot one piece of advice that can be found in the code for
address_space_translate_internal:
/* MMIO registers can be expected to perform full-width accesses based only
* on their address, without considering adjacent registers that could
* decode to completely different MemoryRegions. When such registers
* exist (e.g. I/O ports 0xcf8 and 0xcf9 on most PC chipsets), MMIO
* regions overlap wildly. For this reason we cannot clamp the accesses
* here.
*
* If the length is small (as is the case for address_space_ldl/stl),
* everything works fine. If the incoming length is large, however,
* the caller really has to do the clamping through memory_access_size.
*/
address_space_cache_init is exactly one such case where "the incoming length
is large", therefore we need to clamp the resulting length---not to
memory_access_size though, since we are not doing an access yet, but to
the size of the resulting section. This ensures that subsequent accesses
to the cached MemoryRegionSection will be in range.
With this patch, the enclosed testcase notices that the used ring does
not fit into the MSI-X table and prints a "qemu-system-x86_64: Cannot map used"
error.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
{
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
/* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
/*
* Flush guest TLB:
*
* 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
* 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
*/
if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
return;
sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
} | 0 | [] | linux | 7be74942f184fdfba34ddd19a0d995deb34d4a03 | 82,306,258,198,673,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | KVM: SVM: Periodically schedule when unregistering regions on destroy
There may be many encrypted regions that need to be unregistered when a
SEV VM is destroyed. This can lead to soft lockups. For example, on a
host running 4.15:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#206 stuck for 11s! [t_virtual_machi:194348]
CPU: 206 PID: 194348 Comm: t_virtual_machi
RIP: 0010:free_unref_page_list+0x105/0x170
...
Call Trace:
[<0>] release_pages+0x159/0x3d0
[<0>] sev_unpin_memory+0x2c/0x50 [kvm_amd]
[<0>] __unregister_enc_region_locked+0x2f/0x70 [kvm_amd]
[<0>] svm_vm_destroy+0xa9/0x200 [kvm_amd]
[<0>] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x47/0x200
[<0>] kvm_put_kvm+0x1a8/0x2f0
[<0>] kvm_vm_release+0x25/0x30
[<0>] do_exit+0x335/0xc10
[<0>] do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0
[<0>] get_signal+0x1bc/0x670
[<0>] do_signal+0x31/0x130
Although the CLFLUSH is no longer issued on every encrypted region to be
unregistered, there are no other changes that can prevent soft lockups for
very large SEV VMs in the latest kernel.
Periodically schedule if necessary. This still holds kvm->lock across the
resched, but since this only happens when the VM is destroyed this is
assumed to be acceptable.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <alpine.DEB.2.23.453.2008251255240.2987727@chino.kir.corp.google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
ltv_t *pLtv;
bool_t ltvAllocated = FALSE;
ENCSTRCT sEncryption;
size_t len;
#ifdef USE_WDS
hcf_16 hcfPort = HCF_PORT_0;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_uil_put_info");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
if (urq->hcfCtx == &(lp->hcfCtx)) {
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
if ((urq->data != NULL) && (urq->len != 0)) {
/* Make sure that we have at least a command and length to send. */
if (urq->len < (sizeof(hcf_16) * 2)) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "No Length/Type in LTV!!!\n");
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Verify the user buffer */
result = verify_area(VERIFY_READ, urq->data, urq->len);
if (result != 0) {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "verify_area(), VERIFY_READ FAILED\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Get only the command and length information. */
copy_from_user(&(lp->ltvRecord), urq->data, sizeof(hcf_16) * 2);
/* Make sure the incoming LTV record length is within the bounds of the
IOCTL length */
if (((lp->ltvRecord.len + 1) * sizeof(hcf_16)) > urq->len) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* If the requested length is greater than the size of our local
LTV record, try to allocate it from the kernel stack.
Otherwise, we just use our local LTV record. */
if (urq->len > sizeof(lp->ltvRecord)) {
pLtv = kmalloc(urq->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pLtv != NULL) {
ltvAllocated = TRUE;
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "Alloc FAILED\n");
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
result = -ENOMEM;
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
} else {
pLtv = &(lp->ltvRecord);
}
/* Copy the data from the user's buffer into the local LTV
record data area. */
copy_from_user(pLtv, urq->data, urq->len);
/* We need to snoop the commands to see if there is anything we
need to store for the purposes of a reset or start/stop
sequence. Perform endian translation as needed */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
lp->PortType = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
lp->Channel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID currently same as CNF_DESIRED_SSID. Do we
need separate storage for this? */
/* case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID: */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
lp->atimWindow = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
lp->DistanceBetweenAPs = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based
on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
lp->PMEnabled = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
lp->MulticastReceive = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
lp->MaxSleepDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
lp->holdoverDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
len = min_t(size_t, pLtv->u.u16[0], sizeof(lp->StationName));
strlcpy(lp->StationName, &pLtv->u.u8[2], len);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
lp->loadBalancing = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
lp->mediumDistribution = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
lp->txPowLevel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_CNF_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT: */ /* Short Retry Limit */
/* case 0xFC33: */ /* Long Retry Limit */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Supported Rate Set Control */
lp->srsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->srsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_BASIC_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Basic Rate Set Control */
lp->brsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->brsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
lp->connectionControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
lp->DTIMPeriod = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
lp->ownBeaconInterval = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif /* WARP */
case CFG_COEXISTENSE_BEHAVIOUR: /* Coexistence behavior */
lp->coexistence = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[0].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[1].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[2].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[3].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[4].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[5].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
lp->multicastPMBuffering = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
lp->RejectAny = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
lp->EnableEncryption = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
lp->authentication = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
/* case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
lp->ExcludeUnencrypted = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break; */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
lp->intraBSSRelay = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/*case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:*/
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
/* case CNF_DESIRED_SSID: */
case CFG_DESIRED_SSID:
memset(lp->NetworkName, 0, sizeof(lp->NetworkName));
memcpy((void *)lp->NetworkName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
/* take care of the special network name "ANY" case */
if ((strlen(&pLtv->u.u8[2]) == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "ANY") == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "any") == 0)) {
/* set the SSID_STRCT llen field (u16[0]) to zero, and the
effectually null the string u8[2] */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = 0;
pLtv->u.u8[2] = 0;
}
break;
case CFG_GROUP_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CREATE_IBSS:
lp->CreateIBSS = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL:
lp->TxRateControl[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->TxRateControl[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_PROMISCUOUS_MODE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* case CFG_WAKE_ON_LAN: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
#if 1 /* ;? #if (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_RTS_THRH0:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL0:
/*;?no idea what this should be, get going so comment it out lp->TxRateControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];*/
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_RTS_THRH1:
lp->wds_port[0].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH2:
lp->wds_port[1].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH3:
lp->wds_port[2].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH4:
lp->wds_port[3].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH5:
lp->wds_port[4].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH6:
lp->wds_port[5].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL1:
lp->wds_port[0].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL2:
lp->wds_port[1].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL3:
lp->wds_port[2].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL4:
lp->wds_port[3].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL5:
lp->wds_port[4].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL6:
lp->wds_port[5].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
#endif /* (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
case CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS:
{
CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *pKeys = (CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *)pLtv;
pKeys->key[0].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[0].len);
pKeys->key[1].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[1].len);
pKeys->key[2].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[2].len);
pKeys->key[3].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[3].len);
memcpy((void *)&(lp->DefaultKeys), (void *)pKeys,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
}
break;
case CFG_TX_KEY_ID:
lp->TransmitKeyID = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SCAN_SSID:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_TICK_TIME:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* these RIDS are Info RIDs, and should they be allowed for puts??? */
case CFG_MAX_LOAD_TIME:
case CFG_DL_BUF:
/* case CFG_HSI_SUP_RANGE: */
case CFG_NIC_SERIAL_NUMBER:
case CFG_NIC_IDENTITY:
case CFG_NIC_MFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_CFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_TEMP_TYPE:
case CFG_NIC_PROFILE:
case CFG_FW_IDENTITY:
case CFG_FW_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_MFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_CFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_PORT_STAT:
case CFG_CUR_SSID:
case CFG_CUR_BSSID:
case CFG_COMMS_QUALITY:
case CFG_CUR_TX_RATE:
case CFG_CUR_BEACON_INTERVAL:
case CFG_CUR_SCALE_THRH:
case CFG_PROTOCOL_RSP_TIME:
case CFG_CUR_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_CUR_LONG_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_MAX_TX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_MAX_RX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_CF_POLLABLE:
case CFG_AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHMS:
case CFG_PRIVACY_OPT_IMPLEMENTED:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_REMOTE_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_USED_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_SYSTEM_SCALE: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE1: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE2: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE3: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE4: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE5: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE6: */
case CFG_NIC_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_PCF_INFO:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_COUNTRY_INFO: */
case CFG_PHY_TYPE:
case CFG_CUR_CHANNEL:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_POWER_STATE: */
/* case CFG_CCAMODE: */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_DATA_RATES:
break;
case CFG_AP_MODE:
/*;? lp->DownloadFirmware = (pLtv->u.u16[0]) + 1; */
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "set CFG_AP_MODE no longer supported\n");
break;
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* TODO: ENDIAN TRANSLATION HERE??? */
memset(lp->szEncryption, 0, sizeof(lp->szEncryption));
memcpy((void *)lp->szEncryption, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[0],
(pLtv->len * sizeof(hcf_16)));
wl_wep_decode(CRYPT_CODE, &sEncryption,
lp->szEncryption);
/* the Linux driver likes to use 1-4 for the key IDs, and then
convert to 0-3 when sending to the card. The Windows code
base used 0-3 in the API DLL, which was ported to Linux. For
the sake of the user experience, we decided to keep 0-3 as the
numbers used in the DLL; and will perform the +1 conversion here.
We could have converted the entire Linux driver, but this is
less obtrusive. This may be a "todo" to convert the whole driver */
lp->TransmitKeyID = sEncryption.wTxKeyID + 1;
lp->EnableEncryption = sEncryption.wEnabled;
memcpy(&lp->DefaultKeys, &sEncryption.EncStr,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
break;
/*case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING:
memset(lp->countryString, 0, sizeof(lp->countryString));
memcpy((void *)lp->countryString, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
*/
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
lp->driverEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
lp->wolasEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SET_WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SUITE:
lp->AuthKeyMgmtSuite = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_DISASSOCIATE_ADDR:
pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
/* Endian convert the Tx Key Information */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
/* some RIDs just can't be put */
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
default:
break;
}
/* This code will prevent Static Configuration Entities from
being sent to the card, as they require a call to
UIL_ACT_APPLY to take effect. Dynamic Entities will be sent
immediately */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
/*case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /*;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/*;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
#endif /* WARP */
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING: */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING: */
case CFG_AP_MODE:
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE: */
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
break;
/* Deal with this dynamic MSF RID, as it's required for WPA */
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
if (lp->driverEnable) {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_ENABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_CONNECT);
} else {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISCONNECT);
}
break;
default:
wl_act_int_off(lp);
urq->result = hcf_put_info(&(lp->hcfCtx), (LTVP) pLtv);
wl_act_int_on(lp);
break;
}
if (ltvAllocated)
kfree(pLtv);
} else {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "EPERM\n");
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
result = -EPERM;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB\n");
urq->result = UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB;
}
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
} /* wvlan_uil_put_info */ | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | 141,593,053,337,897,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 600 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
NTSTATUS dsdb_get_extended_dn_uint32(struct ldb_dn *dn, uint32_t *val, const char *component_name)
{
const struct ldb_val *v;
int error = 0;
v = ldb_dn_get_extended_component(dn, component_name);
if (v == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
}
/* Just check we don't allow the caller to fill our stack */
if (v->length >= 32) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
} else {
char s[v->length + 1];
memcpy(s, v->data, v->length);
s[v->length] = 0;
*val = smb_strtoul(s, NULL, 0, &error, SMB_STR_STANDARD);
if (error != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | samba | 0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77 | 152,376,615,412,320,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <[email protected]> |
ClientHttpRequest::assignRequest(HttpRequest *newRequest)
{
assert(newRequest);
assert(!request);
const_cast<HttpRequest *&>(request) = newRequest;
HTTPMSGLOCK(request);
setLogUriToRequestUri();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-116"
] | squid | 7024fb734a59409889e53df2257b3fc817809fb4 | 85,316,794,945,134,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Handle more Range requests (#790)
Also removed some effectively unused code. |
static bool match_by_seid(const void *data, const void *user_data)
{
const struct avdtp_local_sep *sep = data;
uint8_t seid = PTR_TO_UINT(user_data);
return sep->info.seid == seid;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | bluez | 7a80d2096f1b7125085e21448112aa02f49f5e9a | 189,431,482,335,047,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | avdtp: Fix accepting invalid/malformed capabilities
Check if capabilities are valid before attempting to copy them. |
alt_reduce_in_look_behind(Node* node, regex_t* reg, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r;
switch (NODE_TYPE(node)) {
case NODE_ALT:
do {
r = list_reduce_in_look_behind(NODE_CAR(node));
} while (r == 0 && IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
break;
default:
r = list_reduce_in_look_behind(node);
break;
}
return r;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | oniguruma | cbe9f8bd9cfc6c3c87a60fbae58fa1a85db59df0 | 99,626,149,549,695,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | #207: Out-of-bounds write |
plugin_can_extents (struct backend *b, struct connection *conn)
{
struct backend_plugin *p = container_of (b, struct backend_plugin, backend);
assert (connection_get_handle (conn, 0));
if (p->plugin.can_extents)
return p->plugin.can_extents (connection_get_handle (conn, 0));
else
return p->plugin.extents != NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-406"
] | nbdkit | a6b88b195a959b17524d1c8353fd425d4891dc5f | 222,056,088,453,999,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | server: Fix regression for NBD_OPT_INFO before NBD_OPT_GO
Most known NBD clients do not bother with NBD_OPT_INFO (except for
clients like 'qemu-nbd --list' that don't ever intend to connect), but
go straight to NBD_OPT_GO. However, it's not too hard to hack up qemu
to add in an extra client step (whether info on the same name, or more
interestingly, info on a different name), as a patch against qemu
commit 6f214b30445:
| diff --git i/nbd/client.c w/nbd/client.c
| index f6733962b49b..425292ac5ea9 100644
| --- i/nbd/client.c
| +++ w/nbd/client.c
| @@ -1038,6 +1038,14 @@ int nbd_receive_negotiate(AioContext *aio_context, QIOChannel *ioc,
| * TLS). If it is not available, fall back to
| * NBD_OPT_LIST for nicer error messages about a missing
| * export, then use NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME. */
| + if (getenv ("HACK"))
| + info->name[0]++;
| + result = nbd_opt_info_or_go(ioc, NBD_OPT_INFO, info, errp);
| + if (getenv ("HACK"))
| + info->name[0]--;
| + if (result < 0) {
| + return -EINVAL;
| + }
| result = nbd_opt_info_or_go(ioc, NBD_OPT_GO, info, errp);
| if (result < 0) {
| return -EINVAL;
This works just fine in 1.14.0, where we call .open only once (so the
INFO and GO repeat calls into the same plugin handle), but in 1.14.1
it regressed into causing an assertion failure: we are now calling
.open a second time on a connection that is already opened:
$ nbdkit -rfv null &
$ hacked-qemu-io -f raw -r nbd://localhost -c quit
...
nbdkit: null[1]: debug: null: open readonly=1
nbdkit: backend.c:179: backend_open: Assertion `h->handle == NULL' failed.
Worse, on the mainline development, we have recently made it possible
for plugins to actively report different information for different
export names; for example, a plugin may choose to report different
answers for .can_write on export A than for export B; but if we share
cached handles, then an NBD_OPT_INFO on one export prevents correct
answers for NBD_OPT_GO on the second export name. (The HACK envvar in
my qemu modifications can be used to demonstrate cross-name requests,
which are even less likely in a real client).
The solution is to call .close after NBD_OPT_INFO, coupled with enough
glue logic to reset cached connection handles back to the state
expected by .open. This in turn means factoring out another backend_*
function, but also gives us an opportunity to change
backend_set_handle to no longer accept NULL.
The assertion failure is, to some extent, a possible denial of service
attack (one client can force nbdkit to exit by merely sending OPT_INFO
before OPT_GO, preventing the next client from connecting), although
this is mitigated by using TLS to weed out untrusted clients. Still,
the fact that we introduced a potential DoS attack while trying to fix
a traffic amplification security bug is not very nice.
Sadly, as there are no known clients that easily trigger this mode of
operation (OPT_INFO before OPT_GO), there is no easy way to cover this
via a testsuite addition. I may end up hacking something into libnbd.
Fixes: c05686f957
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]> |
static int add_array_entry(const char* loc_name, zval* hash_arr, char* key_name TSRMLS_DC)
{
char* key_value = NULL;
char* cur_key_name = NULL;
char* token = NULL;
char* last_ptr = NULL;
int result = 0;
int cur_result = 0;
int cnt = 0;
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG)==0 ){
key_value = get_private_subtags( loc_name );
result = 1;
} else {
key_value = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , key_name , &result,1 );
}
if( (strcmp(key_name , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG)==0) ||
( strcmp(key_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG)==0) ){
if( result > 0 && key_value){
/* Tokenize on the "_" or "-" */
token = php_strtok_r( key_value , DELIMITER ,&last_ptr);
if( cur_key_name ){
efree( cur_key_name);
}
cur_key_name = (char*)ecalloc( 25, 25);
sprintf( cur_key_name , "%s%d", key_name , cnt++);
add_assoc_string( hash_arr, cur_key_name , token ,TRUE );
/* tokenize on the "_" or "-" and stop at singleton if any */
while( (token = php_strtok_r(NULL , DELIMITER , &last_ptr)) && (strlen(token)>1) ){
sprintf( cur_key_name , "%s%d", key_name , cnt++);
add_assoc_string( hash_arr, cur_key_name , token , TRUE );
}
/*
if( strcmp(key_name, LOC_PRIVATE_TAG) == 0 ){
}
*/
}
} else {
if( result == 1 ){
add_assoc_string( hash_arr, key_name , key_value , TRUE );
cur_result = 1;
}
}
if( cur_key_name ){
efree( cur_key_name);
}
/*if( key_name != LOC_PRIVATE_TAG && key_value){*/
if( key_value){
efree(key_value);
}
return cur_result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | php-src | 97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484 | 294,768,619,077,180,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read |
static unsigned int tweak_transfer_flags(unsigned int flags)
{
flags &= ~URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
return flags;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-119"
] | linux | b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb | 129,756,346,073,017,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
bool insert_precheck(THD *thd, TABLE_LIST *tables)
{
LEX *lex= thd->lex;
DBUG_ENTER("insert_precheck");
/*
Check that we have modify privileges for the first table and
select privileges for the rest
*/
ulong privilege= (INSERT_ACL |
(lex->duplicates == DUP_REPLACE ? DELETE_ACL : 0) |
(lex->value_list.elements ? UPDATE_ACL : 0));
if (check_one_table_access(thd, privilege, tables))
DBUG_RETURN(TRUE);
if (lex->update_list.elements != lex->value_list.elements)
{
my_message(ER_WRONG_VALUE_COUNT, ER_THD(thd, ER_WRONG_VALUE_COUNT), MYF(0));
DBUG_RETURN(TRUE);
}
DBUG_RETURN(FALSE);
} | 0 | [] | server | ba4927e520190bbad763bb5260ae154f29a61231 | 73,811,636,474,253,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | MDEV-19398: Assertion `item1->type() == Item::FIELD_ITEM ...
Window Functions code tries to minimize the number of times it
needs to sort the select's resultset by finding "compatible"
OVER (PARTITION BY ... ORDER BY ...) clauses.
This employs compare_order_elements(). That function assumed that
the order expressions are Item_field-derived objects (that refer
to a temp.table). But this is not always the case: one can
construct queries order expressions are arbitrary item expressions.
Add handling for such expressions: sort them according to the window
specification they appeared in.
This means we cannot detect that two compatible PARTITION BY clauses
that use expressions can share the sorting step.
But at least we won't crash. |
string RewriteOptimizedNodesGroup(const OptimizedNodesGroup& group) override {
VLOG(2) << "Collapse Add/AddN: root=" << group.root_node->name()
<< " op=" << group.root_node->op()
<< " num_optimized_nodes=" << group.optimized_nodes.size()
<< " num_inputs=" << group.inputs.size();
// Do not optimize any of the nodes that are part of this group.
MarkAllMembersWithTag(group, kAddOpsRewriteTag);
// All new nodes will be placed under the scope of a root node.
auto root_scope_and_name = ParseNodeScopeAndName(group.root_node->name());
// Find what shapes are present in the inputs of absorbed nodes.
std::unordered_map<string, std::vector<InputAndShape>> shape_sig_to_inputs;
for (const auto& input : group.inputs) {
shape_sig_to_inputs[ShapeSignature(input.shape)].push_back(input);
}
using SigKV = decltype(shape_sig_to_inputs)::value_type;
VLOG(3) << "Add/AddN group has " << shape_sig_to_inputs.size()
<< " unique shapes: "
<< absl::StrJoin(shape_sig_to_inputs, ", ",
[](string* out, SigKV p) {
strings::StrAppend(out, p.first);
});
// Collect all the shapes from representative elements.
std::vector<TensorShapeProto> shapes;
shapes.reserve(shape_sig_to_inputs.size());
for (const auto& el : shape_sig_to_inputs)
shapes.push_back(el.second[0].shape);
// If all inputs have the same shape, rewrite whole group with a single AddN
if (shapes.size() == 1) {
string node_name = UniqueOptimizedNodeName(root_scope_and_name);
AddInputsOfSymbolicallyEqualShape(*group.root_node, node_name,
group.inputs);
return node_name;
}
// For inputs of different shapes:
// 1. Rewrite inputs of the same shape using AddN (leaf nodes)
// 2. Build a tree of Add nodes, minimizing cost of broadcast
std::sort(shapes.begin(), shapes.end(),
[](const TensorShapeProto& left, const TensorShapeProto& right) {
return CompareSymbolicallyShapedTensorSizes(left, right);
});
// optimized name for leaf AddN nodes
auto leaf_node_name = [&root_scope_and_name, this](int i) {
return UniqueOptimizedNodeName(root_scope_and_name,
strings::StrCat("Leaf_", i));
};
// optimized name for internal nodes of a tree built up from AddN leaves
auto internal_node_name = [&root_scope_and_name, this](int i) {
return UniqueOptimizedNodeName(root_scope_and_name,
strings::StrCat("Internal_", i));
};
// Add/AddN nodes that must be added to the tree
std::deque<InputAndShape> add_ops;
// Prepare leaf AddN nodes for inputs of equal shape
for (int i = 0, end = shapes.size(); i < end; ++i) {
const auto node_name = leaf_node_name(i);
const auto& inputs = shape_sig_to_inputs[ShapeSignature(shapes[i])];
add_ops.push_back(AddInputsOfSymbolicallyEqualShape(*group.root_node,
node_name, inputs));
}
// Build up a tree of Add ops
int internal_nodes = 0;
do {
const InputAndShape lhs = add_ops.front();
add_ops.pop_front();
const InputAndShape rhs = add_ops.front();
add_ops.pop_front();
string name = add_ops.empty()
? UniqueOptimizedNodeName(root_scope_and_name)
: internal_node_name(internal_nodes++);
InputAndShape add = AddAggregatedInputs(*group.root_node, name, lhs, rhs);
add_ops.push_front(add);
} while (add_ops.size() > 1);
InputAndShape optimized_root_node = add_ops.front();
return optimized_root_node.input;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | tensorflow | e6340f0665d53716ef3197ada88936c2a5f7a2d3 | 185,588,662,530,349,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 | Handle a special grappler case resulting in crash.
It might happen that a malformed input could be used to trick Grappler into trying to optimize a node with no inputs. This, in turn, would produce a null pointer dereference and a segfault.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 369242852
Change-Id: I2e5cbe7aec243d34a6d60220ac8ac9b16f136f6b |
SecureElementStatus_t SecureElementInit( SecureElementNvmEvent seNvmCtxChanged )
{
// Assign callback
if( seNvmCtxChanged != 0 )
{
SeNvmCtxChanged = seNvmCtxChanged;
}
else
{
SeNvmCtxChanged = DummyCB;
}
#if !defined( SECURE_ELEMENT_PRE_PROVISIONED )
#if( STATIC_DEVICE_EUI == 0 )
// Get a DevEUI from MCU unique ID
SoftSeHalGetUniqueId( SeNvmCtx.DevEui );
#endif
#endif
SeNvmCtxChanged( );
return SECURE_ELEMENT_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] | LoRaMac-node | e3063a91daa7ad8a687223efa63079f0c24568e4 | 318,150,782,210,093,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Added received buffer size checks. |
static int esp6_output_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct esp_info *esp)
{
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
__be16 sport, dport;
int encap_type;
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
sport = encap->encap_sport;
dport = encap->encap_dport;
encap_type = encap->encap_type;
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
switch (encap_type) {
default:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
esph = esp6_output_udp_encap(skb, encap_type, esp, sport, dport);
break;
case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
esph = esp6_output_tcp_encap(x, skb, esp);
break;
}
if (IS_ERR(esph))
return PTR_ERR(esph);
esp->esph = esph;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | ebe48d368e97d007bfeb76fcb065d6cfc4c96645 | 194,543,550,058,034,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | esp: Fix possible buffer overflow in ESP transformation
The maximum message size that can be send is bigger than
the maximum site that skb_page_frag_refill can allocate.
So it is possible to write beyond the allocated buffer.
Fix this by doing a fallback to COW in that case.
v2:
Avoid get get_order() costs as suggested by Linus Torvalds.
Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Reported-by: valis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> |
static int vvalue_tvb_get1(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, void *val)
{
guint8 *ui1 = (guint8*)val;
*ui1 = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | wireshark | b7a0650e061b5418ab4a8f72c6e4b00317aff623 | 108,752,328,840,698,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | MS-WSP: Don't allocate huge amounts of memory.
Add a couple of memory allocation sanity checks, one of which
fixes #17331. |
f_complete_info(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
list_T *what_list = NULL;
if (rettv_dict_alloc(rettv) == FAIL)
return;
if (in_vim9script() && check_for_opt_list_arg(argvars, 0) == FAIL)
return;
if (argvars[0].v_type != VAR_UNKNOWN)
{
if (check_for_list_arg(argvars, 0) == FAIL)
return;
what_list = argvars[0].vval.v_list;
}
get_complete_info(what_list, rettv->vval.v_dict);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 0ff01835a40f549c5c4a550502f62a2ac9ac447c | 25,674,089,917,583,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | patch 9.0.0579: using freed memory when 'tagfunc' wipes out buffer
Problem: Using freed memory when 'tagfunc' wipes out buffer that holds
'complete'.
Solution: Make a copy of the option. Make sure cursor position is valid. |
static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
{
struct x86_pmu_capability x86_pmu;
u32 dummy[2];
unsigned i;
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED != 3,
"Please update the fixed PMCs in msrs_to_saved_all[]");
perf_get_x86_pmu_capability(&x86_pmu);
num_msrs_to_save = 0;
num_emulated_msrs = 0;
num_msr_based_features = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all); i++) {
if (rdmsr_safe(msrs_to_save_all[i], &dummy[0], &dummy[1]) < 0)
continue;
/*
* Even MSRs that are valid in the host may not be exposed
* to the guests in some cases.
*/
switch (msrs_to_save_all[i]) {
case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
if (!kvm_mpx_supported())
continue;
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
continue;
break;
case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG))
continue;
break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
continue;
break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
continue;
break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
(!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
continue;
break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
msrs_to_save_all[i] - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A >=
intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges) * 2)
continue;
break;
case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 17:
if (msrs_to_save_all[i] - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 >=
min(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, x86_pmu.num_counters_gp))
continue;
break;
case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17:
if (msrs_to_save_all[i] - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 >=
min(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, x86_pmu.num_counters_gp))
continue;
break;
case MSR_IA32_XFD:
case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
continue;
break;
default:
break;
}
msrs_to_save[num_msrs_to_save++] = msrs_to_save_all[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs_all); i++) {
if (!static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(NULL, emulated_msrs_all[i]))
continue;
emulated_msrs[num_emulated_msrs++] = emulated_msrs_all[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all); i++) {
struct kvm_msr_entry msr;
msr.index = msr_based_features_all[i];
if (kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr))
continue;
msr_based_features[num_msr_based_features++] = msr_based_features_all[i];
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-459"
] | linux | 683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b | 287,229,731,734,091,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 99 | KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
JVM_ClassDepth(JNIEnv *env, jstring name)
{
jint result;
Trc_SC_ClassDepth_Entry(env, name);
result = (*env)->CallStaticIntMethod(env, jlClass, classDepthMID, name);
/* CMVC 95169: ensure that the result is a well defined error value if an exception occurred */
if ((*env)->ExceptionCheck(env)) {
result = -1;
}
Trc_SC_ClassDepth_Exit(env, result);
return result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | openj9 | 0971f22d88f42cf7332364ad7430e9bd8681c970 | 159,434,533,501,801,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Clean up jio_snprintf and jio_vfprintf
Fixes https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=543659
Signed-off-by: Peter Bain <[email protected]> |
static unsigned int cp2112_gpio_irq_startup(struct irq_data *d)
{
struct gpio_chip *gc = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&dev->gpio_poll_worker, cp2112_gpio_poll_callback);
cp2112_gpio_direction_input(gc, d->hwirq);
if (!dev->gpio_poll) {
dev->gpio_poll = true;
schedule_delayed_work(&dev->gpio_poll_worker, 0);
}
cp2112_gpio_irq_unmask(d);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-388"
] | linux | 8e9faa15469ed7c7467423db4c62aeed3ff4cae3 | 47,990,421,051,503,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> |
void Image::clearIccProfile()
{
iccProfile_.release();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | exiv2 | 6e3855aed7ba8bb4731fc4087ca7f9078b2f3d97 | 252,981,996,217,003,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/55 |
static void svm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = __sme_set(root);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | d80b64ff297e40c2b6f7d7abc1b3eba70d22a068 | 287,850,328,786,932,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | KVM: SVM: Fix potential memory leak in svm_cpu_init()
When kmalloc memory for sd->sev_vmcbs failed, we forget to free the page
held by sd->save_area. Also get rid of the var r as '-ENOMEM' is actually
the only possible outcome here.
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
static void test_message_parser_garbage_suffix_mime_boundary(void)
{
static const char input_msg[] =
"Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"a\"\n"
"\n"
"--ab\n"
"Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"a\"\n"
"\n"
"--ac\n"
"Content-Type: text/plain\n"
"\n"
"body\n";
struct istream *input;
struct message_part *parts;
struct message_size body_size, header_size;
pool_t pool;
test_begin("message parser garbage suffix mime boundary");
pool = pool_alloconly_create("message parser", 10240);
input = test_istream_create(input_msg);
test_assert(message_parse_stream(pool, input, &set_empty, FALSE, &parts) < 0);
i_stream_seek(input, 0);
test_message_parser_get_sizes(input, &body_size, &header_size, FALSE);
test_assert(parts->children_count == 2);
test_assert(parts->flags == (MESSAGE_PART_FLAG_MULTIPART | MESSAGE_PART_FLAG_IS_MIME));
test_assert(parts->header_size.lines == 2);
test_assert(parts->header_size.physical_size == 45);
test_assert(parts->header_size.virtual_size == 45+2);
test_assert(parts->body_size.lines == 7);
test_assert(parts->body_size.physical_size == 86);
test_assert(parts->body_size.virtual_size == 86+7);
test_message_parser_assert_sizes(parts, &body_size, &header_size);
test_assert(parts->children->children_count == 1);
test_assert(parts->children->flags == (MESSAGE_PART_FLAG_MULTIPART | MESSAGE_PART_FLAG_IS_MIME));
test_assert(parts->children->physical_pos == 50);
test_assert(parts->children->header_size.lines == 2);
test_assert(parts->children->header_size.physical_size == 45);
test_assert(parts->children->header_size.virtual_size == 45+2);
test_assert(parts->children->body_size.lines == 4);
test_assert(parts->children->body_size.physical_size == 36);
test_assert(parts->children->body_size.virtual_size == 36+4);
test_assert(parts->children->children->children_count == 0);
test_assert(parts->children->children->flags == (MESSAGE_PART_FLAG_TEXT | MESSAGE_PART_FLAG_IS_MIME));
test_assert(parts->children->children->physical_pos == 100);
test_assert(parts->children->children->header_size.lines == 2);
test_assert(parts->children->children->header_size.physical_size == 26);
test_assert(parts->children->children->header_size.virtual_size == 26+2);
test_assert(parts->children->children->body_size.lines == 1);
test_assert(parts->children->children->body_size.physical_size == 5);
test_assert(parts->children->children->body_size.virtual_size == 5+1);
test_parsed_parts(input, parts);
i_stream_unref(&input);
pool_unref(&pool);
test_end();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | core | fb97a1cddbda4019e327fa736972a1c7433fedaa | 65,649,076,372,113,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | lib-mail: message-parser - Fix assert-crash when enforcing MIME part limit
The limit could have been exceeded with message/rfc822 parts. |
static void usbredir_handle_data(USBDevice *udev, USBPacket *p)
{
USBRedirDevice *dev = USB_REDIRECT(udev);
uint8_t ep;
ep = p->ep->nr;
if (p->pid == USB_TOKEN_IN) {
ep |= USB_DIR_IN;
}
switch (dev->endpoint[EP2I(ep)].type) {
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_CONTROL:
ERROR("handle_data called for control transfer on ep %02X\n", ep);
p->status = USB_RET_NAK;
break;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK:
if (p->state == USB_PACKET_SETUP && p->pid == USB_TOKEN_IN &&
p->ep->pipeline) {
p->status = USB_RET_ADD_TO_QUEUE;
break;
}
usbredir_handle_bulk_data(dev, p, ep);
break;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC:
usbredir_handle_iso_data(dev, p, ep);
break;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
if (ep & USB_DIR_IN) {
usbredir_handle_interrupt_in_data(dev, p, ep);
} else {
usbredir_handle_interrupt_out_data(dev, p, ep);
}
break;
default:
ERROR("handle_data ep %02X has unknown type %d\n", ep,
dev->endpoint[EP2I(ep)].type);
p->status = USB_RET_NAK;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | qemu | 7ec54f9eb62b5d177e30eb8b1cad795a5f8d8986 | 143,894,506,298,463,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | usb/redir: avoid dynamic stack allocation (CVE-2021-3527)
Use autofree heap allocation instead.
Fixes: 4f4321c11ff ("usb: use iovecs in USBPacket")
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]> |
static void snd_seq_queue_process_event(struct snd_seq_queue *q,
struct snd_seq_event *ev,
int atomic, int hop)
{
switch (ev->type) {
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_START:
snd_seq_prioq_leave(q->tickq, ev->source.client, 1);
snd_seq_prioq_leave(q->timeq, ev->source.client, 1);
if (! snd_seq_timer_start(q->timer))
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_CONTINUE:
if (! snd_seq_timer_continue(q->timer))
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_STOP:
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_TEMPO:
snd_seq_timer_set_tempo(q->timer, ev->data.queue.param.value);
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_SETPOS_TICK:
if (snd_seq_timer_set_position_tick(q->timer, ev->data.queue.param.time.tick) == 0) {
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
}
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_SETPOS_TIME:
if (snd_seq_timer_set_position_time(q->timer, ev->data.queue.param.time.time) == 0) {
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
}
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_QUEUE_SKEW:
if (snd_seq_timer_set_skew(q->timer,
ev->data.queue.param.skew.value,
ev->data.queue.param.skew.base) == 0) {
queue_broadcast_event(q, ev, atomic, hop);
}
break;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 3567eb6af614dac436c4b16a8d426f9faed639b3 | 330,193,743,422,225,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> |
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, NegationBelowElemMatchValue) {
params.options = QueryPlannerParams::NO_TABLE_SCAN;
// true means multikey
addIndex(BSON("a" << 1), true);
runQuery(fromjson("{a: {$elemMatch: {$ne: 2}}}"));
assertNumSolutions(1U);
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: {a:{$elemMatch:{$ne:2}}}, node: "
"{ixscan: {filter: null, pattern: {a: 1}, bounds: "
"{a: [['MinKey',2,true,false], [2,'MaxKey',false,true]]}}}}}");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-834"
] | mongo | 94d0e046baa64d1aa1a6af97e2d19bb466cc1ff5 | 127,000,388,698,735,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | SERVER-38164 $or pushdown optimization does not correctly handle $not within an $elemMatch |
validOperatorName(const char *name)
{
size_t len = strlen(name);
/* Can't be empty or too long */
if (len == 0 || len >= NAMEDATALEN)
return false;
/* Can't contain any invalid characters */
/* Test string here should match op_chars in scan.l */
if (strspn(name, "~!@#^&|`?+-*/%<>=") != len)
return false;
/* Can't contain slash-star or dash-dash (comment starts) */
if (strstr(name, "/*") || strstr(name, "--"))
return false;
/*
* For SQL standard compatibility, '+' and '-' cannot be the last char of
* a multi-char operator unless the operator contains chars that are not
* in SQL operators. The idea is to lex '=-' as two operators, but not to
* forbid operator names like '?-' that could not be sequences of standard
* SQL operators.
*/
if (len > 1 &&
(name[len - 1] == '+' ||
name[len - 1] == '-'))
{
int ic;
for (ic = len - 2; ic >= 0; ic--)
{
if (strchr("~!@#^&|`?%", name[ic]))
break;
}
if (ic < 0)
return false; /* nope, not valid */
}
/* != isn't valid either, because parser will convert it to <> */
if (strcmp(name, "!=") == 0)
return false;
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-94"
] | postgres | b9b21acc766db54d8c337d508d0fe2f5bf2daab0 | 141,598,076,235,088,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | In extensions, don't replace objects not belonging to the extension.
Previously, if an extension script did CREATE OR REPLACE and there was
an existing object not belonging to the extension, it would overwrite
the object and adopt it into the extension. This is problematic, first
because the overwrite is probably unintentional, and second because we
didn't change the object's ownership. Thus a hostile user could create
an object in advance of an expected CREATE EXTENSION command, and would
then have ownership rights on an extension object, which could be
modified for trojan-horse-type attacks.
Hence, forbid CREATE OR REPLACE of an existing object unless it already
belongs to the extension. (Note that we've always forbidden replacing
an object that belongs to some other extension; only the behavior for
previously-free-standing objects changes here.)
For the same reason, also fail CREATE IF NOT EXISTS when there is
an existing object that doesn't belong to the extension.
Our thanks to Sven Klemm for reporting this problem.
Security: CVE-2022-2625 |
static __poll_t cgroup_file_poll(struct kernfs_open_file *of, poll_table *pt)
{
struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
if (cft->poll)
return cft->poll(of, pt);
return kernfs_generic_poll(of, pt);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | a06247c6804f1a7c86a2e5398a4c1f1db1471848 | 128,532,240,066,268,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | psi: Fix uaf issue when psi trigger is destroyed while being polled
With write operation on psi files replacing old trigger with a new one,
the lifetime of its waitqueue is totally arbitrary. Overwriting an
existing trigger causes its waitqueue to be freed and pending poll()
will stumble on trigger->event_wait which was destroyed.
Fix this by disallowing to redefine an existing psi trigger. If a write
operation is used on a file descriptor with an already existing psi
trigger, the operation will fail with EBUSY error.
Also bypass a check for psi_disabled in the psi_trigger_destroy as the
flag can be flipped after the trigger is created, leading to a memory
leak.
Fixes: 0e94682b73bf ("psi: introduce psi monitor")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] |
static void vdi_header_to_cpu(VdiHeader *header)
{
le32_to_cpus(&header->signature);
le32_to_cpus(&header->version);
le32_to_cpus(&header->header_size);
le32_to_cpus(&header->image_type);
le32_to_cpus(&header->image_flags);
le32_to_cpus(&header->offset_bmap);
le32_to_cpus(&header->offset_data);
le32_to_cpus(&header->cylinders);
le32_to_cpus(&header->heads);
le32_to_cpus(&header->sectors);
le32_to_cpus(&header->sector_size);
le64_to_cpus(&header->disk_size);
le32_to_cpus(&header->block_size);
le32_to_cpus(&header->block_extra);
le32_to_cpus(&header->blocks_in_image);
le32_to_cpus(&header->blocks_allocated);
uuid_convert(header->uuid_image);
uuid_convert(header->uuid_last_snap);
uuid_convert(header->uuid_link);
uuid_convert(header->uuid_parent);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | qemu | 63fa06dc978f3669dbfd9443b33cde9e2a7f4b41 | 67,010,100,254,212,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | vdi: add bounds checks for blocks_in_image and disk_size header fields (CVE-2014-0144)
The maximum blocks_in_image is 0xffffffff / 4, which also limits the
maximum disk_size for a VDI image to 1024TB. Note that this is the maximum
size that QEMU will currently support with this driver, not necessarily the
maximum size allowed by the image format.
This also fixes an incorrect error message, a bug introduced by commit
5b7aa9b56d1bfc79916262f380c3fc7961becb50 (Reported by Stefan Weil)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> |
TfLiteStatus Subgraph::PrepareOpsAndTensors() {
if (!memory_planner_) {
memory_planner_.reset(new ArenaPlanner(
&context_, std::unique_ptr<GraphInfo>(new InterpreterInfo(this)),
preserve_all_tensors_, kDefaultTensorAlignment));
memory_planner_->PlanAllocations();
}
// Prepare original execution plan if any applied delegate wants it.
// If any of the delegates is immutable, this won't be triggered
// post-delegation (since we undo/redo delegation). For all other cases, other
// delegates that do shape propagation themselves would still be able to.
bool prepare_original_plan = false;
if (!pre_delegation_execution_plan_.empty()) {
for (int i = 0; i < delegates_applied_.size(); ++i) {
if ((delegates_applied_[i]->flags &
kTfLiteDelegateFlagsRequirePropagatedShapes)) {
prepare_original_plan = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (prepare_original_plan) {
int last_original_exec_plan_index_prepared = 0;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_STATUS(PrepareOpsStartingAt(
next_execution_plan_index_to_prepare_, pre_delegation_execution_plan_,
&last_original_exec_plan_index_prepared));
next_original_execution_plan_index_to_prepare_ =
last_original_exec_plan_index_prepared + 1;
}
int last_exec_plan_index_prepared = 0;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_STATUS(
PrepareOpsStartingAt(next_execution_plan_index_to_prepare_,
execution_plan_, &last_exec_plan_index_prepared));
next_execution_plan_index_to_prepare_ = last_exec_plan_index_prepared + 1;
// Execute arena allocations.
TF_LITE_ENSURE_STATUS(memory_planner_->ExecuteAllocations(
next_execution_plan_index_to_plan_allocation_,
last_exec_plan_index_prepared));
// Ensure custom allocations are large enough for applicable tensors.
// This causes some extra validations for cases with dynamic tensors, but the
// overhead should be minimal since the number of custom-allocated tensors
// will typically be low.
for (int i = 0; i < custom_allocations_.size(); ++i) {
auto index_and_alloc = custom_allocations_[i];
TfLiteTensor* tensor_at_index = tensor(index_and_alloc.first);
const auto& alloc = index_and_alloc.second;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_EQ(context(), tensor_at_index->allocation_type,
kTfLiteCustom);
if (alloc.bytes < tensor_at_index->bytes) {
ReportError("Custom allocation is too small for tensor idx: %d",
index_and_alloc.first);
return kTfLiteError;
}
}
next_execution_plan_index_to_plan_allocation_ =
last_exec_plan_index_prepared + 1;
return kTfLiteOk;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | tensorflow | f8378920345f4f4604202d4ab15ef64b2aceaa16 | 275,672,955,916,329,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 | Prevent a null pointer dereference in TFLite.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 370800353
Change-Id: Ic9c9712ce5c6e384c954dcd640a5bd9ff05c9a05 |
void __init xen_early_init(void)
{
of_scan_flat_dt(fdt_find_hyper_node, NULL);
if (!hyper_node.found) {
pr_debug("No Xen support\n");
return;
}
if (hyper_node.version == NULL) {
pr_debug("Xen version not found\n");
return;
}
pr_info("Xen %s support found\n", hyper_node.version);
xen_domain_type = XEN_HVM_DOMAIN;
xen_setup_features();
if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_dom0))
xen_start_flags |= SIF_INITDOMAIN|SIF_PRIVILEGED;
if (!console_set_on_cmdline && !xen_initial_domain())
add_preferred_console("hvc", 0, NULL);
} | 0 | [] | linux | fa1f57421e0b1c57843902c89728f823abc32f02 | 17,310,433,735,226,548,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using Xen grant mappings
In order to support virtio in Xen guests add a config option XEN_VIRTIO
enabling the user to specify whether in all Xen guests virtio should
be able to access memory via Xen grant mappings only on the host side.
Also set PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS feature from the guest
initialization code on Arm and x86 if CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> |
ExifData::const_iterator serialNumber(const ExifData& ed)
{
static const char* keys[] = {
"Exif.Image.CameraSerialNumber",
"Exif.Canon.SerialNumber",
"Exif.Nikon3.SerialNumber",
"Exif.Nikon3.SerialNO",
"Exif.Fujifilm.SerialNumber",
"Exif.Olympus.SerialNumber2",
"Exif.Sigma.SerialNumber"
};
return findMetadatum(ed, keys, EXV_COUNTOF(keys));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | exiv2 | 6e42c1b55e0fc4f360cc56010b0ffe19aa6062d9 | 138,663,209,248,239,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fix #561. Use proper counter for the idx variable |
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
char *smack;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
smack = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
strncpy(ssp->smk_packet, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
} else
ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 17,180,468,634,097,893,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> |
static int jpc_pi_nextcprl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno < pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
pirlvl = pi->picomp->pirlvls;
pi->xstep = pi->picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
pi->ystep = pi->picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
for (rlvlno = 1, pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[1];
rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
pi->xstep = JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, pi->picomp->hsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
pi->ystep = JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, pi->picomp->vsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcheightexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend;
pi->y += pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend;
pi->x += pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls && pi->rlvlno <
pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno, ++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind *
pi->pirlvl->numhprcs +
prchind;
assert(pi->prcno <
pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-125"
] | jasper | aa0b0f79ade5eef8b0e7a214c03f5af54b36ba7d | 162,154,952,296,218,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 | Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder. |
Subsets and Splits